Pureval Ohio Supreme Court Motion For Expedited Proceedings

Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed October 23, 2018 - Case No.
2018-1523
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No. 2018-1523

:
Appellants/Relators, : Appeal as of Right Pursuant to
: S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3)
-v- :
: Tenth District Court of Appeals,
OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION : Franklin County, Case No. 18AP-789
:
Appellee/Respondent. :
:
APPELLANTS-RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT

SETTING AN EXPEDITED RESPONSE SCHEDULE AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
IN OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION CASE NO. 2018G-022 AND/OR FOR AN
INJUNCTION PENDING A FINAL DECISION
Donald J. McTigue (0022849)** Mark Landes (0027227)
**Counsel of Record mlandes@isaacwiles.com
Derek S. Clinger (0092075) Mark Weaver (0065769)
MCTIGUE & COLOMBO LLC mweaver@isaacwiles.com
545 East Town Street
Andrew N. Yosowitz (0075306)
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Phone: (614) 263-7000
ayosowitz@isaacwiles.com
Fax: (614) 263-7078 Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor
dmctigue@electionlawgroup.com 2 Miranova Place, Suite 700
dclinger@electionlawgroup.com Columbus, Ohio 43215
Phone: (614) 221-2121
Peter J. O’Shea (0086560) Fax: (614) 365-9516
Katz Teller Brant & Hild
225 East Fifth Street, Suite 2400 Counsel for Appellee-Respondent
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Tel: 513-977-3477
Fax: 513-762-0077
poshea@katzteller.com
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Motion for admission pro hac vice pending
Perkins Coie
700 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel: 202-654-6200
Fax: 202-654-6211
bsvoboda@perkinscoie.com
dlazarus@perkinscoie.com
Counsel for Appellants

STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No. 2018-1523

:
: S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3)
-v- :
:
:
APPELLANTS-RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT

SETTING AN EXPEDITED RESPONSE SCHEDULE AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
IN OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION CASE NO. 2018G-022 AND/OR FOR AN
INJUNCTION PENDING A FINAL DECISION
This is an original action in prohibition filed with the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
Franklin County, seeking to prohibit Appellee-Respondent Ohio Elections Commission from
adjudicating Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022 on the basis that the Commission
lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Concurrent with the filing of the Complaint, Appellants-
Relators filed an emergency motion for an alternative writ, injunction, or stay to temporarily enjoin
or stay Case No. 2018G-022 pending disposition of the prohibition action. On Monday, October
22, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Appellants-Relators filed the instant appeal
earlier today.
For urgent reasons, Appellants-Relators respectfully move the Court for an alternative writ
setting an expedited response schedule and staying proceedings in Ohio Elections Commission
Case No. 2018G-0221 and/or for an injunction pending a final decision of Appellants-Relators’
appeal. A memorandum in support is attached for the Court’s consideration.
1
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05 provides that, for original actions, “[i[f an alternative writ is issued, the
Supreme Court will issue a schedule for the presentation of evidence and the filing and service of
briefs or other pleadings. Unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise, issuance of an alternative
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Donald J. McTigue____________

Donald J. McTigue (0022849)**
**Counsel of Record
Derek S. Clinger (0092075)
McTigue & Colombo LLC
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000
dmctigue@electionlawgroup.com
dclinger@electionlawgroup.com
Peter J. O’Shea (0086560)

225 East Fifth Street, Suite 2400
Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Motion for admission pro hac vice pending
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
writ in a prohibition case stays proceedings in the action sought to be prohibited until final
determination of the Supreme Court.” While the present case is an appeal of an original action first
filed in the Court of Appeals, this Court has authority to issue alternative writs in appeals of cases
seeking extraordinary writs. If successful on appeal, a writ of prohibition will issue.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
The instant appeal involves a state agency—Appellee-Respondent Ohio Elections
Commission (the “Commission”)—rushing to adjudicate a complaint over which it patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. The matter is Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022
(“Case No. 2018G-022”), and Appellants-Relators had moved the Commission to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Commission partially denied Appellants-Relators’ motion
to dismiss on Thursday, October 19, 2018. Four days later, on Monday, October 22, 2018,
Appellants-Relators filed an original action in prohibition with the Tenth District Court of Appeals
seeking to prohibit the Commission from adjudicating Case No. 2018G-022. Due to impending
discovery dates and the Commission’s schedule—discovery depositions begin on October 23,
2018 and the commission’s full adjudicatory hearing is scheduled for November 1, 2018—
Appellants-Relators filed an emergency motion for an alternative writ, injunction, or stay to
temporarily enjoin or stay the Commission’s proceedings pending disposition of the prohibition
action. The Commission filed a combined response and motion to dismiss, arguing solely that
Appellants-Relators could not prevail on the merits of their writ of prohibition action.
On October 22, 2018, the Court of Appeals, in a three-sentence entry, denied Appellants-
Relators’ emergency motion—not on likelihood of success on the merits, but rather on two issues
that the Commission had conceded and did not dispute.1 The entry states Relators did not show
1
The Court of Appeals' entry denying Appellants-Relators' emergency motion is a final appealable
order under R.C. 2502.02(B)(4). This statute provides that an order denying a provisional remedy,
such as a preliminary injunction or stay, is a final order if it "determines the action with respect to
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with
respect to the provisional remedy," and the party appealing demonstrates that they would not be
afforded a meaningful remedy following an appeal after final judgment in the action is entered.
R.C. 2502.02(B)(4). This case presents extraordinary circumstances, and without an immediate
1
that continued proceedings before the Commission will result in irreparable injury, and that an
injunction would serve the public interest. In the same entry, however, the Court of Appeals also
denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss. The following day, Appellants-Relators filed the
instant appeal.2
Appellants-Relators now respectfully request this Court to issue an alternative writ setting
an expedited response schedule and staying proceedings in Ohio Elections Commission Case No.
2018G-022 and/or for an injunction pending a final decision of Appellants-Relators’ appeal.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Issuance of Injunction or Stay
An alternative writ or injunction staying or enjoining the Commission’s proceedings is
necessary to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the instant appeal.
appeal of the Court of Appeals' decision, Appellants-Relators' underlying writ of prohibition action
will become moot. This is because the Commission is needlessly rushing to make a decision at its
hearing on November 1, 2018, just five days before the election. Absent an immediate appeal--
and absent immediate relief--the Commission will unlawfully exercise quasi-judicial power on
November 1. Even if the decision on November 1 is reversed on appeal, or even if it is contradicted
by the FEC’s separate resolution of the federal questions at the heart of the OEC Complaint, that
would happen too late to undo the damage done to Appellants-Relators at the November 6 election.
Moreover, even the hearing itself, regardless of the decision, would inevitably and irreversibly
influence the results of the federal election. The OEC Complainant has made clear that he seeks to
present public testimony, in full media glare, from the candidate, his campaign manager, and his
campaign treasurer. Thus, without an immediate appeal of the Court of Appeals' decision,
Appellants-Relators would not be afforded a meaningful and effective remedy. For these reasons,
the Court of Appeals' entry denying Appellants-Relators' emergency motion is a final appealable
order.
2
Attached hereto are the following exhibits from the writ of prohibition action in the Tenth
District: Exhibit A is a copy of the Notice of Appeal and the Court of Appeals’ Entry denying
Appellants-Relators’ motion. Exhibit B is the verified complaint, sans exhibits. Exhibit C is a copy
of Appellants-Relators’ emergency motion and memorandum in support. Exhibit D is a copy of
the Ohio Elections Commission’s combined response and motion to dismiss. Exhibit E is
Appellants-Relators’ reply in support of their motion.
2
The standards for issuing an injunction or stay are the same: (1) whether the appellant has
shown a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether appellant has shown
that it will suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether the issuance of a stay will cause harm to others;
and (4) whether the public interest would be served by granting a stay. See, e.g., Vanguard Transp.
Sys. v. Edwards Transfer & Storage Co. Gen. Commodities Div., 109 Ohio App. 3d 786, 790, 673
N.E.2d 182 (10th Dist. 1996) (setting forth the standard for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction); Prince-Paul v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, 2015-Ohio-3984, 43 N.E.3d 13, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.)
(explaining that these factors are “logical considerations” in determining whether to stay an
administrative order pending appeal).
Balancing the considerations in the instant action favors granting an injunction or stay to
temporarily enjoin or stay Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant appeal.
Appellants-Relators are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal as the Court of Appeals
erred in denying the emergency motion. Further, Appellants-Relators will suffer irreparable injury
by an adverse decision of the Commission while issuance of an injunction or stay will not cause
harm to others. Moreover, the public interest would be served by granting an injunction or stay as
it will prevent state government interference with a federal election.
B. A Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal is Urgently Needed to Prevent Irreparable

Injury to Appellants-Relators’ First Amendment Rights.
The Court of Appeals erred in its three-sentence entry that Appellants-Relators failed to
show that continued proceedings before the Commission will result in irreparable injury to
Appellants-Relators.
The commencement of discovery on October 23, 2018 and a needlessly rushed decision by
the Commission on November 1 in Case No. 2018G-022, when the Commission is without
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, will irreparably impinge upon Appellants-Relators’ First
3
Amendment rights to associate with likeminded voters and the voters’ rights to associate together
to support Appellants-Relators. The First Amendment protection of the right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs has long been recognized as one of “our most
precious freedoms.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787, (1983) quoting Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). And it is likewise well-settled that the “loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (emphasis added).
The impact of discovery and the November 1 proceeding upon Appellants-Relators’ First
Amendment rights is twofold. First, allowing Case No. 2018G-022 to continue—despite the Court
of Appeals seemingly agreeing that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to do so—will result in a
state-sanctioned proceeding against a candidate for federal office in which his political opponents,
in full media glare, will offer purported evidence and argument that he violated the law. This will
impinge upon Appellants-Relators’ and their supporters’ right to a free and fair election in which
a state agency does not exceed its lawful jurisdiction in a way that can only politically benefit their
electoral opponents. Second, Appellant-Relator Pureval’s reputation will be damaged by the
accusations leveled against him just days before the federal election, and voters’ decisions will
likewise be influenced. This will be the case regardless of the Commission’s ultimate disposition
on November 1, 2018, and it is damage that cannot be undone after the election.
As an additional concern, lacking an injunction or a stay, the Commission will reach a
decision at its November 1, 2018, thereby effectively rendering their writ of prohibition action
moot and subjecting them to a loss of First Amendment rights as discussed above. This is
because Appellants-Relators would no longer be able to prevent the Commission from unlawfully
exercising its quasi-judicial power.
4
These irreparable injuries were clearly set forth to the Court of Appeals by Appellants-
Relators (see, Exhibit C at 34-35), and the Commission had even conceded these points by failing
to contend otherwise. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in its three-sentence entry that Appellants-
Relators failed to show that continued proceedings before the Commission will result in irreparable
injury to Appellants-Relators.
C. Issuing an Injunction Will Serve the Public Interest.
The Court of Appeals also erred in its entry that Appellants-Relators failed to show that
issuing an injunction will serve the public interest. Enjoining or staying the proceedings in Case
No. 2018G-022 while the instant appeal and the underlying writ of prohibition action are decided
will serve the public interest.
As an initial matter, the public interest is inherently served in restraining unauthorized
actions by state agencies, and the Court of Appeals seemed to agree with Appellants-Relators that
they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Commission is without jurisdiction
to adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022.3 This is apparent from the Court of Appeals’ denial of the
Commission’s motion to dismiss that contended otherwise. It is also apparent from the Court of
Appeals not finding that Appellants-Relators failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits
of their writ of prohibition action. Thus, if there is a substantial likelihood that the Commission’s
conduct will be deemed unauthorized by law, then the public interest will be served by restraining
this unauthorized conduct pending a decision on the merits. The public interest is further harmed
3
For Appellants-Relators to establish that they are entitled to a writ of prohibition they must
demonstrate, in part, that they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appellants-
Relators lack an adequate remedy at law because they could not immediately appeal the
Commission’s partial denial of their motion to dismiss, and, further, because if they wait until the
full adjudication of the case, the loss of their First Amendment rights will have already occurred
and cannot be restored through an administrative appeal under R.C. 119.12. See, Exhibit C at 33-
34.
5
by permitting a state agency to continue to exercise jurisdiction to completion and effectively
mooting the writ of prohibition relief.
Enjoining or staying the proceedings Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant
appeal and the underlying writ of prohibition action will also serve the public interest by preventing
the Commission from impacting the results of a federal election. A decision in Case No. 2018G-
022 on November 1, a mere five days before the federal election at which Appellant-Relator
Pureval is a candidate, will unquestionably benefit one of the candidates at the federal election. A
favorable decision for Appellant-Relator Pureval will help his candidacy and hurt his opponent’s
candidacy, while an unfavorable decision for Appellant-Relator Pureval will hurt his candidacy
and help his opponent’s candidacy. The impact of such a ruling on November 1 is unescapable
given the proximity of the November 6, 2018 election. However, by issuing an injunction or stay
pending resolution of the instant appeal and the underlying writ of prohibition action, the status
quo will be preserved and the public interest will be served by preventing a state agency from
impacting the outcome of a federal election, especially when Relators have shown a likelihood of
success in their prohibition action that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate
the complaint pending before it.
That the public interest would be served by issuing an injunction or stay was clearly set
forth to the Court of Appeals by Appellants-Relators (see, Exhibit C at 36), and the Commission
had even conceded this point by failing to contend otherwise. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in
its three-sentence entry that Appellants-Relators failed to show that issuing an injunction would
serve the public interest.
6
D. Appellants-Relators’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits of their Writ of Prohibition
Action is Not at Issue in the Instant Appeal.
The Court of Appeals’ denial stated only the two reasons above for denying Appellants-
Relators’ emergency motion. The Court of Appeals did not rule that Appellants-Relators were
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their writ of prohibition action, in which Appellants-Relators
contend that the Commission’s exercise of quasi-judicial power is unauthorized by law because of
the following reasons: (1) The OEC Complaint failed to invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction by
failing to comply with the statutory requirement for individuals filing a complaint with the
Commission to do so by affidavit made on personal knowledge. See, R.C. 3517.153(A). Instead,
the key allegations that expenditures were made for the benefit of Appellant-Pureval’s federal
campaign were made on “information and belief,” which this Court has repeatedly explained does
not constitute “personal knowledge.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d
110, 2002-Ohio-5334, ¶ 24; State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439,
¶ 32; State ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, ¶ 14-
15; State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Dir. v. City of Bay Village,
115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d, 2015-
Ohio-3749, ¶ 25. (2) The allegations raise questions of federal campaign finance law over which
the Federal Election has exclusive jurisdiction. And (3) the OEC Complaint failed to invoke the
Commission’s jurisdiction by failing to comply with the statutory requirement for complaints filed
by individuals to set forth fact that would constitute a prima facie violation of any statute within the
Commission’s jurisdiction. See, R.C. 3517.153(A). (See, Exhibit C at 10-33; Exhibit E).
Thus, Appellants-Relators’ likelihood of success on the merits of their writ of prohibition
action is not at issue in the instant appeal.
7
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants-Relators respectfully request the Court to issue an
alternative writ setting an expedited response schedule and staying proceedings in Ohio Elections
Commission Case No. 2018G-022 and/or for an injunction pending a final decision of Appellants-
Relators’ appeal. Doing so would preserve the status quo and aid the Courts in preserving their
original jurisdiction.
8
**Counsel of Record
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000

Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Motion to appear pro hac vice pending
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 23, 2018 a copy of the foregoing was sent by first class
mail and by electronic mail to the following:
Mark Landes
Mark Weaver
Andrew N. Yosowitz
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor
2 Miranova Place, Suite 700
mlandes@isaacwiles.com
mweaver@isaacwiles.com
/s/ Donald J. McTigue________

Donald J. McTigue
10
Exhibit A
STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL : No.

