(Derek Hook) Critical Psychology (B-Ok - Xyz)

Critical Psychology
Critical Psychology
Editor:
Critical Psychology is an approach rather than a Editor:
theory, an orientation towards psychological
Copyright © 2014. Juta and Company. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S.
knowledge and practice, an to relations of power.
It cuts across the various sub-disciplines and includes
diverse theoretical perspectives and forms of practice.
Derek Hook
Derek Hook
This exciting text offer a broad and ﬂexible Section Editors:
introduction to critical psychology and explores the
socio-political contexts of post-apartheid South Africa.
It expands on the theoretical resources usually Nhlanhla Mkhize
referred to in the ﬁeld of critical psychology e.g.
Marxism, Psychoanalysis, Post-structuralism and
Feminism by providing substantive discussions on
Peace Kiguwa
Black Consciousness, Post-colonialism and Africanist
forms of critique. Anthony Collins
Critical Psychology
Critical Psychology contains a wealth of material,
and critical perspectives spread across theoretical, Consulting Editors:
practical and distinctly South African levels of
application, featuring chapters on racism, community
development, HIV/Aids as well as participatory action Erica Burman
forms of research.\
The Editors:
Ian Parker
Derek Hook, formerly of the Psychology Department
at the University of the Witwatersrand, is a lecturer in
Social Psychology at the London School of Economics.
He has acted as co-editor of Psychopathology and Social
Prejudice (2002) and Developmental Psychology (2002)
- both University of Cape Town Press titles.
Nhlanhla Mkhize teaches in the Psychology
Department at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg.
Peace Kiguwa teaches in the Psychology Department,
School of Human and Community Development,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Anthony Collins teaches in the Psychology Department
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
Erica Burman is Professor of Psychology and Women’s
Studies at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
or applicable copyright law.

Ian Parker is a Professor of Psychology in the Discourse
Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 8/14/2016 9:18 AM via UNISA
AN: 706996 ; Hook, Derek.; Critical Psychology
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page i
Critical Psychology
Editor:
Derek Hook
Section Editors:
Nhlanhla Mkhize
Peace Kiguwa
Anthony Collins
Consulting Editors:
Erica Burman
Ian Parker
Account: s7393698
Introduction to Critical Psychology

First edition 2014
First print published 2013
© Juta and Compant, Ltd
1st Floor, Sunclare Building

21 Dreyer Street
Claremont
7708
South Africa
ISBN: 978 1 48510 228 1 (Parent

ISBN: 978 1 48510 425 4 (WebPDF)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval
system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Subject to any applicable licensing terms and
conditions in the case of electronically supplied publications, a person may engage in fair dealing with a copy of
this publication for his or her personal or private use, or his or her research or private study. See Section 12(1)(a)
of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978.
Project management: Fiona Wakelin

Copy editing and proofreading: John Linnegar
Indexing: Ethné Clarke

Cover design: Pumphaus Design Studio
DTP and design: Charlene Bate
The authors and the publisher believe on the strength of due diligence exercised that this work does not contain
any material that is the subject of copyright held by another person. In the alternative, they believe that any
protected pre-existing material that may be comprised in it has been used with appropriate authority or has been
used in circumstances that make such use permissible under the law.
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page iii
Contents
Contributors.......................................................................................................... xi
Section 1: Theoretical resources ......................................................... 1

Summary ................................................................................... 2
Anthony Collins
1 Critical psychology: The basic co-ordinates ................................ 10
Derek Hook
Learning outcomes ...................................................................................... 10
Critical psychology as orientation rather than theory................................. 11
Theory, context, practice: Three points of focus ......................................... 11
Power and psychology ................................................................................. 12
Psychology as ideological ............................................................................ 14
A politics of knowledge and subjectivity ..................................................... 15
Psychology as a powerful form of knowledge.............................................. 15
Psychological imperialism ........................................................................... 16
Depoliticising experience ............................................................................ 18
Ways of knowing ourselves.......................................................................... 18
Psychology as politics .................................................................................. 19
‘Psychopolitics’ ............................................................................................ 20
A South African critical psychology ............................................................ 20
2 Psychology: An African perspective ............................................... 24
Nhlanhla Mkhize
Introduction ................................................................................................ 25
The context of psychology in developing societies ...................................... 25
The knowing subject: The self in traditional psychology ............................ 26
The nature of knowledge: Western psychology and the place of values ...... 27
Links with critical psychology ..................................................................... 28
Indigenous psychologies.............................................................................. 28
Do we need an African-based psychology?.................................................. 30
An African metaphysical system ................................................................. 35
The notion of vitality or life force................................................................ 42
The principle of cosmic unity...................................................................... 44

Communal life and personhood.................................................................. 46
Criticisms of the ‘self-in-community’ .......................................................... 48
The family community ................................................................................ 48
Personhood as a process.............................................................................. 49
Conclusion................................................................................................... 50
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page iv
Critical thinking tasks ................................................................................. 51

Recommended readings .............................................................................. 52
3 Sociocultural approaches to psychology:

Dialogism and African conceptions of the self ............................ 53
Nhlanhla Mkhize
Introduction ................................................................................................ 54
Vygotsky and the social origins of mental functioning................................ 54
Bakhtin’s dialogism ..................................................................................... 59
The dialogical self........................................................................................ 70
The dialogical self: Comparisons with African approaches......................... 75
4 Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and

critical psychology ............................................................................... 84
Derek Hook
Introduction: The ‘psychopolitics’ of Fanon................................................ 85
The politics of psychology in the colonial context....................................... 88
Psychology and the politics of resistance..................................................... 104
Criticisms of Fanon and Biko ...................................................................... 109
Conclusion................................................................................................... 112
5 Fanon and the psychoanalysis of racism ...................................... 115

Derek Hook
Introduction: The psychological analysis of power ..................................... 116
The ‘psychic life of colonial power’.............................................................. 116
The phobogenic object ................................................................................ 122
Fanon’s psychoanalytic interpretation of racism......................................... 130
Conclusion................................................................................................... 137
6 Psychoanalysis and critical psychology ........................................ 139

Ian Parker
Introduction ................................................................................................ 140
What is, and what is not, psychoanalysis? .................................................. 143
iv
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page v
Essentialist psychoanalysis: Opportunities and dangers............................. 147

Pragmatic psychoanalysis: Questioning subjectivity and history................ 152
Cultural psychoanalysis: Working inside and alongside its discourse......... 158
Conclusions and connections ..................................................................... 161
7 Marxism and critical psychology ....................................................... 162

Grahame Hayes
Introduction ................................................................................................ 163
Defining Marxism ....................................................................................... 165
Social theory, and a theory of the social ...................................................... 176
The lived experience (materialist psychology) of everyday life.................... 179
Conclusion................................................................................................... 185
8 Psychology and the regulation of gender ...................................... 187

Tamara Shefer
Introduction ................................................................................................ 188
Psychology’s role in the construction of sex/gender difference................... 189
Pathologising and regulatory discourses in psychology .............................. 196
Retheorising gender difference? A feminist post-structuralist account
of gender .................................................................................................. 198
Conclusion................................................................................................... 207
9 Foucault, disciplinary power and the critical pre-history

of psychology .......................................................................................... 210
Derek Hook
Introduction ................................................................................................ 211
Pre-disciplinary eras of power ..................................................................... 213
Disciplinary power ...................................................................................... 216

Psychology as disciplinary apparatus .......................................................... 228
Critiquing Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power ..................................... 233
Conclusion................................................................................................... 236
Suggested readings ...................................................................................... 237
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page vi
10 Governmentality and technologies of subjectivity ..................... 239

Derek Hook
Introduction ................................................................................................ 240
The notion of governmentality.................................................................... 241
Technologies of subjectivity......................................................................... 262
Conclusion................................................................................................... 271
Section 2: The South African context ............................................... 273

Summary .................................................................................. 274
Peace Kiguwa
11 Feminist critical psychology in South Africa ................................ 278

Peace Kiguwa
Introduction ................................................................................................ 279
Critical psychology and feminist practice.................................................... 286
Questioning research................................................................................... 289
The ‘liberal’ tradition in psychology............................................................ 292
Focusing on developmental psychology ...................................................... 294
Feminism in an African context .................................................................. 296
Prospects and challenges for feminist theory and practice in Africa:
Focus on HIV/Aids .................................................................................. 299
Essentialism in theory: Psychology’s engagement with difference .............. 306
Feminist psychology and post-colonial theory ............................................ 311
Conclusion................................................................................................... 314
12 Critical reflections on community and psychology in

South Africa ............................................................................................. 316
Thabani Ngonyama Ka Sigogo & Oscar Tso Modipa
Introduction: Thinking about ‘communities’ .............................................. 317
Philosophical assumptions.......................................................................... 320

Critical community practice ........................................................................ 324
Africanist community practice .................................................................... 329
Critical community research methods ........................................................ 331
Summary..................................................................................................... 333
Critical thinking questions .......................................................................... 334
vi
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page vii
13 The role of collective action in the prevention of

HIV/Aids in South Africa .................................................................... 335
Catherine Campbell
Introduction: What do we mean by ‘critical’ health psychology?................ 336
What are the drivers of social change? ........................................................ 337
How does participation in collective action impact on the sexual health
of a community? ...................................................................................... 339
Towards a ‘social psychology of participation’ ............................................ 341
Case study: Peer education by commercial sex workers in South Africa ..... 351
Conclusion................................................................................................... 356
14 South African psychology and racism:

Historical determinants and future prospects .............................. 360
Norman Duncan, Garth Stevens & Brett Bowman
Introduction ................................................................................................ 361
Psychology and racism prior to 1994 .......................................................... 362
Psychology and racism: Post-1994............................................................... 379
Conclusion................................................................................................... 387
15 About black psychology....................................................................... 389

Kopano Ratele
Introduction: Inside outsiders, black conscious critical psychology ........... 390
The birth of black US-American psychology ............................................... 390
Psychologists sans a psychology .................................................................. 398
Conclusion................................................................................................... 412
Creative thinking tasks ................................................................................ 413
Section 3: Forms of practice ................................................................. 415

Summary .................................................................................. 416
Nhlanhla Mkhize
16 Activity Theory as a framework for psychological
research and practice in developing societies ............................. 425
Hilde van Vlaenderen & David Neves
Introduction ................................................................................................ 426
vii
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page viii
The irrelevance of psychology ..................................................................... 427

People-centred development as a paradigm for the critical psychologist.... 427
Activity Theory............................................................................................ 431
Development interventions as Activity systems and the role of the
psychologist in ‘learning by expanding’................................................... 437
Case study: Facilitating development .......................................................... 438
Conclusion................................................................................................... 443
17 Participatory Action Research and local knowledge in

community contexts ............................................................................. 445
Hilde van Vlaenderen & David Neves
Introduction ................................................................................................ 446
Psychology and development ...................................................................... 446
The role of local knowledge in people-centred development ...................... 451
Participatory Action Research ..................................................................... 454
Conclusion: The challenges of being a Participatory Action Researcher ..... 462
18 Community psychology: Emotional processes in political

subjects ..................................................................................................... 465
Kerry Gibson & Leslie Swartz
Introduction ................................................................................................ 466
Community psychology and psychoanalysis: An unlikely partnership? ..... 468
The significance of emotion in community psychology .............................. 471
Emotional pain and the investment in power ............................................. 479
Emotional and structural power.................................................................. 482
Conclusion................................................................................................... 483
19 Discursive practice: Analysing a Lovelines text on

sex communication for parents ......................................................... 487

Lindy Wilbraham
Introduction ................................................................................................ 488
Theoretical framework ................................................................................ 488
Methodology matters .................................................................................. 494
viii
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page ix
The text ....................................................................................................... 502

Discourse analysis ....................................................................................... 505
Disciplining adolescents.............................................................................. 512
Constituting safe families ............................................................................ 517
Concluding comments ................................................................................ 518
20 Writing into action: The critical research endeavour ................ 523

Catriona Macleod
Introduction: Critical psychology and the politics of research .................... 524
Theory and method..................................................................................... 525
The posing of research questions ................................................................ 527
Investigative practices ................................................................................. 529
Researcher reflexivity................................................................................... 532
Knowledge dissemination and social action................................................ 535
Conclusion................................................................................................... 538
21 Human development in ‘underdeveloped’ contexts .................... 540

Mambwe Kasese-Hara
Introduction ................................................................................................ 541
Development: A sociocultural perspective .................................................. 542
Defining ‘underdeveloped’ contexts............................................................ 545
‘Underdevelopment’ and minority group contexts ..................................... 547
Locating studies of human development in the African context................. 549
Conclusion................................................................................................... 557
22 Liberation psychology .......................................................................... 559

Don Foster
Introduction ................................................................................................ 560

Central concerns.......................................................................................... 561
Emancipation and utopia ............................................................................ 569
Modernity and its ills .................................................................................. 572
Psychology and its vicissitudes.................................................................... 575
The psychology of oppression ..................................................................... 582
ix
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page x
Psychological consequences of oppression.................................................. 585

Towards an emancipatory psychology ........................................................ 590
Pitfalls and obstacles ................................................................................... 598
Concluding remarks .................................................................................... 601
Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 603
Index................................................................................................................... 645
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page xi
Contributors
Brett Bowman is a researcher at the Institute for Social and Health Sciences of
the University of South Africa, Pretoria. His current research interests include
the investigation of race, racism and other social asymmetries in post-
apartheid South Africa. His PhD research is a genealogical examination of
South African paedophiles. He is the co-editor of a multimedia CD-Rom (1999)
entitled From method to madness: Five years of qualitative enquiry, published
by Histories of the Present Press.
Catherine Campbell is an External Professor at the University of KwaZulu-

Natal, although she lectures in the department of Social Psychology at the
London School of Economics. Her current research interests focus closely on
issues of community intervention and the politics of HIV/Aids in Southern
Africa. She is the author of Letting them die: how HIV/AIDS prevention
programmes often fail (2003) published by Double Storey/Juta.
Anthony Collins is a lecturer in Psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,

Durban where he is the co-ordinator of the UND Psychology and Society
Masters programme. He is a Fulbright scholar with degrees in Psychology
(Rhodes) and Cultural Studies (University of California). He has a long-
standing interest in Critical Psychology with a specific research focus on
violence and trauma in South Africa.
Norman Duncan holds an Associate Professorship at the Institute for Social

and Health Sciences at the University of South Africa, Pretoria. He is the
current Editor of the South African Journal of Psychology and has acted as co-
editor on a number of books, including ‘Race’, racism, knowledge production
and psychology in South Africa (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001).
Don Foster is Professor of Psychology and Head of Department at the Univer-

sity of Cape Town. His main research areas are the psychology of interrogation
and torture, policing, and explaining human rights abuses. He has published
more than a hundred academic works, in local and international journals, and
presented more than sixty papers at local and international conferences. His
books include Detention and torture in South Africa (David Phillip, Cape
Town, 1987), Mental health policy issues for South Africa (MASA, Pinelands,
1997). Professor Foster has bachelors and honours degrees from Stellenbosch
University, a master’s degree from the University of London, and obtained his
PhD at Cambridge University.
xi
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page xii
Kerry Gibson is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Cape

Town. She is interested in the applications of psychoanalytic thinking to organ-
isations and organisational change in South Africa. She has published widely
on these issues, and recent work includes Counselling and coping (with Leslie
Swartz and Rob Sandenbergh, Oxford University Press, 2002), and Reflective
practice: Psychodynamic ideas in the community (co-edited with Leslie Swartz
and Tamara Gelman, HSRC Press, 2002). She has recently completed a
doctoral dissertation which explores psychodynamic issues in service organi-
sations in South Africa.
Grahame Hayes lectures at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. He was

one of the founding editors of PINS (Psychology in Society), and is currently
the journal’s managing editor. His research interests are the early history of
psychoanalysis in South Africa, focused around the life and work of Wulf
Sachs, as well as developing a social theory (Marxism) of human agency.
Derek Hook was, until recently, a lecturer in Psychology at the University of the
Witwatersrand. He is currently a lecturer at the London School of Economics.
A co-editor of Psychopathology and Social Prejudice and Developmental
Psychology (both of UCT Press, 2002), he maintains a variety of research inter-
ests, stretching from political applications of psychoanalysis, to the history of
postcolonial theory and Foucaultian notions of power. His PhD focussed on
technologies of power in psychotherapy. He has acted as editor on special
editions of Psychology in Society and South African Journal of Psychology.
Mambwe Kasese-Hara is currently a lecturer in Developmental and Health

Psychology, in the School of Human and Community Development at the
University of the Witwatersrand. She has a PhD from Durham University
(UK), an M.Ed. (Special Ed.) from Manchester University (UK) and a BA in
Social Sciences (University of Zambia).
Peace Kiguwa is a tutor in Psychology at the School of Human and Community

Development at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Her MA
thesis was entitled ‘Constructing subjectivity: Young black women’s re-defini-
tions of self ’. Her research interests centre on gender and race identity.
Catriona Macleod obtained her undergraduate and PhD degrees from the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, and her HDE, honours and masters from the
University of Cape Town. She is currently working as a senior lecturer in the
Psychology Department of the University of Fort Hare, East London. Her
major areas of research interest are adolescent sexual and reproductive health
and inclusive education.
xii
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page xiii
Nhlanhla Mkhize is a registered counselling psychologist. He teaches

Psychology at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. His main areas of
interest are indigenous psychologies, moral and ethical decision-making, and
sociocultural psychology, especially those approaches informed by the works
of Vygotsky and Bakhtin.
David Neves is a registered research psychologist who has lived and worked in
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests and external research
consultancy work have centred on cognition and social development.
Ian Parker is Professor of Psychology in the Discourse Unit at Manchester

Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom. He is managing editor of
Annual Review of Critical Psychology and his books include Culture, power
and difference: Discourse analysis in South Africa (co-edited with Ann Levett,
Amanda Kottler and Erica Burman, UCT Press and Zed Books, 1997) and
Critical discursive psychology (Palgrave, 2002).
Kopano Ratele lectures in the Psychology Department at the University of the

Western Cape, Cape Town. His areas of teaching are masculinity, social
psychology, epistemology and research methods.
Tamara Shefer is currently Director of Women and Gender Studies and Asso-
ciate Professor of Psychology at the University of the Western Cape, Cape
Town. Her research and published works have been primarily in the area of
gender, power and sexualities and she has also been co-editor of two South
African texts directed at authorship development: Contemporary issues in
human development and Discourses on difference, discourses on oppression.
She also has a strong interest and teaching experience in the areas of feminist
and qualitative research methodologies and philosophical and political issues
in research.
Thabani Ngonyama Ka Sigogo is a community psychologist who teaches in

Psychology in the School of Human Community Development at the Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand. His interests lie in community activism and in
Africanist perspectives on community psychology as it is practiced in South
Africa. He has published in the American Journal of Community Psychology.
Garth Stevens is a clinical psychologist and researcher at the Institute

for Social and Health Sciences at the University of South Africa, Pretoria.
His research interests include violence and its prevention as well as studies
in social inequality and difference in the context of racialised social
formations.
xiii
Account: s7393698
CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page xiv
Leslie Swartz is Professor of Psychology at the University of Stellenbosch and

Director of Child, Youth and Family Development with the Human Sciences
Research Council, South Africa. He is interested in challenges related to the
provision of health and social security services in low-resource contexts, and
the challenges and opportunities that diversity presents to services. Recent
publications include Culture and mental health: A southern African view
(Oxford University Press, 1997), Counselling and coping (with Kerry Gibson
and Rob Sandenbergh, Oxford University Press, 2002) and Reflective practice:
Psychodynamic ideas in the community (co-edited with Kerry Gibson and
Tamara Gelman, HSRC Press, 2002). He is currently co-editing a volume on
human occupation and social transformation as well as an introductory under-
graduate psychology text for students in South Africa and developing
countries.
Oscar Tso Modipa is a community psychologist with interests in cross-cultural

and social psychology. He teaches in the School of Human and Community
Development at the University of the Witwatersrand.
Hilde van Vlaenderen obtained her PhD degree from Rhodes University,
Grahamstown, where she lectured in research methodology for 12 years. She
has worked in several African countries and her research and teaching interests
focus on participatory community development, local knowledge and organi-
sational development. She uses Activity Theory as a framework for much of
her work. She currently lives in France, where she works as an independent
international researcher and consultant.
Lindy Wilbraham has lectured in Social, Developmental and Health Psycholo-

gies – and qualitative research methodologies – at the Universities of Cape
Town and Durban-Westville, and at Rhodes University, Grahamstown. She is
currently doing research in social psychological aspects of tuberculosis and
HIV/Aids in the Health Systems Research Unit, Medical Research Council,
Cape Town. Despite engaging in research within the crushing realities of South
African health services, she is still a passionate discourse analyst.
xiv
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 1
Section
1
Theoretical resources
‘Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions,

it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates,
unites or reunites. It cannot help but liberate and enslave.
Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what
must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding
an alarm, thought, at the very level of its existence, in its
very dawning, is in itself an action – a perilous act.’
Michel Foucault
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 2
Summary
Anthony Collins
It makes sense that this book should begin with a section entitled ‘Theoretical
resources’ for, unlike mainstream psychology, critical psychology does not
begin with the scientific project of gathering new data but rather with exam-
ining the ways in which existing knowledge is organised. The primary problem
is not finding out new facts but rather reinterpreting how things are under-
stood and showing the implications of those forms of understanding. Unlike
traditional psychological science, which sees facts as the starting point and
theoretical interpretation of those facts as a late and relatively minor part of
the production of knowledge, critical psychology is interested in the theories
themselves, exploring the effects of different assumptions, ideas, concepts and
interpretations.
Critical psychology begins by rejecting the assumption that there can be
such a thing as a neutral presentation of objective facts. All explanations are
interpretations – those that deny this by making claims to universal scientific
truth are simply made more dangerous by their attempt to hide their own
perspective. The following chapters, in different ways, all show up the tradi-
tional assumptions about the truthfulness of certain psychological ideas. To
claim to speak the truth is to claim authority, to have the final say in explaining
or defining things and, most importantly, to silence all those who would say
things differently. In questioning traditional claims to authority, critical
psychology seeks clear spaces for those who have been silenced, ignored,
explained away, pathologised, marginalised or otherwise oppressed, and in
such spaces to open up discussions, permit new ways of speaking, and allow
different people to speak. In this, the challenge to traditional knowledge is a
challenge to those in power, and the questioning of ideas is the first step in
asserting new values, new freedoms, new ways of imagining oneself, and new
ways of conducting one’s life.
One of the problems is that challenging received forms of knowledge is no
easy task. How do we think beyond the categories we were taught to think
with? How do we escape the limits of our own ideas, especially those that are
most taken for granted, those that are so ingrained that we have come to accept
them as common sense? One way is to highlight contradictions, both within a
particular conceptual system and using one part against the other. Another is
to use two systems against each other, showing how elements from one prob-
lematise elements of the other. Yet a third is simply to show the consequences
of taking an approach to its logical extreme, especially where the consequences
are quite different from those that the supporters of that approach might have
wished. But all of these necessarily involve working at a higher level of intellec-
tual abstraction than everyday thought or even scientific research requires.
They involve complex explorations of the interrelations between ideas and the
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 3
Summary: Theoretical resources

effects of conceptual systems. Furthermore, critical thought involves ques-

tioning our most basic assumptions – the very ideas that constitute common
sense and everyday thinking. This necessarily entails a degree of complexity:
both the introduction of new, unfamiliar, often highly technical – and some-
times just plain difficult – concepts, and the development of elaborate analyses
that show complex connections between a wide range of ideas. For the
newcomer to the field this can present a daunting challenge – there may be
moments when the following chapters seem unfamiliar, complex or unneces-
sarily esoteric. But at these moments we can only hope to share a sense that,
although critical psychology can be hard work, the rewards far outweigh the
challenges. For what is at stake is not just more or different knowledge, but the
very principles that motivate this effort: the belief that ideas matter, not
because of some abstract belief in the value of truth, but because they directly
affect what is possible. What can be thought determines what can be done, and
in this world of brutality, inequality, alienation, deprivation and neglect there
is much to be done, and urgently.
In chapters 2 and 3 Mkhize confronts a foundation stone of psychology:
the concept of the self. He shows how the notion of the individual that was
taken for granted as a starting point for most mainstream psychology is in fact
a social construct, specific to recent Western culture. He contrasts Western
ideas of the independent self-contained individual with African notions of
selfhood as existing in relation to others and the environment. Mkhize’s
analysis draws attention to an ongoing theme in this book: the colonial nature
of psychological knowledge. Psychology, especially in its claim to be an objec-
tive science, is a victim of a profound conceptual narcissism. While trivialising
the knowledges developed in other cultures by dismissing them as ‘primitive’,
‘unscientific’ or otherwise idiosyncratic, psychology has failed to reflect on its
own limitations as a very specific cultural form, a product of Western
cosmology, philosophy and historical ideas. As a result, it has imposed itself
unthinkingly on other cultures, often offering inappropriate ideas and
methods while simultaneously undermining the existing indigenous knowl-
edge systems. Mkhize shows how the overwhelmingly Western bias of
psychological training in South Africa leaves professionals ill-equipped to deal
with local problems. He argues instead for an indigenisation of psychological
knowledge, showing the importance of producing frameworks that are consis-
tent with local experiences and worldviews, and applicable to local problems.
After explaining the differences between Western and African ideas of

selfhood in chapter 2, Mkhize then goes on in chapter 3 (Sociocultural
approaches to psychology: Dialogism and African conceptions of the self ) to
show how there are also critical traditions within psychology that explore the
relational aspects of selfhood in ways much more resonant with African views.
He identifies Vygotsky’s developmental psychology as an approach that moves
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 4
Critical Psychology
away from the idea of cognitive development as a purely internal process to

one which sees it rather as primarily interpersonal – always occurring in a
social context in which the child internalises the skills of more competent
others through an ongoing process of social interaction. But even this model
suggests a one-to-one interaction rather than a complete social world; so
Mkhize turns to Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism. Bakhtin argues that self is
produced in interactions, drawing on the cultural resources (language, social
codes, implied rules) of those interactions. This produces a self that is shaped
by social forces, but is complex and even contradictory, given the diverse range
of encounters possible in social life.
Bakhtin’s theory also raises the question of what can and can’t be said in
specific social situations: who is allowed to speak and who is not. This implic-
itly raises questions of power, of who is in authority and who is marginalised,
and this remains a recurring theme in the following chapters. Bakhtin
contrasts dialogical communication, in which both parties contribute to the
growth of understanding, with monological speech, in which one party speaks
at – rather than with – the other. Here it becomes clear that psychology has
traditionally been monological, speaking down from a position of assumed
authority over others who are thought of as having little important to say for,
or about, themselves. The challenge, then, is to produce a psychology that not
only understands the dialogical nature of the self, recognising it as fundamen-
tally social, interactive and relational, but to create a psychology that is in itself
dialogical – one that interacts with and learns from other systems of knowl-
edge. Such a psychology would be far more appropriate to the cultural
diversity and democratic aspirations of the South African context.
In the next two chapters Hook explores issues of the self from a different
perspective, focusing on the work of Frantz Fanon. In recent decades Fanon has
increasingly been hailed as a major critical intellectual of the 20th century. As
a black psychiatrist and anti-colonial revolutionary he, more than any other
single person, mapped out the critical study of racialised identity, unpacking
the trauma of psychological life under colonialism. Yet his name is hardly
known among mainstream psychologists and, more astonishingly in a country
such as South Africa where his ideas clearly have the most pressing signifi-
cance, his work is seldom seen in the psychology curriculum. Within liberal
psychology questions of race tended to be reduced to questions of racism: the
psychological problem of prejudice as a kind of cognitive error that caused
people to relate to others through harmful stereotypes. Fanon’s question is

deeper and more interesting: what kind of selves are created by racist social
systems? How do people experience their own identities in terms of those cate-
gories? Hook explores the radical implications of Fanon’s theory, showing how
Fanon seeks not simply to explain the alienation produced by racism but to
overcome it and heal the damaged self by confronting both the internalised
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 5

ideas and the social systems responsible for that psychological brutalisation.
Hook traces the links between Fanon’s ideas and the work of South African
Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko, showing how Biko’s political activism
stressed the importance of not simply overthrowing the political system of
apartheid but also of overcoming the negative sense of self internalised by
victims of racism.
Hook takes the analysis of Fanon even further, showing that his work not
only provides a model for anti-colonial transformation but in fact offers a
general model for critical psychology. Fanon does this by providing an alterna-
tive way of understanding psychological breakdown. Whereas psychology
tends to trace symptoms back to some failure in the individual, Fanon makes
it clear that most psychological problems have their roots in problems in
broader society. Where psychology blames the victim for his or her own
problems, Fanon reveals the brutality inherent in the social order. Fanon thus
politicises psychology, linking the needs for personal healing and radical social
change. While some commentators interpret Fanon as having abandoned
psychology for political activism, Hook goes on to give a detailed reading of
Fanon’s reworking of specific psychoanalytic concepts, showing how his work
is innovative and important precisely in articulating the links between the
psychological and political domains.
In his chapter Parker takes this exploration of the critical uses of psycho-
analytic concepts further in a more general discussion of psychoanalysis and
critical psychology. Whereas scientific psychology simply asks whether a
particular claim is true or false, Parker highlights the importance of examining
the social effects of adopting particular theoretical frameworks. He shows that
different articulations of psychoanalysis have consequences ranging from the
conservative to the potentially liberating. From the outset we are cautioned
against the dangers of essentialism – the tendency to explain our socially
constructed ways of being as natural and inevitable. Psychology does this by
ignoring the social dimension and attributing the ways we are to an underlying
human nature: a fixed, very often biological condition from which we cannot
escape. This denies the possibility of social change and leads us passively to
accept the current social existence as a reflection of a universal human condi-
tion. A frequent danger of uncritical psychology is that it takes culturally
specific assumptions about people and presents them as universal of human
nature in exactly this way.
Parker identifies two potentially subversive concepts at the heart of psycho-

analysis: the unconscious, and sexual desire. The notion of the unconscious
challenges the essentialised Western notion of the rational, self-conscious indi-
vidual who acts in his (he is assumed to be male) own best interests, showing
instead a self that is subverted by hidden drives of which it is not even aware.
It further allows us to find significance in things that were traditionally
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 6
Critical Psychology
dismissed as meaningless – symptoms, jokes, dreams, slips of the tongue –

revealing layers of social meaning where they might otherwise have remained
invisible. Psychoanalysis also shows how sexual desire becomes independent
from its physiological roots, shaped by meanings that are not biologically
determined but rather structured by social interactions. Here again the recog-
nition of the social dimension prevents the tendency to fall back on
explanations that reduce psychological life to biological essences. This helps
challenge the tendency to reduce social issues to psychological ones, a
tendency clearly illustrated in Mannoni’s attempt to show and explain (and, of
course, justify) colonialism in terms of a supposed psychological need of
certain cultures to be dominated.
Parker shows that psychoanalysis, like all other theories, does not simply
interpret the world but also constructs it. It does not simply describe universal
truths about human nature but produces a system of thought that becomes
true. He shows how, in becoming assimilated into a psychoanalytic culture,
psychoanalysis becomes true for us: it becomes an effective way of under-
standing ourselves. Parker further raises the possibility of using psychoanalytic
concepts against psychoanalysis: exposing, for instance, the way in which
defences and unconscious desires operate within psychoanalytic institutions,
often in ways that work precisely to make them less vulnerable to critique. He
also shows how these critiques can be applied to mainstream psychology, such
as by exposing the myth of researcher as an objective enquirer, revealing instead
the unconscious processes and desires that might influence the research
process. Much of Parker’s critique has relevance beyond psychoanalysis. We
need to maintain a critical awareness of the ways in which all conceptual
systems construct, rather than simply describe, our experiences, and to develop
an alertness to the ways in which such systems often contain within them the
very ideas that can be turned back against them in the form of critique.
In the next chapter Hayes discusses the possible dialogue between
Marxism and critical psychology. He argues that we need a sustained investi-
gation of everyday life – especially one that does not reduce the individual to
their inner experience but that rather grasps the connections between indi-
vidual experience and social structure. Here Marxism provides an important
theoretical resource, by identifying and analysing the specific type of society in
which we live: industrial capitalism. The Marxist analysis shows how the
underlying economic structure influences so many other aspects of social life,
highlighting the underlying tension between the majority who have to work
and the privileged minority who enjoy the profits made by exploiting that
labour. Marxist theory thus not only reveals gross differences in power within
that system but also provides a damning indictment by showing the human
cost of capitalist society. It thus provides a critical social theory that is some-
times missing from critical psychology – a necessary tool to prevent critical
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 7

psychology from lapsing into exactly the psychological reductionism that

plagues mainstream psychology.
Hayes shows how the Marxist notion of alienation provides a conceptual
link between subjectively experienced crises (which psychology likes to pathol-
ogise as purely internal matters) and the social forces that brutalise people.
Marxism provides a structural analysis that looks below the surface accounts
of social life, revealing the hidden forces at work. In so doing, it also develops
that crucial notion of ideology, showing how the available ways of thinking
about ourselves and the world are not just reflections of what is out there but
distortions that conceal underlying conflicts and instead present, and justify,
the way things are from the standpoint of those in power. Hayes points to the
importance of the Marxist notion of dialectics: the importance of under-
standing things in terms how they are interrelated rather than examining them
in isolation as positivist psychology is inclined to do. Here we can recall
Mkhize’s earlier discussion of relationality, but the Marxist analysis goes
further, showing how these interrelationships include formidable distribu-
tions of power that operate outside the hands of individuals. Hayes thus
concludes that Marxism provides both a set of theoretical resources and
pressing research questions for critical psychology. This may be all the more
important now that the issue of economic inequality that was so long at the
heart of South African political debate and action seems to have been deleted
from the agenda by those currently in power.
Shefer’s chapter shifts the analysis to the crucial area of gender. She shows
how psychology has long been active in maintaining ideas and practices that
justify and perpetuate gender inequality. With gender, as with many other ideas,
psychology tended simply to adopt available cultural ideas and then put a scien-
tific spin on them by using those ideas to guide its research and theory.
Psychology, for instance, takes a particular social norm such as the dominant
idea of femininity, accepts it uncritically and turns it into a principle, promoting
it as the standard of healthy behaviour and pathologising all who differ from it.
Shefer exposes how psychology made an ongoing research industry out of the
idea that men and women are fundamentally different, producing endless
studies of sexual difference. Most often these differences were attributed to some
underlying biological cause, thus making them seem natural and inevitable, and
in so doing obscuring the real social forces at work behind gender and gender
inequality. From the outset feminist psychology challenged this tendency,
showing how masculinity and femininity were socially constructed roles that
people learned rather than being the natural result of biological makeup.
Psychology has tended to assume not only that there are two separate and
opposed genders but also that each of them is stable and internally coherent.
Even somewhat more critical models that put gender on a continuum, with a
range of possible positions between extremes of masculinity and femininity,
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 8
Critical Psychology
accepted that each individual could be safely pinned down at some fixed point
along that line.
Shefer shows how post-structuralist feminism has developed a profound
and far-reaching critique of these ideas, shifting the question away from ‘What
is gender?’ to ‘How is gender constructed?’. It reveals how language and
discourse produce gender, and how gender is complicated, changing and
contradictory even within the same individual. Post-structuralist feminists
further shift the understanding of gender away from what one is, to what one
does: gender as coming into being through continual specific practices. This
presents a radically different way of conceptualising gender from that offered
by traditional psychology, and one that opens completely different possibili-
ties for critical intervention into the problems produced by current gender
arrangements. Not only can we fundamentally change the social organisation
of gender inequality, but Shefer conveys the importance of rethinking what
gender is, so that we can re-imagine who we are and transform ourselves
through our shifting understandings and enactments of our own identities.
In the final two chapters of the section, Hook explores the significance of
Michel Foucault’s work for critical psychology, going deeper into some of the
issues of post-structuralism raised by Shefer. Here again the question is shifted
from ‘Who am I?’ to ‘How have I been constructed?’. But the radical innovation
in Foucault’s critique lies in shifting the latter question away from the tradi-
tional psychological query ‘What psychological forces have shaped me?’ and
instead asking a question about psychology itself: ‘How has the discipline of
psychology made people come to think about themselves in particular ways,
fundamentally changing what they are and what they do?’. Foucault enables us
to ask what psychology is, not in terms of its findings, claims and theories but
rather in terms of what its real social function is: why it came into existence,
and what effects it has.
Here psychology is shown to be part of a fundamental shift in forms of
social control, away from terrorising people into obedience with threats of
brutal punishment and instead towards understanding the causes of deviance.
Psychology is part of a process of observing, documenting and explaining
human life. It produces norms and categories: what people should be like, how
to classify and explain them if they are different. In so doing it produces a
profound shift in how people come to experience themselves, a shift in what
they in fact are. It produces self-regulating individuals who are constantly
monitoring their own experience and behaviour (‘Is my sexuality normal?’,

‘Am I emotionally disturbed?’, ‘Is my behaviour anti-social?’). Thus psychology
is part of the new tactics of power, creating people who police themselves,
mostly without the need for the heavy hand of state repression. Indeed, in
policing themselves they do not necessarily feel imposed upon at all, but rather
that they are exercising their individuality, autonomy and personal choice.
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 9

In the final chapter of this section Hook looks more deeply at the links
between psychology and power. He shows how Foucault moves us away from
the idea of state (or capital, in the Marxist model) as a centralised point from
which power is controlled and exercised over citizens, and instead reveals
modern government as an array of techniques and resources that work
together to produce overall effects. Its aim is not to enforce obedience but to
enhance the life of citizens, to optimise their health, wealth and happiness; and
precisely in so doing to enhance the power of the state. Psychology can thus be
seen as one of these technologies of power. It offers us ways of knowing
ourselves, of helping ourselves, of being ourselves that make us participate
more intimately in exactly these new forms of power. Not only in its academic
knowledge and professional practice, but also in self-help books, talk shows,
advice columns, personal growth courses and a range of popular ideas and
practices does psychology help people eagerly to produce themselves as good,
healthy, productive and responsible citizens.
This analysis throws traditional critique off balance, because we are no
longer seen as outside of and against power, opposing the way it tries to stop
us from being ourselves. Nor is the problem with psychology those points
where it collaborates with repression – racism, sexism and the denial of rights
or freedoms. We ourselves, and psychology in its very helpfulness and effec-
tiveness, are the mechanisms and technologies of power. Hence Foucault’s
suggestion that ‘our goal nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse
who we are’, that we need to develop a more radical and far-reaching analysis
that even questions our own deepest desires, the aspects of ourselves we
believe to be most personal and true, in our ongoing attempt to move beyond
the limits of what is given.
These chapters, though dense and varied, are by no means a comprehen-
sive overview of the range of theoretical resources available to critical
psychology. Critical psychology is a diverse and growing area with a long,
though largely unrecognised history. Major areas within the field, such as the
anti-psychiatry movement, the Frankfurt School, important critiques of posi-
tivism and the cultural studies of science, to name but a few, have been
omitted. There are still more possible resources that exist in other fields but
which have not yet been tapped by critical psychology. None the less, the
reader who engages with this material will find a starting point for thought,
debate and action, and will, one hopes, be stimulated to investigate these
fertile areas further, taking up some of the urgent challenges raised by these
authors. These chapters simply provide suggestions of some of the possibili-
ties, marking a few key concepts and providing some useful tools that will, one
hopes, provide an incentive for future critical intellectual work – a task that, as
Hayes suggests, will not be complete until the day when there is no critical
psychology, because all psychology is critical.
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 10
Chapter
1
Critical psychology:
The basic co-ordinates
Derek Hook
‘We should argue for the priority of … political interpretation …

the political perspective is not some supplementary method … but rather
the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation.’
Paraphrase of Frederick Jameson (1983)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Discuss the idea of critical psychology as a critical orientation towards psycho-
logical knowledge and practice that affects how we think about the theory, context
and practice of psychology
Provide examples of how psychology and power might be linked, of how psychology
may itself be political
Discuss what psychological imperialism might mean in a South African context
Elaborate on how psychology might operate as a powerful form of knowledge
Discuss how psychology works as a powerful way of depoliticing experience, of
knowing one's self, as a powerful form of subjectivity.
10
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 11
Critical psychology: The basic co-ordinates

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AS ORIENTATION RATHER THAN THEORY

There is no one critical psychology. Rather there are multiple forms, multiple
critical perspectives on, and uses of, psychology which at best bear a family
resemblance to one another. It is important that we understand from the very
outset that critical psychology is more an approach, a kind of orientation
towards psychological knowledge and practice – and to relations of power in
general – than any one kind of theory, any one set of concepts. It is for this
reason that this introductory chapter would prefer to avoid giving a single,
rigid definition of critical psychology, precisely because critical psychology
cuts across the various sub-disciplines in psychology and is made up of diverse
theoretical perspectives and forms of practice.
One might say that critical psychology is by definition diverse and
multiple, that it cannot be localised to one form of theory, one type of critical
practice, or single context. The diverse concerns of each of these, the discrete
forms of theory and of practice, the particular priorities of specific sociohis-
torical locations in which critical psychology may be practised, militate against
providing any one simple formula. Critical psychology as it is applied as a
means of critiquing psychotherapy, for example, may look like a very different
creature from the critical psychology that comes to play a proactive role in
reformulating forms of community intervention. Just as psychology itself is a
Critical psychology
field comprising diverse component parts – many of which may bear no overt is an approach
methodological or conceptual resemblance to one another – so critical rather than a
psychology itself can be incredibly varied, even fragmentary. theory, an
orientation towards
In this respect it seems that the best way to grasp critical psychology is by
psychological
getting a sense of its agendas and functioning across a spread of theories and knowledge and
practices. This is exactly what this book offers, a broad and flexible introduc- practice – and to
tion to critical psychology and its concerns, a treatment that avoids, wherever relations of power
possible, the reduction of critical concepts and perspectives to formulas. Each in general. It is an
orientation that
of the chapters that follow – despite their diversity – may be considered a cuts across the
component part of the broader critical trajectory of critical psychology, and its various sub-
dimensions will best be grasped by taking into consideration the contents and disciplines in
objectives of each of them. psychology and is
made up of diverse
theoretical
perspectives and
THEORY, CONTEXT, PRACTICE: THREE POINTS OF FOCUS
forms of practice.
This book has been ordered in a particular way. Its structure has been broken
down into three areas: theoretical resources, questions of South African

context, and forms of practice. These three correlate to what the editors
consider to be three vital domains of critical activity or critique, that is, first, an
emphasis on the value of different modes of conceptualisation; secondly, an
eye for specificity; and, thirdly, the drive to convert critical sensibilities into a
kind of critical response or action. Each of these sections contains its own short
11
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 12
Critical Psychology
introduction that draws out the ways in which the chapters locate and respond
to the various imperatives that make up critical psychology; I shall comment
on each only briefly.
The theoretical resources section forms the conceptual backdrop to how we
understand much of what is politically problematic about the knowledges and
practices of psychology. This section demonstrates some of the ways in which
psychology is ideological, oppressive, Eurocentric, and how we might respond
to these crises of knowledge, practice and politics in a critical manner. Certain
traditional critical tools are applied here – Marxism, feminism, psycho-
analysis, post-structuralism – as are some newer ones, such as post-colonial
and Africanist forms of critique. The second section focuses on concerns
particularly germane to the southern African (or ‘Third World’) situation more
generally. Ongoing concerns of poverty, racism and HIV/Aids are addressed
and perspectives on community intervention, development, African
feminism(s), on what a black South African psychology might actually mean,
are all presented. The last section is about forms of practice – new ways of
making psychology more politically responsive, more active in contesting
traditional authority structures in psychology, more active in responding to
grassroots needs in South Africa. It includes explanations of Activity Theory, of
Participatory Action Research, discourse analysis, of the emotional compo-
nents of the typically unstated emotional-political subtexts of community
psychology. It also includes discussions of critical research objectives in critical
psychology, and of liberation psychology – that is, the ways in which
psychology may be usefully used to conceptualise how power works, how
various forms of oppression and inequality come to take hold and function,
and the ways in which they may be contested.
Although it is unnecessary to go into any more detail about these contents
here, it is useful to provide a loose thematic discussion of the key features of
what we take critical psychology to be. I shall do this by ‘playing out’ a number
of key themes or concerns in critical psychology. These themes may be taken as
ways of holding together the diverse activities, theoretical perspectives and
practical imperatives of critical psychology – themes that knit the seemingly
fragmentary component parts of critical psychology together. Such themes
may also be thought of as problematics, at least in view of the fact that they
point to a series of vital and vexing concerns that have motivated the emer-
gence of critical psychology in the first place.
POWER AND PSYCHOLOGY

The first and perhaps most omnipresent theme within critical psychology
is that of psychology and power itself. At its most basic, critical psychology is
exactly an investigation of the relationship between power and psychology. It
12
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 13

is an awareness that psychology itself is powerful – perhaps more powerful

than we may at first expect – and that psychology plays a part in maintaining
and extending existing relations of power. Psychology’s relationship with power
is complex and multifaceted; it is also a relationship of greater intimacy than we
may first expect. Perhaps the most direct way of expressing this relationship is
by asserting that psychology itself has been, and continues to be, a political
tool, an instrument of power. Bulhan makes this point at the beginning of his
Frantz Fanon and the psychology of oppression (1985) by means of a pointed
comparison between the careers of Fanon and Hendrik Verwoerd:
The two men ... were psychologists who put to practice their profession in ways
that made history and affected the lives of millions ... Verwoerd was a staunch
white supremacist, a Nazi sympathizer, an avowed anti-Semite, and a leading
architect of apartheid ... Fanon, in contrast, was a relentless champion of social
justice who, when barely 17 ... volunteered for the forces attempting the libera-
tion of France from Nazi liberation (3).
This is an important contribution to the history of psychology in that it leaves
little doubt as to the political utility of psychology, as either an instrument of
oppression or a potentially enabling means of progressive politics. This is a
point worth reiterating: critical psychology is concerned both with critiquing
oppressive uses of psychology and with enabling potentially transformatory
forms of practice that disrupt imbalances of power and which have social
equality as their goal. Critical psychology
It is important that we introduce a note of caution here, though: in is concerned both
with critiquing
speaking of psychology as a political tool, of psychology as possessing a polit-
oppressive uses of
ical utility, we are not referring simply to politics in the sense of government psychology and
and state – we are referring to politics in the sense of relations of power, that with disrupting
is, relationships of control, authority and subordination. Furthermore, this imbalances of
suggestion that psychology is in some ways political should not be taken to power.
imply that psychology’s involvement in politics is arbitrary, that psychology is
only infrequently, or inconsistently political. As Bulhan (1985) goes on to
make abundantly clear, and as critical psychology should assert whenever
possible, psychology is always – even in its most everyday and mundane forms
– profoundly political, profoundly involved in the reproduction and extension
of relations of power and control.
As all of the chapters in this book argue, in some or other way, psychology
– whether as a form of knowledge or as a type of practice – is always powerful,
always gives rise to relationships of power. This is not just a question of how
clinical psychologists or research psychologists relate to their ‘subjects’, that is,
their clients (or ‘patients’), those on whom they are conducting research (or
studying) – although this in itself is a vital concern of critical psychology. We
are also concerned here with the kinds of knowledge that psychologists
13
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 14
Critical Psychology
produce, that kinds of knowledge that are ideological inasmuch as they priori-
tise certain views of the world over others, in that they marginalise certain
voices, gloss over certain kinds of social contradiction and ultimately collude
with larger structures of power.
It is this realisation more than any other that would seem to lie at the heart
of critical psychology, the realisation that psychology is not a neutral ‘science’,
not an unbiased, simply objective way of knowing the world. On the contrary,
power ‘runs in the veins’ of psychology; there is no form of psychological
Psychological knowledge or practice that does not set up or support a certain relationship of
knowledge, psycho- power. It is this fact more than any other that motivates the efforts, practices
logical expertise and critiques of critical psychology.
and practice always
constitute a power-
relationship of some
PSYCHOLOGY AS IDEOLOGICAL
sort or another.
Just as critical psychology endeavours to play up the very political nature of
psychology, so the traditional or mainstream practices and applications of
psychology have, historically, attempted to do just the opposite, to play down
this political nature. This avoidance of the political questions – that is, the
questions of power – of which psychology is part, is one way of pointing to the
ideological functioning of power. What do we mean by ideological? A number
of complementary notions of ideology are offered in this book, one of which
states basically that ideology might be understood as the ways in which
meaning serves to create and to sustain relations of power and domination.
Our second theme, then, in understanding critical psychology (which
extends the first) is the awareness that psychology functions in ideological
ways which have, for the most part outside of the domain of critical
psychology, gone largely unexamined. Hence Hayes’ (1989) understatement:
‘The study of ideology has not been a central issue in the history of psychology’
(84). Hayes is making two points here, drawing our attention to the facts both
of psychology’s omission of ideology as an important focus of study, and of
psychology’s own immanently (yet unadmitted) political nature. The link
between these two points is not at first clear, although Hayes’ further
comments make this articulation more evident. There could, Hayes (1989)
claims, be at least two possible ways of addressing the issue of ideology in
psychology, one which at basis is critical, another which at basis is substantive:
The critical dimension refers to the knowledge claims and the ontological status
of psychology as a science ... The substantive dimension refers to the operations

of ideology at the level of the individual (84).
Whereas the critical dimension would interrogate psychology as a particular
politics of knowledge, the substantive dimension would examine the theoret-
ical and formal constitution of the subject of psychological theory and research
14
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 15

– engaging psychology as a particular politics of subjectivity. Our third theme,

extending the notion of psychology as ideological, is that of critical psychology
as a politics of knowledge and subjectivity.
A POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE AND SUBJECTIVITY

Why are these two considerations – namely, the politics of knowledge and the
politics of subjectivity – at the heart of what critical psychology is all about?
Well, because, following the line of argument presented above, they are the
most effective ways of obscuring or concealing psychology’s political quality.
By presenting itself as a science, psychology would pretend that it is free of The great majority
politics, because science is assumed to be, by definition, value-free (Hayes, of psychological
discourse typically
1989). Likewise, by omitting to provide an account of the processes by which
assumes that the
an individual becomes the subject of and for ideology, psychology has effec- self-contained
tively isolated the individual from the social sphere, the intrasubjective from individual is primary
the ideological, the psychological from the political. and the world of
social, political,
What are the implications of these two lines of critique? That psychology
cultural and
does produce certain ideologically loaded views of the world. That psychology economic power
does produce powerful effects in its subjects. This latter critique, of the isola- secondary. This is a
tion of the psyche from other elements of the greater social sphere, deserves prioritisation (of
further elaboration, and a number of the following chapters take up exactly individual over
social) and a
this imperative. This isolation of the social from the individual is so important division (of social
because it precludes the possibility that the facts of social and political power and individual) that
may precede – or even constitute – the subject. The reverse is typically assumed has remained
in much traditional psychological discourse, namely the situation in which the remarkably firm in
the history of
self-contained individual is taken to be primary and the world of social, polit- psychology.
ical, cultural and economic power secondary. This is a prioritisation (of
individual over social) and a division (of social and individual) that has
remained remarkably firm in the history of psychology. Taking this position, of
the primacy of self-contained individualism, and of the separate nature of
sociopolitical context, is to risk missing that, as Hayes (1989) puts it, ‘the
category and notion of the individual itself ... [may be] constituted by partic-
ular, historically situated, ideological discourses’ (85). Hence Hayes’ argument
that this subject of psychological theory and research needs to be ‘decentred
from its illusory coherence of an integrated psychological unity, or some essen-
tial core personality’ (Hayes, 84–85).
PSYCHOLOGY AS A POWERFUL FORM OF KNOWLEDGE

We can rephrase (and reiterate) aspects of the foregoing discussion in slightly
more straightforward terms. Critical psychology, we might say, is concerned
with the kind of knowledge that psychology produces, knowledge that is seem-
15
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 16
Critical Psychology
ingly scientific, based on an objective, neutral ‘knowing’ of the world that thus
sells itself as ‘the truth’. Critical psychology is concerned with this supposed
truthfulness, with what has ‘fallen out of the picture’ in mainstream psycho-
logical depictions of the world, with how psychology produces what counts as
knowledge, and with how this knowledge is put to use in ways which detract
our attention from real, concrete relations of power within the world.
At the very broadest level, then, one of critical psychology’s basic preoccu-
pations lies with those ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions concerning reality,
human nature and knowledge that are reflected and perpetuated by
psychology. Why is this such a vital concern of critical psychology? Well, to re-
emphasise the point, because the knowledge produced by psychology is not
simply a neutral and objective reflection of how the world is, but is rather a
kind of knowledge that is produced by a certain group, in certain ways, and for
certain interests. For this reason it becomes imperative to ask: who is
producing psychological knowledge, and for whom is this knowledge being
produced? The knowledge of psychology, to put things somewhat differently,
is not disinterested or impartial, nor is it universal. This is our fourth theme:
an awareness of the fact that psychological knowledge operates to extend rela-
tions of power.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM
In saying that psychology produces powerful kinds of knowledge, we need be
aware that the knowledges of psychology are exclusionary, that is, they exclude
a great number of people in their attentions and priorities. Here we see a vital
concern for an African critical psychology: a critical attention to how partic-
ular forms of knowledge, generated within and particular to the ‘First World’
come to be generalised, assumed to be universal, and hence applied to non-
Western settings in prescriptive ways. We might understand this as the
imperialism of Western psychology. (The notion of the ‘First World’ is obvi-
ously questionable and problematic, since it implies a moral evaluation of the
‘First World’ as superior to the ‘Third World’; I use the term here as a way of
indicating the pervasiveness of this particular tendency to prioritise US-
American or European values and understandings.)
The question of the ideological nature of much knowledge produced by
psychology is not only a question of who is producing knowledge and for
whom; it is also a question of how such knowledge is approached and what are
the mechanisms, the particular methodologies and procedures used to
produce such kinds of knowledge. It is a questioning of what psychology’s
underlying assumptions are, the philosophical lenses that come to condition
its ‘truths’. All of these are liable to produce ideologically skewed or unrepre-
sentative kinds of knowledge. Given their Western ‘First World’ origin, these
16
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 17

BOX 1 Critical psychology is ...
As mentioned in the introduction to this

A focus on introducing new methods, novel
chapter – critical psychology is no one single
techniques and emergent theories into
theory or practice; rather it is in its very nature
psychology as means of serving an emanci-
diverse and even seemingly fragmentary.
patory and socially transformative agenda.
Although I have tried to avoid giving any single
A critical attention to how the vocabu-
definition of critical psychology in this chapter,
laries, theories and clinical techniques of
I thought it would be useful to provide a series
psychology come to hold particular versions
of ideas – drawn from the following chapters –
of people and social worlds in place.
as to aspects of what critical psychology might
A critical awareness of how psychology is
be understood to be.
set up as an authority in defining what is
Critical psychology is: normal and what is abnormal in Western
An interrogation of the ‘taken-for-granted’ society.
assumptions concerning reality, human The attempt to implement social better-
nature and knowledge, which are simultane- ment and/or change, to serve an
ously reflected and perpetuated by emancipatory and socially transformative
psychology. agenda that is properly responsive to the
A critique of power-relationships consti- demands of a developing society.
tuted by psychology as a form of knowledge The critique of the imperialism of Western
and practice. psychology, of the way it universalises or
An attempt to problematise the place of generalises certain terms of human experi-
psychological explanations in patterns of ence and marginalises traditional forms of
power and ideology. knowledge.
Reflexive attention and critique directed A critical attention to the mechanisms, the
towards the procedures of psychology. particular methodologies and procedures
A determination to analyse psychology as used by psychology to produce certain
an instrument of power, as a means of kinds of knowledge, a questioning of the
implementing social asymmetries, that is, a underlying assumptions of this knowledge,
critique of how psychology reproduces and an engagement with the philosophical
legitimates inequalities (of race, of gender lenses that come to condition its ‘truths’.
etc) at the levels of practice, knowledge The questioning of the psychological
and organisational structure. processes, dynamics, capacities and prac-
A focus on how psychology constructs tices through which people may achieve
differences that perpetuate dominant emancipation, freedom, liberation and
constructions (of race, of sexuality, of escape from particular power structures of
gender) and subsequent asymmetrical rela- oppression and exploitation.
tions of power.
types of knowledge may be less than helpful – if not in fact actively harmful –
in African contexts and especially so if they have not first understood the
cultural contexts, the concepts, the beliefs, the worldviews of Africans. We
need be critically aware, in other words, of how psychology is a particular way
of approaching and making knowledge – hence what is called for is a critical
attention to its modes of knowing, its ways of doing research, the procedures it
uses in examining the world, and the concepts it assumes. In addition to this,
17
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 18
Critical Psychology
We need be
we need also a vigilance regarding how psychology imposes categories of expe-
critically aware of rience, ways of knowing over, in opposition to, older ways of knowing and
how psychology is a understanding the world, which it is typically disrespectful of. As Nhlanhla
particular way of Mkhize makes us aware in his two chapters, first, all psychologies are tied to
approaching and
making knowledge –
historical contexts and, secondly, when we are speaking about exclusionary
what is called for is kinds of knowledge, we are referring to nothing less than the marginalisation
a critical attention of the lived experiences of others.
to its modes of
knowing, its ways of
doing research, the DEPOLITICISING EXPERIENCE
procedures it uses in
examining the Another vital consideration of critical psychology is to be found in the claim
world, and the that much psychology has actively depoliticised our understanding of
concepts it assumes. ourselves and our world. Mainstream psychology has traditionally chosen
types of analysis that ignore pressing political contexts of culture, of
economics, of social power – of factors such as poverty and cultural and
economic marginalisation – in favour of abstracted, decontextualised and, of
course, psychologised descriptions of the world and the individual’s place
within it. As a number of chapters in the book argue, psychological research
has historically been dominated by issues of interest to the ‘First World’.
Knowledge production of this sort has traditionally been unconcerned with
political issues and, even less so, with political change. Furthermore, very little
psychological research has been directed towards improving the everyday lives
Critical psychology of underprivileged communities or towards explaining the processes of rapid
is concerned with
how psychology social change in developing countries. As such, one potential role for a critical
impacts on our psychology that is politically interested – that is, concerned with implementing
identities, how it social betterment and/or change – and that does aim to contribute to the
plays a part in specific concerns and interests of the developing world is exactly that of
making us who we
are by providing the
providing knowledge and services of social development in a rural African
technical vocabulary development context.
and concepts that
enable us to
examine ourselves, WAYS OF KNOWING OURSELVES
to practise and
Critical psychology is concerned with how psychology creates ways of under-
develop ourselves in
the terms it standing ourselves, frameworks of popular knowledge, for example, through
provides. which we begin to ‘know’ and speak of ourselves, through which we come to
regulate and control our behaviours. Critical psychology is concerned with
how psychology in a sense ‘makes us’, gives us subject-positions, categorical

roles in society through which we describe and understand who we are as men,
as women, as children, as adolescents, for example, or as ‘black’, or ‘white’ – or
any other racial designation. Our fifth theme: critical psychology is concerned
with how psychology impacts on our identities, how it plays a part in making
us who we are. Psychology provides the technical vocabulary and concepts that
18
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 19

enable us to do this – to examine ourselves, to practise and develop ourselves

in the terms it provides. More than just that, though, psychology plays an
important part in generating and substantiating categorical kinds of knowl-
edge about groups of people, about how they are, of how they act, of what their
tendencies and characteristics are. Another way of making the same point is by
suggesting that critical psychology is a critical awareness of how psychology
locks us into descriptions of who we are, descriptions which reiterate and rein-
force patterns and relations of social power.
It is for this reason that in her chapter Lindy Wilbraham speaks of critical
psychology as an attention to how the vocabularies, theories and clinical tech-
niques of psychology come to hold particular versions of people and social
worlds in place. These vocabularies, theories and techniques have a great deal
of power in modern societies, not only because they are formulated by experts
but because they provide us with the parameters of normality and abnormality
and because they inform questions of self, subjectivity and sexuality, questions
that we consider to contain the fundamental truths of our existence. These
vocabularies and techniques have entered the domain of popular discourse,
that is, they have informed our common-sense understandings and practices
of self and sexuality. More than this, they have come to supply a series of corre-
sponding social roles, or subject-positions, within which we locate ourselves.
Critical psychology
Our analytic work as critical psychologists is to take a skeptical view; to inter- is a critical
rogate where those taken-for-granted ways of making sense of selves come awareness of how
from, and how they operate; and to consider the effects and implications of psychology locks us
these constructed identities in our local context. into descriptions of
who we are,
descriptions which
reiterate and
PSYCHOLOGY AS POLITICS reinforce patterns
The last theme I shall discuss is that of the necessity of using psychology itself and relations of
as a form of politics. As much as critical psychology is suspicious and social power.
distrustful of psychology, of the particular versions of people and social worlds
it comes to hold in place, critical psychology is also an engagement and
critique with broader forms of social power that may be thought to exist
outside of psychology. In fact, as much as critical psychology is a critique of
psychology, it also makes cautious use of some forms of psychology to better
conceptualise, better analyse and hence better resist certain forms of power.
Although it has not often been the case in the history of the discipline,
psychology can provide us with a language which helps us illustrate how

certain forms of social power – such as racism, for example – appear to work.
The tendency to be avoided here is that of psychological reductionism,
where pressing sociopolitical circumstances (as discussed above) are ignored
in favour of a kind of analysis which prioritises purely psychological terms of
reference, which describes relations of power – again, such as racism – in ways
19
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 20
Critical Psychology
which suggest that it is a purely internal phenomenon, that it is somehow

natural, inevitably occurring, cut off from the social and political circum-
stances that give rise to it. Critical psychology does not wish to do away with all
of psychology, or with all psychological forms of analysis. As ideologically
unsound as much – even the majority – of psychology might be, we should still
look to the critical potential of certain forms of psychology, like that of psycho-
analysis for example, as a way of trying to understand, grapple with, and
ultimately intervene in, the working of power. Here we might suggest that one
important task of critical psychology is not to dispense with psychological
types of analysis but rather to reconnect them to political levels of description
and/or analysis.
‘PSYCHOPOLITICS’
Here it is useful to draw on the notion of a ‘psychopolitics’, which may be taken
to refer to the explicit politicisation of the psychological. We can read the
notion of a psychopolitics in at least two ways, both of which helpfully illus-
trate what critical psychology is about. Such a politicisation may refer to the
critical process by which we place a series of ostensibly psychological concerns
and concepts within the register of the political and thereby show up the extent
to which human psychology is intimately linked to, and in some ways condi-
tioned or limited by, the sociopolitical and historical forces of its situation.
Likewise, such a politicisation may refer to the critical process by which we
employ psychological concepts, explanations and even modes of experience to
Critical psychology describe and illustrate the workings of power. The hope in this respect is that
involves questions by being able to analyse the political in such a psychological way, we might be
of the psychological able to think strategically about how we should intervene in ‘the life of power’,
processes,
dynamics, capacities
without reducing power to nothing but the psychological. Put differently, we
and practices might say that liberation psychology is a key component part to what we have
through which been calling critical psychology. What is liberation psychology? Well, as Foster
people may achieve describes it in his chapter, liberation psychology involves questions of the
emancipation,
freedom, liberation
psychological processes, dynamics, capacities and practices through which
and escape from people may achieve emancipation, freedom, liberation and escape from partic-
particular power ular power structures of oppression and exploitation. The engagement and
structures of critique of the power of psychology, and the psychological engagement and
oppression and
exploitation.
critique of power, are two very broad conceptualisations of critical psychology
and, by the same token, two of its most important responsibilities.
A SOUTH AFRICAN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Continually thinking about and experimenting with how psychology itself may
be operative as a form of political practice is perhaps the most pressing imper-
20
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 21

ative for much critical psychology today. Looking over some of the key texts in
critical psychology, we find what seems to be a disproportionate attention paid
to the conceptual and ideological problems in much of mainstream
psychology, a focusing of intellectual activity on theoretical and ideological
levels. While this is no doubt absolutely crucial, if we are properly to ‘follow
through’ on critical psychology’s promise as both an intellectual and a practical
form of criticism, we need to balance this intellectual attention with concrete
activity. It is not enough for critical psychology to remain a theoretically
oriented critique of ideology. Critical psychology needs to do more than ‘take
apart’ from afar. It needs to do more than critically deconstruct and evaluate
psychology as a system of knowledge and values, without formulating alterna-
tive ways and means of seeing and acting in the world. It does not carry its
critique far enough if it does only this: it remains too far removed from the
object of its criticism.
After all, if mainstream psychology is as much about knowledge as about
practice, then critical psychology – as exactly the critical engagement with the
relationships between power and psychology – need equally involve both intel-
lectual and practical components. As two of the book’s contributors, Hilde van
Vlaenderen and David Neves put it, a South African critical psychology needs
to move beyond the applied level of ideological critique to consider ways of
refashioning itself so as to serve an emancipatory and socially transformative
agenda that is properly responsive to the demands of a developing society.
In post-apartheid South Africa a psychology of political commitment and
action involves very practical concerns of redress, of community involvement
and assistance in areas which may traditionally be seen as lying outside of what
a Eurocentric psychology should concern itself with. Grassroots needs outside
of a delineated focus on the singular individual become pressing here, as do
questions of social and/or community resources not often prioritised by US-
American or European types of psychological intervention. Likewise, different
social and political crises come more immediately to the fore here, suggesting
a reformulation not only of the practices of psychology – and its contours as a
discipline – but of how one thinks about its core areas of concern. Quite
evidently, a South African critical psychology needs to address and engage as
central and even primary the sociopolitical concerns of its location. The
pressing concerns of ongoing social inequality, of the effects and circumstance
of poverty, of a rampant HIV/Aids problem, of globalised underdevelopment
– these are items which are at the top of the agenda as we think of what a refor-
mulated and uniquely South African psychology, and a South African critical
psychology, will be. And in this reformulation, the hope is that a discourse
from the South will not only challenge the discourses and institutions of the
North but suggest altogether new modes of practice also.
21
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 22
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 What is critical psychology? – Anthony Collins
Before we ask ‘What is critical psychology?’, inner workings to the exclusion of the
perhaps we should ask ‘Why?’. Why is critical surrounding relationships, the interconnections
psychology? Why does it exist? Before it is a between individuals and their broader environ-
theory, a method, or a body of knowledge, ment. Thus, our second principle: critical
critical psychology is an attitude – and, let it psychology is a contextual psychology that
be said, a bad attitude: a disrespect for attempts to understand people in their social
authority, an uneasy suspicion that something and material worlds.
is wrong. And no matter how often we are told But why is this a critical psychology rather
that things are not so bad, that it is all on the than, say, a social or cultural or community
very verge of finally being fixed, that all we psychology? Because it is not just an attempt
need to do is complete the proper research or to fill a gap within psychology, to map out
perfect the necessary technique, the unshake- some neglected area. It is attempting funda-
able feeling remains that something is seriously mentally to challenge the foundations on which
amiss. the discipline is built. Psychology does not
We refuse to let this rest, because what is know what it is doing, because it does not
wrong is not simply a mistake, a conceptual know what it is. It is so busy doing its business
error, a lack of data, or the failure to implement that it has not been able to take the necessary
the necessary programme, but something far step back to consider exactly what business it
deeper and more serious. The world is full of is doing. Just as it takes individuals out of
suffering, alienation, brutality and neglect, and context, psychology takes itself out of context
psychology has responded with an erratic – it lacks a sense of the specific social and
combination of ineffectual concern, wilful igno- historical conditions in which it emerged, and
rance and willing collaboration. This intolerable how those conditions shaped its concepts,
situation leads us to the first principle: critical methods, institutions and practices. It believes
psychology is ethical practice, a response to a its own stories about itself because it does not
principled outrage. know where they came from.
Why does this concern drive us to critical For the most part psychology has been
psychology? Because psychology offers, or uncritically built on ideas that happened to
claims to offer, or we were once young and carry weight in the particular cultures in which
naive enough to believe it offered, a sustained it developed. Perhaps the two most influential,
attempt to intervene in the problems of human and disastrous, have been science (as the path
unhappiness, to make people’s lives better. Now to true knowledge) and the individual (as the
we are not so sure. We still believe that experi- way of conceptualising people), but these ideas
ence is important, and that human existence are so much part our everyday common sense
cannot simply be reduced to the abstract that is hard to imagine thinking differently. To
concepts of economics, politics, sociology, or do this we need to examine the origins and
any of the biological sciences. Thus we remain effects of these ideas, and to try to produce
committed to the discipline which (sometimes) alternatives.
takes seriously the understanding of human Critical psychology is precisely this moment
experience. But from this point we begin to of interrupting business as usual and examining
diverge from most traditional psychology on psychology from the outside. The critical
one fundamental issue: experience cannot be method entails a suspicion of accepted ideas.
understood in isolation, cannot be understood To do this critical psychology draws on many
in terms of internal processes or mechanisms other disciplines – including history, philos-
inside the individual. The fundamental problem ophy, sociology, anthropology, politics,
of psychology is that it tends to focus on these economics and everything that can be called
22
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap01 11/2/04 10:41 am Page 23

BOX 2 What is critical psychology? – Anthony Collins (continued)
‘cultural studies’, including feminism, post- psychology but to transform it to the point
colonial studies, critical race theory, science where it can become what it claims to be:
studies, and all manner of post-structuralisms. simultaneously a rigorous way of understanding
Thus critical psychology is transdisciplinary: it people and a caring profession. It is not the
is both inside and outside of psychology, it enemy of psychology, nor its sibling, but rather
borrows and steals useful concepts from its conscience: the insistent voice of self-
wherever they may be found, and it deliberately reflection that will not rest until psychology
attempts to make conceptual connections with lives up to its own best principles. Thus we can
critical approaches outside the field. state the final principle: critical psychology is
Critical psychology has a double meaning: a critique as method and goal: neither nihilism
critique of psychology, and a critical way of nor idealism, but a sustained and systematic
doing psychology. The aim is not to destroy attempt to transform through critical analysis.
23
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 24
Chapter
2
Psychology: An African
perspective
Nhlanhla Mkhize
‘The concept of culture I espouse ... is essentially a

semiotic one. ... Man [sic] is an animal suspended in
webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore
not an experimental science in search of law[s] but an
interpretive one in search of meaning.’
Geertz (1973, 5)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Critically discuss the context of psychology in developing societies
Distinguish between indigenous psychology and indigenisation
Define worldviews and the four dimensions of worldviews, illustrating each dimen-
sion with examples from traditional Western and indigenous societies
Illustrate the counselling and healthcare implications of the notion of worldviews,
preferably with your own examples
Critically discuss the core components of an African metaphysical system, including
a critical appraisal of the notion of a person-in-community.
24
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 25
Psychology: An African perspective

INTRODUCTION
Traditional Western approaches to psychology are based on certain pre-
suppositions about the person and the world. They also claim to be free of
roots in particular philosophical and value systems. Western-derived theories,
which are assumed to be universal, have been imposed on non-Western popu-
lations. Indigenous theoretical frameworks, on the other hand, have been
marginalised.
This chapter critically reviews the context of psychology in developing soci-
eties. A critical, emancipatory psychology, it is argued, should take into account
indigenous people’s languages, philosophies and worldviews (see Table 2.1 on Worldview: set of
page 36). It is through these worldviews and philosophies that people make basic assumptions
sense of themselves and the world. A traditional African metaphysical frame- that a group of
work is presented. This framework provides a basis for an African-based people develops in
order to explain
psychology. Its inclusion in teaching and research will give voice to marginalised reality and their
African perspectives. This will empower marginalised communities as active place and purpose
participants in the knowledge-generation process, rather than spectators. in the world.
Worldviews shape
our attitudes,
THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES values and
opinions, as well as
Modern psychology as we know it is essentially a Western product. It was the way we think
brought to developing countries as part of the general transfer of knowledge and behave.
and technology (Sinha, 1986). In the quest to emulate the natural sciences,
psychologists construed their discipline as an objective, value-free and
universal science. Eager to demonstrate the universality of psychological
processes such as motivation, perception and emotion, psychologists saw
culture as an impediment (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, & Misra, 1996). Traditional
psychology seeks to uncover underlying, universal structures of human func-
tioning. It assumes that psychological processes are fixed and ‘deeply hidden’
within individuals. Its purpose is to go beyond ‘superficial differences’,
resulting from varying cultural contexts, so as to isolate basic underlying
psychological mechanisms and describe the invariant laws of their operation
(Shweder, 1991). In line with this universalistic orientation, psychologists have
attempted to understand people in developing societies with reference to
conceptual categories and theories developed in the West. The same situation
applies to research conducted in developing nations. The research tends to be
initiated by psychologists in developed societies. Attempts are made to repli-
cate studies conducted in developed societies, using imported theoretical

frameworks (Sinha, 1990).
Cultural colonisation
The vertical – that is top-down, one-way – transfer of knowledge, ideas, values
and practices from developed to developing societies is a form of cultural
25
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 26
Critical Psychology
Self:
colonisation (Gergen et al, 1996; Sinha, 1990). It ensures that the developed
in traditional world continues to produce and market psychological knowledge and tech-
psychology, regarded nology (eg psychological tests) to developing societies. The latter, on the other
as a bounded, hand, remain consumers of Western ideas and technology. The end product is
autonomous entity:
it is defined in
that contemporary research and theorising in developing nations are largely
terms of its internal irrelevant to the needs of the local populations. These are needs such as elimi-
attributes such as nating poverty and illiteracy (Nsamenang, 1992; Sinha, 1990).
thoughts and Dissatisfaction with the assumptions and values embedded in Western
emotions, indepen-
psychology has increased in the past two decades or so. It has been argued that
dently of social and
contextual factors. psychological science is based on Western cultural presuppositions about the
knowing subject and the nature of knowledge (Gergen et al, 1996; Greenfield,
1997; Laubscher & McNeil, 1995). Traditional Western psychology is premised
on an independent view of the self. It also assumes that knowledge is value-free.
THE KNOWING SUBJECT: THE SELF IN TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Traditional Western ways of knowing draw sharp distinctions between the
Psychic unity: knowing subject and the object of her/his knowledge (Greenfield, 1997). The
assumption that knower is a solitary, disinterested subject. He or she is stripped of all particulari-
human beings are
ties such as gender, culture, position, his or her existence in space and time, and
all the same. It
purports that there the like (eg Rawls, 1972). The self in traditional psychology is regarded as a
are universal, bounded, autonomous entity: it is defined in terms of its internal attributes such
underlying
psychological
processes that are
inherent in all
individuals. From
this perspective,
the aim of
psychology is to go
beyond superficial
differences (eg
culture) so as to
uncover these
processes.
The self in traditional psychology is regarded as a bounded, autonomous entity: it is

defined in terms of its internal attributes such as thoughts and emotions, indepen-
dently of social and contextual factors. A collectivist approach to self, by contrast,
adopts a context-based view, and sees self as defined in terms of one’s relationships
with others, such as family, community, and status or position within the group.
26
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 27

as thoughts and emotions, independently of social and contextual factors. Collectivist self:
Where relationships with others and the social order exist, they are thought to be view of the self
established through discretionary choice (Shweder, 1982). This view of selfhood shared by many
is also known as self-contained individualism (Hermans et al, 1992; Sampson, indigenous societies
and non-Western
1988) or the independent view of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994). culture in which the
The abovementioned view of the self contrasts sharply with conceptions of self is fundamen-
the self in indigenous societies and non-Western cultures in general. The self in tally context-based,
these societies tends to be context-based (Shweder, 1991). It is defined in terms defined in terms of
one’s relationships
of one’s relationships with others, such as family, community and status or
with others, such as
position within the group. The goal of socialisation is not to be autonomous family, community,
but to harmonise one’s interests with those of the collective. This view of and status or
selfhood is also called the collectivist or interdependent self (Markus & position within the
group. Also
Kitayama, 1991, 1994).
understood as the
interdependent
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE: WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE notion of self.
PLACE OF VALUES
Traditional Western approaches to science seek objective knowledge. Knowledge
is not supposed to be affected by the knower’s values and meanings. The knower Materialism: theory
stands apart from that which is to be known, uninterested. Objective knowledge that physical matter
is the only reality
can be arrived at by anyone who has engaged in the necessary thought processes and that
or experimental procedures. This way of knowing, also known as ‘separate’ everything,
(Clinchy, 1996), is neither timeless nor universal. It is a product of the scientific including thought,
revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries (Cushman, 1990; Richardson, Rogers feeling, mind and
will, can be
& McCarroll, 1998). During this period the Western world witnessed a gradual
explained in terms
shift from a community/religious orientation to an unprecedented scientific and of matter and
materialistic position. This was accompanied by a rebellion against traditions physical
and customs, which were seen as a threat to individuality and freedom (Richard- phenomena.
son et al, 1998). Thus emerged the view that individuals could be sharply
distinguished from the world and each other, and from their customs, traditions,
and the social realm in general (Richardson & Fowers, 1998). Cultural
psychology: study
Cultural psychology of the way cultural
traditions and social
Cultural psychologists, among others, have criticised the notion of value-free practices regulate,
knowledge. Shweder (1991) defines cultural psychology as ‘the study of the express, and
way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform transform the
the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic human psyche,
resulting less in
divergences in mind, self, and emotion’ (73; emphasis added). Cultural psychic unity for
psychology also postulates that ‘subject and object, self and other, psyche and humankind than in
culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, live ethnic divergences
together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make in mind, self and
emotion.
each other up’ (Shweder, 1991, 73). Thus, while traditional psychology seeks
27
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 28
Critical Psychology
Objective
objective knowledge, cultural psychology assumes that the subject (scientist)
knowledge: and his or her object of knowledge are interdependent.
notion that Like Shweder (1991), Bruner (1990) emphasises that an important part of
knowledge is not a human psychology is ‘meaning and the processes and transactions involved
supposed to be
affected by the
in the construction of meanings’ (33; original emphasis). These meanings are
knower’s values and not realised by individuals acting in isolation. They result from participation in
meanings. the symbolic systems afforded by the culture (Bruner, 1990; Shweder, 1991).
From a cultural psychology perspective, psychology cannot be value-free. It
needs to engage with the values and meaning systems of scientists or
researchers and well as those of local actors.
Lived experience:
term closely
associated with
phenomenology, a LINKS WITH CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
school of philosophy The abovementioned objections to traditional Western psychology are consis-
that seeks to study
tent with the goals of critical psychology. Parker (1999) contends that critical
human phenomena,
focusing entirely on psychology aims to reflect upon the diverse ways in which men and women of
them by suspending various cultures and classes create meaning in their lives, including the
all presuppositions. manner in which they reflect upon their lived experience. Because the expla-
In its most basic nations and concepts of psychology feature so strongly in such accounts, an
form, ‘lived experi-
ence’ refers to real important part of such an exercise is an examination of how dominant forms
life, as opposed to of psychology operate here, and operate ideologically in the service of certain
laboratory or interest and power groups. What becomes important here is that we consider
hypothetical, expe- the reflections on life of the marginalised groups in society – those reflections
riences. Thus, one
can study the lived
typically ignored by psychology – because these reflections may help us to
experience of being upset some of the ideological uses of certain psychological notions and the
sexually abused or interests of power that they serve. Furthermore, critical psychology also main-
the lived experience tains that all forms of psychological knowledge are grounded in social, cultural
of being racially
discriminated
and historical contexts (Maiers, 1991; Parker, 1999; Tolman, 1994).
against. Critical psychology is also opposed to the abstract-isolated notion of the
self, so characteristic of traditional psychology. Rather, it aims to restore
concreteness to our understanding of psychological functioning by locating
human values, motivations and behaviours in their cultural context (Martin-
From a cultural
psychology
Baro, 1994; Maiers, 1991; Tolman, 1994). In line with the goals of critical
perspective, psychology, then, this chapter argues that the hegemony of Western psycho-
psychology cannot logical science can be overcome if we turn our attention to indigenous
be value-free. It conceptions of psychology (Nsamenang, 1992).
needs to engage
with the values and
meaning systems of
scientists or
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES
researchers as well The call for indigenous approaches to psychology stems from the realisation
as those of local that indigenous peoples of the world were never passive recipients of experi-
actors.
ence. Long before colonisation, indigenous peoples were actively creating
28
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 29

psychosocial and other forms of knowledge. Every group is confronted by chal-

lenges and problems in the course of its historical development. These are
challenges such as illness and death. Over a period of time concepts, world-
views and assumptions are developed to address these problems (Lock, 1981).
Likewise, indigenous communities had to develop practices and conceptual
frameworks to deal with problems they encountered in life.
Heelas (1981) defines indigenous psychologies as ‘the cultural views, Indigenous
theories, conjectures, classifications, assumptions, and metaphors – together psychologies:
with notions embedded in social institutions – which bear on psychological cultural views,
topics’ (3). Among these are conceptions of what it means to be a person (self- theories,
conjectures,
definition) and statements pertaining to how to relate to others and the natural classifications,
environment. Ho (1998) also considers indigenous psychologies to be ‘the assumptions and
study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context that metaphors –
relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other resources together with
notions embedded
indigenous to the specific ethnic or cultural group under investigation’ (94).
in social institutions
Thus, indigenous psychologies refer to forms of knowledge that arise out of the – which bear on
social and cultural realities of the people concerned. They are not imposed psychological
from outside. They also investigate mundane (everyday), rather than experi- topics.
mental (laboratory), behaviours. Finally, indigenous psychologies aim to
address the needs of the people under investigation (Sinha, 1993).
Indigenisation
The definitions of indigenous psychology offered above focus narrowly on the
role of local frameworks in the interpretation of human experience. Other
frameworks cannot be ignored, however, given that people do not live in
impenetrable cultural enclaves. To take this into account, a distinction should
be made between indigenous psychologies and indigenisation. Indigenisation
is an attempt to blend imported theoretical and methodological frameworks Indigenisation:
attempt to blend
with the unique elements of the culture in question (Sinha, 1993). It aims to imported theoretical
transform foreign models to make them suitable to local cultural contexts. and methodological
According to Kumar (cited in Sinha, 1993), indigenisation may take place frameworks with the
at the structural, substantive, and theoretical levels. Structurally, indigenisa- unique elements of
the culture in
tion refers to the nation’s organisational and institutional capabilities to question. Indigeni-
produce and disseminate relevant knowledge. For example, Nsamenang sation aims to
(1992) laments that the growth of indigenous knowledge in Africa is hampered transform foreign
by limited publication and technological resources. Substantive or content models to make
them suitable to
indigenisation could be achieved by applying psychology to address national
local cultural
policy issues (eg health and educational policies) (Sinha, 1993; Nsamenang, contexts. Indigeni-
1992). Finally, theoretical indigenisation seeks to develop conceptual frame- sation can occur at
works and metatheories that are consistent with the sociocultural experiences, structural, substan-
worldviews and goals of the people in question. This includes the use of locally tive and theoretical
levels.
derived reference systems as well as borrowed theoretical frameworks that
29
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 30
Critical Psychology
Self-contained
have been transformed to suit the needs of local populations (Sinha, 1993).
individualism: While recognising the importance of other forms of indigenisation, this
traditional chapter focuses on theoretical indigenisation.
psychological view
in which the self is The worldviews of a society
regarded as a
bounded, The chapter provides a conceptual framework to facilitate the indigenisation of
autonomous entity psychology in Africa. This is based on the realisation that it is not possible to
– defined in terms arrive at a balanced understanding of psychological processes in developing
of its internal
attributes such as
societies without a critical awareness of these societies’ assumptions about life.
thoughts and A proper understanding of a people should begin with an examination of the
emotions, philosophies, languages and worldviews through which they experience the
independently of world (Huebner & Garrod, 1991; Simpson, 1974; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987).
social and
contextual factors.
Psychology in general is based on the worldviews of the white middle class, to
Like the idea of the the exclusion of the worldviews and values of people in developing societies
knowing subject, (Nsamenang, 1992).
the self-contained
individual is
stripped of all DO WE NEED AN AFRICAN-BASED PSYCHOLOGY?
particularities such Contesting ideas of a ‘dated’ worldview
as gender, culture,
position, and of his Before going any further, I should like to address the possible objection that
or her existence in the worldview propounded here is dated, given the widespread influences of
space and time. acculturation and globalisation. To address this objection, I begin by posing
the typical Bakhtinian (1981) questions: Who says that the worldview is dated?
Based on what information? And whose voice/perspective and interests does
he or she represent? Far from being dated, the worldview continues to guide
the lives of many people in traditional sectors of African society. Unfortu-
nately, psychology in developing societies tends to be confined to the modern
sectors. It has hardly permeated the majority of people in rural settings
(Nsamenang, 1992). Rural inhabitants, who hardly, if ever, participate in
studies conducted by psychologists, continue to rely on indigenous theories of
illness and interventions, among others. What right do we, as psychologists,
have to proclaim that these ways of life are ‘dated’? If rural inhabitants
abandon their ‘dated’ ways of life, can we guarantee that they will be able to
participate in and benefit from modern psychology, among others? Or are we
creating doubly marginalised people, deprived of their own cultural heritage
and yet unable to partake meaningfully in modern ways of life? Let me leave
Acculturation: the reader to ponder these questions.

modification of the
culture of a group
or an individual as Selective acculturation and the racism of Western philosophy
a result of contact The selective acculturation of urban Africans into European ways of life tacitly
with a different reinforces the assumption that European experiences and philosophical tradi-
culture.
tions explain the totality of human experiences all over the world. The fact that
30
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 31

Rural inhabitants,
who hardly, if ever,
participate in
studies conducted
by psychologists,
continue to rely on
indigenous theories
of illness and
interventions,
among other things.
What right do we,
as psychologists,
have to proclaim
that these ways of
life are ‘dated’?
acculturation tends to be unidirectional perhaps bolsters the view that

Western ways of life are better, and African ways superstitious and backward.
(Psychologists have never adequately addressed the question why accultura-
tion in South Africa tends to be unilateral, with blacks being assimilated into Unilateral:
white ways of life, rather than bi-directional.) In a way, this is consistent with relating to, involving
the views of some major European philosophers, who contended that nothing or affecting only
of note ever came out of Africa (Laubscher & McNeil, 1995; Onyewuenyi, one side.
1993). For example, Hegel (1956) argued that ‘[Africa] ... is no historical part
of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical
movement in it – that is in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European
world’ (99). Likewise, Hume is quoted as follows: ‘I am apt to suspect the
Negroes ... to be naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilised nation
of any complexion other than white’ (cited in Serequeberhan, 1991, 5). These
philosophers had a major influence in the history of Western ideas, including
psychology. It could thus be inferred that their views laid a foundation for the
marginalisation of African philosophical and other knowledge systems.
The danger of importing Western systems of understanding

If one considers that critical psychology is concerned with the manner in which
men and women in various classes and cultures construct and reflect upon their
action and experiences in the world (Parker, 1999), then there must be a place
for indigenous conceptions of human development in psychology. It does not

make sense to explain exclusively the psychological needs and experiences of
people in developing societies with reference to conceptual categories and
philosophical systems imported from the West. These knowledge traditions
‘reflect the needs, intellectual and otherwise, of developed rather than devel-
oping societies’ (Moghaddam, 1993, 121). Although there is some degree of
31
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 32
Critical Psychology
universality in the challenges facing human societies in the course of their

development (eg the need for self-definition, dealing with birth and death),
cultural variations exist in the way these challenges are resolved (Heelas, 1981).
Most importantly, it is usually the most disadvantaged segments of the popula-
tion, with limited access to modern healthcare, who rely most on services
premised on traditional African worldviews. For example, according to the
World Health Organisation, about 80% to 90% of people in developing societies
rely on traditional healers for healthcare. Marginalisation of these perspectives
thus contributes to the oppression of the people who rely on them.
The oppression of traditional African sociopsychological frameworks

