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Teratology in Neoplatonism

In spite of all of its ontological shortcomings, the Neoplatonists urge us to see the
sensible world as a success story. It is, after all, the best possible image of its intelligible
model. They are fully aware, however, that this cosmic optimism could only be justified with
reference to evidence from natural phenomena. Accordingly, the Neoplatonists concern
themselves with showing how a wide variety of natural phenomena are best understood in
terms of causation by higher principles at work here in the sensible world. Their interest in
explaining natural phenomena extends well beyond the celestial spheres and carries them all
the way down to the marshy fields of biology. Here their aims include showing that
teleological processes were at work in embryology and that the overwhelming majority of an
offspring’s physical features could be accounted for by the activity of corresponding form-
principles. The countless distinguishing features that we easily observe among different
human beings are not the chance result of matter’s overcoming a single form-principle
common to all individual human beings; rather, these features are themselves instances of the
successful activity of myriad intelligible principles acting in the sensible world. Yet this
optimistic view of the intelligible world’s influence over the sensible must confront the fact
that not all cases of biological reproduction appear to turn out successfully, even if the
majority of cases do. To be sure, teratogenesis poses difficulties not just for Neoplatonists but
for the entire tradition of teleological embryology to which Neoplatonic embryology
belongs,1 though these difficulties may be seen as taking on a new urgency in a Neoplatonic
setting, given the added importance they attach to intelligible principles ruling the sensible
world.
Yet in spite of this new urgency, there is no extended investigation into the causes of
terata in the transmitted Neoplatonic texts, not even in the sole surviving Neoplatonic text
dedicated to embryology, Porphyry’s To Gaurus On How Embryos Are Ensouled, where the
topic comes up only once and very briefly at that.2 It is tempting to see this omission as an
indication of a limited interest on their part in biology, but this predicament is actually
comparable to the one we would find ourselves in if we set out to investigate teratology in the
Corpus Galenicum. There, too, one would search in vain for a sustained discussion of
teratology, but in a variety of works one would discover a number of isolated passages in
which Galen addresses teratological phenomena,3 and this is also the case with the body of
Neoplatonic texts.
Even so, an examination of these isolated passages could easily give the first
impression that the Neoplatonists failed to acknowledge the urgency of the problems that

1
For an overview of earlier explanations of terata, see Bien (1997).
2
Porphyry AG 12.6 [51,22-23 Kalbfleisch], where Porphyry simply describes terata as
instances of nature failing to achieve the form.
3
See Bien (1999: 67): ‘Galen hat keine umfassende Mißbildungstheorie früherer Autoren
explizit vertreten oder gar selbst eine eigene Mißbildungstheorie aufgestellt. Dennoch
äußert er sich an verschiedenen Stellen seines Werkes zu Fehlbildungsphänomenen’ (‘Galen
has not explicitly maintained any comprehensive teratology of his predecessors nor has he
advanced one of his own making. Nevertheless, he addresses teratological phenomena at
various points in his work’).

1
teratology poses to their optimistic world-view. Indeed, many of the remarks that one finds
would prima facie appear to signal an outright capitulation. This appearance arises first and
foremost in the many passages in which Neoplatonists point to the frustrating influence of
matter as the cause of teratogenesis,4 which would certainly appear to amount to simply
biting the teleological bullet, but the story turns out to be not that simple. To see why this first
impression is misleading, we need to take a closer look at some of these claims about matter
and see how some Neoplatonists sought to make them compatible with a teleological world-
view. In doing so it will be helpful to focus our investigation in the first instance on
teratological cases involving an excess or deficiency in the offspring’s body, such as being
born with a sixth finger, which incidentally also appears to be the most widely cited case of
teratology in Neoplatonic authors.5
Such cases are frequently referred to an excess or deficiency in the matter, though
there is some question as to the identity of the matter at issue. After all, in certain contexts
both the male seed and the female menses qualify as matter,6 and although most of the
passages referred to above offer no further specification as to which of these is intended,
some do. There are several passages where the matter in question is unmistakably identified
as the male seed, but we should be cautious about concluding that such passages give a fair
representation of their considered views. As far as I can tell, such claims are limited to the
commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics,7 where they are clearly paying respect to Aristotle’s

4
E.g., Ammonius In DI 138,6-7 Busse (cf. In De Int. 250,24-31 Busse); Asclepius In Meta 369,22-
25 Hayduck and In Meta. 446,11-15 Hayduck; Philoponus In Phys. 201,10-202,16 Vitelli; In Phys.
269,17-22 Vitelli; In Phys. 291,10-23 Vitelli; In Phys. 318,29-31 Vitelli; In Phys. 319,6-9 Vitelli; In
Phys. 320,8-9 Vitelli; In DA 14,1-8 Hayduck; In Cat. 128,2-4 Busse (and cf. In Cat. 190,24-26
Busse); Proclus In Tim. 2.266,11-16 Diehl (cf. De mal. subst. §60 [79.15-17 Isaac]); Simplicius In
Phys. 362,5-6 Diels; Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,15- 21 Schenkl and Paraph. in Phys. 62,8-10
Schenkl. Cf. John of Alexandria In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 130,24-28 Bell et al.; Psellus Op. psych.
theol. daem. 33,20-25 O’Meara; Michael of Ephesus In GA 189,3-13 Hayduck.
5
E.g., Ammonius In Isag. 16,9-12 Busse; Asclepius In Meta. 365,30-34 Hayduck; In Meta 369,22-
25 Hayduck; In Nic. Intro. Arith. 106.22-27 (p. 44) Tarán; Olympiodorus In Alc. §94,11-22
Westerink; Philoponus In APr 61,14-23 Wallies; In Cat. 128,2-4 Busse; In Phys. 262,23-28 Vitelli;
In Phys. 267,5-6 Vitelli; In Phys. 269,17-22 Vitelli; Simplicius In Phys. 339,28-34 Diels; Syrianus
In Hermog. 2.98,18 Rabe and 2.126,15 Rabe; Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,15- 21 Schenkl.
Cf. Eustratius In EN VI 367,26-32 Heylbut; In EN VI 375,33-376,4 Heylbut; Michael of Ephesus In
Meta. 452,11-16 Hayduck; In GA 189,3-13 Hayduck.
6
Neoplatonists universally rejected the female seed, though it might be more correct to say
that they never even considered the possibility of a female seed. Nevertheless, their
commitment to the one-seed theory may be inferred from concise descriptions of conception
and insemination that refer to the mother as receiving a seed (in the singular) and herself
providing matter. See, e.g., Ammonius In Porph. Isag. 105,1-3 Busse; Asclepius In Meta.
345,30-32 Hayduck (cf. In Meta. 57,36-58,1 Hayduck; 397,16-17 Hayduck; 448,4-5 Hayduck);
Damascius In Parm. 2.42,9-15 Westerink [2.94,13-16 Ruelle]; Porphyry AG 2.4 [35,24-25
Kalbfleisch]; 3.1 [36,16-17 Kalbfleisch]; 10.1 [46,14 Kalbfleisch]; 10.5 [47,16-26 Kalbfleisch];
De Abst. 4.20 (263,14-16 Nauck); Proclus In Tim. 1.300,1-13 Diehl; In Parm. 792,3-15 Steel (cf.
Proclus In Remp. 2.33,16 Kroll; 2.35,24-25 Kroll); Simplicius consistently discusses conception
in terms of a single seed and menses (In DC 101,23-26 Heiberg; 110,5-8 Heiberg; 127,2-3
Heiberg; In Cat. 244,2-3 Kalbfleisch; In Phys. 219,29-32 Diels (citing Aristotle); 248,23-249,5
Diels; 313,7-9 Diels; 362,6-7 Diels; 391,25-27 Diels; Syrianus In Meta. 97,21-24 Kroll. Plotinus
Enn. 5.7 and Philoponus In GC 295,24-27 Vitelli appear to be prima facie exceptions to this
rule, but they are not, as I argue in a monograph currently in progress.
7
Philoponus In Phys. 319,6-9 Vitelli; In Phys. 320,8-9 Vitelli; Simplicius In Phys. 381,10-11 Diels;
Themistius Paraph. in Phys. 62,8-10 Schenkl. Cf. Plotinus 3.1.1.34-35 H-S, where a ‘well-
flowing seed’ (εὔρους εἰς παιδοποιίαν <γονὴ>) is listed as one factor in the success of
reproduction, but the text is uncertain here. γονή has been inserted by Theiler, presumably

