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CWPC Contingency Wartime Planning Course

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

IP - 4000

INSTRUCTOR: Lt Col Bob Barthelmess

DESCRIPTION: This lesson examines the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the cornerstone document
for deliberate planning. The lesson provides information on the organization and content of the JSCP, the type
of guidance it offers to the planning community, the specific planning tasks directed to the CINCs and Services,
and the apportionment of combat forces.

OBJECTIVE: TOOTLIFEST to comprehend the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) in relation to
contingency wartime planning

SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR: Each student will be able to:

1. Describe how the JSCP supports national military strategy and national
objectives

2. Explain how the JSCP relates to USAF wartime planning

3. Describe the purpose and content of the JSCP

4. Know the availability and classification of the JSCP

5. Describe the adaptive planning process

6. Explain how major combat forces are apportioned

 
REQUIRED READING:

Review the CWPC Desktop Reference for definitions of the following:

a. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) e. Intratheater

b. Apportion f. Intertheater

c. Augmentation Forces g Operation Plan (Oplan)

d. Concept Plan (ConPlan)

OPTIONAL READING:

1. Joint Staff Officers’ Guide (Purple Book) (AFSC Pub 1), Pages 6-11 through 6-20

2. Instructional JSCP, FY96 (S) available for your review--ask your FSL

TOPICAL OUTLINE:

1. Introduction:

a. JSCP Support to
National Objectives and National Military Strategy: The JSCP is one of the
products of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSCP carries out
 the Chairman’s National Military Strategy (another product of the JSPS) and
National Objectives by directing the CINCs to accomplish strategic planning.

b. JSCP Relationship to USAF Planning: The JSCP directs the CINCs and Services
to do strategic planning. The Services take the essence of the JSCP (policies,
guidance, apportionment, etc.) and develop their own Service-unique guidance.
In the case of the Air Force, the important aspects of the JSCP are translated
into the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP). The WMP brings into the
Air Force all the critical parts of the JSCP, and then provides more specific
planning guidance for Air Force planners. The Instruction Period on the WMP (IP-
4050) will provide more information.

2. Purpose and Content:

a. JSCP Purpose: The JSCP provides guidance, assigns specific planning

tasks, and apportions forces. The JSCP is a joint planning document that
provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of Services to accomplish tasks
and missions based on near-term military capabilities. It is the
cornerstone document, which officially starts deliberate planning.

d. One volume, ten sections

(1) A - Introduction

(2) B - Strategic Setting

(3) C - Planning

(4) D - Forces

(5) E - Regional Plans

(6) F - Planning Guidance

(7) G - Intelligence
 (8) H - Supplemental Instructions (published separately - see
below)

(9) I - References

(10) J - Glossary

d. Fourteen Supplemental Instructions - published separately.

(1) Amplify guidance in the basic JSCP

(2) Provide functional planning guidance

(3) Indicates functional capabilities

(4) JSCP's 14 Supplemental Instructions:

CJCSI 3110.xx

.02 - Intelligence - .09 - C2 Warfare

.03 - Logistic .10 - C4 Systems

.04 - Nuclear .11 - Mobility

.05 - Psychological .12 - Civil Affairs

.06 - Special Operations .13 - Mobilization

.07 - Chemical Warfare .14 - MOOTW

.08 - Mapping, Charting .15 - Special Technical Ops.

(a) Two major supplements: 3110.03 & .11

3. Availability and Classification

a. Developed by the Joint Staff: J5, Strategy Division. CJCS Manual (CJCSM 3110.01)
  

b. Top Secret, usually available only at the MAJCOM/Service

Component level and above (i.e., CINC,

4. JSCP Planning Guidance

1. Major Theater War (MTW) versus Small Scale Contingency (SSC) –

Core Strategy: Plan for. "..the United States, in concert with regional allies, must
remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two
distant theaters in overlapping time frames." (NSS, May ’97)

(1) Major Theater War (MTW): A regionally centered crisis based on

a significant threat to US vital interests in a region that warrants the
deployment of forces greater than division-wing combinations.

(2) Small Scale Contingencies (SSC): A regionally centered crisis

based on a less compelling threat than those involved in an MTW.
Missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat
spectrum.

b. Regional Assumptions: Assumptions, in tabular format, which

apply to one or more CINCs, and assist them in deliberate planning.

c. Intelligence Estimates: CJCSI 3110.02 (Intelligence Supplement)

provides a threat analysis for various regions. The analysis is for the
current JSCP (i.e., FY 96)

d. Global and Regional Strategies:

(1) Fundamental Objective: Deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend
the nation’s vital interests against any potential foe.

(2) Three Foundations: (See current NMS, IP-2000)

(a) Shape…the world through Engagement

(b) Deter…conflict through a credible combat force

(c) Prepare…for the future

e. Common Regional Tasks: A list, in tabular form, of tasks which each CINC is
required to plan for or include within his operations/concept plans. Examples are:
Continuity of Operations, command relationships, enemy prisoners of war, etc.

f. Adaptive Planning Process: Premise: that

a crisis can arise under a variety of
circumstances that will, in turn, elicit
a variety of likely responses. The
adaptive planning process provides
for three "response options" (from
deterrence through counterattack)
which meet (or "adapt") to the
spectrum of crisis with which the US
may be confronted.

(a) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs): Political, Military, Economic, and Diplomatic deterrent
options which the United States may impose to ward off a potential foe.