Why do social scientists in developing societies favour Western theoretical
frameworks? Is it because indigenous frameworks have fallen out of favour
among the local people? I concur with Moghaddam (1993) that ‘traditional
cultural systems survive in traditional sectors of Third World societies [that
are] supported by traditional industries and the social and psychological
knowledge provided by traditional religions and philosophies’ (121). Tradi-
tional African sociopsychological frameworks are not used because, like the
people who espouse them, they belong in the category of marginalised knowl-
edge. These knowledge systems are oppressed in the same way that women’s
concerns were oppressed in psychology (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger &
Tarule, 1986). Far from being dated, African conceptions of sociopsychological
processes have been rendered invisible by the competition between cultural
systems, of which the Western is the most dominant. The question is: Whose
interests does this situation serve?
Focusing on the needs of a society

The process by which new subjectivities are created does not end with under-
graduate education (see discussion in Box 1 below): it continues at the post-
graduate level. Writing with respect to Iranian psychologists, Moghaddam
(1993) laments the separation of indigenous psychologists from the traditional
sectors of their society. He maintains that the teaching, research and profes-
sional practice of psychologists ‘is oriented toward, and more in tune with, the
modern sector’ (Moghaddam, 1993, 125). Through the process of training, a
new (African) elite, whose views and lifestyles are similar to those of middle and
upper class Westerners, who are their mentors, and different from those of their
own (traditional) societies, is created (Moghaddam, 1993). The same could be
said of the training of psychologists in South Africa. Even at the level of research,
there is a tendency to encourage students to pursue research questions that are
more relevant to the needs of the modern sector (eg human-computer interac-
tions). On the other hand, problems of illiteracy, the disintegration of extended
32
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 33

BOX 1 Oppression of African knowledge systems in education
A reflection on the oppression of traditional uals to realise their innermost potential through
African knowledge systems cannot be complete the process of individuation (separation) and
without a brief overview of the complicity of the self-actualisation.
educational system and the African elite. The The training was alienating because it was
training of psychologists, for example, initiates the opposite of the socialisation I had received
(indigenous) students into a new way of thinking in the process of growing up. This socialisation
about the self and the world. It creates specific had emphasised the relational nature of person-
subjects who do things in a particular way, as hood. This is captured in the saying ‘Umuntu
mapped out by their discipline. Let me illustrate ngumuntu ngabantu’, which roughly translates
this by reflecting briefly on my first encounter as ‘A person becomes a human being through
with psychology as an undergraduate student. I, other human beings’. African conceptions of
like many others in my cohort, was initiated into experience and the world were conspicuous by
an individualistic way of thinking about the self their absence. Even to date, the teaching of
and the world. At first this was strange and African knowledge systems in South African
alienating, given my largely communal up- institutions of higher education has been largely
bringing. We had to master theories such as left to traditions such as philosophy and
behaviourism, psychoanalysis, and humanistic theology (eg Louw, 1999; 2001; Shutte, 1993,
approaches. Apart from being Western in origin, 2001; Teffo & Roux, 1998) rather than
these theories take the individual as the primary psychology. Consciously or unconsciously,
unit of analysis. The context in which the person psychological training creates new subjectivi-
is embedded is ignored. For example, behav- ties, characterised by an individualistic and
iourism focuses on the relationship between disembedded orientation towards the self and
stimuli and responses, while psychoanalytical the world. Again, the critical question is: To
and humanistic approaches seek to help individ- whose advantage?
family systems, and learning under conditions of abject poverty, take a back seat.
A critical
Those who do tackle such issues run the risk of having their research ignored psychology should
because it does not address ‘hard-core’ psychological issues. not only be
concerned with the
Agendas of an African critical psychology way in which
cultural and
The Aids pandemic has aptly brought home the importance of conducting institutional
relevant research in developing societies. Earlier intervention efforts, based on practices shape
research conducted in developed societies, focused on changing people’s individual
development: it
cognitions. The assumption was that cognitive change would result in behav-
should produce
ioural change. These efforts failed miserably because they did not take into research that
account the sociocultural context of people in developing societies. A critical furthers the needs
psychology should thus not only be concerned with the way in which cultural of developing
and institutional practices shape individual development: it should produce societies. This
includes research
research that furthers the needs of developing societies. This includes research into poverty,
into poverty, illiteracy and alienation caused by globalisation, among other illiteracy and
things. It is only then that critical psychology will achieve its emancipatory alienation caused
project. by globalisation.
33
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 34
Critical Psychology
Panacea:
Possibility of dialogue between theoretical frameworks
kind of remedy, I have written at length about the relevance or otherwise of Western-derived
cure for diseases, theoretical frameworks. These frameworks are not irrelevant in an absolute
ailments, difficul-
ties, problems; a
sense (Tolman, 1991). As Tolman (1991) argues, even Watson’s stimulus-
sort of ‘cure all’. response behaviourism was relevant to the interests of capital and its
managers. Western theoretical frameworks do have a relevance of some sort in
developing societies. My objection to them is based on the view that they
cannot be exclusively used to explain human needs across cultures and across
time. In the past, this has been done, to the exclusion of local people’s attempts
to account for their own life experiences. Neither is it implied that African
frameworks are a panacea to resolve all sociopsychological problems among
Africans. Rather, the purpose is to show that a critical psychology should be
willing to engage in a dialogue with theoretical frameworks emanating from
the life perspectives of the people in question.
The dynamic interpenetration of worldviews

Let me hasten to address a common criticism of attempts to introduce indigenous
knowledge systems to academic and other forms of discourse. The objection is
often raised that this reifies culture. (Paradoxically, this criticism is never levelled
against Western psychology, which is supposedly free of cultural influences.) This
criticism fails to take into account the dynamic nature of cultural meaning
Culture: systems. The ideas presented in this chapter are neither static nor the sole deter-
generally refers to minant of African thought systems. Cultural meaning systems are always in
knowledge that is dialogue with other bodies of knowledge. They are thus capable of undergoing
passed on from one innovation and renewal. This has been the case with independent Christian
generation to
another within a
churches in Africa. These churches have successfully interwoven traditional
given society, African and Christian belief systems (Oosthuisen, 1989). One cannot talk about
through which African belief systems without taking history into account. Changes and adapta-
people make sense tions resulting from colonisation, Western-type education, industrialisation and
of themselves and
the world. It
exposure to Western media need to be accounted for. Exposure to multiple world-
incorporates views means that there cannot be a simple, one-to-one correspondence between
language, values, a meaning system and how it is employed in real life. To understand the
assumptions, norms complexity of human experience, we have to take into account the dynamic inter-
of behaviour, ideas
about illness and
penetration of various worldviews. Rather than arguing for a complete break with
health etc. This cultural meaning systems, or a complete immersion in them, attention should be
body of knowledge paid to processes by which they unfold or fail to unfold over time, as they come
is organised into contact with other bodies of knowledge (Maffi, 1998).

systematically and
is known in
anthropology as No one unifying African metaphysics
‘cultural meaning It is important to note that the views presented here are not necessarily shared
systems’.
by all Africans. African scholars are not in agreement about the existence of a
34
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 35

unifying African worldview or metaphysics. As a result, there has been a

tendency of late to approach metaphysical issues in a culture-specific way (eg
Wiredu, 1984, 1991, 1992). Although there may not be a unifying African
metaphysics, there is nevertheless an approach to reality shared by a number
of Africans (Nsamenang, 1992; Teffo & Roux, 1998) and
other indigenous societies. Its central tenets are beliefs about
God, the universe and notions of causality, person and time
(Myers, 1988). Historically, these views have been associated
with large parts of Africa. Thus, they can be regarded as
typical of African metaphysical thinking, especially in the
regions south of the Sahara.
What is a worldview?
A worldview is a set of basic assumptions that a group of
people develops in order to explain reality and their place and
purpose in the world. These assumptions provide a frame of
reference to address problems in life. Worldviews provide
responses to a set of core questions that people in all cultures
have had to respond to in the course of their development (Sue
& Sue, 1999). These are questions about the nature of the
world (what is the world like?) and the meaning of person-
hood, among other issues (Jensen, 1997). Worldviews shape
our attitudes, values and opinions as well as the way we think
and behave (Sue, 1978).
Worldviews contain the following components: time The spread of Western concepts and
categories of understanding – particularly
orientation; people-nature orientation; activity orientation; in psychology – has excluded or
and the relational orientation (Jensen, 1997; Lock, 1981; Sue marginalised the lived experience of
& Sue, 1999). The table overleaf shows general cultural others, especially Africans.
differences in worldviews.
To say that there is an African worldview does not mean every member of
a culture should subscribe to it, in the same manner that not every European
Metaphysics:
subscribes to individualism as a way of life. The worldview described is an branch of philo-
attempt to explain human reality from an indigenous African perspective sophy concerned
(Myers, 1988). Ignoring alternative worldviews limits practitioners’ ability to with our concep-
deal with people from different cultural backgrounds, especially in counselling tions of reality,
position in the
and healthcare (see Boxes 1 and 2).
universe, and our

relation to others
AN AFRICAN METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM and the environ-
ment – our
Defining metaphysics grappling with time,
Metaphysics is concerned with a people’s conceptions of reality, their position space, causality and
existence.
in the universe, and their relation to others and the environment. It represents
35
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 36
Critical Psychology
Table 2.1 Components of a worldview
Description Examples
Time orientation Western societies tend to emphasise the future. Time is organised
A culture may emphasise history and into linear segments, marked by what people are doing at a time
tradition, the here and now, or the distant (Hall, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1990). Traditional communities, on the
future. Time and space orientation are other hand, concentrate on the past and the present. It is not the
intertwined. Self-awareness involves an passage of time per se that is important, but the relationship one
appreciation of where one is coming from, has with ancestors (the past) and one’s fellow human beings (the
the present, as well as where one is likely present). The ideal is to live harmoniously with ancestors, the family
to be in the future and the community. Paying attention to context and relationships is
thus more important than the mathematical division of time.
Orientation to nature For cultures that emphasise the past, external forces beyond one’s
This dimension answers the question: How control determine life (eg God, ancestors, and fate). For cultures
is the relationship of people to nature to that emphasise the present, people and nature co-exist, living
be understood? harmoniously with each other. Most indigenous African societies
emphasise both the past and the present. (Myers, 1988). Future-
oriented cultures, on the other hand, emphasise mastery and control
over the environment, a situation that holds in many Anglo
societies. (Ivey, Ivey & Simerk-Morgan, 1997)
Human activity Traditional Western cultures place value on doing over the being or
The human activity dimension answers the being-in-becoming (the process) mode of activity. This emanates
question: What is the preferred mode of from the belief that one’s value as a person is determined by
human activity? personal accomplishments (Sue & Sue, 1999). Other cultures, on the
other hand, emphasise being or being-in-becoming. This mode
values harmony with others and the social milieu, as well spiritual
fulfillment. (Sue & Sue, 1999)
The relational orientation Traditional Western cultures regard the self as a bounded entity.
This is concerned with how the self is People are defined in terms of internal attributes such as thoughts
defined in relation to the Other and the and emotions. This view of selfhood is also known as self-contained
environment individualism (Sampson, 1988, 1993; Hermans et al, 1992) or the
independent view of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other
hand, indigenous cultures define the self in terms of one’s
relationships with others, such as family, community and status or
position within the group. Children are socialised to harmonise their
interests with those of their family and the community.
Ontology: people’s attempts to grapple with fundamental questions pertaining to

describes the nature existence, space, time and causality (Teffo & Roux, 1998). Metaphysical
of reality to be systems may be seen as cultural models (Quinn & Holland, 1987) or meaning
studied, and what
can be known about systems (Miller, 1997). These are the taken-for-granted models through which
it. For example, people make sense of the world and their behaviour in it.
traditional African Metaphysical ontologies not only prescribe what is but also incorporate
worldviews described
in this chapter posit
ideals of what can be, the ideal cosmic and natural order, and its possible
a world in which defects. For example, traditional African societies believe that there should be
everything is inter- harmony and interdependence between elements in the cosmos. Disconnec-
connected.
tion between parts comprising the whole is undesirable and immoral or
36
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 37

unethical. Thus, awareness of this framework is indispensable if one were

wanting to understand a people’s conception of moral reasoning. Traditional
Western theories, on the other hand, conceive moral development individual-
istically. Moral actors are abstract subjects who derive moral principles
rationally and independently of history and time (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984;
Rawls, 1972). Given the abovementioned differences between traditional
African and European understandings of the relationship between the person
and his or her environment, it is unfair to declare one culture morally deficient
based on the conceptual categories of another (Simpson, 1974).
BOX 2 Worldviews, conceptions of illness, and counselling
The following case study illustrates the impor- he could make peace with them. Bheki believes
tance of worldviews in counselling. The client that someone interfered with the transition of
presented at a Student Counselling Centre at one his father’s soul from the world of the living to
of the local universities. He was finding it difficult the spiritual world. He maintained that his
to concentrate on his studies. Thus, he was not father’s soul was being held captive by
making satisfactory academic progress. His name umthakathi (a sorcerer), who had turned his
and identifying particulars have been altered. father into a zombie. He was worried that his
Bheki is a 29-year-old, single black student. father’s soul was wandering aimlessly, without
He resides in one of the townships surrounding finding peace. He was also worried that, as the
a major urban city. He was referred to the eldest son, the same fate would befall him if he
Student Counselling Centre by one of his happened to die before rectifying the situation.
lecturers, who had noted that he was sometimes Bheki came to the Student Counselling
‘day-dreaming’ in class. Bheki is the 6th eldest Centre reluctantly because he knew that coun-
in a family of nine children. They all live with sellors ‘did not understand traditional problems’.
their mother, who is a pensioner. Except for the I’ve cited this case study to show that the
eldest sister, who now lives independently, all client relied on a different worldview to account
his siblings are unemployed. Prior to returning for his experience. This worldview espouses a
to university, Bheki had been a teacher for 5 different theory of illness. It is based on a con-
years. He decided to pursue further studies to nected, rather than an abstract, view of the self.
improve his education. This would in turn The case study is about relationships, responsi-
improve his income, enabling him to support his bilities, and consequences to the self and others.
siblings better. He maintained that whenever he To make sense of it, one needs to understand the
tried to study he became drowsy and fell asleep. nature of human relationships in traditional
He attributed this to family problems. He had African societies. This worldview is not part of
felt like this since 1994, but the situation had formal psychological training in many institu-
become more pronounced over the years. tions. No wonder the client felt the counsellors
Bheki’s father, Mr Nkosi, passed away in ‘did not understand traditional problems’. When
1994. He was born in a polygamous family. presented with this case, many students are
There was always tension within the family. Mr quick to argue incompetence, preferring to ‘refer
Nkosi decided to get married and stay away from the person to a traditional healer’. From an
his original family. He moved away from ethical perspective, that might be an appropriate
Nkandla, in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, to the city thing to do. However, one way to address this
to escape ‘bewitchment’ by members of his shortcoming is to incorporate indigenous world-
extended family. Unfortunately he died before views into the training of psychologists.
37
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 38
Critical Psychology
Metaphysics and psychology

A related issue is the relationship between metaphysical ontologies and
psychological topics. Much & Harré (1994) maintain that a culture’s psycho-
logical discourse is a reflection of dominant local metaphysical ontologies.
From these ontologies are derived theories of the person, the social context,
and the natural order. All psychologies are somehow ‘connected to underlying
metaphysical ontologies which ... order things in specific ways with regard to
what is “good” and “bad”, “right” and “wrong” about conditions of life’ (Much
& Harré, 1994, 308). Unfortunately, the Western history of ideas has created
an illusion that psychological theories are objective, universalisable and free of
Much & Harré roots in historically particular metaphysical systems. (See Much & Harré,
(1994) maintain 1994, for an account of how spirit and, later, the mind, came to be valued over
that a culture’s the body in Western thought.)
psychological
Metaphysical ontologies are central to traditional African understandings
discourse is a
reflection of of the world. Akbar (1984) and Nobles (1972) have argued that they can serve
dominant local as a foundation of an African-based psychology. In the next section, four inter-
metaphysical dependent philosophical assumptions bearing directly on psychological topics
ontologies. From are discussed. These are (a) the hierarchy of beings, (b) the notion of vitality, (c)
these ontologies are
derived theories of the principle of cosmic unity, and (d) the communal view of personhood. The
the person, the worldview presented below extols connection and interdependence, and is
social context, and hence oriented towards concrete (pparticular) existence. It differs from tradi-
the natural order. tional Western worldviews, which prize an abstract, generalised view of the self.
BOX 3 Marginalised worldviews in healthcare
The fact that a worldview is marginalised does do not give guidelines on how to act ethically
not mean that it ceases to function. People in particular circumstances.
continue to rely on it, sometimes secretly. The The nurses interviewed were black Africans
following excerpt is from Gambu (2000). who saw mainly black patients.
Gambu studied ethical decision-making in the The following extract involves an ophthal-
nursing profession. She was interested in how mic nurse who saw a 50-year-old partially blind
traditional African worldviews influence nurses’ patient. The nurse’s initial examination revealed
understanding and application of ethics. no organic basis for the patient's blindness. Her
Nurses are guided by a professional Code of own beliefs about Zulu traditions then came to
Ethics. Professional codes emphasise the fore. Rather than referring the patient for
autonomy, which is the freedom of individuals further assessment, as expected, she secretly
to hold and act upon their own opinions advised her to consult a traditional healer:
provided they do not violate others’ rights;
beneficence, which requires professionals to Gambu: What was the ethical dilemma for you
protect patients from harm and to promote in that situation?
their welfare; and justice, which requires that Nurse: The conflict was that I really did not
people be treated according to what is fair or know what to do. Should I refer this
due. Professional codes of ethics are based on woman for further assessment or
Western assumptions about the person. They should I advise her to consult a
38
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 39

BOX 3 Marginalised worldviews in healthcare (continued)
traditional healer? The conflict was areas before, people there believe
also the fact that we as black people strongly in traditional customs. We
have our own beliefs and customs also saw many instances where tradi-
while at the same time, in our tional healing was beneficial. (Gambu,
training we are taught what to do, 2000, 68; original emphasis)
which is different to our beliefs. But,
we at the same time know that there This extract has been cited not because the
are customs which we should follow, nurse acted ethically (or otherwise). The aim is
so the [ethical dilemma] for me was to highlight the shortcomings of a universalistic
in not knowing what to do. approach to ethics. Had traditional African
Gambu: What did you eventually do? worldviews, including theories of illness, been
Nurse: I secretly told her to consult a tradi- part of medical discourse, the nurse would have
tional healer whom I knew, and she freely discussed the issue with her colleagues
eventually confessed that she had (rather than acting secretly). This shows that
been to see a traditional healer marginalised worldviews do not die out. They
before. continue to operate underground. It is thus
Gambu: How did your decision make you feel important to engage openly with them. Useful
emotionally? aspects of African worldviews should be incor-
Nurse: It was a very difficult decision for me porated into patient treatment. This way, the
but I consoled myself that I had done many indigenous people who rely on them to
the right thing because I knew that make sense of their experiences will be empow-
there are things that cannot be cured ered. Open dialogue with this perspective will
at the hospital. I have worked in rural also enhance ethical conduct.
The hierarchy of beings

Traditionally, Africans believe that all things in the universe are connected
ontologically to one other. Beings and objects in the universe are organised
hierarchically (Mbiti, 1991; Ngubane, 1977; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Intricate
webs of relationships exist between organisms and objects in the hierarchy
(Figure 2.1). Each object or organism is dependent upon and capable of influ-
encing and being influenced by others. The nature and direction of influence is
determined by the amount of life force (energy or power, see discussion below)
possessed by each object or organism.
Different levels of being

Inanimate objects and plants occupy the lowest level on the hierarchy. They Intermediate
have very little life force of their own. As a result, they have no direct influence world:
level in the
on superior beings such as human beings. Animals occupy the level immedi-
hierarchy of being
ately above that of objects and plants. The next level, which Ngubane (1977) in African
calls the intermediate world, consists of human beings. Human beings can metaphysics that
communicate directly or indirectly with the living-dead (ancestors) (Mbiti, consists of human
beings.
1991), who occupy the next level on the hierarchy. According to Ngubane
39
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 40
Critical Psychology
Generalised versus
(1977), the world of the ancestors is divided into two. First, there is the world
concrete self: of the recently deceased. They do not proceed directly to ancestorhood;
view of the self as initially they remain in an in-between state, until their relatives have
the ‘generalised performed rituals of integration on their behalf. While in this state, they are
other’ requires us to
see all individuals as
incapable of interceding with God on human beings’ behalf. However, they can
rational beings with make their concerns known to their relatives through dreams. Then there is
the same rights and the world of integrated ancestors, those who have had rituals performed for
duties we would them. Integrated ancestors are capable of communicating with God on behalf
ascribe to ourselves.
of their relatives. Ancestors, whose world is both analogous and contiguous to
It is what we have
in common that that of human beings, continue to interact with, and remain interested in the
matters, rather than affairs of, their relatives (Teffo & Roux, 1998). Human beings maintain a link
the individuality or with their ancestors through acts of libation and sacrifices. It is through the
concrete identity of
ancestors that human beings communicate with God, who is rarely invoked
the other. If we
adopt the stand- directly.
point of the self as
the ‘concrete other’, GOD
on the other hand,
people’s individu-
ality, history, and
concrete identity
take centre stage, COMMUNITY OF
while what we have INTEGRATED
in common recedes ANCESTORS
to the background.
WORLD
OF THE RECENTLY
DECEASED
Integrated
INTERMEDIATE WORLD:
ancestors:
Human beings
ancestors who are
capable of
communicating with
God on behalf of ANIMALS
their relatives, and
for whom rituals are
performed.
PLANTS & INANIMATE
Ancestors, whose
OBJECTS
world is both
analogous and
Legend:
contiguous to that
of humans, continue Indicates bi-directional communication

to interact with, Proceed to integrated state, once rituals performed
and remain Direct communication between God and human beings,
interested in the although very rare, may be invoked.
affairs of, their
relatives.
Figure 2.1 Relationships between elements in the hierarchy of beings
40
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 41

The role of ancestors

The notion of ancestors has caused a great deal of confusion in African schol-
arship, resulting in the misrepresentation of African belief systems. This
confusion is often reflected in the view that Africans worship ancestors
(Dzobo, 1992; Ejizu, 2000; Mbiti, 1991). The situation is complicated by the
fact that in English the word ‘ancestor’ means any person from whom one is
descended (Geddie, 1901/1964; Swannell, 1992). However, Africans conceive
ancestors differently. Who is an ancestor, from an African point of view? To
begin with, I propose that the word iinyanya or izinyanya (plural for isiXhosa
and isiZulu respectively) be substituted for ancestors, because of connotations
associated with the English word. Not every person qualifies to be an inyanya
(singular).
Inyanya
Only those who lived a life characterised by high moral standards can be
elevated to the status of an inyanya. These standards include promoting inter-
dependence and harmony within one’s family and community. Once rituals of
integration – ukubuyisa, literally, to return the spirit of the ancestor home –
have been performed, the deceased who were good moral exemplars join the
community of iinyanya. This is a spiritual community of other family members
who lived exemplary lives. Sometimes a person does not have to die to be
considered inyanya (Dzobo, 1992). Older members of the family, whose lives
are worthy of emulation, may be referred to as iinyanya. Nevertheless, it
usually remains essential that integration rituals be performed after death, to
bring their ubu-nyanya (ancestorhood) to completion.
Izinyanya and the living

The relationship between the living and izinyanya is one of interdependence.
The latter need the former to perform rituals on their behalf. This elevates
them to an influential status, thus giving them audience with God. This means
that they can now negotiate with God on behalf of their descendants. Connec-
tion with God through izinyanya is considered essential for family unity and
prosperity (Ngubane, 1977).
The iinyanya are moral paragons or exemplars of good conduct. Their
superior moral values and principles continue to be cherished. These are
adopted as normative standards of conduct. It is believed that the world of

iinyanya is no different from that of human beings. Izinyanya continue to live
an exemplary life in their world. They also remain interested in their families’
affairs. As guardians of morality, izinyanya sanction bad conduct by with-
drawing their interest in family matters. The withdrawal of izinyanya is
undesirable. It breaks the chain of communication between individuals and
41
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 42
Critical Psychology
God. The family is effectively cut off from God, the source of all life. Rituals and
acts of libation are not ancestor worship. They ensure that through izinyanya
one remains connected to God, the highest source of life.
A holistic worldview
God is at the apex of the hierarchy. Although at the apex, God is not apart from
the rest of the world. Together with the world, God ‘constitutes the spatio-
temporal totality of existence’ (Teffo & Roux, 1998, 140). That is, God does not
rule the world from a distance, but permeates everything in it. For example,
the fact that human beings participate in the Divine is captured by the Sotho
saying, ‘motho ke Modimo’, which means ‘The person is (the) Divine’. God’s
Holistic/holism:
omnipresence is consistent with the holistic worldview; an account of the
account of the world in which everything is interconnected in such a way that elements of the
world in which whole are contained in each part (see discussion of cosmic unity below).
everything is
interconnected in
such a way that THE NOTION OF VITALITY OR LIFE FORCE
elements of the
whole are contained Beings and objects in the hierarchy are endowed with a life force. The notion of
in each part. life force has been a source of great controversy in African scholarship since
Tempels (1959) propounded it. According to Myers (1988), life force refers to
the energy or power that is the essence of all phenomena, material and imma-
Life force:
energy or power
terial. Everything is endowed with ‘energy’, spirit, or creative force. The idea of
that is the essence life force as ‘spirit’ does not imply ghost-like, inner powers of an occult nature.
of all phenomena, It refers to dynamic creativity, thought to be the most precious gift from God.
material and This creativity descends hierarchically from God to izinyanya, elders, human
immaterial.
beings, and all that is created (Kasenene, 1992). The creativity of God’s power
is manifest in the changing seasons, birth, the cycles of nature and in human
achievements. It is extended to izinyanya, human beings, and other creatures
and creations lower in the hierarchy, in descending order. The Basotho/
Tswana refer to a person’s life force as seriti, while the Nguni call it isithunzi.
Literally, both terms mean ‘the shadow’. Human beings are capable of influ-
encing events in the world to a certain degree, because they partake in this
creative life force. Ideally, it is expected that one will always use life force to
maintain vital connections and interdependence between the family, the
community and the rest of nature.
Distinguishing life from life force

A crucial distinction needs to be made between the principle of life force, the
principle of life (as in being a living organism), and being full of energy (vitality
as in liveliness). The principle of life force cannot be reduced to the quality of
being alive, given that both the living and the deceased participate in this vital
42
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 43

union. When the Nguni and the Sotho of southern Africa say a person When the Nguni and
uyaphila/o ea phela (he or she has life), they are not referring to biological life. the Sotho of
They refer to the relationship between individuals and their milieu. It is their southern Africa say
lived experience, as evidenced in the day-to-day relationships with others, that a person uyaphila/o
ea phela (he or she
is at stake. It is expected that one will live harmoniously and interdependently has life), they are
with others. From an African point of view, life is a never-ending spiral of not referring to
human and communal relationships. It is defined in terms of reciprocal obli- biological life. They
gations (Dzobo, 1992; Mbiti, 1991). All individuals are expected to promote refer to the rela-
tionship between
vitality in the community by fulfilling their duties and responsibilities,
individuals and
according to their positions or roles (Kasenene, 1992). their milieu. It is
their lived
An organic view of the universe experience, as
evidenced in the
Traditionally, it is assumed that human beings will live harmoniously with day-to-day
animals and nature. This organic view of the universe, the principal feature of relationships with
which is to think ecologically, making little or no distinctions between nature others, that is at
stake.
and culture, is common among indigenous societies (Howard, 1994; Maffi,
1998). Living harmoniously with the natural environment requires that it be
harvested to the extent that it is necessary to support human needs. This had
to be done respectfully and religiously. For example, religious rituals accompa-
nied the planting and harvesting of crops. Respect for the principle of life is
also illustrated by the practice by traditional healers to pray before harvesting Separate and
connected ways
plants for medical purposes. It is believed that not only does this make the
of knowing:
plant more effective; failure to do so could cause it to fail to regenerate. terms popularised
Harvesting the plant in a disrespectful manner will cause it to die. This means by Belenky et al
that it will not be available to support human life in the future. Recently, (1986). Separate
indigenous communities working with Western-trained scientists to find a knowing is charac-
terised by a
cure for HIV/Aids have voiced the view that plants should be collected respect- skeptical, distanced,
fully and religiously (Burford, Bodeker, Kabatesi, Gemmill, & Rukangira, and impartial stance
2000). Behind this concern is respect for the principle of life. It also affirms the toward the object of
interdependence between the natural and the human environment. one’s knowledge. It
takes an adversarial,
argumentative
The causes of things stance to new ideas,
even if they appear
Life forces are constantly in interaction with each other. It is possible for
to make intuitive
unknown forces to intervene in the order of events, without our awareness. sense. Connected
The nature of this intervention is beyond our conscious understanding. For knowing, on the
other hand, tries to
this reason Africans deny the possibility of events happening by accident. For
example, in the event of a personal tragedy, cause is sought as to how indi- accommodate new
ideas, searching for
vidual, the family or a sinister force might have brought about the undesired what is ‘right’ even
consequence. This stems from the belief that the creative life force may be in what might
manipulated for sinister purposes. Witchcraft is an example (Ngubane, 1977). initially appear to
It is believed that a witch can manipulate life force to bring about an be wrong.
43
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 44
Critical Psychology
Teleology: unfortunate event to someone. The tendency among Africans to prefer teleo-
derived from the logically inclined explanations stems from the view that life force can be
Greek words telos manipulated. Teleological orientations assume that ‘reality hangs together
(end) and logos
because of aims, and is driven by aims’ (Teffo & Roux, 1998, 134). Conse-
(discourse), seeks
to explain the quently, questions are directed not only towards why events happen. Of most
universe in terms of interest is why they happen to someone at a particular locality and at a certain
final (rather than point in time.
immediate) causes. In review, then, life force is the creative energy, extending directly from
It is based on the
view that the God to all that is created. Through life force all share in God’s creative energy
universe has a or spirit, although not to the same degree. The creative power descends verti-
purpose or design. cally to izinyanya, human beings, and all that is created. The principle of life
To understand the force requires coexistence with and strengthening of vital relationships, in the
cause of things, one
needs to understand
community and universe (Kasenene, 1992; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Severance
the final cause, of vital relationships constitutes the opposite of the Good, and is undesirable.
which is the Whether life force exists or not is irrelevant for our purposes. What is impor-
purpose why the tant is that a number of people share this belief. The belief continues to
phenomenon exists
or was created.
influence their perception of the world.
THE PRINCIPLE OF COSMIC UNITY

Knowing through participation
Cosmic unity: Cosmic unity is closely related to the notion of vitality (Anyanwu, 1981;
idea that there is a Kasenene, 1992; Kinoti; 1992; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). It is sometimes
connection between
referred to as a holistic conception of life. Cosmic unity means that there is a
God, izinyanya,
animals, plants, and connection between God, izinyanya, animals, plants and inanimate objects
inanimate objects. (Mbiti, 1969; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). Within this system, everything is
Within this system, perpetually in motion, influencing and being influenced by something else.
everything is perpe- This is another principle shared by a number of indigenous societies. Indige-
tually in motion,
influencing and nous societies, for the most part, do not view the world in a mechanical,
being influenced by cause-effect manner (Howard, 1994; Maffi, 1998). They tend to subscribe to a
something else. holistic view of the world. This means that units of analysis are not abstracted
from their context. What has evolved from this point of view is the idea that
knowledge through participation, rather than separation and abstraction, is to
be prized. One does not know by standing and observing at a distance. To
know is to participate in the dynamic process involving interaction between
parts and the whole. Analysis of discrete elements in isolation from their
context cannot account for the flux of becoming (Myers, 1988). Rather,
becoming can be accounted for only by a holistic approach that relates indi-
vidual elements to the total system. Again, this differs sharply from traditional
Western ways of knowing. From a Western perspective, the knower stands
apart from the object of his or her knowledge.
44
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 45

Dynamism between parts and whole

The dynamism between parts and the whole, characteristic of the African world-
view, is illustrated in the following quotation from Senghor (1966). Senghor
draws contrasts between traditional European and African worldviews:
[T]he African has always and everywhere presented a concept of the world,
which is diametrically opposed to the traditional philosophy of Europe. The
latter is essentially static, objective, dichotomous; it is in fact dualistic in that it
makes an absolute distinction between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is
founded on separation and opposition, on analysis and conflict. The African on
the other hand, conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a funda-
mentally mobile yet unique reality that seeks synthesis. (4)
Senegalese poet and Africanist scholar,

Leopold S. Senghor.
Observer as part of the system

Myers (1988) argues that a holistic conception of life is compatible with the
new physics (quantum and relativity theories). Unlike classical physics, the
new physics sees the world in terms of interacting, inseparable components,
which are perpetually in motion. The observer or scientist is integral to this
process, rather than detached. Similarly, Capra (1988) has drawn parallels
between the new physics and the mystic philosophical traditions of the East
and other traditions. He argues that mystical thought ‘provides a consistent
and relevant conception of the world in which scientific discoveries can be

made in perfect harmony with spiritual and religious beliefs’ (11). Although
writing about Eastern belief systems, Capra maintains that his views apply
equally to all mystically based belief systems.
The holistic conception of life means, to reiterate, that one cannot look at
individual units in isolation from their context. This is particularly so if one is
45
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 46
Critical Psychology
working in indigenous societies. Because everything is perpetually in motion,

influencing and being influenced by something else, social science research can
no longer afford to follow the fragmented, disinterested model of the natural
sciences. This model is inadequate, especially in communities that subscribe to
a holistic worldview. What we know about the world and ourselves is insepa-
rable from our worldviews or ways of knowing (Belenky et al, 1986; Howard,
1994). Likewise, we need to understanding psychological processes with refer-
ence to the frameworks of the people concerned. It is high time that the world
open up to traditional African lenses of viewing the world, in the same way that
it has considered similar mystic philosophical traditions from the East.
COMMUNAL LIFE AND PERSONHOOD

‘An organic relationship between component individuals’
Another important principle underlying traditional African thinking is that of
communal life. Personhood in African thought is defined in relation to the
community. It is important to discuss briefly understandings of the term
‘community’ in African scholarship. Community does not mean a ‘mere collec-
tion of individuals, each with his [sic] private set of preferences, but all of
whom get together nonetheless because they realise ... that in association they
can accomplish things which they are not able to accomplish otherwise’
Atomistic:
(Menkiti, 1984, 179). It does not refer to a collection of atomistic individuals
consisting of many who gather together to pursue common goals. Community refers to an organic
separate, diverse or relationship between component individuals (Menkiti, 1984). Coetzee (1998)
disparate elements. defines it as ‘an ongoing association of men and women who have special
commitment to one another and a developed (distinct) sense of their common
life’ (276).
Community as characteristic way of life

Community results from a shared understanding of a characteristic way of life.
A sense of community exists if people mutually recognise the obligation to be
responsive to one another’s needs. The tendency among traditional societies to
regard a number of people as members of one’s family, irrespective of the
actual genetic relationship, stems from this understanding of community
(Nsamenang, 1992). Extension of terms such as mother and father to others
goes hand in hand with an obligation to act responsively, in a manner that is
befitting of these terms (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). For example, parental
responsibilities may be assumed by anyone through the practice of collective
rearing of children (Mkhise, 1999). This is informed by an understanding that
the child will grow and develop leadership and/or other qualities that will
enhance the life of the community as a whole. The entire community is thus
expected to play a vital role in raising children.
46
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 47

Personhood relationally defined

Because of the interdependence between individuals and the community,
personhood cannot be defined solely in terms of physical and psychological
attributes (Menkiti, 1984). It is through participation in a community that a
person finds meaning in life (Kasenene, 1994; Kinoti, 1992; Menkiti, 1984;
Verhoef & Michel, 1997). The importance of the community in self-definition Because of the
is summed up by Mbiti’s (1969) dictum ‘I am because we are, and since we are, interdependence
therefore I am’ (214). The rootedness of the self-in-community is reflected in between individuals
and the community,
sayings such as Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (Nguni), or Motho ke motho ka
personhood cannot
batho babang (Sotho). These roughly translate as: ‘One becomes a human be defined solely in
being through other human beings.’ Similarly, the Xhivenda equivalent, terms of physical
Muthu u bebelwa munwe (‘a person is born for the other’), points at the inter- and psychological
attributes.
dependence between self and other.
Personhood in African thought is defined relationally. A person does not
exist alone. Rather, he or she belongs to a community of similarly constituted
selves. Belonging carries with it a dynamism or ‘dance of harmony [because]
everyone who belongs is continuously moving, adjusting to the rhythm of life
within the community’ (Ogbonnaya, 1994, 77). This occurs as individuals
attend to their responsibilities to others and the natural environment. The
ilimo and ukusisa practices are good examples. Ilimo is a practice by which
neighbours join together to help till another’s fields. It is extended to other
activities such as building a house. Ukusisa refers to the act of loaning
someone cattle so that he or she can plough the fields and milk the cows.
Activities such as these maintain communal equilibrium, thus strengthening
the community.
The importance of
the community in
self-definition is
summed up by
Mbiti’s (1969)
dictum ‘I am
because we are, and
since we are,
therefore I am’
(214).
47
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 48
Critical Psychology
CRITICISMS OF THE ‘SELF-IN-COMMUNITY’

Ikuenobe (1998) raises some plausible criticisms of the African conception of
the person. He notes that it may be construed as an account in which individ-
uals are under the totalitarian control of the community. However, the notion
of the person-in-community does not deny individuality (Myers, 1988; Ogbon-
naya, 1994). Individuals can transcend the perspective of the community in
creative ways. It is expected, however, that the achievements of outstanding
individuals will transform the community to a higher level of functioning. The
relationship between an individual and the community is thus a multi-direc-
tional one. Ogbonnaya (1994) argues that ‘the community is preserved and
enriched by the “highest riches” of the person ... just as the person is continu-
ally enriched by the experience of emergent selves in the persona-communal’
(78). This is a vindication of the principle of interdependence between parts
and the whole: individuals are part of a collective (community) that they create
and which, in turn, creates them (Myers, 1988).
The relationship between individuals and community is not always
smooth. Tensions are likely to occur (Gyekye, 1984). Ideally, tensions should
be resolved in a way that restores interdependence, and perhaps even advance
the community to a higher level of functioning than before. This could be the
case with creative individuals who invent novel ways of doing things. Initially,
these inventions may be viewed with suspicion. However, once the invention
has been shown to benefit the community as a whole, the individual is
acclaimed as a model to be emulated. Dzobo (1992) refers to the symbol of the
fingers and the hand to illustrate the interdependence between an individual
and a community. Fingers represent free, unique, independent members of
society. However, they are firmly rooted in the hand (the whole). On the other
hand, the community (the hand) is incomplete without the fingers. The view
of the self-in-community recognises the possibility of tensions between the
person and the community. The ideal is that they will be resolved in a way that
enhances both individual and community.
THE FAMILY COMMUNITY

If the community in general is important, then the family community is of
utmost significance. It forms an essential element of an individual’s social
reality and personal identity, apart from which personhood is almost incon-
ceivable (Paris, 1995). It should be noted that ‘family’ is not restricted to the
Western notion of a nuclear family. It constitutes a closely knit community of
relatives, including both the living and the deceased (izinyanya) (Moyo, 1992).
Deceased family members continue to partake in the day-to-day affairs of their
families. Through the totemic system, family could be extended to plants,
other non-living objects, and anything connected with human relationships
48
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 49

(Mbiti, 1969). In the totemic system, an animal (eg a particular snake) is Totem: animal,
adopted by the family or clan as its emblem. The animal is treated as a member plant, or natural
of the family. The family, as defined above, is the most important aspect of self- object that serves
definition. To be disowned by family is to cease to exist. among traditional
peoples as the
The family is hierarchically organised, from the oldest member to the emblem of a clan or
youngest child. Members are bound together by a reciprocal understanding of family.
their roles and responsibilities. These depend on position and status in the
hierarchy. The elder, usually the oldest member of the family, has the all-
important responsibility to ensure that the family remains a thriving, cohesive
unit. He or she is thus highly respected. Older members have the most
complete memory of the family’s lineage, and are considered to be much closer
to izinyanya (Mbiti, 1991). The injunction to respect elders, common in tradi-
tional societies, emanates from an understanding that a person of an elder’s
status and position will act in a dignified and responsible manner. Elders earn
their status in the community by virtue of the richness of their knowledge and
experiences. They are expected to bring their wisdom to bear in decision-
making (Ikuenobe, 1998; Paris, 1995). For example, elders play a critical role in
resolving marital and other forms of conflict. Failure to act responsibly dimin-
ishes the elder’s status. Irresponsible elders may in turn be censured by
izinyanya, who do not look kindly upon family members who neglect their
responsibilities (Moyo, 1992).
PERSONHOOD AS A PROCESS
It has been mentioned that the concept of a person in African societies is that
of a person-in-relation, a ‘being-with-and-for-others,’ and not an isolated,
atomistic individual. To attain personhood, it is not sufficient to be a biological
organism with physical and psychological attributes. Personhood does not
follow automatically simply because one is born of human seed. Rather, it
must be earned (Menkiti, 1984; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Menkiti (1984) refers
to this as the ‘processual’ nature of being. Children are first born into a family
community. They then undergo rituals of incorporation, culminating in some
societies in the rites marking the passage from childhood to adulthood.
Personhood as earned
It could be argued that the ‘processual’ nature of personhood means that one
becomes a person as one ‘goes along’ in society. Indeed, Menkiti (1984) takes
this position. He maintains that children are not fully human. Following
Gyekye (1992), however, I would argue that the fact that personhood must be
earned is not a denial of personhood to children. It is an affirmation of the view
that personhood is an ongoing process attained through interactions with
others and one’s community. It requires one to affirm ideals and standards
49
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 50
Critical Psychology
thought to be constitutive of the life of a community. These are standards such

as generosity, benevolence and respect (Gyekye, 1992). A number of sayings in
some African societies refer to people who have failed to meet standards
expected of a fully human person. These are sayings such as ga e se motho
(Tswana) or a ku si muntu (Nguni), literally meaning ‘he or she is not a person’.
Because one can fall short of these standards at any stage in the life cycle,
personhood could be regarded as a becoming. It is an unpredictable, open-
ended process during which personhood may be achieved, lost, and regained,
depending on a person’s circumstances. In the following chapter, the idea of
personhood as becoming is revisited and discussed with reference to the soci-
ocultural approaches to the self.
Ubuntu
Ubuntu: concrete or
It should be emphasised that standards of personhood are not of an abstract,
practical realisation theoretical type. Possession of the qualities of personhood is reflected in
of the knowledge people’s relationships with others and their milieu. It is referred to as ubuntu
that the possession in Nguni, and botho in Sotho/Tswana. Ubuntu is inferred from a person’s
of the qualities of
knowledge of his or her duties and responsibilities within a community of
personhood is
reflected in people’s other, interdependent human beings. Further, to know one’s duties is not
relationship with enough. Ubuntu is the concrete or practical realisation of this knowledge and
others. Ubuntu is not a cognitive appraisal of it. However, because a person is always a being-
characterised by
with-and-for-others, failure to attain personhood points blame at the
caring, just and
respectful individual, his or her family and his or her community. Just as it is a collective
relationships. responsibility to raise children, an individual’s shortcomings reflect poorly on
his or her family and the community. This is consistent with the notion of
person-in-community, discussed above.
CONCLUSION
An African critical psychology
Critical psychology situates psychological functioning in its societal and histor-
ical context. It attends to different voices, especially those that have been
marginalised for ideological and political reasons. This chapter has attempted
to achieve some of the aims of an African critical psychology by highlighting
the value of indigenous worldviews in psychological discourse. Attention to
marginalised voices is particularly important, given the long history of the
cultural subordination of African points of view in South Africa.
A framework for an African-based psychology

The chapter has presented a philosophical framework that could serve as a basis
of an African-based psychology. According to this framework, objects and
50
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 51

organisms in the universe are organised hierarchically, from inanimate objects

at the bottom, to God at the apex. A dynamic interdependence exists between
all elements within the system. These elements are capable of influencing and
being influenced by others, depending on their life force. This dynamism means
that reality can be understood by studying the system as a whole, rather than
isolated parts. Similarly, personhood cannot be conceived independently of the
relationship between the individual and the community. Implications of this
framework for counselling and health-care provision were briefly illustrated.
A dynamic relationship of worldviews

However, the modern world is characterised by rapid changes. Cross-pollina-
tion of ideas between cultures occurs more rapidly than in the past. In the same
way that Western psychology cannot afford to ignore African worldviews, it
will be shortsighted of African scholarship to remain insulated in one concep-
tual framework. It is imperative to take into account the many factors that
influence individual development. As mentioned previously, people are
exposed to multiple perspectives. Once incorporated into people’s ways of
thinking, these perspectives are capable of entering into a dynamic relation-
ship with each other. This process may result in the emergence of new
perspectives out of the old. It is this dialogue between perspectives that is of
psychological significance. The dialogue should address questions such as how
African worldviews interface with new ideas such as Christianity and individ-
ualism. Do they exist simultaneously with these worldviews? Does exposure to
new ideas affect men and women, the young and the old, in the same way? New
theoretical frameworks are needed to account for psychological processes
resulting from the interpenetration of various worldviews.
The task of acknowledging multiple influences in psychological develop-
ment is made possible by the sociocultural approaches advocated by Vygotsky
(1978) and Bakhtin (1981, 1990), among others. Sociocultural approaches
enable us to account for an existence of African psychological perspectives
alongside other orientations. They also offer conceptual tools to critically
engage with tensions and power dimensions involved in psychological devel-
opment. These theoretical frameworks are discussed in the following chapter.
Critical thinking tasks

1. Traditional Western psychology has been criticised because of its under-

lying assumptions. Revisit one or two mainstream psychological theories
you are most familiar with (eg Rogerian approaches) and critically discuss
each theory’s assumptions about (a) the nature of the knowing subject
(the self ) and (b) the relationship between the knower and the object of
his or her knowledge.
51
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap02 11/2/04 10:23 am Page 52
Critical Psychology
2. Distinguish between indigenous psychologies and indigenisation.

3. Mention and briefly discuss local/indigenous practices, values and beliefs
that could contribute to an indigenous African psychology. To help you
get started, three examples are given: communal child-rearing practices,
conceptions of illness and ways of handling grief.
Discuss the psychological significance of the three practices
mentioned above with a colleague who is familiar with African prac-
tices and value systems. (For example, your discussion answers
questions such as: How do traditional African communities raise
children? What is the nature of the self that is encouraged by raising
children this way?)
Working with your colleague again, generate three additional African
practices, values, or beliefs, and critically discuss their psychological
significance.
4.1 Critically discuss the main components of the traditional African meta-
physical system presented in this chapter.
4.2 In what ways does this metaphysical system differ from traditional
Western approaches to psychology? Discuss with reference to healthcare
or any relevant aspect of psychology, illustrating with examples.
Recommended readings
Holdstock, T.L. (2000). Re-examining psychology: Critical perspectives and African
insights. London: Routledge.
Myers, L.J. (1988). Understanding an Afrocentric worldview: Introduction to an
optimal psychology. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing.
52
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 53
Chapter
3
Sociocultural approaches to
psychology: Dialogism and
African conceptions of the self
Nhlanhla Mkhize
‘The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic

human life is open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic.
To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed,
to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates
wholly and throughout his [sic] whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul,
spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in
discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of
human life, into the world symposium.’
(Bakhtin, 1984/1993)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Describe the relationship between higher mental functions and social life
Critically discuss and apply Vygotsky’s account of human development to the South
African context
Compare and contrast Vygotskian and Bakhtinian approaches to psychological
mediation
Critically discuss the notion of a dialogical self
Compare and contrast dialogical and traditional African approaches to selfhood.
53
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 54
Critical Psychology
Dialogism and the

INTRODUCTION
dialogical self: The social basis of psychological processes
for dialogism, there
is no singular, fixed Critical psychology locates psychological functioning in its social, historical
and pre-given and cultural contexts. Sociocultural approaches to psychology, as exemplified
meaning. Rather, by the works of Vygotsky (1978) and Bakhtin (1981), provide the necessary
meaning is emer- tools to explore critically the thesis that psychological processes such as self-
gent. It arises
dialogically, from
understanding emerge from the social basis of life. These approaches also
our encounter with enable us to theorise about the co-existence of, and interface between, indige-
others, and when we nous and traditional Western psychologies. In a world characterised by a high
interact with the degree of movement and contact between cultures, dichotomous explanations
social environment.
This view leads to
of human development, in terms indigenous or Western psychological
the dialogical self, concepts, are no longer tenable. In this chapter, I propose that Bakhtin’s (1981)
which results from literary writings, particularly his notion of dialogism, provide fertile ground to
social and inter study the emergence of psychological processes from a myriad of social and
personal interac-
cultural influences.
tions. It is
characterised by a
high degree of Mediation and internalisation
multiplicity, flexibi-
Before introducing Bakhtin, it is important to review Vygotsky’s account of
lity and change.
human development briefly, so as to introduce concepts that are central to the
understanding of Bakhtin’s work. The two authors have a lot in common and,
although the argument will not be pursued at length here, Bakhtin’s work
Internalisation: could be seen as a logical extension of Vygotsky’s ideas. The chapter thus
processes originally begins with a brief discussion of Vygotsky’s view that higher mental functions
outside of people’s such as thinking originate from social activity. Two concepts central to
control become part Vygotsky and Bakhtin, mediation and internalisation, are presented. Bakhtin’s
of their intrapsycho-
logical world. It
notion of existence as dialogue is then introduced. The view of selfhood
does not describe a emanating from this conceptualisation of life, namely the dialogical self, is
geographic transfer discussed. Comparisons are drawn between the notion of the dialogical self
of activities from and traditional African views of selfhood. The chapter concludes with the view
the social to the
internal world of the
that dialogism provides a framework for reconciling the individual-society
individual. Rather, dichotomy, namely the view that psychological development is influenced
it represents either by individual or by societal factors (Wertsch, 1995).
the process by
which higher
mental functions VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MENTAL FUNCTIONING
are formed.
The general genetic law of cultural development
Vygotsky (1978) located the origins of higher mental functions in social life.
This was against the then dominant social science view that psychological
Ontogenesis: functions can be studied in isolation from their context (Wertsch, 1991;
study of individual Wertsch & Stone, 1985). Instead, Vygotsky argued that ontogenesis (indi-
development. vidual development) originates from social, cultural and historical forms of
54
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 55
Sociocultural approaches to psychology: Dialogism and African conceptions of the self

life. This view is captured in what is known as the ‘general genetic law of
cultural development’ (Vygotsky, 1981). This law posits that:
Any function in the child’s development appears twice, or on two planes. First, it
appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears
between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as
an intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary
attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of
volition. We may consider this position as a law in the full sense of the word, but
it goes without saying that internalisation transforms the process itself and
changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations among people
genetically underlie all higher functions and their interrelationships. (163)
For both Vygotsky
and critical psycho-
logy more generally,
psychological
functioning cannot
be properly
understood outside
of the social,
cultural, historical
and economic
contexts in which it
occurs.
From interpsychological to intrapsychological

For Vygotsky, any
According to the ‘general genetic law of cultural development’, higher psycholo- function in the
gical functions such as thinking first represent relations between people (the child’s development
social or interpsychological plane). Later, these relations become part of the indi- appears twice, or on
two planes. First, it
vidual’s inner world (the intrapsychological plane). This does not mean that appears on the
individual mental processes are a mere copy of outside social life, however. social plane, and
Rather, Vogotsky’s position is that processes that appear on the interpsycholog- then on the psycho-
ical plane, between people, can also be carried out on the intrapsychological logical plane. First
it appears between
plane, within the person (Wertsch, 1991). For example, when an adult gives a people as an
child instructions to solve an arithmetic puzzle (an activity between the child and interpsychological
an adult), the child can later use the same instructions to instruct herself, inde- category, and then
pendently of the adult. Self-instruction could take the form of a rehearsal, which within the child as
an intrapsycholo-
could be done verbally or silently (see egocentric speech). When this happens,
gical category.
the same activity is now being carried out at the intrapsychological plane.
55
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 56
Critical Psychology
Cultural tools
The ‘general genetic law of cultural development’ implies that for psychology
to be truly social, historical and cultural, it needs to take into consideration
social relations and practices: the things people do and say. It needs to address
Forms of life: itself to forms of life valued in various cultural contexts. These forms of life are
in its most simplistic reflected in activities such as plays, songs, cultural narratives and proverbs,
form, the term refers
which collectively constitute the cultural tools through which psychological
to social relations or
practices, the things processes are mediated.
people do, or ways
of relating to each Mediation
other and respond-
ing to life experien- It has been mentioned that higher mental functions were once relations between
ces that are tied to people. Higher mental functions are mediated by cultural tools, which are even-
particular contexts. tually internalised to direct our own behaviour (Shotter, 1989; Wertsch & Stone,
For example,
1985). Mediation is a process by which individuals or groups employ cultural
ukubona, the tradi-
tion by which rela- tools such as language, stories and proverbs to carry out their actions (Wertsch,
tives and community 1995). For example, children in traditional African societies are socialised to the
members visit a moral values thought to be important to the community through storytelling.
family after the The stories are imbued with moral and other lessons that children must inter-
death of one of its
members, consti- nalise to become competent members of their societies. Vygotsky was of the view
tutes a form of life that human agency cannot be understood by analysing individuals or media-
to handle grief. tional means in isolation. Rather, it involves ‘humans ... acting with mediational
means’ (Wertsch, 1990, 69; original emphasis). This view differs from tradi-
tional Western approaches to psychology, which assume that the individual is
the primary unit of analysis. Hence, traditional Western approaches seek to
isolate social and cultural factors so as to uncover what are thought to be the
underlying bases of human behaviour (Shweder, 1991).
‘Self-talk’
We shall further illustrate mediation by contrasting Piaget and Vygotsky’s
understanding of the role of ‘self-talk’ in child development. Piaget
(1924/1969) viewed children’s ‘self-talk’ as an indication of immaturity or lack
of social interest. He expected this tendency, which he termed ‘egocentric
speech’, to disappear as children matured cognitively and socially. Vygotsky
(1966), on the other hand, argued that children use ‘egocentric speech’ as a tool
to solve problems. He noted that ‘egocentric speech’ repeats earlier social rela-
tions between children and adults. It marks the beginning of a process by

which children begin to converse with themselves in the same way that they
had earlier conversed with others. Initially, children require external assistance
to solve problems. Gradually they begin to guide themselves through problem-
solving while verbalising instructions previously given by adults or competent
peers. Eventually the language used by others is incorporated into children’s
56
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 57

psychological world (ie internalised). It becomes a tool that directs their behav-
iour (Shotter, 1989; Wertsch & Stone, 1985). From a Vygotskian perspective,
the ‘disappearance’ of ‘egocentric’ speech means that the social relations it
represented have become part of the inner world of the child. Thus, social rela-
tions between children and their social environment provide insight into
psychological functions such as thinking.
The zone of proximal development

A critical question is how do activities happening between people get transferred
into the intrapsychological realm? To answer this question it is necessary to
revisit Vygotsky’s account of learning and development in children. Vygotsky
drew a distinction between two levels of development, namely the ‘actual devel-
opmental level,’ and the ‘potential’ or ‘zone of proximal development’ (ZPD)
(Vygotsky, 1978). ‘Actual development’ refers to mental functions that are already
fully matured. It is indicated by children’s ability to solve problems independ-
ently. It could be regarded as the end product of development (Vygotsky, 1978).
The ZPD, on the other hand, refers to maturing functions. It is determined
by what the child is capable of doing with the assistance of adults or other
competent children. Formally, it is defined as ‘the distance between the actual
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the
level of potential as determined through problem solving under adult guidance
or in collaboration with more capable peers’ (Vygotsky, 1978, 86). Develop- Inner dialogue:
ment takes place in the ZPD as adults and competent peers interact with we are continually
children to support them to master the values and skills that are essential in engaged in dialog-
ues with others. For
order to become competent and mature members of their society (Tappan,
example, a mother
1998). This view has found support from Rogoff (1990, 1995), who also main- resorts to dialogue
tained that children advance their understanding through ‘apprenticeship’ to teach her child
with others in culturally organised activities. to write (eg ‘You
hold the pen like
this, and then draw
Internalisation a circle.’). These
Internalisation means that processes originally outside of people’s control dialogues can be
repeated internally,
become part of their intrapsychological world. By resorting to ‘iinner dialogue’,
within ourselves,
these processes can be recalled and used to construe, inform, and direct our even when we are
behaviour (Shotter, 1989). Internalisation does not describe a geographic alone. In other
transfer of activities from the social to the internal world of the individual. words, we can
engage in inner
Rather, it represents the very process by which higher mental functions are
dialogues with the
formed. Shotter (1993a, 1993b) further contends that internalisation enables various, internalised
children to learn to do on their own what they initially did under the supervi- parts of the self,
sion of adults. Through internalisation, ‘the child learns to practice with representing
important Others in
respect to himself [sic] the same forms of behavior that others formerly
our lives.
practiced with respect to him’ (Vygotsky, 1966, 39–40). Internalisation may be
57
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 58
Critical Psychology
Through
construed as a transformation in our responsibility for things (Shotter, 1993a,
internalisation, ‘the 1993b). It is a process by which individuals assume responsibility for activities
child learns to that were initially under others’ control.
practice with
respect to himself Internalisation as ethical-moral process
[sic] the same forms
of behavior that Internalisation is an indispensable part of becoming a person (the develop-
others formerly ment of self-understanding). Self-understanding emerges against the
practiced with background social practices provided by the culture at large. Shotter (1993b)
respect to him’
(Vygotsky, 1966, argues that internalisation involves an ethical-moral transformation of the self:
39–40). In learning how to be a responsible member of a certain social group, one must
learn to do certain things in the right kind of way: how to perceive, think, talk,
act, and to experience one’s surroundings in ways that make sense to the others
around one in ways considered legitimate. (73; original emphasis).
Shotter’s (1993b) reinterpretation of internalisation paves a way for the emer-
gence of personhood from the collective forms of life. Internalisation is an
ethical-moral process because it involves acquiring ways of understanding
oneself as a human being in relation to others. The ethical-moral nature of this
process lies in the fact that these ways of being are not ours. They have always
been there, serving other people’s purposes (eg the internalisation of dominant
gender relationships). This view finds support in MacIntyre (1984), who argues
that ‘the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in
communities’ (143). This does not mean, however, that we need to accept
uncritically the limitations of forms of self that are prevalent in our communi-
ties (McIntyre, 1984). These ways of talking and sense-making need to be
critically debated in order to determine their liberating and constraining effects
(Prilleltensky, 1997). Bakhtin’s dialogical account of human functioning,
discussed below, provides the necessary theoretical tools for such a critique.
Beyond Vygotsky
Vygotskian psychology provides fertile ground for studying the sociocultural
origins of psychological processes. Rather than focusing on processes occur-
ring within the individual, Vygotsky was more concerned with what happens
at the boundary or zone between the individual and his or her social and
cultural context.
Positioning
However, perhaps due to his rather short career, Vygotsky’s experimental work
was limited to small group interactions, such as parent–child dyads. He did not
spell out the relationship between cultural, historical and institutional settings
and various forms of mediated action (Wertsch, 1991). Neither did he take into
account influences of positioning in the process of individual development.
58
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 59

Positioning refers to ‘a complex cluster of generic personal attributes, struc- Positioning:

tured in various ways, which impinges on the possibilities of interpersonal, refers to the
intergroup and even intrapersonal action through some assignment of such process by which
rights, duties and obligations to an individual as are sustained by the cluster’ personal attributes
such as gender
(Harré & Langenhove, 1999, 1). For example, a person who is positioned as influence
knowledgeable in a particular field (eg law) will be accorded more say should intrapersonal,
issues pertaining to that field be discussed. People are positioned in various interpersonal or
ways in society, depending on gender, race, and age, among other things. For intergroup actions.
example, traditional African communities accord more status and respect to
elders (Paris, 1995). Vygotskian psychology cannot account for the power
resulting from one’s positioning within a social field. In this respect, it can
benefit from the ideas of Bakhtin (1981), who was concerned with influences of
broader social and cultural factors on individual development.
We are all socially
positioned in
complex and
multiple ways. How
we are positioned
plays a vital role in
the importance and
status we are given.
An example of this
is the status and
respect generally
accorded elders in
traditional African
cultures.
BAKHTIN’S DIALOGISM
The starting point in understanding Bakhtin’s ideas is the notion of dialogue,
which is an interchange of ideas between two equally responsive subjects. For
Bakhtin, meaning is not pre-given, nor does it arise internally, from within the
person. It is constructed actively and dialogically, in our encounter with the
other (Bandlamudi, 1994). It also emanates from the person’s encounter with
his or her social world.
Logical relationships
Relationships characterised by dialogism are better understood in comparison
with logical relationships (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Logical relationships
constitute a closed system. They do not allow for further commentary beyond
59
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 60
Critical Psychology
what is permissible in terms of the rules by which the statements are related.
Bakhtin (1984/1993) showed this by drawing a comparison between two iden-
tical statements, namely ‘life is good’ and ‘life is good’ (see also Hermans, 1996;
Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Vasil’eva, 1985). From the point of view of Aris-
totelian logic, the two statements are identical. Similarly, the statements ‘life is
good’ and ‘life is not good’ only express a relationship of negation. Logically,
the statements can be understood independently of who utters them.
Dialogical relationships
Dialogical relationships, on the other hand, presuppose (and recognise) the
other, with whom one can agree or disagree. A dialogical relationship between
the above pairs of statements exists if they are uttered by two embodied beings,
either in agreement or disagreement with each other. The meaning of the state-
ments can be fully grasped only in the context of the relationship between
speakers. Dialogism extends beyond interindividual processes to include how
the person engages with her or his social and cultural world.
Living language and the study of human life

It should be noted that Bakhtin was a literary analyst: he analysed relation-
ships between characters and the author in written works. However, he was
interested in living language, which is speech as spoken by concrete individ-
uals, and addressed to immediate as well as distant audiences (Skinner,
Valsiner & Holland, 2001). He took the Russian cultural tradition as his point
of departure. This tradition regarded the creative process and, in particular,
the creation of literary texts (eg writing a novel) as a model for the study of
human life (Kozulin, 1991). Bakhtin drew parallels between the process of
writing (production of literary texts) and living. He proposed an account of
individual development (becoming) based on the concept of ‘life as authoring’
and existence as dialogue (Holquist, 1990; Kozulin, 1991).
Life as authoring
The idea of life as authorship is premised on the understanding that ‘the world
is not given but conceived’ (Clarke & Holquist, 1984, 59). This means that we
cannot have direct access to the world because it is not ‘out there’, to be discov-
ered independently of our experiences/actions. We make sense of the world
and ourselves through an active process of engagement. We engage with the

world, and hence come to know it and our place in it through activities such as
thinking, doing and communicating (Kozulin, 1991). It is for this reason that
Bakhtin (1981) argued that human life parallels the process of literary author-
ship. Clarke and Holquist (1984) expressed the relationship between
authorship and living as follows:
60
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 61

Life as event presumes selves that are performers. To be successful, the relation
between me and the other must be shaped into a coherent performance, and
thus the architectonic activity of authorship, which is the building of a text, paral-
lels the activity of human existence, which is the building of a self (64).
Literary authorship and life

Let us consider the analogy between literary authorship and living in detail.
Writing a novel, for example, is an active process. It involves building ideas
into a text. The novelist has to create characters, the plot and points of view.
Further, authors do not invent everything anew when they write: their works
are situated within the context of established literary genres (writing styles We make sense of
such as drama and prose), which must be taken into account during the the world and
writing process. Then there is the question of the point(s) of view, which is the ourselves through
reason the work of art is created. Thus, we can ask ourselves: What was the an active process of
engagement. We
author trying to communicate to us in this novel? Novelists express their
engage with the
opinions, thereby authoring their point of view, through their works. world, and hence
Similarly, we inevitably express (author) our points of view in our come to know it
responses (actions) to challenges in life. The exemplary lives of former South and our place in it,
through activities
African president, Rolihlahla Nelson Mandela, and Black Consciousness
such as thinking,
activist, Bantu Steve Biko, illustrate this. In response to apartheid, both men doing, and
sacrificed their careers/lives to engage in the struggle for liberation. Biko died communication
in jail, whereas Mandela was to spend 27 years of his life in prison, most of (Kozulin, 1991).
which were spent doing hard labour (digging lime in the quarries). The
question is: What were these men (and many other men and women) trying to
achieve by their actions? What were their points of view? The answer to this Horizon of
question is perhaps found in Mandela’s closing remark during the Rivonia trial understanding:
term based on the
in 1964. Their actions were driven by a desire to establish a democratic society philosophy of
in which people live together in harmony and as equals, with equal opportuni- Gadamer (1975),
ties. This, among other viewpoints, was the point of view behind their actions. who maintained
that understanding
does not occur in
Horizons of understanding isolation. Rather, it
Literary authorship and living are also similar because, in the same way that is perspectival. That
novelists situate their work within established literary genres, so do human it, there is always a
background, or
actions take place within the sphere of culture. We live in a world that is horizon, against
already pre-configured in a particular way. We do not reinvent the world anew which we see
every time we do something. Thus, our actions must take into account the anything. As
horizons of understanding (Gadamer, 1975), what has already been estab- psychologists, our
theories and social
lished within a given sphere of communication (Kozulin, 1991; Shotter, backgrounds
1993a). These horizons constitute the background against which we act. For constitute our
example, Mandela and Biko’s actions above could be understood with refer- horizons of
ence to colonialism and its defeat in other parts of Africa. understanding.
61
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 8/21/2016 12:38 PM via UNISA
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 62
Critical Psychology
With the analogy of ‘life as authorship’ Bakhtin laid a foundation for a

meaningful understanding of psychological functioning through the study of
people’s life experiences. Life experiences cannot be studied out of context,
however, given that by definition, our lives unfold in a world populated with
other people.
The utterance as the unit of analysis

If life parallels the process of authorship, then what should the units of analysis
be in psychological studies? It should be noted that, although he studied
literary texts, Bakhtin was concerned with language as a living process: the
manner in which language expresses relationships between real embodied
people, and their life conditions in general. For this reason Bakhtin positioned
himself against the prevailing linguistics of his time, which was dominated by
Saussurian linguists. Saussurian linguists studied grammatical units such as
sentences, phrases, words and phonemes as a means to uncover underlying
and stable patterns of language. These units were studied independently of the
context of their users. Sentences are abstract because they do not belong to
anyone and are not addressed to anyone. Bakhtin argued that such units are
inappropriate because they cannot tell us anything about actual relationships
between embodied beings.
To understand language as a living process, Bakhtin turned his attention to
Utterance: the study of the whole utterance (Holquist, 1983; Vasil’eva, 1985; Wertsch,
any unit of 1990). Utterances are real responsive-interactive units (Shotter, 1993a).
communication
Bakhtin (1986) defined the utterance as:
characterised by a
change of speaking a unit of speech communication ... determined by a change of speaking subjects,
subjects. Utterances that is, a change of speakers. Any utterance – from a short (single-word)
always seek or elicit rejoinder in everyday dialogue to the large novel or scientific treatise – has, so to
a response from
speak, an absolute beginning and an absolute end: its beginning is preceded by
those to whom they
are addressed. A
the utterances of others, and its end is followed by the responsive utterances of
command is an others. … The speaker ends his utterance in order to relinquish the floor to the
utterance, as is an other or to make room for the other’s active responsive understanding (71).
article appearing in
a journal. Unlike sentences, words, and phrases, utterances always belong to ‘individual
speaking people, speech subjects’ (Bakhtin, 1986, 7). They are thus consistent
with a model of human understanding based on people as performers. Utter-
ances not only belong to real, embodied people: they also elicit a response from
the one to whom they are addressed. Bakhtin (1986) referred to this as the
responsiveness and ‘addressivity’ of utterances.
The responsiveness and ‘addressivity’ of utterances

Utterances presuppose someone with whom one can agree or disagree. Bakhtin
(1986) found the study of utterances attractive because they indicate the gaps
62
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 63

or boundaries in the flow of speech between speaking subjects (Shotter, 1993a;

Wertsch, 1990). Once the utterance of one speaker has been finalised, the other
speaker can assume a responsive attitude toward what has been said.
When the listener perceives and understands the meaning ... of speech he [sic]
simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He [sic] either
agrees or disagrees with it ... augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution
and so on. ... Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently
responsive, although the degree of this activity varies extremely. Any under-
standing is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or
another: the listener becomes the speaker (Bakhtin, 1986, 68).
The role of the addressee

Utterances are, by definition, dialogical. Participants can state their point(s) of
view in response to what has been said by the other. This is because, unlike
sentences, which are abstracted from their conditions of real use, utterances are
always addressed to someone, a process Bakhtin termed the ‘addressivity’ of
utterances (Bakhtin, 1986; Wertsch, 1991). Whenever an utterance is made, there
is always an actual or imaginary audience of listeners (Hermans, 1997; Wertsch,
1991). Every utterance has an addressee or a ‘second party’ whose responsive
understanding is being sought. The notion of ‘addressivity’ follows from the fact
that people are not passive in their conversations with others. Quite on the
contrary, they engage in activities such as negotiation, agreeing, disagreeing and
questioning (Sampson, 1993; Shotter, 1995). The very composition and style of
the utterance will depend on the audience for whom it is meant and must, of
necessity, take into account the effect it will have on them (Bakhtin, 1986).
‘Addressivity’ extends beyond actual participants in a dialogue to include
real or imagined Others for whom the utterance is meant and from whom
some responsive understanding is sought (Bakhtin, 1986). For example, when
we contemplate doing something that our parents do not approve of, we may
engage in an internal dialogue with them, even if they are not there. It could
thus be argued that higher mental functions such as thinking do not constitute
the activity of the solitary thinker. Instead, the internal world of the person is It could thus be
‘populated’ with others. Arendt expressed a similar view: argued that higher
mental functions
the thinking process ... is not, like the thought of pure reasoning, a dialogue such as thinking do
between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite not constitute the
alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with activity of the
whom I must finally come to some agreement (cited in Bernstein, 1983, 218). solitary thinker.
Instead, the
internal world of
Oriented towards others the person is
The fact that ‘addressivity’ includes imagined others highlights that we cannot ‘populated’ with
others.
claim to be alone in what we are doing, even in our thoughts. Our actions must
63
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 64
Critical Psychology
always be oriented toward others, and anticipate their responses, in order to be

meaningful. Traditional psychological theories of human development, on the
other hand, posit that people reason in isolation from others and the social
context (Sampson, 1993). For example, in the cognitivist paradigm, higher
psychological functions, such as the development of moral and ethical
reasoning (eg Kohlberg, 1981, 1984), are envisaged to be a matter of individual
legislation, with reference to internally held principles (Day & Tappan, 1996).
This process is envisaged to occur independently of others, history and time
(Benhabib, 1992). Bakhtin’s dialogism opens up the possibility of studying the
role played by others, real or imagined, in the development of higher mental
functions.
The notion of ‘addressivity’ alerts us to the importance of others’ responses to what we

have to say. Utterances are always addressed to someone else, and every utterance has
an addressee whose responsive understanding is being sought. An example of this
might be the telling of a joke. Here the speaker attempts to elicit a response of
humour; if the addressee laughs, then the speaker has been successful.
The superaddressee
Bakhtin (1986) also maintained that the ‘addressivity’ of utterances might be
extended to a ‘third party’ or a ‘superaddressee’. This is an indefinite audience,

such as a system of ideas or beliefs, an appeal to God, or scientific knowledge, to
which we appeal to justify our claims or actions. For example, psychology in
South Africa has not only lived in tandem with racism: it blossomed during
apartheid because it could be used to justify the policy of the Nationalist govern-
ment (see Box 1; Duncan, Stevens, & Bowman (this work); Ratele (this work)).
64
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 65

BOX 1 The discipline of psychology as a superaddressee
Psychology, like other forms of scientific knowl- In South Africa, Holdstock (2000) commented
edge, can function as a superaddressee. That is, as follows on the position of psychology during
we can appeal to psychological knowledge to the apartheid era:
justify our actions. For example, ‘racial differ-
The flourishing of psychology in South Africa
ences’ in IQ have been used to justify educational
during the apartheid era is an equally telling
and employment inequities. In the United States,
example of how a scientific discipline can
Ferguson (1916, cited in Richards, 1997) come to serve the political ends of those in
commented as follows on the performances of power. It also calls for a close examination of
black and white children on intelligence tests: the values underlying the practice of main-
The negroes ... were slow to warm up, quick stream psychology. ... The parallels between
to lose interest, difficult to stimulate except contemporary psychology and the political
through flattery, irregular, moody, vacil- system of apartheid are striking. Although
lating in attention, inaccurate, envious of there will certainly be those in psychology
each other’s progress, given to mumbling, who object to such a comparison, an uncanny
grumbling, humming, saying funny things commonality nevertheless exists between the
while at work. ... the very fact that the political system and the professional disci-
negroes were not interested as were the pline. The scale of the political experiment
whites possibly points to a deficiency in the was just grander than could ever be envisaged
colored group (cited in Richards, 1997, 85). by even the most inclusive of research
projects in psychology. In fact, the political
Ferguson went on to conclude as follows:
experiment approached the ideal of elimi-
[I]t is very clear that by far the greater nating sampling statistics by involving the
number of writers who have dealt with the total population. The entire country became a
problem of the relative mental ability of the laboratory. It is not surprising therefore, to
white and the negro take the view that the find critical descriptions of psychology that
negro is inferior. This is particularly true of fit the homelands policy of the nationalist
those investigators who have used quantita- government like a glove (57–58).
tive methods. The negro has not shown the
same capacity as the white when put to the Both Holdstock (2000) and Richards point us to
test of psychological or educational experi- the fact that psychology is not neutral. Rather,
ment, and the racial differences revealed psychological claims can be used to justify
have been considerable (cited in Richards, oppression.
1997, 85).
The chainlike nature of utterances

It is also important to note that the meaning of utterances cannot be deci-
phered in isolation, independently of the history of ideas and social relations
(Bakhtin, 1986; Holquist, 1983; Shotter, 1993a). Utterances are already
imbued with meaning, associated with the way they have been used histori-
cally within a given sphere of communication. By ‘sphere of communication’ is

meant historically particular contexts in which utterances have been used,
such as the family, work and scientific spheres. Bakhtin (1986) expressed this
feature, which he termed the chainlike nature of utterances, as follows:
Utterances are not indifferent to another, and are not self-sufficient; they are
aware of and mutually reflect one another. ... Every utterance must be regarded
65
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 66
Critical Psychology
primarily as a response to preceding utterances of the given sphere ... Each utter-
ance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies upon others, presupposes them to
be known, and somehow takes them into account ... Therefore each kind of
utterance is filled with various kinds of responsive reactions to other utterances
of the given sphere of communication (91).
On the value of the utterance as the psychological unit of analysis

Given that utterances are linked to other utterances before them, we should
study them with reference to the perspectives, worldviews and positions associ-
ated with a given topic. It is from positions already available to them in their
social settings that speakers seize meaning, making the utterance their own. For
example, suppose a community worker is teaching men about having one
partner as a strategy to reduce the spread of HIV/Aids. If one of these men
responds by saying: ‘I am a man!’, how are we to understand him? This
response can be understood only with reference to the already established
meanings of manhood (masculinity) in his social setting. Most likely, having
multiple partners is an important part of this man’s identity. Thus, interven-
tions that do not tackle the relationship between social identity and sexuality
are likely to fail. By studying utterances, we would be able to discern how people
Voice: engage with voices from their social and cultural worlds – which voices are
speakers have a already imbued with others’ meanings and intentions – to develop new ways of
voice when they use
understanding themselves and their world (Skinner, Valsiner & Holland, 2001).
utterances to
communicate their The study of utterances would appear to be an appropriate subject-matter
personal meanings for a critically oriented psychology. Traditional, mainstream psychology posits
or points of view. that the knower and the object of his or her knowledge are beyond time and
history (ie objective, timeless and universal). Haraway (1991) contends that
the traditional assumption of objectivity represents a ‘view from above, from
nowhere, from simplicity’ (195). The utterance draws to our attention that
psychological and other forms of knowledge can only be articulated by
embodied, living subjects. These subjects can be differentiated on a number of
dimensions, such as race, gender, class, and ethnicity. Thus, knowledge always
represents ‘views from somewhere’ (Haraway, 1991, 196). The utterance
enables us to situate speakers and knowledge in social and cultural contexts. It
empowers us to pose critical questions about the knowledge production
process. These are typical Bakhtinian (1981) questions such as: Who speaks/
writes/conducts research about whom? From which theoretical vantage posi-
tions? Under what social, historical and cultural circumstances? (Brown &
Gilligan, 1991). These issues have not been adequately addressed in South
African psychological discourse.
Utterance and voice

Utterances also differ from abstract linguistic units such as sentences because
they are inherently tied to the notion of ‘vvoice’ (Holquist, 1983; Holquist &
66
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 67

Emerson, 1981; Vasil’eva, 1985; Wertsch, 1990). Holquist & Emerson (1981)
define ‘voice’ as ‘the speaking personality, the speaking consciousness’ (434).
Every utterance exists in so far as it can be produced by someone (Wertsch,
1990). An utterance is endowed with a voice when speakers adopt an expres-
sive, evaluative attitude towards the subject of their speech (Bakhtin, 1986).
The evaluative nature of the words we use in language is realised only in partic-
ular concrete situations, when we employ them for our purposes. Bakhtin
argued that ‘words belong to nobody, and in themselves ... evaluate nothing ...
[T]hey can serve any speaker and be used for the most varied and directly
contradictory evaluations on the part of the speakers’ (Bakhtin, 1986, 85).
Meanings, ideas, and thoughts are voiced when they are expressed by someone
to communicate a personal (ie authorial) position with respect to a particular ‘Words belong to
subject (Vasil’eva, 1985). The term ‘voice’ generally applies to the speaking nobody, and in
themselves ...
subject’s perspective, worldview and belief system with regard to written and evaluate nothing ...
other forms of communication (Wertsch, 1990). It is the very condition for the [T]hey can serve
existence of dialogue, an alternation of subjective points of view between any speaker and be
partners (Vasil’eva, 1985). used for the most
varied and directly
contradictory
Studying voicelessness evaluations on the
part of the speakers’
In I write what I like, Biko (1978) comments critically on circumstances that
(Bakhtin, 1986,
led to voicelessness among black people in South Africa. Suppose that a 85).
‘garden boy’ or ‘maid’ is angry with his or her superior but smiles, pretending
to be happy in his presence. He or she lacks voice to express his or her point of
view. Critical psychology, it could be argued, should also study voicelessness
among the oppressed. This includes studying processes through which the
mind becomes colonised (see Hook’s chapter on Fanon, this work). It should
also investigate means to decolonise the mind, thereby reclaiming voice for the
people. One way of doing this is to explicate the various ways through which
the oppressed have contributed to world civilisation and the history of ideas.
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to that process.
Collective voices
Bakhtin was concerned not only with utterances of individual, speaking
subjects; he paid attention to types of speech produced by certain groups in
society. He referred to these types of speech as collective voices (Bakhtin, 1986;
Wertsch, 1990). The term ‘collective voices’ refers to opinions, points of view
and perspectives that reflect the views of our social and cultural communities.
These voices can also be reflected in the way individuals speak about them-
selves. Bakhtin’s dialogism extends beyond face-to-face interaction. It includes
the process by which a person’s utterance incorporates voices of social groups
and institutions. Bakhtin (1981) referred to this process as ventriloquation.
67
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 68
Critical Psychology
It is important to note that collective voices are not neutral: they are
imbued with expressive meanings. This is because utterances do not belong
entirely to individual speakers. They have always existed ‘out there’, belonging
to other people and social groups. Words cannot be ‘neutral’ because they have
always been used for particular purposes. They thus carry with them traces of
meanings associated with their use in particular spheres of communication
(Bakhtin, 1981; Shotter, 1993). Bakhtin (1981) expressed this as follows:
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the
speaker populates it with his [sic] own intention, his own accent, when he appro-
priates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior
Appropriation: to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and imper-
utterances, argued sonal language ... but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s
Bakhtin (1981), are concrete contexts, serving other people’s intentions: it is from there that one
already imbued with must take the word, and make it one’s own (Bakhtin, 1981, 293–294).
others’ meanings.
Bakhtin used the
term ‘appropriation’ Collective voices and psychological mediation
to indicate a
process by which we
The notion of collective voices enriches our understanding of psychological
give voice mediation. Higher mental functions are also mediated by collective forms of
(intonation, accent, life. This observation ties psychological functions (eg self-understanding,
personal identity formation) to the social and cultural context. For example, a man who
meaning/intentions)
to the utterance or
believes that he is superior to women is not only expressing his point of view.
a particular Most probably, he is ventriloquating patriarchal views in his society, which he
subject/topic. has assimilated into the self. Identity development involves a struggle with
others’ voices. This may result in the person uncritically accepting others’
views, or giving new meanings to them (in Bakhtinian terms, ‘appropriating’
them), thereby authoring his or her own point of view. Thus, when a person is
speaking, we can ask the question: ‘Who is speaking?’ In other words, whose
ideas are being ventriloquated in the person’s speech? In what ways has the
person made sense of these views for himself or herself (ie appropriated them)?
As discussed below, such an analysis takes us beyond the individual–society
dichotomy (Wertsch, 1995). It focuses on the dialogical interchange between
the individual and others’ voices.
Three types of collective voice are critical for our purposes: national
languages, social languages and speech genres.
National languages
For Bakhtin, these are the traditional language units such as IsiZulu, Tshivenda
and Afrikaans. National languages are characterised by coherent grammatical
and semantic forms (Wertsch, 1991). Bakhtin noted that there is a dialogical
interaction between national languages in the sense that one language may be
used at home, another one in the school, and perhaps even another for
68
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 69

religious purposes (Wertsch, 1990). The interaction between national

languages is of vital importance in South Africa. For example, many African
schoolchildren are taught in English and yet use an African language at home.
The impact of this on their understanding of scientific and other concepts has
not been fully explored.
The dialogic relationship between national languages is also important to
understanding relationships between various groups. For example, while it is a
status symbol of some sort for Africans to be fluent in English, French or
Portuguese, the reverse (eg fluency in Tswana) does not hold for people of
European descent. In meetings full of African people, I have observed speakers
automatically switching to English immediately when a person of European
descent arrives. The same does not hold if a non-English-speaking African
enters a hall full of English people. It should be noted that this is not about
languages per se, but about the position and power of the people who speak
them. Despite the potential benefit of studying dialogic interanimations
between national languages, Bakhtin paid more attention to social languages.
Social languages
Bakhtin noted that within a single national language there might exist many
social languages. Social languages represent the social position of the speaker.
Examples are the languages of various professional groups, urban and rural
dialects, as well as the languages of various age groups or generations. Speakers
never produce utterances in isolation. Even if alone, they enter into dialogue
with the social and other languages, representing various interest groups in
society.
The fact that we speak in social languages has several implications for us as
social scientists. We need to engage critically with the voices embedded in our
practices. We need to be aware that our theories, methodologies, and inter-
vention methods are tied to particular social languages. The language of
psychology is consistent with the values of the dominant (white) middle
classes. For example, it has been argued that traditional psychotherapy is class
bound. It values verbal and emotional expressiveness on the part of the client.
It also distinguishes between the mental and physical needs of the client, and
chooses to focus on the former. Sessions are usually limited to 50 minutes,
tend to be unstructured, and the focus is on long-term rather than short-term
goals (Sue & Sue, 1999). The higher dropout rate in psychotherapy among
minorities has been attributed to this fact, among other factors.
The fact that our practices are imbued with class-bound social values calls
for dialogical reflexivity in practice. Reflexivity is ‘a process of explicitly turning
one’s critical gaze on oneself as well as the professional, historical, and cultural
discourses that empower and constrain one’s capacities to think and act in the
69
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 70
Critical Psychology
The fact that we

context of a relationship’ (Hawes, 1998, 105–106). Reflexivity will enhance the
speak in social ability of psychologists and other social scientists to understand and interpret
languages has others’ lives meaningfully.
several implications
for us as social
scientists. We need
Speech genres
to engage critically While the distinguishing feature of social languages is the social position of the
with the voices speakers, speech genres are characterised by the typical situations in which
embedded in our
practices. We need
they are invoked. They are the ‘generic forms of the utterance’ (Bakhtin, 1986,
to be aware that 78), such as greetings and intimate conversations between friends. For
our theories, example, the man who declared ‘I am a man!’, cited earlier, is expressing
methodologies and himself through a speech genre. This expression might be invoked in typical
intervention
methods are tied to
situations where one’s sexuality or manhood is at stake. Speech genres are
particular social products of a community’s history and collective way of life. They are acquired
languages. from our concrete experiences with those around us. Speech genres are more
changeable and diverse. They take into account not only the context and
personal interrelations of the speakers but also their social positions (Bakhtin,
1986). An individual may resort to many genres, depending on the context and
position of those being addressed.
It has been argued that interindividual, small-group and broader collective
forms of life mediate psychological functioning. Given the importance of the
concept of the self in psychology, we shall now turn to the view of selfhood
emanating from a dialogical account of human functioning. Dialogism, it is
argued, enables us to theorise about the relationship between the individual and
society without falling victim to the individual–society antithesis (Wertsch, 1995).
THE DIALOGICAL SELF

Bakhtin’s dialogism leads to a self that is always engaged in relationships with
others and the social context. Bakhtin regarded communication as an essential
aspect of personhood. For him, ‘the very being of man [sic] ... is a profound
communication. To be means to communicate. ... To be means to be for the
other; and through him [sic] for oneself ’ (Bakhtin, 1984/1993, 287; original
emphasis). The dialogical self is not pre-given. It emerges from exposure to
others’ voices. Once internalised, these voices continue to dialogue with each
other on an ongoing basis. The dialogical self is decentralised. It is composed of
multiple characters, capable of engaging each other (Hermans & Kempen,
1993). Although multiplicity of selves has been proposed by others (eg Higgins,
1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987), Bakhtin’s approach
comprehensively explains the emergence of self from collective forms of life.
To understand fully the dialogical basis of selfhood, it is important to
revisit four main characteristics of the dialogical self, namely polyphony,
spatialisation, self-renewal or innovation, and power relationships. Parallels
70
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 71

are drawn between a dialogically conceived self and the traditional African
view of selfhood.
Polyphony and the dialogical self

Bakhtin’s (1984/1993) analysis of Dostoevsky’s literary works and, in partic-
ular, the relationship between characters and the author in his novels provides
a basis for understanding polyphony in the dialogical self (see also Hermans,
1996, 1997; Hermans et al, 1992; Vasil’eva, 1985). To understand fully Bakhtin’s
ideas regarding the polyphonic novel, it is important to contrast the position of
the characters and the author in monological and polyphonic literary works.
Monological versus polyphonic works

Monological works are characterised by the privileged position of the author
as the sole proponent of the truth. The author retains the power to express the
truth directly and there is only one truth: that propounded by him or her. Each
character’s position is measured against the ideological position of the author.
Thus, the author and the characters are not on the same plane; they do not
interact as equals. The characters serve as mouthpieces to convey the author’s
position. The right to mediate between the characters and the readers remains
solely with the author. He or she retains the power to synthesise the various
insights and propositions into a coherent system. Once the ideas have been
synthesised, they are deinvested of their individuality, that is, they are
rendered independently of the characters who created or uttered them or of
the context of their discovery (Bakhtin, 1993; Morson & Emerson, 1990).
Contrary to the traditional, monological novel, Bakhtin (1984/1993) noted
that Dostoevsky created a special kind of novelistic genre, namely, the poly-
phonic novel. A polyphonic novel does not contain only one authorial
viewpoint. Instead, there are several characters, with independent and
mutually opposing voices. The characters are continually engaged in a dialog-
ical relationship with each other. The author’s perspective is just one of many.
The characters are capable of authoring (expressing) and defending their views
and perspectives. Each character is ‘ideologically authoritative and inde-
pendent; he [sic] is perceived as the author of a fully-weighted ideological
conception of his own, and not as the object of Dostoevsky’s finalising artistic
vision’ (Bakhtin, 1984/1993, 5). This leads to a ‘plurality of independent and
unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully-valid voices’

(Ibid, 6; original emphasis).
A plurality of independent voices

The metaphor of the polyphonic novel leads to a conception of the self that is
radically different from the traditional, unitary self. The traditional Western
71
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 72
Critical Psychology
view of the self assumes that there is only one centralised thinker responsible
for the thinking process (Hermans, 2001). Polyphony, on the other hand,
makes it possible to envisage different voices in dialogue within a single person.
These voices are capable of engaging in a relationship of questioning and
answering, agreement and disagreement, with each other. In other words, the
dialogical self is characterised by a plurality of independent voices or perspec-
tives. A person is capable of telling different stories from different vantage
positions, reflecting the multiple worlds in which he or she has grown up.
The voices comprising the dialogical self need not be in agreement with
each other. Rivalry or tensions between different selves may occur. Bakhtin
(1993) showed that once an inner thought of a character has been transformed
into an utterance, dialogical relationships between this utterance and the
utterances of real or imagined Others occur spontaneously (Hermans &
Kempen, 1993). Bakhtin (1993) illustrated this by referring to Dostoevsky’s
novel, The double. In this novel, Dostoevsky creates a second hero (the double)
to act as an externalised, interior voice (thought) of Golyadkin, who is the first
hero. Once the thought of the second hero is externalised, dialogical relation-
ships between this voice and the first hero become possible. This makes it
possible to study the internal world of one individual with reference to the rela-
tionship between the multiple voices comprising the self (Hermans, 1996;
Hermans, 1997; Hermans & Kempen, 1993). For example, tensions may occur
between the social self, defined in terms of one’s membership in a particular
group, and the person’s own intentions (see Box 2).
Spatialisation in the dialogical self

At this point, it is necessary to discuss briefly Bakhtin’s understanding of the
relationship between an idea and a person holding it. For Bakhtin, an idea
represents a person’s point of view: it cannot be separated from the / (person)
voicing it. Likewise, the person holding it becomes a fully fledged personality
by virtue of that idea (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Because it is the idea that
defines the person, it is possible to externalise it metaphorically, in order to
give it its own ‘personality’. Spatialisation refers to an idea that has been
endowed with a personality of its own through externalisation. Once exter-
nalised, the idea tells its own story, from its own vantage position (eg in
Dostoevsky’s novel The double, referred to above). The dialogical self could
thus be conceived spatially as a multiplicity of autonomous authors in an imag-
inary landscape. Each author is capable of telling different stories from

different perspectives (Hermans, 1996; 1997). For example, people can tell
various stories, perhaps from the vantage position of their parents, their
grandparents, and even deceased relatives. The stories are ideologically inde-
pendent and hence can engage dialogically with each other (Hermans, 1997;
Josephs, 1997).
72
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 73

To illustrate the spatialisation of the dialogical self, Hermans, Kempen &

Van Loon (1992) conceived of the dialogical self as a play of positions in an
imaginary landscape. They maintained that:
The / has the possibility to move, as in space, from one position to the other in
accordance with changes in situation and time. The / fluctuates among different
and even opposed positions. The / has the capacity to imaginatively endow each
position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be estab-
lished. The voices function like interacting characters in a story. Once a character
is set in motion in a story, the character takes on a life of its own and thus
assumes a certain narrative necessity. Each character has a story to tell about
experiences of its own stance. As different voices, these characters exchange
information about respective Me(s) and their worlds, resulting in a complex,
narratively structured self (28–29).
The dialogical self is not limited to one centralised position, towards which
every voice gravitates. Rather, the person can move from one position to
another, in response to changes in situation and time (see Box 2).
BOX 2 Relationships between voices in the dialogical self
The following interview extract was taken from the author’s ongoing work on
moral and ethical decision-making. It illustrates many aspects of the dialogical
self. The narrator had been pressurised by members of his family to take part
in an effort to avenge a family murder.
Interviewer: Anything that came to your mind?