2
remark that terata arise ‘when the seed is corrupted.’8 Yet the suggestion that too much or too
little male seed is responsible for the generation of terata is difficult to square with
Neoplatonic spermatology: given their position that all of the formal principles are contained
in every part of the seed, no matter how small,9 how could a missing finger or hand be due to
a small amount of male seed? In fact, the Neoplatonists, like Aristotle, generally think of the
matter in embryogenesis as being provided by the female, and so the following passage from
Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul strikes me as much more felicitous and
perhaps captures better their considered views:

But perhaps someone might raise the problem what the origin of
terata is. Is this not as a result of a deficiency or a surplus on the part
of the seed? […] My response concerning the terata is that it is the
matter which is the cause, since there is also need for a certain
suitability of the matter, both in quantitative and in qualitative
respects; and the menstrual blood is the matter of living beings;
therefore, when this is in excess or deficient or has been made
contrary to nature, it is the cause of terata.10

This identification makes fairly clear that the problem is not exactly the interference of matter
per se, that is of prime matter; rather it is the proximate form of matter as found in the menses.
The Neoplatonists did not view the menses as a seminal principle containing form principles
corresponding to the embryo’s parts,11 but the menses is nevertheless a composite of matter
and form-principles corresponding to its own constitution. Thus, we should think of
teratogenesis as resulting from the conflict between form-principles – those in the seed and
those in the menses.12 In order for the parts to be generated, the form-principles in the seed

incorrectly, since Plotinus otherwise always uses σπέρμα for seed. (The term γονή occurs
only once in the Enn., namely at 1.3.1.8, where Plotinus is quoting Plato Phdr. 248d1-4.
Possibly the text was originally making a point about the need for an ample womb by means
of the Homeric locution εὐρὺς κόλπος, though this would also be the only occurrence of
κόλπος in the Enn. On the narrow uterus as a cause of terata, see Bien [1997: 136-8]).
8
Phys. 199b6-7 Ross.
9
E.g., See Asclepius In Meta. 38,6 Hayduck and 202,25-26 Hayduck; Damascius De Princ.
3.55,6-10 Westerink [1.252,1-4 Ruelle] and 3.91,18-23 Westerink [1.274,24-27 Ruelle];
Iamblichus In Nic. Ar. 82,1-5 Pistelli and Klein (cf. 81,23-24); Olympiodorus In Alc. 1 109,24-
110,1 Westerink; In Phd. 13.2.27-32 Westerink [p. 169]; Philoponus In DA 13,30-34 Hayduck
(cf. 238,9-12 Hayduck); Plotinus 2.6.1.10-12; 3.2.2.18-23; 4.7.5.42-48; 4.8.6.7-10; 5.9.6.10-13;
Porphyry AG 7.2 [43,23-24 Kalbfleisch]; Sent. 37,33-39 Brisson et al.; Proclus In Tim. 1.396,10-
26 Diehl (reporting Porphyry’s view with approval = Porphyry In Tim. Fr. 51 [38,30 – 39,10]
Sodano) and 2.47,22-28 Diehl; In Parm. 754,10-13 Steel; 792,7-9 Steel; De decem dubitationibus
circa providentiam 8.30-41 Isaac; Philoponus In DA 13,26-35 Hayduck; Simplicius In Phys.
382,15-21 Diels.
10
Philoponus In DA 14,1-8 Hayduck, van der Eijk translation slightly revised. Psellus
appropriates this account in Op. psych. theol. daem. 33,20-21 O’Meara.
11
See above note 6. They devoted very little attention to the problems surrounding maternal
resemblance for one-seed theorists, but there are indications that they thought the mother’s
lower soul was responsible. See Porphyry AG 10.1 [46,14-24 Kalbfleisch]; Proclus In Tim.
1.110,31-111,3 Diehl, and Wilberding (2008: 420-26).
12
I would like to thank Jan Opsomer for his insightful suggestion that there might be an
interesting parallel between two different approaches to explaining teratagenesis and two
familiar Neoplatonic approaches to accounting for evil. On the one approach (Plotinus),
matter is simply the cause of evil, whereas on the latter (Iamblichus, Proclus), there is no
single cause of evil but various accidental causes, including conflicting forms. Thus, one
could imagine that there are two corresponding approaches to teratogenesis: simply