580 Walnut Street, Apt. 1302 :
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 : Appeal as of Right Pursuant to
: S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3)
and :
STATE EX REL. FRIENDS OF : Franklin County, Case No. 18AP-789
AFTAB PUREVAL :
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 :
:
and :
:
STATE EX REL. EVAN NOLAN, :
Treasurer, Friends of Aftab Pureval :
3850 Hyde Park Avenue :
:
Appellants/Relators, :
:
-v- :
:
OHIO ELECTIONS :
COMMISSION :
77 South High Street, Suite 1850 :
Columbus, Ohio 43215 :
:
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF AFTAB PUREVAL, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL, AND

EVAN NOLAN, TREASURER, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL
545 East Town Street Andrew N. Yosowitz (0075306)
Columbus, Ohio 43215 ayosowitz@isaacwiles.com
Phone: (614) 263-7000 Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor
Fax: (614) 263-7078 2 Miranova Place, Suite 700
dmctigue@electionlawgroup.com Columbus, Ohio 43215
dclinger@electionlawgroup.com Phone: (614) 221-2121
Fax: (614) 365-9516
Katz Teller Brant & Hild Counsel for Ohio Elections Commission
Tel: 513-977-3477
Fax: 513-762-0077
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
Perkins Coie
700 Thirteenth Street, N.W.,
Suite 600
Tel: 202-654-6200
Fax: 202-654-6211
Counsel for Aftab Pureval, Friends of Aftab

Pureval, and Evan Nolan, Treasurer, Friends
of Aftab Pureval
STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No.

:
: S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3)
-v- :
:
:
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF AFTAB PUREVAL, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL, AND

EVAN NOLAN, TREASURER, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL
Appellants-Relators Aftab Pureval, Friends of Aftab Pureval, and Evan Nolan, Treasurer,
Friends of Aftab Pureval hereby give notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio from the
decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Franklin County, entered on October 22, 2018 in
the matter of State ex rel. Aftab Pureval, et al. v. Ohio Elections Commission, Case Number 18AP-
789, denying Appellants-Relators’ Emergency Motion for an Alternative Writ, Injunction, or Stay
Temporarily Enjoining or Staying Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022. A date-
stamped copy of the Court of Appeals’ entry is attached hereto pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01(B).
This case originated in the Court of Appeals as an original action in prohibition, and this
appeal is therefore of right pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3).
**Counsel of Record
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000

Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
Counsel for Relators
I hereby certify that on October 23, 2018 a copy of this Notice of Appeal was sent by
ordinary US mail and by electronic mail to the following:
Mark Landes
Mark Weaver
Andrew N. Yosowitz

Donald J. McTigue
Franklin County Ohio Court of Appeals Clerk of Courts- 2018 Oct 22 11:59 AM-18AP000789
Court Disposition
Case Number: 18AP000789
Case Style: STATE, EX REL AFTAB PUREVAL -VS- OHIO

ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Franklin County Ohio Court of Appeals Clerk of Courts- 2018 Oct 22 11:59 AM-18AP000789
Motion Tie Off Information:

1. Motion CMS Document Id: 18AP0007892018-10-1899830000
Document Title: 10-18-2018-MOTION TO DISMISS - OHIO
ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Disposition: 3200
Exhibit B
IN THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
STATE EX REL. AFTAB : CASE NO.

PUREVAL :
580 Walnut Street, Apt. 1302 : ORIGINAL ACTION IN
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 : PROHIBITION
:
Franklin County Ohio Court of Appeals Clerk of Courts- 2018 Oct 15 5:48 PM-18AP000789
and :
:
STATE EX REL. FRIENDS OF :
AFTAB PUREVAL :
:
and :
:
STATE EX REL. EVAN :
NOLAN, Treasurer :
Friends of Aftab Pureval :
3850 Hyde Park Avenue :
:
Relators, :
-v- :
:
OHIO ELECTIONS :
COMMISSION :
77 South High Street, Suite 1850 :
Columbus, Ohio 43215 :
:
Respondent. :
RELATORS’ VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN ORIGINAL ACTION

FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
**Counsel of Record
MCTIGUE & COLOMBO LLC
545 East Town Street
Phone: (614) 263-7000
Fax: (614) 263-7078


Tel: 513-977-3477
Fax: 513-762-0077
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Motion to appear pro hac vice
pending
Perkins Coie
Suite 600
Tel: 202-654-6200
Fax: 202-654-6211

Relators aver as follows:
1. This is an original action commenced pursuant to this Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 3, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
2. Relators seek an Order, Judgment, and/or Writ from this Court

to prohibit Respondent Ohio Elections Commission from adjudicating
Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022 (“Case No. 2018G-
022”) because the Commission lacks jurisdiction.
3. Relators also seek an alternative writ, injunction, or stay to
temporarily enjoin or stay the proceedings in Case No. 2018G-022
pending resolution of the instant case, thereby preserving the status quo
and aiding the Court’s original jurisdiction.
PARTIES
4. Relators Aftab Pureval, Friends of Aftab Pureval, and Evan
Nolan, Treasurer, Friends of Aftab Pureval, are the three named
respondents in Case No. 2018G-022.
5. Relator Aftab Pureval (“Relator Pureval”) is a resident of
Cincinnati, Ohio and is the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, having been
elected to the office at the 2016 General Election.

1
6. Relator Friends of Aftab Pureval is the campaign committee
connected to Relator Pureval’s campaign for Hamilton County Clerk of
Courts (the “County Committee”).
7. Relator Evan Nolan, Treasurer, Friends of Aftab Pureval is a

resident of Cincinnati, Ohio and is the treasurer of the County Committee.
8. Respondent Ohio Elections Commission (“Respondent
Commission” or the “Commission”) is a seven-member commission
created by Ohio law to hear alleged violations of state campaign finance
law contained in Ohio Revised Code sections 3517.08 to 3517.13,
3517.17, 3517.18, 3517.20 to 3517.22, 3599.03, and 3599.031. The
Commission has the authority to find facts, make adjudications of
violations, and impose administrative fines.
FACTS
9. On January 31, 2018, Relator Pureval announced that he
would run as a Democrat for the United States House of Representatives
from the 1st Congressional District of Ohio at the 2018 General Election.
10. Relator Pureval registered a candidate committee in
connection with his federal campaign on January 29, 2018. The federal
2
committee is named “Aftab for Ohio” (hereinafter referred to as the
“Federal Committee”).
11. Relator Pureval won the Democratic nomination for the 1st
Congressional District of Ohio at the May 8, 2018 Primary Election, and

he is currently the Democratic nominee for the 1st Congressional District
of Ohio at the November 6, 2018 General Election.
12. On August 10, 2018, a complaint (the “OEC Complaint”) was
filed with the Commission against Relators by an individual named Mark
W. Miller (the “OEC Complainant”). A copy of the OEC Complaint is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
13. The OEC Complaint broadly alleges that: (1) all contributions
received and reported by the County Committee from January 1, 2018 to
June 30, 2018 were allegedly intended for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s
federal campaign; (2) expenditures made and reported by the County
Committee, ranging in dates from August 14, 2017 to May 2, 2018, were
allegedly made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign; (3)
the County Committee allegedly failed to provide sufficient
documentation to verify reported expenditures; and (4) the County

3
Committee reported receiving two PAC contributions that the PACs did
not report making.
14. The OEC Complaint alleges that because contributions and
expenditures were allegedly in connection with Relator Pureval’s

campaign for federal office, the 2017 Annual and 2018 Semi-Annual
campaign finance reports filed by the County Committee are not accurate
in violation of R.C. 3517.13(D) and that for the same reason, the
expenditures also constitute “personal use” of campaign funds in violation
of R.C. 3517.13(O).
15. Respondent Commission assigned the OEC Complaint “Case
No. 2018G-022,” and, pursuant to O.A.C. 3517-1-11, scheduled a
preliminary review for OEC Case No. 2018G-022 before the full
Commission for September 20, 2018.
16. On September 13, 2018, Relators filed their response to the
OEC Complaint with Respondent Commission. A copy of this response
is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4
17. On September 20, 2018, Respondent Commission held the
preliminary review of OEC Case No. 2018G-022 before the full
Commission.
18. At the conclusion of the preliminary review, Respondent

Commission voted to proceed with OEC Case No. 2018G-022, setting the
matter for a hearing by the full Commission, pursuant to O.A.C. 3517-1-
11(A)(3)(d).
19. This decision also initiated the discovery process under the
Commission’s administrative rules.
20. On September 27, 2018, the Commission’s Executive Director
notified counsel for the parties that the Commission would hear and
decide any motions filed by the parties at its regularly-scheduled October
11, 2018 meeting and would conduct a full evidentiary hearing before the
Commission at its regularly-scheduled November 1, 2018 meeting. A
copy of the notice from the Commission’s Executive Director is attached
hereto as Exhibit C.
5
21. On September 28, 2018, Relators in the instant action filed a
Motion to Dismiss Case No. 2018G-022 with the Commission. A copy of
the Motion to Dismiss is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
22. In the Motion to Dismiss, Relators argued that the

Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the OEC Complaint because the
linchpin allegations in the OEC Complaint were based on “information
and belief,” rather than personal knowledge as required by Ohio law and
the Commission’s rules. Relators also argued that that the OEC Complaint
had failed to set forth any claims upon which relief could be granted, and
that many of the allegations were based on federal law over which the
Commission has no jurisdiction.
23. Subsequent to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, on October
1, 2018, a complaint was filed against Relator Pureval and the Federal
Committee with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) regarding
several of the same factual allegations as in Case No. 2018G-022. A copy
of the FEC complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
24. On October 2, 2018, OEC Complainant’s counsel indicated to
Relators’ counsel that he plans to depose six individuals before the

6
Commission’s November 1 meeting, including Relators Pureval and
Nolan, as well as Relator Pureval’s mother. A copy of an email from OEC
Complainant’s counsel is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
25. Subsequently, OEC Complainant’s counsel served notices to

take depositions duces tecum upon Relator Nolan for October 23, 2018
and Relator Pureval for October 26, 2018. The notices contain broad
requests for production of documents relating to expenditures made by the
County Committee. Copies of the notices to take deposition duces tecum
are attached hereto as Exhibit G.
26. On October 2, 2018, OEC Complainant’s counsel also filed a
request with the Commission to subpoena seven individuals, including
Relators Nolan and Pureval, as well as Relator Pureval’s mother, to attend
the Commission’s November 1 meeting. A copy of this request for
subpoenas is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
27. On October 4, 2018, OEC Complainant filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. A copy of this Memorandum in
Opposition is attached hereto as Exhibit I.
7
28. Relators filed a Reply Brief in support of their Motion to
Dismiss on October 8, 2018. A copy of this Reply Brief is attached hereto
as Exhibit J.
29. On October 8, 2018, Relators also filed a Motion to Stay with

the Commission to temporarily stay Case No. 2018G-022 until the FEC
resolves the complaint filed with it regarding the same matters as Case
No. 2018G-022. A copy of Relators’ Motion to Stay is attached hereto as
Exhibit K.
30. On October 10, 2018, OEC Complainant filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Stay. A copy of this Memorandum in
Opposition is attached hereto as Exhibit M.
31. On October 11, 2018, Respondent Commission held its
hearing to decide the motions filed by Relators.
32. At the motion hearing, the OEC Complainant dismissed the
allegations regarding the two PAC contributions after counsel for Relators
pointed out that the PACs had in fact reported making the contributions
8
contrary to what the Complaint alleged. A transcript of the relevant
portions of the October 11 motion hearing is attached as Exhibit L.
33. At the conclusion of its hearing, Respondent Commission
granted Relators’ motion to dismiss with respect to the claims that all
contributions received and reported by the County Committee from
January 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018 were allegedly intended for the benefit
of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign and violated R.C. 3517.13(D).
However, Respondent Commission voted to move forward to a full
evidentiary hearing with respect to the claims that the expenditures made
and reported by the County Committee were allegedly made for the
benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign and the claims that the
County Committee allegedly failed to provide sufficient documentation
to verify reported expenditures. Respondent Commission voted further to
deny Relators’ motion to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the
FEC Complaint. See, Exhibit L.
34. Respondent Commission has set the full evidentiary hearing
for November 1, 2018, which is five days before the federal election.
9
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
First Claim
Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims
that expenditures were made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s
federal campaign because the linchpin allegations in the OEC
Complaint were not made on personal knowledge.
35. Each and every allegation contained above is incorporated as
if fully rewritten herein.
36. The Commission is patently and unambiguously without
jurisdiction over the claims in Case No. 2018G-022 that the expenditures
were made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign because
the linchpin allegations that the expenditures were made for the benefit of
the federal campaign were not made on personal knowledge as required
by Ohio law and the Commission’s rules.
37. R.C. 3517.153(A) mandates that complaints filed by
individuals with the Commission “shall be made by affidavit of any
person, on personal knowledge, and subject to the penalties for perjury…”
(Emphasis added).
10
38. O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1) also requires a complaint to be “[b]y
affidavit by an individual based on personal knowledge…” (Emphasis
added).
39. O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(d) provides further that such a

complaint shall “[c]learly set forth the specific source or basis of the
personal knowledge…”
40. “Personal knowledge” is defined as knowledge gained through
firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief.
Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 95 Ohio
St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707 quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.1999).
41. In the context of affidavits, “personal knowledge” is
“knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which
is original, and does not depend on information or hearsay.” Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC v. Graf, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-361, 2018-Ohio-
2411, ¶ 22 quoting Applegate v. N.W. Title Co., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-855,
2004-Ohio-1465, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
11
42. This high bar of personal knowledge was required by the
General Assembly in order to prevent abuses of a state-created process,
like the filing of spurious claims intended to harass parties and/or deceive
electors close to an election.