Narrator: Yes. In my mind there was a great debate, which I could not
resolve. When I tried to convince them [family members] other-
wise, they said: ‘Don’t worry, you will just drive. You won’t be
involved.’ So, we arrived at this place called Y. We looked for an
area called N, but we could not find it, and it was getting dark and
dangerous. So, eventually we went back home, as we could not find
them that day. So, I tried another plan. I said: ‘Why don’t we
contact the police? ... But at the same time, as I was giving this
opinion, I did not want to appear as a coward. I had to avoid that;
otherwise, they would think being educated has turned me into a
coward. So, I gave this opinion in a matter-of-fact way. We The dialogical self
contacted the police but at the same time we were scared, as they can be described
only in terms of
could have been in cahoots with the criminals. ... Even though we
becoming. It is
contacted the police, we continued our search the next day. So, as
always oriented
we were traveling, [my conscience] was killing me inside, that I am

towards the future,
driving a car, carrying would-be murderers. But at the same time and is continually
they had to be punished because they had done wrong. He who challenged to
lives by the sword dies by the sword! Inside, I wanted them to be reposition itself in
punished, but I did not want to be personally involved. ... But the light of new
somehow they had to feel the pain that we felt. We were looking information.
73
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 74
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 Relationships between voices in the dialogical self (cont)
for them again, but [my conscience] was against what we were
doing. ‘Why Me! Why should I be the one driving the car?’ ... So,
that is the most difficult situation I faced in my life, having to
decide whether to withdraw or not, and the meaning the family
would attribute to my withdrawal. What would they say? They
would say I am forsaking him (the deceased) because he is dead?
At the same time I thought: ‘What about me? If I do not think of
myself as a member of the family, do I like what is happening?’ And
you find that inside; that is against your feelings, that I am doing
this because they say I must do it. Although I do not want to do
it, I do not want to show the Me [his real views]. Because, my
inside, it is weak compared to my outside, which is what I show.
This extract could be analysed in terms of the dialogical interchange between

perspectives. The narrator was torn between his views as an individual (his
‘conscience’), and the part of the self representing his family (anger, pain,
desire to punish, social identity). He vacillates between the two. He was also
concerned with preserving his image as a brave man in his society (his posi-
tioning). The voice representing the family seems to dominate. Thus, he does
not want to voice his views explicitly.
The dialogical self and innovation

Innovation or self-renewal is another critical feature of the dialogical self
(Hermans, 1996, 1997). The dialogical self is always challenged by questions,
disagreements, and confrontations. Owing to the interchange of voiced
perspectives, it is possible for the person to reposition himself or herself,
leading to innovation. That is, the dialogue between voices can lead to a new
way of seeing oneself and the world (Hermans, 1996). The dialogical self can
never be fixed in advance. It is characterised by a high degree of openness. This
is sometimes referred to as the ‘unfinalisability’ of the self (Hermans, 1996,
1997). The notion is taken from the behaviour of characters in a polyphonic
novel. Characters in such a novel are highly unpredictable. They continually
ridicule attempts to turn them into voiceless objects at the mercy of others’
finalising descriptions. That is, the characters ‘sense their own inner unfinalis-
ability, their capacity to outgrow ... from within and to render untrue any
externalizing and finalizing definition of them’ (Bakhtin, 1993, 59; original
emphasis). Meaning in a polyphonic novel is not given a priori: it unfolds

during the process, as the author and the characters continually address each
other in the present (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Likewise, the dialogical self
can be described only in terms of becoming. It is always oriented toward the
future, and is continually challenged to reposition itself in the light of new
information.
74
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 75

Hierarchy, power and the dialogical self

Given the multiplicity of voices comprising the dialogical self, the question of
their positioning with respect to each other, becomes inevitable. The multiple
voices comprising the dialogical self are not necessarily equal. Dialogue is not
only ordered horizontally, but vertically as well (Hermans, 1996). Referring to
Linell’s (1990) work, Hermans (1996) and Hermans & Kempen (1993) showed
that conversations between interlocutors are characterised by emergence of
symmetrical and asymmetrical (dominance) relationships between voices.
Although conversation usually requires turn taking between interlocutors, and
hence alternation between dominance versus subjectivity, it is possible for one
conversant, or groups, to hold perpetual power over others. This follows from
the fact that positions emerging in a conversation ‘can be partly understood as
reproductions of culturally-established and institutionally congealed provi-
sions and constraints on communicative activities’ (Hermans & Kempen,
1993, 73). For example, a conversation between a madam, usually a white
woman, and a maid, usually a black woman, in South Africa, can be under-
stood in terms of the power relations between these two groups in society.
Likewise, the relationships between voices comprising the self are not equal.
For example, the voice representing one’s social group or family may take
precedence over the one representing the person’s aspirations (see Box 2).
THE DIALOGICAL SELF: COMPARISONS WITH AFRICAN APPROACHES

It has been argued that the dialogical self is saturated with others’ perspectives.
The characteristics of the dialogical self, mentioned above, also apply to tradi-
tional African conceptions of the self. The view of a multiple, dialogically
constituted self is not new to African scholarship. The self in traditional
African thought is, by definition, dialogical.
The social and relational origins of the self

The view that the self emerges from relationships is consistent with African
conceptions of personhood. From an African perspective, the human being is
never alone. He or she is always in dialogue with the surrounding environ-
ment. Thus, selfhood cannot be defined individualistically in terms of a
person’s thought processes. This finds support in Zahan (1979), who argues
that African psychology conceptualises the self in much broader and richer
terms. Communication between the self and the world is the order of the day:
[The human being] enters into the surrounding environment, which in turn
penetrates him [sic]. Between the two realities there exists a constant communi-
cation, a sort of osmotic exchange, owing to which man finds himself
permanently listening, so to speak, to the pulse of the world (Zahan, 1979, 9).
75
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 76
Critical Psychology
From a traditional African point of view, ‘the human being lives in close contact
with the universe; he [sic] lives in symbiosis with it and does not artificially
separate himself from it at any moment of his existence’ (Zahan, 1979, 20). As
the passage cited above indicates, there is always interpenetration between the
self and the external environment. Such a conceptualisation renders questions
about what is inside or outside of the person (the individual-versus-society
debate) inadequate. Rather, we should focus on how, through mediation, social
and cultural processes become part of the person’s internal world.
The dialogical implications of ‘Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’

Dialogism in African thought incorporates relationships between people. Let
us reconsider the saying: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. Although quoted very
often, the dialogical implications of this saying have never been fully grasped,
especially in psychology. This saying can be interpreted as: ‘A human being is
a human being because of other human beings’. In other words, it points at the
fact that selfhood emerges dialogically, through participation in a community
of other human beings.’ Further support is found in the Tshivenda equivalent,
muthu ubebelwa munwe. This translates as: ‘a person is [already] born for the
other.’ Both sayings highlight that the self cannot be conceived independently
of social relationships.
Louw (1999, 2001) points out that the saying umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,
as a dialogical principle, is a call for human beings to respect the individuality
and particularity of the other. This does not refer to individuality in the
Cartesian abstract sense, synonymous with the Cartesian view of the self. The Cartesian
(unitary) self: self exists ‘prior’ to society; it is thus inconsistent with a dialogical, socially
traditional Western
immersed self. ‘Individuality’ here refers to the concreteness of the other. It
view of the self that
defines the person refers to particular individuals who, by virtue of their particularity, are capable
in terms of his or of voicing their own perspectives.
her thoughts or The abovementioned interpretation of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu also
psychological finds support in Van der Merwe (1996). He interprets the saying as follows: ‘To be
attributes. It draws
sharp distinctions
a human being is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others
between the self in its infinite variety of content or form.’ (1). Alternatively, the saying could be
(inside) and the envisaged to mean: ‘A human being is a human being through (the otherness of )
non-self (the out- other human beings’ (1). Thus, it is through our encounter with another, fully
side). The Cartesian
voiced consciousness that we gain self-understanding. We cannot claim to fully
self is unitary: it
proclaims only one understand who we are when we deny others the right to mean or speak.
centralised thinker. The saying ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ is a call for us to enrich our own
self-understanding through contact with, and recognition of, the Other who is
different from us. This requires that we come to terms with the Other’s points
of views, or lenses through which he or she makes sense of the world. As
Bakhtin argued, people become fully fledged personalities by virtue of their
ideas or points of view (Morson & Emerson). To deny others the right to mean
76
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 77

(voice) is to deny them individuality. Recognising others’ views is also impor-

tant because it is through them that we come to be conscious of who we are.
The notion that
‘we are because of
others’ is central
to many African
cultures, as in the
saying ‘Umuntu
ngumuntu
ngabantu’, which
may be interpreted
as: ‘A human being
is a human being
because of other
human beings.’
Personhood and becoming in African thought

Selfhood in traditional African thought is also conceptualised in space and
time. The person in African thought is never a finished product; he or she is
perpetually in the making (Sow, 1980). This means that human beings can be
defined only in terms of becoming (Ramose, 1999; Sow, 1980; Zahan, 1979). Selfhood in
People achieve full selfhood once they have undergone ‘certain physical trans- traditional African
formations or ... perform[ed] ... rites designed to admit [them] into adult thought is also
conceptualised in
society as a new member’ (Zahan, 1979, 10). Sow (1980) captures this view of space and time. The
the self in the following paragraph: person in African
thought is never a
[T]he human person/personality is not a ‘completed’ system (already at three to
finished product; he
five years of age); the human being, as such, is perpetually ‘in the making’. From
or she is perpetually
the psychological and psychopathological point of view, difficulties and conflicts in the making.
are always present, seen in a context of ceaseless development, for the person-
ality is continually evolving in a life that is felt to unfold in an orderly fashion,
dominated, at its highest point, by the ideas of seniority and ancestry. The basic
ideas or phases of life (codified through rituals and traditional practices,
including initiation) permit progressive integration into a well-ordered universe.
... The status of full person is really acquired only with old age, which takes on an
ancestral quality (126).
The passage above indicates that personhood in African scholarship can only
be defined in terms of becoming. Conception and birth are not enough to
ensure humanhood (Menkiti, 1984; Zahan, 1979). Instead, it is through
participation in the community of others, which in some societies includes
rituals of transformation, that one becomes fully human (Sow, 1980; Zahan,
1979). These are ritual practices such as imbeleko, a sacrificial offering
77
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 78
Critical Psychology
performed by Nguni groups to introduce a newborn child to the family, the

community of integrated ancestors (izinyanya) and, by extension, to God.
Similar offerings are made during various stages in life, culminating with the
rituals of burial, which mark the person’s transition from the world of the
living to the spiritual world.
Vigilance regarding oppressive ritual practices

At this point, it is necessary to pause to address some possible, and justified,
objections to initiation rituals. I have in mind practices such as ‘female circumci-
sion’, which, in some African societies, marks the transition to womanhood. It is
not my intention to portray all forms of ritual initiation as positive. Indeed, all
cultural practices carry with them complex contradictions. These contradictions
can be exploited for other purposes, including gender and other forms of
oppression. Critical social science has no room for oppressive cultural practices:
its very existence is predicated on the eradication of such practices, among other
practices. The theory of dialogism allows us to critically debate cultural prac-
tices, so as to eliminate their oppressive elements, while retaining positive ones.
For the purposes of my argument, which is to demonstrate that person-
hood is conceived in terms of becoming in African thought, the analysis of
transformation rituals is limited to their social and spiritual significance,
rather than the visible, outside criteria. This is based on the view that outside
criteria can be eliminated, without compromising the hidden social and spiri-
tual meanings attached to the practice. Indeed, some African societies do not
have initiation rites, and yet retain the social and spiritual meanings associated
with them (Zahan, 1979).
Initiation: passage from exteriority to interiority

Following Zahan (1979), I would argue that initiation represents a process by
which people discover themselves (who they are) through others and their
communities. It represents ‘a slow transformation of the individual, a progres-
sive passage from exteriority to interiority’ (Zahan, 1979, 54). The reference to
the ‘passage from exteriority to interiority’ does not mean that knowledge
developed through initiation is of an abstract, individualistic type, as in the
self-contained view of the self (Hermans et al, 1992). Rather, it points to the
fact that self-knowledge is the basis of all forms of knowledge in African
thought (Myers, 1988; Zahan, 1979). Self-knowledge does not result from the
maturation of internally held principles, however. It ensues from a person’s
relationships with others, including the social environment. Thus, it moves
from the direction of the social environment (social relationships and prac-
tices) to the internal world of the individual. One can never completely master
the external environment, and hence, self-knowledge is always oriented
78
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 79

toward the future. As Zahan (1979) argues, initiation (to self-knowledge) Self-knowledge is
‘becomes a long process, a confrontation between man [sic] and himself which the basis of all
ends in death. It becomes an experience which is enriched with every passing forms of knowledge
day, being in principle more complete in an elderly person than in an adult, in African thought.
Self-knowledge does
and more in an adult than in a child’ (55). Because one can never attain full not result from the
(complete) self-knowledge, it could be argued that the self in African thought maturation of
is always distributed at the boundary between the self and the non-self. internally held
principles. It ensues
from a person’s
Ubuntu as a process
relationships with
Finally, I should like to reflect on the open-ended, dialogically oriented view of others, including
the self in African thought by analysing the meaning of the terms ubuntu the social
environment. It
(botho) and umuntu (motho). It should be noted that the term ubuntu has moves from the
complex philosophical and ethical implications. For the purposes of my direction of the
argument, only the linguistic analysis is presented here. Although similar social environment
terms are found in a number of South African languages, I limit the analysis to (social relationships
and practices) to
the Nguni equivalents.
the internal world
Ubuntu, often interpreted as ‘humanness’ in English, is about becoming. of the individual.
The word can be broken down to the prefix ubu- and the stem -ntu. Ubu-
belongs in the group of nouns indicating a process or becoming. The stem -ntu,
on the other hand, indicates a human being (umuntu). This means that, linguis-
tically, ubuntu indicates a being that is always oriented toward becoming.
According to Ramose (1999), umuntu, from which ubuntu is derived,
is the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into experience,
knowledge, and truth. This is an activity rather than an act. It is an ongoing
process impossible to stop. On this reasoning, ubu- may be regarded as be-ing
becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion (51; emphasis added).
The idea of personhood as becoming, (movement) as reflected in the writings
of Bakhtin (1984/1993) and those of Hermans and colleagues (Hermans,
2001a, 2001b; Hermans & Kempen, 1993), is consistent with traditional
African conceptions of the self. The fact that this idea is reflected in African
languages and proverbs indicates that it predates the psychological literature
about dialogism. Further, this view is not something the African reads about in
the literature (and hence, comes to know only cognitively). It is an indispen-
sable part of lived experience or ubu-ntu. Becoming, or inkambo (‘life journey’
or lived experience) is manifest in the relationship between the person and
others, including the surrounding environment. Our analysis of the saying

‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ already testifies to this.
Pluralism and the African self

The traditional African worldview also conceptualises the self in pluralistic
terms (Ogbonnaya, 1994; Sow, 1980; Zahan, 1979).
79
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 80
Critical Psychology
Sow (1980) wrote as follows on that subject:

Inseparable from his [sic] social dimension, the individual in Africa ... appears
composite in space, multiple in time, extending and testifying to a culture of rich
complexity. ... Only an anthropological perspective that views the person as a
living system of social relations and a system of interaction with the realm of the
symbolic will enable one to grasp the way in which Africans experience the self
(Sow, 1980, 126; emphasis added).
To illustrate further the multiple nature of the self in African scholarship, Sow
(1980) cites from the work of Thomas & Luneau (1975), who wrote as follows:
The concept of person sums up and brings together ideas and principles of tradi-
tional Negro-African thought. Indeed, one finds there the necessity of pluralism,
the networks of participation and correspondence that bind the subject to the
group and to the cosmos, the verbal dimensions, the dynamic and unfinished
quality, the richness and the fragility, the important role assigned to the milieu,
and the inevitable reference to the sacred (Thomas & Lineau, 1975, cited in Sow,
1980, 127).
Like the dialogical self, personhood in African thought is pluralistic. It is
extended in space and time.
The human being as a ‘community of selves’

If the self in African thought is multiple, what is the nature of that multiplicity?
Zahan (1979) argues that the self cannot be separate because, physiologically
and psychically, human beings always carry within themselves their own
genitors and ascendants. That is, human beings carry with them the ancestral
(spiritual) component, the present self, as well as selves that are yet to be born.
Ogbonnaya (1994) expresses the same view when he argues that ‘the human
person must be seen as a community in and of itself including a plurality of
selves’ (75). He does not refer to a community outside the person. Rather, this
is the community of selves constituting the internal world of the person. He
maintains that:
the person in African worldview should be visualized as a centrifugal force
capable of emanating other complex selves that can interpermeate each other as
well as other selves generated from other persona-communal centers. This
centrifugality of the person reaches into all directions and touches all events that
contribute to the full person – the mythical past, the generational past, the ever
present nature, and the self in the process of being born (Ogbonnaya, 1994, 79).
The plurality of selves envisaged in African thought is expressed differently,
depending on one’s cultural group. For example, the Balong of Cameroon
believe that a person is born with different souls, some representing the
parents, the ancestors, God and other spiritual beings (Ogbonnaya, 1994).
Similarly, most traditional societies in South Africa believe that over and above
80
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 81

unique ‘individual selves’ people are born with a spiritual self, representing
their izinyanya (ancestors). The spiritual self is thought to be more
pronounced in those called to become traditional diviners and healers
(izangoma). This indicates that multiplicity of the self is integral to traditional
African ways of thinking.
Most probably, plurality of selves applies to most cultures. However, the
people or internal ‘audiences’ (Day, 1991) inhabiting our worlds will differ
from culture to culture and from person to person. For some, these may be
angels (Christians), and for others, ancestors, and even movie heroes for others
(especially children). Further, our internal audiences may change as we move
from one cultural setting to another. The critical question is not only about
who constitutes our internal world, but how internal audiences are formed and
transformed over time (Day, 1991).
Tensions or rivalry between selves

Ogbonnaya (1994) brings to our attention that selves within the person are
always engaged in interplay with each other. The relationship between internal
communal selves resembles the one between the individual and the commu-
nity (see previous chapter). Ideally, the various selves should work together
interdependently, without the loss or sacrifice of other aspects of the
communal self. However, problems of power and dominance between selves
arise, threatening to destabilise the community of selves. That is, the selves can
be in conflict with each other. This is exemplified by someone called by
izinyanya (ancestors) to assume a healing function in society. Because the call
is involuntary, it sometimes results in a struggle between the spiritual self and
the individual personality. The former seeks to dominate the latter by directing
it to assume a healing function. With the assistance of a highly trained spiritual
medium, it is possible for an individual to enter into a dialogue with the spiri-
tual self and, through the medium of impepho, request it to forgive him or her Impepho:
for not accepting the call to heal. traditional incense
used by traditional
Should the individual accept the call to heal, the spiritual self becomes healers to
capable of holding an independent conversation with the individual self. It can communicate with
be consulted for healing purposes. It is the general view that the spiritual self the ancestors.
speaks with its own voice, independently of the voice of the healer. Because the
healer is not aware of what the spiritual self is saying (through him or her), the
service of an interpreter is usually solicited. This lends support to the view that
the multiple selves within a person can be engaged in a dialogical interplay

with each other.
Implications and conclusion

Dialogism has several implications. This principle always recognises another,
with whom one can agree or disagree. It emphasises processes taking place at
81
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 82
Critical Psychology
the zone or contact between the person and his or her environment. Dialogism
provides a meaningful framework for exploring the role of social, historical
and cultural factors in development, making it an important theoretical
perspective for critical psychology.
Through the principle of dialogism, influences of the contact between
various worldviews on development can be explored. It acknowledges that
local (indigenous) and Western worldviews can coexist within a single person.
These worldviews can engage dialogically with each other, and people are
capable of moving between both worlds. The lived experiences of many
African (and other) people are already characterised by a need to continually
shift self perspectives. An old man who works as a sweeper in the mines may
be a highly respected induna (headman) in his rural community. Likewise,
Dialogism
Holdstock (2000) reports on many highly educated Africans who successfully
emphasises shift between modern and traditional ways of life. Because we live in a world
processes taking characterised by connections (eg between the local and the foreign, the
place at the zone or national and the transactional), focusing on the interplay between these world-
contact between
views is more fruitful. This, argue Hermans & Kempen (1998), requires the
the person and his
or her environment. notion of a dialogical self.
Dialogism provides
a meaningful Methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism
framework for
exploring the role Another advantage of dialogism is that it makes it possible to move beyond the
of social, historical, individual-society dichotomy, or what Wertsch (1995) calls methodological indi-
and cultural factors vidualism and methodological collectivism. Methodological individualism
in development.
reduces social and individual phenomena to facts about the individual. Every-
thing depends on the individual. Methodological collectivism, on the other
hand, explains human behaviour in terms of societal factors. Everything depends
on society. Dialogism breaches this dichotomy through the concept of mediated
activity. Mediation explains how what is outside the individual (the social and
cultural realm) becomes part of his or her functioning through internalisation.
The dichotomy between the individual and society is also reduced by the
notion of ventriloquation, by which people speak in collective voices. Indeed,
Bakhtin (1981) argues that the word is neither fully ours nor fully someone
else’s. We make it our own when we appropriate it (from others and the social
and cultural sphere) by populating it with our own intentions and accent.
The need to generate intercultural dialogue

In conclusion, it has been argued that the sociocultural tradition in psychology
facilitates incorporation of local worldviews into psychological discourse. It
has been shown that African conceptions of the person have many parallels
with those emanating from Bakhtin’s dialogism. A truly dialogical account of
knowledge should take into account the Other’s worldviews and perspectives.
82
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap03 11/2/04 10:22 am Page 83

Psychological science needs to generate intercultural dialogue between the

indigenous and the Western, the local and the international (Gergen et al,
1996). If it fails to do so, it runs the risk of becoming monological. We also
need to capitalise on the innovative quality of the dialogical self. Always
oriented toward the future, this self is ready to reinvent itself in the light of new
information. Because meaning emerges at the point of contact between
‘bodies’ of knowledge (Holquist, 1990), psychology will benefit from attending
to processes at the zone between indigenous and Western worldviews.

1. List two higher psychological functions (eg thinking, memory). How are
these functions mediated in your cultural community? (eg memory may be
mediated by the use of stories).
2. Collective forms of life play an important role in self/identity formation.
With reference to some of the cultural tools in your community (eg
children’s comic books, newspaper clippings, songs), critically discuss the
process by which we come to understand ourselves as men and women
(gender identity formation).
3. ‘African conceptions of the self are inherently dialogical.’ Discuss this state-
ment critically, with reference to the key characteristics of the dialogical
self.
4. Find an extract from any text (eg journal, newspaper clipping, song, book).
Highlight voices or conceptions of the self in the text. What is the relation-
ship between these voices or selves? Discuss this with one of your
classmates.
5. Although we may not be consciously aware of it, our lives are characterised
by dialogism. That is, most of us have to negotiate self-understanding (who
we are) continually as we move from one context or locality to another.
Give a few examples illustrating dialogism from your own life experiences.
Discuss these with one of your classmates.
Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1993). The dialogical self: Meaning as
movement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1998). ‘Moving cultures: The perilous
problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society.’ American
Psychologist, 53: 1111–1120.

Ogbonnaya, A.O. (1994). ‘Person as community: An African understanding of
the person as an intrapsychic community.’ Journal of Black Psychology, 20:
75–87.
Sow, I. (1980). Anthropological structures of madness in black Africa (Joyce
Diamanti, trans). New York: International University Press.
83
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 84
Chapter
4
Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko,

‘psychopolitics’ and
critical psychology
Derek Hook
‘Liberate yourselves from mental slavery, none but ourselves

shall free our minds.’
Bob Marley
‘The most powerful weapon in the hands of the oppressor is

the mind of the oppressed.’
Steve Biko
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Define and understand what is meant by the colonial and the post-colonial
Discuss what is meant by a ‘psychopolitics’, and hence elaborate on how Fanon’s
work may be understood as a kind of critical psychology
Explain the concepts of political consciousness, psychological reductionism and
Négritude, as important theoretical contexts to Fanon’s thought
Explain how Fanon adapts the theoretical notion of alienation, along with the
concepts of estrangement, depersonalisation, internalisation and the sociogenetic
basis of psychopathology to explain the damaging effects of a ‘white mask

psychology’
Outline the basic tenets of Steve Biko’s approach to Black Consciousness.
84
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 85
Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and critical psychology

INTRODUCTION: THE ‘PSYCHOPOLITICS’ OF FANON

Perhaps Frantz Fanon’s greatest source of originality as a critical theorist lies in
his combination of psychology and politics. This overlapping of political and
psychological forms of analysis is seen in the fact that Fanon approaches the
problems of national liberation and social revolution from the vantage point of
psychopathology, and the problems of personal identity through a sustained
focus on the violence of the colonial encounter (McCulloch, 1983). To put this
Frantz Fanon
more precisely:
All of Fanon’s work falls into that category where the sciences of personality and
the sciences of society converge … [in an attempt] to traverse the distance
between an analysis of the consciousness of the individual and the analysis of
social institutions (McCulloch, 1983, 206–207).
That Fanon moves between the sociopolitical and the psychological, each as Psychopolitics:
a means of critiquing the other, means that his work has a lot to offer critical awareness of
contemporary critical psychology, especially from within a South African the role that
context. This chapter focuses on what we might call the ‘ppsychopolitics’ of political factors (ie
relations of power)
Frantz Fanon as a way of exploring opportunities for critical psychology. The play within the
notion of ‘psychopolitics’ (as it has been applied by Lebeau (1998), amongst domain of the
others) may be taken as referring to the explicit politicisation of the psycho- psychological. An
logical. Such a politicisation can take at least three related forms. It may refer understanding of
both how politics
to the critical process by which we place a series of ostensibly psychological
impacts upon the
concerns and concepts within the register of the political and thereby show psychological and
up the extent to which human psychology is intimately linked to, and in how personal
some ways conditioned or limited by, the sociopolitical and historical forces psychology may be
of its situation. Similarly, such a politicisation may refer to the critical the level at which
politics is
process by which we employ psychological concepts, explanations and even internalised and
modes of experience to describe and illustrate the workings of power. The individually
hope in this respect is that by being able to analyse the political in such a entrenched.
psychological way, we may be able to think strategically about how we should
intervene in ‘the life of power’. Extending this idea (thirdly), it might be
argued that we can put certain forms of psychology to actual political work,
that we can use both the concepts and the understandings of psychology, and
the actual terms of psychological experience, as a means of consolidating
Register:
resistances to power.
particular
Fanon’s ‘critical psychology’, I shall argue, manages all of these objectives. vocabulary, or
By examining some of the debilitating personality and identity effects of trying conceptual frame-
to understand oneself, as a black man or woman within the system of values of work, stemming
white or European culture, Fanon shows how what might otherwise be under- from a particular
school of thought
stood within a purely psychological framework is far better explained in and/or criticism.
political terms, that is, with reference to understandings of violence, power
and subordination. In doing this, Fanon is also, albeit strategically, using
85
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 86
Critical Psychology
psychological concepts to political ends, that is, to draw attention to the true
extent and damage of colonial/political oppression.
Not only does Fanon bring politics into psychology; he also brings
psychology into politics by analysing power through a series of psychoanalytic
conceptualisations which help to dramatise the working and the logic of such
forms of power, in particular that of colonial racism. The objective of such
psychological descriptions is to subject such forms of power to critique, to
understand them better so as to challenge them more effectively. Here I am
referring to Fanon’s analysis of the ‘psychic life of the colonial encounter’.
Fanon’s work also urges us further to consider how we might explore psycho-
logical concepts, like the terms of everyday experience, to be used as
instruments of a progressive politics. Here, I shall argue, the objective is to
understand how a kind of psychology might inform a politics of resistance. In
this respect, as a way of both extending Fanon and integrating these debates
into the sociopolitical history of racism in South Africa, I shall make reference
to the writing of Steve Biko. This chapter will hence focus both on the politics of
psychology in the colonial context (by focusing on the work of Fanon) and on
the psychology and the politics of resistance (by focusing on Biko’s approach to
Black Consciousness). In the chapter that follows I consider Fanon’s approach
to the ‘psychic life’ of colonial power. Before I move on to these discussions,
however, it is useful to contextualise this chapter properly, first by providing
some information on the work and history of Frantz Fanon and then by consid-
ering the theoretical approach to criticism known as post-colonialism.
Why Fanon?
Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist and revolutionary, born in the French colony
of Martinique, who dedicated much of his life to the liberation of Algeria from
France (see Julien, 1995; Macey, 2000a). Among other achievements, he was
responsible for the influential books Black skin, white masks (1986, originally
published 1952) and The wretched of the earth (1990, originally published
1961). These texts exerted a foundational influence on what would later
become the field of post-colonial theory and criticism. (Although Fanon is typi-
cally considered an anti-colonial theorist, his writings have come to bear such
a formidable influence on the later generation of post-colonial thinkers that it
is legitimate to group his ideas within this rubric, that is, that of the post-
colonial.) Fanon is useful to us here not only because of the fact that he has
been massively influential in constituting the field of post-colonial critique but

also because of all the writers working within this field, Fanon has taken
perhaps the most explicitly psychological analyses of race and racialised
power. Black skin, white masks is Fanon’s crucial text in this regard, and hence
I shall treat it as the central point of reference in what is to follow. In addition
I shall make ample reference to Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (1979, 1980a, 1980b,
86
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 87

1985), a prominent scholar of Fanon, who has provided one of the most
valuable commentaries on Fanon from within psychology.
How can we understand ‘the post-colonial’?

Having briefly introduced Fanon, it is important to contextualise what is
meant by the post-colonial. This is a difficult task, for there is a series of hard-
fought debates as to the nature and value of ‘the post-colonial’. Indeed, as
Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin (1995) and Macey (2000a) have reiterated, this
term has come to mean many different things to many different people, so
much so in fact that the term is in danger of losing its effective meaning alto-
gether. Perhaps the most obvious use of the term is as a basic historical label to
indicate a period of history immediately following the age of European colonial
expansion. This is the period, largely coinciding with the end of the Second
World War, in which colonial powers increasingly began to grant independ-
ence to former colonies. Importantly, the granting of independence did not
simply bring to an end colonial politics or the forms of violence and conflict
that had characterised them. As Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin (1995) warn: ‘All
post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle
forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved this
problem’ (2). So although the terms of Fanon’s analysis are principally those of
the colonial situation, they still usefully inform post-colonial periods, which
are never fully separable from their colonial past.
All post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle
forms of neo-colonial domination.
87
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 88
Critical Psychology
More than just a historical period, the term ‘post-colonial’ denotes a partic-
ular critical orientation to understanding the relationship between colonisers
and colonised, and the psychological, material and cultural effects of these
relationships. Van Zyl (1998) provides one of the most useful shorthand defi-
nitions of the post-colonial from within a South African perspective. She
(1998) views post-colonialism as a critical perspective that aims to understand
the relationships of domination and/or resistance that manifest when one
culture (typically Western) ‘owns’ or controls another (typically Eastern or
African) culture, even after the era of formalised Colonialism has ended. Here
it is useful to add a further caveat, that is, a distinction between colonialism
and imperialism. Said (1978) distinguishes between the two by suggesting that
colonialism is the physical, material and typically violent practice of dispos-
sessing people of their native territory. Imperialism, by contrast, is the broader
theoretical and ideological basis that attempts to justify such actions (Said,
1978; 1993). A useful formulation, again drawing on Said (1979), is that impe-
rialism is the theory, colonialism the practice of forcibly appropriating and
controlling non-Western territories (of both physical and psychological kinds)
into subordinate versions of European or American society. This, incidentally,
is a helpful way of understanding how the legacy of colonialism continues into
the post-colonial era, because quite clearly, imperialism as an ideological form
of cultural and economic dominance continues far beyond the cessation of
formal colonial rule. Because this chapter focuses on Fanon’s discussion of
colonisation, we shall follow his terminology as that of colonial dominance,
although the pertinence of his terms of analysis to more properly imperialist
contexts is obvious.
It is also important that we realise here the importance of this approach to
South Africa. For, as Bertoldi (1998) points out, apartheid may be considered
a particular extension or variation of the basic politics and conditions of colo-
nialism. Similarly, Wolpe (1975) considered South Africa a ‘colonial society of
a special type’, and saw apartheid as a form of ‘internal colonialism’. In a
similar way, we might consider the current post-apartheid period as a particu-
larly South African variant of the broader post-colonial era; South Africa as
such is a very particular ‘post-colony’.
THE POLITICS OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE COLONIAL CONTEXT

Historical specificity
Fanon opens his analysis of racial identity in Black skin, white masks with two
vital qualifications. This first concerns the sociopolitical specificity of the
domain of his analysis. The second – extending the first – concerns the dangers
of making broad or universalising psychological generalisations. In definitive
terms he states ‘[m]y observations and my conclusions are valid only for the
88
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 89

Antilles’ (1968, 14). Clearly, Fanon is acutely aware of the time and place of the
objects of his analysis – here the colonial era of French-controlled Martinique
circa the Second World War. What is important here is Fanon’s insistence on
strong, historically grounded terms of analysis in psychological theorising – a
critical dimension often absent in universalising kinds of psychological theory.
Also of note here is Fanon’s awareness of the variability of human subjectivity.
Indeed, for Fanon one cannot take up psychological questions, such as ques-
tions of identity, outside the consideration of their specific social, historical,
political and economic contexts. These contexts are so much part of an indi-
vidual’s ‘psychology’ that, as Marxist approaches warn (see Grahame Hayes’
chapter: Marxism and critical psychology), the individual does not exist apart
from such contexts. Traditional psychology frequently isolates individuals from
these contexts – examining them as if their own internal psychology was all that
mattered. It is precisely this kind of approach that Fanon’s work sets out to
avoid. And it is in view of Fanon’s attempt to involve political factors fully – that
is, the role of relations of power – within the field of the psychological that his
psychology might be thought of as a ‘psychopolitics’ (Lebeau, 1998).
BOX 1 Fanon in South Africa
Given the two warnings to psychology above, of One should note here, however, that both
the importance of specific sociopolitical and Fanon (1986, 1990) and Bulhan (1979, 1980a,
historical forms of analysis, and of culturally 1985) make repeated reference to apartheid
appropriate, non-universalising forms of explana- South Africa in their writings. Furthermore, as
tion and theory, we should be cautious of is discussed below, critical Fanonian concepts
applying too quickly the terms of Fanon’s feature strongly in the work of Steve Biko and
analysis to the South African situation. Fanon’s the Black Consciousness Movement. Not only did
concepts do provide us with a valuable starting- Fanonian concepts make their influence felt in
point, a basic conceptual vocabulary that we South Africa, it was, as Gibson (2000) notes,
might choose to draw on where appropriate. the post-Soweto (1976) arrival of South African
Nevertheless, we should undertake our own exiles in London (in particular here, members of
forms of analysis and critique of racial identi- the Black Consciousness Movement) that began
ties in the particularity of the post-apartheid to revitalise and popularise elsewhere Fanon’s
South African context. ideas as forms of practical politics.
The politics of racial identity

Although Fanon emphasises that his analysis in Black skin, white masks is
necessarily psychological in nature, psychoanalytic even, he also reiterates that

the ‘effective disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition
of social and economic realities’ (1968, 12–13). Fanon’s point is that, if we are
to understand the disruptive or psychopathological nature of racial identity,
we will need to understand it as the outcome of a double process. Racial
identity, for Fanon, is primarily sociopolitical, and only subsequently – once
89
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 90
Critical Psychology
such effects have been internalised – psychological (Fanon, 1986). Sociopolit-

ical factors hence set limits of sorts to the kinds of identity we have available to
us. Not only is Fanon’s a very social conceptualisation of identity, it is also a
very political and materialist conceptualisation, one that he will develop signif-
icantly in his later writing such as The wretched of the earth. Importantly,
although Fanon continually emphasises the importance of external social,
historical and political factors in the formation of racial identity, he does not
‘reduce away’ a focus on psychological questions.
The point of Fanon’s ‘psychopolitics’ is exactly to take into account both
factors (that is, the psychological and the political) and their reciprocal and
combined effects. Crucially, one should understand, first, how politics impacts
upon the psychological. More than this, though, one should similarly attempt to
understand how personal psychology may repeat, internalise and further
entrench such political effects at the level of personal identity. Fanon’s project in
Black skin, white masks, then, might be seen as tracing the interchange between
personal psychology, on the one hand, and social-political forces of influence, on
the other. The unique challenge of this task lies in not separating these two
‘poles’ – these two points of analysis – too far. The objective, rather, is to blur
these boundaries in some ways, to discern the effects of the political within the
psychological, to understand how the psychological (be it in terms of conceptual
tools or lived experience) might count also as a means of the political.
Political change in South Africa

brought the politics of racial
identity and racism into sharp
perspective.
90
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 91

Eurocentricity and universalising theory

For Fanon psychology in general tends to neglect precisely the economic,
social, and historical levels of analysis in its attempts to understand the indi-
vidual, psychopathology and psychological development. A related problem in
much orthodox psychology is the making of broad generalisations, the fact
that it too glibly assumes the universality of US-American and Eurocentric
concepts and principles. In fact, the assumed universality of certain concepts
and principles is one way in which Eurocentric and therefore dominating,
colonising modes of thought come to be reinscribed in post-colonial contexts.
As a number of post-colonial critics have pointed out, colonial and post-
colonial relations of power are reiterated exactly through the tendency to
‘universalize particularisms’ (Hitchcott, 1993; Moore-Gilbert, 1997). Hold-
stock makes this point in straightforward terms: ‘It is important to keep in
mind that the theories and the principles assumed to be universal in
psychology derive from research on white Americans, mostly males, who
constitute a small percentage of the world’s population’ (2000, 208). Hence the
history, traditions and cultural values of subordinated groups are dismissed –
if not altogether obliterated – as such groups are assimilated into the cultural
norms and ideals of the dominating culture (Ahmad, 1992; Fuss, 1994; Hitch-
cott, 1993; Moore-Gilbert, 1997).
As Bulhan (1980a) rightly points out, these universalising trends postu-
lated a particular type of human psychological reality, namely that of the
bourgeois, white, European male, as the ideal condition of people everywhere.
Models such as these then come to act as the yardstick for all people at all
times; a standard against which all other subjects came to be judged. Hence
‘Conformity or deviation from this class- and culturally-specific reality …
became the absolute criterion for health and pathology …’ (Bulhan, 1980a,
260–261). Expressing this concern in a slightly different way, Edward Said
(1978) speaks of how colonisation makes native peoples foreigners, or cultural
minorities, in their own country, by marginalising the experiences or norms of
their culture to the imposed standards and values of the invading culture.
Experience as a political term

The task Fanon sets himself in Black skin, white masks is that of describing, as
vividly as possible, the lived experience of the black subject. In attempting to
achieve this, Fanon draws on a rich tapestry of different sources, including

Négritude:
psychoanalysis, literary (and poetic) texts, medical terminology, existential literary movement
philosophy and Négritude. Importantly, in attempting to describe lived expe- celebrating black
rience, Fanon is not looking at experience in the banal sense of the term. He is culture and
considering a domain of experience that is deeply enmeshed in the world of essentially black
forms of expression.
which it is part, in Macey’s (2000a) terms, a profound sense of ‘living through’
91
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 92
Critical Psychology
the social conditions which define a particular time and place. One way of
understanding how Fanon means ‘lived experience’ here is through the idea of
Political a political consciousness, that is, an acute awareness both of how one is
consciousness: crucially a part of the world and its conditions and of how one can and should
acute awareness
attempt to change that world on the basis of a carefully considered political
both of how one is
crucially a part of project. Put differently, one might understand a political consciousness as an
the world and its awareness of the political dimension (that is, the power-relations) under-
conditions and of scoring virtually all facets of day-to-day life. This term – political conscious-
how one can and
ness – helps us to understand how for Fanon the field of psychological
should attempt to
change that world phenomena always deserves a political level of analysis – quite simply because
on the basis of a all aspects of day-to-day life are conditioned, by power-relationships such as
carefully considered that of racism.
political project.
Put differently, an
awareness of the Racist objectification
political dimension One of the reasons that Fanon so prioritises race in his analysis is that it comes
(ie the relations of
to act as the overriding, the essential and determining quality of identity
power) underscoring
virtually all facets within colonial contexts. European existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, a prodigious
of day-to-day life. influence on Fanon’s writings, famously announced that ‘existence precedes
essence’, meaning to suggest, amongst other things, that one should not tie
one’s identity, or that of others, to predetermined qualities, prejudices or
stereotypes. The experience of living as a minority – racial or otherwise –
within a dominant or racist culture, is to live the reverse of this adage – to live
the experience of one’s ‘essence preceding one’s existence’. In this connection
Fanon (1986) relates an incident where a white child sees him on a train:
‘Look, a Negro!’ It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by …
‘Look, a Negro!’ It was true. It amused me.
‘Look, a Negro!’ The circle was drawing a bit tighter …
‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’ Frightened! Frightened! Now they were
beginning to be afraid of me (111–112).
Fanon describes this situation in very evocative language, as a kind of ‘ampu-
tation, an excision, a haemorrhage that splatter[s] my body with black blood’
(1986, 112). It is an experience in which, as Wyrick (1998) depicts it, an entire
history of racial stereotypes and colonial oppression reasserts itself, one in
which the black subject feels himself ‘sealed into a crushing objecthood’
beneath the white gaze (Fanon, 1986, 110). Here Fanon feels himself radically
objectified, imprisoned by his race. His subjectivity, along with his ability to
represent or define himself, is dissipated, evaporated, destroyed. Who he is
becomes nothing more than a function of his race. He is held responsible for
his body, his skin colour, his racial history. Hence ‘it is not I who make a
meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing,
waiting for me’ (1986, 134). The black subject, as such, becomes ‘the eternal
92
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 93

victim of an essence, of an appearance for which [she or he] is not responsible’

(Fanon, 1986, 35).
What is particularly important for Fanon here is the inescapability of one’s
blackness. He refers here to Sartre’s thoughts on anti-Semitisim, which suggest
that because Jews have come to internalise the stereotypes others have of them
– even if only to try to contest them – they have become ‘over-determined’ from
within. Put differently, they have come to objectify themselves in much the
same way that, as suggested above, the black subject has to, that is, they have
come to understand themselves in the terms provided by the racist and hostile
culture in which they live. There is a crucial difference here, though: whereas
the Jew can ‘be unknown in his Jewishness … [and can] go unnoticed’, because,
after all, he is white, the black subject cannot but be seen and identified, hence
defined by his race. What Fanon is emphasising here is that blackness comes
to function as a fixed essence both in speech and appearance, one comes to
‘speak’ one’s race, to ‘appear’ it. And, of course, in the case of the latter one
cannot mask one’s race, conceal it … Hence one is ‘overdetermined from
without’ (1986, 16). The evidence of the blackness of one’s identity is there,
unalterable, to ‘torment … pursue … disturb … anger’ the black subject (117).
Racial alienation
Keeping the above example in mind, it is important now that we turn to the
notion of racial alienation. The psychological violence experienced by Fanon in
the above encounter is such that he is barely able to describe it, explain it,
break it down or make it plain. It is partly for this reason that, again demon-
strating his indebtedness to Marxism, Fanon takes to the notion of alienation
as his principal means of understanding racial identity. This notion of alien-
ation helps him to describe what we might understand to be the ‘multiple
psychological violences’ of the racist encounter.
Alienation, however, is a broad and dynamic concept, one with a formi-
dable conceptual history (Zahar, 1969). The particular importance for us of
this concept (and particularly Fanon’s use of it) is that it provides a means of
relating experience to social conditions, of linking personal-subjective and
sociohistorical domains, and of doing so in a way that produces critique
(Bulhan, 1985; Zahar, 1969). Fanon uses the concept in just this way, as
thinking the connections – or articulations – between an individual’s internal
world, and the external world of the constraining social, economic or political
structures that surround and contain them.

Guarding against psychological reductionism
This is a level of relationship that has typically been ignored, or sidelined, by
much traditional US-American and Eurocentric psychology’s focus on the
isolated, singular individual. As Holmes & Lindley (1989) have argued – in
93
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 94
Critical Psychology
tones reminiscent of the anti-psychiatry movement (cf Cooper, 1967, Goffman,

1968; 1973; Laing, 1959; Laing & Esterson, 1964; Scheff, 1966; Szasz, 1973,
1984) – the sum total of much applied psychology has been to depoliticise the
terms of human experience, to reframe problems stemming from sociopolit-
ical contexts as stemming from within, and falling to the responsibility of, the
isolated individual. Similarly, Salmon (1991) suggests that much psychology
affirms the primacy of inner events at the cost of paying attention to how deter-
mining political or cultural realities actually shape personal experience.
Pilgrim (1991, 1994) calls this evasion of the sociopolitical background and the
reduction of social structures to inner feelings and psychological states
‘psychological reductionism’. Fanon’s approach to psychology is formulated
with exactly these problems in mind. Rather than seeking to discover human
psychology through instinctual, genetic or intrapsychic reductionism, claims
Bulhan (1979, 1980a, 1985), Fanon’s project in psychology was to outline how
inseparably enmeshed the individual was in their sociohistorical and cultural
context. Continuing, Bulhan notes that
[Fanon] was convinced that psychological theories that ignore the central role of
the social order tend to blame the victim and also negate the human capacity to
transform the social order and human psychology (1985, 195).
Alienation and estrangement

A second basic aspect of the notion of alienation is the idea of estrangement.
This idea features centrally in what is perhaps the best known account of alien-
ation, that of Karl Marx. For Marx, alienation is the result, particularly
characteristic of modern capitalism, of the separation of the worker from the
products of his or her labour. In his conceptualisation: what the worker
produces they do not own, or ultimately have control over. Their labour hence
takes on a life of its own, which is alien and even threatening. The products
produced by the worker are lost to them, appropriated by the employer, which
leads to a state of estrangement and alienation on the part of the worker. This
alienation of labour leads, as Macey (2000b) summarises, to a loss of reality, to
the situation where human beings are estranged from their own bodies, from
the natural world and from their potentially universal essences.
Importantly, in the original Marxist conception alienation is not an ‘expe-
rience’; it is rather a real material process of separation. It is important that we
make this point, because otherwise we risk psychologising away an

economic/material form of crisis. This, of course, is not Fanon’s aim. His objec-
tive is not to supersede an economic/material analysis with a psychological
analysis, but rather to emphasise also, in addition, the psychological dimen-
sion to such events, to call attention to the full ramifications of the lived
experience and identity of the individual.
94
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 95

Social rupture
The concept of alienation emphasises a sense of rupture – estrangement – in
the relationship between the individual and those things, objects and people
around him or her. This estrangement is not only that of the individual from
the world, but also, in a very powerful way, that of the individual person’s
ability properly to understand him- or herself and their social predicament.
Here it is important to pay attention to how Fanon adapts the concept of alien-
ation to his purposes. For Marx, the root causes of alienation reside in the
substructure of society, and particularly in the alienation of productive labour
engendered by a capitalist mode of production. Therefore, when the worker’s
labour is alienated, so too is his or her ‘humanness’. In different terms, because
of alienated labour, the ‘being’ of the worker remains alien to him and all
others.
For Fanon, race, and the various social practices and meanings attached to
it, proves to be the pivot of alienation rather than productive labour. As Bulhan
(1985) rightly notes, Fanon’s application favours psychological and cultural
dimensions rather than economic and class dimensions. Clearly, as a psychia-
trist, Fanon was interested in an exposition of alienation from a psychological
perspective (Bulhan, 1985). One can then be estranged, from one’s ‘human-
ness’, from one’s own body and sense of self, from a sense even of belonging to
one’s people, all on the basis of race. In many ways, this is perhaps the most
consistent theme throughout Black skin, white masks, that of dehumanisation,
that of the inability, because of various forms of racism and cultural disposses-
sion, to settle on any kind of authentic identity.
Fanon is here making recourse to psychological terms of analysis to
describe, and to critique, the dehumanising features not only of racism but of
sociocultural and political marginalisation more generally. Indeed, it is
through the basic concept of alienation – understood as the processes by which
individuals are distanced from the values, products, meanings and self-under-
standings they produce, the means through which they effectively become
strangers to themselves – that Fanon begins to rethink the notion of
psychopathology.
‘Colonising the mind’

To be a colonised subject, or the subject of cultural oppression or racism, in
Fanon’s (1968) account, is to be continually fed with cultural values and under-
standings which are not one’s own, which are primarily hostile, and which
consistently de-evaluate both me and my culture. It means to exist in a state of
little or no cultural resources of my own, because they have been eradicated by
the cultural imperialism of the coloniser. As Wyrick (1998) emphasises, racism
(as one example) erases the black past, devalues black thinking, denies black
95
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 96
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 Dimensions of alienation
It is important that we retain an awareness of The second aspect Mark referred to as ‘self-
the tremendous conceptual and historical reso- estrangement’, which emphasises the
nance of the notion of alienation, that we do worker’s relation to the act of production
not apply it too glibly. Whilst it is perhaps the itself. The process by which he produces
theoretical term most useful to the analysis of permits him no satisfaction. His ‘life
oppression, it has become, in Bulhan’s (1985) activity’, which should be spontaneous, free,
terms, an omnibus diagnosis for economic, and creative, is coerced, controlled, and
social, psychological and existential malaise. For regulated. He engages in work not for its
own sake, as an expression of his essential
these reasons it is vital to provide a brief sketch
being or of his natural activity, but for a
of this conceptual terrain in relation to Fanon’s
wage to permit him only animal existence –
own application of the term which Bulhan
eating, drinking, sleeping, etc. In conse-
(1985) manages admirably:
quence, the worker is alienated from his own
Fanon … used alienation as a descriptive, activity, which is also alienation from his
diagnostic, and prescriptive guide. His body, cognition and affect. He is alienated
application had a Marxian influence, even from himself (186–187).
though he chose to emphasise some aspects We see here how Marx’s concept is building in
(ie psychological and cultural) more than complexity, from the world of objects, to the
others (ie economic and class). … There are
world of actions, the worker comes to experience
four major aspects to alienation in the
himself as almost ‘outside of life’.
Marxian formulation: a) man’s [sic] alien-
ation from nature, b) man’s alienation from The third aspect refers to the negation of
himself, c) man’s alienation from his species- human essence inasmuch as the worker is
being, and d) man’s alienation from man denied actualisation of his inherent human
(186). potentials through activity. That is, man
expresses, objectifies, and duplicates his
Bulhan (1985) moves on to describe each of ‘species-being’, his human essence, through
these four dimensions of the notion of alienation: his labour, affirming not only his personality,
The first aspect Marx referred to as ‘estrange- but also the humanity he shares with others.
ment from the thing’, which means the Without his life-activity, everything about
alienation of the worker from the product of him remains implicit, unrealized, and unrec-
his labour – that is, the alienation of that ognized. When his labour is alienated, so too
which mediates his relation to the ‘sensual is his ‘humanness’. Through activity, he
external world’ and hence to the objects of leaves his mark in the world, transforming
nature. What the worker produces is not his objects around him, which in turn transform
own, but rather someone else’s; it meets not him. Because of alienated labour, his being
his but alien needs; it is a commodity he remains alien to him and to all others (187).
sells to eke out a bare existence. The more he Whereas the third aspect emphasises alienation
produces, the more his product and hence from mankind in general, the fourth aspect
the objects of nature stand opposed to him concerns alienation from specific others, by
(186). virtue of class contradictions:
If this first dimension of alienation refers to the [T]he fourth aspect refers to estrangement
processes of exploitation where the external of man from other men … It should be
world and its objects come to stand in opposi- stressed that at the conceptual kernel of the
tion to the worker, the second dimension of the Marxian formulation is a … reciprocity
concept refers to the worker’s relation to his between man, productive activity, and
own work: nature. A threefold interaction permeates
96
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 97

BOX 2 Dimensions of alienation (continued)
these constituent parts. Man is part of intends when he puts it to use. To reiterate, all
nature, but he also humanises nature. With four dimensions of alienation reduce to charac-
his activity, he creates and is created. Capi- teristics of ‘alienated labour’. This, for Marx, is
talism divides society into private property because the root causes of alienation reside
and owner, on the one hand, and wage in the substructure of society, and most
labour and worker, on the other. It is to this centrally the alienation of productive labour as
antagonistic opposition of man against engendered by a capitalist mode of production.
man, with the violence and degradation it One should bear in mind, though, that the
entails, that the fourth aspect of alienation
effects of this alienation are profound and
refers (187).
multiple (as described above) and reverberate
Importantly, then, we can now see the density throughout all domains of social and psycho-
of this conceptual term, and all that Marx logical life.
individuality. What we now get a sense of is the debilitating psychological or

identity effects of such processes. To know myself in the oppressor’s terms is to
be continually at the risk of using racist formulations as a way of under-
standing self – of unintentionally objectifying oneself in terms of these racist
values.
Again here we confront the problem of the universalising trends of colonial
or imperial forms of domination – the widespread imposition of supposedly
global standards of value – that are really those of a select white US-American
and European group. In other words, the black subject is, right from the start,
‘predetermined’ to fall short of these norms, by virtue of how culturally specific
they are. ‘Black people, then, abandon themselves individually and collectively
in quest of white acceptance. The quest is inherently and ultimately futile; it
results primarily in solidifying deep and disturbing feelings of inferiority’
(Wyrick, 1998, 29). The theme of internalised kinds of inferiority, socially
induced inferiority complexes, is one which Fanon repeatedly returns to, and it
is one of the most important ways in which he thinks about the real damage,
on the level of identity, the mass victimisation and enforced by dominant racist
cultures on those they colonise.
Cultural dissonance
What Fanon is here attempting to impart to the critical consciousness of his
readers is a sharp awareness of the continual sense of dissonance within the

colonised subject, which occurs between ego and culture, self and society. This
is a lesson very much at the basis of post-colonial critique, a continual aware-
ness of the dislocation between the ideals, the norms of the valorised Western
culture, and those of the dominated culture, which comes to be the demoted
Other of all of these values. This constant and recurring slippage is pathogenic
97
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 98
Critical Psychology
for Fanon in the sense that it causes a deeply rooted sense of inferiority, a
constantly problematised sense of identity which is split and at war with itself,
causing ‘pathologies of liberty’, as Fanon (1990) calls them.
It is thus by tracing the micro-level psychological impacts of various kinds of
structural oppression in this way that Fanon understands colonialism not only
as a means of appropriating land and territory but of appropriating culture and
history themselves and, more pertinently perhaps, as a way of appropriating the
means and resources of identity, and hence effecting powerful forms psycholog-
ical damage. The colonisation of a land, its people, its culture, is also, in short, a
‘colonizing of the mind’, in Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s (1986) famous phrase. In similar
terms, Bulhan (1980, 1985) argues that racial alienation is the counterpart of
Lactification: economic enslavement. Whereas the slave trade had uprooted bodies and trans-
idea of the
ported them to alien lands, such forms of ‘deracination’ dislocate psyches, and
possibility of
moderating one’s impose an alien worldview on them. In his own words: ‘the uprooting of psyches
race, of lessening from their culture to their insertion into another, in which the basic values [are]
the degree of one’s prowhite and antiblack, elicit[s] a victimisation difficult to quantify, but very
blackness, and
massive’ (Bulhan, 1985, 189). It is this broad psychological level of affect that
‘becoming more
white’. This is a Aimé Césaire (1972) has in mind when he describes the impact of colonialism in
desire which Fanon the following terms: ‘I am talking of millions of men who have been skillfully
sees as damaging infected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, debase-
and pathological. ment’ (cited in Fanon, 1986, 14).
BOX 3 ‘Degrees’ of race, the whitening of the black subject
What Fanon’s idea of lactification suggests, apparent lessening of one’s blackness. As true
perhaps contrary to our expectations, is that as these observations might seem, one should
race need not work simply as an ‘all or nothing’ point out that where racial categories have
category. In certain instances, it would seem been essentialised (as to be discussed below)
that we are working with a hierarchy of racial then race becomes an inescapable category. So
identities, with degrees of whiteness and even if one is able to lessen one’s blackness
blackness. The black subject hence, for Fanon considerably, one will never be totally white,
(1986) becomes proportionately white, and totally accepted by the colonising culture. Of
closer to being a real human being, in direct course, it is also important to mention here
ratio to his mastery of a white language, his that a dynamics of race is overlaid not only by
acquisition of white culture and the attaining a dynamics of class, but also by a dynamics of
of a certain level of wealth. Put differently, ethnicity, that Fanon notes that in the Antilles
one might say that the dynamics of race inter- it was understood that Senegalese were
sect with dynamics of class, so that it is considered to be more black, so to speak, that
understood that ‘one is white above a certain is, less civilised than the native inhabitants of
class’ (Fanon, 1986, 44). European accents, Martinique. In this sense one is able to see
figures of speech, fashions, modes of dress – how a racist culture begins to set up levels of
all of these come to act as ‘signals of class’ separation, differential degrees of blackness in
which contribute, in the colonised subject, to this case, hierarchies of prejudice within a
a feeling of equality with the European, to an given population.
98
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 99

Systematic depersonalisation
Perhaps the closest that Fanon comes actually to naming or qualifying the
intrapsychic violence suffered by the black subject in the colonial situation is
the idea of a socially induced inferiority complex. If one is overwhelmed by the
wish to be white, Fanon (1986) argues, it is because one lives in a society that
makes a racial inferiority complex possible, ‘in a society that derives its
stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a society that proclaims the
superiority of one race; to the identical degree to which that society creates
difficulties for him … [it is to that degree that] he will find himself thrust into a
neurotic situation’ (1986, 100).
Fanon (1986) illustrates this situation with reference to the role of cultural
representation in the formation of the black child’s subjectivity. Throughout
his or her upbringing the black child has been exposed to, and so identified
with, a white culture that has been put together ‘by white men for little white
men’, as Lebeau (1998) paraphrases Fanon. This culture has diverse forms and
is evident in systems of education, as well as in literature, and in the films, the
Reify/reification:
comics and cartoons of children’s entertainment. Inasmuch as the black child when concepts or
or adult does not think of or experience themselves as black – in so far as they ideas are spoken
have identified with white culture, and have come to think and act subjectively about as if they are
as white – they then come to experience themselves as a ‘phobic object’ (a term really existing
concrete objects.
I shall go on to explain shortly). As Lebeau (1998) emphasises about Fanon’s Psychological
text: the result of this is the effect of hatred coming both from inside and constructs such as
outside – a racism stemming both from within and without. ‘mind’ and
This is what we might understand as the double damage of the colonial ‘personality’ are
good examples of
environment on black identity. Not only is it the case that the black child takes this.
on the prejudices of the white/European world, coming to understand ‘the
figure of the Negro as the symbolic repository for all the malevolence of the
world’ (McCulloch, 1983, 70). It is also the case that the black child, and then
the adult, uses these racist values to understand and make sense of themselves,
that these deeply ingrained notions, attitudes and stereotypes become part of
the black man or woman’s own subjectivity to the extent that, as McCulloch
puts it, they actively participate in ‘forging the instruments of their own
oppression’ (1983, 70). Steve Biko draws attention to the fact that the inter-
nalisation of racist, self-deprecating identities is a key political tactic of
oppression in his famous comment that ‘[t]he most powerful weapon in the
hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ (Biko, cited in Arnold,
1979, xx).
Pathologies of liberty
For Fanon, we can never gain an adequate sense of the damage of colonialisa-
tion without a consideration of its psychological effects. In the same way, we
99
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 100
Critical Psychology
BOX 4 Inferiority complexes and ego-defences
Although Fanon does not go into great detail in insidious and explicit racism. ‘For him,’ says
describing the psychological ‘mechanics’ of Fanon, ‘there is only one way out [of the hostile
socially induced inferiority complexes, he does and damaging culture of a racist environment]
make reference to Anna Freud’s ideas of ego- … and it leads into the white world’ (1986, 51).
defences. Following Anna Freud, he suggests the This is something of a dead-end, however, for
young ego is flexible and resilient in defending enthusiastic identification with the white world
itself from a hostile environment. This ego may only leads to further alienation.
draw on multiple different defence mechanisms, Again referring to Anna Freud, Fanon (1986)
and withdraw from the threat of pain in a variety notes that ‘the ego is driven to desperation by
of ways for which it is later able to compensate. the amputation of all its defense mechanisms’
When the ego has become more rigid, it often (59), identity becomes increasingly infirm,
comes to fix somewhat obsessively on certain weakened, and the pathological process is
modes of protection, of withdrawal from the hence advanced. The result of this situation is
threats of the world. This situation can lead to referred to by Fanon somewhat figuratively as
impaired development. Fanon uses this under- affective erethism, a massive form of hyper-
standing to emphasise how few identity sensitivity which McCulloch (1983) describes as
resources the black subject has in colonial ‘a pathological condition arising from the
contexts with which to affirm themselves in colonial experience’ which includes ‘a crippling
positive ways, and with which to defend them- sense of inferiority, a perpetual nearness to
selves against the constant onslaught of rage’ (67).
Affective erethism: can never properly understand psychopathology, at least within the colonial
pathological context, outside the consideration of the imbalances of political power that
condition of condition and give rise to it. A wide range of psychopathological symptoms in
hypersensitivity oppressed or colonised groups needs, claims Fanon (1986), to be seen as the
which arises in
oppressive or
outcome of a double process, primarily sociopolitical, and only subsequently,
colonial environ- as an internalised form of damage.
ments and which Although Fanon will not completely rule out the consideration of organic
involves both a or intrapsychic bases in the possible etiology of psychopathology, he insists –
sense of inferiority,
and a constant
and this is part of the radicalism of his approach – on the importance of
nearness to anger cultural dispossession and racial alienation in virtually all explanations of
and/or rage. psychopathology. Fanon will assert, for example, that in colonial contexts
[t]he neurotic structure of the individual is simply the elaboration, the forma-
tion, the eruption within the ego, of conflictual clusters arising in part out of the
environment and in part out of the purely personal way in which the individual
reacts to these influences (1986, 81).
Fanon was often explicitly anti-psychological in the assessment of what may

have seemed to be problems of psychopathology. As Adams (1970) put it, the
majority of human problems were, for Fanon, reality problems, not fantasies:
‘The poor are plagued by poverty …. Jews by persecution, blacks by exploita-
tion … Fanon rallied against a “psychologism” that dealt with all of these
100
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 101

estranging afflictions as if they were … mere states of mind’ (811). Bulhan

(1980a) takes up the same point in a slightly different way, emphasising that
the source of the shared anguish of the politically oppressed is not bad genes
or poor heredity, but rather a specific and inequitable social structure.
Likewise, Macey (2000a) affirms that
[t]he diagnosis and treatment of mental illness in the colonial situation must
Internalisation:
begin, not with metapsychology, but with a situation and the lived experience it process by which
induces. Whereas psychoanalysis [for instance] speaks of fantasy, Fanon consis- external, socio-
tently speaks of trauma and explains mental illness as a form of social alienation historical reality is
(194). assimilated into
‘internal’ and
Fanon develops the notion of internalisation to dramatise the strength of this subjective reality.
two-way relationship between psyche and society. Internalisation refers to the Internal psycho-
process by which external, sociohistorical reality is assimilated into ‘internal’ logical processes
hence cannot be
and subjective reality. Internal psychological processes therefore cannot be divorced from their
divorced from their social context; even the contents of the unconscious mind, social context; even
of dreams, fantasies and so on, are supplied by the social, historical and polit- the contents of the
ical location of individuals. unconscious mind,
of dreams, fantasies
and so on, are
A sociogenetic psychology supplied by the
Given the intimate connection between individual and social structure, we can social, historical
and political
hence understand Bulhan’s (1985) description of Fanon’s perspective on
location of
psychopathology as necessarily sociogenetic and Fanon’s conviction of individuals.
‘madness as organically linked to a situation of oppression’ (Bulhan, 1985,
188). His thoughts in this regard are also foregrounded in Towards the African
revolution (1968), where he advances the proposition that if psychological and
psychiatric practices are those
technique[s] which aim to enable human beings to no longer be strangers to
Sociogenetic: being
their environment … [then] I owe it to myself to affirm that [the colonized social in origin,
subject] … permanently alienated in his [sic] native land, lives in a state of arising from, having
absolute depersonalisation … [of] systematized de-humanization … The function its origins in
of a social structure is to set up institutions to serve man’s [sic] needs. A society society.
that drives its members to desperate solutions is a non-viable society, a society
that needs to be replaced (53–54).
Both Fanon and Bulhan, though, are crucially aware of how insidiously forms
of psychological treatment can, in effect, implicitly ask their patients to adjust
themselves to the particular parameters of inequitable social structures. If

psychopathology in the colonial sphere could more often than not be charac-
terised as a ‘pathology of liberty’, then for Fanon the way that clinical or
psychological forms of activity could properly find their political role was, to
play their part in restoring liberty in some meaningful capacity, to the sufferer.
It is in this way that Fanon presents the roles of clinical intervention and social
101
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 102
Critical Psychology
activism as essentially complementary. In fact, for Bulhan (1985), the Fanonian

perspective suggests a redefinition of the primary tasks of psychology:
[T]he paramount tasks of psychology and psychiatry [should be] … to unravel the
relation of the psyche to the social structure, to rehabilitate the alienated, and to
help transform social structures that thwart human needs (195).
One should think psychological and political change/betterment together.
The individual pathologies that arise as a result of the colonial situation
require, for Fanon, combined action on the individual and on the group. We
may put this somewhat differently by suggesting that effective political change
in colonial contexts requires action on both subjective (ie psychological) and
objective (ie social, material, economic) levels. Forms of psychological inter-
vention should not, for Fanon, be separated in this way from forms of political
intervention or activism; rather they should (ideally) be synchronised, used in
tandem, for, after all: ‘There will be an authentic disalienation only to the
degree to which things, in the most materialistic meaning of the word, will
have been restored to their proper places’ (1986, 11–12).
Psychological intervention reformulated

The attempt to bring psychology alongside programmes of political better-
ment does not mean we should neglect the particular role that psychology is
able to play. So, although the social conditions that fail to meet human needs
must be replaced, and although one can barely emphasise enough the impor-
tance of transforming inequitable social structures, clinical work with
‘casualties of the status quo’, as Bulhan (1985, 200) puts it, remains indispen-
sable. Indeed, just as it is true that political conditions bring about deleterious
psychological affects, so it is true that the remedy and treatment of such affects
does find its part to play within greater projects of political struggle: ‘To
commit oneself to the practice of healing and rehabilitating tormented psyches
is no doubt a form of action – one that is always pregnant with heuristic and
social import’ (Bulhan, 1999, 141).
The particular psychological crises brought about as a result of the colonial
context, be they inferiority complexes or variants of ‘affective erethism’ – the
particular crises of identity that prove so characteristic of such a context – must
be engaged with on a personal level. The tragedy of the colonial situation, as
emphasised above, is that the alienated is first a victim of others and then of him-
or herself as oppressive stereotypes are internalised and self-implemented. One

needs to involve clinical work, then, as part of greater projects of political
struggle, and it is in this way that Fanon sees his role as a clinician residing in the
attempt to help his patients abandon attempts at ‘hallucinatory whitening’:
the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, turn white or
disappear; but he should be able to take cognisance of his existence … if society
102
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 103

makes difficulties for him because of his colour, if in his dreams I establish the
expression of an unconscious desire to change colour, my objective will not be
that of dissuading from it by advising him to ‘keep his place’; on the contrary, my
objective, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to
put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real
source of the conflict that is, toward the social structures (100).
BOX 5 Redefining violence
One of the most profound aspects of Fanon’s Bulhan (1985) warns how many of our
theories of racism and identity is the way they everyday conceptions of violence are overly
stress the ubiquitous violence of the colonial narrow and selective. Many internalised prohibi-
social order. His account forces us to rethink tions and prevailing social controls condition
violence, especially in light of its psychological our views in this respect, he (1985) cautions,
nature, its ‘identity effects’. In apartheid South and as such ‘we tend to recognise violence
Africa, for example, policies of separate devel- mostly in those instances when it is blatantly
opment forced black workers to live in destructive and contrary to the established
homeland areas far removed from their actual norms of society’ (131). Violence for Bulhan
places of work. This would result in the situa- (1985) is more pervasive in our day-to-day lives
tion where black workers would travel great than we commonly believe, underlying more of
distances daily, just to get to and from work. our cherished ideals and institutions than we
David Goldblatt’s famous photographs of those might like to admit.
daily travels force us to rethink our definitions Reviewing a series of definitions of violence
of violence. In some ways we might under- that he sees as inadequate, Bulhan (1985)
standably seek to qualify the damage of this shows how many such understandings rely on
arrangement, travelling up to 8 or 10 hours the ideas that violence must
daily, as a form of structural violence. The
(1) involve the use of physical force against
destructive pressure this arrangement exerted
another person
on families, its disruption of sleep patterns, on
(2) be accompanied by intense negative moti-
the psychological and physical well-being of
vating feelings such as rage and hatred
workers, would certainly seem to count as forms
(3) be intentional
of violence, even if not of the order of imme-
(4) lack social or legal sanction
diate physical effect.
(5) be immediately demonstrable at the level
A similar situation of a kind of indirect
of physical damage (133).
violence came to the fore at the hearings of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where There are problems with each of these criteria,
torturers of the state admitted to layering the as the above examples amply demonstrate. It is
cells of prisoners with water. Such actions with these problems in mind that Bulhan (1985)
would cause no immediate harming of the offers a refined and more inclusive definition:
bodies of prisoners, but given that they had no
Violence is any relation, process, or condition
beds, and that it is impossible to sleep when
by which an individual or a group violates the
half submerged in water, such a simple act

physical, social, and/or psychological inte-
would lead to massive repercussions in terms of grity of another person or group. From this
sleep-deprivation. Both of these examples point perspective, violence inhibits human growth,
to how the systematic undermining of an indi- negates human potential, limits productive
vidual’s physical or psychological resources might living, and causes death (135).
be thought of as a form of violence.
103
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 104
Critical Psychology
BOX 5 Redefining violence (continued)
The value of this definition for our current how post-colonial contexts may exude forms of
purposes is that it makes us understand how a racial violence that are not explicitly apparent,
wide range of activities and deprivations may be but none the less damaging to the subjectivity
understood as violence, even if not of the direct of oppressed individuals.
physical sort. Such a definition sensitises us to
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE

Black Consciousness and the politics of subjectivity in South Africa
Fanon intended Black skin, white masks to serve as a kind of ‘instrument of
liberation’. The original intended title of the book was to have been ‘Essay for
the Dis-alienation of the Black Man’ (Julien, 1995). Fanon reiterates this objec-
tive within the book itself, presenting an actively political role for personal
psychology. Just as psychoanalysis hopes to free the neurotic from his or her
personal neurosis, so the text was intended to offer the reader a means of alle-
viating forms of racial neurosis. Before one can create the conditions for
solidarity among the oppressed, intimates Fanon (1968) – anticipating the
standpoint of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness to follow – there must first
be the destruction of the subjective aspect of black oppression. Biko (1978)
likewise emphasised the role of a healthy subjectivity, of a robust, proud and
positive self-image as crucial both in creating a sense of solidarity amongst the
oppressed and in empowering one’s self to resist oppression. We might under-
stand this as the ‘identity-component’ of liberatory politics.
Black Consciousness
was, in Biko’s
words, ‘the
realisation by the
black man of the
need to rally
together with his
brothers … to
operate as a group
in order to rid
themselves of the
shackles that bind
them to perpetual
servitude’
(1998b, 360).
104
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 105

Biko’s view of Black Consciousness called for the psychological and cultural
liberation of the black mind as a prerequisite for political freedom – in his own
words: ‘mental emancipation as a precondition to political emancipation’
(Biko, cited in Arnold, 1972, xx). A principal part of the liberation struggle for
Biko was therefore exactly ‘the psychological battle for the minds of the black
people’ (Arnold, 1979; emphasis added). As Biko described it in May 1976:
Black Consciousness refers itself to the Black man and to his situation … [to the
Steve Biko
fact that] the Black man is subjected to two forces in [South Africa]. He is first of
all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery, through
laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions,
through poor education – these are all external to him – and secondly … the most
important, the Black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation.
He rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning White to all that is
good … (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, 22).
In opposition to such self-negating ways of thinking, Biko called for solidarity
among blacks, emphasising the need for oppressed groups to identify with
themselves and to advance the liberation struggle on this basis. The challenge
confronting Black Consciousness was to reverse years of negative self-image
and to replace it with an affirming and positive – if not angry – form of identity.
‘Blackness’ here was not simply an issue of skin colour, but was a form of soli-
darity, a collective form of hope and security, a way for black people to ‘build
up their humanity’ (Biko, cited in Arnold, 1979, 34). In fact, Biko defined
blacks as ‘those who are by law or tradition politically, economically, and
socially discriminated against as a group in South African society, and [who]
identify themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their
aspirations’ (1998b, 360). ‘Blackness’ as a kind of politics was, therefore, as
Arnold (1979) argues, a deliberate attempt ‘to lay the intellectual and emotive
base for ultimate political unity between the Africans, Coloureds and Asians of
South Africa’ (1979, xxv). In Biko’s own words:
Black Consciousness is in essence the realisation by the black man [sic] of the
need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their operation – the
blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of
the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the
lie that black is an aberration from the ‘normal’ which is white (1998b, 360). Conscientisation:
political strategy of
resistance in which
Black Consciousness and conscientisation
an attempt is made
The key strategy of Black Consciousness was conscientisation. Conscientisa- to develop a
heightened
tion involves what Biko referred to as ‘protest talk’, talk about circumstances of awareness of
oppression. It involves the repeated attempt to oppressive political
conditions of
make reference to the conditions of the Black man and the conditions in which
existence.
the Black man lives. We try to get Blacks in conscientization to grapple realisti-
105
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 106
Critical Psychology
cally with their problems … to develop what one might call an awareness, a
physical awareness of their situation … to be able to analyze it, and to provide
answers for themselves (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, 33).
Black Consciousness was an extremely positive form of politics, one that main-
tained that the very conditions of oppression were what would often bring a
group of people together, embolden and invigorate them in their resistance to
power. As Biko himself puts it:
The call for Black Consciousness is the most positive call to come from any group
in the Black world for a long time … The quintessence of it is the realization by
blacks [that] … they have to use the concept of group power … Being an histori-
cally, politically, socially and economically disinherited and dispossessed group,
they have the strongest foundation from which to operate. The philosophy of
Black Consciousness … expresses group pride and the determination by the
Blacks to rise and attain the envisaged self (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, xx).
One of the most powerful lessons of Black Consciousness for Biko is contained
in ‘the realization by Blacks that the most potent weapon in the hands of the
oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ (in Arnold, 1979, xx). This, of course,
is a weapon that can be reclaimed.
The consciousness-raising of Black Consciousness also involves a compo-
nent of historical redress: ‘Black Consciousness [has] … to do with correcting
false images of ourselves in terms of culture, education, religion, and
economics’, claims Biko (1998b). ‘[t]here is always an interplay between the
history of a people … the past, and their faith in themselves and hopes for their
future. We are aware of the terrible role played by our education and religion
in creating amongst us a false understanding of ourselves’ (363).
BOX 6 Steve Biko and cultural dispossession in apartheid South Africa
Although Biko was not totally uncritical of two major cultures that met and ‘fused’ were
Fanon’s ideas, many of his basic positions and the African cultural and the Anglo-Boer
political objectives shared a striking similarity culture … the Anglo-Boer culture had all
with those of Fanon. A case in point here is the the trappings of a colonialist culture and …
extensive reference Biko made to the kind of was heavily equipped for conquest. Where
cultural dispossession that Fanon described in they could, they conquered by persuasion,
Black skin, white masks. Here it is worth refer- using a highly exclusive religion that
ring, at length, to the words of Biko himself: denounced all other Gods and demanded a
strict code of behaviour with respect to …
Since that unfortunate date – 1652 – we education, ritual and custom. Where it was
have been experiencing a process of accul- impossible to convert, firearms were readily
turation. It is perhaps presumptuous to call available and used to advantage. Hence the
it ‘acculturation’ because this term implies a Anglo-Boer culture was the more powerful
fusion of different cultures. In our case this culture in almost all facets. This is where
fusion has been extremely one-sided. The the African began to lose a grip on himself
106
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 107

BOX 6 Steve Biko and cultural dispossession in apartheid South Africa (continued)
and his surroundings. Thus, in taking a look indigenous culture. To justify its exploita-
at cultural aspects of the African people one tive basis the Angle-Boer culture has at all
inevitably finds oneself having to compare. times been directed at bestowing an inferior
This is primarily because of the contempt status on all cultural aspects of the indige-
that the ‘superior’ culture shows towards the nous people (Biko, 1998a, 26).
This process of ‘correcting false images’ must be undertaken by black men and
women themselves: ‘Whites … from the outside … can never extract and analyze
the ethos in the black community’ (363). This should not be taken as repre-
senting a segregationist viewpoint; rather, Biko’s (1998b) concern is that blacks
should not always be interpreted by whites. In a similar vein he warns that
[o]ne must immediately dispel the thought that Black Consciousness is merely a
methodology or a means to an end. What Black Consciousness seeks to do is to
produce at the output end of the process real black people who do not regard
themselves as appendages to white society … it will always be a lie to accept white
values as necessarily the best (362).
‘Black souls in white skins’: The radicalism of Biko

In a paper that draws attention both to how Biko made use of Fanon’s ideas
and to how Biko himself has subsequently come to be represented in
107
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 108
Critical Psychology
post-apartheid contexts (such as South African history textbooks), Kros (1999)

concerns herself with the deradicalisation of Biko’s politics. A major example
for Kros is the lack of emphasis placed on Biko’s insistence on the inability and
unwillingness of white liberals – perhaps despite their best intentions – to
detach themselves from the ‘oppressor camp’. In the same vein, Biko argued
that the superior ability of white liberal students to articulate their ideas in
English would have a deleterious impact on the confidence of black students.
Biko pointed out that blacks in South Africa had a 300-year-old ‘inferiority
complex’ to surmount, which had not only dented their self-confidence, but
which had emptied them of their very self-hood and had consequently
rendered them entirely passive. Biko wrote: ‘the first step is to make the black
man come to himself, to pump back life into his empty shell, to infuse him with
pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing
himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign … in the country of his
birth’ (Biko, 1978, 29). Biko believed that the 300 years of oppressive rule had
all but destroyed black ‘imagination’ and their logical convictions and, in
words that deliberately echoed Fanon, ‘disfigured’ the African past. Thus the
scarring of the black psyche was profound. His analysis suggests a rehabilita-
tion of some magnitude not to be confused with an exercise in positive
thinking (Kros, 1999, 6).
Now whereas Biko was not ultimately against integration in South Africa,
he did go out of his way to emphasise that this would be both a false and unre-
alistic ideal until black people had attained ‘the envisioned self ’ above and
beyond the terms of cultural and psychical dominance as conditioned by
apartheid. Hence his ‘Black souls in white skins’ rejects out of hand the project
of political co-operation with white liberals in the latter part of 1970. For Biko
whites were more of a homogenous group than they perhaps realised, in view
of the fact they were all involved – even well-meaning progressives – in the
usurpation of power, in the enjoying of stolen privileges. It was on this basis
that Biko rejected the idea that blacks should in any way be assimilated into
‘white society’, and on this basis that he argued that whiteness was a concept
that ‘warrants being despised, hated, destroyed and replaced by an aspiration
with more human content in it’ (Biko, 1978, 77). Here Kros’s summary is
indeed apt: Biko’s point (in relation to the above) ‘is that ‘whiteness’, no less
than ‘blackness’, was a historically constituted identity with profoundly
limiting ramifications for those who found themselves defined by it. It was not
to be shed … simply by an act of goodwill precisely because it was so bound up

with long historical processes and entrenched material interests’ (1999, 7).
What Black Consciousness is not

Like Fanon’s, Biko’s is a political project which involves a profound cultural
awareness. Both writers may be legitimately criticised for portrayals of
108
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 109

pre-colonial African cultures as idealised, overly static, and predominantly

male, if not downright patriarchal. Despite this, both Fanon and Biko offer
trenchant criticisms in which they associate European culture with analytical
coldness, with egocentrism, and with the aggressive prioritisation of both
individualism and technological advancement. These are not values, espe-
cially in their frequent disrespect for basic moral standards (apartheid itself,
like the massive violences of colonialism, are two pertinent cases in point),
that should overwrite a more human-centred African culture. It is for this
reason, amongst others, that the assimilation of African culture into
European is to be resisted. It is on this basis that Biko, like Fanon, points to
the damage done to African history by the colonial project, on this basis that
Biko argues so forcefully that blacks should rewrite their history, redefine
their culture, and recover its crucial aspects of compassion and collectivity, to
‘reject the prevalent economic system which depends on the exploitation of
others’ (Kros, 1999, 9).
Kros (1999) argues that many contemporary representations of Biko
domesticate the radicalness of his original vision. Neither he nor Fanon offered
either a ‘comfortable politics’ or a ‘politics of quick solutions’; the writings of
both men contain powerful insights for us today on the ongoing path of trans-
formation, even after the overthrow of colonial or apartheid rule. Black
Consciousness, warns Kros (1999), is not to be confused with an exercise in
building self-esteem. Likewise, the determination of the black man or woman
to rise and attain the ‘envisaged self ’ is not to be reduced to a kind of self-help
psychology. The point here is exactly to connect certain psychological levels of
awareness to greater political projects – not to keep the two spheres separate.
Further yet, again as Kros (1999) points out, the drive to overcome political
oppression through collective effort is not merely a psychological ‘formula of
identity’. What Biko appears to have in mind here, by contrast, is a vision of
political solidarity fostered through an ongoing conscientisation of the polit-
ical conditions of everyday racism and/or discrimination. We should be aware,
then, in the writings of both Biko and Fanon, not only of the political uses of
psychological ideas but how such psychological ideas should be taken up not
merely intrapsychically or individualistically but in the realm of broader social
and political goals.
CRITICISMS OF FANON AND BIKO

Before closing, it is important to draw attention to certain apparent shortcom-

ings within the work of both Fanon and Biko. Both men stand accused of
sexism in their writings. This is clear in Fanon’s work, which, despite its height-
ened sense of race-based oppression, contains at times quite explicitly sexist
terms. A large part of Black skin, white masks, for example, deals with the
109
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 110
Critical Psychology
BOX 7 Some personal reflections on Black Consciousness – Thapelo Ramere
As a black person born in 1980s apartheid South because I had attached all meaning with what
Africa, I was raised by an education system that was Western and hence valuable. All this led to
gave me a new language, that is, English, as the having little way to defend myself against
only medium of instruction, which I then had to racism and prejudice – to being even more
use as a means of defining myself. A good vulnerable to racism because I had internalised
example of this is when attending an interview, white values. This is where Black Consciousness
or applying for a job or a bursary: all the ques- is important, because it emphasises the role of
tionnaires are in English, and structured by Euro- a healthy subjectivity, and of a positive image of
centric or US-American concepts, ideas, norms. the black self. It argues that to understand
The education system and media made me myself in the oppressor’s racist terms is to be
understand that the only way to survive was to self-damaging. As means of de-colonising my
aspire to be more Western or more integrated mind, Black Consciousness calls for me to revise
into a Western lifestyle, with the hope of my culture, my language and history, to take
achieving the imaginary symbols and values that respectable, admirable and worthwhile aspects
encourage individual achievement and social of culture which are important to my identity,
mobility. But the political system refused me and to regain the pride, security and confidence
access to any significant material resources lost to the oppressive culture.
necessary for the formation of a strong identity. A challenge to Black Consciousness lies in
As Verwoerd had said: ‘allow a black man to see an awareness that aspects of traditional African
the greener pasture of the European, but don’t culture are not simply ‘pure’ or innocent, that it
allow him to tread there.’ has been patriarchal, oppressive to both females
I was fed with cultural values and under- and children.
standings which were hostile to me, and made We also need to be aware that we need not
to believe that black is an aberration from the a modification of the oppressive system of
normal, which was white or European. I had to apartheid but a total transformation of struc-
study Western history, not my own history; even tures of power – failure to do this produces black
dominant forms of entertainment are of a elites, the ‘cream’ of black communities that
Western kind, with Western norms or standards come to be incorporated into white power, while
that would have a Western lesson for me as a people less privileged, people in the dusty
non-white child. streets of KwaZulu-Natal or Soweto are still
I felt that I lost my culture, the ‘traditional downtrodden by the system.
education’ received from my township life,
question of sexual desire across the lines of race. For Fanon (1986) it is the case
that the black female’s desire to marry a white man is unauthentic, a detestable
example of negative, self-deprecating identity. The black male subject’s desire
for the white female subject is portrayed in very different terms, as containing
an almost redemptive political value: ‘When my restless hands caress those
white breasts, they grasp white civilisation and dignity and make them mine’
(Fanon, 1986, 63). Fanon has rightly been criticised for this sexist double-
standard in his work (Fuss, 1994; McCulloch, 1983; Wyrick, 1998). Kros
(1999) likewise takes issue with Biko’s predominant focus on black men, with
the fact that he seems to have very little to say about the specific conditions
applying to the sexist oppression of black women.
110
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 111

A different critique focuses on the fact that Fanon is said often to represent
the colonial relationship as one of complete dominance and control (Moore-
Gilbert, 1997; Young 1990). The claim here is that Fanon undervalues the
various forms of resistance and opposition that colonised individuals and
groups can offer colonisers, and that he stereotypes the nature of these rela-
tionships. The first part of this suggestion is not always true, although a book
such as Black skin, white masks does spend far more time emphasising the
degree and dynamics of colonial/racist control than it does the possibility of
resistance. The wretched of the earth is a useful counterpoint here, in that it is
exactly a revolutionary text focusing on the possibility and, in Fanon’s terms,
the inevitability of an eventual overthrow of, colonial dominance. Perhaps the
point is that, whereas Black skin, white masks rather pessimistically prioritises
relations of domination and control in its analysis – because it does not want
these processes to be underestimated – The wretched of the earth far more
optimistically prioritises the prospects of revolutionary resistance. In Biko’s
case this criticism seems not to hold. Not only was it the case that apartheid
did approximate a form of (almost) complete domination and control – it
seems hard to overestimate the extent of apartheid’s racial oppression – but it
was also the case that Biko’s focus was exactly on strategised political routes of
contesting and overcoming this oppression.
A further criticism of Fanon is to argue that he himself involves essentialist
and static categories – ‘the black’, ‘the white’, ‘the colonised’, ‘the coloniser’,
and so on, as Caute (1970) suggests. To a certain extent this is true, Fanon does
appear to make sweeping statements at this level and does seem to tie certain
categories of personhood to certain necessary forms of experience, or identity.
The strongest version of this critique is to suggest that Fanon enforces a kind
of victim-blaming, by emphasising how black subjects, in their grasping at
white culture are making only ‘inauthentic’ and self-objectifying bids for
identity. The idea that the black subject perpetuates a form of internal racism
against themselves seems to do much the same – and might even be said to
enforce a different kind of racism altogether, one where the black person is
made problematic once again, understood as pathological, broken, damaged,
less than functional. Of course, one might argue that the reason that both Biko
and Fanon use the kinds of argument that they do is exactly to emphasise the
insidious and pervasive nature of the effects of racism on identity, effects that
had not previously been examined, and particularly not from a perspective of
internalised psychological damage. Does this mean, in the case of Fanon, that
his analysis may be somewhat stark, somewhat caricatured, that his under-
standing of the ‘black subject’ allows for little diversity within itself? In a
similar vein, do Biko’s somewhat romantic representations of an earlier pre-
colonial African culture give us a static, idealised version of ‘Africanness’ that
is no longer retrievable? Do both men rely on a kind of essentialisation, either
111
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 112
Critical Psychology
that of a damaged blackness or of an idealised African past? Is it the case that

more flexibility is required in the analytic approaches of each?
It may in some respects be true to say that both authors foreground the
damage of colonialism and racism and do so even to the extent of portraying
the black subject as a damaged subject. Importantly, though, this is not the
whole of their respective projects. Certainly, Biko’s politics, as suggested above,
are fundamentally oriented towards an overcoming of this state of affairs.
Similarly, Fanon’s objective is to not further racist damage by recourse to a
form of victim-blaming, but to warn those he empathises with precisely of the
damaging effects of internalising racist, objectifying terms of identity. Hence
one might argue that Fanon’s project is a fundamentally liberatory one.
Furthermore, one might suggest that both men provide us with the starting
basis for the analysis of post-colonial contexts. This starting-basis is one in
which the contrasts of the pre-colonial and colonial conditions are sharply
juxtaposed (especially in the case of Biko (1978)), where an emphasis on the
extremity of relations of colonial domination is absolutely pivotal, where the
terms of conceptualisation may be seen at times to be somewhat static, even
somewhat essentialist. Without this foundation it would seem that we may
have been unable to move forward to slightly more textured, more nuanced
accounts of post-colonial relations of power, such as that provided by post-
colonial theorist Homi Bhabha (1994).
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented a view of what one might term the ‘critical
psychology’ of Frantz Fanon. This particular brand of critical psychology may
be typed as a ‘psychopolitics’ that politicises psychology by bringing psycholog-
ical terms and concepts into the register of the political. Fanon’s analysis ties his
psychological analyses at each point to very real sociopolitical and historical
circumstances of colonial domination. By adapting the theoretical notion of
alienation into that of racial alienation, Fanon has succeeded in providing a
powerful account of the damaging impact of a ‘white mask psychology’. That is,
he has dramatised, in a critical and analytical manner, the severity of the impact
of racist politics upon the identity and psyche of the black subject.
This chapter has also attempted to show how Fanon’s concern with the
politics of race and racial identity has had an important influence in the South
African context – particularly via the writings of Steve Biko. In this respect it is
important to note that Fanon’s use of psychology is both powerfully critical
and political. Fanon is aware both of what is wrong with psychology – how it is
used as part of the colonising agenda – and of how certain psychological
concepts, and psychological forms of analysis, may be politically applied as
part of the anti-colonial struggle. We may put this slightly differently by
112
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 113

suggesting that an additional component of a psychopolitics concerns an

awareness of how psychology (or psychological concepts) may be used as tools
of resistance. This fact, that personal identity can be a potent resource of soli-
darity, and of resistance to political forces, is something of which Steve Biko
was well aware. This, of course, was one of the founding tenets of the Black
Consciousness Movement, the idea that positive and politicised forms of black
identity – and powerful forms of self-definition – are the first and perhaps
most fundamental points of resistance to forces of racial oppression. And
although a form of resistance which is purely psychological is not enough, we
would do well to remember, in Biko’s words, that ‘[t]he interrelationship
between the consciousness of the self and [an] emancipatory programme is of
paramount importance’ (1998b, 360).