3
require matter of a specific quality and quantity, and in cases of teratogenesis this condition is
not met. This situation may alternatively be described in terms of the principle of suitability:
the menses is not entirely suitable for reception of the seed’s form-principles. The matter per
se is the problem only in the sense that when opposed form-principles seek extension in
matter, they can no longer co-exist in the same space, as it were, and this leads to conflict.13
While this construal of matter sits better with the Neoplatonic conception of seed, it
would still seem to be at odds with their overall teleological outlook of the sensible world. At
times our Neoplatonic authors even appear openly to embrace this deviation by simply
explaining teratogenesis as a case of spontaneous causation.14 In doing so, they are
employing the term ‘spontaneous’ in a radically different sense to that familiar from Aristotle.
Indeed, it seems to have nearly the exact opposite meaning. According to Aristotle’s
definition in Physics 2.6 a process P is ‘spontaneous’ only if it meets three conditions: (i)
processes of P’s type are mostly goal-directed, (ii) P itself is not goal-directed, and (iii) P has
an external cause.15 In the domain of biology, spontaneous generations of living things occur,
briefly, when material factors come together in the absence of a teleological formal principle
in such a way that some form of life results anyway.16 Thus, later Platonists are in agreement
with Aristotle up to a point, since both parties would say that spontaneous generation is due to
material factors, but the agreement ends there. For Aristotle sees these factors as making a
surprising positive, end-like contribution to the world, but the Platonists see them as simply
frustrating the natural formal principles that are at work in the world. It follows that the label
is applied to very different cases by each school. Although Neoplatonists agree with Aristotle
about the phenomenon of, e.g., certain life-forms springing non-seminally from decaying
corpses and plants, this is not a case of spontaneous generation for them because they
disagree with Aristotle about the etiology. For the Neoplatonists, in strong contrast to
Aristotle, even in such cases a soul is responsible for the creation and so they prefer the label
‘generation from putrefaction’ or ‘generation of what is unlike’ to describe these cases. It is
when something unnatural and worse, not better, results that we have a case of Neoplatonic
spontaneous generation, and that is why we find this term employed in these cases of
teratogenesis.
In the same vein, we can find these authors describing these phenomena as cases
where nature is making a mistake, resulting in an offspring that is contrary to nature’s plan
(παρὰ φύσιν).17 In spite of passages such as these, we must be careful not to jump to any

pointing to matter and pointing to accidental causes such as conflicts between form-
principles. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that those authors who take pains to avoid
simply pointing to the negative influence of matter as the cause of teratogenesis tend to go in
the direction of saying that the terata are not genuine terata at all, and thus not evil but rather
part of the divine plan.
13
See Plotinus 3.2.2.18-23 H-S.
14
See, e.g., Asclepius In Meta. 365,30-34 Hayduck; Philoponus In Phys. 262,23-28 Vitelli;
269,17-22 Vitelli; 291,10-23 Vitelli; Simplicius In Phys. 261,15-17 Diels (where Fleet’s ‘portent’
is an infelicitous translation of teratos); In Phys. 339,28-34 Diels; Themistius Paraphr. in Phys.
56,15-21 Schenkl. For a fuller discussion of spontaneous generation in Neoplatonism, see
Wilberding (2011) and (2012).
15
Aristotle Phys. 197b18-20 Ross.
16
Condition (i) is met because biological generation is usually a process guided by a formal
and final cause. For a discussion of some of the tensions and problems in Aristotle’s theory of
spontaneous generation, see Balme (1962), Lennox (1982), Gotthelf (1989) and Henry (2003).
17
E.g., Ps.-Alexander Problemata 2.47 (65,36-66,2 Ideler); Philoponus In APr 152,13-16
Wallies; In Phys. 262,23-28 Vitelli; In Phys. 269,21 Vitelli; In Phys. 291,10-23 Vitelli; In Phys.
307,21-22 Vitelli; In Phys. 309,21-24 Vitelli; In Phys. 310,12 Vitelli; In Phys. 316,10-12 Vitelli; In
Phys. 331,9-11 Vitelli; Porphyry AG 12.6 (51,22-23 Kalbfleisch); Simplicius In Phys. 271,10-15
Diels; 374,24-26 Diels; In Phys. 380,26,381,1 Diels; Ps.-Simplicius In DA 294,10-16 Hayduck;
Themistius In APr 17,9 Wallies; Paraphr. in Phys. 37,8-10 Schenkl. Cf. Alexander Mantissa

4
conclusions about nature failing in the sensible world. After all, even Aristotle had sought to
reintegrate these cases back into the domain of natural phenomena, though his attempt would
seem to fall short of a genuine reconciliation of terata and nature. What he says is that
although terata do not fall within the scope of normal (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) nature, they do fall
within that of universal nature (φύσιν πᾶσαν).18 This statement is difficult to unpack, in part
because Aristotle, unlike later Platonists, does not actually subscribe to a notion of a universal
nature over and above the particular natures of individual living things.19 On one possible
interpretation his statement would amount to saying that even terata belong to the domain of
natural living things insofar as the formal principle that gives rise to them is natural, even if it
fails to achieve its end.20 If this is right, then it is possible to find a similar line of thought in
Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,21 but ultimately one must still concede that this
approach does little to ameliorate the difficulties that terata pose to the sovereignty of
nature’s intelligible principles in the sensible world, since on this line these principles fail in
achieving their aims.
What is needed is rather the very distinction between particular natures and universal
nature that is not to be found in Aristotle but is a central feature of the Neoplatonic world-
view. How this distinction can be employed to account for teratogenesis can best be seen by
now turning from the merely quantitative cases of terata to the qualitative cases, and in
particular to a subset of these cases in which formal components of different kinds of animals
would seem to be combined in the offspring. Here we must distinguish between two different
classes of such combinations. First, there is the class of human offspring whose appearance
would seem to contain features merely resembling those of some other animal, e.g., a man
with facial features resembling those of a bull. In these we have a fairly common
phenomenon that was subject to much analysis in physiognomical discussions in antiquity and
late antiquity.22 It is worth noting that some of these cases involve a certain overlap with the
quantitative cases, given the terminology used to refer to them. A man with a small head, for
example, was called ‘ostrich-headed’, and one with short arms ‘weasel-armed.’23 The second
class concerns the fantastic hybrid creatures of mythology, such as the minotaur, that is, a
man who does not merely have a face that resembles a bull’s but actually has a bull’s head on
a human body. Whereas the minotaur and centaur present cases involving human hybrids
and as such are at least tangentially related to human embryology, most of the examples one
encounters in this class involve various combinations of non-human animals. Nevertheless,
what the Neoplatonists have to say about these latter cases does provide some insight into
their approach to teratology, and for this reason we shall briefly examine some of these
accounts below.