43. Although the OEC Complainant’s affidavit formalistically
states in its final sentence “that the facts in the foregoing Complaint are
based upon my personal knowledge,” the statement is belied by the actual
internal allegations.
44. The allegations that the County Committee reported
expenditures that were allegedly made for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s
federal campaign committee, in violation of R.C. 3517.13(D) and R.C.
3517.13(O), are in paragraphs 11-35, 42-56, 58-62, and 65-67 of the OEC
Complaint.
45. However, Paragraphs 19, 22, 29, 34, and 54-55 of the OEC
Complaint explicitly state that the linchpin allegations of these claims that
the expenditures were made in connection with federal election are based
on “information and belief,” not personal knowledge.
12
46. Courts have expressly held that “information and belief” is not
sufficient to establish personal knowledge. Young v. State, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 17AP-272, 2018-Ohio-2604, ¶ 19-22; see also, State ex rel.
Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Dir. v. City of
Bay Village, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380, 875 N.E.2d 574, ¶ 13
(holding that an affidavit based on an attorney’s “personal knowledge and
information” did not satisfy the Court’s personal knowledge requirement
for affidavits in support of original actions because it was not clear what
was based on personal knowledge and was based on information)
(emphasis added); see also, Alexander v. Kellog USA, Inc., 674 Fed. App
496, 499 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that statements “based on mere
‘information and belief’…are not based on personal knowledge.”)
47. Paragraph 19 of the OEC Complaint, which refers to the
expenditures identified in paragraphs 11-18 of the OEC Complaint, states
as follows:
On information and belief, the “Travel”

expenditures set forth in paragraphs 11-18 were
made to support of Pureval’s efforts in his
campaign for Congress, and were not legitimate
and verifiable ordinary, and necessary, or
13
otherwise permissible expenditures for Friends of
Aftab Pureval, a campaign committee purporting
to support a putative candidate for re-election as
the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, or the duties
of Clerk of Courts.
(Emphasis added).
expenditure identified in paragraphs 20-30 of the OEC Complaint, states
as follows:
In fact, on information and belief, the “Media”

for which Friends of Aftab Pureval paid, was
photography services at Pureval’s congressional
campaign kickoff events…
(Emphasis added).
49. Paragraph 29 of the OEC Complaint, which also refers to the
as follows:
On information and belief, the “Media”

expenditures set forth in paragraphs 20-22 were
made to support of Pureval’s efforts in his
campaign for Congress, and were not necessary,
legitimate, reasonable, or otherwise permissible
expenditures for Friends of Aftab Pureval, a
campaign committee purporting to support a
putative candidate for re-election as the Hamilton
County Clerk of Courts, or the duties of the Clerk
of Courts.
14
(Emphasis added).
as follows:
On information and belief, the payment to GBA

Strategies was for polling and other services related
to Pureval’s campaign for Congress, and are not a
legitimate and verifiable ordinary, and necessary,
or otherwise permissible expenditures connected to
Pureval’s putative campaign for re-election as the
Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, or the duties of
the Clerk of Courts.
(Emphasis added).
as follows:
On information and belief, the expenditures

referred to in paragraphs 45 and 52 were not a
legitimate and verifiable ordinary, and necessary,
or otherwise permissible expenditure related to
Aftab Pureval’s purported race for re-election as
the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts or the duties
as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts.
(Emphasis added).
15
52. Paragraph 55 of the OEC Complaint, which also refers to the
as follows:
On information and belief, the expenditures

listed in paragraphs 45 through 52 were related to

Aftab Pureval’s testing of the waters for a run for
Congress from either Ohio’s First or Second
Congressional District.
(Emphasis added).
53. Given that the linchpin allegations in the OEC Complaint are
not made on personal knowledge as required by Ohio law and the
Commission’s rules, the Commission, under Ohio law and the
Commission’s rules, lacks jurisdiction over the allegations contained in
the OEC Complaint that the expenditures were made for the benefit of
Relator Pureval’s federal campaign.
54. Despite a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction over the
allegations in the OEC Complaint, Respondent Commission, at the
September 20, 2018 preliminary review and October 11, 2018 hearing on
the motions, has asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.
16
55. Respondent Commission’s decision to assert jurisdiction to
adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022 and to set the matter for a full hearing
before the Commission was a quasi-judicial act unauthorized by law.
56. Respondent Commission will exercise quasi-judicial power

unauthorized by law by conducting an evidentiary hearing and
adjudicating Case No. 2018G-022, presently scheduled to be held before
the full Commission on November 1, 2018.
57. Denying the requested writ of prohibition will result in injury
for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.
58. Extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant issuing an
alternative writ or stay to temporarily stay Case No. 2018G-022 pending
resolution of the instant action, thereby preserving the status quo and
aiding the Court’s original jurisdiction.
59. Relators will suffer irreparable injury if the requested
alternative writ or stay is not issued.
60. Issuance of an alternative writ or stay will serve the public
interest and not cause harm to others.
17
Second Claim
Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction over the allegations that
expenditures were made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal
campaign because these allegations raise questions of federal law over
which the Federal Election Commission has exclusive jurisdiction.

62. Respondent Commission is patently and unambiguously
without jurisdiction to adjudicate the set of claims that expenditures were
made for a federal election because such allegations involve questions of
federal law beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.
63. Instead, the issue is expressly reserved for interpretation and
enforcement by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).
64. To find that the expenditures made by the County Committee
were actually intended to support Relator Pureval’s federal campaign,
Respondent Commission must decide if the expenditures were made for
the purpose of influencing a federal election. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a).
Particularly because the expenditures, in any other context, would
represent prima facie lawful conduct under Ohio law, the finding of a
18
violation on these claims necessarily hinges on a finding of federal
expenditures.
65. Yet, to make such a finding is a matter expressly reserved to
the FEC, which has exclusive civil jurisdiction on these matters. See 52
U.S.C. § 30106(b).
66. Federal law clearly reserves for the FEC the power to
adjudicate cases over the disbursement of funds to engage in federal
election activity.
67. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (the “Act”), as
amended, states that the Act shall “supersede and preempt any provision
of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. §
30143(a); see also 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(a). Specifically, federal law has such
effect with respect to any state law that purports to regulate the
“[d]isclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and
political committees.” 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b)(2).
68. The Act’s legislative history shows that Congress intended “to
make certain that the Federal law is construed to occupy the field with
respect to elections to Federal office and that the Federal law will be the
19
sole authority under which such elections will be regulated.” H.R. Rep.
No. 93-1239, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
69. The Act establishes that “the power of the [Federal Election]
Commission to initiate civil actions . . . shall be the exclusive civil remedy

for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act.” 52 U.S.C. § 30107(e).
70. Courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have accordingly and
repeatedly intervened to guard the Commission’s exclusive civil
jurisdiction and prevent litigants from making an end run around the
federal process. See, e.g., Bunning v. Com. of Ky., 42 F.3d 1008, 1011–13
(6th Cir. 1994) (barring application of state campaign finance law to
polling expenditure incurred by federal candidate as “intrusion into []
federally regulated activity”); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138
F.3d 144, 154 (5th Cir. 1998) (preventing federal candidate from initiating
collateral litigation to thwart federal complaint); Republican Party of New
Mexico v. King, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215–16 (D.N.M. 2012), aff’d, 741
F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on
claim that federal law preempted state law limit on solicitation and receipt
of contributions to be used in federal campaigns).

20
71. Accordingly, Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to
decide claims of purported federal campaign finance violations.
Third Claim
expenditures were made in violation of R.C. 3517.13(D) because the
OEC Complaint failed to set forth facts that would constitute a prima
facie violation of this statute.
73. The Commission patently lacks jurisdiction over the OEC
Complaint for the additional reason that the OEC Complaint fails to set
forth facts that would constitute a prima facie violation of any law over
which the Commission has jurisdiction.
74. R.C. 3517.153(A) mandates that complaints filed with the
Commission must “[set] forth a failure to comply with or a violation of
any provision in sections 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18, 3517.20
to 3517.22, 3599.03, or 3599.031 of the Revised Code…”
75. O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(f) requires complaints filed with the
Commission to “[c]learly set forth sufficient facts, supported by
affidavits, exhibits and/or other documents to constitute a prima facie

21
violation of Ohio election law over which the commission has
jurisdiction.”
76. Further, O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(g) requires complaints filed
with the Commission to “[c]learly set forth each and every separate
alleged violation of Ohio election law over which the commission has
jurisdiction in a narrative form, cross-referenced to the relevant Revised
Code section(s).”
77. It is not sufficient to invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction by
merely asserting that something violates a statute over which the
Commission has jurisdiction.
78. The OEC Complaint, in paragraphs 57-62, alleges that the
County Committee violated R.C. 3517.13(D) by reporting six
expenditures that were allegedly intended for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s
federal campaign.
79. R.C. 3517.13(D) provides that “[n]o campaign committee
shall fail to file a complete and accurate statement required under division
(A)(3) or (4) of section 3517.10 of the Revised Code.”
22
80. The OEC Complaint does not contend or allege that the
expenditures were not in fact received or made by the County Committee
or that the names, addresses, dates, or amounts reported are inaccurate.
81. Therefore, even if presuming that the allegations that the

expenditures were intended for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal
campaign, R.C. 3517.13(D) would still require the County Committee to
accurately report the expenditures regardless of the intended beneficiary.
82. Accordingly, the OEC Complaint fails to clearly set forth
sufficient facts that would constitute a prima facie violation of R.C.
3517.13(D) with respect to the identified expenditures, and the
Commission, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.
Fourth Claim
the County Committee allegedly failed to provide sufficient
documentation to verify reported expenditures in violation of R.C.
3517.10(D)(4) because the OEC Complaint failed to set forth facts
that would constitute a prima facie violation of this statute.
23
84. The OEC Complaint, in paragraph 63, also alleges that the
County Committee failed to provide sufficient documentation for certain
expenditures in violation of R.C. 3517.10(D)(4).
85. R.C. 3517.10(D)(4) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very

expenditure in excess of twenty-five dollars shall be vouched for by a
receipted bill, stating the purpose of the expenditure, that shall be filed
with the statement of expenditures.”
86. Further, O.A.C. 111:2-4-13(D) provides:
The requirement of section 3517.10 of the Revised

Code that every expenditure in excess of twenty-
five dollars shall be vouched for, is satisfied by
providing an original or photocopy of any of the
following:
(1) A receipted bill; or
(2) A canceled check;
(3) An account statement, from the committee's
financial institution, which contains the name of
the payee, amount, date, and check number.
87. Despite alleging that the County Committee failed to provide
sufficient documentation for the identified expenditures, the OEC
24
Complaint had attached as part of its Exhibit 15 bank statements for the
County Committee that satisfied O.AC. 111:2-4-13(D).
88. Accordingly, the OEC Complaint fails to set forth facts that
would constitute prima facie violations of R.C. 3517.10(D)(4) with

respect to these expenditures, and, therefore, the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Relators respectfully pray the Court to grant the
following relief:
A. Issue an Order, Judgment, Peremptory Writ of Prohibition, or Writ

of Prohibition prohibiting Respondent Commission from
adjudicating Case No. 2018G-022;
B. An alternative writ, injunction, or stay to temporarily enjoin or stay

the proceedings in Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the
instant case, thereby preserving the status quo and aiding the Court’s
original jurisdiction;
C. Assess the costs of this action against Respondent Commission;
D. Award Relators’ their attorneys’ fees and expenses; and
E. Award such other relief as may be appropriate.
25

**Counsel of Record

545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000
Fax: 614-263-7078

Tel: 513-977-3477
Fax: 513-762-0077
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
pending
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
Fax: 202-654-6211

26
Case No.
In the
Tenth District Court of Appeals
For the State of Ohio
STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et ah,

Relators,
v.
OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

Respondent.
Original Action in Prohibition
AFFIDAVIT OF EVAN NOLAN
Hamilton County
/ss
State of Ohio
I , Evan Nolan, having been duly swom and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I
am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify, and hereby state based on my
personal knowledge that:
1. I have read the facts set forth in the foregoing Complaint, and the facts as stated
therein are true.
2. I have personally read true copies of each of the exhibits referenced in the
Complaint.
3. I am one of the Relators in this action, and am a qualified elector of Cincinnati,
Ohio.
1
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT
Evan Nolan
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15 day of October, 2018.

th
2
Exhibit C
STATE EX REL. AFTAB : CASE NO.

PUREVAL, et al :
:
Relators, : ORIGINAL ACTION IN
: PROHIBITION
-v- :
:
OHIO ELECTIONS :
COMMISSION :
:
Respondent. :
RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR AN ALTERNATIVE

WRIT, INJUNCTION, OR STAY TEMPORARILY ENJOINING
OR STAYING OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION CASE NO.
2018G-022 AND TO SET AN EXPEDITED SCHEDULE FOR
RESPONSE TO THE MOTION AND REPLY IN SUPPORT
Relators hereby move the Court for an alternative writ, injunction,
or a stay to temporarily enjoin or stay Ohio Elections Commission Case
No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant action. Relators contend
that Respondent Ohio Elections Commission is without jurisdiction to
adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022. Because of this, Relators respectfully
request that this Court grant their Motion to temporarily enjoying or stay
Case No. 2018G-022 until the Court has had an opportunity to address the
underlying question of Respondent Commission’s jurisdiction, thereby

maintaining the status quo and preserving the Court’s original
jurisdiction.
Extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant issuing an alternative
writ, injunction, or stay. Urgent action by the Court is needed to preserve

the status quo because the first discovery deposition is scheduled for
Tuesday, October 23, 2018, and the evidentiary hearing is set for
November 1, 2018, a mere five days before the November 6, 2018 General
Election. Failure to issue an alternative writ, injunction, or stay could
cause this case to become moot, thereby depriving Relators of their right
to challenge jurisdiction before being subjected to an evidentiary and
adjudicatory process that directly impinges on their First Amendment
rights.
Relators also move that the Court set an expedited response date to
the foregoing motion. Relators respectfully suggest a response date of
Wednesday, October 17, 2018 and a reply date of Thursday, October 18,
2018. Relators have served a copy of the Complaint and Motion filed
herein upon Respondent and Respondent’s legal counsel via electronic
mail.
A Memorandum in Support is attached for the Court’s
consideration.

**Counsel of Record
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000

Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
pending
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200

Relators filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition to
prohibit Respondent Ohio Elections Commission (“Respondent
Commission” or the “Commission”) from exercising quasi-judicial

authority to adjudicate Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022
(“Case No. 2018G-022”) because the Commission lacks jurisdiction.
Unless the Court issues either an alternative writ, injunction, or a stay to
temporarily enjoin or stay Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the
instant action, Respondent Commission will conduct a full evidentiary
hearing and adjudication of the claims on November 1, 2018, resulting in
Relators suffering irreparable injury. For the reasons set forth herein,
Relators respectfully request the Court to issue either an alternative writ,
injunction, or a stay to temporarily stay the proceedings in Case No.
2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant action, thereby preserving
the status quo and aiding the Court in its original jurisdiction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Relator Aftab Pureval is the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts,
having been elected to that office in 2018. He is also the Democratic

1
candidate for Ohio’s 1st Congressional District at the November 6, 2018
General Election. Relator Pureval has two campaign committees, one for
his county office, which is Relator Friends of Aftab Pureval (hereinafter
referred to as the “County Committee”), and one for his federal campaign,
named “Aftab for Ohio” (hereinafter referred to as the “Federal
Committee”). Relator Evan Nolan is the treasurer for both the County
Committee and the Federal Committee. The concurrent operation of these
two committees is expressly permitted under both federal and Ohio law.
See, Ohio Campaign Finance Handbook at 2-11, available at
https://www.sos.state.oh.us/globalassets/candidates/cfguide/chapters/cha
pter2.pdf.
On August 10, 2018, a complaint (the “OEC Complaint”) was filed
with the Commission against Relators by an individual named Mark W.
Miller (the “OEC Complainant”). See, Exhibit A to Relators’ Complaint.
The OEC Complaint broadly alleges that: (1) all contributions received
and reported by the County Committee from January 1, 2018 to June 30,
2018 were allegedly intended for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal
campaign; (2) expenditures made and reported by the County Committee,

2
ranging in dates from August 14, 2017 to May 2, 2018, were allegedly
made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign; (3) the County
Committee allegedly failed to provide sufficient documentation to verify
reported expenditures; and (4) the County Committee reported receiving

two PAC contributions that the PACs did not report making them. The
OEC Complaint alleges that because contributions and expenditures were
allegedly in connection with Relator Pureval’s campaign for federal
office, the 2017 Annual and 2018 Semi-Annual campaign finance reports
filed by the County Committee were inaccurate and violated R.C.
3517.13(D) and that for the same reason, the expenditures constituted
“personal use” of campaign funds in violation of R.C. 3517.13(O).
Respondent Commission assigned the OEC Complaint “Case No.
2018G-022,” and, pursuant to O.A.C. 3517-1-11, scheduled a preliminary
review of the case before the full commission for September 20, 2018. On
September 13, 2018, Relators filed their response to the OEC Complaint
with Respondent Commission. See, Exhibit B to Relators’ Complaint. At
the conclusion of the preliminary review, Respondent Commission voted
to proceed with OEC Case No. 2018G-022, setting the matter for a full
3
evidentiary and merits hearing before the commission, pursuant to O.A.C.
3517-1-11(A)(3)(d). This action also initiated the discovery process under
the Commission’s administrative rules.
On September 27, 2018, the Commission’s Executive Director

notified counsel for the parties that the Commission would hear and
decide any motions filed by the parties at its regularly-scheduled October
11, 2018 meeting and would conduct a full evidentiary hearing before the
Commission at its regularly-scheduled November 1, 2018 meeting. See,
Exhibit C to Relators’ Complaint. On September 28, 2018, Relators in
the instant action filed a Motion to Dismiss Case No. 2018G-022 with the
Commission. See, Exhibit D to Relators’ Complaint. In the Motion to
Dismiss, Relators argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear
the OEC Complaint because the linchpin allegations in the OEC
Complaint were based on “information and belief,” rather than personal
knowledge as required by Ohio law and the Commission’s rules. Relators
also argued that that the OEC Complaint failed to set forth any claims
upon which relief could be granted and made allegations that hinged on
federal law over which the Commission has no jurisdiction. On October

4
4, 2018, the OEC Complainant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss. See, Exhibit E to Relators’ Complaint. Relators filed
a Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss on October
8, 2018. See, Exhibit J to Relators’ Complaint.