(1) Used early on in the adaptive planning process

(2) Rapidly executable

(3) Tailored to send the "right message," i.e., use the correct deterrent option to send
a strong message and show US resolve.

(4) For the military option, uses small forces -- brigade/squadron level forces

(5) Forces not placed in jeopardy -- usually

there to demonstrate a show of force;
conflict is not part of FDOs

 
 

(b) Deploy Decisive Force: If FDOs should fail, to take actions, including the rapid
deployment of sufficient and supportable war-fighting force to a crisis region, to
defend US interests, followed by sufficient additional force to end the conflict
quickly and on terms favorable to the United States.

(1) This is the focus of deliberate planning, and encompasses the use of differing
size and composition of forces -- called case forces -- to meet the threat. Deploy
Decisive Force is a range of options for which detailed force and resource planning
is conducted and for which transportation-feasible TPFDDs are developed for
Oplans, and perhaps ConPlans.

(c) Counterattack: An attack against US forces or vital interests without prior

warning or deterrent moves. The CINCs include concepts for a counterattack option
in their operation plans for the employment of assigned and apportioned forces in
case of an unexpected attack against the US.

5. Assigns Specific Planning Tasks

a. Establishes the Supported and Supporting CINCs Provides, in columnar format, who the Supported CINC is,
and lists (up to eight) other CINCs who will be in a supporting role.

b. Directs the CINCs to develop OPlans, ConPlans, and/or Functional Plans

(1) CENTCOM and PACOM OPlans for MTWs, and CONPLANS with a TPFDD for the second of two concurrent
MTWs in their AORs.

(2) For SSCs, CINCs are tasked to develop a CONPLAN either with or without a TPFDD, depending on the
likelihood of execution.

c. Directs Regional Taskings: As discussed above, tables are provided for each CINC. The table directs the CINC
to write a plan to cover a potential crisis. Within the table are assumptions, which the CINC’s staff and
supporting CINCs can use for planning for each crisis. Additionally, the table indicates who the supporting
CINCs will be for each crisis.

d. Prioritization of Work: The JSCP directs the priority of work. States that priority will be as follows:

(1) MTW Plans

(2) ConPlans with a TPFDD for the second of two concurrent MTWs that develop sequentially

(3) Most likely SSC ConPlans

(4) Remaining SSC plans

e. Basis for Service Planning: The

JSCP is the basic joint document
which starts Service planning. The
Air Force, for instance, uses the
JSCP as the source document to
develop the AF War Mobilization
Plan (WMP). WMP-1 (WMP Volume
one) and WMP-3 depend almost
entirely on the guidance and
apportionment of forces shown in
the JSCP. From this, the WMP
further defines deliberate planning
for the Air Force. (See IP-4220)

6. Apportions Forces
for Planning

a. Apportions Generic Forces: The JSCP apportions combat forces for each CINC so
they can begin deliberate planning. The forces are usually "generic." In other words,
the CINC may be apportioned:

1 USN Carrier Battle Group

3 USA Divisions (Light)

10 USAF Fighter Squadrons

Note that the type of fighter squadrons is not specified. They could be F16, F15, or
A10. However, in some instances, the CINC may be apportioned some high-value,
scarce, or unique resources by specific types. For instance, the apportionment table
may show:

5 E3 Aircraft

8 AC-130 Aircraft

In spite of these few examples, the JSCP still apportions generic forces. The Service
planning document (i.e., AF WMP) then further apportions these forces, being more
specific as to type and source.
b. Apportions Current Forces: Forces are apportioned from the present US military
inventory, or as reflected in the current President’s Budget. On a specific date --
known as the "snapshot date" -- a "picture" is taken of current military inventory.
This is the inventory, which is used for apportionment.

c. Forces are Apportioned by Case:

Apportioned forces are divided into
four Cases. Each Case, progressively,
contains more forces, and the CINC
will be apportioned different level of
forces (Cases) dependent upon the
level of threat and the appropriate
response option (FDO, Deploy
Decisive Force, or Counterattack).
Four Cases are used so that forces
can be deconflicted if two
concurrent contingencies happen sequentially. -- see below:

(1) Case 1 Forces (FDO). These forces, primarily in-place and active component
augmentation forces, are designed to support the array of possible flexible
deterrent options available to the CINC and NCA. They are rapidly deployable and
 relatively small (squadron/brigade level). They are there to support the first option:
"Flexible Deterrence."

(2) Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy a Decisive Force): Additive to Case 1
forces, they include the Active component and that portion of the Reserve
component necessary to move and sustain a major force from CONUS. These Case 2
forces support the early stages of the second response option, "Deploy Decisive
Force."

(3) Case 3 Forces (Deploy Decisive Force): Additive to Cases 1 & 2, Case 3 forces are
apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy may not have
completed preparation for war. These forces include the Presidential Selected
Reserve Call-up (PSRC) and Partial Mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces
available for the CINC to focus OPlan development on. These forces further support
the second response option: "Deploy Decisive Force."

(4) Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force): Again, additive to the previous

Cases, Case 4 forces comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required
and made available under Partial Mobilization. These forces are phased into the
OPLAN to support the concept of "Deploy Decisive Force" needed to quickly end a
conflict on terms agreeable to the US.

d. Regional Apportionment: Those forces apportioned to a theater CINC for

planning. As described above, the forces are apportioned by Cases.

 
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