178,10-11 Sharples; De fato 193,14-16 Sharples; Proclus In Remp. 1.66,1-3 Kroll; Eustratius In
EN VI 375,33-376,4 Heylbut.
18
See Aristotle GA 770b9-11 Drossaart Lulofs: ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τι, παρὰ
φύσιν δ’ οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
19
For this view, see, e.g., Nussbaum (1978: 95-98); Cooper (2004: 127n13); Judson (2005:
passim) and Bostock (2006: 54).
20
Such an interpretation could appeal to GA 767b13-15 Drossaart Lulofs: τὸ δὲ τέρας οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν ἕνεκά του καὶ τὴν τοῦ τέλους αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἀναγκαῖον, ἐπεὶ τήν γ’ ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν δεῖ λαμβάνειν.
21
Philoponus In Phys. 269,17-22 Vitelli and 273,14-16 Vitelli. Cf. Aristotle Phys. 199a33-b7
Ross.
22
See Swain (ed.) (2007).
23
For the ostrich-headed (στρουθοκέφαλος), see Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,17 Schenkl.
Cf. Plutarch Mor. 520c and Ps.-Galen Def. med. 19.454,3 Kühn, and see Bien (1997: 71). For
the weasel-armed (γαλεάγκων or γαλιάγκων), see Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg.16.205 Duffy.
Cf. Ps.-Aristotle Physiogn. 808a31-32 Bekker and Plutarch Mor. 520c.

5
 Let us begin with the more quotidian class of terata that merely resemble non-human
animals in certain ways. Obviously, if one of the parents has such features, the offspring would
not be counted as a teras, and its appearance would be explained in the usual way. The case
that interests us here is when the appearance cannot be accounted for by the usual hereditary
factors, and this kind of teras poses a new kind of problem that we did not encounter in the
quantitative cases. For in the case of the six-fingered man, for example, there is no need to
account for origin of the form of the sixth finger, since form-principles of fingers are already
included in the human seed. With the bull-faced man, by contrast, it would seem that some
non-human form-principle is contaminating the formation of the human offspring, and so some
explanation is required both of the origin of this principle and of the manner of its
transmission. Aristotle had considered some such cases in his On the Generation of Animals,
but if the Neoplatonists had been exposed to his explanation, they are unlikely to have found
it satisfactory. For he explains the bull-faced man as an instance of relapse (λύεσθαι).
According to his theory, when the male seed fails to dominate the matter, the powers in the
seed can relapse into more distant powers, first into those of the male’s forefathers, but
ultimately into the more generic powers of human being and animal. The bull-faced human,
then, is the result of the powers corresponding to the facial features relapsing back to the
order of animal.24 In other words, Aristotle cannot account for the apparent bovinity of the
facial features, but only for their non-humanity. The fact is that he does not think that there is
any genuine bovinity to account for, since on his view the only way genuine bovine features
could become part of a human being’s constitution would be by the interbreeding of humans
and bovines, which is impossible due to the different periods of gestation for each species.25
Consequently, Aristotle classifies all such instances as cases of mere likeness (ἐοικότα
μόνον).26
It is easy to see why this simply won’t do for Neoplatonists. For in the creation of
likenesses they see the paradigmatic causal relation, and so likenesses such as this certainly
invite and perhaps even demand a causal account that makes reference to an intelligible
principle. And it is here that the appeal to universal nature comes into its own, as the
following passage from Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics illustrates:
But perhaps even these [viz. terata] are not absolutely contrary to
nature, but in respect of [their] particular nature [they are] not by
nature but contrary to nature, while in respect of universal nature
[they are] both by nature and according to nature. For the particular
nature pursues one form and avoids one privation, but the nature of
the whole pursues every form and avoids every privation. For this
reason, in respect of the nature of man the teras is neither by nature
nor according to nature; but in respect of the whole of nature, since
nothing in the universe is contrary to nature (for there is no evil in the
universe), it is not contrary to nature but by nature and according to
nature – for even these things [viz. terata] arise because nature as a
whole alters the underlying matter and makes it unsuitable for
receiving the form of the particular nature. I mean something like this:
suppose the surrounding atmosphere (τὸ περιέχον), mixed in such
and such a way by the rotation of the heavenly [spheres], did
something to the matter of the human being that is being generated so
that it [viz. the matter] became unfitted to receive the form which
nature would naturally impose upon it: then human nature would fail
of its aim through the unsuitability of the matter, but another form
would arise, which would be contrary to nature in respect of the

24
Aristotle GA 769b7-16 Drossaart Lulofs. Cf. GA 768b8-25 Drossaart Lulofs.
25
Aristotle GA 769b22-25 Drossaart Lulofs.
26
Aristotle GA 769b13-21 Drossaart Lulofs.

6
 particular nature, but according to nature and by nature as regards
the whole of nature.27
Here the explanatory economy of the appeal to universal nature is on full display. Philoponus
begins by staying true to the widely shared explanation of teratogenesis in terms of the
frustrating influence of matter, as we saw above, but now we see that the unsuitability of the
matter is only the proximate cause. For the constitution of the matter – and here we may
assume that Philoponus has the menses in mind – is said to be determined by environmental
factors, which are in turn governed by the celestial spheres, all of which is managed by
universal nature. This fits nicely within the core Neoplatonic theory of embryology, which
also acknowledges the importance of environmental and celestial factors.28
Yet rendering the matter unsuitable for the reception of the perfect human form is
only one part of universal nature’s contribution to teratogenesis. It also provides an
alternative form to which the matter is suitable. Philoponus does not exactly emphasize that
universal nature is the source of this alternative form – he says only that another form will
come to be (201,23) – but insofar as this alternative form is said to be ‘in accordance with’ and
‘by’ universal nature, this would seem to be the conclusion we are meant to draw. This
conclusion finds some additional support in Philoponus’ remarks about the forms of
‘spontaneously’ generated creatures also being supplied by universal nature,29 and is further
corroborated by its consistency with remarks on teratogenesis made by other Neoplatonists.
This is brought out very clearly, for example, in a passage of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s
Cratylus, even if his exegesis of Plato’s text does nothing to boost our confidence in Proclus’
grasp of farmyard biology. In Cratylus 393b7-c7 Plato introduces the presumably
hypothetical case of a horse giving birth to a calf, which he classifies as a ‘teras, as it were’
(ὥσπερ τέρας), in order to make a point about the naturalness of names. Proclus seizes on
this as a straightforward empirical example and sets about explaining how it is possible that
calves are sometimes born of horses. The explanation is comparable to Philoponus’ above:
the calf is contrary to nature in terms of the individual nature of the horse, which has not
prevailed over the matter, but it is in accordance with universal nature because this is where
the calf’s form derives from.30 Proclus even goes so far as to draw the implication that the calf
born of a horse, insofar as its form derives from universal nature, is not a genuine teras at all:
‘This is why Plato here does not call these things terata simpliciter but “quasi-terata” (οἷον
τέρατα), since they are not in every way contrary to nature.’31