On October 1, 2018, after Relators filed the Motion to Dismiss, a
group called the Foundation for Accountability and Civic Trust filed a
complaint against Relator Pureval and others with the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) regarding several of the same factual allegations as
in Case No. 2018G-022. See, Exhibit E to Relators’ Complaint. On
October 8, 2018, Relators also filed a Motion to Stay with the Commission
to temporarily stay Case No. 2018G-022 until the FEC resolves the
complaint over the same matters. See, Exhibit K to Relators’ Complaint.
On October 2, 2018, the OEC Complainant’s counsel indicated to
Relators’ counsel that he plans to depose six individuals before the
Commission’s November 1 meeting, including Relators Pureval and
Nolan. See, Exhibit F to Relators’ Complaint. Later, the OEC
Complainant’s counsel served notices to take depositions duces tecum
upon Relator Nolan for October 23, 2018 and Relator Pureval for October
5
26, 2018. The notices contain broad requests for production of documents
relating to expenditures made by the County Committee. See, Exhibit G
to Relators’ Complaint.
On October 11, 2018, Respondent Commission held its hearing to

decide the motions filed by Relators. At the motion hearing, OEC
Complainant dismissed the allegations regarding the two PAC
contributions, after Relators pointed out that the PACs had in fact reported
making the contributions contrary to what the Complaint alleged. At the
end of the hearing, Respondent Commission granted Relators’ motion to
dismiss as to contributions received and reported by the County
Committee from January 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018, that allegedly violated
R.C. 3517.13(D). However, Respondent Commission voted to move
forward to a full evidentiary hearing with respect to the claims that the
expenditures made and reported by the County Committee were allegedly
made for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal campaign and the claims
that the County Committee allegedly failed to provide sufficient
documentation to verify reported expenditures. Respondent Commission
6
voted further to deny Relators’ motion to stay the proceedings pending
resolution of the FEC Complaint. See, Exhibit L to Relators’ Complaint.
Respondent Commission has set the full evidentiary hearing for
November 1, 2018, a mere five days before the federal election. Relator
Pureval’s next election for Hamilton County Clerk of Courts is scheduled
to occur in 2020.
ARGUMENT
I. Extraordinary Circumstances Exist to Warrant Issuing an

Alternative Writ
Extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant issuing an alternative
writ to temporarily enjoin or stay Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution
of the instant action. See, Loc.R. 13(C) (requiring extraordinary
circumstances for the issuance of alternative writs). Respondent
Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022 yet is
needlessly rushing to make a decision at its November 1, 2018 hearing.
This is precisely what the OEC Complainant hoped for, when taking
dubious federal law claims, and dressing them up as unsupported state law
claims. The OEC Complainant is using the Commission’s machinery to
7
obtain a public hearing five days before the election, which would make
it impossible for this Court to review and redress the Commission’s lack
of jurisdiction.
An adverse decision at the November 1 hearing would effectively

moot the instant action, thereby eliminating Relators’ ability to seek relief
from the Commission’s unlawful exercise of quasi-judicial power in the
form of a writ of prohibition. Even if the decision is reversed on appeal,
or even if it is contradicted by the FEC’s separate resolution of the federal
questions at the heart of the OEC Complaint, that would happen too late
to undo the damage done to Relators at the November 6 election.
Even the hearing itself, regardless of the decision, would inevitably
and irreversibly influence the results of the federal election. The OEC
Complainant has made clear that he seeks to present public testimony, in
full media glare, from the candidate, his campaign manager, and even his
mother. See, Exhibit _ to Relators’ Complaint. For these reasons,
extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant the Court issuing an
alternative writ to temporarily enjoin or stay the proceedings of Case No.
2018G-022 while this action is resolved.

8
II. Standard for Issuance of Injunction or Stay
The filing of the writ of prohibition action does not automatically
enjoin or stay Case No. 2018G-022. Therefore, an injunction or stay of
the proceedings is necessary to preserve the status quo pending resolution

of the instant action and to aid the Court in its original jurisdiction. The
standards for issuing an injunction or stay are the same: (1) whether the
appellant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) whether appellant has shown that it will suffer irreparable
injury; (3) whether the issuance of a stay will cause harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by granting a stay. See,
e.g., Vanguard Transp. Sys. v. Edwards Transfer & Storage Co. Gen.
Commodities Div., 109 Ohio App. 3d 786, 790, 673 N.E.2d 182 (10th
Dist. 1996) (setting forth the standard for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction); Prince-Paul v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, 2015-Ohio-3984, 43
N.E.3d 13, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (explaining that these factors are “logical
considerations” in determining whether to stay an administrative order
pending appeal). This Court has explained further that these factors are
“not prerequisites that must be met but are interrelated considerations that
9
must be balanced together.” Prince-Paul v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, 2015-
Ohio-3984 at ¶ 13.
Balancing the considerations in the instant action favors granting an
alternative writ, injunction, or stay to temporarily enjoin or stay Case No.

2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant action. Relators are likely to
succeed on the merits of their writ of prohibition claim as Respondent
Commission is patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to
adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022. Further, Relators will suffer irreparable
injury by an adverse decision of the Commission while issuance of an
injunction or stay will not cause harm to others. Moreover, the public
interest would be served by granting an injunction or stay as it will prevent
state government interference with a federal election.
III. Relators are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of their Writ of

Prohibition Claim
Relators are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim for a writ
of prohibition. To obtain a writ of prohibition, Relators must show that (1)
Respondent Commission exercised or is about to exercise quasi-judicial
power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that
10
the denial of the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate
remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hunter
v. Summit County Human Resource Comm’n, 81 Ohio St.3d 450, 451, 692
N.E.2d 185 (1998). The last requirement is waived, however, “if the lack
of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.” State ex rel. Durrani v.
Ruehlman, 147 Ohio St.3d 478, 2016-Ohio-7740, 67 N.E.3d 769, ¶ 13,
citing Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm'n, 135 Ohio St.
3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11. Here, Respondent
Commission is patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to
adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022, and Relators are entitled to a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the Commission from adjudicating the matter.
A. Respondent Commission Exercised or is about to Exercise

Quasi-Judicial Power.
Respondent Commission unquestionably exercised quasi-judicial
power in deciding to adjudicate Case No. 2018G following the September
20, 2018 preliminary review and the October 11, 2018 hearing on
motions. Further, Respondent Commission will continue to exercise
11
quasi-judicial power at the full evidentiary hearing on November 1, 2018,
just five days before the federal election.
B. Respondent Commission’s Exercise of Power is Unauthorized

by Law.
In OEC Case No. 2018G-022, Respondent Commission is
proceeding on two of the original four sets of claims. One set of claims is
that a group of expenditures made by the County Committee violate R.C.
3517.13(D) and/or R.C. 3517.13(O) on the basis of a speculative
allegation that the expenditures were made in connection with a federal
election. The other claim is that the County Committee violated R.C.
3517.10(D)(4) by allegedly providing inadequate documentation to verify
certain expenditures. Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate both sets of claims.
1. Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the

set of claims that Relators allegedly made expenditures in
connection with a federal election.
For three independent reasons, Respondent Commission lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the set of claims that the expenditures made by
the County Committee violate R.C. 3517.13(D) and/or R.C. 3517.13(O).
12
First, the OEC Complaint’s linchpin allegations are not made on personal
knowledge. Second, the allegations raise questions of federal law over
which the Federal Election Commission has exclusive jurisdiction. Third,
the OEC Complainant failed to properly invoke the Commission’s

jurisdiction by failing to set forth facts that would constitute prima facie
violations of any statute over which the Commission has jurisdiction.
a. The OEC Complaint’s linchpin allegations are not made

on personal knowledge.
Respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over complaints filed by
individuals is statutorily limited to complaints made on personal
knowledge. This high bar of personal knowledge was required by the
General Assembly in order to prevent abuses of a state-created process,
like the filing of facially spurious claims intended to harass parties and/or
deceive electors close to an election.
R.C. 3517.153 mandates that complaints filed by individuals with
the Commission “shall be made by affidavit of any person, on personal
knowledge, and subject to the penalties for perjury…” (Emphasis added).
O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1) also requires a complaint to be “[b]y affidavit by
13
an individual based on personal knowledge…” (Emphasis added). O.A.C.
3517-1-02(A)(1)(d) provides further that such a complaint shall “[c]learly
set forth the specific source or basis of the personal knowledge…”
“Personal knowledge” is defined as knowledge gained through

firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief.
Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 95 Ohio
St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707 quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.1999). In the context of affidavits, “personal
knowledge” is “knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or
allegation, which is original, and does not depend on information or
hearsay.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Graf, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
17AP-361, 2018-Ohio-2411, ¶ 22 quoting Applegate v. N.W. Title Co.,
10th Dist. No. 03AP-855, 2004-Ohio-1465, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
The Ohio Supreme Court has long held that bases other than
“personal knowledge,” like “information and belief,” will not satisfy a
personal knowledge requirement. The Supreme Court’s familiarity with
personal knowledge requirements stems from the Supreme Court’s own
Rules of Practice, which require complaints for original actions to be

14
supported by an affidavit made on personal knowledge specifying the
details of the claim. See, Sup.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2). For instance, in
State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334,
¶ 24, the Court held that an affidavit in which the alleged facts were “true
and accurate to the best of her knowledge and belief” did not satisfy the
personal knowledge requirement. In State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111
Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, ¶ 32, the Court similarly held that an
affidavit in which the alleged facts were “true and correct to the best of
his personal knowledge” did not satisfy the personal knowledge
requirement. In State ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 Ohio
St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, ¶ 14-15, the Court held that although an
affidavit initially stated that the relator had “personal knowledge of the
matters set forth herein,” the affidavit subsequently stated that the facts
were made “to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief”;
therefore, the affidavit did not satisfy the personal knowledge
requirement. In State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an
Elected Law Dir. v. City of Bay Village, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-
5380, ¶ 13, the Court rejected an affidavit in which the alleged facts were
15
“true and correct” based on the attorney’s “personal knowledge and
information,” explaining that it was not clear which allegations were
based on personal knowledge and which were based on simply on
information. In State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d, 2015-

Ohio-3749, ¶ 25, the Court held that ten affidavits in which the alleged
facts were made to “the best of my knowledge, information, and belief”
did not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement.
These holdings are controlling in the instant action because the
Supreme Court’s personal knowledge requirement is the same as the
Commission’s personal knowledge requirement. In both cases, the
purpose of this requirement is clear: to avoid abuses of state processes, by
placing controls on the quality of the evidence that can be used.
Although the OEC Complaint’s notary block states “that the facts in
the foregoing Complaint are based upon [the Complainant’s]…personal
knowledge” (OEC Complaint at 12), the rest of the OEC Complaint
explicitly says that this is not the case. The linchpin allegations in the OEC
Complaint that expenditures were made by the County Committee
allegedly for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s federal campaign, in violation

16
of R.C. 3517.13(D) and/or R.C. 3517.13(O), all state that they are “based
on information and belief” rather than personal knowledge. Because these
allegations are not made on personal knowledge, the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate them. To review these allegations in turn:

First, paragraphs 11-18 and 59-61 of the OEC Complaint allege that
the County Committee reported four travel expenditures that were
allegedly made for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s federal campaign in
violation of R.C. 3517.13(D). Additionally, paragraph 65 of the OEC
Complaint alleges that two of these expenditures, because they were
allegedly made for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s federal campaign
committee, also violated R.C. 3517.13(O). The Complaint lists the
expenditures as contained on the County Committee’s reports but does
not set forth a single fact tying any of the expenditures to the federal race.
Further, paragraph 19 of the OEC Complaint explicitly states that the key
allegation that the expenditures in paragraphs 11-18 were made in
17
connection with a federal election is based on “information and belief”
rather than personal knowledge.1
Second, paragraphs 20-22 and 58 of the OEC Complaint allege that
the County Committee reported a media expenditure that was allegedly

made for the benefit of Mr. Pureval’s federal campaign in violation of
R.C. 3517.13(D). However, paragraphs 22 and 29 of the OEC Complaint
explicitly state that the key allegation that the expenditure identified in
paragraphs 20-22 was made in connection with a federal election is based
on “information and belief” rather than personal knowledge.2
Third, paragraphs 31-33 and 62 of the OEC Complaint allege that
the County Committee reported a consulting expenditure that was
1
Paragraph 19 of the OEC Complaint states: “On information and belief, the ‘Travel’ expenditures set forth in
paragraphs 11-18 were made to support of Pureval’s efforts in his campaign for Congress, and were not legitimate
and verifiable ordinary, and necessary, or otherwise permissible expenditures for Friends of Aftab Pureval, a campaign
committee purporting to support a putative candidate for re-election as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, or the
duties of Clerk of Courts.” (Emphasis added).
2
Paragraph 22 of the Complaint states in relevant part: “In fact, on information and belief, the ‘Media’ for which
Friends of Aftab Pureval paid, was photography services at Pureval’s congressional campaign kickoff events…”
(Emphasis added).
Paragraph 29 of the Complaint states: “On information and belief, the ‘Media’ expenditures set forth in paragraphs
20-22 were made to support of Pureval’s efforts in his campaign for Congress, and were not necessary, legitimate,
reasonable, or otherwise permissible expenditures for Friends of Aftab Pureval, a campaign committee purporting to
support a putative candidate for re-election as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, or the duties of the Clerk of
Courts.” (Emphasis added).
18
violation of R.C. 3517.13(D). The Complaint lists the expenditure as
contained on the County Committee’s report but does not set forth a single
fact tying it to the federal race. Further, paragraph 34 of the OEC
Complaint explicitly states that the key allegation that the expenditure was
made in connection with a federal election is based on “information and
belief” rather than personal knowledge.3
Finally, paragraphs 45-52 and 67 of the OEC Complaint allege that
the County Committee reported ten travel and meeting expenditures
violation of R.C. 3517.13(O). The Complaint lists the expenditures as
contained on the County Committee’s reports but does not set forth a
single fact tying any of the expenditures to the federal race. Further,
Paragraphs 54-55 explicitly state that the key allegation that the
expenditure was made in connection with a federal election is based on
“information and belief” rather than personal knowledge.4
3
Paragraph 34 of the Complaint states: “On information and belief, the payment to GBA Strategies was for polling
and other services related to Pureval’s campaign for Congress, and are not [sic] a legitimate and verifiable ordinary,
and necessary, or otherwise permissible expenditure connected to Pureval’s putative campaign for re-election as the
Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, or the duties of the Clerk of Courts.” (Emphasis added).
4
Paragraph 54 of the Complaint states: “On information and belief, the expenditures referred to in paragraphs 45
and 52 were not a legitimate and verifiable ordinary, and necessary, or otherwise permissible expenditure related to
19
Thus, every one of the allegations on which the Commission is now
proceeding was impermissibly based solely on “information and belief,”
by the OEC Complainant’s own express admission, in contravention of
the statute’s plain requirement, and in excess of the Commission’s lawful