1. What does Fanon mean by a ‘white mask’ psychology? Elaborate, involving
in your discussion a series of the theoretical terms that Fanon uses to
describe the effects of racism on black identity. Where possible, relate your
discussion back to examples drawn from the South African context.
2. Unlike the majority of orthodox psychology, Fanon takes a sociogenetic
approach to questions of psychopathology. Explain what such an approach
entails, relating it to other aspects of Fanon’s thought. Again, relate your
discussion, where possible, to the South African context.
3. There are several basic parallels between Fanon’s and Biko’s approach to
race consciousness. List them, then suggest a set of potential differences
between the writers.
4. What are the dangers of reducing Black Consciousness to a kind of psycho-
logical formula? What aspects of Fanon’s work might be taken as warnings
against such a reduction?
Fanon’s key texts are Black skin, white masks (1986) (London: Pluto Press)
and The wretched of the earth (1990) (London: Penguin). While they can
be difficult and opaque at first, there is no substitute for attempting to
master the concepts as Fanon himself presents them.
While many of the ‘For beginners’ guides are confusing in their attempt to
compact difficult intellectual material into a comic book format, Deborah

Wyrick’s (1998) Fanon for beginners (London & New York: Writers and
Readers) succeeds admirably. It provides a well-balanced overview that
takes in the entire gamut of Fanon’s writing.
Bulhan’s (1985) Frantz Fanon and the psychology of oppression (New York
& London: Plenum Press) seems to be something of a neglected classic
113
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap04 11/2/04 10:21 am Page 114
Critical Psychology
within the literature of critical psychology. Bulhan uses Fanon as a means

of providing a devastating critique of US-centric and Eurocentric
psychology. He also helpfully illustrates and extends Fanon’s theories, and
makes useful conceptual contributions himself. The book also contains a
good biographical component.
Steve Biko’s I write what I like is probably the best collection of his political
writings foregrounding his own views on Black Consciousness. Donald
Woods’s Biko makes for a good companion piece, setting out in historical
detail the events and circumstances leading up to Biko’s murder by
apartheid security police.
114
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 115
Chapter
5
Fanon and the

psychoanalysis of racism
Derek Hook
‘The white man is convinced that the Negro is a beast ...

Face to face with this man who is “different from himself”,
he needs to defend himself. In other words, to personify
the Other. The Other will become the mainstay
of his preoccupations and desires’.
Fanon (1986, 120)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explain how Fanon adapts, in conditional ways, theoretical notions of psycho-
analysis (such as those of neurosis, phobia, paranoia, the ‘European collective
unconscious’, and so on) to illustrate the workings of colonial racism
Elaborate and apply Fanon’s psychoanalytic account of racism, with particular refer-
ence to the terms of projection, anxiety, sexuality, guilt, scapegoating, the racial
stereotype, the idealising component of racism etc.
115
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 116
Critical Psychology
INTRODUCTION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POWER

The previous chapter advanced the argument that Fanon’s work moves
continually between the sociopolitical and the psychological, that for this
Psychopolitics: reason his ‘critical psychology’ may rightly be called a ‘ppsychopolitics’. One
critical awareness of aspect of such a psychopolitics – that is, the explicit politicisation of the
the role that
psychological – occurs through the placing of a series of ostensibly psycho-
political factors (ie
relations of power) logical concerns and concepts within the register of the political. In this way,
play within the as I suggested in the previous chapter, Fanon shows up the extent to which
domain of the human psychology is intimately linked to sociopolitical and historical forces.
psychological. An A second route of a psychopolitics lies in employing psychological concepts
understanding of
both how politics and explanations to describe and illustrate the workings of power. It is the
impacts upon the latter which forms the focus of the current chapter. The hope of this approach
psychological and is that, by being able to analyse the political in such a psychological way, we
how personal might be able to think strategically about how we should intervene in ‘the life
psychology may be
the level at which
of power’.
politics is interna- It is hence not only the case that Fanon brings politics into psychology; he
lised, individually also brings psychology into politics by analysing power through a series of
entrenched. psychoanalytic conceptualisations which help to dramatise the logic and
working of such forms of power, and particularly that of colonial racism. This
is what we may term Fanon’s analysis of the ‘psychic life of the colonial
encounter’. The objective of such psychological descriptions is to subject such
forms of power to critique, to understand them better so as more effectively to
challenge them. These two approaches – the politics of psychology and the
psychology of politics – should be seen as complementary and, more than that,
as in fact necessary to one another. In fact, one might advance the argument
that one has not sufficiently grasped Fanon if one is unable to see both the
political within the psychological and the psychological within the political. In
working through the psychic life of the colonial encounter we shall touch again
– although in different analytical ways – on certain of the themes discussed in
the previous chapter. Rather than being repetitive, the aim here is to provide,
as Fanon does, a layered theoretical approach to the problems of black identity
in racist/colonial contexts. The aim, in short, is to use complementary theo-
retical explanations to build a unique analytical framework able to critique
aspects of colonial experience from a variety of perspectives.
THE ‘PSYCHIC LIFE OF COLONIAL POWER’

The dream of turning white

At the beginning of Black skins, white masks, Fanon (1986) declares that
his book is a clinical study, and that it will, in a sense, psychoanalyse, not only
race but various aspects of the colonial encounter as well (such as ‘the black-
white relation’, (9)). The prime focus of his psychoanalytic attentions is the
116
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 117
Fanon and the psychoanalysis of racism

juxtaposition of white and black races in the context of colonisation. The white
coloniser and the black colonised exist within the grip of a ‘massive psychoex-
istenial complex’ (1986, 12), he suggests, that has multiple detrimental
psychological effects. Such effects are realized not only in the dreams of the
colonised but also in the psychic life of the colonised, who, in many ways,
thinks of himself (or herself ) as white.
In accordance with psychoanalytic theory, Fanon looks to the underlying
desire motivating the dreams, the actions and the personality of the colonised,
and claims to find there a simple wish. ‘What does the black man want?’ he
asks (8) mimicking Freud’s famous ‘What does a woman want?’. He answers
that ‘The black man wants to be white’ (9). Now it is of vital importance here
that we contextualise this wish within the colonial context, that is, within a
context in which the white subject has – in relative terms – everything and
where the black man or woman has nothing. Hence this desire to be white is
not in any way trans-historical or universal; rather, it is an outcome of a specific Trans-historical:
configuration of power, of real material, economic, cultural and sociopolitical across all historical
settings.
conditions that continually celebrate and empower the white subject and
continually denigrate and dispossess the black man or woman.
Fanon tracks the implications of this answer – of wanting to be white –
across the domains of language, sexuality, dreams and behaviour, finding in
each instance the persistence of this wish – the taking on of the white’s
language and culture, the desire for a white spouse or sexual partner, the
dream of turning white, actions of skin whitening, hair-straightening and so
on. It is this fundamental wish and its affects, the kinds of identity, conflict and
pathology it leads to, that form the focal points of Fanon’s analysis, and indeed,
that he is alluding to with the title of Black skin, white masks. Importantly,
even in his use of a psychoanalytic interpretative approach, Fanon points out
that such ‘pathologies of affect’, even once ‘wired through’ the sexual realms,
through unconscious processes, are ultimately derived from inequalities
present in wider social structures and cannot as such be reduced to the internal
psychical workings of individual subjects.
Neurosis:
Neuroses of blackness emotional disorder,
manifest at the
For Fanon this dream of turning white is a neurotic condition or, as it is put level of personality,
somewhat more figuratively in the introduction to The wretched of the earth, which stems from
the status of the native is a ‘nervous condition’ (1990, 17). What Fanon goes the conflict
between a
on to do is to analyse this pathological desire through Freud’s explanation of fundamental (often
the neuroses, making various changes to Freud’s conceptualisation along the instinctual) impulse
way. Here it is important that we briefly explain the psychoanalytic notion of or wish and the
neurosis. Neuroses hence can lead to a whole series of irrational behaviours need to repress this
instinct.
and beliefs that are the result of the conflict between powerful unconscious
117
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 118
Critical Psychology
Neurosis of
urges and the social/cultural need to keep these urges outside of the conscious
blackness: mind. The ‘nneurosis of blackness’ Fanon has in mind is exactly the ‘dream of
‘dream of turning turning white’ (that is, the wish to attain the level of humanity accorded to
white’ (ie the wish whites in racist/colonial contexts) as it comes into conflict with one’s being in
to attain the level
of humanity
a black body, and within a racist society, which make this wish impossible.
accorded to whites Importantly, rather than framed within the limits of individual psychology, as
in racist/colonial was Freud’s intention with the concept of neurosis, Fanon’s use of the idea of
contexts) as it neurosis makes of it an explicitly social psychological phenomenon, rooted in
comes into conflict
with one’s being in
the specific historical and political contexts of colonisation.
a black body, and in
a racist society, Infantile trauma
which make this
wish impossible.
If we are looking for the cause of neurotic disturbances, says Freud (and
hence, a means to cure them), one must always look to the childhood history
of the individual. The symptoms of neurosis are always linked to a kind of
psychical trauma, which lends them their individual character. More than
this, we are not always looking for a single event, for the cause of the symptom
most often arises out of ‘multiple traumas, frequently analogous and
repeated’ (Freud, cited in Fanon, 1986, 144). Such traumas are expelled from
Traumatic examples of
brutal racist violence are
characteristic not only of
the colonial setting but
also, regrettably, of
recent South African
history, as this Zapiro
cartoon indicates.
118
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 119

the conscious mind as means of saving the neurotic from great suffering. Register:
More importantly, this trauma need not have happened ‘in the real’. It need particular voca-
not have been an actual event, but may just as well have been fantasised. bulary, or concep-
Importantly, this is the conceptual leap which means psychoanalysis can tual framework,
stemming from a
focus its curative efforts almost completely on elements of fantasy rather than particular school of
on elements of reality. Hence, the neurosis of the black man or woman need thought and/or
not then have stemmed from actual experiences (the witnessing of the criticism.
lynching of one’s father is the example Fanon gives (1986)), but rather from
fantasised experiences or, more to the point, from indirect or cultural forms
of oppression or trauma. Then again, one might argue, it would seem that real
examples of traumatic racist violence or abuse would seem quite common-
place in the colonial environment.
BOX 1 Inventing a new language of critique
Many first time readers find Black skin, white ronments. Like Feminism and Marxism, post-
masks a difficult text because it combines the colonial critique ultimately aims to do just this,
registers (that is, the theoretical vocabularies) to formulate a unique register through which
of numerous schools of European thought forms of discrimination and disempowerment
without ever relying on one particular form. that would have otherwise remained effectively
Concepts from Marxism exist alongside invisible, indiscernible, ‘naturalised’ within a
concepts drawn from psychoanalysis and exis- society, come to be brought into sharp relief.
tentialism, each somewhat individualised by One should note here that Fanon had an
Fanon’s own voice. Furthermore, Fanon’s refer- extremely ambivalent relationship with
ences are mixed and diverse. In addition to a psychology and psychoanalysis, that he was
set of rich philosophical resources, his extremely aware that both disciplines transmit,
argument is built up on personal, autobio- reinscribe or reify certain ideologically loaded
graphical anecdotes, and extended references Eurocentric notions that work to serve one
to literary as well as scholarly works. As Scheff dominant (oppressive, racist, colonial) social-
(1968) comments, Fanon’s first book is an political grouping over another. (I am speaking
unshapely mixture of personal reminiscence, here of the power exercised by racial, ethnic,
philosophical analysis, literary criticism and gender and sexual majorities over minorities).
psychiatric case history. Fanon’s writing, there- In other words, Fanon is aware of the strategic
fore, often reads like a patchwork of critical value of deploying certain psychological and
concepts and ideas that is still in the process of psychoanalytic terms in his analysis – and does
being brought together. As a result, one often so to great political effect – without becoming
gets the sense of Fanon formulating a new too reliant on them. Indeed, he compounds his
critical language where one had not previously psychological and psychoanalytic terms of
existed, of Fanon generating a new – even if analysis with so many other forms of criticism
hybrid – set of concepts with which to critique that his critique never becomes dependent on
relations of power in racist and colonial envi- psychological terms alone.
Neurosis and cultural trauma

If not necessarily real events – or necessarily physically real events – then what
are the traumatising causes of neurosis? How can it be that black people who
119
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 120
Critical Psychology
Meaning to
emphasise the
extreme conditions
of colonial racism,
Fanon suggests that
‘a normal black
child … will be
made normal by the
slightest contact
with the white
world’ (1986, 117).
Reify/reification: may not even have had direct contact with whites may still develop ‘neuroses
speaking about of race’? Here Fanon differs somewhat from Freud, as touched on above. While
concepts or ideas as he agrees with Freud that the basis of neurosis must be that of some or other
if they are really kind of infantile trauma, he will suggest that this original trauma can be shared
existing concrete
objects. Psycho-
and cultural rather than simply intrapsychic and individualistic in nature. The
logical constructs colonial environment, argues Fanon, is unlike any other. It is so characterised
like ‘mind’ and by racism, by violence and oppression, that these material and cultural forms
‘personality’ are of trauma may, as opposed to the internal fantasised bases posited by Freud,
good examples.
act as the causes of neurosis. In short, then, the basis of the racial neurosis of
the black subject lies, for Fanon, in the infantile trauma caused by the black
child’s exposure to the racist values of the oppressive colonial environment. It
is worth emphasising here again that Fanon takes solid social and political
inequalities to be at the bottom of what might be seen to be the exclusively
Catharsis:
psychological
intrapsychic problem of psychological neuroses.
process where In Fanon’s conceptualisation, then, the early traumatic event to be found at
distressing or the origin of neurosis appears to be cultural in form, its source hence being a
damaging emotional type of cultural trauma. As he puts it, ‘there is a constellation of postulates, a
material is ‘purged’,
‘gotten rid of’ via
series of propositions that slowly ... with the help of books, newspapers,
the means of some schools and their texts, advertisements, films, radio – work their way into one’s
or other activity mind’ (152). Fanon demands more of an explanation than this, though, and
which externalises
attempts to understand something about the logic of racism in the kind of

it. Collective
cultural victimisation he has been discussing. Each society, he claims, has a
catharsis simply
refers to this form of collective catharsis through which a certain amount of aggression can
process as it be ‘channelled’ outward and released. Cultural forms of expression are one way
happens on a mass in which this happens. Cultural forms in colonial contexts overwhelmingly
social level.
take on a racist coloration, such that whether we are talking about the charac-
120
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 121

ters (or plots) of television, comics, films, popular jokes, stories ‘the Wolf, the Scapegoating:
Devil, the Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, the Savage are always symbolized by projection of blame
Negroes’ (Fanon, 1986, 146). onto another person
or object, who then
Racial scapegoating becomes
blameworthy or
Importantly, there is an element of scapegoating at work here in that the punishable for
victims of punishment and aggression in such narratives are typically not, in something I am in
view of the full historical reality, really deserving of the violence meted out on fact guilty for.
Scapegoating is a
them. Here Fanon refers briefly to the writing of Legman, who ponders why way of avoiding
American popular media representations of the time (ie 1950s and 1960s), feelings of guilt and
need to rely on the myth of the ‘bad Indian’. Legman’s answer to this quandary responsibility.
is that ‘the punishment that we deserve can be averted only by denying respon-
sibility for wrong and throwing the blame on the victim’ (cited in Fanon, 1986,
146–147). What Legman has identified is the mechanism of projection as a
means of avoiding guilt. (Projection, in psychoanalysis, is the process by which
specific aspects of self, or certain wishes or impulses, are imagined to be
Projection:
located in something or someone else. The implication here is that the indi-
process by which
vidual is able to avoid confronting discomforting truths about him- or herself.) specific aspects of
This is a mechanism that Fanon makes use of in his analysis of racism also, and self, or certain
he is fully aware of the bizarre (if unconscious) logic that is at work here: a wishes or impulses,
hating of one’s victims proportionate to the guilt one feels for the injustices and are imagined to be
located in some-
violence one has subjected them to! This, then, is one psychoanalytic interpre- thing or someone
tation of racism: racial hatred arises from the need to deal with feelings of guilt else. It means that
that have emerged from the acts of violence, injustice or oppression that one the individual is
has perpetuated on a particular racial grouping. able to avoid
confronting certain
There seems to be a problem here, though – this ‘explanation’ sounds truths about him-
tautological – in a way, it uses racism to explain racism. It might explain how or herself, and
racism escalates, how racism itself breeds more racial violence, but where does hence functions
this all begin? This explanation does not offer an answer to what comes before as a means of
avoiding guilt.
racism, to the question of what brings the first racist action or sentiment into
being? Fanon again looks to Freud here, who, of course, finds sexual content of
sorts in the origin of virtually all neurotic symptoms. (In psychoanalytic
discourse, a symptom is an irrational action which is a compromise between
the need to express a repressed wish and need to keep this wish repressed.)
Fanon in turn directs his attentions to the dynamics of sexuality present in Symptom:
racism. At first this may seem a less than fruitful line of enquiry, because, irrational action
which is a
thinking intuitively, we might suggest that racism need have nothing at all to
compromise
do with sexuality, or with sexual attraction. Sexual attraction would, in fact, between the need
seem to be the very opposite of the prejudicial hatred that characterises racism! to express a
In opposition to this position, Fanon asserts that ‘no proper understanding of repressed wish and
racism is possible without reference to the sexual sphere’ (1986, 160; emphasis the need to keep
this wish repressed.
added).
121
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 122
Critical Psychology
Neurosis on the surface

Phobic object: Before we go on to discuss in more detail the sexual component of racism, it is
thing or person important that we emphasise one further feature of Fanon’s description of the
causing irrational
feelings of dread,
‘cultural neuroses of race’, namely the fact that such neuroses exist ‘on the
fear, and hate. The surface’, so to speak, rather than in deep unconscious forms. The particular
threat of the phobic form of neurosis with which Fanon is concerned is not one that can be comfort-
object is irrationally ably accommodated in the unconscious, or easily forgotten. Fanon’s point here
exaggerated, and it
is again to reiterate that it is the multiple devaluing ‘myths of blackness’ that
is typically
considered to cause neurotic reactions in black subjects. More than just this, he insists that
possess evil or such cultural traumas cannot simply be repressed away into the unconscious –
damaging intents. ‘Since the racial drama is played out in the open, the black man has no time to
The phobic object
“make it unconscious” ’ (Fanon, 1986, 150). Unlike the ‘normal’ development of
often induces a
sense of paranoid neurotic symptoms, where the neurotic may temporarily forget the cause of his
anxiety; it also acts or her suffering, the black man or woman faces, on a daily basis, the oppressive
as a source of colonial reality that emphasises his or her social and/or existential inferiority.
unconscious This is a further divergence from Freud regarding the notion of neurosis – this
attraction.
difference is fundamental enough, in fact, to suggest that Fanon’s concept is
becoming something almost altogether separate from the Freudian notion.
Fanon develops two figurative terms to dramatise the strength of this
two-way relationship between psyche and society: internalisation and epi-
dermalisation. Internalisation refers to the process by which external,
sociohistorical reality is assimilated into ‘internal’ and subjective reality.
Epidermalisation is used ‘to underscore the profound transformation of
Ambivalence:
phenomenon in
economic inferiority to subjective inferiority’ (Bulhan, 1985, 96).
which powerful
emotional reactions THE PHOBOGENIC OBJECT
appear to coexist
with contrary Phobia and ambivalence
affective impulses Here it becomes important to foreground two basic psychoanalytic notions –
(even if these
contrary impulses
that of the phobic object and that of ambivalence. Ambivalence in psycho-
exist at a analysis refers to the co-existence of contradictory affects and/or impulses.
predominantly Hence, for psychoanalysis, powerful emotional reactions typically contain –
unconscious level). even if at a predominantly unconscious level – what would seem to be their
emotional opposites. Thus, powerful currents of love, for psychoanalysis, also
contain elements of hate, just as responses of fear contain also within them
elements of attraction. This is an example of psychoanalytic thinking at its
most counter-intuitive – its assertion that contrary reactions of fear and attrac-
tion exist as component parts of one another. A similarly counter-intuitive
suggestion is that unconscious elements of desire and or attraction are compo-
Phobogenic: nent parts of racial hatred. We shall move on to explain these concepts in more
fear-causing person
detail shortly; at the moment it is important to explain why, for Fanon, the
or object.
black person comes to act as what he calls a ‘pphobogenic’ object for whites.
122
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 123

Phobia and paranoia

The phobic object, explains Fanon, is essentially that which arouses a sense of
subjective insecurity within me, that is, it incurs feelings of fear or dread. Careful
to qualify the emotional components of the phobic object, Fanon follows the
BOX 2 The inadequacy of Eurocentric theory
Just as Fanon rejected the aggressive Fanon (1986) similarly rejects the heavy-
imposition of Western culture, values and handed application of Hegel’s famous slave-
norms on other cultures, so he was antagonistic master dialectic, in which both parties are
towards an uncritical application of European involved in a struggle for recognition from the
theory in colonised contexts. This was other (the master receives his identity as
particularly the case if such theory functioned master from the slave; the slave his identity
to ‘psychologise away’ social inequality; the from the master’s withholding of his freedom).
facts of racism and violence could not simply be In the colonial context, the master sought not
reduced to minor terms of a theoretical analysis recognition from the slave, but work, claims
for Fanon. So, for example, he sets out to Fanon (1986), whilst the slave wanted simply
reinterpret a set of dreams – those of black to be the master. Although Fanon does not
subjects in the context of the violent Malagasy reject Marxism out of hand, he also has
colonial struggle – already analysed by concerns about how it might be applied in
European psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni. Fanon colonial contexts. Fanon’s terms were post-
sees there not the ever-present phallic symbol, Marxian, as Scheff (1968) notes, ‘economic
nor a threatening pair of father-figures, as realities were determining, but they in turn
reported by Mannoni (1990), but takes the derived from the racial structure of colonial
original objects of the dream, as reported by society’ (92). So although Fanon considered
the dreamers, at relative face value. The rifle in himself a socialist, he refused to equate the
one dream is not a penis but a genuine rifle – native struggle against colonialism with the
‘model Lebel 1916’, as Fanon puts it – a real fight between socialism and capitalism; the
object of the Malagasy uprising. The supposed politics and struggle he wished to wage was not
father figures in such dreams represent not a that of socialism against capitalism but that of
symbolised Oedipal fear but rather real colonial poor against rich and, at some level, the
authorities that the dreamer feared, because derided racial category of ‘blackness’ against
they had in fact tortured him or his peers! Here that of ‘whiteness’, African culture versus
psychoanalysis is working by projecting European.
European cultural values or understandings This is not to say that Fanon rejects
onto the colonial context in such a way that wholesale the critical potential of such theories
real conditions of oppression are masked. In the – clearly he made critical use of both aspects of
same way Fanon denied Mannoni’s contention psychoanalysis and Marxism, particularly, in
that African natives had a peculiar psychology view of the latter, a reformulated conception of
that gave them a need for subjection to others, alienation (as seen above). Likewise the notion
that only races that had a deep unconscious of the master-slave dialectic does inform his
need to be governed, controlled or parented analysis, but in a highly adapted, one might
could in fact be successfully colonised. In even say customised, manner. Fanon’s point is
such forms of psychoanalysis Fanon saw that these Eurocentric theories need to be
nothing but a form of victim-blaming and adequately re-evaluated and reformulated if
colonisation’s attempts at self-justifying forms they are to be sufficiently critical in colonial
of explanation. contexts. Indeed, one of Fanon’s most vital
123
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 124
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 The inadequacy of Eurocentric theory (continued)
critical contributions was to emphasise how theoretical structures, critical as they may be
race, and an awareness of the day-to-day reality within ‘First World’ contexts – both Marxism and
of colonial violence, racism and exploitation, feminism are cases in point here – would not be
came to supersede traditional Eurocentric adequate to properly address the forms of
theoretical terms of analysis. This is also one of power particular to the colonial and post-
the reasons why he becomes so central a figure colonial situations. The danger of these critical
to the field of post-colonial theory: he offers up systems is that they risk homogenising the
the rudiments of a new grid of analysis, a new terms of particular importance to the colonial
set of analytical priorities, around exactly such environment under broader rubrics: race or
questions as cultural dispossession, colonial ethnicity, for example, come to fall under the
violence, racism and racial identity. Pre-existing rubrics of gender or class.
work of Hesnard in specifying that both qualities of revulsion and fear feature
within this sense of subjective insecurity. There is hate within the fear, in other
words; not only does this object scare me, it also revolts me, I find it detestable.
In addition, the phobic object also induces a powerful irrational reaction in me.
After all, in technical terms, a phobic reaction is one that is, by definition, irra-
tional, excessive in nature. As Fanon puts it (1986), ‘In the phobic, affect has a
priority that defies all rational thinking’(155). More than just this, in a proper
phobic reaction, one endows the object ‘evil intentions and ... the attributes of a
malefic power’ (Fanon, 1986, 155). In a phobic reaction, then, one exaggerates
the potential danger of this object, one turns it into something with a thoroughly
evil intent, with a range of threatening powers that promise to cause damage to
me. The phobic object then is something that we respond to with reactions not
Paranoid anxiety: only of fear and hatred but also of paranoid anxiety.
irrational, yet
consistent belief
Phobia and unconscious attraction
that one is being
systematically There is still a further necessary feature of the phobic object. Following the
undermined, logic of ambivalence, psychoanalysis understands the phobic object – that is,
persecuted or
that type of thing or person that causes particular amounts of anxiety, dread or
attacked by a ‘bad’
object, that is, a fear within me – as also a source of unconscious attraction. We have hence
person, group or uncovered, potentially at least, an aspect of sexuality even in phobia – namely
thing which intends that of sexual attraction – even in the revulsion, hatred and paranoid anxiety
to do me damage.
of the phobic response. We can therefore start to anticipate aspects of
Fanon’s psychoanalytic account of racism, an account built on the above

understanding of the phobia in which irrational, paranoid, fearful and hateful
impulses combine with elements of unconscious attraction. We shall return
shortly to this element of attraction as a way of explaining further how
elements of sexuality – in this case a particularly anxious sexuality – feature in
instances of white colonial racism.
124
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 125

Negrophobia Collective
Part of Fanon’s analysis of the colonial encounter concerned an attempt to unconscious:
understand the scale of white or European racism, in particular, the depth and idea that all human
beings share a
pervasiveness of the irrational fear and hatred that the white subject is thought supply of innate
to feel toward the black man or woman. Why is it the case, asks Fanon 1986), ideas or archetypes
that ‘in Europe, the black is the symbol of evil’? (188); Why is it the case that that are genetically
‘concretely or symbolically, the black man stands for the bad side character’? supplied, that are
universal, and that
(198). So widespread, so pronounced and so irrational is this racist response can be seen
that Fanon is tempted to use Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious to spontaneously
explain it. (The collective unconscious is the idea that all human beings share produced in the
a supply of innate ideas or archetypes that are genetically supplied, that are symbolism of
different cultures
universal and that can be seen spontaneously produced in the symbolism of
and times.
different cultures and times. Archetypes are thought to be the universal motifs
or patterns that form the collective unconsciousness. Archetypes are therefore
considered to make up the shared basic contents of religions, mythologies, Archetypes:
legends and so on.) universal motifs or
The concept of the collective unconsciousness would seem to be able to patterns that form
the collective
explain how racism may work unconsciously, in a genetically inherited unconsciousness.
manner, shared by all Europeans or whites. However, just as was the case in his Archetypes make up
application of the Freudian concepts, Fanon again finds it necessary to modify the shared basic
certain of Jung’s basic ideas. The need to do so in the case of Jung is even more contents of
religions, mytholo-
pressing, because of the ways that the Jungian account may lend itself to a gies, legends etc.
naturalisation of racism. It is for this reason, along with Jung’s pronounced They also feature in
Eurocentricity, that Fanon finds much of Jungian theory distasteful. A partic- individual dreams
ular concern of Fanon’s here is Jung’s suggestion that the baser desires of all and fantasies.
racial groupings are associated – in a genetically predisposed way – with
blackness. Negro myth:
racist system of
The Negro myth representations and
values in which the
Importantly, while Fanon violently rejects the notion that there may be any figure of the black
innate, biologically predisposed devaluation of blackness – that blackness man or woman
may be in any inherent way problematic, amoral, pathological or inferior – comes to stand as a
repository, a figure
he does acknowledge the massive scale of white racism. So, for Fanon, there
in whom whites
does seem to be something to the derogatory ‘N Negro myth’, as he calls it, at come to symbolise
least in so far as it exists as a racist system of representations and values. all their lower
Fanon even goes so far as to guardedly use the term of the ‘European collec- emotions and baser
tive unconscious’ to describe how pervasive and systematic this derogatory inclinations. A
dominant theme
image of blackness is. In his own words, ‘... the archetype of the lowest values within what Fanon
is represented by the Negro’ (Fanon, 1986, 198). (Here, though, Fanon uses refers to as the
the term ‘archetype’ as a unit of social value and/or understanding rather ‘European collective
than as an genetically inherited image.) However, the point is that this unconscious’.
125
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 126
Critical Psychology
‘Negro myth’ is just that – a social and political system of representations

and values and not a series of genetically inherited ‘blueprints’, or archetypes
of blackness as evil.
BOX 3 The African as without culture, civilisation
One of Fanon’s strengths as a critical theorist of tion that he requests, but at the same time I
race is his ability to play up the often sublim- can hardly forget that he has a language of his
inal double standards in how black and white own, a country, and that perhaps he is a lawyer
subjects are understood or evaluated. One of or an engineer there. In any case, he is foreign
the best cases of such a racist double standards to my group, and his standards must be
occurs in connection with the devaluation of different. When it comes to the case of the
black language. When I meet a Russian or a [black man] ... nothing of the kind. He has no
German who speaks my language badly, says culture, no civilisation, no ‘long historical past’
Fanon, speaking from the position of the white (1986, 34).
French-speaker, I try to give him the informa-
The ‘European collective unconscious’

The ‘Negro myth’ is not ahistorical, universal, or natural; rather, it has a precise
political function, Fanon claims, and that is to act as a repository – a figure in
whom whites symbolise all their lower emotions and baser inclinations. Here
again we can identify the mechanism of scapegoating, along with that of
projection. One account of racism, then, is that it involves an attempt to exter-
nalise, to ‘project out’ those qualities of one’s self that one finds reprehensible,
‘to ascribe [their] origins to someone else’ (Fanon, 1986, 190). One thus avoids
European having to confront certain qualities of the self. It is in this way that the ‘black
collective man stands for the bad side of character’(189). What we are able to perceive in
unconscious:
Fanon adapts the
white racism, then, is ‘an expression of the bad instincts, of the darkness
Jungian notion of inherent in every ego, of the uncivilized savage, the Negro who slumbers in
the collective every white man’ (187).
unconscious such We may then conditionally employ the notion of a ‘European collective
that it is not
dependent on
unconscious’ in this particular way, to understand something about the
‘cerebral heredity’, workings of racism, but, crucially for Fanon (1986), the collective unconscious
but is rather the ‘is not dependent on cerebral heredity – it is the result of ... the unreflected
result of the imposition of a culture’ (191). Thus, Fanon’s version of the ‘European collec-
imposition of a
culture, is purely
tive unconscious’ ‘is purely and simply the sum of prejudices, myths,
and simply the sum collective attitudes of a given group’ (1986, 188). Fanon’s attempt, as McCul-
of the prejudices, loch (1983) puts it, is to transform this concept of the collective unconscious
myths and ‘from an ahistorical mechanism located in inherited cerebral matter to a
collective attitudes
historically specific psychic structure that is open to continuous social rein-
of a given group.
forcement’ (71).
126
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 127

The ‘racial distribution of guilt’

These racist cultural practices of scapegoating the racial other, of attempting to
achieve a sense of superiority through the inferiorisation of another, are
commonplace. There are few groups of people – ethic, racial, religious or class-
based – who do not attempt to gain some kind of compensation for their own
inferiorisation in this way, says Fanon (1986). So, in his later work (1990), he
will suggest that even the oppressed working classes in Europe – who should,
in principle, seem willing and enthusiastic to embrace the oppressed colonised
masses – do just the opposite. Rather than recognise what they have in
common, rather than identifying what their shared burden of oppression is,
the European working classes instead look down upon this other oppressed
grouping and scapegoat them, in the ways described above. Fanon refers to
this process as the ‘racial distribution of guilt’, the assertion of a ‘hierarchy of
prejudices’, as McCulloch (1983) phrases it, as a way of attempting to compen-
sate for one’s own experiences of oppression.
There is, of course, one set of historical circumstances and one particular
grouping that makes for an exception to this process. Fanon has in mind here
the oppressed people of a colonial regime. Ordinarily it may have been the case
that such an oppressed group would have found another race or ethnic
grouping upon whom they could project their own undesirable sexual and
aggressive impulses. The colonial condition, however, prevents this possibility.
The systematic racism, dehumanisation and inferiorisation of this group
means that, within the colonial environment, there is no other group to whom
they might turn to scapegoat.
‘White souls’
I have, in the previous chapter, discussed the internalisation of racism with
reference to how racist cultural values and prejudices become a potential mode
of self-understanding, according to Fanon, for black men and women in
colonial contexts. In complementing this foregoing understanding of racial
alienation with that of racial neurosis, Fanon extends his analysis of the
psychological effects of racism. Now we know from what has gone above that
the ‘racial neurosis of blackness’ is a neurosis ‘on the surface’ so to speak, that
is not driven deep into the unconscious mind. However, Fanon’s suggestion is
that there is, at times, a level of unawareness here, or willful delusion. So, it
may be the case that the black subject is often forced into the recognition of
their own blackness – this particularly so in contexts where racism is
omnipresent. However, it is also the case that there are frequent occasions
when the black subject thinks of him- or herself as white, that, after adopting
the cultural trappings and language of white culture, they come to conduct
themselves, subjectively and intellectually, as white. As odd as this may sound,
127
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 128
Critical Psychology
one should bear in mind the fundamental irrationality of the neurotic condi-
tion that Fanon is describing. Furthermore, one should be well aware of the
force of the racist social values, understandings and discourse in colonial
settings which come to equate blackness with ‘ugliness, sin, darkness,
immorality’ (Fanon, 1986, 192).
If it is the case that all that is repugnant and undesirable is black, and that I,
as a black man or woman, order my life like that of a moral person, then ‘I am
simply not a Negro ... I know only one thing, which is the purity of my conscience
and the whiteness of my soul’ (Fanon, 1986, 193). What Fanon is speaking of
here is whiteness as a moral category, as a metaphysics of all that is positive. This
provides one way of explaining how I can be black and still divorce myself from
blackness; once the above logic is in place (of whiteness as a kind of moral
category), I may be someone who is black yet who has detached him- or herself
from all the derogatory values that have been associated with being black. I can
perhaps even provisionally recognise my physical blackness without admitting
my psychological blackness, so to speak, and avoid my blackness because of the
whiteness of my soul. Fanon describes this logic as follows: ‘I am a Negro – but of
course I do not know it simply because I am one’(191). Further yet:
As I begin to recognize that the Negro is the symbol of sin, I catch myself hating
the Negro. But then I recognize that I am a Negro ... this [is a] neurotic situation
in which I am compelled to choose an unhealthy, conflictual situation fed on
fantasies [that are] hostile and inhuman (Fanon, 1986, 197).
Hence the black subject may assume the structure of racism – via embracing
whiteness as a moral category of sorts – and unconsciously transposing it onto
himself. This is where the explanation of racial neurosis may be seen slightly to
exceed that of racial alienation: it is not just that I have been distanced from my
own blackness, that my own blackness has been objectified for me or that I
understand blackness only through white values – it is also the case that at
some very deep level I, the black subject, experience myself to be white. I have
taken on the subjectivity of whiteness. This process will always be a jarring one,
because race, unlike religion, and in some ways ethnicity, or even gender,
cannot be hidden or disguised – it is very patently visible. This means that even
if I do have the soul or mind of whiteness, my blackness will be continually
reaffirmed; I will be repeatedly confronted with this painful, and pathological
juxtaposition. It is for this reason that Fanon (1986) says that ‘the Negro lives
an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic’ (192).
Manichean thinking
In his discussions of ‘white souls’ and the ‘Negro myth’, Fanon directs our
attention to the ways in which racist systems of value systematically separate
and divide all that is white from all that is black. This happens physically and
128
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 129

spatially, in terms of segregated living areas, in the splitting up of what would

otherwise be shared public amenities (as in the apartheid era), but also – and
this is of great importance – this occurs at moral and psychological levels also.
This division into black and white not only as a basis of racial distinction but
as a basis of cultural, moral and almost spiritual evaluation is what Fanon
(1968) refers to as a Manichean thinking. Manichean
It is important that we grasp what Fanon is saying here, because racism is thinking:
approach to culture
not simply a question of distinctions made on the basis of different colours, in which all values
different physical features (although this is the ‘grounding distinction’ of and concepts are
racism, and one which is never completely transcended). Racism, very impor- split into binary
tantly, is also a set of separations that come to be implemented at higher levels opposites, one that
is positive (which is
– those of culture, morality, psychology – and it is this ability of racism to white) and one that
motivate difference (and superiority/inferiority) at a variety of different levels is negative (black).
which makes it so durable, so resistant to change. So if a racist explanation of
difference fails at the level of the body – that is, in terms of concrete physical or
material ‘defects’, it can be pitched again at the level of psychology, or of
culture, at levels which are less tangible and hence harder to disprove.
The point here is simply that racism as a system of values uses both racism
of the body and racism of the mind, ‘racisms’ of physical and moral qualities,
each to motivate and justify the other. Each sustains and legitimates the other
and we are left with a self-perpetuating cycle of racist values. Importantly, what
happens in Manichean thinking is that the continual splitting and separation
of racial groups (and all the associations that have come to characterise them)
reaches the point where one is confronted with not only mutually exclusive
groupings, but also mutually exclusive sets of values and cultures. The logic
presented by this kind of logic sustains racism, because it suggests that two
such groups are effectively unbridgeable, so radically different to one another,
so mutually opposed, that no reconciliation, or mutual understanding would
ever be possible.
BOX 4 Manichean divisions in space
Fanon’s explanation of Manichean thinking (1983) describes this as geography re-enacting

suggests that the implementation of racism at discourse, and discourse re-enacting geog-
a number of different levels comes to further raphy:
rationalise and justify notions of difference,
The colonial world is a world divided into
notions of superiority/inferiority, originally

compartments ... The colonial world is a
made on the level of the body. Particularly world cut in two. The dividing line, the
interesting in this respect is his description of frontiers are shown by barracks and police
the colonial division of space, and how this stations. In the colonies it is the policeman
comes to reify constructed notions of psycho- and soldier who are the official, instituted
logical, cultural, moral difference. Edward Said go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler
129
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 130
Critical Psychology
BOX 4 Manichean divisions in space (continued)
and his rule of oppression ... The zone town is a strongly-built town, all made of
where the natives live is not complementary stone and steel ... is brightly lit ... the
to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The garbage cans swallow all the leavings ...
two zones are opposed, but not in the The settler’s town is a town of white people
service of a higher unity. Obedient to the and foreigners. The town belonging to the
rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both colonized people, or at least the native
follow the principle of reciprocal exclu- town, the Negro village ... is a place of ill
sivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the fame, populated by men of evil repute ...
two terms, one is superfluous. The settler’s (Fanon, 1990, 29–30).
‘The separate worlds of white and black South Africa.’
FANON’S PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF RACISM

We are now in a position to bring together the different strands of Fanon’s
psychoanalytic account of racism. In a diverse set of references to personal
experience, popular culture, to theory and literature across Black skin, white
masks, Fanon is able to isolate two basic types of racist reaction. In relation to
blackness, as discussed above, he finds a whole series of derogatory values
relating to inferiority, baseness, sinfulness, lack of civilisation etc. These are

the typical responses of hatred that he understands as working within the
scapegoating mechanism. In other words, all that is considered undesirable
about the self, all that one does not want to admit, or feels guilty for, one
projects onto the Other, as a way of attaining one’s own ‘emotional
equilibrium’. The black man is hence for white culture the ‘object capable of
130
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 131

carrying the burden of original sin’ (Fanon, 1986, 192). Racism in this way is
essentially a kind of defence reaction, ‘projecting his own desires onto the
Negro, the white man behaves “as if ” the Negro really had them’ (1986, 165).
This, in a way, explains why racism so powerfully enforces and reaffirms rela-
tions of separation and distance – the racist wants as much distance from the
object of racism as possible given that he has projected all that is worst about
him or herself onto this racial other.
This explanation would seem to cover one set of racist reactions – but there
is another type of reaction – no doubt intermingled with the first – which
seems to require a somewhat different account. What Fanon has in mind here,
again as anticipated above, is the phobic reaction of the white racist to the
black. Here again we find in the racist a whole series of hateful or derisory
values. Somewhat unexpectedly however, there seems also to be a set of
positive, even idealising associations that are also to be found in the racist
response. There is, in short, just as in the phobic response, something quite
alluring, something quite compelling or attractive about the hated object
of racism.
The idealising component of racism

Such idealising associations may strike us as odd, particularly given that we are
used to understanding racism predominantly within the terms of prejudice
and hate. In contrast to this – or rather in addition to this understanding –
Fanon’s line of argument suggests that in every instance of racism there is also
a kind of idealising activity. Each form of racism contains within it the identi-
fication of highly valued social trait. And here again we detect a kind of
ambivalence – this trait is desired, and the racist subject covets this particular
quality, is jealous of it, wants to have it, and comes to fear and hate it or, more
directly, the racial other, for possessing it.
Take, for example, the case of anti-Semitism. ‘The Jew,’ says Fanon (1986),
‘is feared because of his [or her] potential for acquisitiveness’ (157). This –
despite what we may have expected – is an almost omnipresent theme in this
and all other forms of racism: the unexpected acknowledgement, even if irra-
tionally exaggerated, of an isolated positive quality taken to be specific to this
particular group of people. Importantly, this is not only a positive quality, it is
also one which is highly prized, even valorised within that given society. More
often than not it is a kind of essential quality or virtue that the racist would
dearly like to make his or her own. In fact, we may go so far as to say that it is
a quality that the racist would like to see represented within their most valued
personal attributes. Not a quality that can be manufactured; this quality is
taken to be an inherent trait, something that cannot simply be duplicated; this
is part of why it is so powerfully desired.
131
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 132
Critical Psychology
‘Racial jealousy’
Fanon (1990) provides another example of this idealising component of racism
in The wretched of the earth. In the case of European anti-Muslim sentiment in
Algeria at the time of the war of independence, Fanon claimed that the
European’s belief in the Muslim’s apparent liking for violence revealed a deep,
hidden admiration. In the case of white racism, the perceived attribute of
blacks that represents so much anxiety for whites is that of a massive sexual
potency. We need bear in mind here that the idealised component in racism –
the key stereotype around which its logic turns – is itself irrational, unjustified,
exaggerated. And Fanon (1986) is at pains to emphasise that this assumption
of white colonialists is unrealistic, that there is no evidence to suggest that the
sexual powers of blacks are in any way superior to that of whites.
Fanon (1986) provides empirical evidence in support of his suggestion that a
chief stereotype of blackness is that of unrestrained sexual appetites and/or abil-
ities. He conducted 500 association tests with white Europeans; when his
subjects came to associate to ideas of ‘the Negro’ he was confronted with a series
of images of sexuality, natural vitality, strength and athleticism. A particular
anxiety came to the forefront in the fear of ‘the raping Negro’: ‘The white man is
convinced that the Negro is a beast ... if it is not the length of his penis, then it is
the sexual potency that impresses him’ (Fanon, 1986, 170). There is a certain
concealed respect and/or jealousy at work here for Fanon, a ‘rapturous admira-
tion of black ... prowess’ (1986, 174). We should be aware here how, in the logic
of racism, even the apparent ‘racial virtue’ can be twisted into a vice – an ‘ideal
gone wrong’ as it were. Hence not only is the black man (in particular) reduced
to his virulent sexuality, but his sexuality calls all his other qualities into
question, problematises him, makes him morally questionable, savage, animal-
istic etc. Sexuality, of course, represents a particularly powerful set of instinctual
impulses, and is the chief cause of neuroses, particularly in classical Freudian
psychoanalysis. Fanon has hence identified a particularly strong underlying
current in the perpetuation of colonial racism, although, as discussed above, this
psychical process is not to be reduced to psychological mechanisms alone.
The sexual anxiety of the colonialist

There are two ways in which the perceived sexuality of the black man or
woman causes anxiety in the white colonial. First, we know already that in
colonial racism blackness becomes the ‘catch-all’ category for all negative
values and/or instincts. So, in a very broad way, the black subject comes to
represent all unadmitted and troubling sexual perversities. Hence, the black
subject comes to assume the burden of the European’s sense of sexual anxiety
(McCulloch, 1983). It is through the projection of sexual anxiety and/or guilt
onto the figure of the black – who is, after all, uncivilised, barbaric, uncultured
132
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 133

– that the European avoids a neurotic sense of their own sexuality, or so Fanon
claims (1986). Secondly, however, and perhaps more importantly, the
perceived sexual potency of the black man is enough to create a sense of inad-
equacy and insecurity in the white man, regarding his own sexual abilities.
There is a form of envy underlying this racism, reiterates Fanon, the white man
wishes he possessed what he considers to be the black man’s primitivism, his
joy for life, his unrivalled sexual capacities.
The colonial condition is characterised by extremely high levels of sexual
anxiety for Fanon, and particularly so in white men, who are unusually preoc-
cupied with the threat posed by black men to white women. In this regard
Fanon makes historical reference to the US-American phenomenon of
lynching, that is, group acts of racially motivated mutilation and murder
carried out by white men chiefly on black men, Ku Klux Klan hangings being
the most obvious example. These acts were almost unfailing justified on the
basis of some or other apparent sexual misconduct of the black man, on the
contention that he had made inappropriate sexual advances to a white woman.
This, for Fanon, is an example of how white men have projected their own
sexual anxiety, in the form of exaggerated claims of the sexual powers, abilities
and intentions, onto black men. The fear of the Negrophobe stems from the
fact, as McCulloch (1983) puts it, that they feel a sense of diminution relative
to the fantasy of the black man’s incredible sexual powers. As Fanon puts it:
The white man is convinced that the Negro is a beast ... Face to face with this man
who is ‘different from himself ’, he needs to defend himself. In other words, to
personify the Other. The Other will become the mainstay of his preoccupations
and desires (1986, 120).
The racial stereotype

It is worth reiterating here that the ‘positive’ or idealised trait that the racial
Other is thought to possess, also comes to be twisted into an object of scorn
and derision. Revulsion and attraction, as in the case of the phobic response,
co-exist here; indeed this particular quality, be it that of the perceived indus-
triousness of the Jew, for example, is a basis both for hate and for unadmitted
jealously. The logic of racism at this level therefore seems to be something like:
‘I blame you for something I do not have, that I imagine you to have, that I
place a huge amount of importance on, and that would make me better than
what I am.’ The element of jealousy is clearly very strong here, and one way of
rationalising away both this jealousy and the hatred of the racial Other who
possesses this desired attribute is through a kind of stereotyping or carica-
turing. The tactic here is to exaggerate this quality hopelessly – a process we are
familiar with from the working of the phobia – ridiculously amplifying it,
‘blowing it out of all proportion’, so as to make it seem hopelessly extreme,
unbalanced, unhealthy.
133
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 134
Critical Psychology
It would seem often to be the case in racism that the racial Other possessing
the desired attribute, be it the Jew or the Muslim, is reduced to this particular
quality, as if it exhausted all there was to know about them. Hence even this
valued quality is, in a sense, corrupted because it is framed as excessive, as the
only feature that this particular racial group possesses. So unbalanced, so
extreme, so, in a sense, pathological becomes this attribute that it is made out
to be undesirable. This form of prejudicial thinking works in two ways, not
only does it now pretend that the desirable attribute is no longer desirable; it
also objectifies the racial grouping thought to possess it, by virtue of the idea
that there is nothing else worth knowing about them. The Jew, to pursue the
above example, is nothing more than the acquisitive drive, the love of money.
What we detect here, in the unrealistic and racist reduction of a person or
Stereotype/ category to one or more basic qualities, is the racial stereotype.
stereotyping:
reduction of a The paranoia of racism
person or a
category of person The desired object is not only exaggerated, it is also now broadened and
to one (or more) twisted into a threat to my well-being, made both omnipresent, and power-
basic quality that is fully dangerous. Here, then, we confront the paranoid element in racism, the
taken to be sense of personal threat, the danger of my ‘coming undone’ that the racial
particular to them.
The stereotype is other is always thought to possess. This is what would seem to be at the
itself irrational, an bottom of the true hatred of racism: the sense that the racial other is taking
exaggerated or something away from me, that they are somehow stealing my livelihood, my
unrealistic vitality, something of immense value to my identity and/or my existence.
attribution which is
hence an example
That is why I hate you: because you imperil my life and all the things I hold
of prejudice. dear and stand for.
This logic seems paranoid because it hugely amplifies a perceived threat,
makes the racial other out to be a potentially controlling force who has mali-
cious intents, or evil designs, that target me. Hence the racial other inevitably
poses the threat of moral corruption, the degeneration of values, the violation
of law and order, of ‘the ways things are meant to be’. As Fanon puts it, ‘The
Negro destroys, brings to nothing, ruins, damages ... [is] the detriment of
what we have of our civilisation’ (1986, 180). Put differently, we might say that
this threat starts to approximate something like a delusion of persecution. It
fashions a plot that makes the Other (and the Other’s desired attributes)
responsible for my downfall. This logic is likewise paranoid in nature by
virtue of the fact of its sheer repetitiveness. Indeed, there is something
paranoid about the repetitiveness of racism. Why, one is tempted to ask the
racist, is it necessary continually to reaffirm, to reiterate and act out one’s own
racial superiority – to continually point out the Other’s supposed inferiority –
if this is simply a known fact? Why does one continually need to reassert this
‘fact’ of one’s own superiority and the Other’s inferiority if you are so confi-
dent of it?
134
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 135

Paranoia as defence
The only way to make sense of this emotional reaction is via the logic of
paranoia. That is, the threat of the other needs to be hopelessly exaggerated,
the racist response needs to be continually repeated. Why? Well, because each
of these operations provides a means of defending against my own lack, my
own insecurity. Put differently, there is a bisarre kind of emotional logic at
work here, which twists itself into irrational forms precisely so I can prevent
myself from confronting two basic facts: (1) the perception that I am lacking
something that you have, that I badly want; (2) a deep and lingering sense of
inadequacy which stems from this perception. I don’t want to admit to either
of these facts. The best way to ‘short-circuit’ these realisations, to maintain my
own emotional equilibrium, is to represent them instead as threats coming
from the other. So, my anxieties are not at basis my own personal inadequa-
cies; rather they are a realistic reaction to the dangerous threat that you pose.
It is not that I lack a particular quality, it is rather than you have this quality in
an excessive and hence dangerous quantity. In this twisted emotional logic of
racism I, the racist, hence become the victim of you, the ‘racial Other’ who
undermines and threatens my existence. You, on the other hand, become my
persecutor, that which represents all that is threatening to me. Hence, I deserve
protection against you, and you, on the other hand, deserve punishment.
How the psychological repeats the political

In Fanon’s references above to Freud and Jung, we see how he borrows
concepts from psychoanalysis but puts them to use within the frame of a very
precise historical and political context. As I suggested above in relation to
In this twisted
emotional logic of
racism, I deserve
protection against
you, and you, on
the other hand,
deserve punishment.
135
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 136
Critical Psychology
Freud, it would seem that Fanon’s use of Jungian ideas departs so strongly from
their original conceptualisation that they become totally different concepts.
While this is in part true, Fanon’s analyses of the colonial situation are original,
and do not simply duplicate any foregoing analytical frameworks, it is impor-
tant to remember that, despite his powerful focus on social and political
contextual issues, Fanon does not want to lose sight of psychological concepts,
nor, indeed, a psychological level of analysis. This we see quite plainly in his
psychoanalysis of racism – although, even here, the specific context of the
colonial situation remains paramount.
This is the particular complexity of Fanon’s ‘psychopolitics’ and hence his
‘critical psychology – an awareness that psychology does feature in politics, and
that if we are to be able to confront racism properly, for example, we will need
to have a sophisticated understanding of how it works. Fanon is aware that
derogatory images of blackness can and do infiltrate the unconscious mind,
that such images and myths do feature in and motivate dreams, phobias,
symptoms and neuroses, even though this is not their primary level of exis-
tence, nor their point of origin. This is the challenge of Fanon’s approach: not
just an ability to conceptualise how politics impacts on psychology but an
awareness also of how the psychological repeats, reiterates and reinforces the
political. So, racism, like denigrating images of blackness, are in no way natural,
ahistorical, predisposed ‘qualities of cerebral matter’, although they do, in
racist or colonial environments, feature powerfully in the unconscious minds of
individuals and of the society, just as they do circulate within its psychical
phenomena. The conclusion we may draw from this state of affairs is that we
need strong psychological accounts of racism if such forms of prejudice are to
be adequately confronted and redressed. Such an account of racism finds its
place as one component part of an awareness and contestation of forms of
racism and prejudice, even if it alone is not sufficient. Racism no doubt exists at
levels of social structure, of social meaning and discourse, as well as at the level
of individual psychology. All such dimensions of racism need to be confronted.
We should take an important lesson from Fanon’s late work, where he focuses
his attentions on the revolutionary attempt to destroy the material conditions
of a racist, colonial social structure. That is to say, as important as a psycholog-
ical level of awareness and critique is here, it itself will never be enough.
A point of criticism
This chapter has attempted to illustrate how Fanon has drawn on aspects of
Western psychoanalysis to dramatise both the workings of racism and the
deep psychological impact of the colonial encounter. Particularly important
here, as in the previous chapter, is Fanon’s description of that in-between
position, the condition of a ‘white mask psychology’, of the black man or
woman who wants to be white, who often experiences him- or herself as white,
136
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 137

but none the less runs up against the force of white racism which imprisons
him or her in a derogatory form of blackness.
There is an important point of specification that needs to be made here. We
can understand how Fanon himself experienced such an in-between position.
He was a well-educated doctor with a middle-class background in Martinique,
from a family of reasonable economic means, whole-heartedly initiated into
the traditions of Western philosophy and psychiatry. The ‘white mask
psychology’ of which he writes should perhaps be tied to this particular
context rather than be understood as the universal conflict or circumstances of
the response of all black people to racism or colonialism. Why do I say this?
Because, as McCulloch (1983) emphasises, Fanon has perhaps neglected
somewhat the dimension of class in his analysis. Not all black subjects find
themselves caught in this in-between state, simply because they may well not
have the economic or cultural, or even the historical, means to move beyond
the basest level of racist objectification. Taking an example from Fanon (1986)
himself, the Senegalese, he claims, were considered by many Martiniquians, to
be ‘more black’, so to speak, less civilised, a social and cultural level below such
Martiniquians themselves. Less socially mobile than the majority of
Martiniquians (at least relative to the norms and values of French culture), it
would seem that the Senegalese were perhaps less subject to being caught in
such a midway state between cultures. It is in this respect that McCulloch
(1983) argues that a greater awareness of class and class differences would have
sharpened Fanon’s analysis of colonial racism.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented one aspect of what we might loosely term Fanon’s
‘critical psychology’, namely a direction of ‘psychopolitics’ that politicises
psychology by approaching issues of social power and politics via the critical
use of a psychological (or psychoanalytic) vocabulary. Importantly, though,
even when Fanon revisits the domain of psychoanalysis so as to provide us with
an interpretation of the psychodynamics of racism, he is wary not to reduce
racism to the intrapsychic, to in any way naturalise, or ‘psychologise it away’.
Fanon’s analysis ties his psychological analyses at each point to very real
sociopolitical and historical circumstances of colonial domination.
By adapting the theoretical notion of neurosis into that of racial neurosis,
Fanon has succeeded in providing a powerful account of the damaging impact

of a ‘white mask psychology’. That is, he has dramatised, in a critical and
analytical manner, the severity of the impact upon the identity and psyche of
racist politics on the black subject. In so doing, one of Fanon’s major theoret-
ical contributions, historically speaking, has been to put race ‘on the map’, as a
central term in any critical analysis of power or psychology.
137
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap05 11/2/04 10:20 am Page 138
Critical Psychology

1. Fanon’s accounts of racial neurosis and of the ‘European Collective Uncon-
sciousness’ are heavily indebted to Freud and Jung respectively.
Importantly, Fanon differs fundamentally from certain of the basic under-
lying principles of each of these underlying theories. Carefully list these
differences, reflecting on how Fanon prefers a sociogenetic account of
neurosis and racism.
2. Fanon provides a complex interpretation of racism. Detail an instance of
racism that you have witnessed, applying, where possible, the conceptual
terms Fanon has used to illustrate the workings of racism.
3. Why is racism so resistant to change, even when it is fundamentally irra-
tional in form? Fanon provides a number of reasons why this might be so.
Elaborate.
Fanon’s key texts are Black skin, white masks (1986) (London: Pluto Press)
and The wretched of the earth (1990) (London: Penguin). While they can
be difficult and opaque at first, there is no substitute for attempting to
master the concepts as Fanon himself presents them.
Macey’s recent (2000) biography Frantz Fanon: A life (London: Granta) is
perhaps the most extensive account yet of Fanon’s life and politics. Not
particularly psychological in nature, and perhaps overdetailed in its preoc-
cupation with the politics of the Algerian war of independence, it none the
less makes for a superb introduction to the life, writings and revolutionary
activities of Frantz Fanon.
McCulloch’s (1983) Black soul white artifact: Fanon’s clinical psychology
and social theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) seems under-
represented in the literature on Fanon, which is a pity because it is an
excellent book. It provides a very incisive, yet critical overview of Fanon’s
thought, usefully linking the theoretical components of Black skin, white
masks both to the later The wretched of the earth and to a series of Fanon’s
clinical papers. McCulloch is not afraid to critique Fanon, and points out
apparent inconsistencies and contradictions when he finds them. The way
he rephrases and explains some of Fanon’s denser theoretical postulates is
of great value to anyone attempting to gain a basic grasp of the material.
138
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 139
Chapter
6
Psychoanalysis and
critical psychology
Ian Parker
‘The truth of psychoanalysis lies in its very exaggerations.’

Theodor Adorno
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explain the basic psychoanalytic conceptualisations of the unconscious and sexual
desire
Show how certain kinds of psychoanalysis (such as Kleinian psychoanalysis) serve
to treat certain psychological characteristics as essential and unchanging
Expand on how some kinds of psychoanalysis (such as US-American ego-
psychology) can be used strategically and pragmatically to deal with pressing tasks
of critical psychology
Demonstrate how certain kinds of psychoanalysis (taking the French Lacanian
tradition as an example) can link psychoanalytic work with an analysis of culture.
139
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 140
Critical Psychology
INTRODUCTION
Against an essentialising psychology
Critical psychology is, amongst other things, an attempt to problematise the
place of psychological explanations in patterns of power and ideology. In this
respect it is important that we remain aware of the force of psychological
knowledge, of the fact that it wields authority and power, particularly within
Western societies, and particular with reference to questions of what is
normality and abnormal, and in terms of the ‘truth’ of deep internal states of
being. For this reason, a key objective of critical psychology is to contest essen-
tialising forms of psychology. These are those types of psychology that generate
internal categories of personhood that are unchanging and timeless, that come
to be inescapable, and hence that bear a determining influence of sorts on the
person in question. Determining, that is, at least inasmuch as that person
comes to understand themselves and how they are understood by others.
Essentialising forms
of psychology:
those types of
psychology which
generate internal
categories of
personhood that are
unchanging and
timeless, that come
to be inescapable,
and that therefore
bear a determining
influence of sorts on
the person in
question.
Why are such essentialising trends so much of a problem for critical

psychology? Well, at the most basic level, such categorical ways of thinking
harbour racism, sexism and various other forms of prejudice (see Tamara
Shefer’s chapter in this work: Psychology and the regulation of gender for an
extended discussion of this point). They are often the means through which
certain dominant constructions of the world – or of particular groups of
people – come to be reiterated, solidified, given a kind of psychological
grounding, and hence a formidable kind of ‘reality’. Such essentialising trends
are a prime way that constructed and political notions come to be normalised,
140
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 141
Psychoanalysis and critical psychology

naturalised, psychologised. This, in other words, is one of the primary ways in

which psychology functions ideologically. Once we understand this, it
becomes clear why an overwhelming priority of critical psychology lies with
tackling the way psychology mirrors and hence reproduces present-day, cultur-
ally specific and historically bound assumptions about human nature,
experience and behaviour (Parker, 1999).
The ideological complicity of psychoanalysis

One of the oldest modes of psychological explanation is that of psycho-
analysis. Psychoanalysis in its dominant English-speaking forms, for example,
has long tried to interest psychologists in its work and it has sought to legiti-
mate itself by drawing on mainstream psychological research. Clearly,
psychoanalysis does not necessarily lead us to be critical, and it does not
necessarily oppose the essentialising trends of much psychology – at times it
even extends them. Hence one of the principal objectives of this chapter is to
take to task a number of psychoanalytic explanations – principally those of
Kleinian psychoanalysis – that work in the essentialising ways described
above. The second objective of this chapter also lies with a critical scrutiny of
psychoanalysis. Here, however, the objective is to bring to the surface those
radical elements of psychoanalytic theory that are generally ‘screened out’ by
the ideological concerns that have come to structure psychology. It seems that
there is some radical potential within psychoanalysis, a potential that we
should not reject out of hand just because certain applications of psycho-
analysis have been politically conservative. Here it is just as important to
consider those kinds of psychoanalysis that have not been put to popular use
as those that have. If it is the case that psychology is structured around the
ideological preoccupations of capitalist society, that it constructs what it
pretends to discover – namely (and mostly typically), the alienated competi-
tive subject of capitalist society – then any articulation of subjectivity that
would extend beyond this framework would be systematically filtered out
A principal
(Parker, 1997). It most certainly does seem to be the case that a great deal of objective of critical
psychoanalytic theory has been ‘ideologically domesticated’, brought into psychology lies with
line with a series of status quo assumptions and understandings of the day. tackling the way
This, however, is not all that psychoanalysis has to offer. Such ideologically psychology mirrors
and hence
domesticated uses of psychoanalysis do not exhaust all of its potential critical reproduces present-
extensions or applications.
day, culturally
specific and
historically bound
The radical potential of psychoanalytic thought assumptions about
In fact, as a number of theorists have attempted to shown over the last 50 or so human nature,
years, there remains a radical critical and political potential within psychoana- experience and
behaviour.
lytic theory. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School – Adorno and Marcuse
141
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 142
Critical Psychology
Rational unitary
(1969) in particular – looked to psychoanalysis in this way (Elliot, 1992), as did
subject: early psychoanalyst Reich (1970), the Marxist Althusser (1971), a series of
term used to feminist theorists such as Mitchell (1974), but also Kristeva, Irigaray and
describe the image Cixous (see Minsky, 1996), and a series of post-colonial thinkers such as
of the self used in
current academic
Bhabha, Spivak and, of course, Fanon (see Moore-Gilbert (1997)) (for Fanon’s
and popular critical use of psychoanalysis, see Derek Hook’s chapter in this work: Fanon
discourse in Europe and the psychoanalysis of racism).
and US-America. In fact, one might argue that it would be a serious omission for critical
Psychologists have
psychology if we were to neglect the subversive potential of psychoanalysis.
been the most
enthusiastic Why so? Because psychoanalysis is founded on the notion of the unconscious,
supporters of this which, for Freud at least, is the home of those transgressive desires that cannot
image as it allows be represented in the domain of the symbolic that cannot be allowed, except in
them to value distorted and disguised forms, into the realm of culture. Given this, it would
‘rational’ cognitive
processes over seem that psychoanalysis holds a powerful potential for the subversion of
feeling and treat certain ideological notions, such as essentialised categories of gender, or the
the mind as made notion of the singular, rational and self-conscious subject (Grosz, 1990). As
of components Minsky (1996) puts it, ‘in stressing the central role of the unconscious in all
unified to make a
self into a subject
identity ... (in everything with which we make an identification, including
they can study. language and knowledge), psychoanalysis inevitably suggests that all
meanings can be potentially subverted’ (xii). This, she (1996) claims, is the
ever-present potential of the unconscious to disrupt meaning.
Symbolic: New forms of theory and explanation
for psychoanalysis,
a domain of There is an important lesson here for critical psychology. Critical psychology
language, law should not become a static form of criticism satisfied simply to point out, to
and/or social destabilise, and pick apart the ideological contents or functioning of
authority.
psychology. In the same vein, critical psychology should not focus simply on
what has been ‘screened in’, allowed within the frame of broader psychological
discourse. If this was all that critical psychology was, if this was the sum total
Psychologisation: of its approach and content, then it would soon be relegated to little more than
turning human a watchdog position within the broader discourse of psychology. It would, in
experience into other words, amount to little more than a minor critical term, easily dismissed,
categories reduced
to the level of the
unable really to challenge the massive orthodoxy of mainstream psychology.
individual and The contribution of critical psychology needs to be more proactive, and more
objectified so that substantial than that. Critical psychology should look to the radical potential
psychologists can of either that lying outside of psychology or to that lying at its peripheries (as
treat them as
in the case of neglected aspects of psychoanalytic theory) with a view to intro-
processes and vari-
ables that can be ducing rival forms of theory and explanation into psychology itself. Critical
discovered inside psychology needs to do more than point out the ideological complicity of
people and manipu- standard psychology; it needs to facilitate and encourage rival theories and
lated in empirical forms of explanation which counter these ideological biases, and which do so
research studies.
in an ongoing way.
142
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 143

In the course of this chapter I will explore how psychoanalysis might be Cathartic:
profitably connected to critical psychology. In doing this I will warn that we effect in which
need to refuse reactionary ideas in psychoanalysis that may lead us from there is insight and
psychology into something at least as bad. More than this, I will argue that we a feeling that one
has discharged
have to refuse the psychologisation of psychoanalysis that may lead us from something painful
being critical back into old reactionary psychology again. inside oneself.
WHAT IS, AND WHAT IS NOT, PSYCHOANALYSIS? Oedipus complex:

Psychoanalysis is a ‘talking cure’ developed by Sigmund Freud and his here the child has
to deal with a rival
followers at the end of the 19th century. Its first premise, that talking about – usually its father
traumatic events would have a ‘ccathartic’ effect (in which there is insight and a – for its first love
feeling that one has discharged something painful inside oneself ), was later object, usually
elaborated on and transformed into a full-blown theory of how infants become the mother.
walking, talking human beings. The well-known psychoanalytic descriptions
Oedipus complex’ (in which the child has to deal with a rival – usually
of the ‘O Freudian slips:
in Western-style nuclear families the father – for their first love object, usually ‘slips of the
tongue’, where what
the mother) and ‘FFreudian slips’ of the tongue (in which unconscious desire for
we say seems an
others, which has been formed out of the first contradictory relationships of error, but it actually
love and hatred for the parents, appear in disguised form in everyday life) are reveals an instance
often referred to in the media. But what lies underneath those popular repre- of unconscious
sentations of what psychoanalysis is about? desire.
Two key ideas define psychoanalysis in Freud’s work, and they define the
battleground over psychoanalysis through the last century, namely the notions Psyche/psychical:
of the unconscious, and sexual desire. of, related to, or
affecting the mind.
A term for psycho-
The unconscious logical processes
The first defining idea of psychoanalysis is the notion of the unconscious. The and qualities.
‘unconscious’ is a realm of psychical activity that operates beyond our
conscious control, manifesting itself in unexpected ways in our everyday life in Critical psychology
dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes. The unconscious, at least in classical needs to do more
psychoanalysis, is at the same time a vast repository of inaccessible memories than point out the
ideological compli-
and experiences, and a storehouse of our most disturbing ideas and impulses, city of standard
ideas and impulses that we would find abhorrent and disturbing, to say the psychology; it
least, should we be directly confronted with them. These are ideas that have needs to facilitate
been ‘repressed’ because they are too painful, because they will cause us and encourage
rivalling theories
massive anxiety should they be admitted, are still at work in the unconscious,
and forms of
and they emerge in disguised form as slips of the tongue, jokes and dreams. It explanation which
is important to note here that for Freud the unconscious is constructed of our counter these
earliest desires and losses, and that these powerful childhood emotions and ideological biases,
and which do so in
wants make up its system of ‘frozen meanings’. These meanings are thought to
an ongoing way.
influence everything we do, without us being aware of it. It is exactly because
143
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 144
Critical Psychology
they are so old, ‘primal’, stemming from most basic childhood emotions, that
we would find them difficult to accept or to identify with. It is in this respect
that Freud understands the unconscious as ‘knowing no time’ as unchanging in
its basic constituents. Freud took these apparently nonsensical and super-
fluous aspects of our everyday life, that is, dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes etc,
seriously. Psychoanalysis is a way of reading significance into our everyday
actions, activities and wishes so as to discover the way the unconscious is at
work both in the choices we make and in our reactions to others.
Psychoanalysis is a
way of reading
significance into
What the unconscious means to psychology
our everyday Psychology is happy to look at ‘non-conscious’ processes and hence show that
actions, activities people do not really know what they are doing. Psychoanalysis unravels
and wishes, so as to
discover the way
consciousness much further, so as to question the assumption that any kind of
the unconscious is psychologist could know better – than we are ourselves – what we are doing.
at work both in the There is a point of critical reflection to be made here. Once you open the question
choices we make of the unconscious you should be led to examine what psychologists think they
and in our reactions
to others.
are doing when they examine other people. This would seem especially so if it is
the case that psychologists are qualifying themselves with an ability to read the
actions and thoughts of people better than they themselves can.
For psychoanalysis,
who we are always
seems to be a kind
of negotiation
between individual
and social. In this
approach, we can
never isolate the
individual, access
them apart from the
social world, which
continually
influences who they
are and want to be.
Sexual desire
The second defining idea of psychoanalysis is that of sexual desire. Psycho-
analysis sees unconscious sexual desire as the mainspring of human
relationships. More than this, psychoanalysis also treats this unconscious
sexuality as a strange mixture of a drive for connection and erotic gratification
144
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 145

that is very different from our everyday adult conscious ideas about what sex
is. The ‘repression’ of our sexual desires is considered by psychoanalysis to be
a necessary part of growing up. Furthermore, we are thought to use different
kinds of defence against our desires throughout our lives. These desires affect
who we attach ourselves to on an individual and an intra-psychic level. Broader
forms of such desires are also evident in the social world and come to be
manipulated in the representations of mass media forms, as in advertising
images, for example, to imply that we will get some kind of sexual enjoyment
from buying certain products.
Most of the time mainstream psychology reduces sexuality to the banal and
predictable question ‘are there any sex differences?’. Psychoanalysis opens up
that question into a more radical one, which is ‘how is it that ‘sex differences’
comes to define who you think you are?’. It is important that we properly grasp
the psychoanalytic notion of desire here. One way of doing this is by suggesting
that human beings are the only creatures who can truly experience sexual
desire in a powerful subjective and psychological form, that is, who experience
desire in excess of the mere satisfaction of reproductive instincts. Put differ-
ently, human beings come to appreciate a variety of bodily sensations that were
initially tied to instinctual needs but that have subsequently come to be
enjoyed as pleasurable sensations outside of the fulfilment of any necessary
biological or physiological function. This is why the term ‘instinct’ is so
misleading a term. Freud explicitly used the German term ‘Trieb’, which
should be translated as ‘drive’, a force on the border of the physiological and
the psychical. What we experience driving us is always invested with meaning,
it is not a simply biologically wired in motor for psychoanalysis (Bettelheim,
1986).
This is the kind of sexuality that Freud has in mind in speaking of sexual
desire, a striving for pleasure which may be separated out from the needs for
survival, which is habit and tendency forming, and which comes to bear a very
powerful influence on the patterns of behaviour, the preferences and aversions
we will exhibit in later life. It is true to say, then, that in classical Freudian
terms, the difficult and painful process by which we become conscious human
subjects is marked by ‘infantile sexuality’ and what we, and others, do with it.
What sexual desire means to psychology

Mainstream psychology finds all the talk of unconscious sexuality in psycho-
analysis very difficult to incorporate into its models of the rational individual,
and to speak of such things disturbs any clear boundary between what is indi-
vidual and what is social. Why is this so? Well, first, because the individual
does not simply ‘know’ himself or herself in any stable way when it comes to
questions of sexuality and desire. For psychoanalysis we do not always fully
know why we do what we do – in fact, for a very large part of the time, we
145
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 146
Critical Psychology
Anti-essentialism:
definitely do not know all of the reasons why we do things, or make certain
approach to choices. This makes for something of a challenge to the rational, ‘knowable’
subjectivity, individual that forms the focus of much psychology.
sexuality or identity Furthermore, sexuality, in the Freudian interpretation given above, is
which suggests that
persons are not
extremely flexible, pliable, adaptable, not needing to take any one predisposed
fixed, predeter- form or content. Importantly here, we are not innately heterosexual for Freud,
mined, immutable just as we are not innately drawn, sexually, to any one kind of person or one
or unchanging basic type of sexual interaction or act. There is a powerfully anti-essentialist
essences.
strain to Freud’s notions of sexuality which defy commonplace notions of what
is and is not sexually ‘normative’. Plainly put, there is no normative model for
early sexuality for Freud: we all begin life in a polymorphously perverse state,
a phrase Freud coins to suggest that we have as yet no preferred form of sexual
pleasure, or sexual partner, or part of the body. This approach to sexuality is
also difficult to assimilate fully into much mainstream psychology in that it
Polymorphously
allows for no strict defining line between what is individual and social. Indeed,
perverse: if the form of our sexuality is not predetermined, but instead comes from inter-
here Freud suggests actions with the outside world, then who we are, at least as sexual beings,
that we have at the always seems to be a kind of negotiation between individual and social. Simi-
earliest stages of
larly, if the sexual desire which is treated as so vital to our individual
life no preferred
form of sexual personhood is always a kind of relation to things outside of us, then we can
pleasure, sexual never isolate the individual, access such things apart from the social world
partner (sexual which continually exercises an influence on who they are and on who they
type), part of the want to be. This makes psychoanalysis disturbing not only to the psychologists
body or kind of
sexual interaction.
but also to those types of bureaucratic control, and those forms of common-
place discourse and understanding that would like to know exactly who we are
and pin us into their own categories of sex, race and personality.
Psychoanalysis as against essentialist psychology

Psychoanalysis precisely poses a question to us about who we are and how we
have come to be, a question that is necessarily one without a clear answer, one
There is a powerfully that defies any attempt to find underlying essential psychological processes.
anti-essentialist What we need to document, as part of our critical attention to the ideological
strain to Freud’s
notions of sexuality
forms that are very compatible with mainstream psychology, and to avoid, in
which defy common- the development of our own perspectives, are those reactionary motifs which
place notions of tell us that we cannot change society because we cannot change the under-
what is and is not lying nature of human beings. Here we see a form of psychological thinking
sexually ‘normative’.
which is very powerfully ideological – it discourages any attempt to change
There is no norma-
tive model for early society, and makes our current circumstances appear as if they are the only
sexuality for Freud: way they ever could have been, as if there are no real social, political or histor-
we all begin life in ical alternatives. Some of these most reactionary motifs appear when
a ‘polymorphously psychoanalysis makes racial difference into an essential asymmetric differ-
perverse’ state.
ence that is impossible to change.
146
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 147

BOX 1 Why Jung is a problem for critical work in psychoanalysis in South Africa
It is not surprising, perhaps, that approaches approach so problematic within apartheid

derived from Carl Jung – a one-time colleague of psychology? Because it allowed such psycholo-
Freud from Zurich who later broke away to found gists to set up the terms of human experience of
his own ‘analytical psychology’ – should have black and white subjects as almost totally
been the most popular ‘psychoanalytic’ perspec- different, without commonality. This is itself a
tives under apartheid in South Africa. What kind of racist essentialisation. Indeed, phenom-
Jung provides is an ideological legitimation for enological psychologists could travel out from
the underlying differences between racial groups their departments to the ‘homelands’ of
in the name of ‘archetypes’. While humanists like oppressed cultures in order to explore the
to gaze at the universal archetypes that are different life-worlds, and then return back home
common to all humanity, they avert their gaze reassured that those horizons of meaning were
from the no less necessary notion in Jung’s work so utterly distant from their own that they really
of ‘racial archetypes’ that distinguish the essen- did necessitate the joys of separate develop-
tially different psychology of one group from ment. The lesson of this is two-fold: it is an
another (Dalal, 1988). This Jungian trap leads indictment of Jung, who for these purposes we
us straight back into the worst of phenome- do not include in the scope of psychoanalysis
nology, an approach that looks like an proper; and it is a warning that a simple rejec-
alternative to laboratory-experimental psycho- tion of laboratory-experimental psychology is
logy but actually was the mainstay of apartheid not at all a guarantee that we will do something
psychology. Why was the phenomenological more critical.
How critical psychology might use psychoanalysis Jungian:

We will now turn to look at how different varieties of psychoanalysis might be Jungians downplay
helpful or otherwise to the project of critical psychology. We shall do this, first, the importance of
sexual desire (which
by looking at how psychoanalytic approaches serve to essentialise their was crucial to Freud)
accounts in the name of truth (that is, to find fixed things under the surface and talk about the
that will explain everything). Secondly, we shall call attention to how psycho- ‘subconscious’ (not a
analysis might work pragmatically in the service of critical work (that is, how Freudian term) and
different layers of
it might be tactical and open to different possibilities that might be useful to the mind in racial
us. Thirdly, we shall hope to open a space for reflection on the construction of and human history
psychoanalysis’s own accounts (to look at how its arguments have been formed in the ‘collective
in distinct cultural contexts). In each case we shall look at institutional unconscious’. Today
Jungians are not
processes, clinical work and research strategies. The question here is how to usually considered
understand the way psychoanalysis takes root in a culture, how it might to be part of the
function to relieve distress and how we might make psychoanalytic ideas psychoanalytic
useful for critical research in psychology. tradition.
ESSENTIALIST PSYCHOANALYSIS: OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS

One of the problems with psychoanalysis is that people who really believe it try
to spread it with an evangelistic zeal that makes every phenomenon that it
studies fit into a grid of hidden fixed essences. There is an essentialism in much
147
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 148
Critical Psychology
Phenomenology:
English-speaking psychoanalysis that becomes evident in the attempts to bring
philosophical the good word once again to Africa in training institutions modelled on those in
approach that Western Europe. We see this essentialism also in the attempts to explain the
attempted to study as history and effects of oppression in psychologically reductionist terms, and in
fully as possible all
the appearances of
the attempts to discover in research material the underlying processes psycho-
human experience. analysis knows must be there. Here psychoanalysis works like a meta-
Phenomenology narrative, that is, a privileged form of explanation, an account, a story or a theo-
demands that one retical system, that is treated as superior to all others in its explanatory abilities.
bracket one’s own
Psychoanalysis thus becomes the most ‘real’ form of explanation available, and
subjective position,
along with all objec- theoretical postulates and constructs of which it speaks come to be reified.
tive notions of truth Psychoanalytic forms of explanation hence come to be projected onto the
and knowledge, world, onto all kinds of social phenomena, with an unquestionable reality and
wherever possible, in
importance. Here we see one of the central dangers of psychoanalytic thought:
order to grasp the
lived experience of what had claimed to be a mode of interpreting the world comes instead to be a
one’s subject. way of constructing it, of imposing its categories and understandings on it.
BOX 2 Key (essentialist) concepts from British psychoanalysis
British psychoanalysis has been heavily influ- relations’ theory in psychoanalysis because Klein
enced by the work of Melanie Klein, and one of sees the defensive processes as happening inside
the three factions in the British Psychoanalytical the mind of the individual rather than between
Society consists of followers of her ideas. people. The most extreme defences of ‘splitting’
Kleinian psychoanalysis is a good example of into good and bad objects occurs during the
‘essentialist psychoanalysis’. For Kleinians the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position, and Kleinians claim
unconscious is conceptualised as being like a that there is a developmental shift in the infant
separate space in the mind outside conscious from the paranoid-schizoid position (charac-
awareness that is full of different ‘instincts’ terised by acute fear and hostility and defended
which have direct representation in objects. The by splitting into the good and the bad) to the
mind is assumed to be heterosexual, and this ‘depressive’ position in which we recognise that
basic characteristic is seen as biologically wired- we have ambivalent feelings to other people.
in; the infant already unconsciously knows, for Not only is Klein’s view of the mind very grim,
example, what the difference between men and but she sees these destructive and defensive
women is. The infant (and adult) defends itself processes as universal and unchanging. For
from these unconscious instinctual forces by Kleinians these are ‘developmental’ processes,
using mechanisms such as ‘projective identifica- but they also assume that we flip from one
tion’, in which they expel unpleasant objects ‘position’ to the other throughout adult life, and
from their own minds into the minds of others. so psychoanalysis in this tradition aims to bring
Kleinians are concerned with relations between the patient from a paranoid-schizoid position to
‘objects’, then, but they differ from ‘object- a depressive position.
Let us take each of the components of the problems in essentialist psycho-

analysis in turn, looking at institutional, clinical and research aspects of this
approach.
148
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 149

Institutional contexts for new forms of colonialism Meta-narrative:

Psychoanalysis has a built-in fail-safe mechanism that kicks in when critical privileged form of
researchers try to use its ideas and then want to reflect on its limitations. We explanation; story
or theoretical
can see this mechanism as a ‘ddefence mechanism’ that manifests itself in the system treated as
argument that only those who have been through analysis themselves can superior to all
understand what psychoanalysis is, and so only practising psychoanalysts are others in its
in a position to comment on the shortcomings of the approach. (The idea of explanatory
abilities. Psycho-
‘defence mechanisms’ refers to the strategies that we are thought to use to
analysis and
protect ourselves from psychic pain, or from thoughts and memories that Marxism have often
evoke pain.) A defence mechanism is something that psychoanalysis typically been accused of
detects in individuals, but psychoanalytic theory becomes politically useful working in this way.
when we can use it not simply to analyse individuals but, perhaps more impor-
tantly, to analyse institutions. It is in this sense that psychoanalysis can operate
institutionally as a self-protecting discourse. This argument needs to be
tackled by critical psychologists, who are not engaged in clinical practice,
because it has a number of serious implications for any kind of radical work. Projection:
The consequences of this traditional psychoanalytic argument also draw atten- mental mechanism
tion to the need for careful scrutiny of psychoanalysis by critical psychologists. by which the infant
expels unwanted or
Institutionalised psychoanalysis in South Africa frightening aspects
of his or her
One consequence of the way that institutional psychoanalysis discredits internal world, and
unqualified psychoanalytic accounts is that countries such as South Africa that projects them onto
do not have local training organisations controlled by the International someone or some-
thing else in the
Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) end up having their own indigenous external world.
‘psychoanalytic’ work discredited. (The International Psychoanalytical Associ-
ation is the organisation set up by Freud and the one that dominates
discussions of psychoanalysis in the English-speaking world.) Those psycho-
analysts who have been trained outside the country are then in an
Defence
extraordinarily privileged position to comment on the worth of local psycho- mechanisms:
analytic research. It would, of course, be bad enough if there were local IPA strategies to protect
training, because this would still mean that only certain people would have the ourselves from
right to speak with authority about psychoanalysis. But with the end of psychic pain and
from the thoughts
apartheid, there is now an even greater risk of colonisation by those operating and memories that
outside the country. The British Psychoanalytical Society, for example, evoke pain.
includes a very large mainly white South African émigré membership, and
there are now concerted attempts for this local IPA in Britain group to move
into the new South Africa and make sure that training is conducted according
to its own criteria. IPA-linked organisations in Britain, such as the Tavistock Émigré:
Institute, have also been busy trying to set up local training. One task of critical someone who has
psychologists is to argue that psychoanalysis is a diverse practice and that it left their native
country, often for
should not be defined by any one tradition in any particular organisation. political reasons.
What we are becoming aware of within psychoanalytic discourse, then, is a
149
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 150
Critical Psychology
Reify/reification:
very hierarchical approach to truth, a tendency to disqualify opposing inter-
when concepts or pretations and explanations, a tendency to control the way psychoanalysis is
ideas are spoken used to explain. It is small wonder, then, that radical forms of psychoanalytic
about as if they are theory have been underrepresented in the wealth of psychoanalytic discourse
really existing
concrete objects.
that circulates in contemporary culture. Of course, this attempt to control
psychoanalytic discourse is not only a question of regulating psychoanalysis as
a form of knowledge and explanation; it has implications for the structure of
the organisation and for how it categorises and understands people, and its
members. Indeed, there is at the moment a particular danger for gay men and
lesbians, for the IPA training stills treat heterosexuality as ‘normal’, and so
there is a risk of importing some deeply reactionary ideas about the construc-
tion of sexuality (Kottler, 1997).
Clinical explications of political history

When we turn to the clinical implications, we find some interesting sugges-
tions in psychoanalysis as to how identity is constructed. The danger here,
however, is that the authority of the argument is assumed to lie with psycho-
analysis as a universal truth. Some of the best critical work on racism, for
example, slides from specific descriptions of present-day racism into a message
about what unchangeable human nature is really like. When Melanie Klein
(1986) writes about aggressive phantasies of tearing, biting and the scooping
out of the insides of the mother, for example, we have to ask how it is that she
could note such things at a certain moment, rather than reading these descrip-
tions as ‘intrinsic to human nature’ (Young, 1993, 10). Kleinian accounts are
very sharp (so to speak), but it does not mean that ‘the forces involved are very
primitive’ (Ibid). If one assumes that racism is a result of the operation of
Projective Kleinian ‘primitive’ defence mechanisms of projective identification, for
identification: example, the most one could hope for in clinical practice with racists or those
term used by
Melanie Klein and
who are the victims of racism would be a shift from a point of violent destruc-
her followers to tive pathology into a position of ‘depressive’ acknowledgement and forms of
describe the way in ‘reparation’ which still assume that those tendencies will always lie under the
which unconscious surface ready to erupt again. In other words, the use of psychoanalysis in this
material is expelled
way comes to view racism – or other social ills – as, in an odd way, somehow
in such a way as
others take into ‘natural’, as deeply internally motivated phenomena, as intrinsic, unchanging
themselves. It and, worse still, unchangeable. This may not have been the intention of the
involves the process original theorists, but – and here lies a very important lesson for critical
where aspects of psychology – we need always to ask how a given psychological theory may be
the self are
projected onto the
used, what it may be used to justify ...
other and then There has been a great deal of critical interest in Frantz Fanon’s (1986)
eventually taken insights into processes of racist colonial objectification, insights which focus
back again, or ‘re- on the experience and identities of those subjected to racism, and which have
introjected’.
implications for psychoanalytic accounts (eg Manganyi, 1973). Once again, the
150
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 151

attempt to combine Fanon’s ideas with British ‘oobject-relations’ psychoanalytic Object-relations:

theory has certain implications for clinical work. One sympathetic response to theory that became
Fanon’s descriptions of the way the colonised subject attempts to integrate the popular in British
denigrated image of themselves puts it this way: ‘If read in an object-relations psychoanalysis after
1945 under the
frame it is a moving account of work towards a depressive position: the black influence of Melanie
self has to be accepted, first in jubilant relief that this is possible, then slowly Klein. While Klein
the damage done to it in the course of its previous denigration by the subject was concerned only
acknowledged and mourned’ (Davids, 1996, 232). Again, the ‘depressive with unconscious
fantasy inside the
position’ is something that could be sabotaged at any moment by paranoid-
mind of the infant,
schizoid splitting. Again, a clinical interpretation of a political phenomenon some psychoanalysts
risks universalising what it is speaking about, ‘naturalising’ it, making it took seriously the
inescapable, and putting its own terms of explication before the terms of more action ‘relation’ that
the infant had with
considered historically, socially and politically specific types of explanation.
its ‘objects’. Object
Relations Theory
Research in which you’ve been framed focuses on
There is a problem when psychoanalysis is treated uncritically, as if it really did questions of
attachment in
know about internal mental processes that can be uncovered in the course of
childhood and real
research. Critical psychologists should be wary whenever they read a text relationships in
which starts to tell them what the mind of the infant is really like, for at these adult life.
points we are buying into implications not only for clinical treatment but also
for the ethics of research. Some recent qualitative research on fear of crime in
Britain, for example, uses Kleinian theory to interpret interview material. Once
again, there is a risk of sliding from an illuminating account of the way fear of
crime can be understood into an assumption that the description is the expla-
nation! We can see how this occurs in an approach which sees fear of crime as
‘consistent with a paranoid-schizoid splitting of good and bad’ (Hollway &
Jefferson, 2000, 20). Here, once the description is treated as true, everyone is
made to fit into psychoanalytic categories: ‘different people will be charac-
Splitting:
terised by a predominance of one or the other defensive organisation – the unconscious process
paranoid-schizoid and depressive – as their typical response’ (Hollway & in which the infant
Jefferson, 2000, 21). The use of psychoanalytic explanation here seems far (or adult) is
more concerned with itself, with further extending and ‘verifying’ its own thought to separate
the ‘good’ objects
concepts and categories, than in being adapted to explain the world we are of unconscious
able to witness. fantasy from the
There are also implications for the ethics of research in this hardline ‘bad’ within its own
Kleinian tradition which directly contradict the attempts by critical psycholo- internal world,
splitting the self in
gists to make the process of research into one which is open to participants as two. Usually the
‘co-researchers’. This approach also makes it difficult to do anything corre- ‘bad’ parts of the
sponding to ‘aaction research’, that is, those forms of research where researcher world become
and research subjects, or, more accurately, research participants, work disowned and
projected upon the
together to produce research and to bring about certain forms of social or external world.
political change. If one treats the interview material as if it were clinical
151
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 152
Critical Psychology
Action research:
material that can be subjected to psychoanalytic interpretation, then it is
forms of research understandable that the researcher would not want to negotiate their accounts
where researcher with their participants. Hollway & Jefferson (2000, 100), for example, are
and research happy to talk about the ‘honesty’ with which they approached ‘the data openly
subjects, or, more
accurately, research
and even-handedly’, but because of the nature of the interpretations they are
participants, work making they cannot be honest with their participants, and they say that they
together to produce do not take their interpretations back for feedback for ‘ethical’ reasons. Here
research and to there is a perfectly logical argument, but only if one works on the premise that
bring about certain
critical research should be based on the model of Kleinian clinical practice.
forms of social or
political change. Psychoanalytic ideas that could be useful tactically, then, are turned into a
form of truth that, like many other forms of mainstream psychology, protects
the researcher rather than those they study. These forms of truth, moreover,
are not made available to the scrutiny of those studied, they become protected
‘truths’ – another instance of psychoanalytic discourse being used in a selec-
tive, qualified way, in which certain people can make proclamations about the
world that others cannot question.
Turning psychoanalysis against itself?