27
Philoponus In Phys. 201,10-25 Vitelli, Lacey translation slightly revised. Cf. In Phys. 201,25-
202,21 Vitelli.
28
One interesting detail in his account is that Philoponus allows the celestial things only a
mediated causal role: their motions influence the environment. In other words, he is not
envisioning here any kind of direct causality by means of the rays issued from the individual
planets and stars, though this, too, figures into some Neoplatonic accounts of embryology and
could easily supplement the account given here. Proclus thinks, for example, that the position
of the stars can lead to terata (Proclus In Remp. 2.60,19-24 Kroll), and a theory that Michael
Psellus sketches (Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.50-72 Duffy), according to which deformities of
specific parts of the body are connected to the positions of individual celestial bodies, might
well derive from a Neoplatonic source. Cf. Ideler Physici et Medici Minores, vol. 1, 387,1-13.
See also Ptolemy Tetrab. 3.8-9 (3.447-547 [pp. 195-201] Hübner).
29
See, e.g., Philoponus In GC 169,4-23 Vitelli; In DA 52,4-25 Hayduck; In DA 270,13-16
Hayduck; In Phys. 191,9-29 Vitelli; In Phys. 403,19-31 Vitelli. Todd (1980: 163) points out the
likelihood of the phrase ὑπὸ or ἐκ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας having been drawn from Proclus.
Note that the final lines of In DA 268,31-38 Hayduck are corrupt, but Sophonias supplies us
Philoponus’ intended meaning in Paraphr. in DA 57,14-17 Hayduck.
30
Proclus In Crat. §82 (38,22-39,1 Pasquali).
31
Proclus In Crat. §82 (39,1-3 Pasquali). Proclus is presumably thinking of ὥσπερ τέρας in
Crat. 393b9 Duke et al. See also Proclus De mal. subst. §60.1-28 Isaac, where Proclus
describes creatures that ‘appear’ to be terata.

7
 Proclus’ suggestion that these offspring are not genuine terata and Philoponus’
indication that ‘another form’ is generated bring out some of the difficulties involved in
determining the intelligibility of terata. To begin with, we need to distinguish between those
congenital deformities that simply amount to a deficiency and those that involve a
combination. Plotinus and Proclus both deny that there is any form-principle of lameness, for
example,32 though such offspring would still presumably be classified as being in accordance
with nature insofar as universal nature is responsible for the unsuitability of the matter. By
contrast, the latter class of terata do appear to correspond to form-principles, though not in
the way that normal offspring do. Non-teratogenic individuals correspond to a unified
seminal form-principle that is itself a bundle of form-principles accounting for all of its parts.
Teratogenic offspring, by contrast, do not correspond to such a unified seminal form-
principle, but insofar as they are in accordance with universal nature, they are nevertheless
intelligible in the broader sense that all of their features are accounted for by form-principles,
only these are derived from more than one source. To this extent, such hybrid terata are
comparable to mules, which were also classified as terata because their form results from the
mixture of those of horse and donkey.33 Thus Proclus at one point describes them as
‘mixtures of forms occurring in connection with matter.’34
There is, however, at least one passage in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus
that suggests that forms corresponding to all possible combinations of different form-
principles have already been pre-established at the level of soul. It is here that we come to
the second class of hybrids – the fantastic creatures of mythology. To be clear, the overall
impression one gains from Neoplatonic texts is that they did not believe that the creatures of
myth really existed, at least not in the literal, flesh-and-blood sense. Hippocentaurs, for
instance, are routinely named side by side with Aristotle’s goat-stags as examples of
creatures that exist in thought but not in nature,35 and this includes Proclus.36 This is not to say
that the Neoplatonists did not take mythology seriously. On the contrary, Homer and Hesiod
were seen as anticipating valuable philosophical insights, but Neoplatonists seem to have
accommodated the references to these fabulous creatures by advancing non-literal
interpretations of them in terms of higher, immaterial powers.37 Nevertheless, in this one
instance at least, Proclus appears to go on record as accepting the existence of these
creatures in a more literal sense. His general aim in this passage is to describe the way in
which hybrid creatures (τὰ καλούμενα κοινογενῆ – cf. Plato’s Sophist 265e8) involve a
mixture of genera and species forms, and his examples leap from the prosaic (mules – cf.
again Sophist 265e1-2) to the fabulous: ‘beings that have a human face but the rest of it is like
a fish, or beings having the form of a dragon but with the face of a lion,’ adding that many
such creatures arise in the earth and the sea.38 This leap from mules, which are the offspring
of individuals of two species actually interbreeding, to the likes of mermaids might invite

32
Plotinus Enn. 5.9.10.2-5 H-S; Proclus De mal. subs. §44.17-18 Isaac.
33
Of the mule Philoponus says that it cannot reproduce because its nature is not pure, neither
horse nor mule (In DA 267,29-32 Hayduck: ἱστοροῦσι δὲ ὅτι κυήσασαί ποτε ἡμίονοι
ἐξήμβλωσαν, μὴ δυνηθείσης τῆς φύσεως τελεσφορῆσαι τὸ κυηθὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινῆ
μηδετέραν φύσιν, μήτε τὴν ἵππου μήτε τὴν ὄνου, ἀλλ’ ἑκατέραν πήρωμα εἶναι). On mules,
see also Ammonius In Isag. 125,9-20 Busse; Asclepius In Meta. 95,19-22 Hayduck; 404,25-31
Hayduck; 406,1-7 Hayduck; 411,8-13 Hayduck; Philoponus Aet. Mund. 12,14-24 Rabe;
Porphyry Isag. 19,1-3 Busse; Syrianus In Meta. 107,27-31 Kroll.
34
Proclus De mal. subst. §60.20-21 Isaac: quales utique specierum que circa materiam
mixtiones.
35
E.g., Ammonius In Isag. 39,14-40,6 Busse; Asclepius In Meta. 75,11-12 Hayduck; Elias In Isag.
47,6-9 Busse; Philoponus In Cat. 9,17-18 Busse (cf. In GC 44,13-16 Vitelli); Simplicius In Cat.
270,25-30 Kalbfleisch. Cf. Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 102,7-8 Schenkl.
36
Proclus In Parm. 885,8-13 Steel.
37
E.g., Hermias In Phaedr. 30,27-29 Couvreur.
38
Proclus In Tim. 2.202,23-26 Diehl, Baltzly translation.