jurisdiction.
b. The allegations raise questions of federal law over which

the Federal Election Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Respondent Commission is patently and unambiguously without
jurisdiction to adjudicate the set of claims that these expenditures were
made for a federal election for the additional reason that such allegations
involve questions of federal law beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Instead, the issue is expressly reserved for interpretation and enforcement
by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).
To find that the expenditures made by the County Committee were
actually intended to support Relator Pureval’s federal campaign for
Aftab Pureval’s purported race for re-election as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts or the duties as the Hamilton
County Clerk of Courts.”
Paragraph 55 of the Complaint states: “On information and belief, the expenditures listed in paragraphs 45 through
52 were related to Aftab Pureval’s testing of the waters for a run for Congress from either Ohio’s First or Second
Congressional District.”
20
Congress, Respondent Commission must decide if the expenditures were
made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. See 52 U.S.C. §
30101(9)(A)(i). Because the expenditures would otherwise represent
prima facie lawful conduct under Ohio law, finding a violation on these
claims necessarily requires a finding of federal expenditures. Yet, to make
such a finding is a matter expressly reserved to the FEC, which has
exclusive civil jurisdiction on these matters. See 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1).
Federal law clearly reserves for the FEC the power to adjudicate
cases over the disbursement of funds to engage in federal election activity.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (the “Act” or “FECA”), as
amended, states that the Act shall “supersede and preempt any provision
of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. §
30143(a); see also 11 C.F.R. § 108.7. Specifically, federal law has such
effect with respect to any state law that purports to regulate the
“[d]isclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and
political committees.” 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b)(2). The Act’s legislative
history shows that Congress intended “to make certain that the Federal
law is construed to occupy the field with respect to elections to Federal

21
office and that the Federal law will be the sole authority under which such
elections will be regulated.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1974). And, the Act establishes that—with one lone exception not
relevant here—“the power of the [Federal Election] Commission to

initiate civil actions . . . shall be the exclusive civil remedy for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act.” 52 U.S.C. § 30107(e).5
Courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have accordingly and repeatedly
intervened to guard the Commission’s exclusive civil jurisdiction and
prevent litigants from making an end run around the federal process. See,
e.g., Bunning v. Com. of Ky., 42 F.3d 1008, 1011–13 (6th Cir. 1994)
(barring application of state campaign finance law to polling expenditure
incurred by federal candidate as “intrusion into [] federally regulated
activity”); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 154 (5th
Cir. 1998) (preventing federal candidate from initiating collateral
5
That exception applies only when the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia declares that the FEC has
unlawfully failed to act on a complaint, when the FEC fails to conform with the court’s declaration, and when the
court authorizes the complainant to bring a private right of action against the respondent. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8).
See also, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, Civ. No. 16-259 (BAH) (D.D.C. Aug. 3,
2018). The narrowness of this lone exception from the FEC’s exclusive civil jurisdiction, and the rarity with which it
has been deployed, shows how seriously Congress and the FEC have treated the exclusiveness of the FEC’s
jurisdiction. It shows also the OEC Complainant’s audacity in leap-frogging the federal process and going to a state
administrative agency to get a hearing five days before an election.
22
litigation to thwart federal complaint); Republican Party of New Mexico
v. King, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215–16 (D.N.M. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d
1089 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on claim
that federal law preempted state law limit on solicitation and receipt of
contributions to be used in federal campaigns).
Federal preemption is especially important now that an actual FEC
complaint has been filed over the issues before the Commission in Case
No. 2018G-022. A rush to judgment by Respondent Commission in Case
No. 2018G-022 could be counter-productive and not serve Ohio’s
interests because the factual and legal questions necessary to resolving the
state law allegations depend at least in part on resolving the FEC
complaint. While the OEC ultimately decides whether Ohio law is
violated, in a case like this, the underlying federal determinations are
required to be made by the FEC. The fact that the OEC Complainant filed
his complaint with the OEC instead of the FEC given his factual premise
that the contributions and expenditures were for a federal election, itself
demonstrates the sort of forum-shopping that the Act’s preemption and
23
exclusive jurisdiction provisions were designed to thwart.6 As other courts
have done previously, this Court should prevent Respondent Commission
from asserting jurisdiction it does not have to decide claims of purported
federal campaign and to prevent the OEC Complainant’s end run around
the federal process.
c. Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate

complaints filed by individuals that do not set forth facts
that would constitute a prima facie violation of any statute
within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
expenditure claims for the additional reason that the OEC Complaint
failed to properly invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction by failing to set
forth facts that would constitute a prima facie violation of any Ohio
election law over which the Commission has jurisdiction. R.C.
3517.153(A) mandates that complaints filed with the Commission must
“[set] forth a failure to comply with or a violation of any provision in
6
OEC Complainant might well have known that, had he gone to the FEC as he was supposed to, he would not have
prevailed. See, e.g., Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and Commissioners Caroline C. Hunter
and Donald F, McGahn, MUR 6225 (Dec. 1, 2010), at 4 (refusing to open an investigation over claims that a newly
re-elected nonfederal officeholder impermissibly used state PAC funds to pay for a poll in connection with a potential
U.S. Senate race, on the grounds that “Commission regulations clearly allow committees to evenly split the costs
associated with a poll …”).
24
sections 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18, 3517.20 to 3517.22,
3599.03, or 3599.031 of the Revised Code…” O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(f)
requires complaints filed with the Commission to “[c]learly set forth
sufficient facts, supported by affidavits, exhibits and/or other documents

to constitute a prima facie violation of Ohio election law over which the
commission has jurisdiction.” Further, O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(g)
requires complaints filed with the Commission to “[c]learly set forth each
and every separate alleged violation of Ohio election law over which the
commission has jurisdiction in a narrative form, cross-referenced to the
relevant Revised Code section(s).”
Paragraphs 58-62 of the OEC Complaint allege that the County
Committee violated R.C. 3517.13(D) by reporting six expenditures,
identified in paragraphs 11-33 of the OEC Complaint, that were allegedly
intended for the benefit of Respondent Pureval’s federal campaign
committee. R.C. 3517.13(D) requires campaign committees to file
complete and accurate annual and semiannual campaign finance reports.
Even if presuming that the expenditures were made for the benefit of the
federal campaign, R.C. 3517.13(D) would still require the County

25
Committee to report all expenditures made regardless of the intended
beneficiary. In other words, it would only be a violation of R.C.
3517.13(D) if the county committee failed to accurately report the
expenditures. Here, the OEC Complaint does not contend that the County
Committee did not actually make the six expenditures, nor that the payees,
addresses, dates, or amounts reported by the committee are inaccurate.
The OEC Complaint offers nothing besides “information and belief” to
question the “legitimate and verifiable” character of any of the
ependitures.
For these reasons, the OEC Complaint, with respect to the six
expenditures identified in paragraphs 11-33, fails to set forth sufficient
facts that would constitute a prima facie violation of R.C. 3517.13(D),
thereby failing to properly invoke Respondent Commission’s jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claims in paragraphs 58-62 of the OEC Complaint that the County
Committee violated R.C. 3517.13(D) by reporting the six expenditures.
26
2. Respondent Commission is Patently and Unambiguously
Without Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the Set of Claims that
Relators Violated R.C. 3517.10(D)(4).
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim that the County Committee violated

R.C. 3517.10(D)(4) because the OEC Complaint fails to set forth
sufficient facts that would constitute a prima facie violation of this statute.
Indeed, the OEC Complaint actually acknowledges that the County
Committee provided the very expenditure verification documents
required by law.
R.C. 3517.10(D)(4) states, in relevant part that “[e]very expenditure
in excess of twenty-five dollars shall be vouched for by a receipted bill,
stating the purpose of the expenditure, that shall be filed with the
statement of expenditures.” Further, O.A.C. 111:2-4-13(D) provides:
The requirement of section 3517.10 of the Revised

Code that every expenditure in excess of twenty-
five dollars shall be vouched for, is satisfied by
providing an original or photocopy of any of the
following:
(1) A receipted bill; or
(2) A canceled check;
27
(3) An account statement, from the committee's
financial institution, which contains the name of
the payee, amount, date, and check number.
Paragraph 63 of the OEC Complaint alleges that Relators failed to
document the expenditures identified in the Complaint. However, for ten

of the seventeen identified expenditures—identified below—the OEC
Complaint itself acknowledges that Relators provided either bank account
summaries or a copy of a canceled check showing the name of the payee,
amount, and date of the expenditure, which O.A.C. 111:2-4-13(D)(2)-(3)
permit filers to provide to satisfy R.C. 3517.10(D)(4)’s expenditure
verification requirement. For the seven other expenditures—also
identified below—the OEC Complaint alleges that Relators failed to
provide any supporting documentation, but this allegation is belied by the
Complaint’s own exhibits, which contain the supporting documentation.
a. For ten expenditures, the OEC Complaint acknowledges

that sufficient documentation was provided.
For the ten expenditures referred to in paragraphs 12, 14, 16, 18, 21,
32, 37, and 53 of the OEC Complaint, the allegations actually
acknowledge that the County Committee provided bank account
28
summaries or copies of cancelled checks to verify the expenditures. Under
O.A.C. 111:2-4-13(D), bank account summaries or copies of cancelled
checks are sufficient to verify expenditures.
The ten expenditures, with the corresponding admissions, are as

follows:
 Paragraph 12 of the OEC Complaint alleges that Friends of Aftab

Pureval provided “only a bank account summary showing that a
debit card payment in the amount of $2,884.00 using VENMO”
to verify the $2,884 travel expense identified in Paragraph 11.
(Emphasis added).
 Paragraph 14 of the Complaint alleges that Friends of Aftab

debit card payment in the amount of $300.60 was made to Delta
using a debit card” in reference to the $300.60 travel expense
identified in Paragraph 13. (Emphasis added).

debit card payment in the amount of $412.00 was made using
VENMO” in reference to the $412 travel expense identified in
Paragraph 15. (Emphasis added).

debit card payment in the amount of $139.30 was made to Delta
using a debit card” in reference to the $139.30 travel expense
29
debit card payment in the amount of $360.50 was made using
VENMO” in reference to the $360.50 expense identified in
Paragraph 20. (Emphasis added).
 Paragraph 32 of the OEC Complain alleges that Friends of Aftab

Pureval provided “a copy of check 1061” in reference to check

used to pay GBA Strategies for the expenditure identified in
Paragraph 31.

debit card payment in the amount of $2,884.00 [sic] was made
using VENMO” presumably in reference to the $257.50 expense
 Paragraphs 53 of the OEC Complaint allege that Friends of Aftab

Pureval provided only “a bank statement showing debit charges
in those amounts to American Airlines on that date” in reference
to the three $188.40 expenses identified in Paragraph 47.
(Emphasis added).
Because the OEC Complaint alleges that the County Committee
provided bank account summaries showing the payee, the amount, and
date of the expenditures for the ten expenditures referred to in paragraphs
12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 32, 37, and 53, the OEC Complaint does not set forth
facts that the documentation provided for these expenditures fails to
comply with R.C. 3517.10(D)(4). The OEC Complaint, therefore, fails to
30
comply with R.C. 3517.153(A) and O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(f)-(g),
which require that in order to properly to invoke the Commission’s
jurisdiction, complaints filed by individuals must set forth facts that would
establish a prima facie violation of a statute within the Commission’s

jurisdiction. For this reason, Respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction
to adjudicate these alleged violations of R.C. 3517.10(D)(4).
b. For seven other expenditures, the OEC Complaint’s

allegations that sufficient documentation was not provided
are belied by the OEC Complaint’s own exhibits which
contain the documentation.
For the seven expenditures referred to in paragraphs 45-46 and 48-
52, the OEC Complaint’s allegations that the County Committee failed to
provide sufficient documentation are belied by the OEC Complaint’s own
exhibits which include bank account summaries verifying each expense.
Again, under O.A.C. 111:2-4-13(D), bank account summaries are
sufficient to verify expenditures.
The expenditures referred to in paragraphs 45-46 and 48-52 were all
made from August 2017 to December 2017.7 They are as follows: a
7
Relator Pureval did not become a federal candidate until 2018.
31
$595.99 expenditure on August 14, 2017 to Ellis Hotel for lodging (OEC
Compl. ¶ 45); a $25.67 expenditure on August 14, 2017 to Meehans’
Public House for a meeting expense (Id. ¶ 46); a $64.47 expenditure on
November 7, 2017 to Reserve Bar for a meeting expense (Id. ¶ 48); a

$229.73 expenditure on November 29, 2017 to Minted, LLC for a meeting
expense (Id. ¶ 49); a $336.27 expenditure on December 5, 2017 to
Murphin Ridge Inn for lodging (Id. ¶ 50); a $150 expenditure on
December 5, 2017 to White Star for a meeting expense (Id. ¶ 51); and a
$195.80 expenditure on December 8, 2017 to Anderson Pub & Grill for a
meeting expense (Id. ¶ 52).
Contradicting the OEC Complaint’s allegation that the County
Committee failed to provide any expenditure verification documentation
for these expenditures is Exhibit 15 to the OEC Complaint, which is a
copy of the committee’s 2017 Annual Report. Attached to the 2017
Annual Report are bank statements for August 2017 through December
2017, and these contain the information required by O.A.C. 111:2-4-
13(D)(3) for these seven expenditures.
32
Because the OEC Complaint’s allegation that the County
Committee failed to provide sufficient documentation for these seven
expenditures is disproven by the OEC Complaint’s own exhibits, the OEC
Complaint does not set forth facts that the County Committee violated
R.C. 3517.10(D)(4) with respect to the seven expenditures identified in
paragraphs 45-46 and 48-52. Accordingly, Respondent Commission lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate these alleged violations of R.C. 3517.10(D)(4).
C. Relators Lack an Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of

Law.
As an initial matter, Relators do not need to demonstrate that they
lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because
jurisdiction to adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022. Ruehlman, ¶ 13 (stating
that the requirement to demonstrate the lack of adequate remedy at law
“is waived if the lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.”).
Despite this, Relators do indeed lack an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Relators cannot immediately appeal Respondent
Commission’s denial of their motion to dismiss as the denial is not a final
33
order and, under R.C. 119.12, only the Commission’s final orders are
appealable. Further, waiting for a final order to appeal would not be
adequate because, as set forth below, Relators will suffer irreparable
injury if they are subjected to Respondent Commission’s unlawful

exercise of quasi-judicial power.
IV. Relators Will Suffer Irreparable Injury if an Alternative Writ,

Injunction, or Stay is Not Issued
Relators will suffer irreparable injury if Case No. 2018G-022 is not
enjoined or stayed pending the resolution of the instant action for three
independent reasons. First, lacking an injunction or stay, Respondent
Commission will reach a decision at its November 1, 2018 evidentiary
hearing. This would effectively moot the instant action, thereby
eliminating Relators’ ability to seek relief from the Commission’s
unlawful exercise of quasi-judicial power.
Second, a decision by Respondent Commission on November 1—
just five days before the federal election at which Relator Pureval is a
candidate—will, at the very least, result in a state-sanctioned proceeding
against the federal candidate in which his political opponents, in full
34
media glare, will offer purported evidence and argument that he violated
the law. An adverse decision by Respondent Commission, which patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Case No. 2018G and
has no jurisdiction or oversight with respect to elections for federal office,

could irreparably—and unnecessarily—harm Relator Pureval’s
reputation just before the federal election at which he is a candidate.
Voters would inevitably be influenced on how they vote in a close federal
election, and the damage could not be undone after the election.
Third, a needlessly rushed decision by the Commission on
November 1, when it lacks jurisdiction to do so, would impinge upon
Relators’ First Amendment rights to associate with likeminded citizens.
See, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury”). Relator Pureval and his supporters are
entitled to a free and fair election, in which a state agency does not exceed
its lawful jurisdiction in a way that can only politically benefit their
electoral opponents. For these reasons, Relators will suffer irreparable
injury if an alternative writ, injunction, or stay is not issued.