For critical psychologists, things so far do not look so good for psychoanalysis,
even if the approach throws up some intriguing suggestions as to how we
might think about politics, therapy and research. A typical ‘critical psycholog-
Strategic ical’ move here might be to deconstruct the claims to truth of psychoanalysis,
essentialism: to treat these claims to truth as if they themselves were structured by ‘projec-
approach which
takes seriously the
tive identification’. In each case we see an attempt to force material on another
ascribing of qualities and to get them to accept it as the truth. While this would be an intriguing
of experience to exercise, because it would subject psychoanalysts to their own favourite proce-
categories of person dures, we do not really need psychoanalysis to make sense of this process. An
by the dominant
ideology (so that it
attention to history and power will do fine, as it does in all critical psychology
seems to know worth the name. But let us turn to some ways that psychoanalysis might sit
exactly what women, more easily alongside critical work in and against the discipline.
homosexuals and
members of different
cultural groups are PRAGMATIC PSYCHOANALYSIS: QUESTIONING SUBJECTIVITY
really like) but only AND HISTORY
to turn negative
qualities into Despite what was said at the beginning of this chapter about the dangers of
positive ones and essentialism, it is possible to work with a ‘sstrategic essentialism’, precisely to
then to dissolve or take seriously how forms of identity have been historically linked to certain
transform them once
it has done its
forms of oppression. The strategy here is to speak from a position (of being a
critical work. woman, of being black, for example) because that is the way one is already posi-
tioned by others. It is a ‘strategy’ because it refuses to take for granted the
categories used by others, and it plays with those categories in order to free the
subject from those categories as fixed. Strategic essentialism enables us to grasp
152
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 153

how we have been made into subjects structured by notions of sex and race (for
example) that are woven into patterns of power. Likewise, strategic essentialism
helps us to grasp how those who have been denied the right to speak may now
exercise that right, precisely in order to dismantle those oppressive structures.
BOX 3 Key (pragmatic) concepts from US-American psychoanalysis
US-American psychoanalysis developed its own into healthy, wholesome activities, then they
culturally specific images of individual psycho- should not be felt to be a problem. The ‘ego’ is
logy after the Second World War. Its main aim also the site of reflexive awareness of who we
was to ensure the healthy functioning of the are and what our relationships are with others.
individual in society. This is why it is a good The US-American vision of the individual is
example of a ‘pragmatic’ way of approaching therefore quite optimistic, closer to humanist
problems and trying to fix them in psycho- psychology, and the ‘development’ of the indi-
analysis. For US-American psychoanalysis the vidual and of civilisation are seen as
unconscious is seen as a part of the mind that progressive linear processes which should go
needs to be integrated into consciousness, and hand-in-hand. The developmental model applied
psychoanalysts working in this tradition assume to parts of the world which are supposedly
that there is a ‘conflict-free’ part of the mind – emerging from a less ‘civilised’ state and the
the ego – which develops as the rational problem- idea that individuals should adapt themselves
solving part of the mind which it is the task of to society in order to behave in a civilised and
psychoanalysis to develop further. Unconscious healthy way are ‘pragmatic’ then; but, of
sexual desires are seen as sometimes disruptive, course, they are ‘pragmatic’ seen from a US-
but the idea is that if they can be channelled American point of view.
The questioning of how the subjectivities of the oppressors and oppressed have
been historically constituted is a more pragmatic use of psychoanalysis. Let us
turn to institutional, clinical and research aspects of this pragmatic approach.
Institutional struggle to reclaim history from psychology

Psychoanalysis is woven into history, and a crucial part of the project of critical
research in psychology is to show how psychoanalytic ideas have been buried.
The discipline of psychology rests on psychoanalysis, though the long-
standing connection between psychologists and psychoanalysts is often
obscured. There is also a hidden history of psychoanalysis in South Africa that
speaks to the attempt to make sense of the different positions of cultural
groups. One example of such a hidden history of psychoanalysis in South
Africa is to be found in Wulf Sachs’s (1996) Black Hamlet, which is a case study
of Sachs’s psychoanalysis of a young black man, John Chavafambira.
Chavafambira was a diviner-healer in Zimbabwe, a ‘nganga’, before coming to
South Africa to work in hotels and restaurants in Durban and Johannesburg.
Black Hamlet (first published in 1937, although followed by a revised
edition 10 years later entitled Black anger), presents an account of everyday
153
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 154
Critical Psychology
The approach of
racism in South Africa. The book explores the deep and eventually politicising
strategic essen- effects on John Chavafambira and also the effects on the relationship between
tialism is to speak black indigenous healing and white psychoanalysis (Sodi, 1999). Perhaps it
from a position (of was because Wulf Sachs was a little more sensitive than many other psychoan-
being a woman, of
being black)
alysts of the time to the life difficulties of John Chavafambira that he was able
because that is the to work with the specific questions that his patient raised. Sachs did at least try
way one is posi- to understand that because his patient came from a culture different from his
tioned by others. It own, it would be necessary to work differently. One should also note here that
is a ‘strategy’
Sachs did not use his psychoanalytic encounters with Chavafambira as a basis
because it refuses
to take for granted to posit essentialist categorical differences between black and white, as much
the categories used social science research of the time did (Bertoldi, 1998).
by others, and it None the less, Sachs’s case study raises questions for critical psychologists,
plays with those
such as a concern with how his interpretation is already ‘cued in’ by the title.
categories in order
to free the subject Clearly, ‘Hamlet’ is already a story from Europe about a man’s relationship
from those cate- with his dead father and his rivalry with another figure who has stepped in to
gories as fixed. take the father’s place regarding the affections of his mother. We need ask here
whether even a well-intentioned form of psychoanalytic interpretation might
be seen to be reading a European cultural narrative into the African context.
We should, in addition, also note here that the story of John Chavafambira
is also embedded in a history of psychoanalysis as a peculiar kind of ‘indige-
nous’ healing practice which was brought by Jewish immigrants to South
Africa but which itself was subject to some serious repression during the years
of apartheid. The practice of psychoanalysis itself, in other words, often taken
to be a ‘Jewish science’ scorned and suppressed by anti-Semite and apartheid
forces alike, was also subject to certain forms of social repression. If we look to
Black Hamlet as a kind of historical document, then, as Hayes (2002) has done,
we can see how the history of psychoanalysis in South Africa is also necessarily
a history of racism.
Clinical challenges to psychoanalytic imperialism

Mannoni’s Prospero and Caliban
Frantz Fanon’s (1967) denunciation of colonialism and racism in The wretched
of the earth has been the inspiration for revolutionaries in Africa, but it is his
Black skin, white masks (1986), written shortly after he qualified as a psychia-
trist, that tackles the question of racism, subjectivity and the role of
psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic context for this work was the attempt by
the French psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni (1990) in Prospero and Caliban to
explain, as the subtitle of his book put it, ‘the psychology of colonisation’.
Mannoni drew on his experiences working in Madagascar to elaborate his
understanding of the ‘inferiority complex’ that is suffered by the colonisers,
who play the part of ‘Prospero’ in his account, and the ‘dependency complex’
154
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 155

that afflicts the colonised – ‘Caliban’ – side of the equation. As with the Kleinian
accounts of racism, the descriptions of the racist mentality as characterised by
‘grave lack of sociability combined with a pathological urge to dominate’
(Mannoni, 1990, 102) are suitably pathologising, and perhaps we are happy to
go along with that, but the descriptions of the colonised are more problematic.
For example, Mannoni claimed that the Malagasy wanted to avoid a sense
of abandonment by the white man, and although there were ‘neither inferior
nor superior’, they were ‘wholly dependent’ (Mannoni, 1990, 157). This diag-
nosis, of course, leads to certain clinical formulations in which the treatment
would focus on trying to address the sense of ‘abandonment’ and bring about
a state of healthy ‘independence’. Fanon quite rightly objected to this psychol-
ogisation of colonialism, and to the implication that the fantasies of rebellion
and revenge on the part of the colonised could be interpreted in terms of a
‘dependency complex’.
Psychoanalysis and the naturalisation of oppression

In Mannoni we see one of the worst examples of how psychoanalytic theorising
can be used to legitimate and naturalise a kind of oppressive politics.
Mannoni’s suggestion is that only certain groups/races/nations can be
colonised, and only certain others can be colonised, because of deep psychical
processes characteristic to each of these groupings (ie the ‘inferiority complex’
that drives colonisers to colonise, and the ‘dependency complex’ that makes
the colonised accept colonial conditions). Mannoni’s theory suggests that the
‘dependency complex’ of the Malagasy would mean that they would experience
great amounts of anxiety at the threat to established society, therefore all
impulse to change a given social order would come to be avoided at all costs.
Here we have a kind of emotional development destined to dependence. We
are not then just talking about a distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘non-
civilised’ cultures – although with Mannoni we are certainly talking about that
as well – we are dealing with the claim that certain societies have a severely
hampered capacity to develop or change at all! Malagasy culture, for Mannoni
(1990), is essentially static, and does not possess the potential to progress,
advance or better itself.
Quite aside from the moral implications of these claims – that is, that a
culture is so anxiety-prone that it fears any change and therefore is unable to
muster any forms of social progress or advancement – we see here a powerful
psychological validation for a massive form of sociopolitical inequality.

Mannoni (1990) is effectively telling us that the basic emotional need of the
Malagasy – the means through which the world is made orderly and safe – is
through establishing a bond of dependence or, more to the point, a relation-
ship of subordination. If there was ever a retrograde psychoanalytic theory,
then this is it. Not only is Malagasy culture analysed as somehow less, as
155
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 156
Critical Psychology
wanting, but it is considered as needing some or other form of domination, of

external authority. Not only does the victim get blamed here, they are psycho-
analysed as in fact having unconsciously desired their own domination, having
(worse still, needing) it at the cost of not being able to progress socially, cultur-
ally or technologically. Furthermore, should this relationship of dependence
not be established, social crisis would erupt – hostility and violence would
emerge from the lack of a higher patron, from the inability to establish a bond,
a relationship of subordination.
Clearly, then, we may suggest that political forms of analysis need at times
to take precedence over purely psychical or psychological forms of analysis.
Why is this so important? It is important because otherwise psychological
and psychoanalytic theories run the risk of simply reproducing the given ideo-
logical status quo. Indeed, rather than providing us with anything like a
critical perspective, Mannoni’s theory makes colonisation sound inevitable
and, in a way, justifiable. His interpretation seems to begin with an accept-
ance of the framework constituted by the colonial condition and to then ‘read
off ’ the psychology of the coloniser/colonised encounter on this basis. As
such we have the case of a theory which amplifies social injustice and reiter-
ates the violent inequality of the colonial encounter, even while trying to
explain it. Mannoni’s account is still, in a very odd sort of way, useful to us,
though. It enables us to discern the logic of a certain kind of racism in theory
which holds the oppressed responsible for their own oppression and which
derogates not on the basis of race per se but rather on the basis of culture, of
notions of civilisation and of progression. In this way we might suggest that
the values of Fanon’s Black skin, white masks lies less in the insights it gives
into the psychology of those oppressed by racist colonialism and more in the
question it poses to those – like Mannoni himself – who enjoy privilege in the
old colonial centres.
Research strategies that include subjectivity

The psychoanalytic perspective in research
One of the useful things about psychoanalysis is that it raises questions about
the subjectivity of the researcher, and it helps us to reflect on our own place in
any kind of research. One of the problems of mainstream psychology is that it
tries to attain an objective position through an exclusion of the subjective
component. Why someone should choose to research a particular topic and

the way their own personal and political motives impact on the research is
usually carefully screened out. Because psychoanalysis treats objectivity itself
as infused with desire and fantasy, any research activity has to be subjected to
reflexive inquiry. In this respect, Hunt (1989) brings to the fore a number of
issues in sociological fieldwork that are relevant for critical psychologists
156
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 157

engaged in research involving other people. She (1989) points out that a Transference
‘psychoanalytic perspective makes three assumptions foreign to most sociolo- relationships:
gists’ (25). First, ‘it assumes that much thought and activity takes place outside those relationships
of conscious awareness’ (Hunt, 1989, 25). A reflexive analysis, then, is a place (eg of the
psychotherapist and
for exploring assumptions that we may have taken for granted, and a research client, of psycho-
team or co-supervision may be a good opportunity for turning around and analyst and
looking critically at even the most ‘critical’ research. (In this respect see Kerry analysand) that
Gibson & Leslie Swartz’s chapter in this work: Community psychology: play out patterns of
earlier formative
Emotional processes in political subjects). The second assumption is that
relationships (eg of
unconscious meanings are linked to ‘webs of significance which can ultimately a parental nature).
be traced to childhood experiences’ (Hunt, 1989, 25). What Hunt has in mind Transference
here is the way transference relationships with others in the course of research relationships are
will replay patterns of relationships with others in childhood. The third one of the ways
that unconscious
assumption, according to Hunt, is that the psyche is ‘divided into a tripartite material manifests
system composed of the id, ego and superego’ (1989, 25). itself in
consciousness.
Keeping psychoanalysis at a distance
Now, with respect to the second and third assumptions that Hunt (1989)
outlines, we have to take care once again not to buy into a whole package deal
about what the structure of the mind is really like. Hunt is working in one of
the dominant psychoanalytic traditions in the English-speaking world, partic-
ularly influential in US-America, that of ‘eego-psychology’, and so the way she
describes the mind – with the ego in the middle subject to irrational forces that
make it misperceive others in patterns of transference – reflects that tradition. Ego-psychology:
emphasis by
As we saw earlier, a Kleinian view of the mind organised around ‘projective psychoanalysts
identification’ would see things differently. Nevertheless, Hunt does usefully based mainly in US-
draw attention to the role of subjectivity in research, and there is a connection America (eg Heinz
here with some of the recent innovative work in psychology on the intersection Hartmann, Ernst
Kris and Rudolf
between subjectivity, gender and race (Mama, 1995). As Mama’s (1995) Lowenstein) or in
research makes clear, there is a feminist way of making the argument about Britain (eg Anna
reflexivity which draws on psychoanalytic ideas but which also makes us reflect Freud) after 1945
on the role of psychoanalysis as something that we may want to use strategi- on the development
of the rational ego
cally in our research only as provisional and subject to question. as one of the
These strategic uses of psychoanalysis, which employ some psychoanalytic achievements of
ideas while keeping the approach at a safe distance, would be viewed by civilisation and one
psychoanalysts as indicating an underlying ‘ambivalence’ in the way it is being of the aims of
psychoanalytic
viewed, for it seems that there is something in it that is fascinating but still
treatment. They
dangerous. In each of these three domains it is possible to be ‘strategic’ about encouraged
what we take to be ‘essential’ at any moment only if we adopt a certain notion identification with
of rationality in which the ego is firmly in charge. That is, we can subject these the ego of the
analyst as the route
approaches to a critical psychological reading that reveals how they rest on
to a cure.
assumptions of ego-psychology, in which the ego is the master of the house and
157
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 158
Critical Psychology
Psychoanalysis has
its task is to keep watch on forces that might disturb things. But if we reflect on
become true for the ease with which this notion of ‘ambivalence’ can be wheeled out to
many subjects, and diagnose us, how psychoanalytic language is used, we are led to conceive of
as they speak about psychoanalysis in another way, as part of a culturally specific discourse.
things deep within
they make them-
selves into the kind CULTURAL PSYCHOANALYSIS: WORKING INSIDE AND ALONGSIDE
of subjects for
whom psycho- ITS DISCOURSE
analysis will work. Perhaps we have to take psychoanalysis seriously because it has become true
for many subjects, and as they speak about things deep within they make
themselves into the kind of subjects for whom psychoanalysis will work. Some
of the tools from psychoanalysis for thinking about ideology might really
presuppose that psychoanalysis is true, but at the same time these tools allow
us to reflect on how psychoanalysis itself calls out to us so that we must recog-
nise ourselves within it, and then it might even work as a therapeutic approach.
The study of language, and the language of psychoanalysis, is now one of
the powerful ways of approaching psychology in a critical way, and once again
we shall look at institutional, clinical and research aspects.
BOX 4 Key (cultural) concepts from French psychoanalysis
French psychoanalysis has been the site for ‘drives’ that are discursively constructed at the
some radical rereadings of Freud’s work, partic- very same moments that the individual
ularly in the tradition of the school of constructs themselves in relation to others. The
psychoanalysis developed by Jacques Lacan image of self, or ‘ego’, is laid down during the
after 1964. This Lacanian tradition is a good mirror stage at about eighteen months old,
example of how psychoanalysis might link with and this image then carries on misleading us as
cultural issues, for good or ill. The Lacanian to where the real stuff of human psychology
vision of the unconscious is of the ‘gaps’ in lies. The unconscious and sexual desire are both
language, of the things that cannot be said by in some sense ‘outside’ us, and the psychoana-
someone when they speak, and each individual lyst has in some way to be ‘outside’ culture in
has their own peculiar ‘gaps’ in speech because order to analyse how it works. The cryptic, diffi-
of their own peculiar history. Sexual desire, for cult, esoteric nature of Lacanian discourse is
the Lacanians, is always ‘desire of the Other’, itself a necessary part of the attempt to try to
intimately linked to what the Other wants or analyse from ‘outside’ everyday taken-for-
what we perceive as being lacking in them. granted assumptions in a culture.
Lacanians do not talk about ‘instincts’ but of
Institutional processes structured like a language

Psychoanalytic accounts of language, which draw on the work of Lacan (1979),

have been very useful in showing us how ideology works to call us into a certain
position, to pull us into line. In particular, the work of Louis Althusser (1971)
on ‘interpellation’, which describes the process by which someone responds to
being ‘hailed’ or called into position by ideology, describes how identity is
158
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 159

constructed, reproduced and reinforced each time we respond (Hayes, 1989). Mirror stage:
Althusser likens the process of interpellation to a policeman who calls out ‘hey, seen by Lacan as the
you there’, and our immediate sense is that the call is meant for us, as the guilty moment, at about 18
or good citizen. The interpellation of black citizens of the new South Africa in months old, at which
the infant sees an
the frame of ‘Ubuntu’ can serve, for example, to confirm the essential identity image of itself in a
of a community when it is sent back as a message to the community about how mirror which it then
they should work hard and not contradict power structures. When it is used in ‘misrecognises’ as
this way, it ties the community to certain managerial and economic agendas. being a direct,
accurate reflection.
There are also deep implications for how the interpellation of the good citizen
The image is espe-
may be tied to certain ideas of what a good ‘family’ is (Hayes, 1989). cially alluring
This description also has implications for how we understand the work of because it gives
psychoanalysis itself. We can combine this description of interpellation into some stability, and
ideology with another notion from Lacan that is elaborated in greater detail contrasts with the
uncoordinated move-
by Jacques-Alain Miller, that of ‘eextimacy’. For Miller (1986), ‘the extimacy of ments of its body.
the subject is the Other’’ (77), and interpellation works so powerfully because The ‘ego’ produced
it is a process that works as if it were inside the subject when it is really outside here in front of a
in the organisation of language. The phenomenon of being ‘outside’ thus mirror then lays
down a perception
marks the enduring quality of human experience that psychoanalysis brings
and experience
us face to face with. There are implications here for the role of psychoanalysis which Lacanians call
in culture. Miller comments that perhaps ‘it is this position of the psychoana- the line of the
lyst’s extimacy that makes so distinct and constant the role of the Jew in the ‘Imaginary’.
history of psychoanalysis’ (Miller, 1986, 77). What Miller draws attention to
here is the importance of Jews to the development of psychoanalysis – Freud
and many of his followers in the psychoanalytic movement were Jewish – and
the way that perhaps psychoanalysis was able to develop simultaneously as
something ‘inside’ Western culture and as something ‘outside’ and critical of
it precisely because of the condition of Jews as an important part of the
culture but a part that was also marginalised. Once again, we are brought face
to face with the cultural historical nature of all theories concerning
Extimacy:
psychology.
neologism used by
Lacan and his
Clinical strategies for learning analysis followers – in
particular by his
What this way of thinking of psychoanalysis draws attention to is that psycho-
son-in-law Jacques-
analysis itself has to be learnt and believed in order for it to work. That Alain Miller – to
‘learning’ may not be explicit, for it may be absorbed through ways of speaking capture the way in
that we then take for granted, and then we shall be ‘interpellated’ into the which what seems
position of being a subject with an unconscious and defence mechanisms. to be inside is

actually ‘outside’,
What is ‘extimate’ to us will then be experienced as something deep inside us what is at once
that can only be accessed by psychoanalysis. intensely intimate
That what is most intimate to us is really ‘outside’ also makes our sexual to the individual
enjoyment, that which is termed by Lacan as ‘jouissance’, so susceptible to subject is also
external to them.
being ‘stolen’ by the Other; ‘Racism is founded on what one imagines about the
159
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 160
Critical Psychology
Jouissance:
Other’s jouissance; it is hatred of the particular way, of the Other’s own way, of
term used by Lacan experiencing jouissance’ (Miller, 1986, 179). This critical take on the clinical
to describe a form psychoanalysis of racism still then needs to be subjected to a critical reading to
of sexual enjoyment ensure that it locates these processes historically, as with any phenomenolog-
that appears
alluring but then
ical account (cf Couve, 1986). During the last years of apartheid, some of the
also goes too far so good clinical work carried out by psychotherapists working in a psychoanalytic
that it turns into framework did actually include an element of teaching, for traumatised youth
pain. The ‘too much’ in the black townships needed to be able to understand what the ‘unconscious’
of jouissance is
was in order for psychoanalytic psychotherapy to function for them (Straker,
designed to charac-
terise something 1988). The operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission then
beyond the ‘pleasure operated on a psychotherapeutic discourse in which ‘trauma’ had to be taken
principle’, as a seriously in order that it could be spoken about, and spoken about in such a
domain of satisfac-
way that the speaking subject believed that it would be cathartic to have done
tion that we find
manageable. so (Hayes, 1998). Here you can see the importance of early ideas about
‘catharsis’ in early psychoanalysis and the way these early notions have perco-
lated into popular discourse.
Research on the discourse and rhetoric of psychoanalysis

Research in the field of psychoanalysis should then be concerned with the way
forms of language construct psychoanalytic phenomena as if they were true.
Recent close analysis of Freud’s own case histories, for example, have shown
how the process of ‘repression’ can be understood as a series of rhetorical
strategies in which someone talks about something in order to avoid some-
thing else (Billig, 1999). And this work is complemented by analyses of the way
different varieties of psychoanalysis circulate in culture as forms of discourse
that produce ‘psychoanalytic subjects’ (Parker, 1997). What we take to be
‘psychopathological’ then needs to become an object of critical research in
psychology, not so much in order to do better clinical work but in order to
understand something of how we have become the kind of subjects we so
Rhetorical:
deeply feel ourselves to be.
the way speech may These ways of using psychoanalysis critically do not necessarily make for a
be used for ‘critical psychoanalysis’, and we should still take care to subject this use of
persuasive effect. psychoanalysis to critical inquiry. We might read these attempts to use psycho-
analysis in such a way as to use and abuse it while treating it as a cultural form,
not a part of ourselves, as driven by an impossible relation with it as something
‘extimate’. It is intimately bound up with our own experience, but it lies
outside, and that is where it should stay. These ways of using psychoanalysis do
help us to work in and against the discipline of Psychology, and in and against
psychoanalysis to stop it turning itself into just another form of psychology,
and to bring it closer to critical psychology.
160
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap06 11/2/04 10:19 am Page 161

CONCLUSIONS AND CONNECTIONS

Psychoanalysis offers some useful ways of rethinking ‘psychology’ and chal-
lenging assumptions made by the discipline of Psychology, and the particular
development of psychoanalytic ideas in South Africa has not always been
progressive (Bertoldi, 1998). But along the way we have to give up the idea that
new psychoanalysis can offer us a tried-and-tested alternative to old
psychology, which itself is structured by the history of racism in Europe (Teo,
1999). For all the value of psychoanalysis, it presents some serious problems
for a critical psychologist. It also poses questions for other theoretical
resources that we might use. Some alliances can be made, and there are some
points of serious dispute with other approaches within critical psychology.

This brings us to some final questions to think about in relation to other
critical frameworks discussed in this book:
1. Psychoanalytic interpretation, for example, is as much directed to change
as is Marxism, so the question is, do we restrict ourselves to changing the
internal world when we use psychoanalysis or whether we connect that
work to class struggle? (In this regard see Hayes’ chapter in this work:
Marxism and critical psychology.) Class struggle:
2. Psychoanalysis disturbs dominant understandings of gender in such a way as struggle between
exploited and
to make common cause with feminism, so the question is does this then put
exploiters, which
sex differences back in place or could it really help women and men to chal- may take many
lenge heterosexism? (See Kiguwa’s chapter in this work: Feminist critical forms – economic,
psychology in South Africa and Shefer’s chapter: Psychology and the regula- political, ideolo-
tion of gender.) gical, theoretical –
although each of
3. Psychoanalysis focuses on the way that we speak, and this helps us to make these is subordinate
links with discursive approaches. Does it really successfully answer to the political
Foucault’s charge that it is part of the spiral of confession that structures struggle. In Marxist
power in Western culture? (In this regard see Hook’s chapter in this work: thought class
interests are
Foucault, disciplinary power and the critical pre-history of psychology.) considered
4. Psychoanalysis focuses its attention on rationality as something produced irreconcilable.
rather than taken for granted; has it managed to disentangle itself from
colonialism, or from being simply another tool in the pathologising of
indigenous forms of self?
Sachs, W. (1996). Black Hamlet. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press.
Sey, J., & Moss, D. (eds) (1998). ‘South Africa Special Issue.’ American Imago,
55: 1.
161
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 162
Chapter
7
Marxism and
critical psychology
Grahame Hayes
‘[The] declining influence of Marxism within European radical and

critical theory cannot be accounted for intrinsically … but must
be seen in the context of politics and society at large.’
Homer (1998, 5)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Understand what distinguishes Marxism as a theory
Offer an explanation of what Marxism as a theory and practice can offer critical
psychology
Explain some of the basic Marxist concepts of alienation, ideology and dialectics,
and motivate how each may be engaged as a form of analysis and critique
Understand what is meant by a ‘socially situated conception of individuality’, or
how individuality is constructed in and through society or social relations
Explain what could be meant by a materialist psychology of ‘the lived experience
of everyday life’
Appreciate both how theoretically Marxism can be changed through an engagement
with psychology and how psychology can be altered through an engagement with
Marxism.
162
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 163
Marxism and critical psychology

INTRODUCTION
Marxism and psychology
Marxism and psychology have had very little to do with each other throughout
psychology’s century-and-a-quarter’s history. And for the majority of psychol-
ogists this is not a particularly lamentable affair, probably more an occasion to
rejoice! At best psychology has not seen the relevance or usefulness of Marxism
to its theory and practice, and at worst, psychology has been quite hostile Karl Marx
towards Marxism as an ideologically laden totalitarian theory and system. The
‘discrediting’ of Marxist theory was certainly given a boost following the
collapse of the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
during 1989. Be that as it may, it seems that the period of strident anti-
Marxism is somewhat in decline, and that in fact there are a number of
indications of renewed interest and engagement with Marxism, and even with
Marx’s work. One could advance many reasons for this, or rather these, returns
to Marxism at both a political and a theoretical level, and yet it also needs to be
remembered that many people never left Marxism, so it is not just a case of
returning.
‘De-revising Marxism’
Marxism as a tradition does not need to be given special treatment, and so it
should be appraised according to whether it offers us some useful ways of
thinking about the world and acting upon our worlds and lives. Boris Kagarl-
itsky (2000, vi), the Soviet and Russian intellectual and activist, puts the case
for Marxism quite forcefully in his trilogy entitled Recasting Marxism, where
he writes ‘that Marxism is not only relevant but also needs de-revision’.
Marxism is clearly (and continually) in need of revision, and especially where
this revision means being sensitive to changing historical circumstances.
However, the many calls for the revision of Marxism have also meant a conser-
vative undercutting of its political criticism of the status quo. And so
Kagarlitsky is suggesting that the calls for the ‘revision’ of Marxist thought
themselves need to be questioned, what he calls ‘de-revision’. The issue, then,
is not about a blinkered loyalty and uncritical attachment to Marxism but
rather an attempt to understand what Marxism as a theory and practice can
offer psychology, and other social and human disciplines for that matter.
Marxism as left theory and practice against capitalism

Part of the de-revision that Kagarlitsky refers to is acknowledging Marxism’s
explicit political project. And so Kagarlitsky (2000, 3) notes that ‘[t]he crisis of
the left movement is usually seen as having three causes: the disintegration of
the ‘communist bloc’; globalisation; and the technological revolution. It is true
that these developments have made it impossible for the left to remain as it
163
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 164
Critical Psychology
The Left:
was. But in the new conditions, the need for a radical anti-capitalist alternative
political position has become greater, not less’ (emphases added). The point is that Marxism has
that seeks to always been connected to and associated with the Left, and the Left (properly
critique capitalism understood) as a critique of capitalism, and hence part of an anti-capitalist
and develop an
anti-capitalist
alternative. In short, Marxism is a left theory and practice against capitalism,
alternative. and for a different, more egalitarian society.
Life under capitalism

So if psychology is going to take on Marxism, it seems that the least that it
needs to do is understand the effects, particularly the negative effects, of life
under capitalism. In other words, what are the psychological effects and conse-
quences of life under capitalism, for the diverse range of classes and social
A psychology that groups within capitalist societies? A psychology that seriously engages with
seriously engages Marxism would be interested in understanding the psychological processes of
with Marxism would
be interested in the
people’s experiences of, and reflections on, everyday life. First, this would
psychological involve what might be called a substantive analysis of the concrete reality of
materiality of every- people’s everyday lives. A substantive analysis means gathering empirical,
day life: first to concrete, practical examples and instances of what people’s lives are about.
chart what this is –
Secondly, a psychology responsive to Marxism would want to comment on, or
a substantive ana-
lysis; and, secondly, judge, the psychological effects of living particular lives as the subjects of capi-
to comment on, or talist societies – this involves psychology as a moral practice that is prepared to
judge, its effects on take a stand with regard to its research findings.
the psychological
And yet it would be a disavowal of historical reality to assume that one
subjects of
capitalist societies could merely present a positive account of Marxism in and for psychology, as
– a moral practice. though Marxism were just another theoretical orientation of the kind of
phenomenology or existentialism that psychology has engaged more warm-
heartedly. Not even an old, unapologetic, unreconstructed, critical Marxist
such as myself believes this! Marxism is on the defensive, and this is especially
true in psychology where it has mostly been absent. So I am going to try to
answer the defensive question: What can Marxism do for psychology?
Substantive A critical psychology of Marxism

analysis: An immediate answer to this question is to say that Marxism would make
analysis that
gathers concrete,
psychology critical. Another way of putting this is to say that a critical
empirical, practical psychology is a psychology that takes Marxism seriously. The idea of a critical
examples and
psychology is inherently negative, and the origins of critical psychology are

instances of what is exactly that, a criticism of mainstream, orthodox, establishment psychology.
being analysed (in
this chapter, the
While critical psychology can be defined in a reasonably uncontentious way as
everyday details of both a critique of mainstream psychology, and as an elaboration of the social
what people’s lives and political embeddedness of psychology, we should not be too comfortable
are about). with the separation of psychology and critical psychology. Critical psychology
164
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 165

(as reflected in the various chapters in this book) does refer to a particular set
of topics or specifiable content, and yet critical psychology should be worried
about its separate identity. On a grander (maybe even grandiose) political
scale, critical psychology should want all of psychology to be critical, and hence
for the label ‘critical psychology’ to become redundant! In the current histor-
ical context Marxism is obviously part of the theoretical and research tools that
a critical psychology needs, and yet Marxism would not be satisfied with its
exclusive enclosure within critical psychology while leaving mainstream
psychology to pursue ‘business as usual’.
DEFINING MARXISM
At the outset it is useful to say some general things about what Marxism is,
bearing in mind that even amongst thinkers who would self-consciously
identify themselves as Marxists there would not be complete agreement
about how to characterise and define Marxism. This points to the vibrancy of
current debates about reinvigorating Marxist theory for the 21st century. For
example, Jameson’s (1997) five theses of Marxism only partly overlap with
what is presented below. The intention is not to discuss in any detail the
following five dimensions of Marxism, which I consider as important defining
characteristics, but merely to present them as definitional maxims or theses,
and as a challenge to a psychology wanting to adopt the label ‘critical’ to
describe itself.
Marxism is a social theory, or rather a theory of the social

How social relations of production structure society
The origins of Marxism are obviously in Marx’s work, and his consistent and Marx’s analysis is an
major work was to understand, analyse and criticise the functioning of a attempt to under-
stand how the
particular social system, namely, industrial capitalism of 19th-century Europe. social relations of
Marx’s analysis is not merely a narrow account of the functioning of the production structure
economic realm of industrial capitalism but more an attempt to understand and determine the
how the social relations of production structure and determine the modes of modes of reproduc-
tion and general
reproduction and general social intercourse within the whole of the society.
social intercourse
Simply put, Marx identified two basic components of society: production and within the whole of
reproduction. Each society must produce the necessities of life to sustain itself: the society.
food, shelter, institutions (schools, hospitals), while at the same time making
sure that these ‘productions’ are reproduced. In other words, a society must
produce the means of existence, while at the same reproduce (over time, across
generations) the conditions to allow production to occur. Furthermore, and
importantly for psychology, a society needs to reproduce the individuals that
are involved in the production and maintenance of society.
165
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 166
Critical Psychology
Reproduction of social, cultural and psychological conditions

The reproduction of the people of a society is obviously not meant in a simply
biological sense, but it also includes the social, cultural, and psychological
conditions that make us human. So we reproduce ourselves while at the same
time reproducing the conditions for our continued existence and survival.
Obviously what is important for social and psychological analysis is how
production and reproduction take place in any particular society. Given the
stress on the social relations that make up production and reproduction, it is
not surprising, then, that the academic discipline that has been the most
responsive to Marxist ideas has been sociology. Thus to engage with Marxism,
psychology would need to situate itself as part of the theory of the social, some-
thing it hasn’t done much of in its history, until very recently.
The idea of critique

Marx’s magnum opus, Capital, and the many prefatory works to Capital, were
titled and subtitled, ‘the critique of political economy’. Marx, and Marxism
generally, resist the disciplinary, and in fact ideological, carving up of the social
world into discrete and separate entities. For example, the separation of the
Polity: economy from the polity, from politics. Marxism attempts to do at least two
form of government things simultaneously, namely, to hold a conception of the social whole in mind
of an organised
when we are analysing a part of social reality, and to think about the implications
society, a nation, a
state etc. or consequences of our analyses. In other words, it is imperative for Marxism
that critique follows theoretical and empirical analysis. So for Marxism an
analysis of the economy cannot be separated from the political determinants
Critique: that structure the economy, or rather any particular economy. For instance,
not to be confused what happens to profit (surplus value and extraction) is not merely a ‘technical’
with ‘criticism’, the
issue of economic relations, as certain societies give legitimacy to private
notion of critique
implicates politics, property and individualised forms of the accumulation of wealth. The ‘legiti-
judgement and mate’ appropriation of profit is sanctioned by the laws of a country, which in
change in its turn are sanctioned by the power (politics) of the government.
analyses.
In effect, then, Marxism makes the obvious point that there are significant
power differentials in capitalist societies, and to ignore these in our research
work is just plain bad social science, as well as being morally suspect. It is in
this sense that Marxism is a critique: Marxism implicates politics, judgment,
and change in its analyses. And this is the meaning of Marx’s famous, and oft-
quoted eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted
the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (cited in Balibar, 1995, 13).
Thus to engage with Marxism, psychology would need to stop hiding behind
the veil of ‘scientific’ objectivity, and understand that research is part of social
relations. Hence our ‘data’, our ‘findings’ have consequences in the lives of
ordinary people. And so, a psychology in serious dialogue with Marxism
166
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 167

would combine objective research and analysis with critique. Striving after Positivism:
objectivity is a goal that both Marxism and psychology aspire to, and yet objec- approach to science
tivity must not be confused with the positivist conception of truth and science. that argues that it
is not possible to
go beyond the
Alienation objective,
Marxism as critique, or as a critical social theory, is interested in analysing the observable world,
effects of certain economic, political and social arrangements. One could say and that only those
questions that can
that this was what Marx was doing in Capital – Volume 1, where his interest in be answered from
the specificity of the capitalist mode of production was in determining partic- the application of
ular social relations of production, and the reproduction of those social objective scientific
relations of production. However, clearly, Capital is much more than an method are valid.
analysis of the political economy of capitalism, in so far as this text is redolent
with a critique of the effects of working in a capitalist economy for the majority
of ordinary workers (the working class). As we would say these days, Marx’s Psychology, for
Marxism, needs to
critique of capitalism tends to be a macro-economic analysis, and yet as a polit-
stop hiding behind
ical analysis his critique incorporates the alienation wrought by capitalist the veil of ‘scienti-
relations of production on the working class. fic’ objectivity, to
understand that
Exploitation of workers by capitalists research is part of
social relations, and
According to Marxism, a capitalist economy sets up a conflict of interests, an hence our ‘data’,
antagonism, between workers and those they work for (owners of firms or our ‘findings’ have
businesses, called capitalists). The basic principle of capitalist economies is consequences in the
lives of ordinary
the creation of profit (surpluses) which then is unevenly or unfairly distrib- people.
uted. The workers are paid a fixed wage for their work, for the time that they
spend at work, and the profit (excess, surplus) that is created by the workers
According to
Marxism, a
capitalist economy
sets up a conflict of
interests, an
antagonism,
between workers
and those they work
for. For a surplus or
profit to be created
workers need to be
paid less than they
are worth. This

profit-making is the
foundation of the
economic
exploitation of
workers.
167
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 168
Critical Psychology
Alienation:
is then appropriated by the bosses or the capitalist class (owners of the facto-
consequences or ries and firms). For a surplus or profit to be created workers need to be paid
effects of economic less than they are worth or, to put this another way, workers create more than
relations of the value of their wages. This profit-making or, in Marxist terms, this surplus
exploitation in capi-
talism. Alienation
extraction, is the foundation of the economic exploitation of workers.
occurs in a number Workers do not passively accept these exploitative conditions, and because
of areas: first, the they (workers) resist capitalists are forced to continually ‘renew’ the avenues
person or group for exploitation. For example, it is not so long ago that it was argued that
becomes estranged
women workers did not need to be paid the same as men – for doing the same
from the results or
products of their job – because the primary breadwinner was the male (head of the house-
own labour activity, hold!), and hence women’s wages were seen as ‘extra income’ for families. In
and often from the simple terms, women were, and still are, being exploited for doing the same
activity of work
work as men because of some odd idea that capitalists were paying men a
itself. Secondly, how
people live (or are ‘family wage’.
‘forced’ to live) their
lives. Thirdly, for Alienation from products of one’s own labour
Marxism alienation
is always under- Marxist economic analysis concentrates on the nature and consequences of
stood as self- exploitative working relations in capitalist societies. One of the consequences
alienation in the or effects of economic relations of exploitation is alienation. One of the earliest
sense that the and most elaborate accounts of alienation appears in Marx’s (1977) 1844
person (or huma-
nity) becomes Economic and philosophical manuscripts (although only published in the
estranged from 1932). In this work Marx suggests that alienation occurs in a number of areas:
their fellow human first, the person or group becomes alienated (estranged) from the results or
beings as well as products of their own labour activity, and often from the activity of work itself.
from their own
human potentia-
Take, for example, a worker on the production line of a motor-car manufac-
lities. All three turing firm producing luxury 4x4s. Assume that this worker is well paid and
aspects of alien- earning R6 000 per month! This worker is obviously alienated from the
ation are closely product of his labour as he is never going to be able to afford to buy the 4x4
interlinked and
mutually
that he produces and probably, given his monthly wage, will never be able to
reinforcing. own any new car. Depending on the actual conditions of work on the produc-
tion line – monotony, dirt and dust, noise, danger – this worker might also be
alienated from the activity and process of his work experience. In what sense
does industrial psychology understand ‘job satisfaction’ under these alienating
conditions of work? Without overstating the claim, it could be said that much
of industrial and organisational psychology has operated to adapt workers to
exploitative and alienating conditions of work.
Alienation in how one lives one’s life

A second area of alienation for people is how they live (or are ‘forced’ to live)
their lives. The most stark and hideous example of alienating living conditions
were (are) the apartheid created urban townships. These were spaces (often
168
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 169

far) outside the white city centres and the white residential suburbs that were
explicitly created to house a black working class. The difficulties that these
township communities experienced were transport to and from work; lack of
basic infrastructure – electricity, water, street lights; lack of resources – hospi-
tals, libraries, sports fields, parks; and very little sense of belonging and
community identity with these ‘township spaces’. It is not surprising, then,
that these living areas became sites for the most extreme forms of alienation:
rape, murder, child neglect and drunkenness. A challenge facing the demo-
cratic government of South Africa is how to transform these townships from
alienating ‘residential spaces’ into places where people want to live, into
homes, into communities with a sense of belonging. This would also be a chal-
lenge for a critical social psychology to contribute to an understanding of the
current levels of alienation of people’s lived experiences in these post-apartheid
townships, and then to suggest ways to go beyond (transform) these alienating
living conditions.
Self-alienation
Finally, a third area of alienation that Marx refers to is what is called ‘self-
alienation’. For Marxism alienation is always understood as self-alienation in
the sense that the person (or humanity) becomes alienated or estranged from,
their fellow human beings, as well as alienated from their own human possi-
bilities and potentialities. All three aspects of alienation referred to here are
closely interlinked, and mutually reinforcing. (For a lengthier discussion of
alienation, consult Derek Hook’s chapter in this work: Frantz Fanon, Steve
Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and critical psychology). Through the human activities
and practices of our work (or lack of them – unemployment), where and how
we live, we come to experience ourselves and our social and interpersonal rela-
tionships with others as either fulfilling or alienating. It is difficult to feel
happy, to believe that our lives are meaningful, and that there is scope for us to
realise our potential if we are stuck in some poorly paid temporary job, are Through the human
living in an overcrowded informal settlement, and are struggling to keep our activities and prac-
children at school. The structural and social conditions of alienation tices of our work (or
lack of them –
mentioned above have profound psychological effects in people’s lives, and in unemployment),
how they experience themselves and others. It is interesting to note that early where and how we
psychiatrists were called alienists; in other words, they studied and worked live, we come to
with aliens, the insane, the mad. Psychological disturbance is quite properly a experience ourselves
and our social and

form of alienation, regardless of whether its origins are sometimes more social, interpersonal rela-
and at other times more personal or interpersonal. The notion of alienation is tionships with
particularly pertinent to a (critical) psychology that wants to engage with the others as either
negative effects of exploitative social relations on the lived experience of fulfilling or
alienating.
ordinary people.
169
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 170
Critical Psychology
BOX 1 Controversies over ‘alienation’
The notion of alienation, given the most elabo- the complex notion of the ‘epistemological
rate and sustained discussion in Marx’s (1977) break’ (between the early Marx and the later
1844 Economic and philosophical manuscripts Marx) (Althusser, 1979). Althusser, and other
(although only published in 1932), has been ‘opponents of the theory of alienation, have
the centre of a controversy about Marx’s work insisted that what was called alienation in the
and how best to understand Marxism. This early Marx was much more adequately described
controversy has centred on the separation of in the later works by scientific terms such as
Marx’s work into two distinct periods: the early, private property, class domination, exploita-
‘humanist’ Marx, still influenced by Hegelian tion, division of labour etc. But it has been
idealism and a philosophical anthropology; and argued in reply that the concepts of alienation
a later more mature Marx of the ‘economic and de-alienation cannot be fully reduced to
writings of the mid-1850s and beyond. This any (or all) of the concepts which have been
separation, or sharp division of Marx’s work into offered as replacements, and that for a truly
two distinct ‘theoretical projects’, was most revolutionary interpretation of Marx the
forcefully argued by the influential French concept of alienation is indispensable’ (in
Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser, through Bottomore, 1983, 13).
Structural/ The structural level of analysis

structuralist: A structural level of analysis is not peculiar to Marxism. It can be seen emerging
forms of analysis in a number of nascent disciplines of the late 19th century. Structural (or struc-
that make a
distinction between turalist, as it most often called these days) levels of analysis make a distinction
appearance and between appearance and reality and, in contrast to most post-modernist forms
reality and, in of thought, posit that there is something, another reality to what is below or
contrast to most beyond the appearance or surface. Stating this more strongly, the real or ‘true’
post-modernist
forms of thought,
meaning of some social phenomenon is properly grasped only by penetrating
posit that there is the surface appearance and getting to the deeper, hidden meaning! For
something, another example, within bourgeois economics, or neo-liberal economic thought as it is
reality, to what is called these days, the idea of profit is presented as an ‘outcome’ of the proper or
below or beyond
the appearance or
efficient functioning of the (capitalist) economy. In effect, the idea, and opera-
surface. For a tion, of profit is naturalised and removed from any political entanglements. On
structuralist the contrary, Marxism suggests that ‘behind’ the surface appearance of profit –
position, the real or understood as the extraction of surplus value by Marxism – lie a set of exploita-
‘true’ meaning of
some social
tive social relations of production which guarantee the profit. To put this
phenomenon is only blandly, and as critique, workers are paid less than their due for their labour –
properly grasped by in common parlance, they are ripped off – so that the ‘excess’ or ‘surplus’ can
penetrating the
accrue as profit for the ‘owners’ of the means of production (capitalists).

surface appearance
and getting to the
deeper, hidden Structural and theoretical forms of analysis
meaning. The structural(ist) analysis engaged in by Marxism is also a theoretical, and at
times quite abstract, form of analysis and critique. This abstract analysis is an
attempt to lay bare the structural foundations of social, economic or psycho-
170
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 171

logical processes. Structural forms of analysis are not unfamiliar to Bourgeois:

psychology, Freud and Piaget being two obvious examples. However, generally, a person
psychology’s strong empirical tradition, sadly dominated by empiricist and belonging to the
neo-positivist epistemologies, has had the effect of undermining structural middle class; also
used to describe the
(and theoretical) analyses, even within the sphere of critical psychology. attitudes and
Evidence the shift to quite descriptive and ‘quantitative’ accounts of psycho- behaviours, the
logical experience being presented by much current discourse analysis. This standards and
general anti-theoretical stance within psychology is interestingly criticised in conventions of the
middle class. In
Parker’s (2002) book, where he urges us (critical psychologists, in particular) to
Marxist theory, used
work with theory. A psychology in dialogue with Marxism would simultane- of a member of the
ously be committed to a theoretical and structural analysis of psychological property-owning
reality or, should I say, psychological appearance and reality. class – hence a
capitalist.
Ideology
An important term linked to the structural distinction between appearance
and reality is the notion of ideology. What Marxism says is that the appear-
ance of social reality being the only reality is illusory, or rather that reality is
represented by vested interests in the society. For example, think about what
The contradiction that capitalism finds itself in is one where it can’t actually claim that it ‘pays a
fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’! Capitalism obscures or conceals this contradiction concerning
the ‘necessary’ exploitation of workers through the ideological practices of the living wage; the
legitimacy of trade unions as the vehicle through which workers are fairly represented; paying
people according to their skill or educational level, and so on.
171
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 172
Critical Psychology
Ideology:
the range of vested interests might be that present women as passive and as
(within Marxism) a sex objects? The various presentations of women in this way would be
set of social prac- referred to as ideological practices. Ideology (within Marxism) can be defined
tices, ideas and as a set of social practices, ideas, and meanings that conceal or obscure – or
meanings that
attempt to obscure
more accurately, attempt to obscure and conceal – social contradictions (cf
and conceal social Hayes, 1989). Staying with the example of profit, Marxism would argue that
contradictions. For there are ideological reasons behind the attempt to present profit as a
Marxism, the ‘neutral’ descriptor of economic relations, and in fact profit’s naturalisation is
appearance of social
precisely achieved by (ideologically) concealing or obscuring the social
reality, being the
only reality, is contradiction of exploitative relations of production. The social contradiction
illusory; rather, this is that for capitalists to make a profit, they have to exploit workers. Capi-
reality is represented talism, as a profit-generating economy, would not survive if workers were
by vested interests
paid the full value for their labour time. So the contradiction (or the corner)
in the society.
that capitalism finds itself in is one where it can’t actually claim that it ‘pays a
fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’! It obscures or conceals this contradiction
concerning the ‘necessary’ exploitation of workers through the ideological
practices of: the living wage; the legitimacy of trade unions as the vehicle
through which workers are fairly represented; paying people according to
their skill or educational level, and so on.
Ideology as a form of analysis for psychology

It seems to me that with mainstream psychology’s tendency to naturalise and
normativise many of people’s psychological realities, the notion of ideology could
be powerfully engaged as a form of analysis and critique of our many received
The notion of notions. For example, the distinction between the normal and the pathological;
ideology could be the process of gendered identity formation; the overly cognitive conceptions of
powerfully engaged mind; the category of ‘groups’ within social psychology, and so on. This is illus-
as a form of analysis
and critique of many
trated by the following example: an obvious form of ideological practice is the
of our received usage of the DSM-IV in psychology as a useful way of classifiying psychological
notions. This seems disturbance. First, the DSM is an instrument of the American Psychiatric Associ-
particularly vital in ation, and its purpose is mostly diagnostic. Secondly, by following the DSM
the context of main-
stream psychology,
system psychologists buy into the spurious classification of psychopathology and
which has the tend to medicalise suffering rather than attempt to understand the complex
tendency of natural- psychological processes involved in symptom formation. Thirdly, whose inter-
ising and normalis- ests are served by classifying psychopathology into diagnostic categories?
ing many of people’s
Fourthly, why is it that diagnostic systems (of psychological disorders) are so
psychological
realities. resistant to change and criticism? The answers to these concerns and questions
are complex and multiple, but the least that we can say is that there is more to
them than simply accepting things as they positively appear to us.
A crucial element, then, in the dialogue between psychology and Marxism
would be the notion of ideology, and more specifically for psychology to take
on forms of ideology-critique.
172
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 173

Dialectics Dialectics:
Dialectics as methodology and as relationship between theory in general, refers to
and practice the fact that pro-
cesses and relations
There are two aspects of dialectics that are worth considering. The one relates are reciprocal,
to dialectics as methodology, and the other the dialectical relationship interwoven and co-
between theory and practice and the rather special place that practice has determining.
Dialectics is a
within Marxist thought. Practice can be understood either as doing theoretical methodology for
research (theoretical practice) or as practical action in the world (being looking at how
involved in a march in support of the Treatment Action Campaign’s call for things, ideas and
universal access to anti-retrovirals), and practice can also be understood as social relations are
constituted,
transformatory or revolutionary practice (changing the social conditions that maintained and
give rise to the rape of women). In general, dialectics refers to the fact that changed. Dialectical
processes and relations are reciprocal, interwoven and co-determining. Dialec- thought is
tics is a way (a methodology) of looking at how things, ideas and social ruthlessly reflective.
In this way, it is
relations are constituted, maintained and changed.
concerned with
reversals, with
Reversals, contradictions, non-identity contrary notions.
Dialectical thought is ruthlessly reflective, and self-reflective in its questioning
of the conditions of possibility of its own categories. Dialectical thought is
concerned with reversals, with contrary notions, with identity located in
identity and non-identity, with being located in being, non-being and
becoming. For example, we don’t define ourselves only positively but nega-
tively as well. Sometimes, young boys (say at the age of about 7) might say: ‘We
don’t play with girls.’ Their increasing confidence and self-consciousness casts
them ‘against’ girls, and is particularly evident when they are in a group
context. So, by asserting ‘we don’t play with girls’, they are asserting something
(opaque) about being boys, about their ‘boyness’. Ten years later, these same
boys are very keen to ‘play with girls’. These boys, now (becoming) young men,
are moving away from being boys (children), and are having to negotiate
different relationships with girls or women, who are simultaneously different
from boys or men (non-males) Yet this difference, this Otherness, is exactly
what interests (heterosexual) young men as they attempt to define themselves
as sexual beings. These sets of developmentally changing identities are dialec-
tically constituted by the myriad practices that young people participate in in
the course of defining who they are and who they aren’t, and who they would
like to become.
An object’s relation to a whole

One of the more complex aspects of dialectical thought resides in an object’s
relation to the whole or, as Homer (1998, 17) pertinently puts it: ‘Until a
given object is situated in relation to the totality itself, it remains partial,
173
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 174
Critical Psychology
fragmentary and incomplete.’ Herein lies the real difficulty of dialectical

thinking and particularly of a dialectical style of writing, ‘its holistic totalising
character’. Precisely because dialectical thought is so difficult to grasp in its
movement between the particular and the whole, there is a temptation to try
to oversimplify the dialectic through method (rather than maintain its critical
stature as methodology). Oversimplifications of the dialectic abound in
Marxist and non-Marxist social science, especially in the retreat to method, or
what might be called methodologism, and sadly a lot of the promise of quali-
tative methods has succumbed to this.
Distinguishing between method and methodology

Many texts in qualitative methodology have become ‘how to do it’ manuals.
Great stress is placed on the steps of a discourse analysis, for instance. Now,
there is nothing wrong with spelling out the steps that we might need to take
to analyse discourse, but this needs to be combined with a thorough under-
standing of what discourse is, and what we are doing when we carve it up to
analyse it. The origins of qualitative methodology are situated in a criticism of
the dominance of method in psychology and, particularly quantitative
method. Whether one is doing quantitative or qualitative research, one can’t
simply adopt a rule-bound method as a form of data analysis. One has to
Methodology: consider the issues beyond the method, beyond the immediate presentation of
conception of the data. This wider conception of research is called methodology, where
research in which
consideration is
consideration is given to the context(s) of the research; the theoretical or philo-
given to the sophical assumptions underlying the chosen research strategy; how the data
context(s) of the was gathered; and the implications of analysing part of the data that makes up
research; the a greater whole.
theoretical or
The psychological realm seems to ‘scream out’ for dialectical thought, and
philosophical
assumptions under- yet it is mostly absent in psychological writing, even within much of the new
lying the chosen critical psychology. Psychology’s empiricist excesses have certainly under-
research strategy; mined seeing the discipline in more discursive terms, and so this has
how the data was
discouraged a robust dialectical methodology from flourishing. The mark of a
gathered; and the
implications of critical psychology would surely be its commitment to dialectical ways of
analysing part of thinking about, and doing research.
the data that makes
up a greater whole. Dialectical interaction between Marxism and psychology
It is to be contras-
ted with method, a The above five ‘defining characteristics’ of Marxism could be said to be some of
rule-bound series of the theoretical backbone of Marxism, or abstract terms defining the meta-
steps of analysis theory of Marxism. Most Marxist and non-Marxist scholars would accept the
used in research.
above five concepts as central to an understanding of Marxism, albeit that
different selections would be made depending on an author’s particular disci-
plinary background, and their political convictions concerning Marxism. For
174
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 175

example, a range of central concepts of Marxism that I have omitted are: mode
of production; labour, or labour power; use value and surplus value; class;
practice or praxis; contradiction; ideology; hegemony; and there are others.
However, it seems that there are two important considerations with regard
to Marxism that a critical psychology needs to attend to. First, psychology
needs to be aware of what kind of theory Marxism is, so that if it engages
Marxism the consequences for psychological theory and practice are at least
clear. Secondly, seeing as I don’t believe that there is such a thing as a Marxist
psychology, the ‘thing’ then that there is, is a dialogue, a dialectical interaction
between psychology and Marxism. Because, as Touraine (2000, 255) writes,
‘the gulf between the Subject and society can never be bridged’, and hence
there can’t be some epistemological ‘solution’ between Marxism and
psychology, but theoretically Marxism can be changed through an engage-
ment with psychology, and so too psychology can be altered through an
engagement with Marxism. What seems more important than the theoretical
‘adjustments’ or changes consequent upon a rapprochement of Marxism and
psychology, is rather how substantive issues (in the world) would be better
understood and improved as a result of the Marxism–psychology dialogue. So
the task (in this chapter) is to understand how psychology might or can be
enhanced by engaging with Marxist thought – which is not to imply that
Marxism isn’t equally in need of ‘enhancement’ through an engagement with
matters psychological.
In an attempt to demonstrate the possible (positive) effects of psychology’s
insertion into Marxist thought I would like to focus on two issues: the theory
of the social; and the notion of the lived experience of everyday life.
BOX 2 What Marxism offers psychology
If psychology is to engage Marxism properly, it will need to:

Situate itself as part of the theory of the social.
Avoid the attempt to hide behind the façade of ‘scientific objectivity’ and
understand that social science research is itself part of social relations.
Be aware that the knowledge produced by psychology has consequences in
the lives of ordinary people, and hence try to combine objective research
with critique.
Engage with the negative effects of exploitative social relations on the lived
experience of ordinary people.
Be committed to both a theoretical and a structural analysis of psycholog-
ical reality; should attend, in other words, to both psychological appearance

and reality.
Understand and employ the notion of ideology – to take on the forms of
ideology-critique – as way of expanding its critical engagement with the
world.
Make use of dialectic ways of thinking about and doing research.
175
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 176
Critical Psychology
SOCIAL THEORY, AND A THEORY OF THE SOCIAL

Psychological reality as part of social relations
Individualist:
It could be argued that critical psychology has become quite docile over the last
perspective whose 10 years, if ever it was a radical and disruptive challenge to mainstream
primary focus is on psychology. Many reasons could be advanced for this state of affairs. One
the individual and suggestion is that the lack of a social theory to underpin a critical psychology
which maintains the
renders it subject to neutralisation as a radical challenge to psychology, and
belief that individua-
lity can be defined thus it becomes ‘tolerated’ as one of the many alternatives within the so-called
in itself, in isolation, liberal canon of psychology. Human experience, psychological life, is part of
whether in terms of the ensemble of social relations, and does not exist separately in some pre-
biology, psychology,
social sphere. This conception of psychology and psychological reality as part
economic behaviour,
etc. of social relations is a radical displacement from the usual idealist and individ-
ualist conceptions that abound in the discipline. Whether one is thinking
about the individual in cognitive psychology, in personality theory, and even in
industrial psychology, they are often presented in quite abstract ways as
divorced from their social and cultural contexts. It is not just a case of adding
social context to our conception of the individual but realising how individuals
are formed in particular historical, social and cultural contexts, are integral
parts of their social worlds, and if abstractly removed from these contexts they
lose their individuality.
Human experience,
psychological life, in
Marxist thought is
part of the ensemble
of social relations
and does not exist
separately in some
pre-social sphere.
We are always a part
of our social
surroundings.
Marx’s view as neither individualist nor organicist

In discussing Marx’s idea that the human essence is the ensemble of social rela-
tions Balibar (1995, 30) writes that ‘[t]he words Marx uses [‘ensemble’, ‘social’,
‘relations’] reject both the individualist point of view (primacy of the
176
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 177

individual and, especially, the fiction of an individuality which could be Organicist: point of
defined in itself, in isolation, whether in terms of biology, psychology, view (also called
economic behaviour or whatever) and the organicist point of view (which, holistic) which sees
today, following Anglo-American usage, is also called the holistic point of view: the whole as
primary and sees
the primacy of the whole, and particularly of society considered as an indivis- society considered
ible unity of which individuals are merely the functional members).’ as an indivisible
unity of which
A socially situated conception of individuality individuals are
merely the func-
The socially situated conception of individuality being advanced here requires tional members.
that we conceptualise the individual and society in relational terms, rather than
in the static appeal to human nature or human essence. What Balibar (1995) is
alerting us to is that Marx was onto something quite different about how to
conceptualise the constitutive relation of human essence or individuality, which
only now, through thinkers (Kojève, Simondon, Lacan) of the 20th century, we It is not just a case
have a word for: trans-individual, trans-individuality. Balibar (1995, 30–32) of adding social
notes that ‘we have, in fact, to think humanity as a trans-individual reality and, context to our
ultimately, to think trans-individuality as such. Not what is ideal “in” each indi- conception of the
individual, but
vidual (as a form or substance), or what would serve, from outside, to classify realising how
that individual, but what exists between individuals by dint of their multiple individuals are
interactions.’ This is very similar to the notion of the subject advanced in post- formed in particular
structuralist psychoanalysis (Lacanian), of the subject constituted through historical, social
and cultural
intersubjectivity – the unconscious as part of intersubjective reality. contexts, are
integral parts of
Trans-individuality their social worlds,
and if abstractly
This trans-individuality or intersubjectivity or, what amounts to the same removed from these
thing, a (more) materialist conception of the individual requires us to say contexts lose their
something about what we think society is. If the ‘human essence’ is constituted individuality.
in and through social relations, we shall understand human psychological indi-
viduality properly only if we theorise this within a conception of the social,
social relations, society or, as Marxism has referred to it, the social formation.
The discussion of the social has been ensnarled by the controversy
surrounding the notion of totality, social totality. The controversy has mostly Trans-individuality:
centred on the implications for the type of society that is ‘generated’ or socially situated
‘produced’ by adopting an idea of the social whole, or social totality. Crudely conception of
individuality in
put, a theory of social totality produces a totalitarian society! Before indicating which the individual
what some of the problems are in conceiving of society as a social totality, it is and society are
important to define social totality. For example, conceptualised in
relational terms
Social totality in Marxist theory is a structured and historically determined rather than in the
overall complex. ... The significance and limits of an action, measure, achieve- static terms of
ment, law, etc, cannot therefore be assessed except in relation to a dialectical human nature or
grasp of the structure of the totality (in Bottomore, 1983, 480). human essence.
177
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 178
Critical Psychology
We will understand
And again, more forcefully referring directly to Marx’s work:
human psycholo- Marx’s conception of historical materialism theorises social development from the
gical individuality totalising vantage point of a ‘world history’ that arises from the objective determi-
properly only if we
nations of material and inter-personal processes (in Bottomore, 1983, 480).
theorise this within
a conception of the
social, social A tendency toward totalisation and determinism
relations or society.
What is at issue here is a distinction between Marxism as ideas, system of
thought, and the politics that have been carried out under, or in the name of
Marxism. It has been noted that the ‘ ... declining influence of Marxism within
European radical and critical theory cannot be accounted for intrinsically ... in
terms of the history of ideas, but must be seen in the context of politics and
society at large’ (Homer, 1998, 5). This is not to suggest that Marxism bears no
Historical
political responsibility. For instance, the collapse of the communist states of
materialism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not needed to tell us that there are
dialectical some serious problems within Marxist theory. This is not to say that Eastern
materialism holds Europe and the USSR are incidental to a critique of Marxism. They tell us a
that everything is
material and that
great deal about the problems of Marxism, which we should heed, otherwise
human beings Marxism will become a less than useful theory of social life.
create social life The problem of ‘Marxism in power’ points to a tendency of totalisation and
solely in response determinism in its theory and practice of social life. It is no good to say that
to economic needs.
there isn’t really a problem here, as the problem is about Marxism-Leninism
All aspects of
society are and not really about Marxism per se. We have to address the problems of the
considered to link between Marxism in power, Marxist governments, and the problems of
reflect the economic totalitarianism. There is a tension in Marxist theory between its critical and
structure.
explanatory capacity as a theory, and the bothersome tendency to theoretical
Furthermore, classes
in society are totalisation and societal totalitarianism. A necessary vigilance with regard to
determined by their the tendential problems of Marxist theory will begin to curtail the societal and
relationship to the political excesses committed in the name of a liberatory social theory. As with
means of all theory, we should ask the question what Marxism enables us to do (better)
production. The way
in which growth, in psychology, and what it dis-enables us to do, what it gets in the way of us
change, and doing.
development are
conceptualised is as The role of agency and subjectivity
taking place
through a naturally While it is possible to admit that there are theoretical, and political problems
occurring ‘struggle with the notion of totality (in Marxism), it is nonsense to suggest, as many
of opposites’.
critics of Marxism do (and especially those from a post-modernist perspec-

Application of these
principles to the
tive), that the notion of totality (directly) gives rise to totalitarianism and
study of history and soviet-style societies. It is obvious to me at least that the form of this kind of
sociology is called critique of totality, never mind the content, is inherently ideological. It also
historical fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between theory and practice,
materialism.
let alone political practice. The will to totality which Laclau (1990) and others,
178
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 179

have laid at the feet of Marxism has had a number of negative effects, both Social totality:
theoretical and practical. An effect of Marxism as a totalising theory of society idea in Marxist
has been to remove agency and subjectivity from any serious consideration of thought that all the
its critique of capitalism. A totalising, scientistic and structuralist Marxism various components
of social life need to
had place for human agency only as the (passive) effect of social processes and be considered
relations. And this form of agency was mostly considered in its collective together, in
expression rather than also incorporating its individual expression. So while conjunction. The
Marxism has glossed agency or individuality at the expense of sociality, the social totality is the
idea of a structured
social whole, the human sciences and psychology, in particular, have operated
and historically
in the opposite direction. However, while critical psychology may have been determined overall
slightly less guilty of this slide to individualism, the counter of a robust social complex. The signifi-
theory of human agency within critical psychology has been lacking. A cance and limits of
an action, measure,
psychology that is concerned to be an integral part of the social world that it
achievement, law
acts on, and thinks (research) about, will need to argue the case for a social etc cannot therefore
theory of human agency that takes seriously the notion of social totality within be assessed except
which individuality operates. in relation to a
dialectical grasp of
the structure of such
The dialectical co-construction of individual and social
a totality.
On a small scale, the least that psychology needs to do in engaging Marxism is
to take on the fact that psychological realities are part of the social worlds
within which they operate, and that this can’t be done in such a mild way as Agency:
merely to invoke the ‘social context’. A much grander and more interesting theoretical term
task for a psychology engaging with Marxism is to develop theoretical used to convey the
belief that an indi-
accounts that are equally sensitive to the constitution and operations of
vidual has the
human individuality, subjectivity and agency, and the constitution and opera- capacity of intention
tions of dimensions of social life and sociality. Not nearly enough theoretical – thus, through
work has been done on the dialectical co-constitution of the individual and the rational thought,
social. For example, do we really know, from a psychological perspective, what free will, motivation
or emotion, to
it is like to be a semi-skilled worker on a production line? Do we really know, direct their behav-
from a psychological perspective, what it means to be young, male and white iour or to make
in South Africa today facing uncertainties and insecurities as the society strug- particular choices.
gles to deracialise? So, just on a theoretical level, it seems that there are a
number of interesting research possibilities that present themselves for a
critical psychology wanting to engage Marxism as a theory of the social. While Marxism has
glossed agency/
individuality at the
THE LIVED EXPERIENCE (MATERIALIST PSYCHOLOGY) OF expense of sociality,
EVERYDAY LIFE the social whole,

the human sciences
The extraordinariness of the everyday and psychology, in
The discussion thus far of the intersection of the social and the individual has particular, have
operated in the
proceeded at a somewhat theoretical level that would now benefit from an opposite direction.
attempt to locate the individual in the extraordinariness of everyday life.
179
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 180
Critical Psychology
Solipsism:
Neither Marxism nor psychology has stood up particularly well to this task or
belief that the self challenge. They have both failed in their own ways, and yet it is my contention
is the only thing that a dialogue between Marxism and psychology could fruitfully contribute to
that can be known a social theoretical account of human individuality that is sensitive to the ordi-
and verified.
nariness of the lived-experience of everyday life. For example, what are the
daily rituals and practices that a traditional Hindu housewife performs in one
of Durban’s ‘Indian townships’, and what psychological consequences are
there for her in this life that she leads?
Marxism’s characterisation of questions concerning human agency and
individuality as inherently idealist, bourgeois and individualist has had the
consequence of rendering the theory of everyday life inadequate and incom-
plete. Psychological dimensions of people’s lives are not intrinsically
personalistic and solipsistic! How could this be so? The personal and the
private are social and historical constructs. A Marxism of everyday life is not
achieved by surrendering questions and issues of human nature, human
agency and individuality to bourgeois thought. Regrettably, many of the
conceptions of the person in psychology have been overly individualistic and
asocial, and subject to the elitist bias of bourgeois thought. As Lucien Sève
(1978) has argued, psychology has produced a view of an abstract individual,
far removed from the concrete materiality of ordinary people’s lives.
How do we
understand the
extraordinariness of
everyday life, the
social contradic-
tions and social
circumstances of
individual lives?
How might a
dialectical inter-
change between
psychology and
Marxism make this
possible?
Marxism’s need for a theory of individual human behaviour

The psychology, or everydayness, of social life has to a large extent been
neglected and absent in Marxism. The stark reality is that Marxism has rela-
tively little to say about the micro-level of human interaction, about the nature
180
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 181

of the individual human psyche, about personal relations or about the rela- Materialism:
tions between the state and the individual or between the public and private theory that physical
spheres. Marxism sees the individual as a social product (as Althusserian matter is the only
‘structuralist’, Marxism has stressed) and yet it requires a theory of individual reality and that
everything,
human behaviour and social interaction to underpin historical materialism. Its including thought,
goal (as Marxist humanists have seen) is both to explain and engage in the feeling, mind and
process of bringing about the end of reified social relations of production and will, can be
intercourse, subjugating them ‘to the power of the united individuals’. Why is explained in terms
of matter and
this the Marxist goal? Because, ‘the reality which communism creates is
physical
precisely the basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist inde- phenomena.
pendently of individuals’ (Bottomore, 1983, 228). (One needs to bear in mind
here, of course, that for Marxism reality is nevertheless ‘only a product of the
preceding intercourse of individuals’ (in Bottomore, 1983, 228).) One starts to
see here, then, at least in these explanations of the goals and key concepts of
Marxism, why an explanation of the individual would be so important. We
might put this slightly differently and say that not only has the inherent struc-
turalism of Marxism sidelined human agency but an opportunity has been lost
to account for the contradictions of social life in contemporary societies (capi- Reify/reification:
when concepts or
talist or socialist). For example, how do we understand what it means to live in ideas are spoken
Cato Crest (a central Durban informal settlement) in the shadow of poverty about as if they are
and requiring treatment for TB?; or what does it mean to be a poor white kid really existing
hooked on crack?; or what does it mean to be a Zimbabwean woman trying to concrete objects.
Psychological
eke out a living on the streets of Johannesburg?; or a jazz musician trying to constructs such as
make a living from his music? Of course, Marxism can tell us a lot about the ‘mind’ and
social circumstances of the lives mentioned here but it can tell us significantly ‘personality’ are
less about the meaning and experience of these people’s lives. good examples.
BOX 3 Psychology as part of social theory
A psychology concerned to be part of the social world will need to:

Understand fully that psychological realities themselves are part of the
social worlds within which they operate.
Argue for a social theory of human agency that understands the notion of
social totality within which individuality operates.
Understand how human experience, and psychological life, is part of the
ensemble of social relations and does not exist in a pre-social sphere.
Develop theoretical accounts equally sensitive to the constitution and oper-
ation of individual human subjectivity and agency, and to the constitution

and operations of social life and sociality on the other.
Understand both how many conceptualisations of the person in psychology
have been overly individualistic and asocial, and how Marxism requires a
theory of individual human behaviour and social interaction to underpin its
historical materialism, similarly, understand.
181
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 182
Critical Psychology
Psychology and Marxism as potential theories of the ordinary

The historical antagonism between Marxism and psychology has contributed
to the lack of an adequate account of everyday life and experience. The irony
and tragedy of Marxism and psychology is that they are both potentially
theories of the ordinary, the everyday, and yet have remained aloof from the
promise of their theoretical possibilities. Psychology as the study of the indi-
vidual has surprisingly little to tell us about how individuals live their lives, and
try to make sense of their lives in ever-stressful and complex circumstances.
The language of ‘lived experience’ might suggest that a return to existentialist,
humanist and phenomenological psychology is being advocated. There is
nothing inherently wrong with these approaches to psychology, except to say
that they have tended to eschew theory and held a rather naïve view of the ‘will
to choice’ facing the person, or human subject. This is not to say that there
haven’t been examples within psychology over the last 15–20 years that were
concerned to advance a different conception of the subject (of psychology),
and simultaneously a critique of mainstream psychology. One could think of
the following developments at least: the influence of feminist theory in
psychology, and the now established tradition of feminist psychology; the
discursive turn in psychology, and the subsequent ‘mainstreaming’ of qualita-
tive methods; the influence of structuralist (Althusserian) Marxism in
psychology as evidenced in that seminal work Changing the subject
(1984/1998) by Henriques et al; the collection edited by Parker & Spears
(1996) that brings together radical politics and psychology with perspectives
for change in contemporary Marxism; and a range of other influences from
Lacan to Z̆iz̆ek, from Foucault to Nikolas Rose.
A materialist psychology of situated lived-experience

The argument for a (materialist) psychology of everyday life is not to suggest
that this is simply achieved through the detailed account of the uniqueness of
particular individual lives. The concrete materiality of individuals’ lives must
be sought in the situatedness of lived-experience, as well as in the dialectical
development of a theoretical language able to explain the contradictions of
everyday lived-experience. In other words, as we begin to research the lived
experience of ordinary people’s lives, we shall start to discover the appropriate
theoretical language to describe and account for these lives. An objective study
of the psychology of everyday life has the potential to disturb the complacency
of the psychology world and its practitioners, a complacency ensconced within

the class privilege and bourgeois ideology of psychology’s social location.
There are very few examples from the history of psychology where the
production of knowledge has consistently and unambiguously been in the
service of the majority, of ordinary people, of the poor and unemployed, of the
182
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 183

working class, or of the insane. A psychology of everyday life takes people’s There are very few
experiences seriously, as well as people’s ability to reflect on their lives. This examples from the
does not mean that people’s accounts or reflections of their lives equal knowl- history of psycho-
edge, but rather that we cannot have knowledge of people’s lives without their logy where the
production of
accounts. It is indeed a strange psychology that has a disdain for ordinary knowledge has
people’s attempts at making sense of their lives. The raw material of a consistently and
psychology of everyday life surely resides in the richness of our ‘expressions’ of unambiguously been
our lives. However, a theory of the psychology of everyday life requires the in the service of the
majority, of ordinary
development of a theoretical conceptualisation which takes us further than
people. A psycho-
people’s accounts of their lives. logy of everyday life
takes people’s expe-
The ‘articulateness’ of ordinary accounts of social life riences seriously, as
well as people’s
One of the theoretical tasks facing Marxism in psychology is to make sense of ability to reflect on
people’s everyday experience and develop an explanation of what it means to their lives.
live in particular social formations in specific historical conjunctures. In other
words, what should a psychology of everyday life, that is sensitive to the ques-
tions of Marxism – class, contradiction, alienation – consist of? As a
beginning, what terms and language should constitute this project? The diffi-
culty in answering these questions point both to psychology’s and Marxism’s
distance from ordinary working and unemployed people’s experiences. How
do people speak about their lives? Why does human and social disciplinary
knowledge still have such an inherent distrust of the potential articulateness of
the ordinary language of social life? This is not to suggest that what we say as
people trying to live and make sense of our lives translates into a coherent
theory of ordinary experience. Theory is not only developed through the alien-
ation of common discourse, as theory can and should be developed in and
through the language of everyday life. This might be less true for physics, but
it certainly pertains to psychology, and especially critical psychology.
Thinking theoretically as a means of thinking critically

Thinking theoretically entails saying something beyond the descriptions that
people give us about their lives; thinking theoretically entails attempting to
explain some of the quandaries which people face about their lives; thinking
theoretically entails an understanding of the nuances, interstices and contra-
dictions of lived-reality; thinking theoretically entails penetrating beyond the
appearances, beyond the saids, beyond the inconsistencies; and thinking theo-
retically, as Marxists, entails developing some responses to the conditions, both
emotional and material, of people’s lives which undermine and oppress them.
To the extent that Marxism continues to refuse to talk about the personal,
about emotionality, it allows an unthinking, an unquestioning psychology to
determine the content and substance of human identity and individuality.
183
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 184
Critical Psychology
The depersonalisation of the personal in capitalism

There is a significant difference between accepting bourgeois ideology’s
construction and identification of human nature and human life and an aban-
donment of the issues facing human nature and human life as bourgeois issues.
Marxism needs to become involved, embroiled even, in understanding
people’s personal lives, so that they can become exactly that, personal. One of
the most startling contradictions of so-called personal life under capitalism is
that it is not personal at all. The state and capital are all over our lives! We liter-
ally are the ‘administered society’, deceived into believing that we truly exercise
our own free will and make meaningful individual choices about our lives.
Much of individuality, and personal life today, reflects what Marx called
‘abstract individuality’. We will know that substantial social changes have
taken place when there is a shift from abstract individuality to concrete indi-
viduality. We will know that substantial social change has taken place when
Where psychology concerns of how best to organise the economy are replaced by concerns of how
has avoided the best to organise our emotional lives. The only thing that is really personal and
political impli- private under capitalism is private property, hence the importance of the
cations of its
continued alienation of concrete individuality in the form of abstract individ-
researches, Marxism
has avoided the uality (cf Sève, 1978). The social relations that maintain the system of private
psychological property impel the abstract logic of creating ‘subjects of ’ capitalist social life.
implications of its Concrete individuality is potentially full of the threat of human agency, of
politics.
human action, of political will.
One of the most startling contradictions of so-called personal life under capitalism is
that it is not personal at all. We shall know that substantial social change has taken
place when concerns of how best to organise the economy are replaced by concerns of
how best to organise our emotional lives.
184
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 185

CONCLUSION
Psychology and the neglect of social life
What do we know about sections of the working class, the unemployed, the
homeless, about middle-class single-parent women, Aids sufferers, the insane?
The list is an indictment of the silence of the psychology of everyday life. This
is not to say that the whole of psychology should be devoted to the study of
the psychology of everyday life. Clearly not, but the continued silence can only
be interpreted as a political choice of the intended neglect of this aspect of
social life.
Where psychology has avoided the political implications of its researches,
Marxism has avoided the psychological implications of its politics. Marxism
as a theory promoting social change is committed to a society free of exploita-
tion and oppression, where people can live in fulfilment of their potential; a
society in which people won’t want for basic human and social needs, where
people will have the possibilities of fulfilling their potential as human and
social beings, and be able to enjoy their lives and be happy. A psychology
locating itself firmly in social life, while at the same time pursuing empirical
analyses of the formation and experience of human individuality, is able to
position itself within the social whole and yet from the vantage point of the
individual offer a critique of alienating social conditions. As stated in the
introduction, a psychology linked to Marxism is a Left psychology, a
psychology prepared to comment critically on the deformations of the human
spirit under capitalism.