8
some entertaining speculation as to how exactly he thought the latter were spawned,39 but the
real point of interest lies in his account of the metaphysical parameters of such combination:
All of these form-principles [of combination], which determine all of
the mixtures of forms in the universe, have likely been comprehended
in advance in the soul, and no other form-principles of combination
could arise apart from these, as all things are formed according to
them.40
This suggests that terata are intelligible in a much more robust sense: all of the bundles of
form-principles corresponding to teratological possibilities exist not only at the level of
sensible matter; rather, they pre-exist in some prior manner at the level of soul.
Two general observations about the Neoplatonic appeal to universal nature as the
cause of teratogensis may be added to the above. The first concerns the subsequent history
of the appeal to universal nature as the cause of teratogenesis. It would appear that centuries
later the appeal to universal natural as an explanation of teratogenesis became an object of
controversy in Christian Byzantium. Unlike Michael of Ephesus, whose explanation of
teratogenesis stays very close to Aristotle’s own with little or no Neoplatonic influence,41
several other nearly contemporaneous Christian thinkers also associated with the university
in Constantinople showed themselves much more willing to adopt Neoplatonic lines of
thought. At the time this was not without its dangers. In 1082 CE John Italus was condemned
for his misguided Platonic views, which at the very least included the doctrine of Platonic
Forms and the transmigration of souls.42 Against this background it is perhaps surprising to
find the universal nature explanation of teratogenesis advanced by John’s teacher, Michael
Psellus, as well as by his student, Eustratius of Nicaea,43 and Psellus at least, who had also
found himself subject to accusations of pursuing Platonism beyond the limits permitted by
Christian doctrine,44 even signals the tension with Christian doctrine at one point and
reverses direction. His treatise Other Solutions to the Problems in Nature contains two
separate discussions of teratology.45 In one, he straightforwardly gives the Neoplatonic
explanation via universal nature, without indicating in any way that he does not accept this
account.46 In the other he attributes this account to ‘the Greeks who take their wisdom too far’
(οἱ περιττοὶ τὴν σοφίαν Ἕλληνες),47 and he objects specifically to the ‘illogical’ conjecture

39
He limits himself to the generic claim that they are ‘constituted’ (συνέστηκεν), which hardly
commits him to the possibility of reproduction via bestiality, though cf. Plutarch Mor. 990F-
991A.
40
Proclus In Tim. 2.202,26-30 Diehl: οὗτοι δὴ οὖν οἱ λόγοι πάντες εἰκότως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
προελήφθησαν, πάσας ἀφορίζοντες τὰς ἐν τῷ παντὶ μεθέξεις τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν
γένοιντο παρὰ τούτους ἄλλοι τῆς κοινωνίας λόγοι, κατὰ τούτους πάντων
εἰδοποιουμένων.
41
Michael of Ephesus In GA 185,1-29 Hayduck.
42
See Hussey (2010: 142-146).
43
Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.188-206 Duffy and Eustratius In APo II 157,6-13
Hayduck (cf. Eustratius In EN VI 367,26-32 Heylbut and 375,33-376,4 Heylbut).
44
Hussey (2010: 143).
45
Michael Psellus ἕτεραι ἐπιλύσεις φυσικῶν ἀπορημάτων πρὸς τοὺς ἰδίους μαθητὰς καὶ
ἑτέρους ἐπερωτῶντας in Op. log. phys. alleg. 16 Duffy (pp. 47-56). The two discussions are
contained in problem two, ποίᾳ αἰτίᾳ τῶν βρεφῶν τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἐλλιπῆ, τὰ δὲ ἄρτια (16.33-
83 Duffy), and problem six, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν τῶν γεννωμένων τινὰ τερατοειδῆ γίνονται
(16.187-213 Duffy).
46
Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.188-206 Duffy. He does append to this account two
alternative accounts offered by astronomers and the Hippocratics (16.207-213 Duffy).
47
Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.50-51 Duffy.

9
regarding the existence of universal nature.48 As he spells out elsewhere, his complaint is
that this conjecture goes against Christian scripture.49
Perhaps this perceived conflict with scripture has something to do with our second
observation, which concerns the nagging misgivings one might have at the thought of
welcoming deformed children back into the fold of nature’s design. While those born with
crippling disabilities might take some comfort in the idea that these congenital physical
impediments are not just a case of bad luck but a part of some divine plan, one cannot help
but wonder what universal nature is trying to achieve by setting up certain individuals to go
through life with the added challenge of deformity and disability. The answer to this
quandary will come as no surprise to those familiar with the Platonic doctrine of
transmigration. Olympiodorus succinctly presents the solution in his comments on the
eschatological myth in Plato’s Gorgias. When a disembodied soul is to return to the sensible
world, then ‘in accordance with its individual worth it receives once again an organic home in
this world. They [viz. the souls] receive their organs of one kind or another, whether maimed,
disabled, or whatever, to match their previous constitution.’50 Moreover, although this should
be seen as a punishment for past wrong-doings, Neoplatonists, true to Plato, place the
emphasis on rehabilitation rather than retribution. To paraphrase Olympiodorus, if being
born into a deformed body makes no contribution to the improvement of the soul, then nature
has acted in vain.51 To this we shall add only that universal nature’s aim in teratogenesis is not
always focused on the rehabilitation of descending souls. So much is clear from the fact that
many cases of teratogenesis were known to result in miscarriages.52 In such cases universal
nature’s care is presumably directed at the parents or the community.
Let us conclude by taking notice of how the Neoplatonic embryology was designed to
disarm a teratological concern of an entirely different order, one which may be seen as the
Neoplatonic pendant to one of the central questions of contemporary evolutionary biology,
namely how the world influences living things in such a way that new species come about.
For the Neoplatonists the problem is spun the other way; they want to establish that species
forms remain stable over uncountably many generations, and it was not the possibility of
evolution towards higher levels of fitness that was seen as a serious theoretical threat at the
time, but rather the possibility of devolution, that is, the possibility of increasing levels of
deformity with each new generation.
The anti-Hegelian idea that the world and its inhabitants are somehow devolving from
a golden age of bliss and wisdom into lower and lower forms of existence necessitating toil
and ignorance was widespread in antiquity. Hesiod made this idea famous in his account of
the five ages of man,53 which clearly had some impact on Plato’s thought, not only in the
Sophist myth but also in his discussion of the decline of the Kallipolis in Republic books 8-9,
where Plato seems to exploit this pessimistic intuition with an explicit reference to Hesiod.54
This may be compared to the prologue of the Timaeus, in which the original Athenians were
born of divine seed and far excelled the city’s subsequent inhabitants,55 and to the Critias,
where Plato describes the divinity in mankind as growing fainter and fainter until they appear