35
V. Issuance of an Alternative Writ, Injunction, or Stay Will Serve
the Public Interest and Not Cause Harm to Others
Granting an alternative writ, injunction, or stay would serve the
public interest and not cause harm to others. Conversely, a decision in

Case No. 2018G-022 by Respondent Commission while this action is
pending could negatively—and potentially wrongfully—impact the
results of a federal election for one candidate in the federal election while
benefitting the other. This is true regardless of whether Respondent
Commission finds in favor of the OEC Complainant or Relators.
However, by granting an injunction or stay, the Court would maintain the
status quo pending resolution of the instant action, thereby preventing
Respondent Commission from benefitting one candidate over the other
and impacting the outcome of a federal election.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Relators respectfully request the Court to
grant an alternative writ, injunction, or a stay to temporarily enjoin or stay
the proceedings in Case No. 2018G-022 pending resolution of the instant
36
action, thereby preserving the status quo and aiding the Court in its
original jurisdiction.
37
**Counsel of Record
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000

Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
pending
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
38
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Motion and
Memorandum in Support were served via email on October 15, 2018 upon
the following:
Philip Richter
Executive Director and Staff Attorney
Ohio Elections Commission
77 South High Street, Suite 1850
Phone: 614-466-3205
philip.richter@elc.state.oh.us
Damian Sikora
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Ohio Attorney General
30 E. Broad Street, 17th Floor
Phone: 614-466-4320
damian.sikora@ohioattorneygeneral.gov
Counsel for Respondent

Donald J. McTigue
39
Exhibit D
State Ex Rel. Pureval, et. al., :

:
Relators, : Case No. 18AP-789
:
vs. :
:
Ohio Elections Commission, :
:
Respondent. :
RESPONDENT’S COMBINED MOTION TO DISMISS

RELATORS’ COMPLAINT FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION
AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RELATORS’
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT,
INJUNCTION OR STAY
Donald J. McTigue (0022849) Mark Landes (0027227)

Derek S. Clinger (0092075) mlandes@isaacwiles.com
McTigue & Colombo LLC Mark Weaver (0065769)
545 East Town Street mweaver@isaacwiles.com
Columbus, Ohio 43215 Andrew N. Yosowitz (0075306)
614-263-7000; Fax: 614-263-7078 Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor
614-221-2121; Fax: 614-365-9516
Peter J. O’Shea (0086560) Attorneys for Respondent Ohio
Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild Elections Commission
513-977-3477; Fax 513-762-0077
Brian G. Svoboda
David Lazarus
Perkins Coie
202-654-6200; Fax: 202-654-6211
2
Relators admit in their Complaint that the Ohio Elections
Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged
violations of State campaign finance law (Complaint, ¶ 8). That is exactly
what the Commission is trying to do—adjudicate alleged violations of
State campaign finance laws. Relators were sanguine with the
Commission’s process until their motion to dismiss was partially denied

and discovery was scheduled to begin. Now, facing those substantive
deadlines, Relators attempt to morph their concerns about the
Commission’s handling of the underlying complaint into purported
jurisdictional hurdles for the Commission.
In this case, a complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that
Relators violated Ohio Revised Code §§ 3517.10 and 3517.13—alleged
violations that Relators admit that the Commission has clear subject
matter jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate. The complaint alleges
improper spending by a state-regulated campaign committee, for which
the Commission is duty-bound to investigate. Why the spending was
improper cannot divest the Commission from jurisdiction. It could be that
drinks or photographs or baseball tickets were purchased, unrelated to a
state campaign committee’s purpose. The object of the spending may give
other regulatory agencies cause for interest, but if the spending itself is
not permissible under state election law, that mandates the Commission
to act.
3
Relators argue that the underlying complaint is deficient in form and
substance, but a complaint’s failure to state a cause of action or
insufficiency of evidence is procedural in nature, not jurisdictional. In
other words, such alleged failings, even if true, do not deprive the
Commission of jurisdiction.
As stated in the Memorandum below, the Commission has statutory

authority to exercise jurisdiction over the types of claims alleged in the
underlying complaint. Relators’ attempt to use a writ of prohibition to test
the sufficiency of a complaint is inappropriate and must be denied.
/s/ Mark Landes

Mark Landes (0027227)
Mark Weaver (0065769)
614-221-2121; Fax: 614-365-9516
Attorneys for Respondent Ohio
Elections Commission
4
I. RELEVANT FACTS 1
A. A COMPLAINT ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF

VARIOUS CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS IS FILED AGAINST RELATORS
The essential facts of this case are not disputed. On August 10, 2018,
Mark Miller filed a complaint (hereinafter “OEC Complaint”) with the
Commission alleging that Aftab Pureval, Friends of Aftab Pureval and
Evan Nolan violated R.C. §§ 3517.13(D), 3517.10(D)(4) and 3517.13(O).
(Complaint, ¶ 12, OEC Complaint attached to Relators’ Complaint as
Exhibit A, at ¶¶ 57-67).
The OEC Complaint alleges that 19 separate expenses or
contributions violated either R.C. § 3517.13(D) (Failure to file a complete
and accurate statement of campaign contributions and expenditures), R.C.
1
For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, Respondents presume all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true; however, statements of law and legal
conclusions need not be accepted as true. Morrow v. Reminger and
Reminger Co., LPA, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d
696, ¶ 7. By narrowing the issues for the Court in this Motion, the
Commission does not intend to waive any other defenses that could later
be stated in an Answer.
5
§ 3517.10(D)(4) (Requiring every expenditure greater than $25.00 to be
vouched for by a receipt stating the purpose of the expenditure which shall
be filed with the statement of expenditures) and/or R.C. § 3517.13(O)
(Prohibiting beneficiary of campaign fund from converting or giving

anything of value from the fund for personal use). (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-14,
Exhibit A, generally; see also Exhibit J attached to Relators’ Complaint
entitled “Overview of Allegations in Complaint”).
The OEC Complaint was supported by an affidavit with numerous
exhibits. (Complaint, ¶ 43, Exhibit A). The affidavit was signed and
notarized and states “that the facts in the foregoing Complaint are based
upon my personal knowledge.” (Id.). Six of the sixty-seven paragraphs
use the phrase “information and belief.” (Complaint ¶ 45, Exhibit A).
B. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The Commission is a seven-member commission created by Ohio
law to hear alleged violations of state campaign finance law contained in
Ohio Revised Code sections 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18,
3517.20 to 3517.22, 3599.03 and 3599.031. (Id. at ¶ 8). The Commission
6
has the authority to find facts, make adjudications of violations, and
impose administrative fines. (Id.).
The Commission assigned the OEC Complaint “Case No. 2018G-
022,” and, pursuant to O.A.C. § 3517-1-11, scheduled a preliminary

review before the full Commission on September 20, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 15).
At the preliminary review, the Commission voted to proceed with the case
and set the matter for a hearing. (Complaint, ¶ 18). A motion hearing was
scheduled for October 11, 2018 and a full evidentiary hearing was
scheduled for November 1, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 20).
On October 11, 2018, the Commission dismissed some of the claims
in the OEC Complaint but voted to move forward with claims regarding
alleged unlawful expenditures. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, Exhibit L). Relators’
Complaint for a Writ of Prohibition followed four days later.
II. RELATORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF

PROHIBITION
By design, writs of prohibition are to be used sparingly. A writ of
prohibition is “an extraordinary remedy that is granted in limited
circumstances with great caution and restraint.” Salloum v. Falkowski,
7
151 Ohio St.3d 531, 2017-Ohio-8722, 90 N.E.3d 918, at ¶ 7, citing State
ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 2001 Ohio 15, 740 N.E.2d
265 (2001). Relators are entitled to the writ only upon a showing that (1)
the Commission is about to exercise judicial power, (2) its exercise of that
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in
injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course
of the law. Id., citing State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114,
2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18. Prohibition will not lie unless it
clearly appears that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the cause
that it is attempting to adjudicate, or the Commission is about to exceed
its jurisdiction. Broderick v. Paris, 8th Dist. No. 106987, 2018-Ohio-2123,
at ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe, 138 Ohio St. 417, 35 N.E.2d
571 (1941), paragraph three of the syllabus. “The writ will not issue to
prevent an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to
correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its
jurisdiction.” Id., citing State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court of Darke
Cty., 153 Ohio St. 64, 65, 90 N.E.2d 598 (1950).
8
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Commission has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the Complaint before it. If so, Relators’
Complaint must be dismissed and their Emergency Motion for Alternative
Writ, Injunction or Stay must be denied.

A. THE COMMISSION HAS CLEAR JURISDICTION TO

ADJUDICATE THE OEC COMPLAINT
The undisputed facts in Relators’ Complaint illustrate the
Commission’s clear jurisdiction to adjudicate the OEC Complaint.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court's power over a type of case. It is
determined as a matter of law and, once conferred, it remains. Pratts v.
Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 34. Stated
another way, subject matter jurisdiction relates to the proper forum for an
entire class of cases, not the particular facts of an individual case. Subject
matter jurisdiction is present if the action brought before a court or
administrative agency alleges "any cause of action cognizable by the
forum." Avco Fin. Servs. Loan Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67, 520
N.E.2d 378 (1987).
9
In this case, the OEC Complaint presents the “type of case” that the
Commission has the specific authority to preside over. The Commission
has jurisdiction to hear complaints “setting forth a failure to comply with
or a violation of any provision in sections 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17,

3517.18, 3517.20 to 3517.22, 3599.03, or 3599.031 of the Revised Code.”
R.C. § 3517.153(A); see also Complaint, ¶ 8. The OEC Complaint at issue
in this case clearly alleged violations of R.C. §§ 3517.13(D),
3517.10(D)(4) and 3517.13(O). (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-14, Exhibit A,
generally and ¶¶ 57-67, Exhibit J (Overview of Allegations in
Complaint)). Whether the allegations are true, false or sufficient to state a
claim are immaterial to the determination of jurisdiction. The
Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate the OEC Complaint and is not
exercising power unauthorized by law. Consequently, Relators have no
basis for a writ of prohibition.
10
B. RELATOR’S ARGUMENTS OPPOSING
JURISDICTION FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW
Relators advance three arguments opposing the Commission’s
jurisdiction: (1) the Commission lacks jurisdiction because certain

allegations in the OEC Complaint were not made on personal knowledge,
(2) the OEC Complaint is preempted by federal law and (3) the OEC
Complaint fails to state a prima facie violation of the law. None of
Relators’ arguments has merit.
Relators’ first and third arguments can be easily disposed of. These
arguments allege that the OEC Complaint fails to state a claim. Whether
or not the OEC Complaint states an actionable violation is procedural, not
jurisdictional. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 65
Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992) (holding that Rule 12 motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is procedural); Murray v. City of
Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-912, 2014-Ohio-2790, at ¶ 13 (same).
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the complete
failure to file an affidavit which is required by statute is a procedural issue,
not a jurisdictional one. In Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks, 145 Ohio
11
St.3d 408, 2016-Ohio-1192, 49 N.E.3d 1296, a mandamus complainant
failed to file a complaint with an affidavit as required by R.C. § 2731.04.
Id. at ¶ 3. The complainant later amended the complaint and included the
affidavit. Id. at ¶ 4. The Court held that “the statute’s requirement that the
complaint be verified by affidavit is not jurisdictional.” Id. at ¶ 15. Thus,
even if the OEC Complainant in this case completely failed to file an
affidavit—something which did not occur in this case—the Commission
would still have jurisdiction over the complaint.
Like a court acting pursuant to Civ. R. 12(b)(6), the Commission has
the legal authority to dismiss an insufficient complaint. 2 See O.A.C. §
3517-1-11(A)(3)(e)(i). Stated differently, the Commission has
jurisdiction to dismiss inadequate complaints. In fact, the Commission
exercised its legal authority to dismiss certain parts of the OEC Complaint
at issue in this case. (Complaint, ¶¶ 32-33). Relators cannot morph the
sufficiency of the form and substance of the OEC Complaint into a
2
The Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 12 apply to the
Commission’s proceedings. See e.g. O.A.C. §§ 3517-1-07(A), 3517-1-
08(B), and 3517-1-09 (C).
12
jurisdictional defect. The essence of Relators’ argument is that the
Commission erred when it did not dismiss the entire OEC Complaint.
Whether the Commission’s decision on Relators’ Motion to Dismiss was
correct or incorrect is of no import to jurisdiction. Where a court possesses

general subject-matter jurisdiction over a pending action, a writ of
prohibition will not issue to prevent an error of law. State ex rel. Bell v.
Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181; State ex rel.
Winnefeld v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler Cty., 159 Ohio St. 225,
112 N.E.2d 27 (1953).
Next, the courts in this District have specifically denied the
insufficient-affidavit argument that Relator makes in this case. In Stow
Munroe Falls Sch. Dist. Levy Cmte. V. Ohio Elections Comm’n, (Sept. 27,
2013), Franklin Cty. Common Pleas Case No. 11CVF-13362, 2013 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 3134, the Court ruled that administrative agencies are not
bound by the strict rules of evidence applied in court. Id. at *16. The Court
rejected a requirement that affiants alleging violations before the
Commission personally observe the alleged wrongdoing. Id., citing
Athens Cty. Democratic Party v. Ohio Elections Commission, Franklin
13
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 08CVF07-10699. In other words,
the rigors of the personal knowledge requirement are not as onerous in the
Commission’s administrative setting. Moreover, the cases cited by
Relators in their Motion, State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d