1. Marxist thinking helps us test and challenge a number of commonplace
terms in psychology. In this respect compare the following two sets of
terms: first, methodology and method, and, secondly, criticism and
critique. Explain how the differences between these terms describe aspects
of the Marxist approach.
2. Two vital theoretical notions that Marxism has given us are those of
ideology and alienation. These are both very broad theoretical concepts,
and have come to be used in many different ways. Make a list of the various
ways in which each of these concepts is used throughout this book. On this
basis, generate your own definitions of these terms, being careful to involve
as many subsidiary concepts as seems necessary to do these notions justice.

3. It remains important that Marxism never becomes simply an exercise in
theory. Examine the components of the basic definition of Marxism
supplied above, and try to give grounded practical examples of each such
component. Then think of how each component may be the basis of a
critique of sorts that may be mounted from within psychology.
185
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap07 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 186
Critical Psychology
4. The notion of trans-individuality or intersubjectivity is isolated, in this

chapter, as being of central importance to critical psychology. Why is this so?
Which other chapters in this book make use of similar kinds of notion in an
attempt to conceptualise the psychological lives of people? Which notions
are they?
Parker, I., & Spears, R. (eds) (1996). Psychology and society: Radical theory
and practice. London: Pluto Press. Read the following two chapters:
Introduction by Spears & Parker: Marxist theories: Marxist theses and
psychological themes.
Chapter 11 by Hayes: Marxist theses and psychological themes.
Hayes, G. (1996). ‘The psychology of everyday life: Some Marxist reflections’.
In I. Parker & R. Spears (eds). Psychology and society: Radical theory and
practice. London: Pluto Press (chapter 11).
Spears, R. & Parker, I. (1996). ‘Marxist theses and psychological themes’. In
I. Parker & R. Spears (eds). Psychology and society: Radical theory and
practice. London: Pluto Press (1–17).
186
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 187
Chapter
8
Psychology and the

regulation of gender
Tamara Shefer
‘Far from collectivising women’s oppression, therapies of all kinds

have been seen as individualising and psychologising women’s
subordination, tending to treat women’s experiences as arising from
qualities within themselves rather than their patriarchally
organised circumstances.’
Burman (1995a, 471)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explore how psychology, in particular the psychology of gender, has served to
reproduce and legitimise gender inequality
Understand the way in which psychology as a normative and popularised discourse
has contributed to both women’s oppression and the oppression of gay and lesbian
South Africans
Present contemporary critical perspectives on a psychology of gender towards the
reconstruction of South African psychology.
187
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 188
Critical Psychology
Gender:
INTRODUCTION
concept usually Psychology’s reproduction of gender inequality
referring to the
social construction Psychology as a discipline has long been criticised for its reproduction of
of inherent sexual gender and other inequalities (see, for example, Bohan, 1992; Burman et al,
differences between 1996; Wilkinson, 1986; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995). Such a critique has been
men and women. aimed both at the content of psychological knowledges as well as the practices
Most gender
theorists assume
of psychology, including the realm of academia, intervention and organisa-
that gender is social tional structures. In South Africa it has been well illustrated that white males
whereas sex is have dominated in psychology as a practice and in the production of knowl-
biological; and most edge, particularly as authors, where black and female psychologists have been
also hold that the
term encapsulates a
underrepresented (Levett & Kottler, 1997; Potgieter & De la Rey, 1997; Seedat,
notion of power 1992, 1997; Shefer, Van Niekerk, Duncan & De la Rey, 1997).
inequality. It has also been widely acknowledged that psychology, in particular the
psychology of gender, has been highly problematic in the way in which it repro-
duces and legitimates gender difference and inequality. While debates about
the sexist content of psychological knowledge have been present for a number
Heterosexist: of decades in the international context, there has been little focus on this in
assumption that all South Africa. The need to develop a South African psychology of gender that is
sexuality refers to both local – that is, representing indigenous experiences of gender develop-
heterosexual ment and identities – and critical – in that it problematises the construction of
practices and that
the ideal, accept- gender difference and inequality – is another challenge within the broader
able and ‘normal’ transformation of South African psychology.
sexual practices are
those between men Gender as difference
and women. Such
values and practices Gender has historically been constructed as difference – immutable differ-
are discriminatory ence(s) between men and women – in both popular and academic discourse.
and oppressive. This construction has fuelled and continues to fuel broader gender inequalities
in social contexts. Furthermore, the reproduction of the binary opposites of
male/female contributes (sometimes inadvertently) to the reproduction of
heterosexism and homophobia. The construction of gender as difference is
Discourse: founded on such a binarism and has been theorised within ‘scientific’
complex term that discourses that continue to legitimise, naturalise and rationalise both such a
Foucault used to
refer to bodies of
construction and the inequality it creates.
practice that 'form Psychology has played a large role in perpetuating the notion that men and
the objects of women are deeply different psychical beings, with studies of gender constituting
which we speak' a massive research program in the discipline (Burman, 1995b; Connell, 1987;
(1969); he analysed
Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; 1992; Lott, 1990; Morawski,
professional
discourses on 1990; Unger, 1990). Psychology, and the social sciences more generally, has been
sexuality as con- set up as ‘the authority’ defining ‘normality’ (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990a;
structing sexuality Unger, 1990). Thus the ways in which psychology has construed these differ-
as we know it. ences have played a significant role in (re)producing the dominant construction
188
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 189
Psychology and the regulation of gender

Despite having
one of the most
progressive
constitutions in the
world, South Africa
remains tainted by
heterosexism.
Homophobia:
rejection of
homosexual
practices and
lifestyles. It
frequently emerges
in negative
prejudicial attitudes
and stereotypes,
and discriminatory
and violent practi-
ces towards gays,
lesbians and
bisexuals.
Psychology has
played a large role
in perpetuating the
notion that men
and women are
of gender and consequent power inequalities. Psychology, steeped as it is in deeply different
Western culture’s obsession with dualism and dichotomy, has had a long history psychical beings ...
Psychology, and the
of focusing on individual difference, with gender/sex difference being a primary social sciences more
focus. The discipline’s continued interest in proving or disproving sex or gender generally, has been
differences reveals much about its broader social role(s) and raises significant set up as ‘the
problems with the social dualism of masculinity/femininity. authority’ defining
‘normality’ in
This chapter overviews some of the central ways in which psychology has Western culture.
reproduced gender difference through empirical and theoretical work on Thus the ways in
sex/gender difference and gender development, and attempts to unpack the which psychology
way in which this has served to legitimise gender inequality. has construed these
differences have
played a significant
PSYCHOLOGY’S ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEX/GENDER role in (re)produc-

DIFFERENCE ing the dominant
construction of
Essentialising gender difference gender and
While feminists have been criticising psychology’s notion of sex differences for consequent power
inequalities.
more than twenty years, suggesting that ‘the matter of sex differences was
189
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 190
Critical Psychology
something of a red herring for feminist psychologists’ (Unger, 1990, 102), the
focus on difference continues, albeit amidst increasing debate and murkiness as
to what constitutes masculinity/femininity. In the early years of psychology,
these differences were attributed to biology and as such were universalised,
naturalised and essentialised. Most early psychological research served to
‘prove’ this difference, framing the genders as ‘opposite, complementary, recip-
rocal, and equal’ (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990c, 186). The focus on difference,
with the abstraction of categories of masculine and feminine, therefore served
both to obscure the power inequality between men and women and to legitimate
ideologically the continued reproduction of such difference (and inequality).
Central to the traditional psychology of gender conceptualisation is an
assumption of what Connell (1987) terms a ‘uunitary sexual character’ (167).
The sex/gender research in psychology was based on a central notion that
masculinity and femininity exist as a corpus of traits, including characters,
roles, abilities and temperaments, which are embedded in individual men and
women. Thus a notion of static, stable, unitary gender identity was evident,
which, of course, ignored both the diversity of gendered experience across
other lines of social identity and ‘fixed’ individuals to a singular, enduring
experience of their own gender. The notion of a unitary sexual character
persists in popular culture, and recent analytic studies of how men construct
gender illustrate that the ‘difference discourse’, that is, the depiction of gender
as difference (whether biological or social), is still central to talk on gender and
serves as a rhetorical strategy in legitimating gender inequality (Gough, 1998;
Harris, Lea & Foster, 1995).
Unitary sexual
character:
idea that
masculinity and
feminity exist as a
collection of traits,
roles, abilities and
temperaments
which are embedded
in individual men
and women.
190
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 191

BOX 1 Men are from Mars, women from Venus Feminist/feminism:

umbrella term for a
The book Men are from Mars, women are from Venus by John Gray (1992) exem- large and diverse
plifies the popular construction of men and women as inevitably ‘Other’ and alien body of work that
to each other. While it should not be disputed that many people may have found broadly explores
this book useful, the discourse that it relies on should be looked at critically. The women’s sub-
key thesis in the book serves to reflect and reproduce the popular construction of ordination in
male-dominated
men and women as so different from each other that it is as if they speak a
societies. All femi-
different language. The book promises to provide translations for these two
nist work has in
beings who, while often living together, ‘in fact’ are living on different planets!
common the goal of
challenging gender
power inequality.
Challenging androcentric psychology
As feminism began to open up spaces in androcentric psychology, where
women were invisible both as object and subject of knowledge-production, the
role of the social was introduced. But feminists and others continued, out of
habit perhaps but also due to the imperative of the ‘science’, to study differ-
ence. A new discourse of social learning theory – ‘socialisation’, a focus on
gender roles and gender stereotypes – began to emerge. These new discourses, Androcentric:
while stimulating a reconceptualisation of gender, were still unable to contex- referring to a
tualise gender within broader social processes and power relations. discipline or
practice that is
Furthermore, much effort was now made to ‘prove’ (and it appeared very easy centred about
to do so) that differences between men and women were minimally evident – masculinity or men.
rather they have a ‘now you see them, now you don’t’ quality (Unger, 1982, Feminists have
cited in Unger, 1990, 107). Connell (1987, 170) concludes that the main finding criticised science
and knowledge
‘from about eighty years of research, is a massive psychological similarity
production as being
between women and men in the populations studied by psychologists’. While created by men and
this finding should spell the death of notions of a distinct unitary sexual char- for men, and
acter and a seamless difference between male and female subjects, this has not therefore
happened. Rather the notion of polarised and oppositional genders continues representing male
experiences and
to be central in the work of social scientists, culture and social policy (Lott, concerns.
1990). The pervasiveness of the dualism of gender has to be seen in the light of
the huge amount invested in gender difference, which makes it difficult to
refute it completely (Connell, 1987).
The ambiguity of the ‘evidence’ on gender difference did, however, lead to
some shifts in theoretical thinking. For example, the introduction of the scalar
model, with the notion of a continuum between masculinity and femininity,
became popular, with a wide range of inventories being developed to measure

Polarise:
gender in this way. The notion of a continuum allows for a more dimensional to cause to
analysis, more space for movement, and less rigidity between the polar unitary concentrate about
accounts of masculinity/femininity. None the less, wherever one is located, so two conflicting or
contrasting
shall one be gender-fixed. Besides producing very little new understanding of
positions.
the psychosocial processes involved in gendered subjectivity (Constantinople,
191
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 192
Critical Psychology
Scalar/androgyny
cited in Connell, 1987, 174), these scales perform a reifying function by
model: constructing people as objects – reducing the gendered self to a score (Connell,
conceptual schema 1987). Bem’s androgyny scale, for example, arguing for an integration of the
that hypothesises feminine and masculine for a ‘whole’ healthier self, appears to disentangle
a continuum of
femininity and masculinity from the feminine and the masculine (body), yet
gender from
dominant male still proposes a unitary self (‘in the figure of the androgyne’) (Butler, 1990b,
to dominant female 328). The model prescribes a combination of the two dualistic sexes, thus
characteristics. reproducing the legitimacy of gender categorisation, rather than challenging it
A personality that (Unger, 1990; Wetherell, 1986). Furthermore, the model of androgyny was
scores high on
both male and ironically (and predictably) biased towards ‘masculinity’, with masculinity
female character- scores strongly predictive of androgynous behaviour, and the very construct
istics is named itself based on individualist, male-centred values (such as independence, self-
androgynous. containment and instrumentality) (Morawski, 1990).
BOX 2 Patriarchal psychotherapies
Psychology does not only reproduce gender Bernardez (1988) affirms suggestions that the
inequalities at the level of psychological knowl- majority of psychotherapies gender women into
edge; it also reproduces gender inequalities at submissive roles rather than challenging the
the level of practice. Psychotherapy, for example, social conditions that oppresses them. The
has been the target of a great deal of feminist three most common reactions by therapists to
critique, and deservedly so, one might say, female patients in Bernandez’s (1988) study
particularly given the view that, as Miller (1973) were:
puts it: ‘Therapy acts to enforce the whole male (1) the discouragement and disapproval of
structure’ (485). Perhaps the most immediate behaviours that did not conform to tradi-
and most prominent feminist criticism in this tional gender role prescriptions;
respect focuses on how psychotherapy has (2) the disparagement and inhibition of
played a part in enforcing the subordination of expressions of anger, ‘negative’ effects
women in society. As Brown (1973) argues, the and aggressive behaviours not expected of
vast majority of psychotherapies have effectively women, and
attempted to adjust women to living in the (3) the absence of confrontation, interpre-
conditions of a chauvinist world rather than to tation and exploration of passive-
liberate them from it. The feminist critique here,
submissive and compliant behaviour in
then, focuses on demonstrating the extent to
the patient (1988, 26).
which psychotherapy is powerfully politically
active in gendering women into submissive social These qualities (exhibited particularly by male
roles and positions. Burman (1995a) argues therapists) are part of the way in which both
along the following lines: Bernardez (1988) and Nugent (1994) assert
that therapy contributes to a socialisation of
Far from collectivising women’s oppression,
women towards dependency and away from

therapies of all kinds have been seen as
individualising and psychologising women’s
autonomy.
subordination, tending to treat women’s Chesler, in her landmark text, Women and
experiences as arising from qualities within madness (1972), argues that psychotherapeutic
themselves rather than their (patriarchally treatments, by their reliance on social norms,
organised) circumstances (471). insidiously attempt to curtail ‘unfeminine’
192
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 193

BOX 2 Patriarchal psychotherapies (continued)
traits such as assertiveness and initiative. This disordered or neurotic behaviour is hence
is what Allen (1986) refers to as ‘gender role expected from women. Furthermore, deviations
maintenance’, what Busfield (1996) labels from such conceptions, claims Ussher (1991) –
‘gender regulation’. Ussher (1991) similarly the case of the woman who is adventurous,
draws attention to the insidious and pernicious assertive, competitive, sexually active, inde-
gender stereotypes that, she suggests, implic- pendent or aggressive, the woman who rejects
itly inform the norms and standards of much the role of wife and mother – subsequently runs
psychotherapeutic treatment. Borrowing from the risk of being designated psychologically
the classic study of Broverman et al (1970) – disturbed:
which illustrated clinicians’ gender biases in
In fact, the woman who reports symptoms
conceptions of mental health and illness –
which are seen as ‘male’, such as alcohol
Ussher (1991) argues that culturally normative abuse or aggressive antisocial behaviour,
conceptions of women are defined against will be seen as more psychologically
masculine norms. Hence women are generally disturbed than the man who exhibits the
perceived as being more submissive, less inde- same symptoms (Ussher, 1991, 166).
pendent, less adventurous, more easily Ussher’s agenda here is to emphasise
influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, how thoroughly saturated in patriarchy the
more excitable in minor crises, having their implicit social norms and values of
feelings more easily hurt, being more conceited psychotherapy typically are. More than this,
about their appearance, less objective, and so her agenda is to suggest what Busfield
on. Further still: (1996) calls the ‘Catch 22’ of female mental
health, what we might here understand as
The description of a healthy adult, either
the therapeutic double-bind confronting
male or female, conform[s] ... to the
women patients of (much) psychotherapy.
masculine stereotype, whilst the feminine
On the one hand the norms and values of
stereotypes, of passivity, conformity, less
psychotherapy typically construct or
aggression, lower achievement, motivation,
‘engender’ woman as inferior, as deeply
etc., [are] ... seen as psychologically
problematic. On the other, they patholo-
unhealthy (Ussher, 1991, 166).
gise, with what seems a particular
For both Chesler (1972) and Ussher (1991) it is patriarchal zeal, any attempts by woman to
through the operation of such patriarchal escape these denigratory stereotypes. It is
biases, no matter how discretely implemented, on this basis that Chesler (1972) asserts
that forms of psychological practice continue to that ‘[w]hat we consider “madness” ... in
perpetuate constructions of women as intrinsi- women ... is either the acting out of the
cally more problematic and innately patho- devalued female role or the total or partial
rejection of one’s sex-role stereotype’ (56).
logical than their male counterparts. More
The ‘androgynous schema’ Androgyny:

Assumptions about a unitary, fixed and stable gender, residing somewhere term used to des-
cribe a personality
inside of us, whether determined biologically or created socially, are similarly characterised by a
evident in most theories about the development of gender identity (another good balance
area where psychology has reigned as ‘expert authority’). Freudian and of traditionally
Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, which provides a very complicated male and female
attributes.
story of gender identity development and have been for many feminists the
193
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 194
Critical Psychology
Binary:
hope for analysing gender development within patriarchal culture, still ‘tells a
referring to socially story that constructs a discrete gender identity and discursive location which
constructed polar remains relatively fixed’ (Butler, 1990b, 329). Butler illustrates that a theory
opposites such as does not have to be essentialist in order to arrive at this point, as in feminist
man/woman,
white/black. Post-
psychoanalytic theory, which criticises claims of essential femininity or
modern theorists, masculinity (for example, Mitchell, 1975) but still posits an outcome which is
following Derrida, fixed (not only by the age of 6, but also within the cultural prescriptions of sex,
see contemporary gender and desire).
societies, and
Similarly, Chodorow (1978) uses object relations, together with a critique
language itself, as
being founded on of unequal parenting in patriarchal societies, to speak of the development of a
binarisms, where unitary woman’s sexual character which prepares all women for motherhood
the one term takes (Connell, 1987). Although she locates the roots of this development in Western
its value in relation
industrial capitalism, her work reads as an assertion of essential enduring
to the devaluation
of the other – one differences between women and men at a global level, and may be used as a
term always way to legitimate these divides (and inequalities) in spite of her desire to chal-
superior, viewed as lenge social power relations (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1992). Furthermore, in
the ‘normal’ and suggesting a change in parenting through the integration of masculine and
‘natural’, in relation
to the inferior, feminine qualities, she subscribes to an androgynous schema which, as
often objectified, pointed out, is based on an acceptance of a universal dualism of masculinity
abnormalised and and femininity, and a ‘normative model of a unified self ’ (Butler, 1990b, 328).
marginalised ‘Other’.
The feminine subject

In opposition to the androgynous schema, some feminists, including feminist
psychologists, have motivated for difference, and within the radical
Beta bias:
feminist/cultural feminist mould, have glorified women’s difference from
representations of men. They have argued for a ‘specifically alternative feminine subject’ who
gender that see few defines herself in relation to others and is rooted in a primary maternal identi-
differences between fication (Butler, 1990b, 328). Similarly, cultural and ecological feminists have
males and females.
called for the ascendance of the feminine, for a world organised by feminine
values and characteristics (nurturance, care, equality, democracy), rather than
masculine ones (aggression, violence, competition, colonisation, authoritari-
anism). While the strategy of reconstructing traditional femininity in a
positive paradigm, revaluing femininity, has a political function (much like the
Alpha bias: Black Consciousness Movement), the reproduction of the dominant discourse
representations of
gender that see
on difference and the humanist essential self is evident (Weedon, 1987).
Women are viewed as the embodiment of a female unitary self, and the notion
huge differences
between males and of an inevitable female-male polar divide is perpetuated.
females, and that
often idealise or try
to legitimate such Alpha and beta biases
perceived Hare-Mustin & Maracek (1992) argue that these two opposing lines of inquiry
differences.
have led to two incompatible representations of gender: one that sees few
194
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 195

BOX 3 The transformation of oppression into illness
Forms of psychological practice (such as What this calls attention to is the fact that for
psychotherapy) often then work, as Chesler the most part psychotherapy is not gender-
(1972) suggests, to blind their patients to neutral in its basic assumptions and that it
oppression by conceptualising their unhappi- might be a means of transmitting misogynistic
ness and anger as personal pathology. Likewise, assumptions. As Ussher (1991) puts it: ‘Therapy
psychotherapy in particular might be thought will [after all] merely mirror the oppression and
of as keeping women from exploring, under- systematic treatment of women ... which takes
standing and resolving conflicts produced by place in all organizations in society’ (177).
social determinants. Palming women’s anger off Burman (1995a) describes the situation elo-
as illness, dismissing their misery as the result quently (and it is worth quoting her here at
of some internal flaw – and thus exonerating length):
the male oppressors (or the responsible misog-
Instead of discovering new insights, new
ynistic culture) – is a key tactic of patriarchy,
ways of thinking about oneself and one’s
as Ussher (1995) argues. It is in this way that experiences, it could be argued that the
the transformation of oppression into illness client is being pursuaded to formulate her
might be considered to be one of the (poten- experience within a particular value-laden
tial) patriarchal functions of psychotherapy. framework of meaning ... [T]herapy, and the
Ussher (1995) in fact argues that in most forms discourses and practices it is embedded in,
of psychotherapy is productive: it creates its own objects ...
[t]he woman is taught to see her misery as [one of whom is the] ... client – who ... is
illness, and to direct attention and care at both constituted by, and subjected to, the
herself ... [taught] ... to fixate upon herself therapeutic discourse. Therapy becomes not
as object ... [t]he woman is thus separated a resource for self-knowledge and libera-
from her own feelings, which are compart- tion, but a coercive framework for
mentalised and dismissed. She must constructing and interpreting experience ...
integrate them into a therapeutic [T]herapy give[s] rise to ... [a] range of
‘normality’ ... look for help to relieve her of representations of subjectivity. [Do these]
her ‘illness’ ... [from] those ... firmly notions of selves ... of self-development,
entrenched in the medicalised models ... fulfillment, and actualization, relate to
Her oppressors, the therapists, are imbued normative definitions of the compliant,
with definitions of normality based on responsible citizen? (471–472).
misogynistic assumptions (174–175).
differences between males and females (what they call ‘beta bias’); and one that
sees huge differences, and often idealises or legitimates these differences or
calls for a reintegration of the difference (what they call ‘alpha bias’). They
suggest that both have their inherent problems: alpha bias in exaggerating
differences and therefore providing justification for differential, unequal treat-

ment of men and women; beta bias in de-emphasising difference, thus
allowing for the obfuscation of ‘women’s special needs’ or for redressing the
inequality. They maintain further that both schools of thinking adhere to the
notion of difference, and therefore an essentialised, universalised, dichoto-
mised notion of gendered subjectivity.
195
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 196
Critical Psychology
Normative:
Feminists have become increasingly wary of the very question ‘is there a
referring to difference?’ in the psychology of gender (Unger, 1990). Clearly the need to
behaviours and prove difference has been linked to the prerogative of legitimating the status
practices that are quo of male domination. But in feminist psychologists’ critiques of the ‘differ-
viewed as ‘normal’
and correct in a
ence debate’, one cannot help but notice that much energy is spent on
particular social emphasising a lack of difference. Somewhere in the writing, in spite of the
context. Psychology critique of liberal humanism, seeping in between the lines is an irresistible
plays a particular insistence on women’s equality to men and the consequent de-emphasis of
role in the
difference. The danger in what Hare-Mustin & Maracek call the beta bias (that
processes and
regulation of is, undermining the difference between men and woman) is that existing
socially constructed inequities will be ignored (much like debates in this country about affirmative
standards of action). There are other insidious dangers – one is almost led to believe that
normality.
one should throw up the task of theorising gender altogether, for, after all, it
accounts for only 5% of the variance in social behaviour (Lott, 1990). In this
way, the apparent lack of gender difference (based on characteristics, behav-
iour) serves to obscure gender difference in location and access to power. Once
again we face the invisibilising of the huge differences that still do exist
Acknowledging that between men and women, notwithstanding the multiplicity of forms they take.
gender and differ- Acknowledging that gender and difference are culturally constructed, are
ence are culturally
constructed, are
constantly shifting and changing, and are always mediated by other inequali-
constantly shifting ties, never a unitary, fixed process or identity, should not constitute a denial
and changing, and that gender difference is there, is here, in all its slippery manifestations.
are always mediated
by other inequali-
ties, never a unitary, PATHOLOGISING AND REGULATORY DISCOURSES IN PSYCHOLOGY
fixed process or
‘Gender disorders’
identity, should not
constitute a denial Another area where psychology, together with psychiatry, has played a partic-
that gender ular role in affirming the notion of immutable difference between genders has
difference is there,
been in the pathologisation of those who do not ‘fit’ neatly into the categories
is here, in all
its slippery of prescribed gender/sexual identity. In this respect, the social reproduction of
manifestations. a rigid matrix of relations between sex, gender and sexuality (see Butler,
1990a), involving deterministic relations between biological sex, socialised
gender identity/roles and sexual attraction for the opposite sex, is closely
guarded by psychological and medical ‘science’. This concern is well illustrated
through the psychological diagnostic category of ‘gender disorder’ and histor-
ical attempts by these ‘sciences’ to institute behavioural (eg desensitisation
programmes for gay and lesbian people), medical (eg hormones) and surgical
(sex-change therapy) procedures to ‘treat’ such ‘disorders’. In the South
African context, a shocking example of such interventions in contemporary
history has been the exposé of the South African Defence Force’s treatment of
gay men (see Mail & Guardian, 28 July–3 August 2000).
196
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 197

BOX 4 The ‘thumb prints of sexuality’
The rigidity of the sex/gender/sexual discourse case mystifying ‘scientific language’ and ‘tech-
has been increasingly highlighted by feminist, nical’ drawings (on closer inspection, a
gay and lesbian, and queer activists and simplistic sketch) are used to construct ‘truth’
academics. The serious threat that challenging and credibility. ‘The pink thumb-print’ is one
this rigid ‘matrix of intelligibility’ poses is which both women and gay men share –
evident in the backlash responses to the absolute proof of shared genetic material! For
cultural, political and intellectual post-modern gay men, this is viewed as a consequence of in
moves to dismantle and subvert sex/gender/ utero abnormalities – stressed mothers,
sexual categories. A small review of the local hormone imbalances. In this way homosexuality
popular press exposes the virulence with which is linked very neatly with femininity, and
the essential and deterministic polarities of masculinity and femininity are kept in ‘their
male/female and heterosexual/homosexual are place’. Lesbian women are now also categoris-
being reinterpreted in the face of the notion of able following another ‘scientific’ study which
multiple and diffuse sexual locations. found that ‘lesbians have a difference in their
Recent local newspaper articles provide inner ears, which makes them slightly harder of
good examples of this. In an article entitled hearing than heterosexual women’ (Sunday
“Rule of thumb” could finger gay criminals’ we Times, 8 March 1998, 5).
see the cultural imperative to ‘prove’ (yet Similar discourses emerge in an article
again, in yet another bizarre way) that homo- documenting the increase of sex changes for
sexuality is genetic and easily identifiable children in Britain (Saturday Weekend Argus, 18
through thumb-prints. The prevailing message October 1997). Here the well-worn concept of
is that, while the majority of people are born ‘gender dysphoria’ or gender disorder is imputed
heterosexual, some are born homosexual – to create ‘order’ in the sexual/gender regime.
there is nothing in between, and it is all There is no need to enter the debate at a moral
scripted in your genes or ‘programmed’ in your level (which is, of course, the ‘natural’ inclina-
brain. It is now possible, so this article main- tion), to argue whether it is ‘better’ or ‘worse’
tains, to ensure that your sexual orientation is for a child to be allowed to change sex if he or
classified at birth (reminiscent of equally irra- she feels in the ‘wrong body’, but what stands
tional historic classification systems closer to out in the article is the increased social need to
home), for it ‘opens the way for a simple test to ‘sort things out’. Better to undertake fairly
help determine a person’s sexual orientation’ extreme surgical and hormonal measures than
(Saturday Weekend Argus, 14 February 1998, 8). to acknowledge identities that subvert the
The same scientists are also hoping to establish gender order. The notion is that a psychical
that ‘sexual orientation may be affected by the consciousness and desires cannot be allowed
type of hormones circulated in the womb and expression if residing in the inappropriate body
that high stress levels in pregnant women could (presumed sex), as one of the psychiatrists
be linked to the birth of homosexual sons’ (8). involved is quoted as saying: ‘Changing the
The need to categorise, establish genetic deter- body to match the mind is increasingly the
mination and pathologise (stress, incorrect accepted way of doing things, ...’. (Saturday
hormones) is clear in this popularisation of Weekend Argus, 18 October 1997, 11). Psychol-
‘scientific’ research. ogists and psychiatrists have spent much time

Stereotypic notions of sexual identity and and energy trying to ‘change the mind’. A
the male/female polar binarism are also notable example, exposed recently by the Truth
embedded in the article. Following a long tradi- and Reconciliation Commission, was the former
tion of popular culture, being a homosexual South African Defence Force’s application of
man is conflated with femininity, but in this applied behavioural punishment-based ‘therapies’
197
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 198
Critical Psychology
BOX 4 The ‘thumb prints of sexuality’ (continued)
(using electric shocks), often against the consent of the patient), which has been legiti-
participants’ will, to ‘reprogramme’ gay men mated and naturalised through medical
into heterosexuality (PsySSA, 1997). expertise (Barnes, in press). Barnes found that
The contemporary focus, in an age of post- texts on intersexuality in South African libraries
modern technology, proposes the surgically and were similarly ‘mutilated’ so that they had to be
hormonally invasive intervention of ‘changing taken off the library shelves to be protected
the body’. Clearly, in a society that insists on a from violation, further highlighting the popular
rigid divide between male/female and intolerance of gender/sexual ambiguity. The
heterosex/homosex, with traditional and scientific and medical worlds are engaged in
heterosexual masculinity and femininity as the reproduction of technologies and ‘truths’
privileged terms, there is an imperative to which sustain and legitimise the rigid system of
position oneself and others categorically. gendering, sexing and sexualising. While
Struggles of intersexual (hermaphrodite) people certain subcultures and individual desires
have particuarly exposed the role of medical continue to challenge such a system by practice
practice in the disciplining of gender/sexual and discourse, with ‘rival and subversive
identity. Intersexuals point out the brutal matrices of gender disorder’ (Butler, 1990a, 17),
treatment of ambiguity in sexuality or gender the dominant medico-scientific regime steps up
(surgical ‘correction’ of the genitals without the gender policing.
Queer theory: RETHEORISING GENDER DIFFERENCE? A FEMINIST POST-

a collection of theo- STRUCTURALIST ACCOUNT OF GENDER
retical thinking which
is critical of tradi- ‘Identity is not understood as a foundational issue, based on fixed, God-given
tional notions of essences – of the biological, psychic or historical kind. On the contrary, identity
gender, sex and sex- is taken as being constructed in the very gesture that posits it as the anchoring
uality. Such theories point for certain social and discursive practices. Consequently, the question is no
posit notions of longer the essentialist one – What is national or ethnic [or gender] identity? –
multiple genders and but rather a critical and genealogical one: How is it constructed?’ (Braidotti,
sexualities which are
1997, 31; emphasis added).
not necessarily linked
to each other in the
rigid way we normally Deconstructing gender
think of biological sex Feminist psychologists assert that new ways of theorising gender are emerging
in heterosexual terms.
in psychology, particularly those informed by post-structuralist and other
strands of post-modern thinking. Clearly these are voices among many others
who are questioning the theoretical problems inherent in the Enlightenment
notions of identity and gender difference.
In the post-structualist framing of subjectivity the ‘real’ nature of male and

female cannot be determined (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1992); rather, the very
notion of gender becomes evidence of dominant notions about what consti-
tutes gender, sex, sexuality, femininity and masculinity. We can deconstruct
the concept of gender, as I have tried to do here, the way in which it has been
used in the social sciences (such as the psychology of gender), and in so doing
198
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 199

learn much about the social construction of gender discourses and gendered Post-structuralist:
subjectivity. referring to the
A number of contemporary theoretical fields, including queer theory, post- more theoretical and
structuralism, and feminism, have spurred a challenge to the conceptual philosophical side of
the post-modern
binarism inherent in the concept of gender. As already evident in the critique era, characterised by
of mainstream gender/sexuality theorising, post-modern theory has opened a paradigm shift
up a way of moving beyond binary opposites of male–female to acknowledge from structuralist
multiple genders, with multiple sexualities. As mentioned, in line with Michel thinking (eg the
work of Lévi-
Foucault’s influential work on sexuality, many have begun to theorise the way
Strauss) to an
in which sexual identity and practice, including the identities of heterosexual acknowledgment of
and homosexual, are socially and historically constructed and therefore ever- the shifting, non-
changing (eg Richardson, 1996; Rubin, 1984; Tiefer, 1992; Vance, 1984; fixed and fluid
relationships
Weeks,1985; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1993) .
between ‘things’,
(eg as the signifier
Gendered subjectivity and signified in
The works cited above facilitate the understanding of gendered/sexed/sexu- language). Post-
alised subjectivity as socially constructed, in relation and in opposition to structuralist theory
has implications for
dominant discourses on gender, sex and sexuality, which are set up within a psychology,
network of prescriptive representations and relations with each other. As including the chal-
human beings, within the dominant discourses which prescribe ‘gender lenging of its
identity’, we are sexed, in that we are named male or female (based on subject of study,
‘the individual’ or
presumed ‘real’ biological differences); we are gendered, in that we are named ‘self’. Whereas most
male or female (with a whole range of prescriptions about dress, behaviour, psychological theory
roles etc to go with that); and we are sexualised, in that we are named hetero- assumes a fixed,
sexual (usually assumed, unless proven otherwise) or homosexual (based on rigid identity
(following develop-
our sexual intimacies or desires with/towards other gendered, sexed, sexualised
ment), post-
subjects or our own identifications). As with the broader post-structuralist structuralist theory
understanding of subjectivity, we understand ourselves, including our bodies, questions such
as both subjected to the dominant discourses on gendered subjectivity and also notions and theo-
as active subjects who are constantly reinterpreting ourselves, sometimes in rises rather a self
that is shifting,
resistance and rebellion, to ‘others’ and the dominant discourse. Thus we may multiple, fluid,
position ourselves in multiple ways to the dominant discourses on sex, gender contextual and
and sexuality; may shift and change in relation to these discourses over time partly irrational
and in different contexts; may resist and reproduce these subjectivities, in often (unconscious). Post-
structuralism also
contradictory and apparently confusing ways. challenges ‘grand
narratives’.
The inscribed body
Central to the construction of gendered subjectivity is the body, as vehicle for

the inscription of masculinity and femininity. Post-modern theorists caution
against the view of the body as a passive vehicle, but acknowledge the body-
subject as both subjected to and active in resisting discourse. Significant in this
respect are the different inscriptions on the male and female body, which are
199
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 200
Critical Psychology
We may position
particularly evident and visual in contemporary globalised capitalism with its
ourselves in powerful consumerist culture. These inscriptions are enacted through discipli-
multiple ways to the nary practices which are historically and contextually bound. Moreover,
dominant discourses different status is embodied in masculinity and femininity, with a woman’s
on sex, gender and
sexuality; may shift
body inscribed with an inferior status (Bartky, 1990).
and change in Historically, in Western society at any rate, the regimentation of the female
relation to these body, has been particularly evident, given that ‘men act and women appear’
discourses over time (Berger, 1972, 47), through the social objectification of women. Much emphasis
and in different
has been placed on women’s body size and shape, facial characteristics, manner
contexts; may resist
and reproduce these of dress, presentation and movement. In all of these areas, prescriptions for the
subjectivities, in construction of ‘ideal femininity’ are set up, and women are expected to work at
often contradictory creating ‘the image’, unattainable for the vast majority of women. Feminists
and apparently have also illustrated how in contemporary Western society the ideal image for
confusing ways.
women is so slim that it is reminiscent of adolescent girls, which is seen as
reflecting and reproducing women’s powerlessness in male-dominated society
(Bartky, 1990; Coward, 1984). In reading such imagery, it is important to
Post-modern: remember that bodily regimes are culturally and historically constructed (for
complex term refer-
ring to both a period
example, slimness in women has not been viewed as beautiful in many African
of time and a theo- cultures), and that the gaze is clearly moving onto the male body within the
retical paradigm. global economy, with the increasing emphasis on male consumerism and
Post-modern under- shifting images of masculinities. While some feminists have argued that men’s
standings of power
bodies and sexuality have been ‘exempted from scrutiny ... because a body
see power as more
complex and fluid defined is a body controlled’ (Coward, 1984, 229), contemporary work is illus-
than modernists, trating that men are no longer exempted from the ‘the look’. Connell (1990), for
which see power as example, in his case study of a ‘champion sportsman’, illustrates how the male
the unchanging body is appropriated by ‘hegemonic masculinity’, such that it may be an obses-
preserve of a group.
Post-modernists
sive focus in the lived experience of some men. A quote from a local magazine,
suggest that power True Love (Ngudle, 1998, 74), in an article on what women think of men’s
can shift and change dressing, is illustrative of a changing discourse on masculinity and the male
depending on the body: ‘The new man takes a lot more time in front of the mirror and defines
context, and that
there are multiple
himself through this clothes.’ But clearly male and female bodies are still
sites of power. inscribed differently and unequally in contemporary society.
Gender ‘othering’
The gendered subject is therefore located within discursive power-relations, so
that men and women are positioned differently and unequally in relation to
power and control. Central to the construction of gender as a power-relation is

a process of ‘othering’. Deconstruction theorists such as Derrida, Deleuze and
Guattari have illustrated how difference in European modernity has long been
‘colonized by hierarchical and exclusionary ways of thinking’ such that those
who are ‘different’ are set up as ‘other’ and constructed as ‘being-less-than’
(cited in Braidotti, 1997, 29–30). Following Simone de Beauvoir’s classic
200
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 201

dictum ‘He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other’ (1982, 16),
feminist post-structuralist theorists together with deconstructionists have
reinterpreted this existential-humanist conceptualisation to encompass the
way in which difference colludes with power inequality, thus devaluing and
degrading that which is ‘other’ to the ‘norm’ (the ‘Same’).
Feminists using a critical version of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory* have
particularly drawn on the theoretical framing of woman as ‘other’ to man, to
illustrate how within patriarchy women are always outside the ‘Symbolic’, the
realm of language and culture, which is male-dominated, androcentric, and
founded on women being outside, being ‘Other’. Julia Kristeva, for example,
theorises masculinity and femininity as an aspect of language with masculinity
linked to the ‘Symbolic’ (the rational, cultural realm) and femininity to the
‘Semiotic’ (non-rational, challenges the Symbolic) (cited in Weedon, 1987).
She argues that both aspects are present in language, and open to all irrespec-
tive of their biological sex, and that it is the semiotic in our language and
subjectivities that holds the potential for change, for it is the repression of the
semiotic, the non-rational, the feminine, that preserves the apparent stability
of the subject and fixes the meaning of the Symbolic. While Weedon criticises
Kristeva for an ahistorical construction of femininity and masculinity as
universal aspects of language, and equating the feminine (even if not attached
to women) with the irrational, the theory is clearly useful in facilitating an
understanding of the role of the unconscious in subjectivity and of the subject
‘as an inherently unstable effect of language’ (91).
The doing of gender

Central to the post-structuralist notion of subjectivity is the understanding of
subjectivity as mediated through social discourse and social dialogue, as a form
of negotiation and therefore as a process (rather than a self ). Social actors
negotiate their identity in relation to discourses, both broader institutionalised
discourses and interpersonal discursive activities. It is in the doing of gender,
or the repetition of that which is considered gender appropriate, that we
constantly redefine ourselves and reconstruct ourselves as man or woman. In It is in the doing of
gender, or the
so doing we are also a part of the reproduction of such discourses, so that repetition of that
‘[g]ender is created through interaction and at the same time structures inter- which is considered
action’ (West & Zimmerman,1992, 384). What is significant about this gender appropriate,
conceptualisation of the subject is the notion of repetition. Thus, if the subject that we constantly
redefine ourselves
appears to be fixed, that is only because he or she is consistently and conti-
and reconstruct
ourselves as man or
woman. In so doing
* This feminist theoretical work has often been referred to as ‘French’ feminism (also some- we are also a part
times post-Lacanian feminism). Braidotti (1997, 25), however, points out that using of the reproduction
‘nationalist systems of indexation for feminist theories’ is both an ‘inaccurate and [a] reduc-
of such discourses.
tive’ way of categorising feminist debates.
201
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 202
Critical Psychology
BOX 5 Butler’s concept of performativity
In a historic paper in the late 80s, West and tivity is produced. Based on the Foucauldian
Zimmerman (1992) spoke about ‘doing gender’ notion that subjects are produced through
as opposed to being a gendered man or woman, discourse, Butler uses performativity to refer to
thus reflecting a ‘new’ view of gender as an ‘that aspect of discourse that has the capacity
active, dynamic process. Through this concep- to produce what it names’ (1994, 33). Butler
tualisation, we begin to understand gender as a cautions that performativity is different from
verb, rather than a static object, such as a role performance. Thus, doing gender is not simply
or a position. Judith Butler uses the term a ‘performance’, which is based on the assump-
performativity to refer to this process by tion of a subject performing in front of others.
which we create our genders by doing them. Rather, the notion of performativity calls into
Through discourses on gender, we are provided question the very notion of the subject, facili-
with the ‘tools’ to enact and re-enact our tating a view of subjectivity as continuously
gender. Thus gender is viewed as an ongoing and repetitively constructed through its
repetitive process, by which gendered subjec- performances within discourse.
Judith Butler’s notion of performativity suggests that we create our genders by doing them. Through
discourses on gender, we are provided with the ‘tools’ to enact and re-enact our gender. Thus gender is
viewed as an ongoing repetitive process.
nously repeating the gestures of gendered subjectivity, reconstructing himself

or herself as man or woman, in line with dominant prescriptions of what that

entails (Butler, 1990a).
The split subject

Important, too, is the understanding that the subject is fragmented, consti-
tuted through multiple axes of power and identity. Thus, as Walkerdine (1986,
202
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 203

65) elaborates on women’s subjectivities, ‘woman’ is not itself a unitary

category, but relates to different positionings’ which ‘have different histories ...
and the effects in terms of power may well be differently lived’. These include
multiple intersecting, sometimes contradicatory, locations of identity, such as
sexuality, age, class, race, ethnicitiy, religion, structure subjectivity. At any one
time or context, any one of our social identities may take up a salient postion,
but given that they are in complex relation to each other, they will also
constantly shift in relation to each other (Braidotti, 1997).
Post-structuralist theories of subjectivity also bring to the subject the Judith Butler
notion of the irrational, and the unconscious – the ‘split subject’. The subject’s
interaction with representations of identity, such as woman/man, is always
mediated for ‘they contain a sizable ‘imaginary’ component’ (Braidotti, 1997,
33). It is the intersection of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism that has
allowed for the understanding of the non-rational subject and the power of Performativity:
unconscious identification in the construction of the subject (Parker, 1992; notion that we
create our genders
Hollway, 1984; Weedon, 1987).
by doing them.
Through discourses
The unconscious and the gendered subject on gender, we are
Psychoanalysis, in particular feminist, Lacanian and post-Lacanian reworkings provided with the
‘tools’ to enact and
of Freud’s work, has played a significant role in the theory of subjectivity in re-enact our gender,
post-structuralist thinking, even more so in theorising the gendered subject. which is viewed as
As Weedon (1987) points out, in psychoanalysis the heterosexual organisation an ongoing
of sexuality and gender identity are central in the structuring of the uncon- repetitive process
and by which
scious and conscious mind. She argues, as others have (notably Henriques et
gendered
al, 1984), that the theory of the unconscious is central to the notion of post- subjectivity is
structuralist subjectivity. While classical psychoanalysis reduced the produced.
unconscious to an ahistorical, biologically driven psyche, Weedon argues that
it is possible to conceive of the unconscious as contextual and historical (as
Juliet Mitchell and others have attempted to illustrate). While there is some
tension between the notion of the subject as never fixed, and yet still steeped in
unconscious, unreachable desires, acknowledging the role of the unconscious
and the non-rational does challenge the dominant assumption of psychology’s
rational, unitary self.
The unconscious is also significant in theorising the construction of
dominant subjectivities through the repression of desires that are censured
within the particular social regime. As such, individuals may be seen as both
‘the site and subjects of discursive struggle for their identity’ (Weedon, 1987,
97). The notion of agency and resistance is central within the feminist post-
structuralist notion of the subject. The subject is active in repeating dominant
constructions of himself or herself as man/woman, but may also be active in
resisting and defying such constructions. Subjects may take on forms of
gendered subjectivity which challenge the dominant discourses. These forms
203
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 204
Critical Psychology
of subjectivity, as with other subversive subjectivities will be policed, often

marginalised as insane or criminal (Weedon, 1987), or incorporated into hege-
monic culture in ways that diffuse the challenge they are making (apparent in
the ‘watering down’ of feminism in women’s magazines). But in Butler’s
(1990a) forceful argument, it is the forms of gendered subjectivity which do
not fit within the rigid categories of identity set up in heterosexist, patriarchal
culture that signify resistance and challenge to such a system.
Gender and agency

The question of agency represents another central debate within post-struc-
turalist thinking on the subject. As Butler (1990a) points out, ‘agency’ has
usually been falsely presumed to be (a) either established through recourse to
some stable identity prior to discourse (as in radical feminism’s notion of
Woman); or (b) not possible within the discursive reading of subjectivity
Signification/ where it is constructed as a determination. She argues instead that the
signifier/signified: question of agency cannot be answered through recourse to a pre-discursive ‘I’
refers to the use of
signs or signifiers
(outside of the signification process), but is rather a question of how significa-
(ie spoken or tion and re-signification works.
written words) to Importantly, signification refers to the use of signs or, more accurately,
make meaning of signifiers (that is, spoken or written words) to make meaning of the world
the world through
through the representation of concepts or ideas (that is, signifieds). The rela-
the representation
of concepts or ideas tionship between signifiers and signifieds is arbitrary – we need not, for
(ie signifieds). The instance, use the word ‘cat’ to represent that particular kind of creature: there
relationship are many other words (as in other languages) that would do the job just as well.
between signifiers This helps us understand the idea that knowledge is constructed. Just as there
and signifieds is
arbitrary. This helps are no pre-existing words for concepts, so there are no pre-existing concepts
us to understand for things, for objects ‘out there’ in the world, or so the post-structuralist
the idea that approach to knowledge maintains. There is, in short, no predetermined rela-
knowledge is tionship between concepts and things, and no predetermined relationship
constructed. Just as
there are no pre-
between words and concepts. What this means, then, is that just as we can use
existing words for different words to indicate the same object, so we can use different concepts to
concepts, so there understand what would seem to be the same object or phenomenon. To return
are no pre-existing to our point of departure, then, something like gender can be understood in
concepts for things,
for objects ‘out
radically different ways, and we should not necessarily consider given tradi-
there’ in the world. tional notions of gender (as immutable difference, as biologically
predetermined, essentialised etc) to be the only ways of understanding or
approaching it. Furthermore, if different concepts may be used to understand

something like gender, then how we ‘know’ gender – that is how we come to
experience and practise gender as real – may change quite dramatically if we
adopt a different means of conceptualising it. This is what Butler has in mind
when she speaks of signification and re-signification as holding the potenial for
some kind of agency.
204
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 205

Butler emphasises that the process of signification constitutes a ‘regulated

process of repetition’, and ‘agency then, is to be located within the variation on
that repetition’ (145). So, if the rules that govern signification can be viewed as
not only restricting but also enabling new forms of subjectivity, then it is only
within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity is
possible. It is not a self, prior to the discourse, that emerges, but a self that is
reconfigured, that constitutes himself or herself by ‘taking up of the tools
where they lie, where the very ‘taking up’ is enabled by the tool lying there’
(145). Butler then illustrates that in a paradoxical way, the ‘sounds-like’ deter-
ministic discursive constitution of subjectivity, which sets up gendered
identity as an ‘effect’, as ‘produced’, is precisely that which opens up possibili-
ties of agency, that are foreclosed by theories that see identity categories as
BOX 6 Thandi’s story: Resisting the hegemonic matrix of sex-gender-sexuality
The following story was told by a psychology them for the fact that I am not like them.
student at the University of the Western Cape Growing up has some implications, espe-
when asked to describe her gender and sexual cially when there are girls around. My friends
development. The story illustrates the author’s (boys) started proposing and had girlfriends
considerable creativity in enacting her resistance and they would ask me to back off because
to prescribed femininity and sexuality. In partic- they told me that what they were doing was
ular, we see Thandi (not her real name) boys’ things. That really made me feel very
strategically adopting masculine subjectivity and sad, but I told myself that I was still going
to do everything with them and I am going
discourse to achieve her desires. Her story, remi-
to propose to some girls and I am going to
niscent of many tales through history of women
have more girlfriends than what they had. It
assuming male identity, is, however, full of pain
worked, and they protected my identity from
and is further evidence of the damage effected by
those girls who did not know me.
a restrictive gender and sexual regime. They had to pretend as if I am a boy too.
During these 27 years there were some times That worked also, but the problem now was
which one cannot forget because of sexu- that I had to wear a uniform when going to
ality and part of it was really confusing ... school and that was for girls, of course.
I hated myself as a girl for the fact that I Some girls whom my friends dated were in
should sit down when I pass water and the same school with me, so I had to hide
I never loved dresses, even now. During that and if they saw and asked me questions I
time ... people would just say that she would just tell them that ‘I have a twin
(myself) is a tomboy and I thought ‘yes, why brother, maybe you are talking about him’
should they call me a tomboy, therefore that and I really got away with that. It was then
I do have a penis and its hidden inside me that I started, we can say, ‘having sex’.
and maybe if I grow up it will come out’. ... Some said that I am a boy and some
I did everything that a boy should do said that I am a girl. I did not have any
and I did it five times better than them and problem with the confusion some people had
there was always that discrimination and about my sexual identity.
that did not bother me so much but some- ... even at school I never entered girls’
times it worked me psychologically. I never toilets ... In fact I liked it very much when
mixed with women and I felt superior to they called me a boy. Things started getting
205
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 206
Critical Psychology
BOX 6 Thandi’s story: Resisting the hegemonic matrix of sex-gender-sexuality (cont)
worse and worse with my parents, especially Thandi’s story takes a surprising (or
my mother. My mother started by not buying not so surprising) turn when she next
any trousers for me and did all these things speaks of having sex with a man:
that girls do and now I was round about the A time of confusion arose when I came
age of 15 ... I valued ... being called a boy to terms that I am a woman and I had sex
because I also thought that I was a boy. I was with a man which did not make me myself
in high school now and things were tough and more because now I was going to be the
because now I could feel love and beautiful mother, not the man I was always fanta-
women in my school knocked me off my feet. sising about.
At school I was a girl but after school I ... I wished that I could go to a place
would quickly run home and change what I where none knew me to start a new life. My
wore and I would wear a trouser and after girlfriend was admitted into hospital at that
changing I would go and visit girls from time because she heard the news about me
another school.. This was a risk because and she suffered from a shock because I was
children from other schools usually know not the kind of man she thought I was and
each other, but for some time it went right all the 9 years we had together as lovers just
until my neighbour blew it one day ... I was went away. I may have faked my identity,
embarrassed and my identity as being a but the only thing which I was honest about
woman came out. I had to leave the school is my undying love for her ...
to go to another school where no one knew
me. I went to a private school and there we Thandi concludes by saying that, while she now
did not wear a uniform, ... I enjoyed life clearly sees herself as a lesbian, she feels very
there because I was living my life the way I ostracised by both men and women:
wanted to ... even my principal liked me very ... I wish I could have a man on campus to
much. Once he told me that I was the most put away the labels they are giving
handsome boy in his school ... Really I can me ...
say that, that made me not to think of myself
as a woman but as a man and I kept asking Is Thandi suffering from what sexologists have
God ‘when is my penis going to appear?’ called ‘gender dysphoria’ (Blanchard et al, cited
When one goes to church, the preacher in Crooks & Baur, 1996, 53)? Or has she got
will tell you that everything is possible with unresolved penis envy according to Freud? Or is
God and, well, I did not want too much but she illustrating a desire to own the phallus and
just a penis. have access to male power, according to Mitchell
(1975)? Or is there a way of constructing
Thandi goes on to speak about attending a
meaning of her story that does not pathologise
summer camp, seducing a woman and beginning
or politicise her or her desires? Clearly, as in
a long-term relationship with her:
Thandi’s experience, pleasure and desire also
The worst part is that she even introduced play a role. She appeared to do quite well
me to her parents and they really loved me without a penis in nine years of a relationship
and her mother even called me her son-in- with her female lover. Were it an option for
law. I loved that because I could see that Thandi to engage in male activities and a loving
they really believed in me, but I knew the
relationship with a woman without having a

truth. She really loved me so much and at penis in a non-homophobic society, one wonders
that time she was still a virgin, ... she to what extent she would have desired one.
wanted me to break her virginity and I kept
saying that the time is not right or I have a
Source: Shefer (1998).
headache or stomach-ache and I always got
away with it.
206
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 207

fixed. Thus construction does not necessarily restrict agency, but may facilitate
the expression of agency, for there is no possibility of agency outside the
discursive practices. For Butler the task ‘is not whether to repeat, but how to
repeat or, indeed, to repeat and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to
displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition itself ’ (148).
CONCLUSION
Based on develop-
Psychology and the normalisation of gender difference ments in feminist
In spite of decades of critique, psychology continues to play an active role in and post-modern
theory, in particular,
reproducing and legitimating social notions of a rigid divide between male and
new ways of under-
female. Psychology, as theory and practice (through research and clinical and standing gender and
applied practice) continues to play a role in legitimating gender inequality in its relationship with
South Africa, as it does at an international level. This chapter has highlighted, sex and sexualities
in particular, how psychological normalising discourses on gender difference have become
possible. Impor-
serve to rationalise gender inequality as well as the oppression of people who tantly, we begin to
resist traditional gender and sexual identities. The activities of ‘normalisation’ be able to
are dramatically enacted through interventions such as behavioural therapies deconstruct the
and surgical attempts to ‘cure’ people of subversive desires in order to reinstate ‘old’ picture of the
binarism of male–
the current dichotomous prescriptions of gender identity. female, and the
This chapter has presented an alternative version of gendered, sexed and rigid set of
sexualised identities. Based on developments in feminist and post-modern relationships
theory, in particular, new ways of understanding gender and its relationship between biological
sex, cultural gender
with sex and sexualities become possible. Importantly, we begin to be able to and (hetero)sexual
deconstruct the ‘old’ picture of the binarism of male-female, and the rigid set orientations.
of relationships between biological sex, cultural gender and (hetero)sexual
orientations. Emerging out of this ‘new’ and critical view is a subversive and
challenging picture of multiplicity and fluidity, in which almost everything we
assumed as solid and ‘real’, the very assumption of a world divided into male
and female, is overturned. In its place, we can begin to imagine multiple sexes,
genders and sexualities with diverse relationships between bodies, subjectivi-
ties and sexual practices.
Reconceptualising gender identities in South Africa

It is argued that the task of reconstructing psychology in South Africa involves
the challenge of reworking our current theories of gender/sexual identities.
Such a challenge can be met only through theoretical and empirical work which
allows for the diversity of not only local experiences of gender development and
subjectivity but also of gender development and subjectivities in all their multi-
plicity. Local stories, such as the one shared in this chapter, which challenge our
traditional understandings and expectations of gendered, sexed and sexualised
207
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 208
Critical Psychology
subjectivities, need to be told and heard. In particular, in contemporary South

Africa, which is still fraught with a range of inequalities and oppression linked
to gender and sexual practices, manifesting in unsafe and coercive
(hetero)sexual practices, gender violence, heterosexism, homophobia and
others, we need to produce, re-produce and share (already existing) alternative
voices and discourses that reveal resistance and challenge to the still hegemonic
discourses on what it means to be gendered, sexed and sexual.

1. Think about your own development as a girl or boy. How did you become
aware of your gender and sexual identity? What were the messages you
received about what it meant to be female or male, and what that meant for
your sexuality?
2. Think about puberty in your community. What are the responses a young
woman receives when she begins menstruating? What are the responses a
young man receives when he reaches puberty? How do these differ and
what do they tell you about femininity and masculinity in society?
3. Nokuthula goes for an interview for the masters in clinical psychology
programme at the university. She is asked whether she would like to share
anything about herself, and tells the panel that she is a lesbian. Would a
heterosexual have done the same? What does your community think about
gay and lesbian lifestyles? How do you understand sexual orientation?
4. Is gender difference inevitably about power inequality? Can one be
different but equal, and is that the solution to gender inequality? How do
you understand the challenges to creating equality and shifting the rigid
system of gender and sexuality in our societies?
Judith Butler’s Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity
(1990) is absolutely central in contemporary gender studies. The book is often
credited with ushering in a new era of feminism, introducing strongly post-
structuralist and Foucaultian forms of critique into the analysis of gendered
identity. Conceptually dense and counter-intuitive, it is difficult at first, but a
continually rewarding read.
Sue Wilkinson’s (1986) Feminist social psychology: Developing theory and
practice is an important edited volume which helpfully introduces feminist

critical psychology and shows just how central feminist critique has been to the
development of critical psychology.
Men, women and madness: Understanding gender and mental disorder,
by Joan Busfield (1996), introduces and develops discussions of the pathologi-
sation of gender within psychology, and therefore makes for a very forceful
208
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap08 11/2/04 10:18 am Page 209

feminist critique of the practice of psychology. Joan Ussher accomplishes a

similar task in Women’s madness, misogyny or mental illness? (1991).
Wendy Hollway has been a key figure in the analysis of the discursive
construction of gendered subjectivity. Her chapter ‘Gender difference and the
production of subjectivity’ in J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn & V.
Walkerdine (eds), Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation and
subjectivity (1984), remains something of a classic.
209
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 210
Chapter
9
Foucault, disciplinary power

and the critical pre-history
of psychology
Derek Hook
‘... all methods of knowing the human [subject] relate to it not

as a means to discovery against an object to be known, but as a
productive power towards an object that is also its effect.’
Butchart (1998, ix)
‘... if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by
curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure ...
has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these
charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted
in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is
speedily implanted to the whole body.’
Plato, cited in Wolberg (1977, v)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Appreciate and understand the critical value of Foucault’s genealogical approach to
the pre-history of psychology
Understand, how, for Foucault, psychology is powerful in three particular ways: as
a form of knowledge that objectifies; as a form of practice that disciplines, and as
a form of self-understanding that subjectifies

Utilise the notion of disciplinary power, along with the terms humanisation, power-
knowledge, ‘soul’, individualisation, normalisation and moral orthopaedics it
entails.
210
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 211
Foucault, disciplinary power and the critical pre-history of psychology

INTRODUCTION
The importance of Foucault
Michel Foucault is a pre-eminent figure both in the conceptualisation of the
development of modern forms of power and in the critique of the applied
human (or social-medical) sciences. Whereas many critiques of power in its
applied clinical forms use typically repressive models of understanding (the
work of Szasz (1979, 1984) is a good case in point here, but also that of Brown, Michel Foucault
1973; Chesler, 1972; Cooper, 1967; Masson, 1989, 1994; Ingelby, 1972, 1981)),
Foucault is aware of the fact that power may have positive, or productive
effects, that it may ‘call things into being’. In the same vein, many of these Repressive:
forms of power that
previous critiques have lacked in historical contextualisation and have tended gain control through
to occur in isolation from questions regarding the broader production of negative, punishing,
knowledge (again, the work of Masson, Chesler, Brown). Likewise – such constraining,
critiques have often lacked the finer-grain analyses of an applied attention to prohibiting means,
often relying on
the specific means of shaping docile (that is, obedient) or subservient subjects. physical violence.
In contrast to these approaches, Foucault (1977, 1980a, 1980b) offers a Foucault contrasts
genealogical account; that is to say, he offers a radical historical critique that this characteristic
looks to the forgotten origins of a phenomenon, here that of the human feature of pre-
modern forms of
sciences (which is inclusive of the development of psychology). The human
power with the
sciences are those sciences that take the human subject – that is, individuals – mainly productive,
as their focus, so we are talking about social sciences such as sociology, crimi- or positive, form of
nology and anthropology and so on, in addition to the medical sciences. modern power.
Psychology makes for something of a special case here, in that it fits into both
categories, as both a social science that produces knowledge about individuals Genealogy:
form of radical
and a ‘caring’ pseudo-medical practice which aims to cure or alleviate psycho-
historical critique
logical distress or maladaption in individuals. Foucault is hence able to that looks to
examine power as a positive, productive force that is inextricably tied to the uncover the origins
advent of Western modernity. Further yet, Foucault’s account of the nature of of a phenomenon
modern power is able to explain how power works in ways that produce knowl- generally thought to
be ahistorical,
edge and that ultimately have great efficacy in governing and producing natural or universal.
individuals. The objective of
genealogy is a
The value of historical critique critique of the
present, the desta-
Foucault’s explanation of the birth of the human sciences occurs via an exegesis bilisation of what is
of disciplinary power, the paradigmatic form of power in the modern period, taken-for-granted,
common-sense
which Foucault (1977) views as inseparable from the development of the

knowledge as well
human sciences. Simply put, just as a proper understanding of the nature of as an indication of
the human sciences does not proceed without an understanding of modern how such common-
disciplinary power, so a sufficient understanding of disciplinary power does place knowledges
not proceed without a sense of the nature and functioning of the modern conceal the func-
tioning of power.
human sciences. Indeed, it is the complex interface of forms of power and
211
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 212
Critical Psychology
Modernity:
knowledge that, as Best & Kellner (1994) put it, have ‘created new forms of
historical period of domination in which the emergence of the human sciences, the formation of
the modern, often specific disciplinary apparatuses and the construction of the subject are all
understood to inextricably linked’ (35). The objective of this chapter is to stay as close to
represent a
departure from
Foucault’s texts on disciplinary power (1977, 1980a, 1980b) as possible –
established tradi- particularly the landmark Discipline and punish – as a means of providing a
tions, from the broad-sweep analysis of this concept and of the emergence of the human
values of Classical sciences integral to it.
Antiquity. Different
Writing for a moment in purely methodological terms, Foucault’s
thinkers position
the beginning of genealogical objective in Discipline and punish was, in part, to provide a
the Modern Era at historical ‘surface of emergence’, a ‘history of the present’, in his terms, that
different points in outlined the conditions of possibility which made the development of a disci-
history, though it
pline such as psychology feasible. The goal that Foucault arguably succeeds in
generally coincides
with unprecedented achieving is that of unearthing the determining and central components at the
levels of industriali- origin of these social science practices, components that, he claims, have long
sation, with a new since been discursively buried. It is in this way that Foucault is able to provide
focus on the a deeply rooted kind of criticism that works from the bottom up, uprooting a
apparent autonomy
and independence discipline such as psychology by a systematic engagement with its most signif-
of individuals, and a icant precedents. Hence one may suggest that the genealogical approach
new relationship of adopted by Foucault aims not only to analyse the early development or history
person to knowl- of the social science disciplines but also fundamentally to destabilise their
edge (ie people
knowing themselves
fields of practice by considering their foundations, their pre-history.
and the world
around them in a Foucault’s critical psychology
stable, scientific If critical psychology is, in part, the study of psychology and power, or perhaps
and rational way).
more directly the critical examination of psychology as itself powerful, as a
form of power, then Foucault’s pre-history of psychology is of pivotal impor-
tance to us. Why? Well, Foucault shows how psychological knowledge first
emerges within contexts of control, through attempts to create docile (that is,
obedient or subservient) subjects. In his account, psychology is powerful in
three particular ways: as form of knowledge that objectifies, as a form of
Subject(s): practice that disciplines, and as a form of self-understanding that subjectifies.
Foucault uses the It is crucial that we understand each of these three modes of power, for the
term ‘subjects’
rather than ‘individ-
critique of psychology that critical psychology attempts needs to address each
uals’ because his such mode if it is to be at all sufficient.
approach empha- The chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines two pre-
sises the various disciplinary eras of power: those of sovereign power and that of the era of
forms of social
humanist reform. The second focuses on disciplinary power and its predomi-
power we are
subjected to and nant themes. The third section provides a synopsis of a typical disciplinary
that subsequently apparatus and reflects on psychology’s status as just such an apparatus. The
bring individuals last section concludes the chapter, briefly introducing a number of criticisms
into being. of Foucault’s theory. A word of caution is necessary here. One should be aware
212
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 213

not to limit the force of Foucault’s critique here merely to psychology; indeed, Disciplinary power:
the chapter keeps its focus deliberately wide, on the human or sociomedical modern form of
sciences (I use these terms interchangeably) for just this reason. Furthermore, power which, for
one may point out, with some legitimacy, that Foucault’s historical analysis Foucault, is
productive rather
was developed in and for a European context and as such may seem to be than repressive, in
lacking in relevance to a southern African context. This is not strictly true, in the sense of
view of the obvious fact that such modalities of European power were ‘bringing things
imported, in some cases wholesale, into its former colonial domains. As into being’,
producing both
Edward Said (1983) puts it, ‘discipline [here referring to Foucault’s notion of
knowledge (ie the
disciplinary power] was used to administer, study, and reconstruct – the subse- discipline of
quently to occupy, rule, and exploit – almost the whole of the non-European psychology, as a
world’ (222). What is true, though – and Said (1983) also emphasises this fact way of knowing the
– is that some attention needs to be applied to how these particular variations world) and
subjective effects
on disciplinary power were customised to the politics and culture of their (eg individuality,
particular settings. As a result, this chapter features a series of interest boxes the soul, personal
connecting Foucault’s theories to a southern African location, and in this psychology etc).
respect the work of Butchart (1996, 1997, 1999) features prominently, as a way Disciplinary power
is related to a set
of anchoring Foucault in the South African context.
of techniques,
procedures and
PRE-DISCIPLINARY ERAS OF POWER assessments that
measure, monitor
Sovereign power and treat subjects
so as to normalise
Foucault begins Discipline and punish with a vivid example of what was perhaps
deviant ones
the predominant form of punishment in the era of sovereignty: torture. In this further.
early and crude order of power a breach of the law was like an act of war,
requiring a response from the king, whose body (figuratively) had been attacked
in the action of the crime. Accordingly, the criminal had to be physically
attacked, tortured, dismembered, destroyed, in a symbolic display of the sover-
eign’s power. This form of power had several limitations. First, each time the law
was broken such a display of ritual atrocity had to be re-enacted. Furthermore,
this spectacular, brutal and discontinuous form of punishment left untouched
and undeterred a wide-ranging and continuous illegality of less serious and less
detected transgressions. Lastly, it was also at times an unstable form of power, at
least inasmuch as it risked the insurrection of the masses who might choose to
sympathise with the punished criminal rather than with the authorities.
The era of humanist reform

The form of power that Foucault considered to have succeeded monarchical law
was that of the humanist reformers, which was essentially an art of manipulating
representations as a hopeful means of the correct reordering of social life. Several
aspects of this transformation of power are pertinent. For a start, the monarch
lost absolute sovereignty in matters of punishment. Furthermore, public torture
213
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 214
Critical Psychology
Sovereign(ty):
was abolished. Because crime was no longer understood as an assault on the
the Sovereign is a person of the king, criminal justice changed its objective from taking revenge on
figure – a king, the king’s behalf to simply punishing. Crime was now an attack on society as a
queen or chief of whole, and the responsibility to punish was now its; the standard of justice was
state – who
exercises supreme
now the ‘humanity’ that all parties of the social contract shared. Serving prima-
authority. By rily the principle of humanity, punishment now had to bring the offender ‘back
sovereignty, to their place in society’; it had basically to requalify the juridical subject, as
Foucault is referring Foucault (1977) puts it. Keeping in mind also the humanity of society as a whole,
to pre-modern forms
punishments now needed to be instrumental in deterring and preventing future
of power arranged
around a sovereign’s crime. Hence begins one of the trajectories that Foucault sees as running right
right to punish the through to the development of the human sciences: that in which the technology
crimes of of power is in fact the same principle as the very humanisation of punitive mech-
wrongdoers in
anisms. (A technology is typically understood as the application of a science to a
brutal, physical and
demonstrative particular objective of mastery or control. Foucault uses the term to refer to a
terms. More discrete set of tactics, knowledges, techniques, procedures, discourses (or tech-
generally, it refers nical forms of language) used by select experts or professionals as part of a stated
to supremacy of objective of increasing relations of control.)
authority or rule.
Individualisation and objectification
In terms of both the demonstrative capacity of punishment and its efficacy in
eradicating the root of the crime, punishment needed now to take into account
‘the profound nature of the criminal ... the presumable degree of his wicked-
ness, the intrinsic quality of his will’ (Foucault, 1977, 98). Hence the penalty
(and its prospective modulation) came to consider that which hitherto had
never been considered: the individual defendants themselves, their nature and
Humanisation:
to imbue with way of life, their attitude of mind, their past, and the ‘quality’ rather than the
humaneness, or simple intention of their will. What therefore began to emerge was the parallel
human kindness; to classification of crimes and punishments, the precise adaptation of punish-
civilise; to respect ments to individual offenders, the individualisation of sentences.
the principle of
humanity. Two points are important to emphasise here. One is that the first appear-
ance of psychological knowledge occurs in a way that is intimately and
inextricably tied to the enforcement of power. The second is that the push
toward individualisation within practices of subjection led towards powerful
collateral processes of objectification. The criminal became a species to be
studied and understood, to be known, the crime something to be exhaustively
coded and classified. As Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) put it, for proper interven-
Objectification:
for Foucault, the

tion to be made, the object (be it criminal or crime) needed to be fixed as an
generation of individual entity and known in great detail. The criminal became a species to
generalised be known, the crime something to be exhaustively coded and classified
knowledge about a (Foucault, 1977). It is here, as Barker (1998) notes, that the first step towards a
particular category
of people.
study of ‘man’, and ‘his’ behaviour and social environment is taken, and taken
in the direction of a science of society that would treat ‘men’ as objects.
214
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 215

Knowledge, in short, and as alluded to before, became a key principle of Power-knowledge:

power. This is what we have in mind when we speak of the power of psychology term used by
as a form of knowledge that objectifies. In fact, it is important here to bear in Foucault to reiterate
mind here that power and knowledge can never be separated for Foucault the powerful role of
knowledge and, just
(1977). Where we find power there is always knowledge, and where we find as importantly, the
knowledge there is always power. Here it is worth quoting Foucault (1977) importance of
directly: knowledge to
power.
[W]e should abandon [that] ... tradition that allows us to imagine that knowl-
edge can exist only where power-relations are suspended and that knowledge can
develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... We should
admit rather that power produces knowledge ... that power and knowledge
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correla-
tive constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (27). Humanism:
system of thought
It is for this reason, the need always to be aware of the powerful function of
that focuses on
knowledge and the importance of knowledge to power – that Foucault often human beings and
refers to ‘ppower-knowledge’, instead of splitting up the two concepts. their values,
capacities and
worth; a concern
The importance of the soul and of ‘humanisation’ with the interests,
‘Souls’ or minds now started to be seen as the targets of power. It was no longer needs, and welfare
primarily the body but the soul and mind that should ideally be punished, and of human beings.
these not through physical pain but through representations and signs circu-
lating throughout society. Four major themes of power may therefore be seen
as emerging from the period of humanist reform: humanisation, individuali-
sation, objectification, and the notion of the soul/mind. Here one should
emphasise that the humanising initiatives within the penal system served not
so much to establish a more equitable system, but rather to create a better Subjectification:
‘economy’ of the power to punish (Foucault, 1977). They rendered more effec- for Foucault, the
tive, constant and detailed power, as Foucault puts it, whilst diminishing its generation of
individualising
political and economic costs. Rather than punishing less, these initiatives knowledge about a
punished better – the point that Foucault is driving at here is that humanism, subject according to
in all its guises, has, more than anything, ‘enabled the insertion of power ever categorical
more deeply into the social body’ (1977, 82). understandings.
Such knowledge is
also taken up by
A structure and focus for an emerging science of ‘man’ such individuals
themselves in the
Within such a power-relation, as between criminals and those in the position to
forms of self-
punish them, one finds the blueprint of a particular way of knowing and trans- knowledge and
forming the subject. This ‘blueprint’ for knowing and changing individual understanding, so
subjects would come to be duplicated throughout the social science disciplines. individuals may be
Indeed, this simultaneous arrangement of objectification (the generation of said to subjectify
themselves.
generalised knowledge about a class of people) and subjectification (the
215
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 216
Critical Psychology
generation of individualising knowledge about a subject) became increasingly

solidified as the era of disciplinary power advanced. Objectifying knowledges
came ever more persuasively to sanction prescriptions of expert intervention
(treatments, cures, means of rehabilitation). These forms of intervention came
increasingly to individualise (ie uniquely specify) singular subjects. Foucault’s
point is hence that knowledge, as a modality of power, grew in two different
directions at the same time – it produced ever more knowledge about categories
of people (ie objectifying them), while also producing ever more specific
applied knowledge about individuals (subjectifying them).
To grasp disciplinary power is, in many ways, to understand exactly that
these two forms of knowledge come to be used in reciprocating, mutually rein-
forcing and circular ways. Indeed, subjectifying forms of knowledge (ever more
detailed analysis of individuals) came to inform categorical understandings of
persons, to produce new specialist knowledges, to validate even greater sanc-
tions of intervention on the part of experts (be they of medicine, education or
criminal rehabilitation). Concurrently, the role of psychological knowledge
grew in importance. As Foucault notes, every criminal offence came to carry
with it the legitimate suspicion of insanity or anomaly. Every sentence, more
than being a legal decision that laid down punishment, came to bear with it ‘an
assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normaliza-
tion’ (Foucault, 1977, 20–21).
Disciplines: Parallel ‘judges’ multiplied around legal judgment. Psychologists, psychia-
Foucault (1977) trists, educationalists all came to share in its power. Not only were such
appreciates the personnel required to assist in juridical judgment (and to extend its powers
ambiguity of this
term – disciplines beyond the sentence of the offender), but, in the form of various social science
are both divisions disciplines, they were able also to generalise its authority across ever wider and
of knowledge, more inclusive populations. Rather than revenge or didactic moral demon-
separate ways of stration, punishment came to centre on supervision, surveillance and
knowing (ie
psychology, transformation. The individual psychology of the offender, and its possible
anthropology) and and desirous change, came to be the object of punitive operation rather than
modes of power, simply that of the body of the criminal made to suffer. It was in this way that
forms of power- psychological expertise found one of its functions:
knowledge which
utilise specific [I]nscribing offences in the field of objects susceptible of scientific knowledge ...
methods to ensure provid[ing] the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable hold ... not
control over the only on offenses, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what
operations of they are, will be, may be (Foucault, 1977, 18).
subjects and ensure

the constant
‘subjection of its DISCIPLINARY POWER
forces’, and to
impose upon them Differences and similarities
a ‘relation of The third era of power described by Foucault, that of disciplinary power,
docility’.
continues certain themes of the reformist era (humanisation, objectification,
216
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 217

individuality, a focus on psychology/soul), while definitively breaking with

others. The first split concerns the aim of punishment: whereas previously it
had been public representation and didactic moral insight, the aim of preven-
tative or normalising detention (the new predominant form of punishment) is
now that of behavioural modification – both of body and soul – ‘through the
precise administration of techniques of knowledge and power’ (Fillingham,
1993, 152). Secondly, whereas both the ritual of torture (in the first order of
power) and the punitive demonstrations of the reformers had been ostenta-
tious and publicly accessible, this new scheme of punishment now requires
secrecy and autonomy in its operations.
Visibility and surveillance

In a total reversal of the situation in sovereign power, in which power was
constantly and spectacularly put on display (and where the masses were in
contrast ‘kept in the shadows’), disciplinary power is exercised through its
invisibility, while the subjects of power are now exposed to constant visibility.
The importance of such an ‘optics of power’ is not to be underestimated. One
of the prime goals of a disciplinary system is to make surveillance an integral
part of its production and control such that the individual worker, patient or
schoolboy can be precisely observed and compared to others (Merquior,
1985). The subject’s awareness of their own visibility is a fundamental factor
here. This awareness is what makes subjects come, in a classic phrase of
Foucault’s ‘to themselves assume responsibility for the constraints of power’
(1977, 187). Subjects hence ‘inscribe in themselves a power relation in which
they are the principle of their own subjection’ (Foucault, 1977, 203).
Secrecy and autonomy

The right to punishment (or rehabilitation) in disciplinary regimes is
entrusted only to the correct and most suitable authorities. Convicts, for
example, ‘were to be reclaimed individually, through a concerted orthopaedy
exerted upon them and isolated both from the social body and juridical power
in the strict sense’ (Foucault, 1977, 130). In this way advancements in the treat- Disciplining:
attempts to correct,
ment of deviance were accompanied by an incontrovertible growth in the rehabilitate, mould
powers of the disciplinary agent. So although the disciplinary subject became or develop the
increasingly active in disciplining themselves, this internal functioning of body/mind of the
power was matched and supported by the spread of a new kind of professional subject through
therapeutic means,
agent of power: the teacher, the prison warden, the military superior, the to increase both the
factory supervisor, the medical expert, the psychologist. docility and the
The efficacy of the control exercised by the disciplinary agent was contin- aptitude of the
gent on the fact that this must be a total power, undisturbed by any third party, body/mind in
question.
which would entirely envelop its subject (Foucault, 1977). Within such power,
217
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 218
Critical Psychology
Technology:
furthermore, secrecy and autonomy, particularly in relation to matters of tech-
discrete set of nique, were imperative. Such a disciplinary power needed to maintain ‘its own
tactics, knowledges, functioning, its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it needed be
techniques, proce- able to fix its own norms and decide its own results’ (Foucault, 1977, 129).
dures, discourses
(technical forms of
It was in this way that disciplinary political technology advanced, by taking
language) used by what were essentially political problems (problems of control), removing them
select experts or from the domain of political discourse, recasting them in the neutral language of
professionals as part science (or that of its associated applications) and transforming them into tech-
of a stated objective
nical problems for the sole attention of specialists and experts (Dreyfus &
of increasing rela-
tions of control. For Rabinow, 1982, 196). The constitutive role that power has played in such
Foucault, technology problems is thus elided in the humanist attention to the development of the
refers to the various specialist technical domains of ‘treatment’. An excellent example of this
minutiae of the is provided by Duncan, Stevens & Bowman (in their chapter in this work):
concrete instruments
and machinery of
Drapetomania – a psychopathology endemic to slaves, an ‘irrestrainable
institutional applica- propensity on the part of the slave to run away, to escape from slaverly’. Here we
tions of power. can see quite clearly that a sociopolitical problem, a problem of social control, is
converted into a pseudo-psychological condition in a way which powerfully
depoliticises the real context/background to the ‘problem’. Thomas Szasz
makes a similar point when he (1973) suggests that ‘[a]ddiction, obesity, starva-
tion (anorexia nervosa) are political problems, not psychiatric: each condenses
and expresses a contest between the individual and some other person or
Orthopaedics: persons in his environment over the control of the individual’s body’ (18).
branch of medicine
that focuses on the ‘Moral orthopaedics’
prevention or correc-
tion of injuries or Perhaps the most dramatic break of disciplinary power from the objectives of
disorders of the body the humanist reformers concerned the body. The body, which had become
through repetitive increasingly unimportant in the previous order, returned now as the primary
therapeutic forms of template, the surface upon which disciplinary power would operate, at least, as
treatment and/or
attention. Moral
Miller (1994) notes, in the early stages of its deployment. This body was not the
orthopaedics is the focus of a power bent on destroying it but rather that of a power intent on
term Foucault coined training, moulding, exercising and supervising it (Foucault, 1977). There was
for the correction or hence a remarkable refinement of punitive measures which came to be essen-
prevention of
injuries or disorders
tially corrective, orthopaedic or therapeutic. Each such correction was like an
of the ‘soul’ (the investment that needed to have a direct return of sorts, that needed to represent
psyche, the mind) an increase in ‘the body’s productive forces’, as Foucault (1977) put it. Each
through repetitive rehabilitative measure had to result in a proportional increase of dominance
therapeutic forms of
(on the part of the disciplinary agent) and obedience (on the part of the disci-
treatment and/or
attention, such as plinary subject), docility and aptitude (Foucault, 1977). This is what one has in
those dispensed by mind when speaking of psychology, or any other social or medical science, as
psychotherapists, powerfully disciplining the body/mind of the subject, that it attempts to
counsellors, teachers
correct, rehabilitate, mould or develop it through therapeutic means, to
etc.
increase both the docility and the aptitude of the body/mind in question.
218
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 219

BOX 1 Colonial power and African illness
Megan Vaughan brings certain of Foucault’s unable to contain any notion of difference that
concepts and analytical terms to bear on the was not directly tied to the question of inferi-
colonial context. In her book Curing their ills ority and the necessity of subordination’ (115).
(1991), she explores the disciplinary function Vaughan’s point, then, should not be seen as
of African medical, psychiatric and psycholog- simply opposing Foucault’s theory but rather as
ical forms of research. She argues that the augmenting his analysis at a different level.
elaborate classification systems and practices Another potential difference in how
of these types of knowledge played a large role European and African forms of disciplinary
in the operation of colonial power. Indeed, power worked concerned the role of individual-
medicine and its associated disciplines worked, isation. Rather than the strong focus on types
in many of the ways suggested by Foucault, to of individualisation that characterise European
actively construct ‘the African’ as an object of disciplinary power, Vaughan suggests that
knowledge. Colonial psychologists and psychia- unitisation took precedence. ‘Unitisation’
trists seemed to be continually grappling – in means the procedures by which people were
their various different ways – with the question counted, for tax or census purposes ‘weighed
of who ‘the African’ was. In what appears to be and measured ... given medical histories and
a difference from the ways disciplinary power medicalised records’ (11). As she puts it:
worked in European contexts, the definition of In colonial medical discourse and practice
abnormality in colonial African contexts took colonial Africans were conceptualised, first
something of a back seat relative to questions and foremost, as members of groups, rather
of Africanness. ‘The literature on madness in than individuals, who were said to possess
colonial Africa was more concerned with a defi- distinctive psychologies and bodies. In ...
nition of ‘Africanness’ than with a definition of colonial Africa group classification was a
madness’ (119). It was as if ‘Africanness’ was far more important construction than indi-
assumed to be so essentially different from vidualization ... there was a powerful
‘Europeanness’ that it was itself already a strand in the theories of colonial psycholo-
fundamental form of Otherness. One did not gists which denied that Africans might be
need concentrate as much on categories of self-aware individual subjects, so bound
madness and abnormality as one would have in were they thought to be by collective iden-
the European context – one did not need to rely tities (11).
as heavily on these kinds of deviations from the Again, here, Vaughan’s work may be seen as a
norm – because the African was already a kind careful application and extension of Foucault’s
of essential Otherness. Hence, even in his most ideas rather than representing a simple contra-
normative condition, the African is, in compar- diction of the notion of disciplinary power. It is
ison to disciplinary values generated in Europe, not that procedures of individualisation were
already different, abnormal; and, as such, the not implemented in Africa. Rather it is a case
African found his place among the various that the individualising procedures of measure-
‘Others’, the criminals, juvenile delinquents, ment, assessment and comparison were imple-
sexual perverts against which the whole set of mented, but against the group of Africans as a
European norms worked. The African, then, is, whole. It was not really the case that single
if the paradox is to be permitted, normally individuals came to be known and understood in

abnormal. This is what Vaughan is driving at great detail against a general norm – as was the
when she insists that colonial psychologists case with European disciplinary procedures –
were always ‘locked into a discourse of differ- rather it was the case that the African, as a
ence’ (1991, 115). Furthermore: ‘the discourse whole general class of people, came to be
of colonial psychology and psychiatry was known and understood, measured, assessed and
219
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 220
Critical Psychology
BOX 1 Colonial power and African illness (continued)
compared against the European norms. Why was Africans might be self-aware individual subjects,
this the case? Well, the procedures of normali- so bound were they thought to be to their
sation in Europe were used to discipline deviant collective identities’ (11). Colonial psychology,
individuals, to introduce a range of power-rela- medicine, psychology and psychiatry seemed so
tions between them and society so that each busy on objectifying the African, and so focused
such individual could be better scrutinised. It on what made them, as a group, different from
was in this way that they could be better sepa- the European, that subjectifying modes of
rated out from the social mass of which they power seemed to have slipped through the
were originally part, and controlled. Because of cracks somehow. These modes of power were so
the massive racism of colonial Europe, it was locked into producing categories of racial differ-
taken that all Africans were already problematic ence that they did not see Africans as
(in this respect, refer to the earlier chapters in possessing any personal subjectivity apart from
this book on Fanon). Hence such systems of the subjectivity supplied them by their social,
control and understanding that would normally racial, ethnic grouping. In fact, in contrast to
hope to place individual subjects under greater Foucault’s focus on an actively subjectifying
relations of power and surveillance were applied power of modern disciplinary power, Fanon
across the board to the entire racial grouping of (1986) understands the force of colonial power
Africans. Race and racial difference was reiter- in terms of its absolutely objectifying force. For
ated at each point in the workings of colonial Fanon (1986), what we observe in the gaze of
power. The need, in short, to differentiate, to colonial power on the African is more than
separate out, to ‘make other’, to individualise anything an obliteration of subjectivity, an anni-
the problematic subject – the typical func- hilation of the African, a turning of him or her
tioning of individualisation – was most certainly into ‘nothingness’. He (1986) describes the
present in African colonial contexts then, it was realm of blackness, for example, as a ‘zone of
simply applied at a group rather than at a non-being, an extraordinarily sterile and arid
singular level. region’ (10); the experience of colonial racism
One area where the workings of colonial as that of ‘crushing objecthood’, of ‘my body ...
power did differ quite markedly from European abraded into nonbeing ... [a] taking me out of
forms of disciplinary power was with reference the world’ (109). Here it seems important to be
to subjectivity, that is, with reference to the aware of the specific difference between the era
domain of self-knowledge and understanding, of colonial power, and that of modern discipli-
the self-observing functioning of power that nary power. Of course, in the present of
Foucault takes to be so central to modern post-apartheid South Africa, one would need to
power. ‘Indeed,’ claims Vaughan (1991), ‘there be aware of how variations of both such forms of
was a powerful strand in the theories of colonial power might work together in quite complex
psychologists which denied the possibility that ways.
Furthermore, each such rehabilitative ‘correction’ needed have an effect on the