48
Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.79-81 Duffy.
49
Michael Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 119,30-120,1 O’Meara.
50
Olympiodorus In Gorg. §50.3 (264,28-31 Westerink), Jackson et al. translation. See also
Proclus In Tim. 1.51,13 - 52,3 Diehl.
51
See Olympiodorus In Gorg. §50.2 (263,20-25 Westerink).
52
See, e.g., Philoponus In Phys. 314,4-5 Vitelli and 322,7 Vitelli; Porphyry AG 12.6 (51,21-23
Kalbfleisch); Simplicius In Phys. 372,8-9 Diels.
53
See Hesiod Opera et Dies 109-201.
54
See Rep. 547a1 Slings. On Plato’s appropriation of Hesiod in the Soph., see El Murr (2010)
and Rowe (2010).
55
Plato Tim. 23b7-24a2.

10
‘hideous’ (αἰσχροί) to those who are able to see them for what they are.56 Some of the Stoics
also seem to have emphasized the superiority of early humans over their descendants.57 And
yet for the subject of our study perhaps the most significant nod in this direction comes from
the Jewish tradition of the Pentateuch. In Genesis 1-2 the first human beings are described as
having been created by God’s own hand, whereas all subsequent human beings are created
by other human beings. Moreover, since Adam and Eve are hardly God’s equals, they are
bound to produce inferior offspring, which then would be expected to produce inferior
offspring in turn. This decline is reflected in the decreasing lifespans of the generations.
Whereas the generations between Adam and Noah generally live nearly a millennium each,
Abraham is described as dying ‘an old man, full of years’ at the age of 175.58
The Jewish Platonist Philo, in his commentary on Genesis, picks up on these
indications of decline and uses it as an opportunity to make a case for retrograde evolution:
Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul, surpassing
all the men that now are, and all that have been before us. For our
beginning is from men, whereas God created him, and the more
eminent the maker is, so much better is the work. For as that which is
in bloom is always better than that whose bloom is past, be it animal
or plant or fruit or aught else in nature, so the man first fashioned was
clearly the bloom of our entire race, and never have his descendants
attained the like bloom, forms and faculties ever feebler having been
bestowed on each succeeding generation. I have observed the same
thing happening in the case of sculpture and painting: the copies are
inferior to the originals, and what is painted or moulded from the
copies still more so, owing to their long distance from the original.
Much the same appears in the case of the magnet: for the iron ring
which touches it is held most forcibly, but that which touches this one
less so. A third hangs on to the second, and a fourth on to the third,
and a fifth on to the fourth, and so on in a long series, all held together
by one attracting force, only not all alike, for those removed from the
starting point are getting continuously looser, owing to the attraction
being relaxed and losing its power to grip as it did before. Mankind
has evidently undergone something of the same kind. As generation
follows generation the powers and qualities of body and soul which
men receive are feebler.59

56
Plato Crit. 121a8-b4, though Plato here is surely envisioning a moral rather than physical
decline. See also Phlb. 16c7-8.
57
See Posidonius Fr. 284 Edelstein-Kidd = Fr. 448 Theiler.
58
Gen. 25:7-8, cf. Gen. 5:4 and 9:29.
59
Philo Opific. Mund. §§140-1, Colson and Whitaker translation slightly revised. Philo scholars
debate whether this doctrine of degeneration was drawn from Stoic theory. The source in
question is usually Posidonius (see above note 57). Such influence is defended by Früchtel
(1968: 37-8) and Theiler (1971: 25-35). Runia resists this suggestion (1986, 386n106), in the
opinion that ‘the parallels between Opif. and the Senecan passage are not sufficient to assume
a common source….The notion of a Golden Age and subsequent decline was widespread in
Greek literature.’ Moreover, as I understand Runia (386n107) he wants to cast doubt on
Philo’s actual commitment to the doctrines outlined in this passage, insisting that ‘Philo does
not exhibit anything like true historical thinking here…The fate of the first man is
exemplaristic of what happens to the soul, and so can profitably be allegorized (§154-166).’
But I don’t find Runia’s suggestion that the allegorization of §154-66 should be read back into
§140-1, and I suspect that Früchtel (36-40) is right that, if anything, the allegorical reading
goes the other way around. Philo’s interpretation of the Fall of Man amounts to this account of
retrograde evolution: ‘Er berichtet nie vom Sündenfall als einem einmaligen Geschehen,
sondern immer nur in der oben beschriebenen Weise von einer Abwärtsentwicklung der