110, 2002-Ohio-5334, State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d
437, 2006-Ohio-5439 and State ex rel. Escaro v. Youngstown City
Council, 116 Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699 are inapposite. Hackworth
and Evans concerned attorneys providing affidavits of their client’s
purported knowledge. See Hackworth and Evans at ¶¶ 24 and 32,
respectively. In Escaro, the affiant did not even attempt to state that the
affidavit was based on personal knowledge. Escaro at ¶ 15. Such is not
the case here. In this case, the OEC Complaint was supported by an
affidavit with numerous exhibits. (Complaint, ¶ 43, Exhibit A). The
affidavit was signed and notarized and states “that the facts in the
foregoing Complaint are based upon my personal knowledge.” (Id.).
While six of the sixty-seven paragraphs use the phrase “information and
belief (Complaint ¶ 45, Exhibit A), that does not vitiate the entire affidavit
14
and its exhibits and, even if it did, it is not a jurisdictional issue, but, rather
a procedural one.
Relator’s argument that the claims in the OEC Complaint are
preempted by federal law also fails. As an initial matter, the Ohio Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted the Commission’s jurisdiction. R.C. §
3517.151(A) confers exclusive jurisdiction over complaints with respect
to acts or failures to act under the specified provisions on the Ohio
Elections Commission. State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell,
111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, 855 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 15. “The
General Assembly employed broad, sweeping language to confer the
exclusive initial jurisdiction to consider these alleged violations [the
violations listed in R.C. § 3517.153] on the Ohio Elections Commission.
Jurisdiction is conferred on courts in these matters only after the
commission has rendered a final determination [which has not occurred
in this case].” Id. at ¶ 16. In addition, it is well-settled that an
administrative or quasi-judicial body has the power to determine in the
first instance its own jurisdiction. State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch,
134 Ohio St. 3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, ¶16, 983 N.E.2d 302 (a court with
15
general subject-matter jurisdiction may determine its own jurisdiction);
State ex rel. Canfield v. Civil Service Comm., (April 26, 1991), 7th Dist.
No. 91 C.A. 3, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1896 at *5, 1991 WL 66198
(administrative agencies may determine their own jurisdiction); 67 Ohio

Jur.3d § 182 (Inferior tribunal may determine its own jurisdiction).
This case is not preempted by federal law. The OEC Complainant
alleges a violation of R.C. § 3517.13—a state law over which the
Commission has jurisdiction. The complaint alleges improper spending
from the account of a state campaign committee, and spending is exactly
what the Commission investigates.
Relator Aftab Pureval is seeking election to the U.S. House of
Representatives. (Complaint, ¶ 9). Under Ohio law, that is the only
election in which he is considered a “candidate” in 2018. See R.C. §
3501.01(H); R.C. § 3513.052(A)(4) (prohibiting a person’s candidacy for
a “federal office and a state or county office” at the same election). Even
though Relator Pureval is not a candidate for state office, he still has a
state campaign committee. Relator Friends of Aftab Pureval is the
campaign committee purporting to support Relator Aftab Pureval’s
16
campaign for Hamilton County Clerk of Courts. (Complaint, ¶ 6, Exhibit
A, ¶ 3). Under Ohio law, Aftab Pureval is considered a “beneficiary” of
the Friends of Aftab Pureval campaign committee. Relator Aftab Pureval
also has a separate campaign committee supporting his U.S.

Representative campaign. (Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 4). Two campaign committees
in this situation is allowed under Ohio law, but only one campaign
committee can be used to support a candidate during his candidacy.
Ohio law prohibits the (1) conversion of Ohio campaign committee
funds “for personal use” and (2) the provision of campaign funds to a
beneficiary of a campaign fund or any other person, for the beneficiary's
or any other person's personal use. See R.C. § 3517.13(O). In this case,
the OEC Complainant alleges that Relators made expenditures from the
Ohio Relators’ state campaign fund for illegitimate purposes. (OEC
Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12, 15-16, 36-37, 45-52, 65, 67). More specifically, the
OEC Complaint alleges that the state campaign expenditures were made
to support Relators’ U.S. Representative campaign. This is not
permissible under Ohio law. See R.C. § 3517.13(O)(3)(a) (stating that
Ohio campaign funds can only be used to support a candidate other than
17
the beneficiary (other than Pureval)). The question to the Commission is
this: was the state committee’s money used for a permissible purpose, or
not?
To hold for Relator here is to hold that the Commission can look at
some impermissible purposes listed in the statute, but not others. Relator
argues unpersuasively that “to find that the expenditures were actually
intended to support Relator Pureval’s federal campaign, Respondent
Commission must decide if the expenditures were made for the purpose
of influencing a federal election” which, allegedly, is a finding expressly
reserved to the FEC. (Complaint, ¶¶64-65). This is not true. Whether the
expenditures were made “for the purpose of influencing a federal
election” is not an element of R.C. § 3517.13(O). The issue for the
Commission is whether the expenditures from an Ohio campaign fund fall
within the legitimate expenditures listed in R.C. § 3517.13(O). The
expenditures may also be a violation of federal law, but that does not
prohibit the Commission from adjudicating alleged violations of Ohio law
as well.
18
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissions’ actions were not
unauthorized by law. Consequently, Relators’ Complaint for a Writ of
Prohibition should be dismissed and Relators’ Motion for Alternative
Writ, Injunction and Stay should be denied as moot.

/s/ Mark Landes

Mark Weaver (0065769)
614-221-2121; Fax: 614-365-9516
Attorneys for Respondent Ohio
Elections Commission
19
I hereby certify that on October 18, 2018, a copy of the foregoing
was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by
operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this
filing through the Court’s system.
Service was also made via electronic mail to the following:
dmctigue@electionlawgroup.com,
/s/ Mark Landes

4839-9654-2841.1
20
Exhibit E
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE EX REL. AFTAB : NO. 18AP-789

PUREVAL, et al :
:
Relators, : ORIGINAL ACTION IN
: PROHIBITION
-v- :
:
OHIO ELECTIONS :
COMMISSION :
:
Respondent. :
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION

FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT, INJUNCTION, OR STAY
TEMPORARILY ENJOINING OR STAYING OHIO ELECTIONS
COMMISSION CASE NO. 2018G-022
545 East Town Street Andrew N. Yosowitz (0075306)
Columbus, Ohio 43215 ayosowitz@isaacwiles.com
Phone: (614) 263-7000 Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder &
Fax: (614) 263-7078 Teetor

Phone: (614) 221-2121
Peter J. O’Shea (0086560) Fax: (614) 365-9516
225 East Fifth Street, Suite 2400 Counsel for Respondent
Tel: 513-977-3477
Fax: 513-762-0077
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Admitted pro hac vice
Perkins Coie
Suite 600
Tel: 202-654-6200
Fax: 202-654-6211

INTRODUCTION
Respondent Commission’s Motion to Dismiss and Response in
Opposition (“Response”) focuses entirely upon whether the
Commission’s exercise of quasi-judicial power was unauthorized by law,

which is part of the determination of whether Relators are likely to
succeed on the merits of their writ of prohibition claim. In so doing, the
Commission concedes that the remaining equitable factors
overwhelmingly favor granting Relators’ minimal request: an alternative
writ, injunction, or stay temporarily enjoining or staying Case No. 2018G-
022 pending disposition of the instant action.
On the merits of whether Respondent Commission’s exercise of
quasi-judicial power was unauthorized by law, the Commission’s
Response tries to draw the Court’s attention away from the proper inquiry:
whether the Commission’s power to adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022 is
unauthorized by law. Instead, the Commission attempts to frame Relators’
action as a challenge to the Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction to
hear complaints alleging violations of Ohio campaign finance law. But
that is not what Relators’ action is about. Rather, the issue is that the OEC
1
Complaint fails to comply with a mandatory statutory prerequisite for the
Commission to be able to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
For these reasons, the Court should grant Relators’ motion.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Respondent Commission concedes that the sole dispositive issue is
whether the Commission’s exercise of quasi-judicial power is
unauthorized by law (Response at 9), which is one element in determining
Relators’ likelihood of success on the merits. Because the Commission
does not address the remaining factors relevant to the determination of
whether to issue an alternative writ, injunction, or stay temporarily
enjoining the Commission from adjudicating Case No. 2018G-022
pending disposition of the instant action, the Commission has conceded
these points and Relators do not further address them herein.
I. Relators are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of their Writ of

Prohibition Claim.
The Commission does not dispute that it is exercising quasi-judicial
power nor does the Commission dispute that Relators lack an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remaining issue then in
2
determining the likelihood that Relators will succeed on the merits of their
writ of prohibition action is whether Respondent Commission’s exercise
of quasi-judicial power is unauthorized by law.
A. Writs of prohibition will issue when the exercise of quasi-

judicial power is unauthorized by law; they are not narrowly

limited to situations where a tribunal lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.
The Commission’s Response seeks to frame Relators’ action as a
challenge to the Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear
complaints alleging violations of Ohio campaign finance law. (Response
at 3, 8-10). But this is not at issue. Instead, the issue is whether the
Commission’s exercise of its quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the OEC
Complaint is unauthorized by law.
There is an important distinction between lacking authorization to
exercise quasi-judicial power and lacking subject matter jurisdiction as
the latter is a subset of the former. If a tribunal lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, then it lacks authorization to exercise quasi-judicial power.
However, if a tribunal lacks authorization to exercise quasi-judicial
power, it is not necessarily because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction; a
3
tribunal could have subject matter jurisdiction and still act without
authorization. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized this in State ex
rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d
396, in which the Court explained that “even if a common pleas court has
general jurisdiction over a case, a writ of prohibition will issue when the
court seeks to take an action or provide a remedy that exceeds its statutory
authority.” Id. at ¶ 69 citing State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d
279, 2004-Ohio-6384, ¶ 12-16, State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross, 111 Ohio
St.3d 231, 2006-Ohio-4705, 855 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 50, State ex rel. Adams
v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 328-29, 285 N.E.2d 22 (1972).
This means that when a tribunal lacks the judicial power to take a
particular action, it lacks “jurisdiction” in the boarder sense of the term.
See, Black’s Online Legal Dictionary, “Jurisdiction” (defining
“jurisdiction” as the “power and authority conferred upon…a court or
judge”). For instance, in State ex rel. Durrani v. Ruehlman, 147 Ohio
St.3d 478, 2016-Ohio-7740, 67 N.E.3d 769, a writ of prohibition case, the
Ohio Supreme Court explained that the case was “not about the
jurisdiction of the trial court, or even of Judge Ruehlman, to hear the

4
underlying tort cases,” but was about whether the judge had the “judicial
power” or “authority” under the Rules of Superintendence of the Courts,
the Civil Rules, and the Hamilton County Local Rules to consolidate
cases. Id. at ¶ 21-26. Finding that that the judge did not have the authority
under the procedural rules, the Durrani Court issued a writ of prohibition.
Id.
Thus, the Court’s focus here must be on whether the Commission’s
attempt to adjudicate Case No. 2018G-022 is unauthorized by law.
B. The exercise of quasi-judicial power is unauthorized by law if

the tribunal’s jurisdiction has not been properly invoked.
In general, Respondent Commission’s exercise of its quasi-judicial
power could be unauthorized by law for several reasons. This would
include a scenario where a complaint does not present an issue within the
Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction. However, it would also include
a scenario where a complaint fails to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites
to invoke the Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction. The instant action
presents the latter issue. The OEC Complaint failed to meet the
jurisdictional prerequisites to invoke the Commission’s subject matter
5
jurisdiction as it did not adhere to statutory requirements for filing
complaints. As a result, the Commission’s attempt to adjudicate the
claims in the OEC Complaint is unauthorized by law.
1. The Commission’s complaint-filing process is a creature of

statute, and, therefore, its procedures must be strictly

followed.
An individual’s right to file a complaint with Respondent
Commission is a right conferred by statute, not by the Ohio Constitution.
As such, the right can be exercised only in the manner as prescribed by
the General Assembly.
The Commission cites Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks, 145 Ohio
St.3d 408, 2016-Ohio-1192, 49 N.E.3d 1296 for the proposition that
requirements to file complaints by verified affidavit are not actually
mandatory. (Response at 11-12). However, the key distinction between
Salemi and the Commission’s process is that Salemi involved the
requirements for mandamus actions, which are provided for in the Ohio
Constitution. See, Article IV, Sections 2(B)(1)(b), 3(B)(1)(b) of the Ohio
Constitution. In holding that miscaptioned pleadings or omissions of
affidavits do not automatically invalidate mandamus actions, Salemi

6
essentially stands for the proposition that statutory requirements for filing
mandamus actions may facilitate but not restrict the constitutional right to
file a mandamus action.
In stark contrast to mandamus actions¸ the Commission’s

complaint-filing process is entirely a creature of statute. See, R.C.
3517.153. As such, the right must be exercised in the manner prescribed
by the General Assembly. This is a well-settled principle. For instance, in
Helms v. Koncelik, 187 Ohio App.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1782, 931 N.E.2d
657, in which this Court was presented with a question of whether an
appeal from the Ohio Environmental Review Appeals Commission was
timely filed, the Court explained the following longstanding principles:
(1) “[w]here a statute confers the right of appeal, an appeal may be
perfected only in the manner prescribed by statute.”; (2) “An
administrative appeal, the right to which is conferred by statute, can be
perfected only in the mode prescribed by statute. The exercise of the right
conferred is conditioned upon compliance with the accompanying
mandatory requirements.” (3) “Strict compliance with statutory filing
requirements is a necessary precursor to jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 15 (internal

7
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also, State ex rel.
GE v. Indus. Comm’n, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-648, 2007-Ohio-
3293, ¶ 22 (explaining that Ohio law grants to the Industrial Commission
of Ohio the “jurisdiction to adjudicate contested workers’ compensation

claims,” but that “[i]n order to exercise that jurisdiction…the commission
must adhere to statutory requirements.”) (emphasis added).
With the above principles in mind, this Court and the Ohio Supreme
Court have regularly held that individuals, agencies, and courts must
strictly adhere to statutory requirements in order to invoke jurisdiction
that is conferred solely by statute. For instance, courts have held that the
failure to identify specific legal or factual errors in the grounds of a party’s
appeal, as formerly required in administrative appeals under R.C. 119.12,
is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Foreman v. Lucas Cnty. Court of
Common Pleas, 189 Ohio App.3d 678, 2010-Ohio-4731, 939 N.E.2d
1302, ¶ 15, 17 (10th Dist.) Courts have also held that a notice of
administrative appeal’s failure to contain the required statement that “the
agency’s order is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence and is not in accordance with law,” is also a jurisdictional defect.