‘soul’. Within this return to the body, the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ was certainly not
forgotten. The ‘soul’ in fact became far more instrumental in disciplinary power
than it had been in previous orders of power. For Foucault, it was power exer-
cised upon the body that had given rise to the effects of the soul in the first
place. It is the refined, technically elaborated return to the body, the surplus
power exercised upon it that gives reality to this notion (and experience) of soul.
220
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 221

Here it is worth quoting Foucault at length: Subjugate/

It would be wrong to say that the soul is a illusion, or an ideological effect. On the subjugation:
contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within to make subser-
the body by a functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished ... on vient, to bring
under control.
those one supervises, trains and corrects ... This is the historical reality of this
soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin
and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment,
supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is
the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the
reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power rela-
tions give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and
reinforces the effects of this power (1977, 29).
The soul, then, to Foucault is ‘the trace of power’, something that is very defi-
nitely real, but at the same time no more than the internal effects experienced
by subjects subjugated by a series of intersecting power-relations.
BOX 2 Subjectifying power in practice
Foucault’s understanding of the subjectifying larly, therapists progressively ‘slimmed down’

function of disciplinary power sometimes seems their talking contributions to a bare minimum,
a little difficult to conceptualise. Some so that the therapeutic narrative came very
examples drawn from the realm of close to approximating the therapeutic mono-
psychotherapy help make this idea a little logue of the self-monitoring patient. This
clearer. There is clearly a very strong self-focus combination of the continual redirection of
in the talk of clients of psychotherapy, which questions and of the decreased speaking role of
psychotherapeutic practice effectively extends the therapist made patients increasingly self-
and amplifies. In a study of the talk between reflexive.
patients and psychotherapists, Hook (2001) Patient self-awareness was further encour-
found that the therapeutic talk of clients was aged by the fact that at virtually each point of
strongly ‘self-attending’. This therapeutic talk the therapeutic narrative the strong self-focus
was that of a personal story, a personal narra- of the client’s narrative was supported and rein-
tive, of which they were both author and forced, such that the focus on self and self’s
protagonist. In this way such narratives were problems was soon the vastly predominant and
marked by a fundamental self-attention, a (speaking relatively) only real concern of the
strong ‘I’ centring. A vital component of these therapeutic dialogue. The use of prescribed or
self-attending ‘talkings’ was the provision of a generic answers/responses of the ‘this must be
self-reflective or reflexive attitude that, while difficult for you’ kind likewise served to keep
often vague at first, soon grew in strength. This the personal involvement of the therapist to an
self-focus was powerfully encouraged by the absolute and clinical minimum whilst simulta-
psychotherapist, who, through the refusal of neously facilitating the narrative emergence of
the typical mode of conversation came to the subjective, personal life of the patient. The
promote this self-attending orientation. Inap- re-use of large segments of the patient’s
propriate questions, personal enquiries and descriptions, of their own words and terms of
overly result-based queries were gradually understanding, similarly ensured that the ther-
extinguished by the therapist’s avoidance of apeutic narrative was, at times, essentially a
providing answers as therapy progressed. Simi- monologue, essentially the narrative of one
221
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 222
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 Subjectifying power in practice (continued)
voice, that of the subjective patient’s, even if it what causes these feelings ...’ (Wolberg, 1977,
was repeated, re-emphasised or extended by 1050; emphasis added). The patient’s comment:
the therapist in ways that structured or ‘It’s how I feel about myself that really counts’
directed the session. Take the following (Wolberg, 1977, 1081) provides evidence of this
example, in which the therapist explicitly kind of therapeutic effect, as does the com-
directs the patient towards a self-monitoring ment: ‘Ever since I’ve been coming to see you,
and (emotionally) self-aware form of narrative: I’ve been giving more thought to myself than
Pt. ... I’ve had some disappointments ... I I’ve ever done in my whole life’ (Wolberg, 1977,
took an interest in helping crippled 1079). A useful adjunct here was the emphasis
children ... Normal children hurt little of the words used to reference the patient, the
children, you know ... I feel badly about it, vocal italicisation of the patient’s name, of
but I don’t think that has anything to do mentions of ‘you’: ‘But how do you feel?’, ‘And
with ... what’s happening to me. then what did you do?’.
Th. There are other things?
Pt. It goes further. The placement of such a premium on the
Th. It goes further? It involves your own feel- development of patient subjectivity and reflex-
ings about yourself? (Wolberg, 1977, 1052). ivity was a strong and unremitting pattern
throughout therapeutic protocols. The patient’s
As evidenced in the above extract, the self increasingly became a level of awareness
accessing and reinforcement of subjectivity and a surface of intervention that needed to be
also occurred through therapists’ continual prioritised; more than this it became the vessel
querying of the personal opinion of patients. through which therapists could repeatedly
Typical of this tactic was the therapist’s redi- appeal to the patient’s agency, to their own
rected retort to a direct question: ‘But what do personal prerogative, and responsibility, to
you think?’. More simply: ‘Do you have any idea change.
Moral The soul as ‘object-effect’ of power

orthopaedics: The production of souls is diffusely managed; more than simply an
see Orthopaedics.
orthopaedics of the bodily order, the moral orthopaedics of disciplinary tech-
nology became the form of diverse treatments, operating not only through
Apparatus: punishment and constraints but also through healings, treatments, therapies,
for Foucault, a col- medical interventions and the advisings of experts. As McNay (1994) empha-
lection of discour- sises, because disciplinary technology is a set of techniques rather than a solid
ses, institutions,
institution, it can be easily applied in a number of settings without being
regulatory decisions,
laws, administrative reduced to them; employed by pre-existing authorities or apparatuses, used in
measures, scientific conjunction with other forms of power without merely replacing them. The
statements, philoso- easy appropriation of disciplinary technologies has meant that their usage has
phical, moral and

spread from the punitive responsibility of prisons to other sectors of society, to
philanthropic
propositions – other administrations of control, other places of reform, rehabilitation, educa-
basically, an abstract tion, to the factory, to the school, the hospital and the clinic. At each of these
logics of power – sites, anchored to subjections made upon the body, and in the strict regimes of
used to implement surveillance, disciplinary power extended its range of influence to ever smaller
relations of control.
fragments of life and the body.
222
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 223

We should bear in mind that Foucault uses ‘soul’ as a variant on various Object-effect:
psychological notions of self, or ego. The soul, he claims, is the reality-reference object-effect of
upon which various concepts and domains of analysis have been constructed. power is something
The psyche, subjectivity, the notions of self, personality and consciousness brought into being,
constructed, known,
number among these constructions (Foucault, 1977). Moreover, upon such a understood through
variously articulated ‘soul’ ‘have been built scientific techniques and the a powerful form of
discourses and moral claims of humanism’ (Foucault, 1977, 30). It is this ‘soul’ knowledge. For
in any of its variously constructed forms that is the ‘prison of the body’ example, the various
understandings of
(Foucault, 1977, 30).
self as presented by
Foucault here thus leaves little room for doubt regarding psychology’s psychology, such as
complicity in the procedures and agendas of modern power. This ‘soul’ whose the psyche, the ego,
manipulation and continued substantiation is absolutely central to discipli- personality. These
are objects of power
nary control is both the subject and object of psychology. Psychology’s subject,
inasmuch as they
‘knowable man [sic] (soul, individuality, the self, consciousness, conduct, are prime points of
whatever it is called), is the object-effect of this analytic investment, of this focus for a partic-
domination-observation’ (Foucault, 1977, 305). Indeed, disciplinary power is ular kind of
as such operative on, and the constitutive element within, not only individu- knowledge, that is,
objects of power in
ality, but on all the senses of autonomy, responsibility, subjectivity and that knowledge is
personality predicated upon it. These are all object-effects of disciplinary produced about
power, that in their objectifiable nature will directly inform the ongoing them. However, they
production of knowledge about individuals. As Rose (1991) puts it: are also effects of
power in that they
Psychological theories have played a key role in the birth of this new concept of ‘come into being’
the self, and psychological techniques have had a crucial role in the development through such forms
of those practices and techniques through which modern selves are constructed, of knowledge. For
sustained and remodelled (xii–xiii). Foucault, power and
knowledge can
These object-effects are, moreover, in their subjective nature, also the inter- never be separated
– he prefers ‘power-
nalised instruments (power-effects) adopted by subjects who come to take
knowledge’.
responsibility for making them play upon themselves. It is in this sense that we
can understand Foucault’s deliberate ambiguity in speaking of how discipli-
nary power produces ‘subjects’ – subjects, that is, both in the sense of being
subject to control and in being tied to their own identity through self-knowl-
edge or conscience (Foucault, 1982).
Producing individuals
Foucault extends his earlier suggestions of the individualising capacities of
disciplinary power when he notes that the micro-power of discipline works

differentially on individuals. Instead of bending all of its subjects into a single
uniform mass, disciplinary power separates, analyses, differentiates. The indi-
vidual worker, patient or schoolboy is precisely observed and compared to
others; ‘at the same time and by the same means, the ordering of the whole
multiplicity is carried out’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 156). It is hence beneath
223
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 224
Critical Psychology
the production of a disciplined population (be it one of learning, labour,

psychological wellness or obedience) that one finds the individualising frag-
mentation of power-effects; the precise observation, calibration and
comparison of individuals. As Foucault famously put it: ‘Discipline ‘makes’
individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both
as objects and as instruments of its exercise’ (1977, 170). Individualisation is,
in this sense, exactly an effect of the functioning of this kind of power; in
Western modernity ‘each individual receives as their status their own individ-
uality’ (Foucault, 1977, 192), and is linked by this status to the features,
measurements, the gaps and ‘marks’ that characterise them.
BOX 3 Implementing power on one’s self
In speaking of subjectifying forms of power we progress. Clients seem increasingly to take

are not only calling attention to the fact that on the ‘speaking function’ of the therapist
this type of power focuses on the self, on as psychotherapy progresses, ‘speaking the
extending and elaborating the ‘subjectivity of therapist’s role’, starting to conduct the
its subjects’, so to speak. We are also calling facilitative, explorative and ‘knowing self’
attention to the fact that this kind of power therapeutic functions autonomously.
works in ways that come to be implemented by Indeed, the talk of clients in late stages of
subjects on themselves. This is the power-rela- therapy came to be increasingly ‘auto-
tionship in which subjects, to paraphrase therapeutic’, to perform their therapeutic
Foucault (1979), are the principle of their own lessons independently:
subjection. In this respect, an interesting part (The patient is speaking of a previous
of the client ‘subjectivisation’ in psychotherapy dysfunctional relationship.)
(as discussed above) was that of encouraging Pt. Do you see? He ... keep[s] on dabbling
the development of an ‘auto-therapeutic’ narra- with ... women ... I say ‘Yes, all right, I’ll
tive on the part of clients. In Hook’s (2001) be here; all right, I’ll see you.’ And as soon
study, he found that the clients of psychody- as I say it, I know I shouldn’t have said it.
namic psychotherapy frequently appeared to I know I’m wrong. I know I’m being too
take on the conversational roles of both client soft, too easy about things ... Do you
and therapist, eventually becoming both the understand? ... You see? I say ‘Yes’ or ‘All
author and evaluator of their own dialogue. He right, I’ll do it’, and if I say I will, I’ll do
gives as an example the comparison between it, no matter what. But I shouldn’t. I
the questions a patient asks her psychothera- should be very careful of what I answer
pist in their second session and a comment she and what I say ... There’ll be a lot of
makes in her ninth session, respectively: opportunities, but I must watch out not to
Pt. I would like you to tell me what is wrong, start anything with someone – well, a man
doctor ... who isn’t deserving: and I’m not going to
(Wolberg, 1977, 1050), get involved, no matter what demands are
Pt. My big problem ... is what I do to myself made (Wolberg, 1977, 1098).
because I feel no good (Wolberg, 1977, In the above example the patient appears to be
1098). Such a shift in the focus of the instructing the therapist by continually querying
therapeutic narrative, and in the locus of whether he follows her self-instructions. This
attention and responsibility, might typi- adoption of the narrative structure previously
cally be viewed as evidence of therapeutic lent by the therapist frequently ensured that
224
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 225

BOX 3 Implementing power on one’s self (continued)
clients were able to motivate and guide their client taking on therapist functions, that of the
own treatment with a relative amount of inde- ‘therapeutic corrections’, are the verbal amend-
pendence; similarly, clients often, at this point, ments made by clients to their own narratives.
began to lead their own narrative with ques- Dysfunctional trends and directions within their
tions of a self-probing nature. Furthermore, typical narratives were gradually, systematically
clients often came to provide self-assessments, eliminated and became the subject of clients’
self-recommendations and personal suggestions reflexive criticisms, where they were able to
of reparative behaviour. Continuing, Hook identify such recently highlighted ‘dysfunctions’
(2001) points out that a similar example of the and vocally check their ‘mistakes’.
Internal regulations of disciplinary power

The ability and overwhelming priority of discipli-
nary power is to ensure that subjects adopt certain
fundamental self-reflexive, self-monitoring and
self-judging relationships to themselves. This self-
observing and self-policing quality is famously
exemplified by Foucault (1977) in the figure of the
Panopticon – a watchtower structure within the
prison into which the outsider cannot see and
which thus assures that prisoners know at all
times that they may well be under surveillance.
Prisoners, or ‘souls’ more generally, thus come to
operate as if under constant surveillance, taking
the role of controlling observer upon themselves.
In this way power-relations are reproduced, imple-
mented from within the internal position of the Foucault used the figure of the panopticon to
subject. Hence Foucault’s (1977) reference to the exemplify the self-observing and self-policing
modern subject as one who becomes the principle quality of disciplinary power. The panopticon was a
of their own subjection. It is in this way that disci- watchtower structure within the prison into which
the prisoner could not see, and that therefore
plinary technology functions in a non-corporeal ensured that prisoners knew at all times that they
manner and is therefore far more flexible, might well be under surveillance. Prisoners, or
constant, profound and permanent in effect than ‘souls’ more generally, thus come to operate as if
earlier technologies of power. The modern indi- under constant surveillance, taking the role of
controlling observer upon themselves. In this way
vidual thus becomes inseparable from the forces of power-relations are reproduced and implemented
disciplinary technology that come to have from within the internal position of the subject.
increasing bearing upon their nature, upon what
they most essentially are, will be, or may become. As Best & Kellner (1994)
succinctly put it, borrowing from Foucault (1977): ‘the modern individual
became both an object and subject of knowledge, not “repressed”, but positively
shaped and formed within the matrices of “scientifico-disciplinary
225
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 226
Critical Psychology
mechanisms”, a moral/legal/psychological/medical/sexual being “carefully

fabricated ... according to a whole technique of force and bodies”’ (50).
BOX 4 The invention of African bodies and minds
The work of Alex Butchart (1996, 1997, 1999) other devices for examining the interior of
usefully extends many terms of Foucaultian the African body extended to it the medical
analysis within the South African context. He re- gaze deep within the body ... (103).
emphasises, following Foucault, that the many Butchart here draws particular attention to
techniques through which social scientists study sociomedical anxieties about the African body
the body, mind and society are all components as potential container of disease:
of a ‘productive assembly line’ as he puts it, that
continually creates and sustains our knowledge The African body was ... fabricated as a
and understanding of reality. Through careful container of disease, creating a need for
historical work, he traces how techniques and technologies that could monitor and prevent
procedures of control were the basis for the the transmission of disease between bodies –
development of various forms of sociomedical hence the emergence within mining medicine
study and intervention: and public health of an elaborate system of
barriers and surveillance devices directed to
In South Africa during the 17th and 18th the hygienic supervision of recruitment,
centuries psychology and anthropology were working, sleeping, eating, spitting and all
as unthinkable as epidemiology and social other bodily functions that might enhance
medicine. Instead, the classificatory tech- the spread of disease from body to body
niques of natural history coincided with the (103).
regime of sovereign domination ... Beginning
in the mid-1800s, the African body began to Divergent strands of sociomedical discourse
become a voluminous entity, the practice of were hence unified by a common strategy of
missionary medicine fabricating as its object securing control over African bodies through the
and effect the African loquacious body as extension of techniques for the ‘prevention and
possessed of a spiritual interior ... toward suppression’ of disease. By the 1920s, however,
which the provision of curative care as a form the increasing number of Africans and Europeans
of ‘benevolent conquest’ was directed in an resident in towns and cities meant that this
effort to convert the African from ‘heathe- centralised and objectifying power was no
nism’ to Christianity (103). longer enforceable, ‘since it had little capacity
to govern such intimate activities as sexuality,
The advancement of techniques of health and
bathing, bowel movements and dietary habits’
knowledge were therefore indivisible from the
(Butchart, 1997, 104). This failure was to
development of more sophisticated procedures
provide the condition of possibility for a new set
of control. If missionary practices were the basis
of disciplinary practices that embraced the
for new knowledges and interventions within the
African body in ‘a different strategy of atten-
African soul and body in the 17th and 18th
tions aimed at overcoming these limitations’
centuries, then the mining industry took on this
(104). One such strategy was
role in the 20th century:
The rise of the psychological sciences and

Mining medicine transformed the bodies of
their invention of the African mind as a site
African labourers from an inchoate mass into
of disciplinary subjectification by which the
a closely supervised economy of individual
governmentality of the African could be
anatomical bodies and social relationships
established and the ‘native problem’ regu-
... In its analyses, mining medicine’s use of
lated through self-surveillance on the part
pathological anatomy, radiography, and
of the ‘good citizen’ (104).
226
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 227

Normalising technology
Having spoken of the breadth and generalisability of disciplinary power, it
seems now pertinent to address the question as to what holds all these
different moral orthopaedic projects together. How are all their site-specific
objectives actually the same? An answer is provided by Best & Kellner (1994)
in a way that rounds up the crucial characterising aspect of disciplinary power:
‘[t]he ultimate goal and effect of discipline is ‘nnormalisation’, the elimination Normalisation:
of all social and psychological irregularities and the production of useful and elimination of all
social and
docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies’ (47). It was the psychological
possibility of comparison between subjects, enabled through surveillance, and irregularities and
later through their own confessions, that unified the operations of disciplinary the production of
power, that enabled a kind of ‘normalising judgement’. useful and docile
subjects through a
This kind of normalisation, made up of a combination of themes of indi-
refashioning of
vidualisation, objectification and surveillance, was able to solidify the minds and bodies.
punishments of the disciplinary order down to ever finer levels of specification
(Foucault, 1977). Indeed, it operated a ‘micro-penality’ in which infractions too
trivial to have been granted a legal status now became captured by power; ‘the
slightest deviations from the norm were now made punishable’ (Foucault,
1977, 178). Far more extensive in effect than a simple binary opposition of
permitted and forbidden, the norm brings into existence a far wider
continuum of judgement. It is no longer good enough to be judged right or
wrong, good or evil, argues Foucault (1977); one is now locked within a
perpetual relationship to the standard of the norm. Not only were errors and
wrong-doings punishable – so was failing to attain a certain standard – the
whole domain of non-conformity now became punishable. Through the speci-
fication of the most detailed aspects of everyday behaviour and the
establishment of a rigorous set of social norms, the non-conformist, even the
temporary one, became the object of disciplinary attention.
The technology of the examination

An important mechanism of disciplinary individualisation is to be found in the
measurement, testing and examination of subjects: the amassing of files, docu-
ments, dossiers on the individual – ‘the fixing of the individual in writing’
(Foucault, 1977, 185). For Foucault, the technology of the examination – under-
stood broadly – marks the combination of the techniques of hierarchical
observation and normalising judgement, making it possible to qualify and
classify the individual and to recommend them for punishment or treatment. It

was this disciplinary writing, this ‘accumulation of documents, their seriation,
the organization of comparative fields ... [that made] it possible to classify ...
categories, determine averages, fix norms ... any institution using this instru-
ment, like hospitals, clinics, function as laboratories of sorts’ (Foucault,
1977, 190).
227
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 228
Critical Psychology
Confessional technology
Confession is one of the most crucial mechanisms of normalising technology. It
is through confession that the speaking subject tells the disciplinary agent that
which they may not have otherwise been able to see or know. Through the ‘ther-
apeutic’ process of the confession the subject’s fantasies, secret problems and
issues of sexuality are elicited and subjected to the scrutiny of disciplinary
surveillance. Psychology has a prime role to play here. As Butchart (1997)
explains, from the disciplinary focus in medical technologies – that of seeing the
sick body – psychology came (predominantly, although not exclusively) to install
a technology of hearing. This, then, is how we should understand confession; a
technique of intimate surveillance ‘through which the most confidential ideas
and private secrets of everyone are amplified to audibility and lifted into socio-
medical space as devices of disciplinary subjectification’ (Butchart, 1997, 107).
The underlying logic of confession is basic: the more one speaks, the more
one will know oneself, the freer one will be (Foucault, 1980b). The irony of the
deployment of the tool of confession is, as Foucault (1980b) says, that it would
have us believe that it is our liberation that is in the balance. By inducing in the
individual the role of the speaking subject that comes to admit their deepest
secrets and desires, confession is an exemplary means of subjectifying individ-
uals. It places them in the role of the self-examinatory, self-reflective subject
who needs to recognise and tell the truth about their innermost qualities.
However, just as procedures of confession encourage subjectifying forms of
power – that is, self-implemented and self-understanding forms of power – so
they also substantiate the authority of experts. For it is increasingly only
through the mediation of such expert interpreters, says Foucault (1980b), such
as doctors, psychologists and psychiatrists, that the individual can properly
know the truth of their own psyche, sexuality and nature.
No matter how helpful, beneficial or therapeutic such confessional modes of
power may be, they remain central in the attempt to transform the subject,
crucial components of a greater technology of power. To paraphrase Dreyfus &
Rabinow (1982), as long as the interpretative sciences continue to search for deep
truth, proceeding on the assumption that they have privileged access to meaning,
whilst insisting that the truths they uncover lie outside the sphere of power, as
long as this continues, ‘these sciences remain vital strategies of disciplinary
power, despite the privileged externality they would pretend’ (1982, 181).
PSYCHOLOGY AS DISCIPLINARY APPARATUS

Individualisation/objectification
We are now in a position to sketch the profile of psychology as a disciplinary
apparatus. It is perhaps easiest to do this with reference to the domain of
applied (that is, clinical or therapeutic psychology). The first characterising
228
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 229

element of disciplinary power is that it functions in modes of treatment or

supervision in which individuals are simultaneously the level of intervention
and observation and the fonts of ever-increasing knowledge production. This is
clearly the case in applied psychology, where individual treatment is the typical
form of practice; here, variations of history-taking, the case-study, and proce-
dures of psychological assessment (that is, psychological tests of aptitude,
personality, intelligence, and so on) form an integral part of how psychological
norms (and notions of deviance) are generated. In fact, the ‘explanatory
leverage’ the therapist has in dealing with a particular case is reliant on the
clinical knowledge that is secured (on an individual level) from the disclosures
of a particular client and (more generally) on the lenses of theory and prior
therapeutic knowledge derived from larger therapeutic populations. More than
this, the basic starting point of the overwhelming majority of conventional
psychology is exactly the human individual, often unrealistically cut off from
the social and political forces that surround them. Indeed, in many ways,
psychology seems to be the par excellence study of human individuality.
Disciplinary modification
Secondly, the disciplinary apparatus is one with a primarily modificatory
function which requires a particular technology (comprising a discrete knowl-
edges, techniques and the functions of experts) generated by it. Applied
psychology’s objective of facilitating beneficial change or development within
its patients or clients certainly qualifies it as party to the modificatory objec-
tives of the disciplinary power. Applied psychology, like other applications of
disciplinary power, aims not only to change their subjects but to do so by their
own actions, from an internal position. The individualisation of disciplinary
power, so central to its modificatory function, is evident within the particular
functioning of psychotherapy, which appears continually to reiterate and reify
the ‘I’ foundation of the therapeutic narrative, continually referring to and
substantiating the subjectivity of the client. Indeed, it is this quality, as
described both by Cushman (1990, 1992, 1995) and Rose (1991, 1996) that is
thought both to ensure psychotherapeutic efficacy and to distinguish
psychotherapeutic practice from more openly suggestive, prescriptive or
educative forms of influence. Here we see a particular disciplinary dynamic
epitomised, that in which subjects come to inscribe in themselves (to para-
phrase Foucault (1977)), ‘a power relation in which they are the principle of
their own subjection’.
Secrecy of operation
In view of a third characteristic of disciplinary technologies – that they
maintain a secretive and autonomous level of functioning – one might again
refer to psychology’s applied practices. Two points are of importance here.
229
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 230
Critical Psychology
First, applied psychology is generally understood as the practised extension of

the academic social science of psychology, which, of course, has as its respon-
sibility a certain knowledge-production that it treats as its own exclusive
preserve. Secondly, practitioners such as therapists, counsellors, psychoana-
lysts make use of techniques and procedures not commonly understood or
taught outside of the confines of its practice.
Humanisation and knowledge

A fourth aspect of typical disciplinary apparatuses is that they have a func-
tioning ensured and supported by rationales of both humanity and
knowledge. These rationales or, better still, these discourses seem so ingrained
within the rudimentary fibre of psychology that they barely warrant remen-
tioning; these would seem to be foundational to psychology’s rationale as both
a body of knowledge and as a form of practice – the need to know, to under-
stand human individuals better, and to treat them, assist them, to develop, to
grow towards ideals of psychological health and well-being. The whole notion
of the therapeutic, one might argue, as a beneficial and curative form of treat-
ment, which takes the care and health of its subjects as the principles of its
transformative objectives, reflects the logic of disciplinary power. Perhaps one
example will help anchor this point: the entirety of the hugely influential
client-centred approach advocated by Carl Rogers’ humanism (1961) seems
emblematic of contemporary psychology’s debt to humanising discourse.
Importantly, these discourses further sanction the applied activities of
psychologists, and further justify and motivate their capacities to generate
truth and actually prescribe intervention.
Soul-effect
Fifthly, as discussed under the rubric of ‘moral orthopaedics’, disciplinary
activity needs to implement a ‘soul-effect’ of sorts. This kind of ‘soul’ provides
a surface of purchase for knowledge (hence constructs such as the mind, the
psyche, personality) as well as something that may be subjectively experienced
(as is the case in constructs such as the self, the soul, subjectivity). Psychology,
both as a domain of learning and as an applied form of practice, certainly
makes for fertile terrain for examination in these terms. Applied psychology,
furthermore, might be seen as typifying the disciplinary institution, at least
inasmuch as it takes the soul/mind/psyche as the optimal site for its normal-
ising intervention. Psychotherapy is a fully moral orthopedics, in Foucault’s

(1977) phrase, in that individual psychology is the prime object-effect of its
practice.
In this respect it is useful to provide an across-schools sprinkling of key
concepts and objectives of psychotherapeutic practice; such objectives of
practice read like a virtual wish-list of disciplinary power. ‘Increasing the ego
230
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 231

strength of the patient’ is a goal of psychoanalytic approaches, as is ‘putting

patients more in control of themselves’ (see Smith, 1991, 1993). In a similar
vein the existential approaches aim to enable the patient to ‘become more
true to themselves’ (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1993), whereas behaviour therapies
have as their objective the ‘changing of patients’ behaviour’ (O’Sullivan,
1993). Cognitive therapy takes its goal as ‘building more adaptive techniques
inter and intra-personally’ within the patient (Freeman & Greenwood, 1983),
while Adlerian therapy aims to ‘re-educate perceptions, social values and to
modify motivation’ (Clifford, 1993). Person-centred therapy ‘assists the
autonomous and self-responsible client to attain their true fully-functional,
self-actualizing potential’ (Rogers, 1961) and Gestalt therapy ‘encourages the
person to recognise that they are the author of their own life, their own
“author-ity”’ (Parlett & Page, 1993). Given this shortlist of the across-schools
objectives of psychotherapists, it seems difficult to dispute that therapists are
indeed agents of normalising influence seeking to install or strengthen more
powerful internal disciplinary subject positions. One should be aware of the
subtlety of the normalising descriptions of therapies as given above – the
normalising function of these therapies may operate in emphatic modes that
express no overt judgement. Indeed, the normalising function here may seem
to be the sole prerogative of psychotherapeutic subjects themselves, rather
than the overtly exercised influence of the psychotherapist. Indeed, as Hook
(2001) has demonstrated, psychotherapy elicits, with impressive regularity,
a ‘powerful gravity’ towards normative self-evaluations on the part of
its patients.
BOX 5 Psychotherapy and the confession
For writers such as Nikolas Rose (1991, 1996) psychotherapy makes for an exem-
plary example of a disciplinary technology. Rose (1996) is instructive in linking
disciplinary topics of confession, authority and subjectification. The truthful
rendering into speech of who one is and what one does, he (1996) claims, is
both identifying, in that it constructs a self in terms of certain norms of
identity, and subjectifying, in that one becomes a subject at the price of
entering a certain game of authority:
Confession ... characterizes almost all of the proliferating systems of
psychotherapy and counseling ... To speak the truth of one’s feelings and
desires ... is not merely a rendering audible of the inarticulate murmuring of

the soul. In the very technical form of therapeutic procedures ... the
confessing subject is identified. The ‘I’ that speaks is ... identical with the ‘I’
whose feelings, wishes, anxieties ... are articulated. One becomes ... the
subject of one’s own narrative, and ... is attached to the work of constructing
an identity (Rose, 1996, 96).
231
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 232
Critical Psychology
The ‘lineage’ of the prison

Having qualified the functioning of psychology as a disciplinary apparatus, it is
now useful to link the discipline to more overt forms of power and regulation.
Indeed, although achieved through more individualising and indeed more
sophisticated means, the normalising, modificatory function of applied forms
of psychology, like that of the psychotherapeutic arena, is in fact intrinsically
the same as that of the school, the clinic and the prison. The fundamental task
of all of such interventions is to rehabilitate subject-positions that have failed,
to (re)institute normalising subject-positions that entail a fundamental struc-
ture of observant, reflexive and judgemental relations to self. It is, as McHoul &
Grace (1997) put it, in this attempt to eliminate behavioural, social and psycho-
logical deviances of all sorts that such disciplinary apparatuses have broken
fundamentally with neither the aim nor the methods of the prison.
All of the social/human sciences (psychology, statistics, demography, crim-
inology, social hygiene etc) and their associated practices emerged first from
institutions, from the context of relations of power, through practices of exclu-
sion, surveillance, objectification and confinement, and are as such, according
to Foucault (1977), rightly called ‘disciplines’. From such institutional bases
they have grown to new levels of specification, with their own rules of evidence,
modes of recruitment and exclusion. It is in this respect that the disciplines of
treatment, whose ultimate goal and effect is the elimination of all social, phys-
iological, behavioural and psychological irregularity, have not as yet been
separated from the technologies which invested the prison.
Following Foucault’s account, Best & Kellner (1994) assert that the psychi-
atric, sociological, psychological and criminological disciplines continue to
contribute to the refinement and spreading of new techniques of power. Simi-
larly, institutions such as the asylum, the school, the hospital and the
psychotherapeutic arena all still function as laboratories for experimentation
with correctional techniques, for the acquisition of knowledge for social
control (Best & Kellner, 1991, 50). It is in this way, in the positive (and normal-
ising) shaping of patients into subject-positions that entail a fundamental
structure of observant, reflexive and judgemental relations to self, that a
specialised disciplinary apparatus like that of psychotherapy assumes its links
to reparative institutions like that of the prison. The fundamental task of both
of these operations (therapeutic or reparative) is to rehabilitate subject-posi-
tions that have failed, whether those subject-positions, or ‘souls’, are deviant
behaviourally or psychologically. Hence Foucault’s (1977) reference to psychol-

ogists as ‘servants of moral orthopaedics’.
The ‘psycho-sciences’ and individualisation

Whereas once individualisation remained below the threshold of description,
it is now a primary feature of the subject/object, a document for possible use,
232
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 233

an instrument for the induction of conformity or productivity of a certain type.

To paraphrase Foucault (1977), individualisation now stands as one of the
strongest instrument-effects of a power that has characterised itself on an
inversion of invisibility, where the subject is constantly brought into the gaze
of power, even when that gaze is the one the subject comes to bear upon them-
selves. Turning this insight to the ‘psycho’ sciences, Foucault contends:
All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root ‘psycho-’ have their
origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization. The
moment that saw the transition of historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation
of individuality to the scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms, when the normal
took over from the ancestral and measurement from status ... that [was the]
moment when a new technology of power ... [came to be] implemented
(1977, 193).
Once again we return to the crossing of power and knowledge; it is here where
the vast proliferation of knowledge on individuals and populations coincides
with the continuous flourishing and refinement of new areas of research and
the concurrent refinement of disciplinary techniques for observing and trans-
forming subjects.
To reiterate, for Foucault (1977) it has only been through the variously
articulated marriages of observation and technique, of investigation and inter-
vention, knowledge and method, study and subjugating practice, that the
‘man’ – that is, individual – of modern humanism, the subject/object of social
science, and of psychology, was born in the first place. Subsequently, one
might assert that the individual is in fact inseparable from the forces of disci-
plinary technology that come to have an increasing bearing upon their nature,
on what they most essentially are, will be, may be or eventually become. It is
important to be wary at this point of diluting the full implications of Foucault’s
position. Disciplinary power is considered to be no less than the constituent
element of not only individuality but all the senses of identity, autonomy
responsibility, subjectivity and personality predicated upon it. These are all
object-effects of disciplinary power that, in their objectifiable nature, will
directly inform the ongoing production of knowledge about individuals, and
that in their subjectifiable (or subjective) nature are also the instruments by
which such objects are internalised and actively adopted by subjects who come
to make them play upon themselves.
CRITIQUING FOUCAULT’S NOTION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER

Locating theoretical limitations
Before closing this chapter, it is important to entertain a series of critiques of
Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power. It is often contended that Discipline
and punish is based on a rather selective and limited number of historical
233
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 234
Critical Psychology
BOX 6 Foucault in South African psychology
Butchart (1997) takes issue with misappropria- teaches us to be somewhat mistrustful of ratio-
tions of Foucault within the domain of South nales of liberation, humanism, freedom and
African sociomedical sciences. Not only is empowerment. Even something like Black
Foucault’s work largely ignored by these Consciousness, following Butchart (1997),
quarters; but, when it is referred to, it is typi- whilst offering to liberate Africans from inter-
cally distorted by being pressed into precisely nalised oppression still manufactured ‘a new
the liberal-humanist and Marxist analyses that and essentialist African personality ... wherein
Foucault was himself so concerned to dispel. If each African was his own overseer, exercising
we sufficiently grasp Foucault, argues Butchart surveillance over and against himself [sic]’
(1997, 1999), we understand that something (104).
like human subjectivity is not the origin of Butchart comments on participatory and
power, nor the source of any answers, but action research initiatives within psychology in
instead the end result and effect of its forces: much the same way:
What makes the psyche conceivable as the These ... novel analytical techniques [whilst]
origin of thought and locus of personal inviting people to empower themselves
identity ...? The Foucaultian answer ... is through the verbal confession of their
that ... such entities exist only in so far as thoughts, feelings and emotions, fashion
they are fabricated and sustained by the subjectivity itself as an object and relay
socio-medical sciences as objects of through which power is articulated in an
positive knowledge ... without psychology ever more anonymous and insidious format
to produce the subject there would be no (104).
notion of subjectivity ... the socio-medical
sciences do not find but invent the objects
To this we might offer the retort that there is
of their investigation, and therefore instead some tactical or instrumental use to be gained
of being appendages to power the socio- in recourse to such discourses or procedures,
medical sciences are in fact its very essence that they do offer, even if only momentarily, a
(Butchart, 1997, 102; emphasis added). different subject-position from which subject
may reassess their political existence within
Given that power is thus so intrinsically a part the world. Here it is also useful to carefully
of such disciplinary procedures, Foucault sees distinguish the aims and level of our political
little potential of meaningful escape, or depar- project. If this project is to be aware of, and try
tures from power within such terms, within and escape from, the insidious levels of a disci-
such forms of knowing and acting. In Foucault’s plinary ‘psychopolitics’ where we produce and
account, even the terms of the most seemingly police ourselves through practices of subjec-
liberationist psychology, are going to inevitably tivity, then a form of political awareness such
reinscribe procedures of subjectification and as Black Consciousness is perhaps not appro-
objectification, which ultimately link up to priate. If, on the other hand, we are concerned
greater programmes of power. What hence with combating a different order of power, say,
makes Foucault so radical, and at times so diffi- for example, that of discursive racism as imple-
cult for us to swallow, is his insistence that mented in institutional and psychological
freedom, empowerment and liberalism are
forms, then a strategy such as Black Conscious-

always double-edged, for they are ‘at once ness certainly does seem a well-suited form of
enhancing and at the same time a concealing resistance. Perhaps the overriding point here is
veil under which an ever more finely tuned that in different contexts different forms of
machinery of surveillance installs itself within political activity take precedence. Hence, while
and around everyone’ (107). Foucault hence not undervaluing the importance of Foucault’s
234
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 235

BOX 6 Foucault in South African psychology (continued)
trenchant critiques of disciplinary power, one and control them. What we need to be
might suggest that in certain environments the aware of here is the situation, characteristic
struggle against distinct forms of inequality for Butchart (1997) of liberationist South
(such as racism or sexism) may indeed take African sociomedical discourse, where
immediate priority over broader contestations objectives of ‘stripping away the veneers of
of disciplinary subjugation. interests, motives and ideologies mutates
into a machinery of production that
For all this, we should not lose Foucault’s sustains ... the corporeal and the social as
skepticism about forms of politics that take parts of an objectively [and disciplinary]
unqualified objectives of liberation, or given reality’ (106). More simply put, if
truth as their objective. For Foucault, the individuality, personal subjectivity and so
production of knowledge is never separable on are the fundamental creations of mecha-
from the production of power, just as the nisms of disciplinary power, then the more
various objects, identity, personality, we detail and substantiate them – even in
psychology etc of the sociomedical disci- attempts to free them – the more we risk
plines are never independent from the strengthening the grasp of power on
institutional forms of power that bring ourselves.
them into being and continue to monitor
sources (see, for example, Merquior (1985)) and that it cannot be considered a
well-balanced or realist work of history. There is some truth to these claims:
Foucault does appear to neglect a series of important historical documents and
events. One might argue, however, that the book attempts not to be an exhaus-
tive kind of history and is in fact almost intentionally perspectival in that its
foremost objective is to engender and develop criticism against forms of social
power.
Put differently, Foucault is not interested in history for history’s sake, but
in using it in critical ways to theorise insidious forms of modern power. McNay
(1994) therefore comments that a multiplicity of divergent phenomena are
subsumed under a totalising and essentially undifferentiated notion of disci-
plinary power:
the concept of power is generalized to such an extent that it loses analytic force
... [this] lack of differentiation ... results in a reductionist and functionalist
account of processes of social control (105).
Poulantzas (1987) takes up these critiques of reductionism by suggesting that
Foucault has posited a ‘metaphysical’ notion of power as the original source of
all forms of social control – a situation which means that Foucault ‘obviates a
more complex form of analysis which addresses the institutional specificity of
power and the forms of its spatial and temporal mediation in the state’ (in
McNay, 1994, 105). The point here is that without a textured, nuanced account
of a specific institutional site, one risks overstretching Foucault’s concept of
disciplinarity. These are important comments, warning of the need precisely
235
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 236
Critical Psychology
(and critically) to apply Foucault’s concepts to specific and individual contexts

rather than using his work as a meta-theory of power.
McNay (1994) extends her critique above by suggesting that a general
(disciplinary) paradigm of power risks slippage from a positive to an essen-
tially dominatory model of power. Certainly, McNay (1994) would seem to
have a point here – how much of a positive view of power do we have when rela-
tions of control seem so easily understood as unavoidable systems of
ubiquitous coercion and unmitigated domination? Foucault may himself be
accused of implicitly falling back onto a negative notion of power simply by
(apparently) overestimating the reach and effects of disciplinary power. One
may argue that to emphasise the breadth and extent of modern power may not
seem to militate against maintaining a positive conception of this power. On
the other hand, however – and, as Foucault’s later work (1979, 1986, 1988a,
1988b, 1988c, 1990, 1997) goes on to show – the complex forms of freedom
and individual empowerment increasingly generated by modern society are
both regulatory and constitutive of reflexive and autonomous modes of
identity. In this later work Foucault does, additionally, offer a series of different
conceptualisations of power, so as to limit and qualify the application of the
disciplinary model better.
CONCLUSION
Sticking to a close reading of Foucault’s (1977) account of the emergence of
modern disciplinary power, this chapter traced the pre-history of psychology
as a human science discipline through the themes of humanist reform: objecti-
fication, individualisation, humanification and the mind or soul. This
pre-history was then extended through the examination of the disciplinary
themes of visibility and surveillance, secrecy and autonomy, the return to the
body, knowledge-production and the technologies of normalisation and
confession. On the basis of this reading, the discipline of psychology is, for
Foucault, unavoidably, a constituent component of greater overarching forms
of disciplinary power that it supports and extends. Indeed, the extension of
Foucault’s argument is that the ongoing development of psychological forms of
practice, technique and knowledge continue to contribute to the increasingly
sophisticated regulation of individual subjects. Foucault’s analysis of the
human sciences as complex forms of power hence furthers the agendas of
critical psychology by showing how psychology is powerful in three particular

ways: (1) as a form of knowledge which objectifies; (2) as a form of practice
which disciplines, and (3) as a form of self-awareness and/or self-under-
standing that subjectifies.
Despite a series of important criticisms – perhaps most pertinently
regarding the overgeneralisation of the disciplinary theory, and its potential
236
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 237

slippages into a dominatory or negativist model – Foucault’s model of discipli-

nary power certainly makes for a powerful and cutting indictment of the
nature and objectives of much applied psychology. The historical contexts that
he has surfaced continue to play an invaluable role in unsettling commonplace
assumptions and understandings of the role and function of psychology in
society.

1. In the course of disciplinary power, problems of social control come to be
taken up in very depoliticised and individualised ways. Such methods seem
to be less about political control than about the orthopaedics of individ-
uals. Explain how this occurs, giving actual examples in your answer.
2. At the outset of this chapter it was suggested that psychology is powerful in
at least three particular ways. Describe each in detail, looking, where
possible, to illustrate your discussion with examples drawn from the South
African context. Also give some thought to describing what you take to be
the interrelationships between these powerful modes of psychology.
3. Foucault considers normalisation to be a key component in the working of
disciplinary power. Likewise, he emphasises the role of individualisation in
disciplinary power, that is, the role of forms of separation, differentiation
and individualised analysis. Explain these two concepts (normalisation
and individualisation) together, basing your explanation in an actual
example of a disciplinary institution such as a school, a prison, a hospital
or a clinic.
4. How do therapeutic forms of psychology typically manage to place their
clients in the role of self-examinatory, self-reflexive subjects, that is, how do
they come to encourage subjectifying forms of power in their subjects?
Suggested readings
Foucault’s (1977) Discipline and punish is the primary text regarding the
notion of disciplinary power. On the ‘down’ side, it is very dense, with multiple
elaborate formulations, and at times an almost poetic turn of phrase, all of
which can make it seem a little elusive at first. On the ‘up’ side, it bears many
rereadings, and seems to become increasingly insightful and powerful in its
analysis of power upon each subsequent read.
There are a number of useful commentaries of Foucault. Philip Barker’s

(1998) Michel Foucault: An introduction is particularly useful as an initial
‘entry point’ into Foucault’s work. Lois McNay’s (1994) Foucault: A critical
introduction, whilst slightly more concise and complex, focuses more than
most introductory texts on the later, post-Discipline and punish work. Dreyfus
& Rabinow’s (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics
237
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap09 11/2/04 10:17 am Page 238
Critical Psychology
is perhaps the advanced commentary of choice on Foucault. The text was one
of the first systematic overviews to be produced by US-American scholars; it
came out whilst Foucault was still alive, and has the recommendation of being
endorsed by Foucault himself, who also added an afterword.
Alex Butchart’s (1998) The anatomy of power: European constructions of
the African body is perhaps the best example of a Foucaultian genealogical
analysis carried out in the South African context.
238
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 239
Chapter
10
Governmentality
and technologies of
subjectivity
Derek Hook
‘... the state’s power ... is both an individualizing and a totalizing

form of power. Never ... in the history of human societies ... has there been
such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization
techniques, and of totalization procedures.’
Foucault (1982, 213)
‘The translation of the human psyche into the sphere of knowledge

and the ambit of technology makes it possible to govern subjectivity
according to norms and criteria that ground their authority in an
esoteric but objective knowledge.’
Rose (1991, 9)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explain the difference between micro- and macro-politics, and describe how the
two may be thought to function in conjunction
Explain Foucault’s notion of governmentality, along with the subsidiary concepts of
‘government’, ‘disciplinary bio-power’, ‘apparatuses of security’, the ‘police’,
pastoral power and the ‘psy-complex’

Understand what might be said to be a ‘technology’ of subjectivity and/or self; and
explain how such notions suggest a profoundly political dimension to subjectivity
Elaborate upon the particular role psychology plays in political technologies of
subjectivity and self.
239
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 240
Critical Psychology
INTRODUCTION
How subjectivity is political
One of the conceptual challenges of critical psychology lies in thinking how
subjectivity itself may be thought to have a profoundly political dimension. One
response to this challenge lies in the Marxist assertion (see Grahame Hayes’
earlier chapter: Marxism and critical psychology) that our selves are little more
than ensembles of social relations. Here we are presented quite starkly with the
materialist suggestion that structures and relations of power are at the basis of
our own individual experience. Foucault also rises to this challenge with his
argument, explained in the previous chapter, that power adopts subjective
forms. Foucault suggests that power is internalised in self-monitoring, self-
knowing ways, that it has come to be implemented and applied exactly through
the production of subjectivity. Hence, what we are – at least in the sense of
being subjective individuals – is very difficult to separate out from the effects
that power has had upon us. This is a difficult assertion to grasp. Why? Well, we
typically understand our subjectivities – that is, the sense of our own individu-
ality, our own self-understandings – as independent of structures of power, as
existing before them, and outside their reach. We tend to see such aspects of
ourselves as the basis of our own independence and autonomy, as perhaps our
most vital points of resistance to the workings of power. Foucault’s rather
sobering response is that such cherished notions of individuality, of subjec-
tivity, may themselves already be the outcomes, the object-effects of power.
Power may, in a sense, make our subjectivity; it may, in Foucault’s terms,
produce us and our individuality at the same time that it works upon us. More
than this, the illusion of autonomy from such structures, which is fundamental
to the vast majority of psychology, is enabling to power. It is perhaps the alibi
which best conceals and facilitates the functioning of modern power, a form of
power which, for Foucault, must take psychological or subjective forms if it is
to function efficiently or effectively. This is one of the points where psychology
is at its most ideological, when it depoliticises the realm of human experience,
when it cuts off questions of social, political, economic and historical power
from questions of who and what we are. Foucault’s notion of governmentality
goes some way to redressing this problem in that it attaches questions of
macro-power, that is, notions of the state and the control of populations, on
the one hand, to questions of micro-power, that is, notions of subjectified indi-
viduals who adopt technologies of subjectivity and of self to model their own
conduct, on the other.
Psychology and the supply of political subjectivities

The challenge of critical psychology lies not only in understanding how subjec-
tivity itself is political but also in understanding psychology’s special role in
240
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 241
Governmentality and technologies of subjectivity

this process. We need to understand how psychology supplies us with types of Government:
subjectivity that are operational in the extension and implementation of any calculated direc-
power. Here we confront another assertion that is difficult to grasp. Not only tion of human
do we intuitively think of our own psychologies as ‘coming before’ power, as conduct. More
broadly, the general
existing beyond it; we also understand the practice and knowledge of regulation of conduct
psychology as benevolent. We view the knowledges and practices of as understood across
psychology as out to help us, to improve our lives, to somehow remove, cure macro- and micro-
or combat forms of psychological discomfort, ailment, maladaption etc. The political levels, that
is, as spreading from
irony here, for Foucault, is that psychology does play a role in this way, it does
questions of the
intervene in very personal ways into our lives, towards the ends of some or regulation and
other kind of betterment, change or improvement. However, that psychology control of the state
may be taken to be benevolent and helpful in these ways does not mean that it and that of far
smaller entities such
is not also a mode of control, that it does not also operate a formidable form
as the family,
of ‘ggovernment’ over us. This is the paradox that we need to grasp if we are to workers, or the self.
understand the full functioning of psychology in power. If we remember that Put differently: a
for Foucault modern power is productive, encouraging, helpful, therapeutic way of acting upon
even, then this paradox becomes easier to appreciate. Indeed, if we under- the lives and
conduct of subjects,
stand his point, we become aware that there is no paradox here at all: power of shaping them in
does, in a sense, ‘make us a better’, does improve us, for these are exactly the desired ways,
routes it takes ever more fully to permeate our lives. Foucault’s notions of through the use of
‘technologies’ of subjectivity and of self, his ideas concerning the psychological various techniques
and devices. Govern-
management or, better still, government of selves, provides a way of under- ment has a
standing this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs. This explanation, population as its
particularly as it is extended by Nikolas Rose (1985, 1991, 1995), suggests that target and involves
the practice of psychology is not only a way of understanding, of making sense kinds of self-govern-
ment as part of its
of our selves; it is also a means of ordering, regulating or controlling ourselves. operations.
Not only is psychology a discipline, it is also a kind of self-discipline, as I shall
go on to show.
The twin challenges of this chapter, first, the ‘thinking’ of how subjectivity
is political, and, secondly, an understanding of how psychology implements
modes of self-regulation, secondly, will be accommodated in two basic theo-
retical formulations: the notions of governmentality and technologies of
subjectivity/self. The basic sections of this chapter will correspond to these
two linked areas of theory. As will become clear in the ensuing discussion, tech-
nologies of subjectivity and self are crucial aspects of what Foucault calls
‘governmentality’.
THE NOTION OF GOVERNMENTALITY

The ‘arts of government’
Foucault’s (1979, 1982, 1988a, 1988b,1988d) work on governmentality stems
from his study of a series of key texts in 16th-century political theory. The
241
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 242
Critical Psychology
Sovereignty:
central challenge that Foucault had set for himself was that of adequately
in general, the conceptualising ‘the powers of state’ without deferring simply to the tradi-
notion refers to tional terms of sovereignty. Foucault’s work on governmentality constituted
supremacy of his most significant attempt to flesh out the ‘middle order’ in his account of
authority or rule.
More directly, an
power, to connect, as Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) note, a disciplinary focus on
order of power in subjected individuals with that on the anonymous mechanisms of broader
which a sovereign – levels of power, and to do so via a tentative reassertion of limited kinds of
king or queen – has sovereignty.
absolute authority.
Sovereignty may be
considered to be
Limited conceptualisations of ‘government’
homogenous, given One of the first misconceptions that Foucault (1979) hopes to clear up in his
that virtually all theory of governmentality is the idea that questions of government are
instances of power
repeat and extend
predominantly, if not exclusively, questions of the macro-politics of the state.
the will of the There are, rather, Foucault (1979) claims, multiple ‘lower-order’ categories of
sovereign. government; one may reasonably speak of the government of the family, of the
workplace, of one’s relationship to one’s self, and so on. Government here,
following Dean (1999), refers to any calculated direction of human conduct.
Rose adds to this definition. Government, he claims, is a way of acting upon
the lives and conduct of subjects, of shaping them in desired ways, through the
use of various techniques and devices (Rose, 1990). Importantly, then, ques-
tions of government include a focus on the smaller micro-politics of day-to-day
life in addition to macro-political issues. Using the notion of government in
this way ‘gives particular emphasis to issues of the government of human
Macro-/micro-
politics:
conduct in all contexts, by various authorities and agencies, invoking partic-
‘macro-politics’ ular forms of truth, and using definite resources, means and techniques’
refers to large struc- (Dean, 1999, 2; emphasis added).
tures of social Foucault (1979) thus loosens up our notion of government, suggesting that
power, to the state,
there are multiple and variable modes of government that may actually be
its policies, the
structural conditions dissociated from the large-scale macro-political government of the state.
of day-to-day life Importantly, though, despite the fact that such micro-political forms of
(eg apartheid). government may be immanently separable from macro-political forms of
‘Micro-politics’ refers government, these two typically work together, in conjunction, in combina-
to the functioning
of power at indi-
tion. Such combinations are difficult to predict, and should not be understood
vidual or inter- as planned or predetermined. They do not connect in any simple, one-to-one
personal levels (eg or linear way. In fact, such combinations often seem to work in discontinuous
between two or indirect ways. However, and this is the vital point, the micro-politics of
people) or that one
government nonetheless typically work to support and extend the overarching

has over oneself.
agendas of macro-power. Here it starts to become possible to point to what
governmentality might mean, namely the overarching rationality behind the
use of multiple forms of government; an awareness of how the conjoined
effects of lower-order (micro-political) forms of government work to support
the broadest agendas of the state.
242
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 243

The macro- and micro-politics of apartheid

Governmentality:
An example is helpful here. The macro-politics of apartheid, as a state- overarching
legislated system, implemented racism at a formal and institutional level. It did rationality behind
the use of multiple
not, however, legislate or order that whites must be racist in the micro-politics forms of
of their interpersonal dealings with blacks (although it may certainly be said to government; an
have encouraged this). None the less racism was, and still is, powerfully perpet- awareness of how
uated on just such micro-political levels. Indeed, the micro-level functioning of the conjoined
effects of lower-
racism might be seen to be one of the reasons that apartheid lasted as long as it
order forms of
did. The personal racism of the individual racist was not ‘patrolled’, strictly government support
enforced or regulated by the apartheid government. Nevertheless, such forms the broadest
of racism functioned, almost without fail – and at even the smallest levels of agendas of the
state.
interpersonal contact – to extend and support the structural racism of the state.
In Foucault’s terms, the micro-functioning of something like racism is ulti-
mately absolutely integral to sustaining broader, macro-level structures of
racist state power. Indeed, one might argue that it is easier to remove the latter
than the former. In this example we can see how macro- and micro-levels of
power may be seen as working together, in conjunction, in combination, each
extending and supporting the other, without being carefully correlated,
without their relationship being strictly codified. It is exactly the conjoined
effects of such multiple lower-order ‘governments’ to the general benefit of the
high-order government of the state, which Foucault is trying to conceptualise.
In fact, it is exactly this relationship, of how the conjoined effects of lower-order
governments work to support the overarching agendas of the state, that may be
offered as the definition of the notion of governmentality.
The ‘arts of government’ versus sovereign notions of power

In many Western 16th-century political texts the ‘arts of government’ came to
be considered in relation to a wide range of issues, from educational questions
on the government of children, via the government of individual souls and
lives, to questions of the monarch’s government of the state, to even issues
pertaining to the government of one’s self. In an ‘arts of government’, then,
power is diffused broadly among multiple micro-level institutions and sites of
social exchange. Power is not so homogenous here; not reducible to a single
figure, namely that of the sovereign. Indeed, rather than the case in sover-
eignty, where virtually all instances of power repeat and extend the sovereign’s
will, the state of government is characterised by a diverse and immanent
network of practices of government which criss-cross state and society. These

practices have very different levels of application, and very different forms, this
is why one speaks of an ‘arts of government’. As Foucault (1979) puts it:
practices of government are, on the one hand, so varied that they involve a great
number of people: the head of the family, the superior in the convent, the teacher
243
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 244
Critical Psychology
or tutor in relation to the child or the pupil, so that there are several forms of
government among which the Prince’s relation to his state is only one particular
mode; and on the other hand, all these governments are internal to the states of
society (9).
What we start to find in an ‘arts of government’, argues Foucault (1979), is a
continuity between various levels and types of power which may often seem
totally autonomous.
This continuity works both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’, ‘upwards’ in the
sense that the person who governs must first learn how to govern himelf or
herself correctly, and ‘downwards’ in the sense that the head of a family will
know how to look after his family, and in the sense that individuals, in general,
under the sociopolitical power of the state, will behave correctly (McNay, 1994).
We have a wider domain of power in an ‘arts of government’ – a wider collection
of different orders and types of power than we previously did in a state of sover-
eignty. Power is much more flexible now, works in many ways and at many
different levels, and focuses on many more objects than was the case in the oper-
Heterogenous: ation of sovereign power. Governmental activity is heterogenous, pervasive and
made up of multiple multiple, coming to apply, as Dean (1999) notes, to a complex of people and
dissimilar elements
things. It is no longer a case simply of the sovereign’s possessions, his territory,
or parts – not
homogeneous. that concern power, from this point on, there are innumerable objects, relations
and capacities that come to bear the vested interests of governmental power. To
reiterate, in speaking of the ‘arts of government’, we are talking about prolifer-
ating and multitudinous kinds of prospective government, which would come
to fall within the ambit of something far larger, a potentially organising prin-
ciple that we might term precisely as ‘governmentality’.
Serving the people

In opposition to the self-justifying notion of sovereignty, the ends of govern-
ment rest in something beyond itself, in what Foucault (1979) refers to as the
disposal of things in the most correct and efficient manner. In the case of
government it is not simply a matter of maintaining the authority of an
unquestionable, final and categorical law – as in the case in Sovereignty – it is
rather a question of disposing things and people always towards their most
profitable and productive outcomes. The logic of government is that of the
ever-changing, and ever-tactical, orientation of people and things towards
their greatest potential productivity.

The governor, or the ruler of state, now takes as their goal the welfare of the
population. The ends of government now lie not simply in ruling itself, or in
increasing the sovereignty of the ruler, but in improving the condition of the
population, in increasing its wealth, its longevity, its health as a whole
(Foucault, 1979). The powers of the governor stem from their mandate to serve
244
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 245

the people. Rather than wielding power through the threat of punishment and Population:
recrimination, the governor now wields power predominantly through their notion of the sum
assumed responsibility to advance and improve the standard, quality and total of people
longevity of their subjects’ lives (McNay, 1994). Modern power works to inhabiting a specific
area. Foucault
organise, incite, monitor, optimise, reinforce, control and organise the forces claims that the
within its domain. Power is now bent on generating forces, making them grow, concept emerged in
on ordering them; this is a power which ‘exerts a positive influence on life ... 16th-century Europe
endeavours to administer, optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise as a focus of
governmental atten-
controls and comprehensible regulations’ (Foucault, 1980b, 137).
tion, as a means of
conceptualising a
The emergence of populations body of people that
needed to be regu-
It was no longer the case, then, that the rationales and ordering principles of
lated and control-
the sovereign or state could be defined through reference to the betterment or led. Populations
improvement of the sovereign or the state itself, as it had been in eras of sover- were believed to
eignty. The rationales of government now had to take root through the possess their own
regularities, effects,
promise to manage and develop effectively the social body of the state’s popu-
defining characteris-
lation. This notion, of a population, came to be increasingly central in late tics, habits and
16th-century writings on government. This new construct emerged as a focus tendencies.
of governmental attention, as a means of conceptualising a body of people that
needed to be regulated and controlled. Indeed, for Foucault (1990), the target
of the power of government is its population. As such the subject of population
came to represent a growing body of knowledge and came to be seen as
possessing both its own regularities (its own rate of death and diseases, and so
on) and its own intrinsic and aggregate effects (Foucault, 1979). It therefore
became possible to speak of the defining characteristics, habits, activities and
tendencies of ‘a population’. To measure, predict and monitor the population
in all its different dimensions, facets and peculiarities became an absolute
imperative of governance. It is in this way – and here we see the first conspic-
uous suggestion of the role of disciplinary power – that the forms of knowledge Disciplinary power:
and the techniques of the human and social sciences (as discussed in the modern form of
power which
previous chapter) – started to became integral to practices of government.
functions at the
‘capillary’ level of
Disciplinary bio-power individuals,
increasing their
Not only was there great change in how the responsibilities of government docility, optimising
were being conceptualised, there was also a fundamental shift in the way their capabilities,
power came to work. The great technologies of power in Western modernity, and integrating
them, by self-
claims Foucault (1979), came, around the 18th century, to adopt a radically regulating
new logic and to take on new forms implementation. What was once a ‘power subjectivity, into
of death’ – the sovereign’s right to take away the life of his or her subjects – now systems of efficient
become a ‘power of life’, the state’s responsibility to care for, to cultivate and and economic
control.
even enhance, the life of its citizens. We should be careful not to be too glib in
245
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 246
Critical Psychology
The great BOX 1 Government, population and psychological sciences

technologies of
power in Western Prioritising the notion of population helps us to understand better the idea of
modernity, claims government. The powers of a government are always focused on exactly this, its
Foucault (1979), population. As Rose (1990) explains:
came, around the
18th century, to Government entails ways of thinking about the population, ways of rendering
adopt a new logic, it the object of political discourse and calculation. It requires ways of
and a new form of knowing the population, instituting a vast enterprise of enquiry into its state
implementation. and condition. And it demands the bringing into being of the mechanisms
What was once a which can enable those in authority to act upon the lives and conducts of
‘power of death’ – subjects (105).
the sovereign’s right
It is for this reason, argues Rose (1990), that government opened a space in
to punish subjects
which psychological sciences would come to play a key role, ‘[f]or these
or take away life
sciences are intrinsically tied to programmes which, in order to govern subjects,
now become a
have found that they need to know them’ (105).
‘power of life’: the
state’s duty to care
for, to cultivate and
even enhance, the understanding the importance of this transformation. Instead of subjects of
life of its citizens. the sovereign, we now have citizens of the state; rather than a right to possess
and/or kill, we now have the responsibility to serve, an obligation to optimise
the health and well-being of the population. What we also start to observe is a
change in the logic of loyalty: it is no longer simply the case that subjects owe
their lives to the sovereign. The state and, more to the point, its particular
government, now owes its existence – and hence its loyalty – to the people.
Bio-power/ ‘The power of life’

bio-politics:
generic term that Perhaps what is most difficult in comprehending this transformation in how
Foucault uses to power came to work lies in understanding a ‘power of life’ rather than a ‘power
refer to the diverse of death’. Foucault refers to this power as bio-power. It is important that we
methods of power
and knowledge that,
understand what is meant by this notion of bio-power, and that we grasp the
in Western breadth of what is included within the scope of the bio-political. Foucault’s
modernity, have notion of bio-power refers to all those methods of power and knowledge that
taken responsibility have taken responsibility for the control and modification of life-processes in
for the control and
Western modernity. As Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) assert, bio-power is the
modification of life-
processes. By bio- name Foucault gives to the increased ordering of all realms under the guise of
politics Foucault improving the welfare of the individual and the population. Reiterating this
refers to the parti- point, McNay (1994) talks of bio-politics as the calculated management of the
cular means,
population, as required by governmental power. The domain of bio-politics

mechanisms and
devices deployed as here includes all processes of life – in the sense of the vital biological processes
part of an exhaus- of propagation, birth, mortality, disease, life expectancy and so on – all of these
tive, large-scale processes came increasingly – and ever more inseparably – to fall under the
‘administrating supervisory and regulatory controls of the state. This theme of bio-power, that
of life’.
is, the theme of the exhaustive and large-scale ‘administrating of life’, is one
246
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 247

that Foucault had cautiously touched on in his earlier descriptions of discipli-

nary power. The idea of bio-power in fact extends and broadens the
description of disciplinary power, so much so that Foucault will ultimately
come to speak of ‘disciplinary bio-power’.
Life as a political object

It is easy to gloss over the profundity of Foucault’s point in his explanation of
bio-power. So thoroughly have contemporary methods of power and knowl-
edge assumed responsibility for the control and modification of life-processes
of modern populations, he claims (1980b), that, for the first time in history,
biological existence is reflected in political existence. The most pressing
concern voiced here is the critical notion that our political existence is insepa-
rably attached to our vital biological functions as both individuals and
members of the ‘species body’ of a population. Put more simply, there is no
question of the body, its health, its wellness, no question of biology, disease or
physical well-being, that is not also a political issue. All of these concerns
become focal points for power, primary co-ordinates through which it is
enforced and implemented.
Biology and power, for Foucault, in short, have become inseparable. And
more than this: life and power themselves have become inseparable – it is
exactly through the regulation of life and life-processes that power exercises its
influence, that it guarantees its hold upon us. Biology and power,
It is power’s increased preoccupation with all the process of life that has so for Foucault, have
become inseparable.
massively ‘widened its jurisdiction’, so to speak, that has resulted in its satura- Life and power have
tion of all aspects of everyday existence. It is this factor which, likewise, has so themselves become
dramatically extended the ‘interventionist warrants’, the spread of different inseparable – it is
disciplinary techniques and apparatuses of power. Similarly, this ‘taking charge through the
regulation of life
of life’ has meant that power has been able, with remarkable success, to possess and life-processes
and manoeuvre the discourse of ‘rights’ as the basis of its own legitimacy: that power exercises
its influence, that it
It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles ... The
guarantees its hold
‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, upon us.
and beyond all the oppressions or ‘alienations,’ the ‘right’ to rediscover what one
is and all that one can be, this ‘right’ ... was the political response to ... [the] ...
new procedures of power (Foucault, 1980b, 145).
Matrix:
grounding basis of
Technical matrices of normalisation rules, concepts,

ideas or formulas
The success of the bio-political spreading of power is in part due to the ‘tech-
from which
nical matrix’ it establishes. As Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) put it: something else may
Bio-power spreads under the banner of making people healthy and protecting be developed, but
that remains
them. When there was resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was
contained within.
construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of
247
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 248
Critical Psychology
the experts. A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to

be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established,
the spread of bio-power was assured, for there was nothing else to appeal to;
any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely tech-
nical problems. We are promised normalization and happiness through
science and the law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of the
same (196).
The law as norm

A series of important parallels between disciplinary and bio-political power
are in evidence here. Among these is an interest in technical and technological
means of implementation, the recourse to humanitarian discourse and, of
course, a preoccupation with normalisation. In fact, these are not so much
parallels as continuities, given that Foucault will eventually (1997) come to
speak of ‘disciplinary bio-power’ as a singular, although diversely realised,
Apparatuses: ‘system’ of power. Important also here is the point Foucault makes about the
essential technical normalisation of bio-power. Whereas his earlier work (1977) had seen normal-
means of govern- isation as an outcome of disciplinary mechanisms of power, he now argues that
mentality. Foucault ‘[a] normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power
here intends the
loose coordination centred on life’ (1980b, 144), hence suggesting that normalisation is an
of various means outcome of the far wider and more encompassing regime of bio-power. Impor-
through which the tantly, the ascendancy of normalisation does not mean
principles and power
of government come that the law fades into the background, or that the institutions of justice tend to
to be applied. More disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that
specifically, appara- the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of appara-
tuses are tuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part
heterogenous regulatory (Foucault, 1980b, 144).
ensembles of
discourses, institu-
tions ... regulatory A proliferation of semi-autonomous technologies and controls
decisions, laws,
administrative As is suggested above, the expanse and diversity of this challenge of regulating
measures, scientific and administering human ‘life’, in the broadest possible sense, meant that a
statements, philo- successful regime of government would have to rely on a range of different and
sophical, moral and
philanthropic propo-
semi-autonomous techniques and apparatuses. This range of techniques – or,
sitions etc. more accurately perhaps, technologies – and apparatuses, whilst not strictly
Apparatuses may be synchronised or networked, would nevertheless work together in a comple-
understood as the mentary or mutually coherent way. Again, as in attempting to conceptualise

‘go-betweens’ that
join together micro-
the interchange between micro- and macro-forms of power, Foucault is
and macro- func- suggesting that we be aware of how such multiple forms of the administering
tionings of power – life work as a network of diverse elements. What he has in mind here is a web
the broader political of disciplinary and governmental effects made up of seemingly discrete
‘logics’ of the state.
components that none the less work in conjunction, in a joint and
248
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 249

complementary way without necessarily being arranged in any systematic or

intentionally orchestrated manner.
Again the example of apartheid is useful here. The full impact of apartheid
is grasped not simply through a listing of official governmental policies, by
cataloguing its ideological commitments and their various institutional mani-
festations. The full effects of apartheid – although obviously impossible
actually to quantify – would need to be grasped through the great network of
various racisms, through an infinitely complex web made up of macro- and
micro-forms of racism, and maintained by the combined effects of racism
implemented across multiple institutional, individual and interpersonal levels.
What Foucault comes to call governmentality is exactly an awareness of how
power works in this way, of how power manifests at various multiple levels of
implementation, which flows down from larger structures just as much as it
flows up, from minute interactions and transactions of seemingly mundane
daily life. What the concept of governmentality helps us to understand is not
just the combination between these forms of power, but the fact that these
directions, or levels of power, may be seen as reciprocally interrelated and in
fact mutually dependent.
Zapiro’s suggestion
that all whites
benefited from
apartheid is a way
of reminding us
that the full effects
of apartheid cannot
be grasped merely
by listing official
apartheid
government policies
or by cataloguing
its institutional
manifestations.
Disciplinary measures as the instruments of bio-power

This conceptualisation of power as coming both from the top down, and from
the bottom up makes for a useful way of understanding the intersection, in
practice, of bio-power and disciplinary power (although, as mentioned above,
bio-power is the larger concept that comes to subsume disciplinary power, so
249
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 250
Critical Psychology
Disciplinary
that we may speak of the overriding category of ‘disciplinary bio-power’).
bio-power: Disciplinary power, as we have already seen (in the previous chapter), func-
Foucault’s overriding tioned at the ‘capillary’ (‘bottom-up’) level of individuals, increasing their
category of modern general docility, optimising their capabilities, and integrating them, via the
power, the combined
effects of bio-
route of a self-regulating subjectivity, into systems of efficient and economic
politics and control. Bio-power, coming from ‘the top down’ focused primarily on regu-
disciplinary power, lating the ‘species body’ in all its vicissitudes, and by gathering, as Dreyfus &
the concept that Rabinow (1982) note, a massive body of information on the resources, capaci-
links together the
ties and problems of the population, which was then subjected to multiple
political technolo-
gies of the body, the methods of investigation and analysis. In this way ‘disciplinary bio-power’
knowledge- ‘spread its net down to the smallest twitches of the body and the most minute
producing efforts of stirring of the soul’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Disciplinary bio-power thus is
the human and
the concept which links together the various political technologies of the body,
social sciences, and
the structures of the knowledge-producing efforts of the human and social sciences, and the
state domination. structures of state domination (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).
This conglomerate notion of ‘disciplinary bio-power’ hence usefully
enables Foucault to join ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ ‘flows’ of power, whilst
maintaining an emphasis on technical and tactical imperatives. Similarly, it
posits the importance, within governmental regimes, of a multiplicity of
diverse and multi-modal forms of social control working in a state of
‘unorchestrated synchronicity’. What it still requires, however, is the provi-
sion of something of a pivot, something of a relay, or a ‘go-between’,
connecting these micro- and macro-‘physics’ of the functioning of power.
Foucault provides just this with his discussion of what he calls the ‘appara-
tuses of security’.
Zapiro’s biting
commentary on the
South African
government’s Aids
policy shows how
modern govern-
mental power is
very much bio-
political in form in
that it takes on the
responsibility of its
population’s
biological processes
of propagation,
birth, mortality,
disease, life
expectancy etc.
250
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 251

‘Apparatuses of security’
Apparatuses as ensembles
The apparatus, claims Foucault (1990), is the essential technical means of
governmentality. As McNay (1994) notes, Foucault (1990) uses the designa-
tion ‘apparatuses of security’ to describe the various semi-autonomous
techniques of government necessary for the regulation of the modern state. As
Foucault himself (1980a) elaborates, apparatuses are ‘thoroughly heteroge-
nous ensemble[s] consisting of discourses, institutions ... regulatory decisions, Ensemble:
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and group of
complementary
philanthropic propositions’ (194). In more basic terms, what Foucault has in parts that work
mind here is the loose co-ordination of various ways and means through which together to produce
the principles and power of government come to be applied. It is important a single overriding
here that he uses the notion of an ensemble – that is, a group of diverse yet effect, such as a
group of supporting
complementary parts that all contribute to a single or overriding effect. Each
musicians, dancers
aspect of an ensemble is quite different, they may each have very different or actors who
chores, or roles, and may be played by quite different types of people or things; perform together.
however, each such aspect is an important component part that plays an active
role and retains a kind of autonomy.
Regularity across different functions

If we are to grasp the effective functioning of power, of governmentality, for
Foucault, we need to apply just such a model (of the ensemble), to be aware of
how very different types of thing, such as values, common sense and profes-
sional knowledge, how popular discourse, recurring or dominant kinds of
representation, even popular philosophical notions or ideas and so on, come
to join up with actual rules and laws, with actual kinds of practice, or prohibi-
tion, to form broad patterns of power across different levels of society. Foucault
has in mind here a kind of regularity across the functions of different compo-
nent parts of an ensemble or apparatus. The notion of governmentality tries to
do this, to suggest, by way of the idea of apparatuses, a kind of patterning of
relations of power across all levels of society.
The rationality of power

Before moving on to an example of such an apparatus, it is important that one
further qualification be made. In his work on apparatuses, Foucault is less
intent on analysing, per se, the different institutions and mechanisms of state
power than he is in ‘getting a hold’ on the specific type of political rationality
that the state has produced in these ancillary apparatuses (cf Foucault, 1990).
To reiterate, Foucault is less interested here in the concrete physical conditions
and/or instruments of power than he is in the broad patterns that might be
seen as holding all these the diverse values, instruments, practices, discourses
251
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 252
Critical Psychology
Technologies:
and materials of power together. This attention to the political rationalities of
broadly, the the state is absolutely crucial for Foucault; for he will go on to argue that the
concrete government of persons – whether of small or very large groups – will always
instruments and involve, quite indispensably, the elements of state rationality.
mechanisms of
institutional
It is useful here to draw a distinction, within Foucault’s own theoretical
applications of vocabulary, between ‘apparatuses’ and ‘ttechnologies’ of power. The latter, as a
power. More category of analysis, is strongly focused on exactly the minutia of the concrete
specifically, a set of instrumentation and mechanisation of institutional applications of power: the
tactics, knowledges,
former is far more concerned with the broader political ‘logics’ of the state. It
techniques,
procedures and is important to note that focusing, in this way, on the patterning of relations of
discourses (or power, on the rationality of power, enables Foucault to explain better – and for
technical forms of that matter, to gauge better – the spread of power, its existence and ‘rooted-
language) used by
ness’ across social networks.
select experts or
professionals as part
of a stated The ‘police’
objective of
increasing relations The first general apparatus, or ‘rationality of state’, that Foucault discusses is
of control. that of the ‘police’. This may seem unsurprising in the sense that such an appa-
ratus would be absolutely central in terms of the implementation of a successful
regime of government; what is surprising, however, is the unusual historical
inflection Foucault gives the term. Importantly, Foucault is not speaking merely
of the institutionalised office of the police as we commonly understand the
term – that is, those civil servants whose specific job it is to prevent and investi-
Police: gate crime. He speaking about ‘ppolice’ in the sense of a utopian governmental
Foucault uses the project – as present in the work of French and German political thinkers of the
term as it was
17th and 18th centuries – as a set of administrative concerns over people and
originally used in
the work of French things, over the relationships between (in the broadest sense) men, property,
and German produce, exchange, territory and the market (Foucault, 1990).
political thinkers of
the 17th and 18th
centuries, that is,
‘To protect and serve’
in the sense of a This particular notion of the police was very broad, encompassing, amongst
utopian government other things, the maintenance of religion, the upkeep of morals, health, public
project, as a set of
broad adminis-
safety and amenities, trade and so on. Everything, in short, with a bearing on
trative concerns how people lived, and with a bearing on the problems, diseases and accidents
over people and that befell them, lay within the scope of police concerns – anything, that is, that
things, over the could be grouped under the broadest interpretation of the state’s mandate to
relationships
between men,
‘protect and serve’ its people. Perhaps the most obvious contemporary equiva-
property, produce, lent to this notion would be the portfolios given to the various members of a
exchange, territory state’s parliament. This would seem an apt comparison, given that Foucault
and the market. (1990) claims that the ‘true object’ of the police at this time was ‘man’ [sic] in
all his or her capacities and concern not only over how she or he might survive,
but over how she or he might be improved, expanded and developed.
252
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 253

Another way of understanding this notion of the police is given by Dreyfus ‘The vocabularies of
& Rabinow (1982) when they point out that the job of the police was the artic- psychology have ...
ulation and administration of techniques of bio-power so as to increase the provided the terms
state’s control over its inhabitants. Perhaps what is most striking about this which enable human
subjectivity to be
account is the degree to which the police were understood as adopting translated into the
undoubtably positive functions within society, such as fostering working and new languages of
trading relationships between persons, encouraging ‘modesty, charity, loyalty, government ... they
industriousness ... honesty’ amongst the citizens of a nation (Foucault, 1990, have constituted
subjectivity as a
77–78). The police, understood in this way, was not simply an altruistic insti-
possible object for
tution. No doubt a prime objective of the police was to keep the population rational management
healthy and happy and to improve the quality of life wherever possible, but ... They make it
this was all in order to serve a higher priority, that of enabling the state to possible to think of
achieving desired
increase its collective power, to exert its strength in full. This is the central
objectives – through
paradox underlying the notion of the police which Foucault outlines when he the systematic
defines the aim of modern government, or state rationality, namely to ‘develop government of the
those elements constitutive of individual’s lives in such a way that their devel- psychological domain’
opment also fosters that of the state’ (1990, 82). (Rose, 1990, 106).
BOX 2 Psychology as a mode of government
Government depends upon knowledge, Rose which enabled human subjectivity to be

(1990) reminds us, on a positive knowledge of translated into the new languages of
its population and, more than that, a way of government of schools, prisons, factories,
rendering this population, and the inner lives the labour market and the economy.
of its individuals, into thought ‘so that it can Secondly, they [made] subjectivity and
be analysed, evaluated, its ills diagnosed and intersubjectivity ... themselves possible
its remedies prescribed’ (105). Psychology plays objects for rational management, in ...
a key role here, both in the development of speaking of intelligence, development,
mental [abilities] ... family relations and
languages able to describe the objects of
group dynamics and the like. They made it
government (its population and, more directly,
possible to think of achieving desired
the inner lives of its individual members) and,
objectives – contentment, productivity,
in acting upon them, curing them. Rose’s
sanity, intellectual ability – through the
(1990) description further expands one’s grasp systematic government of the psychological
of the notion of government. All of the many domain (106).
domains of government come to be realised, or
brought into existence, through the languages The best way of grasping Rose’s point here is to
that represent them, through the calculations, think of the role that psychologists play in
measurements and techniques that these schools, the workplace, prisons and so on. In
languages make conceivable. Psychology is just helping to maximise the abilities of ‘problem-
one such language of government for Rose atic’ subjects, to make them more productive
(1990): members of the given organisation, psycholo-
gists are playing a kind of ‘police’ role (in
The vocabularies of the psychological Foucault’s understanding of the term). They are
sciences have made two distinct ... contri-
exercising, through psychology, a kind of
butions to social powers over the last
language and practice that can access the inner
century. Firstly, they provided the terms
253
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 254
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 Psychology as a mode of government (continued)
world of the individual, measure and assess it in the invention of diagnostic categories,
relative to a norm (typically through various evaluations, assessments, and tests that
psychological tests), and then treat it. This constructed the subject in a form in which
then is the policing function of psychologists it could be represented in classifications.
for Rose (1990). The power of psychology, he The psychological test was the first device
writes ... Psychology began to claim a capacity
not only to individualise, but also to advise
lay in its promise to provide inscription upon all facets of institutional life, to
devices that would individualise ... trouble- increase efficiency and satisfaction, produc-
some subjects, rendering the human form tivity and contentment (109–110).
into calculable traces. Its contribution lay
Pastoral power/
Pastoral power
pastorate/pastor: A second apparatus of power named by Foucault is that of the pastorate. This
salvation-based notion of the pastorate, or pastoral power, is one that fascinates Foucault,
form of power,
centred on the role
perhaps predominantly because it designates so unique a form of power, one
of a moral or so historically idiosyncratic. The pastor is not a magistrate, nor a prophet, nor
spiritual guardian of an educationalist, nor a sovereign, nor a benefactor, says Foucault (1980b),
sorts (the pastor) even though the influence he or she wields over his or her followers contains
whose charge is to
provide an
elements of all of these leadership roles. Why? Well, at its most basic, the
‘individually kindly’ pastor’s role is that of a spiritual overseer. The model for this kind of guardian-
power, to act as an ship is that of the shepherd in charge of a flock. This charge has several basic
intermediary of a constituents. First, the shepherd’s role is to watch over his or her flock with
greater authority, to
scrupulous attention, to ensure their salvation through ‘constant, individual-
care for each
member of his or ized and final kindness’ (Foucault, 1990, 69). Pastorship is therefore a
her flock, and to salvation-based form of power; more than this, it is a kindly power, one predi-
know their ‘souls’ – cated on the provision of love (Foucault, 1990).
ie to have deep
Secondly, given that the shepherd is an intermediary of a greater power or
knowledge of their
personal life. knowledge – typically that of God – a kind of unquestionable authority comes to
characterise his or her leadership. Thirdly, the pastor is understood as bearing a
kind of responsibility or accountability for the flock. As reiterated by Dean
(1999), the pastor is bound by a particularly complex moral tie to each member
of the flock. The pastor also maintains the charge of properly knowing each
member. This is an in-depth and individualising knowledge that runs deep; the
shepherd needs to know of the needs and deeds, the sins and wishes, the
contents of the soul, of each member of the flock. As Foucault (1982) explains:
‘this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s
minds ... exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost
secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it’ (214).
Lastly, the pastoral relationship should result in a developed form of
conscience in its subjects, in the gradual use and understanding of a series of
254
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 255

techniques of self-examination, by which they come to know themselves better

and implement upon themselves the lessons of the pastor. In this respect,
Foucault explains how the need to access the ‘private sins of the individual’
came to be combined with technical elaborations that would ensure its
success; hence the classical techniques of self-examination and the guidance of
conscience (as practised in Greek antiquity) came to be transposed into Chris-
tian thematics. What therefore became central to the practising of pastoral
power was the establishing of a link between knowledge of one’s self, and an
honest confession to someone else. The techniques of examination, confes-
sion, guidance and obedience came to be seen as absolutely necessary to the
functioning of pastoral forms of power – as Dean (1999) puts it: the pastoral
relies on techniques that seek to formalise a knowledge of the individual’s
secret inner existence.
Secular ‘pastorships’
Although the pastorate in the strictly religious or spiritual sense may appear to
have lost much of its sway in modern society, more generic forms of pastoral
power have in fact grown and spread throughout modern society. So great is
the multiplication and diffusion of this particular mode of power that Foucault
refers to it as the predominant form of the individualising power characteristic
of modernity (Foucault, 1982). Emblematic of the ‘gentle functioning of
power’, this notion of pastoral guidance is what lies beneath our modern ideas
of a ‘caring’ treatment. What Dean (1999) has in mind here are those tender,
beneficial forms of attention and regulation operating on the basis of the
mechanism of love or some heartfelt duty or ‘calling’, but which none the less
serve state power-interests. The ‘office’ of pastorship has multiplied and frag-
mented into a variety of different public institutions, each of which offered a
dedicated and individualising service to citizens in moral, medical, financial,
social or psychological crises. The rationale and procedures of pastoral power
have come to be exercised by a variety of groups and institutions stretching
from traditional structures (such as families) to welfare institutions, private
ventures (of philanthropists, benefactors) and to state structures (public insti-
tutions such as schools, hospitals etc). The objective of these secular
‘pastorships’ is no longer to lead people to their salvation in the next world.
Their secularised goals of salvation now lie in ensuring the promises of better
health, well-being, wealth, security and protection.
We see, in the broad practice of various forms of psychological/psychiatric

consultations, counselling and therapy, a case in point of the pastoral model.
Here there is a relationship characterised by the positive and altruistic motiva-
tions of the psychologist, a form of care that follows the rationale of needing to
‘know the soul’ of each client, and that succeeds in eliciting the secret disclo-
sures of individuals, in encouraging them to institute, as basic qualities of
255
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 256
Critical Psychology
The pastoral relies

identity, the techniques of self-examination, and conscience. It is for this
on techniques that reason that the modern institutional grouping that most overtly exhibits such
seek to formalise a qualities of the secular pastorship is that of the ‘psy’ disciplines. As Dean
knowledge of the (1999) remarks, forms of counselling, social work, applied psychology and/or
individual’s secret
inner existence.
‘psychotherapeutics’ are the closest modern approximation of the pastorate.
‘Filling the gaps of power’

We need to be careful here not to concretise or literalise too strongly these
notions of police and pastorate. We need to remember that in looking at appa-
ratuses of power Foucault is not looking to localise forms of power into
concrete elements (as he does in his focus on disciplinary power); rather, he is
trying to isolate the concepts, the values, the procedures and the assumptions
common to a particular kind of government, which come to diffuse themselves
throughout a culture. The description of ‘apparatuses of security’, of how the
rationality of state has been filtered down to the level of citizens, enables
Foucault to ‘span the gap’ between a focus on subjugated individuals (in disci-
plinary power, see the previous chapter), and the structures of state. By the
same token, this concept of the apparatus gives Foucault an important relay, an
important ‘go-between’ that joins disciplinary micro-processes and macro-
bio-political processes.
We can describe this in another way by saying that what Foucault has
managed here is to weld a politics of the state to a politics of the individual. His
account of apparatuses of security provides an intermediary mechanism which
is able to facilitate the flow of power both from the top down and from the
bottom up. We can now start to think of the two-way link between individu-
alised, singular citizen and larger-scale structure of governmental power.
Tracing the flow of power first from the top down: the idea of ‘the police’
provides the rationale behind the distribution of officials or ‘officers’ of state
power throughout the population (even if this distribution occurs beneath the
benevolent guise of service, on the promise of the cultivation of useful citizens).
(Here, of course, we are speaking of police in the sense of a broad set of ‘officers’
who would work according to the state’s objectives of ‘serving and protecting’
the people, a definition that would include doctors, psychologists, teachers
etc). Tracing the flow of power from the bottom up: the idea of the pastoral
relationship provided the impetus, within the rationale of the personalised
guidance of individuals, for individuals voluntarily to ‘give themselves up to

power’, to follow its injunctions, to acceed to its requests for self-examination,
disclosure and normalisation. It is in this way that Foucault argues ‘[g]enerally
speaking I think one needs to look ... at how the great strategies of power
encrust themselves and depend for their conditions of exercise on the micro-
relations of power’ (1980a, 190).
256
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 257