11
 It is entirely reasonable that this theory of retrograde evolution would appeal to one
such as Philo. As a pious Jew the story of the creation of the world in Genesis is bound to have
considerable authority for him, even if his ultimate interpretation of this text is influenced by
his understanding of Plato’s Timaeus.60 Indeed, the paths of influence probably ran in both
directions. His adherence to the account of Genesis is likely to have been a key factor in his
developing and defending the literal interpretation of the Demiurge’s creation of the universe
in the Timaeus, although in Aristotle, Alexander, and the Middle Platonists Atticus and
Plutarch Philo would have found good company for his literal interpretation.61 The thesis of a
unique, discrete62 creation is a natural complement to the thesis of retrograde evolution.
After all, if things have been getting worse for the entire lifespan of the universe, and the
universe’s lifespan had no beginning, then one might expect things to be in a much worse
state in the present than they actually are. More importantly, however, the theory of
retrograde evolution would seem to imply a certain genealogical conception of participation
in the Forms that ultimately demands a unique and discrete creation account. Rather than
putting forward the view that each individual human being has a direct and immediate
connection to the Form of Human Being, as is generally thought to be the case by
contemporary and late ancient scholars alike, Philo appears to suggest here that one’s
relation to the Form of Human Being is mediated through one’s ancestors.
Philo’s theory of retrograde evolution poses a formidable challenge to later Platonists
who wish to preserve the integrity of the species over all time. The challenge is so
formidable because Philo’s position would seem simply to be the logical result of two
premises that Platonists should find unobjectionable. The first is the nearly axiomatic
Neoplatonic principle that the product is always an inferior likeness of the producer,63
illustrated here by Philo’s analogy to magnets and copies in art. The second is the prima facie
undeniable (if somewhat mundane) observation that the parents produce their offspring.64
Taken together, it would appear to follow that each generation of offspring is an inferior copy
of the previous generation.65 Plotinus even bears witness to this challenge in a vexingly

Menschheit…Es zeigt sich, daß Philo nur eine allegorische Deutung der jahwistische
Sündenfallgeschichte kennt.’ (‘He never describes the Fall of Man as an event that occurs at
one time, rather always in the manner described above: as a downward development of
humanity … It becomes clear that an allegorical Interpretation of the story of the Jahwistic Fall
of Man is the only interpretation Philo knows.’)
60
On this see Runia (1986), Dörrie and Baltes (1987-2008, vol. 5: 398ff.), and Sterling (1992).
61
See Aristotle DC 280a28-34 Allan and Proclus In Tim. 1.276,30-277,3 Diehl, and cf. Sorabji
(2005, vol. 2: 162).
62
I am consciously avoiding the term ‘temporal.’ As Baltes (1976-8, vol. 1: 32 and 87ff.) has
pointed out, time for Philo is created with the sensible world, so that creation cannot take
place in time. See Opific. Mund. §26; Leg. alleg. 1.2 and 2.3; Aet. Mund. §§52-4. That said,
Frick (1999: 100n29) is quite right to draw out attention to De decalogo §58 where Philo does
indeed say there was a time when there was no cosmos.
63
Plotinus Enn. 3.8.5.24-5; 4.7.83.9-11; 5.1.6.39 und 7.47-8; 5.2.2.1-4; 5.3.16.5-7; 5.5.13.37-8;
5.8.1.19-21; 6.7.17.4-6; Porphyry Sent. §13 and AG 6.2 [42,17-21 Kalbfleisch]; Proclus El. Th. §7
and In Tim. 3.322,1ff. Diehl; etc. The Neoplatonists understood Plato to be advancing this
principle at Phlb. 27a5-6 (cf. Proclus In Tim. 1.259,26-260,4 Diehl). And see Lloyd (1976). Cf.
Aristotle DA 417a18-20 and 418a3-6 Ross; Meta. 1032a22-25 Ross.
64
Philo appears to have been open to Hierocles’ understanding (apud Stobaeus Anthol.
4.640,8-10 = Ramelli [2009: 82-83]) of the Timaeus’s ‘visible gods’ who assist God in creation
as human parents who act as agents of God by ‘moulding the living being in the womb’ (De
decalogo §120) and thereby imitating God’s creative act. Their creative activity is limited to
the body, or at least it does not encompass the entire soul, as ‘the divine part’ is said to come
‘from outside’ (Opific. Mund. §67; Her. §184). See Runia (1986: 252-3).
65
An anonymous commentator has urged me to emphasize a point here that I will ultimately
make in the final paragraph, namely that the Neoplatonists reject this second premise.

12
dialectical chapter of his treatise On Whether the Stars are Causes, where he articulates a view
that he ultimately opposes and that is very close to that of Philo above:
This is, perhaps, why what comes later in the series is always worse.
Men, for instance, were quite different once from what they are now,
since by reason of the [space] between [them and their origins] and
the continual pressure of necessity their form-principles have yielded
to the affections of matter.66
The Neoplatonists, however, meet this challenge and collectively reject Philo’s
genealogical account of participation. This rejection begins with their understanding of the
creation account in the Timaeus, which they do not take to mean that the cosmos came into
being some finite time ago. Rather, they were more or less in agreement that the physical
world was beginningless, and that the Timaeus’ discussion of the world being ‘generated’
should be understood as a didactic tool that is meant to help the reader see that the sensible
world is continually dependent for its being on its intelligible cause, namely the Demiurgic
Intellect and the Forms.67 In fact, the beginninglessness and endlessness of the cosmos and
all of the species within it follow from their metaphysics of procession and reversion, which
demands that the timeless activity of the Intellect is the production of a sensible image of itself
and all of its contents (the Forms). Thus, there can be no Adam, that is, no first human being
that is directly brought into existence by divine causes in a way that subsequent human
beings are not.
Nor do they concede that the normal biological reproduction necessarily entails the
generational decline envisioned by Philo, despite their universal acceptance of the principle
that a product is always an inferior likeness of its producer. This is because in some sense
they take issue with Philo’s second premise. That is to say, the parents are certainly the
proximate causes of their offspring, but according to the Neoplatonists their causal efficacy in
reproduction is tied to their being part of the entire ontological hierarchy. In each act of
biological creation, the form-principles in the seed are not simply transferred as images from
the father to the offspring, but also restored by a series of higher causes that begins with the
mother’s nature or soul and reaches all the way to the corresponding Forms.68 In other words,
it is wrong to think of the origin of a given human being’s form-principles as simply a
genealogical or ‘horizontal’ affair, where each individual is caused by an individual of an
earlier generation; rather, to take up again Philo’s analogy to art, the stable integrity of all the
copies is safeguarded because each of them is checked, at it were, against the original. In
this way Neoplatonists sought to neutralize the concern that the natural sequence of
reproduction over generations necessarily entails deformity and a deterioration of the
sensible world’s intelligibility, and thus to eliminate a considerable perceived threat to the
successfulness of the sensible world.

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Plotinus Enn. 2.3.16.27-29 H-S, Armstrong translation slightly revised.
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The notable exception would be the late Philoponus. See Sorabji (2005, vol. 2: 162-189) and
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68
Constraints in space prevent us from developing this point in full here, but the general
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Busse.

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