8
See, e.g., River Room, Inc., v. Ohio Liquor Control, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 14 AP-956, 2015-Ohio-2924, ¶ 12. Additionally, courts have
repeatedly held that an untimely filing is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. DeMatteo v. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 10th Dist. Franklin No.
17AP-678, 2018-Ohio-3635, ¶ 33, 35; State ex rel. McGirr v. Winkler,
152 Ohio St.3d 100, 2017-Ohio-8046, 93 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 15-16 (explaining
in a writ prohibition action that the filing of a transfer deed within ten days
of its execution is necessary to vest a probate court with jurisdiction over
voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors).
Thus, because an individual’s right to file a complaint with the
Commission exists solely by statute, this right must be exercised in the
manner prescribed by law. Failure to adhere to the statute’s filing
requirements is, therefore, a jurisdictional defect.
2. To invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction, the General

Assembly requires complaints filed by individuals to be made
by affidavit on personal knowledge.
For individuals filing complaints with the Commission, the General
Assembly established a heightened requirement to invoke the
Commission’s subject-matter jurisdiction compared to complaints filed

9
by the Secretary of State or any of the boards of elections. Complaints
filed by the Secretary of State or any of the boards of elections must
simply “set[] forth a failure to comply with or a violation of” any
provision within the Commission’s jurisdiction. R.C. 3517.153(A).

Complaints filed by individuals, on the other hand, “shall be made by
affidavit of any person, on personal knowledge, and subject to penalties
for perjury.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, as a jurisdictional prerequisite
to invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction, complaints filed by individuals
must be made by affidavit on personal knowledge.
In explaining its authority to exercise quasi-judicial power over
complaints, Respondent Commission entirely omits this heightened
requirement for individual complainants. Instead the Commission asserts
that it has the power to adjudicate any complaint that simply alleges a
violation of Ohio’s campaign finance laws. (Response at 3 (implying that
the Commission is “duty-bound to investigate” any complaint that alleges
a violation of state campaign finance laws), at 10 (asserting that the
standard is whether a complaint merely alleges a violation of state
campaign finance law)). Getting even further away from the requirements
10
set forth by R.C. 3517.153(A), Respondent Commission absurdly
contends that “even if the OEC Complainant in this case completely failed
to file an affidavit…the Commission would still have jurisdiction over the
Complaint.” (Response at 12). This interpretation flies in the face of this

Court’s statement that “[s]trict compliance with statutory filing
requirements is a necessary precursor to jurisdiction.” Helms, 187 Ohio
App.3d at ¶ 15.
Adopting the Commission’s position would not only require the
Court to omit the express language of R.C. 3517.153(A)—something
courts cannot do (see, Beau Brummel Ties, Inc. v. Lindley, 56 Ohio St.2d
310, 311-12, 383 N.E.2d 907 (1978) (explaining that, in interpreting legal
provisions, courts are “not to delete words used” in statutes)—but it would
also represent a sea change in Ohio campaign finance law. It would allow
any person who baldly alleges that another individual or committee
violated Ohio campaign finance law to then go on endless fishing
expeditions. For instance, in the underlying action before the
Commission, the OEC Complainant has requested the Commission to
subpoena Relator Pureval’s mother to testify. This cannot be what the

11
General Assembly intended when it expressly required complaints filed
with the Commission by individuals to be made on personal knowledge.
3. The OEC Complaint did not properly invoke the Commission’s

jurisdiction because it failed to satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisite to make its allegations on personal knowledge.
As explained more fully in Relators’ Motion, the OEC Complaint’s
primary defect is that its linchpin allegations that expenditures were made
by the County Committee for the benefit of Relator Pureval’s federal
campaign are not based on personal knowledge. Rel. Motion at 13-20
Instead, they are, by their own words, based on “information and belief,”
which the Ohio Supreme Court has explained does not constitute personal
knowledge. See, Rel. Motion at 14-16. Thus, these allegations are not
sufficient to invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction, and without them, the
OEC Complaint has not alleged any violation of Ohio law.
Respondent Commission contends that the Ohio Supreme Court
cases cited in Relators’ Motion defining and explaining “personal
knowledge” are somehow “inapposite.” (Response at 14). However, the
Commission provides no real explanation as to how these cases are
“inapposite.” The cases cited all stand for the simple proposition that if an
12
affidavit affirmatively states that any number of allegations contained
therein are based on something other than personal knowledge—whether
it be “information and belief,” “personal knowledge and information,” or
“to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief”—then the affidavit

is not made on personal knowledge. The Commission cannot get around
this.
The Commission also cites two decisions from the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas to contend that the personal knowledge
requirement is somehow “not as onerous in the Commission’s
administrative setting.” (Response at 13-14 Athens Cty. Democratic Party
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n. (Aug. 23, 2011), Franklin Cty. Case No. 08-
CVF-07-10699; Stow Munroe Falls Sch. Dist. Levy Cmte v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n (Sept. 27, 2013), Franklin Cty. Case No. 11CVF-10-
13362). However, these decisions stand only for the proposition that
personal knowledge does not require parties to have personally observed
the alleged wrongdoing—one can still have personal knowledge of
13
wrongdoing without having personally observed it.1 They do not stand for
the proposition that “information and belief” satisfies “personal
knowledge.” If they did, they would be in direct conflict with the Ohio
Supreme Court’s numerous opinions that hold otherwise.

In sum, because the key allegations in the OEC Complaint are based
on information and belief instead of personal knowledge, the Complaint
fails to properly invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction. As a result, the
Commission’s exercise of quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the claims in
the OEC Complaint is unauthorized by law.
4. The Complaint fails to invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction for

the additional reason that it fails to set forth facts that would
constitute a prima facie violation of Ohio campaign finance law.
As an additional jurisdictional prerequisite, Ohio law and the
Commission’s rules require complaints filed with the Commission by
1
See, Athens Cty. at *9 (“In the case at bar, Appellants would mandate
that Ms. Morris be personally in attendance at the 2000 City Council vote
and be personally in attendance when Appellants created and/or
authorized the advertisement before she could file a complaint, which
cannot be the standard.”); Stow Munroe at *15-16 (“imposing a
requirement in this appeal that the affiant personally observe the alleged
wrongdoing under R.C. 3517.10(A) would be unreasonably onerous”).
14
individuals to set forth facts that constitute a prima facie violation of Ohio
campaign finance law. See, Rel. Motion at 24-25 citing R.C. 3517.153(A),
O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(f), O.A.C. 3517-1-02(A)(1)(g). This is similar to
the former requirement under R.C. 119.12 for notices of administrative

appeals to set forth the specific grounds of the party’s appeal, which courts
had held was a jurisdictional prerequisite for courts to adjudicate the
appeal. See, e.g., Foreman, 189 Ohio App.3d 678, ¶ 15, 17. In other
words, it is not merely a matter of form, as the Commission contends.
(Response at 12-13). And as set forth more fully in Relators’ Motion (Rel.
Motion at 24-33), the OEC Complaint failed to set forth facts that would
constitute a prima facie violation of R.C. 3517.13(D) or R.C.
3517.13(D)(4). For this independent reason, the Complaint did not
properly invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction, and the Commission,
therefore, lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.
C. The Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate

the claims that expenditures were made for a federal election.
On federal preemption, Respondent makes three arguments. First,
Respondent says it is simply trying to “adjudicate alleged violations of
15
State campaign finance laws.” (Response at 3.) Second, Respondent
points out that the Ohio Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the
Commission’s jurisdiction. (Response at 15.) Third, Respondent argues
that “[w]hether the expenditures were made for the purpose of influencing
a federal election is not an element of R.C. § 3517.13(O),” thereby
suggesting that the Complaint does not involve federal law. (Response at
18).2
Each of these arguments fails. First, whether Respondent is simply
trying to enforce the state campaign finance laws is beside the point.
Under FECA’s sweeping preemption language, state agencies cannot
enforce generally applicable state laws in matters FECA regulates. See 52
U.S.C. § 30143(a) (FECA supersedes and preempts “any provision of
2
Respondent also confusingly argues that Relator Pureval’s status as a
federal candidate prevents him from spending funds from his state
campaign committee at the same time. (Response at 16-17.) However, as
Relators noted previously, state guidance says otherwise: “This single
committee restriction does not prevent a local or statewide candidate from
also having a federal political committee in concurrent operation for the
purpose of seeking election to a federal office.” See Ohio Campaign
Finance Manual at 2-11 (March 2013),
https://www.sos.state.oh.us/globalassets/candidates/cfguide/chapters/cha
pter2.pdf.
16
State law with respect to election to Federal office”). Thus, for example,
even though Kentucky law regulates the financing of Kentucky elections,
the Sixth Circuit kept the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance from
investigating whether a federal candidate spent federal campaign funds to

“test the waters” for state office. Bunning v. Kentucky, 42 F.3d 1008,
1012 (6th Cir. 1994). Even though Georgia law regulates lawmakers’
conduct to avoid corruption, the Eleventh Circuit kept that state from
enforcing a law that barred lawmakers from soliciting funds during
legislative sessions, in cases where the lawmakers sought federal office.
See Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 1996). In each case, the state
was unable to “look at some impermissible purposes” under state law
(Response at 18), because federal law controlled.
Second, whether “the Ohio Supreme Court has broadly interpreted
the Commission’s jurisdiction” is also beside the point. (Response at 15).
Under federal preemption doctrine, the question is not whether the
Commission’s jurisdiction is broad or narrow under state law, but whether
it withstands preemption under federal law. “[W]hen state law conflicts
or interferes with federal law, state law must give way.” Teper, 82 F.3d at
17
993. To decide whether Relators spent funds in connection with a federal
election is a question of federal law, and state law cannot be applied to
conflict or interfere with the assignment of exclusive jurisdiction in
Section 30143(a) of FECA. The centerpiece of the Complaint is a poll

undertaken to help Relator Pureval decide whether to run for Congress, or
simply seek re-election to state office. The Federal Election Commission
adopted specific, detailed rules on how to pay for such polls. See 11 C.F.R.
§ 106.4 (2018). Yet while a federal complaint is pending over this same
poll, Respondent would hasten to decide whether Relators paid for the
poll correctly.
Third, it does not matter that a federal election-influencing purpose
“is not an express element of R.C. § 3517.13(O).” (Response at 18.) The
central question in the Complaint is whether the expenditures were made
for the purpose of influencing a federal election. See 52 U.S.C. §
30101(9)(A)(1). The travel, media, polling and meetings expenses before
Respondent are all classic legitimate and verifiable campaign expenses.
The only reason Complainant thinks them suspect is that Relator Pureval
is running for Congress. Thus, the Complaint repeatedly asks the

18
Respondent to unmask “[d]isguised federal campaign expenditures …”
Complaint at 3. It repeatedly claims that the disputed expenses were: (1)
“made to support Pureval’s efforts in his campaign for Congress,” id. at
4, 6; (2) “related to Pureval’s campaign for Congress.” id. at 7; and (3)

“related to Aftab Pureval’s testing of the waters for a run for Congress
…” Id. at 10. There is simply no way for the Commission to decide these
claims without deciding whether Relators made expenditures in
connection with a federal election. Here, again, the potential for conflict
is clear. Lacking jurisdiction over these federal questions, Respondent
could decide them adversely to Relators, while the Federal Election
Commission, which has exclusive civil jurisdiction over them, could
decide them favorably. See 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1).
It is not surprising that Respondent seems to admit that Relators’
federal preemption argument cannot “be easily disposed of.” (Response
at 11.) It is also not surprising that Respondent’s brief conspicuously lacks
cases discussing FECA preemption, and completely fails to distinguish or
debunk Relators’ cited authorities. The governing law, the expressly
stated intention of Congress to preempt state law in the field of federal

19
campaign finance, and the Complaint’s specific allegations all clearly
indicate federal preemption is necessary and appropriate in this case.
Unless this Court steps in, Respondent Commission, while claiming to
enforce state law, will decide a question of federal law, thus setting up a
potential conflict with the FEC, which is the only administrative agency
that is supposed to decide it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, there ample grounds upon which the
Court should grant Relators’ motion to temporarily enjoin or stay the
proceedings in Case No. 2018G-022. Doing so would allow the Court to
decide the instant action without having the Commission proceed full
steam ahead to adjudicate the matter just days before a federal election.
20
**Counsel of Record
545 E. Town St.
Tel: 614-263-7000

Tel: 513-977-3477
Brian G. Svoboda*
David Lazarus*
*Admitted pro hac vice
Perkins Coie
Tel: 202-654-6200
21
I hereby certify that on October 19, 2018, a copy of the foregoing
was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by
operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this
filing through the Court’s system.
Service was also made via electronic mail to the following:
Mark Landes, mlandes@isaacwiles.com
Mark Weaver, mweaver@isaacwiles.com
Andrew Yosowitz, ayosowitz@isaacwiles.com

Donald J. McTigue
22

Pureval Ohio Supreme Court Motion For Expedited Proceedings

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Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed October 23, 2018 - Case No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No. 2018-1523

APPELLANTS-RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT

Counsel for Appellants

STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No. 2018-1523

APPELLANTS-RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT

Franklin County, seeking to prohibit Appellee-Respondent Ohio Elections Commission from

appeal. A memorandum in support is attached for the Court’s consideration.

/s/ Donald J. McTigue____________

Peter J. O’Shea (0086560)

Counsel for Appellants

The instant appeal involves a state agency—Appellee-Respondent Ohio Elections

Commission (the “Commission”)—rushing to adjudicate a complaint over which it patently and

Appellants-Relators filed an emergency motion for an alternative writ, injunction, or stay to

2018G-022 and/or for an injunction pending a final decision of Appellants-Relators’ appeal.

A. Standard for Issuance of Injunction or Stay

An alternative writ or injunction staying or enjoining the Commission’s proceedings is

administrative order pending appeal).

it will prevent state government interference with a federal election.

B. A Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal is Urgently Needed to Prevent Irreparable

to support Appellants-Relators. The First Amendment protection of the right of individuals to

electoral opponents. Second, Appellant-Relator Pureval’s reputation will be damaged by the

As an additional concern, lacking an injunction or a stay, the Commission will reach a

exercising its quasi-judicial power.

C. Issuing an Injunction Will Serve the Public Interest.

will serve the public interest.

As an initial matter, the public interest is inherently served in restraining unauthorized

mooting the writ of prohibition relief.

the complaint pending before it.

serve the public interest.

Commission to do so by affidavit made on personal knowledge. See, R.C. 3517.153(A). Instead,

Thus, Appellants-Relators’ likelihood of success on the merits of their writ of prohibition

action is not at issue in the instant appeal.

Peter J. O’Shea (0086560)

Counsel for Appellants

/s/ Donald J. McTigue________

STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL : No.

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF AFTAB PUREVAL, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL, AND

Counsel for Aftab Pureval, Friends of Aftab

STATE EX REL. AFTAB PUREVAL, et al. : No.

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF AFTAB PUREVAL, FRIENDS OF AFTAB PUREVAL, AND

appeal is therefore of right pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.01(A)(3).

Peter J. O’Shea (0086560)

Counsel for Relators

/s/ Donald J. McTigue________

Case Number: 18AP000789

Case Style: STATE, EX REL AFTAB PUREVAL -VS- OHIO

Motion Tie Off Information:

STATE EX REL. AFTAB : CASE NO.

RELATORS’ VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN ORIGINAL ACTION

Fax: (614) 263-7078

Peter J. O’Shea (0086560)

Counsel for Relators

1. This is an original action commenced pursuant to this Court’s

original jurisdiction under Section 3, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.

2. Relators seek an Order, Judgment, and/or Writ from this Court

to prohibit Respondent Ohio Elections Commission from adjudicating

Ohio Elections Commission Case No. 2018G-022 (“Case No. 2018G-

022”) because the Commission lacks jurisdiction.

3. Relators also seek an alternative writ, injunction, or stay to

temporarily enjoin or stay the proceedings in Case No. 2018G-022

and aiding the Court’s original jurisdiction.