BOX 3 The psy-complex as apparatus
As we have seen, the concept of the apparatus that psychological discourse provided a vocab-
is the way Foucault attempts to think of the ulary for the experience of self ‘provoked by an
interaction between micro- and macro-politics, economic system that operates much of the
between bottom-up and top-down forms of time out of people’s control, cloaked and
power. The apparatus tries to understand this encouraged by a cultural climate of commodifi-
complex linkage via the identification of what cation and individualization’ (1997, 3).
he refers to as an overall ‘political rationality’ Importantly, this network is not only the
(1980b). If we are to try to understand the preserve of professional and academic
‘synchronisation’ between these types of power, psychology’; it includes all the varieties of
it makes sense, then, following Foucault’s lead, psychological talk and practice diffused
that we try to isolate a series of similar through the wider community. As Parker (1997)
patterns or regular themes or conceptual puts it, the psy-complex ‘informs day-time tele-
approaches common to both. It is in this vision discussions and “step” programs for
respect that Parker (1997) refers to the psy- self-improvement, and as it sprawls throughout
complex as an apparatus which ‘operates as a the world it carries with it prescriptions for how
network of speculations about the behaviour the modern self should be investigated and
and mental states of individuals and as a range treated’ (4).
of attempts to regulate how people behave and Importantly, the psy-complex entails strong
think’ (123). The psy-complex is a term central aspects of both the examples Foucault gives us
to critical psychology. In more basic terms, the of ‘apparatuses of security’, namely the ‘police’
psy-complex refers to an intricate network of and the pastorate. Psychologists can quite
theories and practices ‘which govern how far we clearly be seen to be representatives of state
may make and remake mind and behaviour and power, that is, examples of ‘police’, inasmuch as
the ways in which emotional ‘deviance’ should the outcomes of their applied treatments are
be comprehended and cured’ (Parker, 1997, (at least ideally) healthier, improved, more
3–4). The psy-complex, as broad network of productive subjects of the state. Furthermore,
psychological forms of knowledge and practice the practice of much applied psychology
– in both their institutionalised/professional or certainly makes use of the procedures, logics
popular/informal forms – hence comes to and techniques of the pastorate (producing
inform our most basic and everyday notions of obedient, self-examining and confessing
self, mind, deviance and normality (cf Ingelby, subjects). In this bringing together of ‘top-
1985; Rose, 1990, 1991; Parker, 1997). Here, down’ and ‘bottom-up’ flows of power – that is,
then, we see bottom-up and top-down flows of in thinking psychologists as officials of state
power joining together, being combined via a power on the one hand, and in the spread of
shared set of themes, concepts or approaches, pastoral practices of self-knowing on the other
through the ‘institutionalised models of mind’ – we can see how the broad application of
provided by psychology. Parker links the psy- psychology, or, more directly perhaps, how the
complex to the development of capitalism in psy-complex may be seen as an exemplary
Europe and North America in his suggestion example of an apparatus of security.
‘Officers of power’
We have seen that the apparatus is a broad ensemble that entails a pervading
logic of practices and procedures, a collection of concepts, ideas and princi-
ples, and, as evident in the concepts of the pastorate and the ‘police’ a number
of ‘officers’ of sort.
257
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 258
Critical Psychology
Psy-complex:
Interestingly, Foucault (1990) here is making room in his account for those
broad network of qualified or professional experts and practitioners who might, in a limited
popular and capacity, be said to ‘dispense’, or ‘conduct’ power. In his earlier analyses of
professionalised/ power, as in Discipline and punish (1977), Foucault shied away from such a
institutionalised
psychological
conceptualisation – he did not want to reduce the complexity of power, its
knowledges and multiple flows and multiple directions, simply to an interchange between a
practices that kind of ‘agent’ of power, and a subject. Such a conceptualisation of power
informs our most seemed to Foucault to resemble too closely a sovereign notion of power, the
basic and everyday
idea that a single monumental power might be reproduced in largely homoge-
notions of self,
mind, deviance and nous ways by multiple agents of the state. The modern power of government is
normality. As an far more complex than this, far more heterogenous, more diverse in its forms
intricate collection and, importantly, largely autonomous in the workings of those people who
of theories and might be taken to be its ‘officers’.
practices, the psy-
complex, is a disci-
A similar point to bear in mind here is that Foucault does not want to use a
plinary apparatus ‘model of exchange’ that risks privileging an exclusively ‘top-down’ model of
that operates as a power and losing sight of how power also flows upwards. However, having
network of specu- made perfectly clear the conceptual implications that Foucault wishes to avoid,
lations about the
it seems that Foucault is allowing for such a category, a category that I am
behaviour and
mental states of tentatively terming that of the ‘officer’. Officer here might be taken to refer to
individuals and as a those persons – such as psychologists – who might be taken to exercise a kind
range of attempts of practical authority, a relation of relative dominance or control, at very
to regulate how specific and discrete points of the social body (ie those areas where their
people behave
and think. expertise is most valued). These points are not merely projections, cascading
downwards, of facets of the sovereign’s great power dispersed through society.
Rather, they are the dispersed ‘points of attachment’, the footholds, that allow
the power of government to ‘build upwards’ to a pinnacle. It is for this reason
that Foucault (1990) comments that for the State to function in the way that it
does, there must be, between people, such officers and their subjects, ‘quite
specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and
relative autonomy’ (187–188).
The government of psychologies

This discussion of government and governmentality has been useful for a
number of reasons. It has complemented Foucault’s theories of sovereign and
disciplinary forms of power. It has also described the complex interchange
between macro- and micro-politics, between top-down and bottom-up forms of
power. More than this, it has also provided us with an argument which shows
how psychology might be said to be integral to large programs of government,
not only as a crucial means of gathering information on populations but also as
supplying a series of pastors or ‘police’ figures who prove to be central within
the apparatuses which ensure the overall functioning of government. It is vital
that we do not underestimate the role of psychology here. There are two points
258
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 259

to be made in this respect. The first is to emphasise the extent to which modern
government focuses and and relies upon individuals as the basis of its power.
The second is to reiterate, via the notions of technologies of subjectivity and
self, just how crucial psychological forms of examination and self-knowledge
are to the maintenance of government, that is, how crucial the procedures and
understandings of psychology are to government.
‘States’ of individuals
Earlier in this chapter I quoted Foucault to make the point that ‘the great
strategies of power encrust themselves and depend for their conditions of
exercise on the micro-relations of power’ (1980a, 190). For Foucault one cannot
properly grasp the functioning of large structures of power – such as those of
the state – without a sufficient understanding of the technologies, procedures
and understandings of individualisation, such as those of disciplinary mecha-
nisms and of the pastoral and police apparatuses. Foucault’s overriding
argument is that the aim of modern government lies in developing those
constitutive elements of individuals that foster the overall strength of the state.
In other words, what makes individuals – precisely that part of power that indi-
vidualises and personalises – is exactly what extends the powers of the state. In
Foucault’s own words:
This form of power applies itself to everyday life which categorizes the indi-
vidual, marks him by his [sic] individuality, attaches him to his own identity,
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to
recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects
(Foucault, 1982, 212).
Foucault is mindful of the role of the state of course – the notions of govern-
ment and governmentality are precisely his way of attempting to account for
its power – although he feels that the role of individualising forms of power is
typically underemphasised in understandings of the state:
I don’t think that we should consider the ‘modern state’ as an entity which was
developed above individuals, ignoring what they are ... their very existence, but
on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals would be
shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way,
Structural:
we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization (Foucault, 1982, of the underlying
214–215). structures or
organisation of
This is not to elide the importance of the structural powers of state; to reiterate,
society, the
the notions of government and governmentality are exactly the explanations of underlying social,
the formidable kinds of control that modern governments hold over their economic and
citizens. The point here is that the state is never reducible simply to structural political relations
mechanisms of control. Modes of individualising its citizens are just as crucial that ‘pattern’
society.
in its functioning.
259
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 260
Critical Psychology
In Foucault’s own words:

I’d like to underline the fact that the state’s power ... is both an individualizing
and a totalizing form of power. Never ... in the history of human societies ... has
there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individ-
ualization techniques, and of totalization procedures (Foucault, 1982, 213).
Dispositional links between individualising and totalising procedures

It is the articulation of this ‘go-between’ connecting individualising and total-
ising qualities of power that Foucault is speaking of above that perhaps best
evokes what is meant by ‘governmentality’. It is again important here to reit-
erate that what we see in governmentality is the adoption of multifarious
techniques of government not necessarily immanent in the state itself or
deployed in an intentional fashion. There is no strictly causal link between these
strategies and a centralised state power; their connections are often circuitous,
indirect, dispositional. Put differently: the link between individualising and
totalising forms of power – despite being almost unfailingly reliable – cannot
simply be qualified in the terms of a one-to-one, input-output model of
causality. Such links are extremely complex, but maintain an impressive
dependability, both because of the sheer number of ‘minor governmentalities’ –
minor offices of power and regulation spread throughout different levels of the
populace – and because of the heterogenous and strategic nature of these links.
BOX 4 Indirect officers of the state
Foucault is not here saying that psychologists are simply the direct agents of
the state who, without any autonomy, simply carry out the orders of the govern-
ment (although this may be the case in certain societies – see, for example, the
chapter on Racism in South African psychology by Duncan, Stevens & Bowman).
It was in order to avoid such an implication that I was somewhat reticent,
earlier in this chapter, to use the term ‘officers’ in the discussion above. (This
term might be said to suggest too close a relationship of proximity between the
state and certain of its ‘officials’.) What Foucault is saying, though, is that
psychologists are officers of the state inasmuch as they are kinds of ‘pastor’ and
‘police’ whose work ultimately supports its overall functioning by increasing the
individual health and capabilities of its individual citizens.
Psychologists, of course, work within a particular political climate where
certain ideas, values and principles come to predominate over others, and many
of these ideas link back up to the ideologies of the state. Here it helps to
remember that an apparatus is as much an ensemble of discourses, understand-
ings and philosophies as it is an ensemble of actual practices, procedures and

techniques. Hence it should come as no surprise to us if certain of these values
or ideologies of the state come to creep into the concepts, values or even into
the concrete objectives of the knowledge and practice of psychology. This
unstable correlation is part of what Foucault wants to call attention to through
the notion of governmentality.
260
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 261

BOX 4 Indirect officers of the state (continued)
We need to be careful of where we stand here, though. Foucault is also not

saying that the role of psychologists in the state is simply accident, fortuitous
or ‘benign’, that the way the work of psychologists happens to ‘take up’ the
power of the state is incidental. The knowledge produced by psychologists is
actively drawn upon and acted upon by the state; psychologists do, as empha-
sised in the above box, implement treatment regimes on unproductive or
problematic subjects so they will better conform to the demands and or require-
ments of society. The role of psychologists, like that of other ‘pastoral officers’,
is absolutely crucial to the success of governmental power – the role they play
does not accidentally support the greater functioning of power, it is rather
integral to it. However, to make the point again: even though the support that
such micro-powers lend to government is substantial, it is not strictly co-ordi-
nated, controlled, owned by government. It remains an indirect means of
support. And this, of course, as I shall go on to explain, is part of the reason
that it is so effective.
Self-government
There is one vital aspect of government that we have neglected somewhat in
the foregoing discussion, and that is the fact that self-government is an essen-
tial component of any successful form of governmental power. In this respect
Dean (1999) refers to government as ‘an assemblage of practices, techniques
and rationalities for the shaping of the behaviour of others and of oneself’ (198;
emphasis added). He also suggests that questions of government can be
broken down into three interlocking domains: of state, of other persons and of
the self. Similarly, he returns to his definition of government as ‘the calculated
direction of human conduct’, to qualify that ‘conduct’ here refers not only to
activities – leading, guiding, directing – but also to self-referential qualities –
reflexivity, self-attentiveness, self-awareness and comportment. There is in
government then an undeniable aspect of ‘self power’, as one might put it, an
acting of self upon self. It is in this connection that Rose (1990) points out that
our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs are all vital targets of government.
While these ‘identity-effects’ of power have already been touched on (in the
previous chapter, in a description of a moral orthopaedics of power that aims to
leave a trace on the ‘soul’ or subjectivity of the modern subject), Foucault now
seems to be amplifying these contentions, so much so that he presents the distin-
guishing focus of his very last work as that of ‘the way ... a human being turns
himself – or herself – into a subject’ (1982, 208). It is no longer simply the case
that power has an outcome that might be qualified in terms of subjectivity,
identity or self; it is now the case that power involves these qualities, as indispen-
sable components in the maintenance and spread of power over populations. It
is with this in mind that we now turn to a focus on ‘technologies of subjectivity’.
261
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 262
Critical Psychology
Technologies of
TECHNOLOGIES OF SUBJECTIVITY
subjectivity: Self as ‘political capital’
broad set of self-
regulative practices; If it is the case that the self, individual subjectivity, has come to be seen as an
attempts to adjust or irreducible, irreplaceable component in the operation of the modern state, then
to shape ourselves why is this so? Why is it the case that, as Rose (1991) argues, ‘subjectivity has
according to the tech-
become a vital resource in the managing of the affairs of the nation’ (5)? The
niques propounded by
‘experts of the soul’. answer, for Rose (1995), lies in the fact that we maintain a profound belief in the
Such technologies truth of the self. This ‘inner substance’ of the self is taken to be the basis of our
involve modes of self- personhood; we regard the self as the most fundamental thing about us. Here,
inspection,
then, we get a sense of how powerful psychology actually is, given that it is the
self-problematisation
and confession where discourse of the self, at least in much of the Western world. It is for this reason
we evaluate ourselves, that the self has become such a key mechanism in the operations of power – this
account for ourselves, is what we have in mind when speaking of ‘ttechnologies of subjectivity’:
and work upon
ourselves. More As selves, we [are] ... characterized by a profound inwardness: conduct, belief,
technically, these value, and speech [are] ... to be interrogated and rendered explicable in terms of
technologies involve an understanding of an inner space ... This internal universe of the self, this
the operating of a profound ‘psychology’ [lies] ... at the core of those ways of conducting ourselves
kind of power which that are considered normal and that [provide] ... the norm for thinking and
connects the normal-
judging the abnormal. ... Our lives [are] meaningful to the extent that we [can] ...
ising objectives of
certain authorities to discover our self, be our self, express our self, love our self, and be loved for the
the ideals we have for self we really [are] (Rose, 1995, 4).
ourselves. Such tech-
nologies focus on the The psyche as such has become a target of choice for ‘systematic government
inner psychology of its in the pursuit of sociopolitical ends’ (Rose, 1991, 7). (Rose uses psyche here
subjects, for it is this simply as a more technically refined variant of the self, as that version of self
inner psychology that articulated by and hence particularly susceptible to the attention of experts.)
explains their conduct
and strives for kinds The self is thus taken to be a ‘vital element in the networks of power that
of self-realisation and traverse modern societies’ (Rose, 1991, 213). Here we see a reiteration of
self-fulfilment. When Foucault’s notions of bottom-up power; the regulatory apparatus of the
such technologies of modern state is not, for Rose (1991), something imposed from the outside
subjectivity – say, for
example, the terms, upon individuals who remain essentially untouched by it. Rather, it is the case
explanations, proce- that ‘incorporating, shaping, channeling, and enhancing subjectivity have
dures, understandings been intrinsic to the operations of government’ (213).
used by a particular
kind of psychotherapy
– come to be inter- Shaping subjectivity
nalised and Rose is signalling here the role of psychology in the functioning of broader
individualised by an structures of power. As suggested above, it is the conceptual systems devised

individual, or used as
a way of regulating within the ‘human’ sciences, these specific languages of analysis and explana-
and knowing them- tion for Rose that ‘have provided the means whereby human subjectivity and
selves, then we may inter-subjectivity could enter the calculations of the authorities’ (1991, 7). And
speak of a technology
it is for this reason that he argues that psychology is never merely a body of
of self.
abstracted theories and explanations. Psychological knowledge, no matter
262
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 263

how intellectual, is always embedded in practice, in technical devices, in appa-

ratuses, be it those of the laboratory, the assessment, the interview, the
diagnosis or the counselling session. Psychology is always an expertise in the
sense that is has the capacity to
provide a corps of trained and credentialed persons claiming special competence
in the administration of persons and interpersonal relations, and a body of tech-
niques and procedures claiming to make possible the rational and human
management of human (Rose, 1995, 11).
The psychological being of the subject has, in other words, become a prime
target of power. This psychological existence – ‘interiority’ as it is sometimes
referred to – becomes an invaluable ‘territory’ of power exactly because it has
been placed at the origin of the emotional activities of loving, desiring,
speaking, labouring etc. This interiority ‘has been given to humans by all those
projects that would seek to know them and act upon them in order to tell them
their truth and make possible their improvement and their happiness’ (Rose,
1995, 197). The inner terrain of ‘psychological being’ is continually expanded,
detailed and developed by the technical languages and procedures of psychol-
ogists. It is constructed – produced in concepts and theories – at the same time
that it is made more practicable. By broadening this concept of ‘psychological
being’ – whether in theory or in practice – the discipline of psychology finds
ever more footholds for power.
Rendering subjectivity ‘calculable’ in these ways makes it practicable, and
makes people amenable to having things done to them – and doing things to
themselves – in the name of subjective capacities. New languages, new concep-
tual and technological systems have been invented ‘that construct, inscribe
and calibrate the human psyche, identifying its possible pathologies and
normalities’ (Rose, 1991, 8). Such languages and technological systems of
course also introduce a variety of self-regulatory techniques. Rose (1991)
perfectly captures a sense of the ‘downward saturation’ of this form of power in
suggesting that ‘[t]he new vocabularies provided by the sciences of the psyche
enable the aspirations of government to be articulated in terms of the
knowable management of the depths of the human soul’ (7).
Distinguishing technologies of subjectivity from technologies of self

This downward saturation of power, by virtue of which individuals begin to
self-implement larger structural technologies, helps in the conceptual differen-

tiation of individualised technologies of the self from the broader shape of
technologies of subjectivity. Technologies of subjectivity, for Rose (1991),
refers to a broad and heterogenous set of relays which function to bring ‘the
varied ambitions of political, scientific, philanthropic, and professional
authorities into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of individuals, with
263
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 264
Critical Psychology
the selves each of us want to be’ (213). There resides within these various tech-
nologies a kind of family resemblance in the regulative ideals concerning the
diverse practices operated upon human beings. Furthermore, these technolo-
gies maintain a normalising focus ‘on our existence as individuals inhabited by
an inner psychology that animates and explains our conduct and strives for
self-realization, self-esteem, and self-fulfilment in everyday life’ (Rose, 1995, 3).
When such a mobile and multivalent technology is ‘enfolded into the person
through a variety of schema [such as those] ... of self-inspection, self-suspicion,
self-disclosure, self-decipherment, and self-nurturing’ (Rose, 1995, 26), then it
functions as a technology of self.
We should make a brief qualification here. The notion of the ‘technology’ is
not meant to imply something that is dehumanising, warns Rose (1991),
despite the fact that they are the means through which power is introduced
into the inter- and intrapersonal dimensions of existence. Quite the contrary:
human technologies, despite the apparent paradox, should be understood as
enabling, empowering, as at the very basis of personhood, as producing cures,
reforms, efficiency, education within human conduct (Rose, 1991).
BOX 5 Identifying technologies of the self
One step down on the ladder of theoretical abstraction from technologies of

subjectivity we find the more individualised, micro-level of the self-managed
skills that Foucault (1988c) initially referred to as ‘technologies of the self’.
These are the ‘self-steering mechanisms’ the highly individualised ways in which
we experience, understand, judge and conduct ourselves. Rose (1991) provides
a series of criteria that we may apply to identify these technologies:
Technologies of the self take the form of the elaboration of certain techniques
for the conduct of one’s relation with oneself, for example, requiring one to
relate to oneself epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master
yourself), or in other ways (care for yourself). They are embodied in particular
technical practices (confession, diary writing, group discussion, the 12-step
program of Alcoholics Anonymous). And they are always practiced under the
actual or imagined authority of some system of truth and of some authorita-
tive individual, whether this be theological ... [or] psychological and
therapeutic or disciplinary and tutelary (29).
‘Distance government’
What is vitally important to grasp here is that this government of subjectivities

should not be linked in a directive, one-to-one way with greater overarching
structures of political power. Psychologists, for example, need not collude
directly with the state in controlling and conditioning subjects (although in the
history of psychology this has sometimes been the case). Liberal democracies
are characterised exactly by the limits that are placed on such coercive
264
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 265

interventions. For this reason ‘governments of subjectivity’ must act upon the
choices, wishes, values and conduct of the individual in an indirect manner
(Barker, 1998). Subjectivity of citizens is hence actively shaped, cultivated,
produced in an encouraging manner rather than being stymied, constrained,
repressed. The ‘indirection’ of this form of power is achieved in a number of
ways, perhaps most obviously through recourse to the category of the expert.
Expertise, after all, provides an important distance between the formal appa-
ratus of laws, courts, and police, on the one hand, and the shaping of the
activities of citizens, on the other.
Expertise, such as that of the psychologist, claims Rose (1991), achieves its
effects not through the threat of violence but by way of the persuasion inherent
in its truths, the attraction exercised by its images of life and of self. Similarly,
technologies of subjectivity do not contain an overt codification of right or
wrong – they are not, at the most obvious level, moralistic enterprises. In this
respect Rose suggests that ‘[p]sychology is potent because it can appear to shift
... judgements from a sphere of values, prejudice, or rule of thumb to the
sphere of human truths, equality of standards, cogently justifiable choices and
objective criteria of efficacy that should reign in a democracy’ (1995, 90).
Rather than the moral judgement of social authorities, and rather than a
system that would attempt to impose a new moral self upon us, we now have
an approach to subjectivity that speaks to our truth as human beings, that
seeks to ‘free the self we truly are, to make it possible for us each to make a
project of our own lives, to fulfil ourselves through the choices we make, and to
shape our existence according to an ethics of autonomy’ (Rose, 1995, 97).
Producing identities
What is becoming apparent, then, is that subjectivity is a clear focus of modern
power. This, though, is a subjectivity that is acted upon tacitly, indirectly, via
the means or activity of someone or something else. We might say, in other
words, that government operates upon the general level of subjectivity via the
medium of the psychological inscriptions of experts. These are the two points
that Rose (1995) wants us to grasp: first, that psychological expertise is deeply
enmeshed with the objectives of government, and, secondly, that such
expertise provides a means for shaping, sustaining, and managing human
beings not in opposition to their personal identity but precisely in order to
produce their identities. Rose (1995) illustrates this point with reference to the
practice of psychotherapy:
psychotherapies ... aspire to enabling humans to live as free individuals through
subordinating themselves to a form of therapeutic authority: to live as an
autonomous individual, you must learn new techniques for understanding and
practising upon yourself. Freedom, that is to say, is enacted only at the price of
265
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 266
Critical Psychology
relying upon experts of the soul. We have been freed from the arbitrary prescrip-
tions of religious and political authorities ... But we have been bound into
relationship with new authorities, which are more profoundly subjectifying
because they appear to emanate from our individual desires to fulfil ourselves in
our everyday lives, to craft our personalities, to discover who we really are (17).
Contradictions of freedom
The ‘contradiction of freedom’ that we face here is the following: when we
exercise our subjectivity, our freedom as subjective, autonomous individuals,
we do so by drawing on the values, norms and ideas already set in place by
broader structures of government – we do so in a space which is already within
the ‘auspices of power’, so to speak. The full irony of the successful implemen-
tation of ‘technologies of subjectivity’ should by now be apparent.
Technologies of subjectivity – be those the concepts of a particular psycholog-
ical theory, the procedures of confession and/or psychotherapy, the
understandings of a popular self-help book or the kinds of advice given by the
radio/television talk show – these are the ways in which we hope to empower
ourselves, to realise ourselves more fully. But as we ‘practise’ ourselves in these
ways, we are also participating in our own subjugation. Here, again, it is useful
to refer directly to Rose:
diverse fragments and components of psy have been incorporated into the
‘ethical’ repertoire of individuals, into the languages that individuals use to speak
of themselves and their own conduct, to judge and evaluate their existence, to
give their lives meaning, and to act upon themselves. This transforms ... our
‘relation with ourselves’ – the way in which we make our being and our existence
intelligible and practicable, our ways of thinking about and enacting our
passions and our aspirations ... [However] ... in making the human subject think-
able according to diverse logics and formulas, and in establishing the possibility
of evaluating ways of thinking about people by scientific means, psychology ...
opens people up to a range of calculated interventions (Rose, 1995, 65).
Where ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ flows of power meet

Freedom, or the appearance of it – at least on a personal, subjective or psycho-
logical level – has become one of the ways in which power seems to work. The
critical and conceptual challenge presented by this way of thinking lies in
grasping that freedom – again, of identity, of the personal, subjective, psycho-
logical – may be an intricate component within the functioning of power.

‘Freedom,’ as Rose (1995) puts it, ‘is not the negation of power, but one of its
vital elements’ (96).
The pertinence of Rose’s commentary is that it brings to the fore the degree
to which we are unable to stop being subjectively thinking, wanting, feeling,
citizens ‘relating to others in terms of these psychological forces ... affected by
266
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 267

the relations that others have with them’ (1991, 10). In this sense there are no
self-dialogues, no deep intrinsic levels of personal subjectivity, that have not
been saturated by the basic norms and values of a greater governmental logic.
If this is true, then it may well be the case that for every ‘top-down’ strand of
power there exists a reciprocating ‘bottom-up’ influence. Indeed, those
bottom-up forms of power that flow from the shaped subjectivity of individ-
uals may be just as important, just as vital to the overall functioning of power,
as top-down forms of power! To understand properly how governmental
power works we need to grasp that these two work together, that there is a kind
of symmetry between them.
The subjectivity of apartheid racism

To continue an example introduced earlier, we need to appreciate how
apartheid was substantiated just as much in the individual, subjective racist
identities of the white population as in the institutional structures of the state.
Furthermore, there is a correspondence between these two – indirect, of
course, but formidable all the same. What we are becoming aware of here is the
In attempting to
understand why
brutal acts of racist
violence persist in
South Africa even
after the demise of
institutionalised
apartheid, it helps
to bear in mind that
the racism of
apartheid was – is –
as much a kind of
racist identity as an
institutionalised set
of racist policies.
Apartheid was just
as much substan-
tiated in the
individual, subjective
racist identities of
the white popula-
tion as in the
institutional struc-
tures of the state.
267
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 268
Critical Psychology
fact that there is a politics of subjectivity – a technology of subjectivity – for

virtually every element of structural power. This is the ideal of governmen-
tality: an inner technology of power – irreducibly bound to identity, to forms
of self-knowledge and subjectivity – that matches, and reiterates, at every
point, the structural arrangement of external forms of power. ‘Top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ forces of power would hence meet to produce a subject as deeply
subjectified as objectified by power. This kind of explanation would help us
understand why the racism of apartheid has proved so difficult to eradicate:
because it was, is, as much a kind of racist identity as an institutionalised set of
racist policies. Indeed, here we have an example where the subjectivity of a
kind of power seems to have outstripped its institutional correlates, at least
inasmuch as the racism of apartheid seems to persist in South Africa despite
the ending of its existence as an official state doctrine.
Domination and subjectification; repression and education

Clearly then, power does not simply work through negative, repressive means.
Modern citizens – for the most part – are not simply dominated, repressed or
colonised (although these were the structural conditions of apartheid, for
example). They are rather subjectified, educated, and solicited into a loose and
flexible alliance between personal interpretations and ambitions and institu-
tionally or socially valued ways of living (Rose, 1995). This is where we can
locate the tools and practices of psychology – they provide the links, the means
of implementing the ideals, the values and the norms of a government on a
personal, subjective level:
The languages and techniques of psychology provide vital relays between
contemporary government and the ... technologies by which modern individuals
come to govern their own lives ... They provide languages of self-interpretation,
criteria for self-evaluation, and technologies for self-rectification that render exis-
tence into ... a profoundly psychological affair and make our self-government a
matter of choice and our freedom (Rose, 1995, 79).
‘Unbecoming ourselves’
If it is the case that our individual subjectivities exist less as essentially private
entities and more as intensely governed facets of our personal existence, then
most, if not all forms of self-knowledge and/or practice – as long as they are
attached to normalising procedures – must be a trap. It is in this respect that
Foucault famously asserts that

Maybe the goal nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse who we
are. We have to ... get rid of this kind of political ‘double bind’, which is the simul-
taneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. The
conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of
268
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 269

our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s
The languages and
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individu- techniques of
alization which is linked to the state (216). psychology provide
vital relays between
A governmental psychotherapy contemporary
government and the
Perhaps one of the most obvious and concrete examples of how psychology ... technologies by
operates a technology of subjectivity is to be found in the domain of which modern indi-
psychotherapy. Indeed, given the foregoing discussion, it is easy to see how the viduals come to
govern their own
psychotherapeutic exchange might represent a particularly intensive lens
lives ... They
of/for technologies of subjectivity, a lens through which certain logics of the self provide languages of
may be reiterated, reimposed and reintegrated. For Rose (1991) the techniques self-interpretation,
of psychotherapeutics are most certainly in powerful accordance with the new criteria for self-
political rationalities for the government of conduct. By the same token, the evaluation, and
technologies for
whole realm of the psychotherapeutic is linked at a very profound level to the self-rectification
sociopolitical obligations of the modern self and of the modern state (Rose, (Rose, 1995, 79).
1991, 1995). Psychotherapies provide us with languages of self-interpretation,
criteria for self-evaluation, technologies for self-rectification that ‘render exis-
tence into thought as a profoundly psychological affair and make our self
government a matter of choice and our freedom’ (Rose, 1995, 79).
One should be aware of the complexity of this interchange of power,
however, cautions Rose: ‘One would be wise not to overstate the constitutive
powers of psychotherapeutic discourse and practice. Their potency derives
from their confluence with a whole political rationality and government tech-
nology of the self ’ (1991, 245). So, while a practice such as that of
psychodynamic psychotherapy stands beyond the specific jurisdiction of the
state, it none the less occurs in symmetry to ‘the practice of normativity that
have shaped our present in terms of the political apparatus of the state’ (Rose,
1995, 12). Hence the psychotherapeutic arena is one place where the state and
the political have been relocated as shifting zones for the coordination, codi-
fication, and legitimation of certain complex and diverse practices of
governmentality of individuals, and of individuals’ self-governmentality
(Rose, 1995).
The breadth of ‘an arts of subjectivity’

Rose’s (1991) argument then leaves little doubt that subjectivity is the ‘key to
our humanity’ (x) and, accordingly, that the regulation of subjectivity –
through various forms of psychological expertise – is vital for the maximisation

of human resources to apparatuses of power of almost all kinds. For him (1995)
we have become profoundly psychological beings; it is less the case that ‘we
have been equipped with a psychology than that we have come to think, judge,
console and reform ourselves according to psychological norms of truth’ (96).
269
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 270
Critical Psychology
It is important, in this respect, and as this chapter draws to a close, that we

emphasise the overwhelming pervasiveness of technologies of subjectivity in
modern society. It is true that such technologies, like the popular discourses of
psychology and the contemporary ‘culture of the self ’, have become so thor-
oughly ingrained in popular discourse that we cease to view them as anything
but ordinary. It is hence useful to provide some slightly more concrete
examples of technologies of subjectivity.
Earlier I suggested how one might identify technologies of the self; it is now
helpful to pose a similar set of criteria through which we might isolate specific
technologies of subjectivity. Technologies of subjectivity, for both Foucault and
Rose, refer to modes of self-inspection, self-problematisation and confession
where we evaluate ourselves according to the criteria provided for us by others.
Such practices involve ways and means of inspecting one’s self, accounting for
one’s self, working upon one’s self. We are talking here about a very broad set
of self-regulative practices; attempts to adjust or to shape ourselves according
to the techniques propounded by ‘experts of the soul’ (Foucault, 1988d; Rose,
1991). These procedures enable us to fulfil our potential, to gain happiness and
to exercise our autonomy. As such we might refer to them, as Rose (1991) does,
as the ‘arts of subjectivity’, and we may become more aware of them by asking
the following questions. How do we come to understand, to repair, to improve
or to know ourselves? What concepts, what mechanisms and/or tools, what
kinds of ‘expert knowledge’ do we use to this end? Where, or from whom, do
these knowledges and/or procedures come? How do they come to insert them-
selves as vital components in how we know ourselves, and vital objectives in
how we practise ourselves? How do they come to regulate our ideals, and the
norms we assess ourselves in terms of? How do they become the principles
according to which we govern ourselves?
The psy-complex is a useful concept here, because it helps us to understand
that as fundamental as psychology is to such modes of government – in
supplying them with concepts, languages and procedures of self – such tech-
nologies of subjectivity are far more widespread than merely the strict
academic or institutionalised applications of psychology. These various
concepts, languages and procedures have come to saturate popular culture
thoroughly. We see them in the multiple forms of advice columns, in public
forms of confession, in chat lines, talk shows, in the documentaries and discus-
sions of the mass media, in self-help publishing, not to mention in virtually all
forms of human management. Perhaps the best way to animate many of the
functions and concepts of such technologies of subjectivity is with reference to
Lindy Wilbraham’s later chapter on Discursive practice in which she provides
an extended analysis of a popular news media column dealing with issues of
HIV/Aids.
270
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 271

CONCLUSION
This chapter has had a number of objectives. It has hoped to extend and elabo-
rate Foucault’s overall theorisation of power, as introduced in the previous
chapter, by fleshing out the notion of governmentality. This notion, of course, is
one, like that of disciplinary power, which finds a very central place for the role
of psychology as a powerful mode of both knowing and practising. The theory
of governmentality offers a way of explaining the interaction between top-down
and bottom-up, or micro- and macro-forms of power. In so doing, it explains
how an ‘arts of subjectivity’ has become essential to the effective government of
populations in modernity, an arts of subjectivity which, as the work of Nikolas
Rose amply demonstrates, relies in large part on the languages, concepts and
procedures of self as supplied by psychology. This is why I suggested, at the
outset of this chapter, that psychology is not only a discipline but also a self-
discipline. Psychology, in short, has become a crucial component in the modern
regulation of populations, in the regimes of modern government.

1. What are the parallels between disciplinary and bio-power? List these, then
compare and contrast these two conceptualisations of power, and explain
how they might be thought to intersect or combine. Approach the concepts
of sovereign and governmental power in the same way, compare and
contrast them, and then discuss how they may be thought – if at all – to
intersect and combine.
2. One of Foucault’s most challenging concepts is that of the apparatus.
Explain this concept in detail. As way of broadening your explanation,
discuss the two basic examples he gives us of an apparatus – namely, the
‘police’ and the pastorate – and relate them to the notion of the psy-
complex.
3. Foucault’s ideas of technologies of subjectivity and self are difficult at first
to grasp. Using your own words, distinguish between these two concepts,
identifying their commonalities and points of overlap. Then compile a list
of examples of each, drawn from your own daily experience.
As is evident in the chapter, the work of Nikolas Rose is absolutely central in
applying the notions of governmentality and technologies of subjectivity to

psychology. He has produced a number of books in this regard, the two most
impressive being Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self (1991)
and Inventing our selves (1995). He has also provided the lengthiest exposition
of the psy-complex in his 1985 text The psy complex: Psychology, politics and
society in England 1869–1939.
271
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap10 11/2/04 10:16 am Page 272
Critical Psychology
The writings of Foucault remain pivotal, of course, to understanding

governmentality, bio-power and technologies of subjectivity. His 1979 paper
on governmentality is a rather concise formulation of this new theoretical
notion, and usefully sets out the basic co-ordinates of this idea. The first
volume of History of sexuality (1980b) proved to be unexpectedly accessible –
short and to the point, without sacrificing any of Foucault’s characteristically
counter-intuitive forms of critique. The idea of technologies of the self is first
put forward in an edited volume (Foucault, 1988c) stemming from a series of
seminars Foucault gave on the topic.
272
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 273
Section
2
The South African context
‘South African society lingers as one of the few in the world

where the structure of oppression appears clear. But as the
juridical frameworks of segregation, disenfranchisement and minority
privilege begin to fall away, what remains is a social reality which
may be just as pernicious and disempowering, but much more
murky – where it is harder to get a grip on just what factors and
forces constitute the nature of oppression.’
Maliq Simone
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 274
Summary
Peace Kiguwa
It is certainly useful to gain a broad, well-rounded and ultimately flexible

perspective on critical psychology. This, in many ways, is the aim of this book.
On the other hand, it would seem just as important to gain an applied sense of
critical psychology, to be able to focus its diverse resources and capacities on a
particular point of context. In this respect, one might suggest that we should
attempt to ground critical psychology in relation to a particular sociopolitical
location and its imperatives. The sociopolitical location we have in mind here
is obviously that of post-apartheid South Africa. Clearly, it would seem that the
aims and objectives as well as the form of a South African critical psychology
should be different from other implementations of critical psychology else-
where in the world. The chapters that follow foreground some of the particular
aims and objectives of a South African practice of critical psychology.
Certainly, inasmuch as the following chapters engage with questions and
practices of racism and of HIV/Aids, they grapple with pressing current
South African sociopolitical issues. They also, however, deal with questions
pertaining to the form of critical psychology, remaining acutely aware of the
multiple ways in which specific forms of knowledge work to create political
realities. One such instance of this is the ways in which various intersections
of power come to define and organise knowledge and to prescribe sociopo-
litical norms of behaviour and value, various institutionalised forms of
practice. This is most pertinent for post-apartheid psychological practice in
South Africa – a context where, in the words of Maliq Simone, ‘mentalities of
domination continue’. Oppression takes on a new framework: we need be
aware here of how racial and cultural difference become important only on a
surface level and not in fact as crucial gateways to alternative worldviews or
practices.
The chapter by Sigogo & Modipa seeks to locate community psychology
within contemporary South African psychology, focusing on the latter’s deficit
and complicit political history, and acknowledging the need to ‘reflect on the
political histories and beliefs of the people in a given socio-political context’.
Most crucially the authors emphasise psychology’s role in the regulation and
pathologisation of communities and how such practice has worked to disem-
power, and not empower, communities. The chapter thus calls for a re-
evaluation of common-sense notions of empowerment that have tended to
underlie the practice of community psychology in South Africa. It raises perti-

nent questions as to who controls the ‘empowerment narrative’: Who makes
the decisions regarding the nature and direction of a community’s empower-
ment? A crucial agenda of a post-apartheid psychology is the notion of
democratising power in knowledge-production and psychological practice or,
in the words of the authors, ‘sharing psychology with communities’. While it is
274
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 275
Summary: The South African context

crucial to highlight such a notion, we cannot allow it also to prove redundant

by remaining an end in itself.
The chapter is therefore a call to move beyond mere theoretical engage-
ment with notions of empowerment, but rather, a challenge to actively redress
inequalities and foster more genuine political involvement. Another signifi-
cant issue raised by the authors is the historical marginalisation of African
knowledge systems within the discipline and the need to redress such over-
sight. A critical psychology must pay attention to the power dynamics between
systems of knowledge and, with this agenda in mind, the chapter offers up
several community orientations of the Africanist perspective. Critical
psychology is an attempt to break away from such traditional mechanisms of
social control and, rather, seek more active forms of social empowerment.
Duncan, Stevens & Bowman take up this issue of psychology’s role of social
control versus social empowerment further by providing a basic overview of
the ways in which the discipline of psychology has been complicit in the
oppression and exploitation of marginalised groups. From Verwoerd to Galton
the authors show how psychological theories have served ideological functions
in legitimating and sustaining racial oppression in society, not just in South
Africa but in European and US-American contexts also. In so doing the authors
bring to the fore two fundamental aspects of a critical psychology agenda: (1)
the issue of content – the subject-matter of psychology – and (2) means of
access – how South African psychology has been so politicised that it restrains,
oppresses and omits particular forms of knowledge, what may be termed a
‘monopoly of intellectual discourse’. While the chapter is pertinent in its
historical overview of psychology’s role in sustaining apartheid’s discursive
constitutions of difference and control, it is equally crucial in its exploration of
the ways in which South African psychology may also be extricated from its
history and of the possibilities for a new kind of psychology.
A post-apartheid critical psychology necessarily seeks to be sociopoliti-
cally relevant. European and US-American frameworks, in both philosophy
and content, have traditionally informed South African psychology. This is an
accusation that also applies to many critical theories that have risen against
mainstream psychology. Saths Cooper (1990) describes this better when he
says: ‘Even when the discourse has been on the nature of a radical, critical or
relevant psychology the paradigms are firmly ensconced in the Euro-
American tradition’ (61). South African psychology is undoubtedly
inaccessible to many South Africans. Why? Could this be partly a result of

psychology’s roots and continued affiliation with philosophies which when
adapted for a local context prove irrelevant and oppressive to many? Ratele
deals in part with this issue, tracing the development and philosophical tenets
of ‘Black psychology’ as it originated in the United States. The chapter
explores the modalities of identity and meaning as a critical alternative to
275
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 276
Critical Psychology
Western psychology and explores the ways in which black psychology

provides a challenge to Western forms of knowledge. From a black psychology
as conceptualised in the United States, the author turns to a South African
context. But a black psychology is not just assumed to exist readily in a South
African context. Ratele questions whether there might even be a genuinely
South African psychology: ‘In a country where there is a sizeable number of
black people, whose experiences and lives remain outside the ambit of main-
stream psychology, if, that is to say, there is no black local psychology, there
can therefore be no truly South African psychology.’ Ratele makes an
argument for advocating a South African black psychology but remains
critical throughout, pointing out that proponents of a black psychology can,
and often do, fall into essentialist traps through such attempts at ‘mytholo-
gizing Africa’ and other features of African philosophy and behaviour that
tend to be reified. As Ratele concludes: ‘If by such a discipline it is understood
that black people are ontologically special, [then] black psychology is as
critical as separate doors for Afrikaners and Africans.’
The chapter is also pertinent in its assertion that, while a black psychology
is certainly needed, it is far from being the solution in challenging dominant
hegemonic thought in mainstream psychology. In the words of Ratele, ‘it is
plain good sense that not all traditional white psychological theory is useless in
trying to understand black people’; indeed, ‘there are enough difficulties faced
by black people at the hands of black people’. A critical psychology seeks to
break away from mainstream psychology’s historical polarisation of knowl-
edge by which only forms of knowledge rooted in Europe or US-America
enjoyed a dominant position in psychology. Critical psychology not only
acknowledges traditionally silenced voices but also attempts to deconstruct
this knowledge-polarisation. Such knowledge systems now speak across to
each other on an equal footing: ‘what we need is a psychology of universal and
particulars.’
This polarisation in knowledge production is an issue that the chapter on
Critical feminist psychology in South Africa engages with in its explorations of
what an African feminist agenda might and should look like in contemporary
South Africa. The chapter is in part a critical overview of contemporary
feminist thought, focusing on the relationship between this and South African
critical psychology. The latter aspect details the ways in which feminist
psychology may be applied to a South African context. The chapter thus
provides several South African examples – the problems and dilemmas faced
by many South African women – to illustrate significant conceptual argu-
ments. The author also engages with the multiple ways in which critical
feminist thought has been, and continues to be, instrumental in contesting
hegemonic thought within psychology as well as the ways in which psychology
has ‘normalised’ women into specific feminine roles.
276
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 277
Summary: The South African context

Campbell’s chapter on Collective action in the management of HIV/Aids is

especially pertinent to contemporary South Africa and its current Aids
epidemic. Locating itself within the context of a critical community
psychology, which seeks to explore the potential of various forms of grassroots
involvement (ranging from peer education to multi-stakeholder partnerships),
the chapter challenges the notion of promoting community contexts that
enable and/or hinder current struggles to contain the HIV/Aids epidemic.
Campbell raises and explores two crucial issues for the role of collective
management: (1) the role of collective action in struggles to promote positive
social change, and (2) creating contexts that enable and support effective
prevention of HIV transmission, and the management of Aids care. The
chapter draws on notions of social identities, empowerment, critical
consciousness, social representations and social capital as a means of theo-
rising the processes by which collective action may potentially impact on
health and well-being; at the same time, it is critical of the ways in which these
phenomena may be shaped by material and symbolic power-relations in South
Africa. Far from presenting an impractical and uncritical notion of social
empowerment of local communities, the chapter emphasises the conditions of
social empowerment such as poverty, gender, denial and stigma, and how
these have functioned to undermine effective local responses to the Aids
epidemic. However, the chapter also examines case studies where local
communities have succeeded in changing their social circumstances in ways
that have reduced disease transmission.
Disciplinary power has traditionally been practised both in the production
of knowledge and in the knowledge-validation process (Collins, 1989). The
discipline of psychology – as a symbolic system of knowledge production – has
been instrumental in organising and legitimitising specific modes of existence
for particular contexts. The chapters in this section engage directly with such
practical neo-political hegemonic functioning of psychology – the ways in
which psychology ignores actual need and social reality, such that it has signif-
icantly come to be experienced as irrelevant and oppressive to many groups of
people – what Swartz & Gibson refer to as ‘the crisis of relevance’. Critical
psychology as a tool for political action and emancipation is a crucial issue that
these chapters engage with and seek to defend. Perhaps we need alternative
epistemological views that are less entrenched and practised if they are even-
tually to define and form a more egalitarian and relevant psychology, one
where knowledge is both collectively produced and negotiated.
277
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 278
Chapter
11
Feminist critical
psychology in
South Africa
Peace Kiguwa
‘Feminism. You know how we feel about that embarrassing

Western philosophy? The destroyer of homes. Imported mainly
from America to ruin nice African women.’
Ama Ata Aidoo (1986, 22)
‘That feminism is many and not one is to be expected

because women are many and not one.’
Rosemarie Tong (1998, 7)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Understand feminisms as a diverse range of approaches
Discuss some major theoretical and research trends of feminist research in
psychology
Explore how alternative ‘routes’ to exploring gender issues may be applied in local
contexts
Use the notion of ‘difference’, along with essentialism, in thinking about, and
doing, psychology
Discuss some of the major agendas of a critical psychology and the role of an
African feminism within these agendas.
278
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 279
Feminist critical psychology in South Africa

INTRODUCTION
Feminism as action
Feminism is often mistaken for an exclusively academic pursuit, where femi-
nists (usually women) debate issues of gender and women’s oppression.
Feminists are certainly committed to studying gender relations and how
gender as a cultural construct can be manipulated as a tool of oppression, Gender:
where men are able to occupy positions of social power over women. But there social, cultural and
psychological
is also another aspect to feminism that may not always be understood as an
differences between
extension of feminist theory, and that is that feminism is also action/behav- men and women.
iour. Feminist practice is not just about studying gender and gender relations.
It is also about trying to change those constructs and relations that are seen to
reinforce women’s subordination to men.
Feminists do not all agree on the exact cause of gender inequality.
Depending on one’s theoretical orientation, it is possible to have a range of
different commitments and agendas that one would deem necessary to remedy
women’s unequal status in society. In other words, feminist theories tend to
differ on what they consider to be the causes of women’s oppression as well as
the means by which such oppression can be eliminated.
Plural feminisms
The original feminist idea of Sisterhood – the idea that all women share some Sisterhood:
kind of ‘kindred’ interest – has come under increasing attack and discredit by notion that all
women share the
women (eg so-called ‘Third World’ feminists such as Chandra Mohanty) tradi- same kind of
tionally excluded from mainstream (that is, European and US-American) ‘kindred’ interest by
feminist debate. We now generally accept that common political, economic virtue of being
and social goal(s) cannot be ascribed to women as a group feminist commit- women.
ment has come to mean different things to different women and has taken
many forms in different places (see Table 11.1, overleaf ). Hence it is appro-
priate to talk of feminisms as plural rather than singular. This invites the
question of how these multiple feminist perspectives and interventions may or
may not engage with psychology.
Asymmetrical relationships between groupings of people have come to be
cemented through ostensibly authoritative forms of knowledge such as
psychology. The above description of feminism therefore becomes doubly
important in an African context, because, quite simply, not all feminisms are
equally responsive to the particular political and substantive issues facing

African women. This chapter is spread over a wide set of theoretical and polit-
ical agendas. This is not only so as to grapple with what an African feminism
might be, but also to establish what an African feminism of critical psychology
might be.
279
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 280
Critical Psychology
Table 11.1 ‘Feminism and its differences’: Brief summary of major feminist schools of thought
Stand- Background Key ideas and agendas Strengths Weaknesses

point
Liberal Traced back to There is no fundamental Liberal feminist The interplay of power
feminism the 18th century, difference between men agendas have been in sustaining unequal
most notably and women. And there- particularly instru- gender relations not
with the publica- fore no real basis for mental in the fully emphasised. A
tion of what has the unequal sharing of establishment of more liberal feminist agenda
come to be resources and gender equity laws, could, for example, be
considered one opportunities which have arguably inadequate in
of the key texts Women’s oppression an improved the quality accounting for ongoing
of the women’s inevitable outcome of a of lives of many male violence in South
suffrage systematic denial of women. South Africa’s African society
movement – opportunity for women post-’94 Constitution, The pervasive effects of
Mary Woll- as enjoyed by men for instance, has past discriminatory
stonecraft’s Female subordination opened the way for gender practices not
(1759–99) A thus a direct result of many women, tradi- fully considered, such
Vindication of the legal constraints tionally marginalised, that those previously
the Rights of women are subject to to pursue career disadvantaged are in
Women and also in patriarchal society interests in politics, many ways still disad-
in the 19th Works from within the law, entrepreneurship, vantaged in the present
century, John structure of mainstream etc. In the words of As is often the case
Stuart Mill’s The society to integrate Tong (1998): ‘... such with any liberal agenda,
Subjection of women into that struc- reforms are to be ‘working from within’
Women in 1869 ture neither trivialised nor the system may often
memorialised as past mean getting very little
accomplishments’ (44) accomplished by way of
radical social change
Marxist Emerged in Attributes women’s Contemporary Marxist Underemphasises the

feminism feminist oppression to the capi- feminists have allowed interplay of non-
critiques of the talist/private property us to move beyond material forces of
left post-1968 system (see Marxism reductionist power that equally
chapter in this edition) economic/class sustain female sub-
The only way to end analysis and gender ordination in society,
such oppression is to oppression to a such as culture. In
overthrow the capitalist holistic approach, such other words, female
system of economy as questioning the subordination is
Theorises the role of interrelatedness debated and given
domestic labour as part between institutions priority only in so far
of class system such as the nuclear as it can be linked to
Problematises the family and broader a wider economic
public/private sphere economic structures analysis of society
division (Tong, 1998)
Challenges sexism
within structures, forms
and relations of left
organizations; later
versions concerned with
intersections of class,
race and sexuality
➲
280
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 281

Standpoint Background Key ideas and agenda Strengths Weaknesses
Radical Post-liberal era Patriarchy (rather Radical feminist Argues that the
feminism Cutting edge of than class as for emphasis on social patriarchal system
feminist theory Marxist/socialist as opposed to must be destroyed
between 1967 and feminism) is the natural difference completely – but
1975 most fundamental between men and does not say how
Emerged from the cause of women’s women has encour- this is likely to
gay rights move- oppression aged the occur
ments Women’s oppression deconstruction of Rather impractical
exists in any society social/cultural to presume that a
– capitalist/socialist, constructions of system so perva-
communal/individu- gender difference sive as patriarchy
alistic etc can simply be
This system of ‘rooted’ out of
oppression includes existence. Female
even the most subordination is
common and popular both practised and
of institutions, such experienced at
as marriage and the multiple and inter-
family twining levels, eg
This system of ideological,
oppression is not economic, social
easily eradicated by and sexual.
changing legislature Rooting out one
or abolishing capi- level does not
talist economy in necessarily trans-
society late into women’s
Patriarchal system liberation
cannot be reformed Tendency to
– and must therefore romanticise and
be rooted out universalise
completely women’s position
Seeks to question and experiences,
gender roles, eg why without taking
must women adopt account of other
certain roles such as structural inequali-
‘mother’ by virtue of ties between
their biology and women
men alternative roles
also by virtue of
their biology?
We must problema-
tise gender
behaviour by
drawing distinctions
between biologically
vs culturally deter-
mined gender
behaviour
281
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 282
Critical Psychology
Psychoanalytic Stemmed from Fundamental expla- Emphasises the Underplays the role
feminism Freud’s theories nation for women’s role and function of legal, political
about sexuality behaviour is rooted of the psyche in and economic insti-
In the 1970s femi- deep in women’s women’s self- tutions and
nists contested the psyche liberation. Can structures in
biological reduc- Relies on Freudian therefore speak sustaining women’s
tionism of Freud’s concepts of pre- directly to post- oppression in patri-
construction of Oedipal stage and colonial theory’s archal society
femininity and the Oedipal complex focus on ‘mental Tendency to univer-
masculinity, Gender inequality decolonisation’ salise
arguing that femi- rooted in a series of (see also Fanon’s
ninity/masculinity early childhood ‘double conscious-
are in fact socially experiences resulting ness’ and Biko’s
constructed in both men’s and ‘Black Conscious-
Psychoanalytic women’s perceptions ness’ debate, in
feminists of themselves as this work)
attempted to rein- masculine/feminine. Offers a univer-
terpret Freud by Argue that patriar- salist theory of
‘telling the Oedipal chal society psychic construc-
tale in a non-patri- constructs and tion of gender
archal voice’ (Tong, values these identity on basis
1998, 138), by perceptions of repression. By
focusing on pre- differently so doing, it gives
Oedipal as opposed Theorists such as specific answers
to Oedipal stage Chodorow have to how we
Juliet Mitchell’s focused on the need acquire our
key book Psycho- to change contexts gender identities
analysis and of early childrearing as well as how
feminism argues as a means of we internalise
that psycho- reconfiguring gendered norms
analysis provides a gendered and values
description of subjectivities
gender relations
under patriarchy,
including the
constitution of
sexed/gendered
difference, rather
than a prescription
for it. This opened
the way for a
radical re-engage-
ment with
psychoanalysis as a
way of theorising
resistance, both
against oppressive
conditions and to
change
282
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 283

Post-structuralist Stemmed from No such thing as Recognises the interplay Tendency to

feminism post-structuralist a universal gender of social factors such as be too
theoretical experience race, class, sexuality in abstract and
assumptions Not so much influencing how women not very
about language/ concerned with may experience gender accessible,
meaning and particular cause Seeks to de-essentialise also very
subjectivity or solution to gender identity Eurocentric
(see the discur- women’s oppression, Emphasises the social Tendency to
sive practice as with the ways in constructedness of universalise
chapter in this which women experi- gender identity through Ignores
work) ence gender – and discursive reproductions differences of
Linked to a oppression – Emphasises the power structural
variety of theo- differently interests behind these relations
retical positions Uses post- constructions
developed from structuralist Focuses on practice of
the works of notion of language, resistance in the
theorists such as discourse, social construction of identity.
Lacan (1977), processes and insti- This is necessary in
Foucault (1978) tutions to attempting a theory for
and Kristeva understand gendered ‘mental decolonisation’
(1981) power relations and (see also ‘Black
identify strategies Consciousness’)
for change Able to explain where
Through concept our gendered experiences
of discourse post- come from, why we may
structuralist experience these as
feminism seeks to contradictory and
explore the working why/how these may also
of power as well as change
resistance to power Able to account for the
(see Wilbraham political limitations of
& Hook, in this change at the level of
edition) individual consciousness
through its emphasis on
material relations
Can explain the assump-
tions underlying the
agendas of other
feminist theories, thus
making their political
assumptions more
explicit
Can indicate the types of
discourse underlying
particular feminist ques-

tions and locate these
both socially and institu-
tionally
Can also explain implica-
tions of these discourses
for feminist practice
➲
283
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 284
Critical Psychology
Black First formulated Feminist politics among Explicitly addresses the Tends to rely
feminism in US-America black women is – unlike racial discourses of on an essen-
through fiction- Western and mainstream knowledge-production tialist
writing in the feminisms – rarely seri- as well as emphasising position in
works of many ously explored the relevance of cate- its claim that
African-American Black female researchers gories such as ‘black black women
women, as a should seek to develop woman’. This is a exclusively
direct result of new theories and concepts distinct category. For have insight
dissatisfaction which capture actual lived example, a ‘poor black into their
with anti-racist experiences of ‘Third woman’ relates neither experiences
movements World’ women in Africa to poverty nor to racism by virtue of
(largely domi- Identifies white feminism in the same way a ‘poor their socio-
nated by black as misrepresentative and black man’ does. Inter- economic,
men) as well as oppressive to black locking categories of cultural and
feminist women race, gender and class biological
movement are significant tools of heritage
(equally domi- analysis in trying to
nated by white understand the totality
women) of her experience as a
woman
Provides a basis for
consciousness-raising
among black women as
well as emphasising
emotional and psycho-
logical empowerment
Womanism Origins of A woman is never simply A more comprehensive Tendency

womanism lay in a woman: she has a racial view of gender oppres- towards
black women’s and class identity, which sion. Emphasises the romanticism
dissatisfaction also influences and some- interlocking categories and mysti-
with the white times determines the ways of race, class and cism of black
feminist she will experience herself gender in analysing women’s
movement as a woman women’s experiences experiences
Often associated Similar to black feminism Places the reality and Tends to
with black in its definition of racism experience of black essentialise
feminism in its and sexism as not just an women at the centre of women and
theoretical expression of denigratory theoretical feminist blacks into
framework ideas with no foundation debate and activism fixed attrib-
Has also been but also as theoretical (see also Black utes
linked to the and practical exclusion of feminism)
theoretical black women’s experiences
frameworks of Developed a theoretical
Marxism, space – one that is void
feminism and of the term ‘Black’ – to
Pan-Africanism/ explore any marginalised

Black Conscious- woman’s identity and
ness (see Biko gender experience. It is in
chapter in this this one respect that
work) womanism can be distin-
guished from black
feminism
➲
284
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 285

Womanism In South Africa, ‘Womanism’ – while Allows for a nuanced

(continued) the womanist acknowledging the approach to exploring
movement has psychological necessity many black women’s expe-
remained of self-naming – riences. For example,
largely unpop- simultaneously seeks where traditional main-
ular. Gquola to go beyond a reasser- stream feminism would
(1998) has tion of ‘blackness’ target traditional maternal
argued that a Not a separatist role as a key site of
key reason for movement (unlike female oppression, a
this might lie Black feminist agenda), womanist approach would
with the that is, not focused on seek to show how the role
‘absence of the separatism but more of motherhood has been
word “feminist” ‘centring’. In other experienced by many
in the name words, a womanist black South African
adopted by the framework is more women as both ambiguous
womanist concerned with placing and liberating – even in
movement. It is African and other so- the face of stereotypical
the coining of a called ‘Third World’ mothering (Hendricks et
name which women at the centre of al, 1994). In the words of
shows no theoretical debate bell hooks (1984):
loyalty to Concerned with the ‘... because the family is a
feminism which psychological, existen- site of resistance against
makes tial and mystical racism for black women,
womanism meanings of strong it does not have the
suspect to its black womanhood – ie same oppressive
critics’ (quoted the spiritual welfare of meanings for them that it
in Abrahams, black women as the has for white women’
2002, 61) basis of the struggle (cited in Hendricks et al,
for social justice 1994, 221)
African Has been linked Focus on a reconstruc- Like black feminism and Like womanism,
feminism to Africanist tion of pre-colonial womanism, African African
movements history as a period in feminism seeks to feminism often
which domi- which black women construct anti-imperialist falls prey to a
nantly construct experienced consider- knowledge systems which romantising and
a pre-colonial able political and emphasise an independent essentialising
Africa that is social power and positive sense of tendency in its
free from any identity for many ‘Third nostalgic call
form of oppres- World’/ black women for a pre-
sion Strategic in its subversion colonial Africa
of colonial constructions By so doing it
of racial inferiority of also ceases to
black people. Plays a be sufficiently
mentally decolonising critical of pre-
role. Thus is of important colonial history

and necessary psycho- and the tradi-
logical value (see tional patriarchy
Fanon/Biko chapters in that charac-
this work) terised this
history
Source: Table assembled from various sources.
285
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 286
Critical Psychology
Not all feminisms

are equally
responsive to the
particular political
and substantive
issues facing
African women.
CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FEMINIST PRACTICE

The powers of psychology
A critical psychology agenda is both cognisant and critical of the different uses
and abuses of psychology and the ways in which these have been complicit in the
perpetuating of oppressive social relations (see Duncan, Stevens & Bowman in
this work). The discipline of psychology exercises power through both its
methods and its forms of knowledge (see Hook’s chapter on Foucault, discipli-
nary power and the critical pre-history of psychology). Psychologists must
therefore be constantly critical of their practice and of the ways in which they
produce and reproduce knowledge about the people they study and seek to help.
This continual interrogating of the use and abuse of psychological power
must include not just how knowledge about people is produced but also the
notion that psychology can represent everyone in its construction of knowl-
edge. A critical psychology is one that resists any temptation to ‘speak for’ all
groups precisely because it recognises that the philosophical underpinnings of
psychology are far from universal and may in fact be oppositional to other
philosophies and forms of practice. Mhkize (in this work) discusses the ways in
which African belief systems may be philosophically and ontologically
different from a Western belief system, such that even the notion of ‘identity’,
for instance, may be understood in conceptually different ways. This difference
may be attributed to the ‘communal’ versus ‘individualistic’ ways of knowing
286
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 287

and theorising identity. Because mainstream psychology is rooted in European

and US-American philosophies, psychological practice and theory may be
irrelevant and misrepresentative of non-Western contexts and people.
Who psychology has excluded

Because marginalised voices have traditionally been excluded from any gener-
ation of psychological knowledge, a more critical approach would seek to
redress this exclusion – not by presuming to speak for such marginalised
groups (which would just be another effective and powerful way of further
silencing them) but, instead, allowing them to speak for themselves as legiti-
mate and equally crucial to understanding the individual self. A critical
psychology should open itself up to other non-mainstream knowledge systems
if it is to be critical of traditional psychological practice and be more relevant
to the people it is meant to serve.
Challenging identity
Perhaps even more crucial is the notion of the individual self, implicit in
psychological theory, which asserts that our identities are fixed and connected
to an ‘eessence’. In psychology the notion of ‘identity’ implies a singular, indi- Essence:
vidual subject. Much essentialist construction of knowledge has stemmed true nature of
objects, people.
from this understanding of identity as both unchanging and universal. It is
May be understood
precisely this conceptualisation of a stable and universal identity that has given as any category
much legitimacy to psychology’s presumption to represent and consider its that is assigned to
theoretical constructs as unquestionably applicable to all human groups. objects, people and
experiences that
Mama (2002) has argued that ‘identity’ as a concept has no distinct meaning
are seen to be the
(as would be understood psychologically) in most African languages simply one defining nature
because Africans tend to define themselves in communal terms that indicate or characteristic
their clan or ethnic origins. Psychology’s conceptualisation of identity thus of that person
remains a vexing one to many Africans precisely because it cannot be pinned or experience.
down. Shefer (1997) has shown how women’s gender identity may be
expressed differently depending on the rural or urban setting in which the
individual finds herself, where one setting requires a more ‘traditional’ presen-
tation of self as a married woman would not require this and the subject is free
to discard and adopt a different identity. Identity therefore becomes some-
thing that can be changed and adopted depending on the situation we may
find ourselves in. We cannot therefore go with the assumption that our identi-
ties are unitary and constant.
Critical feminist practice and the ‘universal woman’

Having considered some of the defining characteristics of what a critical
psychology must entail, we turn now to the agenda of critical feminist practice
287
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 288
Critical Psychology
While patriarchy is
and the ways these speak directly to the agendas of a South African critical
universal, the ways psychology. Because feminism is necessarily political in the sense that
in which women feminism is geared toward actual change in social relations, whether at the
may experience this economic or political or sociocultural level, it addresses one of the key tenets
are far from
universal and any
of a critical psychology, which is that the psychological practice can and has
such universalising been put to political use and has been employed to serve specific power
practice inevitably interests.
means the exclusion Traditional feminist practice has largely focused on the ‘universal woman’
and/or marginalisa-
tion of certain
as oppressed. This conceptualisation has relied on a universalist under-
women’s standing of identity/experience/oppression and gender. All women were
experiences. perceived to share similar experiences of gender and oppression by virtue of
being women. Such conceptualisation downplayed other equally crucial cate-
gories that may differentiate women’s experience of gender and oppression.
Categories of race and class, for example, may influence the ways in which a
poor black woman’s experiences of gender may be dramatically different from
Patriarchy: a middle class white woman’s for instance. In other words, while patriarchy is
defines the universal the ways in which women may experience this are far from universal
personal, physical
and institutional
and any such universalising practice inevitably means the exclusion and/or
power that men marginalisation of certain women’s experiences. This is another way in which
exert over women. theoretical and disciplinary power operates.
Although it takes
many forms, patri-
archy is universal. Identities of flux
It is important to Critical feminist practice therefore constantly seeks to interrogate its own
recognise the
cultural, social and
forms of knowledge-production. Traditional feminist ideas of gender
political diversity identity have largely come from psychology’s constructions of these
between patri- concepts, which have generally tended to view these as stable and
archies, but this unchanging, following a set developmental pattern. These terms have,
should not under-
mine the fact that
however, come to be redefined by more critical theorists such as Judith Butler
women experience and Michel Foucault, who have theorised identity to be in constant flux and
oppression as lacking in a fixed essence.
women first and Inasmuch as feminist theory has been criticised for its marginalisation of
foremost.
many women from mainstream debates, it is important to note that this is an
injustice that has been increasingly readdressed by many feminists – both
Western and non-Western. Mama (2001) makes this point too (see Box 4),
arguing that it would be both redundant and theoretically limiting for non-
Western feminists to focus only on the marginalisation of so-called ‘Third

World’ women’s lived experiences from mainstream debate. It is important to
note here, then, that feminist theory is in a process of re-evaluation: traditional
constructs and methodologies are increasingly being re-examined, and alter-
native voices are being explored for their multiple value that could be
enriching for feminism in general.
288
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 289

The ‘concrete material reality’ of cultural constructions

Hoff (1996) has argued that a focus on how we come to know gender may
displace equally significant questions of what needs to be known about
women’s lives. In a manner of speaking, we recognise that gender relations
may be discursively constituted, but this should not detract from the fact that
these relations also have a concrete material reality. This can be illustrated with
a very common example: Cultural constructions may position women as
‘submissive’ and ‘nurturing’. On the one hand, we have a romanticised and
idealised image of women – a glorified image of womanhood, if you like. A
feminist analysis can deconstruct and show the ways in which such construc-
tion has been socially constructed or created, such that women are once again
essentialised and controlled through patriarchal discourse. But, on the other
hand, we also have a concrete reality in which women’s identities and lives are
experienced within such a framework, and their oppression as women stems
directly from this framework and construction. The ‘nurturing mother’ who
fails to bear any children or, in some instances, sons for her husband is
ostracised precisely because she has not conformed to a culturally prescribed
role. While we may acknowledge the gendered roles that are certainly inherent
in such construction and explore the ‘constructedness’ of such gender
prescriptive behaviour and identities, we cannot ignore the fact that this is
both an actual lived and oppressive experience for many women.
Ramazanoglu (1996) has described this overemphasis on the discursive
construction of gender as a subtle means by which feminist knowledge disem-
powers itself.
Localised forms of oppression

Perhaps what a critical feminist agenda needs to engage with is not how gender
oppression is a universal phenomenon but rather the ways in which such
oppression can be experienced on different levels and how it is embedded in
different institutional structures and policies of a society – in other words, the
ways in which gender is a crucial oppressive category in areas such as
HIV/Aids and health policy or cultural practices that are meant to symbolise
the coming into one’s manhood/femininity etc which may be inherently
oppressive to women. An example that comes to mind here is the virginity-
testing rites that many young African girls often have to submit to.
QUESTIONING RESEARCH
Research that constructs identities
The paucity of gender research in psychology and the theoretical and method-
ological limitations attaching to it has been researched and documented in
289
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 290
Critical Psychology
what is fast becoming a wide range of feminist criticisms and explorations of

gender bias in social science research (see for example, Shefer, 2001 and in this
work; Hollway, 1989; Weisstein, 1996; Eagle, 1999). Previous research into
gender issues was generally limited in theoretical and methodological
approach. In trying to construct a universal gender identity and define the
essence of womanhood many feminist and non-feminist studies tended to
employ essentialist notions of gender identity.
Decontextualised gender identities

In addition, methodological frameworks were such that they never really
captured women’s gendered narratives. Why? This is largely as a result of a
Positivist science: compliance with traditional positivist social science paradigm with its
belief that social emphasis on objective and valid research. The nature of social reality is seen to
science can and
should only know
be stable, with pre-existing patterns just waiting to be discovered (Neuman,
what can readily be 2000). Social research is seen to be void of any subjective value and/or political
observed. Social agendas. The result is that theories on gender identity and oppression remain
reality is what we decontextualised from the social, economic, political and ideological environ-
can see (observe)
ment. Thus psychological theories such as Erikson’s eight stages of identity
to exist.
development (see Hook, Watts & Cockcroft, 2002) may argue that contexts of
gender development can and do differ but nevertheless still follow a set pattern
or process. However, a young South African child from a rural environment,
living in poverty, may not be said to share similar patterns of gender identity
development. It is reasonable to assume that other influential factors may play
significant roles in her gender identity (Shefer, 1997).
The problems of positivist science for feminist research

Feminist critique of traditional gender research has generally focused on the
methodological limitations of the notion of a value-free science that can be
objective in its approach to studying gender issues. Social reality is charac-
terised by a stable pre-existing pattern or order that can be discovered
(Neuman, 2000) and therefore it is quite feasible for a researcher to be objec-
tive and value-free when doing research. There is no place for values in research
because science is by nature value-free. Explanations of events that one studies
must also be based on factual evidence. Such issues, related to the myth of
objectivity as well as the position of the researcher as superior in relation to
subjects have been questioned by many a feminist analysis of research method-

ologies in psychology (Mama, 1995).
The positivist and/or experimental approach in most psychological studies
has generally tended to undermine or downplay the workings of any sociopo-
litical factors in a given context. With regard to studies with female subjects
this approach has been especially narrowly focused, largely because significant
290
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 291

factors that should be considered when trying to understand the experiences ‘Psychology is one
of women still remain underresearched (Unger, 1979) and reinterpreted from version of the
the [usually male] researcher’s own framework, with subjects having little or power of the
no space to control her own narrative: ‘Psychology is one version of the power narrative. As with
any power, it can
of the narrative. As with any power, it can be misused to wield power rather be misused to wield
than to empower others’ (Apter, 1994, 41). Because psychologists generally power rather than
tend to occupy more powerful positions in the research process than the to empower others’
subjects they study, any agency for subjects to determine the form their narra- (Apter, 1994, 41).
tives will eventually take is drastically reduced and sometimes even
non-existent. The final outcome may thus often be the researcher’s own inter-
pretation of events and meaning. This inevitably raises some ethical questions
about the conduct of research.
Subjective, explorative research

Collins (1990, 207) has argued that objective positivist research is problematic
with particular reference to studying minority women’s experiences: ‘Such
criteria requires (sic) ... women to objectify ourselves, devalue our emotional
life ...It seems unlikely that black women would use a positivist epistemolog-
ical stance in rearticulating black women’s standpoint. Black women are more
likely to use an alternative epistemology for assessing knowledge claims, one
using different standards that are consistent with black women’s criteria for
substantiated knowledge and with our criteria for methodological adequacy’
(cited in Abrahams, 2002, 66).
The dominance of the positivist approach to research was later to be
contested by the interpretive approach, which focused on more subjective
explorative research. In seeking to understand and describe women’s lived
experiences feminists researchers with more interpretative worldviews focused
on the ways in which women generated and sustained meaning. This new
approach was quite welcome for its emphasis on value-laden research as desir-
able. This was a marked shift from the positivist ‘value-free’ stance.
Interpretive research also allowed for more alternative approaches to doing
research with women, for instance the use of the autobiography as a valid form
of data collection.
Showing up structures of oppression

This interpretive approach to research was, however, problematic in its disre-

gard of the political context within which women may generate and sustain
meaning. This paved the way for theorists with far more critical agendas. Social
science research was not only value-laden but the task of feminist researchers
was to challenge the illusions and false beliefs that tended to hide gendered
power relations in society. Social change can be achieved only when women are
291
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 292
Critical Psychology
able to question the structures and institutions in their society that sustain
oppression. Social research is also political and feminists are equally concerned
with the political dimensions of most psychological research on gender issues.
THE ‘LIBERAL’ TRADITION IN PSYCHOLOGY

How gender has been linked to genetics
The liberal approach in gender research is a crucial one to discuss precisely
because it has been the most influential and has helped to recuperate and de-
radicalise feminist interventions. Liberal trends in researching gender issues in
psychology represent a marked opposition to previous traditional research
that represented gender (when considered as a ‘variable’ in particular research)
as nothing more than a natural category that could be brought to bear in an
analysis. The traditional treatment of gender – approached as sex differences –
presented differences between men and women (whether behaviour, person-
ality or roles) as biological and therefore natural. For example, Kimball (1981)
and Aper (1985), both cited in Goldberg (1996), focused on the various ways
in which ‘sex differences’ have been studied in psychology by linking gender to
genetic differences in the brain as well as in cognitive functioning.
Psychology’s move from such blatantly reductionist approaches to more
egalitarian ways of doing gender research can be described as a move towards
a more ‘liberal’ psychology. This trend has also arguably been influenced by
early liberal feminist notions of gender equality (see Table 11.1).
Points of similarity rather than difference

Psychologists with a liberal agenda have tended to move from theorising
gender as difference to highlighting similarity. In fact, the proving of similarity,
and hence the need for equality, was seen as a key objective in this respect. This
was particularly so, given that gender differences – and the idea of women’s
characteristic roles, skills, positions, preoccupations – were typically under-
stood to indicate deficits in women relative to men. The purpose of this
research was overwhelmingly that of redressing such representations of
women, avoiding the ‘discourse of difference’ so as to argue for equality.
We might take the work of Carol Gilligan as something of a counter-
example here (see Gilligan, 1982; Grant, 2002). Her critique of Kohlberg’s
stages of moral development seems to suggest that women and men are
morally different in orientation, despite the fact that an understanding of

equality in difference, a kind of equal but separate view, is asserted. The liberal
tradition takes a very different approach in the emphasis and approach of its
research. It would suggest, in the case of moral development (to extend the
example), that men and women are not particularly likely to be morally
different from each other than is supposed. This would then be a move away
292
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 293

from presumed natural – and therefore – biological gender difference to

emphasise commonality or even the universal transcendence of gender.
Universalising the gender experience

This liberal trend in theorising gender does not just encompass relationships
between men and women but also between women themselves. Women and
men are seen to be equal but so also are all women in relation to each other.
Gender research is therefore seen as applicable and relevant for every woman,
regardless of race, class, sexuality, and geographical location, for example. This
can be described as a universalising of the gender experience, that is, the
assumption that all women share the same experiences of oppression and In attempting to
gender by virtue of being women. explain female
subordination, the
Such theoretical practice is not only misleading in its representation of discipline of
gender as universal but also effectively serves to further silence many women psychology has
already marginalised by their race, class and sexuality. What may be termed focused almost
‘triple oppression’ is exemplified in the lives of many domestic servants in exclusively on
sexism and gender
South Africa for instance. Poor and lacking in any worthwhile education, these issues and as a
women are often oppressed at the level of their race, gender and class. In consequence has
attempting to explain female subordination, the discipline of psychology has had little or no
focused almost exclusively on sexism and gender issues and as a consequence applicability to the
special position of
has had little or no applicability to the special position of black women in a
black women in a
white social structure. These, however, are the women who are subject to the white social
effects of racism, sexism and class bias in combination (Howitt & Owusu- structure.
Bempah, 1994).
‘Triple oppression’ is
the term that has
been coined to
describe the
situation in which
many black South
African women find
themselves:
oppressed in terms
of race, class and
gender.
293
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 294
Critical Psychology
BOX 1 ‘The Invisible Man’
The American sociologist Michael Kimmel tells a revealing anecdote about one
of his graduate classes in Women’s Studies in which he heard a dispute going
on between a white and a black woman. The white woman was arguing that the
universal oppression of women by men bound black and white women
together in a common plight. The black woman disagreed and asked, ‘When you
wake up in the morning and look in the mirror, what do you see?’
‘I see a woman,’ the white woman replied.
‘That’s precisely the problem,’ said the black woman. ‘When I wake up in the
morning and look in the mirror, I see a black woman. My race is visible to me
every day because I am not privileged in this culture. Because you are privi-
leged, your race is invisible to you.’
Kimmel was very much struck by this exchange because he realised that
when he looked in the mirror he saw neither his whiteness nor his masculinity.
All he saw was a simple human being.
Source: Kimmel, quoted in Wetherell & Griffin (1991).
FOCUSING ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

While the discipline of psychology as a whole has been instrumental in legiti-
mating certain forms of power in knowledge-production the field of
developmental psychology represents a special interest to us here. In the words
of Morss (1996), ‘developmental psychology has told us what development is’
(1). Theories of development have enabled us to define what ‘normal’ as
opposed to ‘abnormal’ human development is. It has provided norms and
guidelines through which we can assess healthy psychological and social devel-
opment (for a further discussion of norms, see Hook’s chapter on Foucault and
disciplinary power). It is because we have some pre-set notions of what
children are like, for instance, that we set up specific laws for their protection.
Developmental psychology may therefore be seen to have a crucial importance
in reiterating forms of social or structural power.
The importance of developmental issues for feminism

Burman (1994) identifies developmental issues as crucial for any psychological
feminist analysis because the developmental process of the individual, from
birth to death, is one that has been gendered by the discipline of psychology,
with passivity, dependence and emotionality culturally associated with femi-

ninity as well as immaturity, and autonomy, activity and rationality associated
with masculinity. Further additional responsibilities for ‘successful develop-
ment’ are borne by women as mothers. The healthy development of the child
is constructed as dependent on several key factors and influences, the most
significant being that of the mother’s presence in the child’s life.
294
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 295

For many black South African women, psychological theories of child

development arguably have more significant implications than may be
normally supposed. Escalating crime (perpetrators understood to be mainly
the black male) – as well as the sociocultural contexts in which these occur –
bring to the fore specific and implicit understandings of black family culture
and the specific roles black women are seen to play in creating the pathological
black male. Phoenix (1987) has explored the ways in which a dynamic of
homogenised absence/pathologised presence structuring the representation
of black families, and especially black women, has been a dominant trend in
psychology.
A critical African
feminist approach
to psychology is
aware of how
mothers are
typically made to
bear responsibility
for the ‘successful
development’ of
their children.
BOX 2 ‘Monstrous mothers and selfish mothers’: How women

carry the burden of gender
Alldred (1996) has questioned psychology’s constructions of the ‘traditional’ and

‘non-traditional’ family with specific focus on female-headed households. She
argues:
Making links between psychology and popular culture allows psychological
research practice to be contextualised in the broader cultural and political issues
of its time, and highlights the implications of psychological discourses as they
operate in everyday life ... Images of the monstrous mother have included the
overprotective mother who refuses to relinquish the child and so smothers or

subsumes them ... the fears evidenced in this particular cultural moment are
about women bearing and rearing children without men, and the danger of these
‘monstrous females’ breeding ‘monstrous children’.
In much the same way that heterosexuality is seen to require no justifica-
tion or cause, neither is the ‘traditional’ family. The label ‘non-traditional’ is one
295
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 296
Critical Psychology
BOX 2 ‘Monstrous mothers and selfish mothers’: How women

carry the burden of gender (continued)
that is used to ‘set outside the norm, and render [...] oppositional to those seen
as traditional’. The term ‘traditional’ evokes a history, by virtue of which the
object is then naturalised. This then confers a moral weight so that it becomes
possible to argue that it ought to be simply because it has been ... the image
that is evoked is of white families, leaving black families already positioned as
Other. The supposedly general concept of family is actually fairly narrow.
Source: Alldred, Pam. (1996). ‘“Fit to parent”? Developmental psychology and “non-
traditional” families.’ In Burman et al Challenging women.
The family structure and the scapegoating of women

Howitt et al (1994) focus on several key areas of mythical ‘knowledge’ gener-
ated by psychology about family structure, and do so in a way that draws
attention to the maternal role and how women are often scapegoated by patri-
archal discourse. Why is the focus on the family such an important one for the
promulgation of racist/patriarchal stereotypes? Well, the family and its struc-
tures of power are taken to have and extend the beliefs and values of one’s
society or culture. Furthermore, it is taken to be the social institution where
enculturation, or rather the fragmentation (or lack thereof ) is thought to
occur.
The black family living in South Africa is commonly assumed to follow a
matriarchal family structure, one that is dominated by females who have taken
on traditional male roles, inherently transgressing ‘normal’ family structure.
The value that psychology has placed on the ‘father figure’ as role model for the
male child (Weiten, 2002) has in many ways been detrimental for single,
female-headed families. Studies have been conducted to stress the importance
of the father to a child’s motor and mental developmental tasks (for example,
Pederson, 1979) and social responsiveness (Parke, 1979).
These families are implicitly assumed to embody some form of fragmenta-
tion and difficulty in enculturation. Children from such families are assumed
to have been denied proper socialisation skills and find it difficult to integrate
fully within broader society as psychologically healthy and fully functioning
individuals. Psychopathology is deemed to be the inevitable outcome of such
an ‘abnormal’ family pattern.
FEMINISM IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT

‘... Psychology has nothing to say about what women are really like, what they
need and what they want, essentially because psychology does not know.’
Naomi Weisstein Psychology constructs the female (1996)
296
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 297

BOX 3 Post-natal depression as an expression of rebellion against the maternal role
‘She loved, she tried to love, she screamed instinct which is crowned queen by psychology.
and was not heard, because there was The ‘fathering’ of a child (Lupton & Barclay,
nothing and no one in her surrounding that 1997, 27) does not ensure its healthy develop-
saw her plight as unusual, as anything but ment (Holmes, 1993). Psychiatry cannot be
the homemaker’s plight to her home. She applauded for objective clinical diagnosis as it
became a scapegoat, the one around whom pulls the patriarchal proverbial corsette strings
the darkness of motherhood is allowed to of social control of the feminine subject.
swirl, the invisible violence of the institu- Women are not allowed to extrapolate from its
tion of motherhood.’ pre-definitions of the maternal. The feminine is
Welburn (1998, 132) playdough in the hands of culture, which
assumes to construct her psychopathology.
An exploration of ‘invisible violence of the Women are taught to be depressed rather than
institution of motherhood’ exposes how the defiant. Chesler (1974) suggests that good
feminine is highly enmeshed with the ‘home- mothers ‘will resolve to be more patient and
makers plight to her home’. The maternal as a cling more tightly to what passes for sanity’.
natural feminine entitlement, is one that has Chesler (1974) suggests that women’s psycho-
indeed ‘scapegoated’ women through biological pathology is an expression of the ‘devalued
discourse, psychological theory and culturally feminine role’.
mediated social practice. An alternative explo-
The scapegoat is also an escape valve;
ration of post-natal depression is offered for
through her the passions and blind raging
women who have ‘tried to love’, ‘screamed’ and
waters of suppressed knowledge are
are ‘not heard’ because clinical theory has
permitted to churn, so that they need not
negated to explore the patriarchal assumptions emerge in less extreme situations as lucid
from which it is born. Socially motivated rebellion (Welburn 1974, 132).
biological assumptions may often become
biological realities by which women’s child- Women who show resistance to motherhood may
bearing capacities align themselves with become scapegoats, so that the ‘blind raging
child-caring responsibilities and maternal traits waters’ of suppressed feministic rage does not
(Chodorow, 1978). Motherhood is a role women emerge as lucid rebellion.’ The invisible violence
are expected to adopt and accept readily. This of the institution of motherhood swelling in the
has infringed upon their own personal nourish- belly of the feminine and the patriarchal perils
ment and their ability to construct own of psychiatry cannot offer an objective under-
femininities. standing of post-natal depression.
Psychology’s object relational theory has Source: Kruger, Monique. (2002). Post natal
further trapped women in maternal obligations depression as an expression of rebellion against the
(Doane & Hodges, 1992). It is the maternal maternal role.
The experiences of marginalised women

We have seen that women can hardly be said to constitute a homogenous

group. Solidarities are broken along the lines of ‘race’, ethnicity, class, language,
rural/urban divisions and sexuality, as well as almost every other social identity
marker that exists. Feminism as modelled upon Western and Eurocentric
philosophy thus becomes somewhat problematic for a non-Western context.
What is certainly needed is a feminism that does not just acknowledge but also
297
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 298
Critical Psychology
actively engages with every woman’s perceived ‘difference’ and resulting subjec-
tive experience of gender. Hendricks et al argue this same point in their
emphasis on the need to ‘reassess the concepts, methods and models used for
defining feminism, and to develop new ways of identifying and charting
marginalised women’s unique engagement with feminism’ (225).
In July 2001 a workshop hosted by the African Gender Institute and
feminist academic journal Agenda was organised. It was aimed at reflecting on
the multiple meanings of feminism in Africa. Essof (2001) reported on the
distinct understandings that were put forward regarding the theory and
practice of African feminism: ‘... there are those who argue feminism is not
African and thus has no relevance to Africa’s political, social and economic
realities. Rather, it is seen as an elite, bourgeois phenomenon, an invention of
the West with no real value, or meaning for African women’ (124–125).
The damage of being named

The alternative practice to theorising feminism is to suggest that while
feminism is very much an important ideology relevant to all women, it is also
one that needs to be renamed by marginalised women. Gqola (2001) and
Mama (2002) have ascribed this to the ‘damaging power of being named’, by
which as colonial subjects, Africans for a long time have not only been told
While feminism is who they were but the ways in which these terms of reference – ‘natives’,
very much an ‘kaffirs’, ‘negroes’ etc – have been used as sites of oppression and dominance.
important ideology Indeed, the labels chosen seem to testify to a specific affirming essence, the
relevant to all need to define and possess an identity that we have freely chosen for ourselves
women, it is also
one that needs to and which in some ways foreground and prioritise our own particular lived
be renamed by experiences as specific subjects, so that we have post-colonial/Black/
marginalised African/Womanist feminisms (see table 11.1), in the words of Mama (2002,
women. 1): ‘...for many of us, identity remains a quest, something in-the-making.’
An African feminism of sociocultural and political contexts

A critical feminist practice explores issues and concerns of women by situating
them within the political and sociocultural contexts. An African feminist
agenda in this regard is to address and explore the gender-related experiences
of African women in acknowledgement of the fact that many African women’s
experiences of gender and identity development have not been fully repre-
sented in psychological theory. Also, an African feminism would consider the

political/economic and sociocultural contexts to be crucial to theorising and
exploring gender identity development. Emphasis would be on those areas of
social and political life that implicitly are influenced by gender, such as health,
and which are implicitly oppressive, within patriarchy, to women. The Aids
pandemic in Africa would thus be one such area of focus for feminist research.
298
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 299

BOX 4 ‘Talking about feminism in Africa’: Elaine Salo speaks to Amina Mama
The following extract is adapted from an inter- that, say, global capitalism can be viewed
view with Professor Amina Mama, an activist as an enemy ...
scholar and academic in feminist theory and The constant tirades against ‘white feminists’
practice at the University of Cape Town (UCT). do not have the same strategic relevance as
Elaine Salo lectures at the African Gender Insti- they might have had 20 years ago when we first
tute at UCT. subjected feminism to anti-racist scrutiny.
ES: Would you say that womanism has any Since then many Westerners have not only
relevance for African feminists? listened to the critiques of African and other
AM: ... I have no problems with womanism but so-called ‘Third World’ feminists – they have
changing the terminology doesn’t solve also re-considered their simplistic paradigms
the problem of global domination. I and come up with more complex theories. Post-
choose to stick with the original term, colonial feminism owes much to African, Asian
insist that my own reality inform my and Latin American thinkers. Western feminists
application of it. Words can always be have agreed with much of what we have told
appropriated, for example there is not just them about different women being oppressed
womanism, but Omolara Ogundipe-Leslie’s differently, and the importance of class and
Stiwanism and Catherine Obonulu’s Moth- race and culture in configuring gender rela-
erism – but this does not get away from tions. Having won the battle why would we
the main problem, namely white domina- want to abandon the struggle, leave the
tion of global politics and northern-based semantic territory to others, and find ourselves
white women’s power to define. We should a new word?
define our own terms. To put it bluntly,
Source: (2001) Agenda 50: 58–63.
white feminism has never been strong
enough to be ‘the enemy’ – as the way
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

IN AFRICA: FOCUS ON HIV/AIDS
‘Culturally prescribed gender scripts that legitimate sexual violence against
women lie close to the roots of the current Aids epidemic in South Africa.’
Leclerc-Madlala WHP Review (2001, 6)
The ‘gendering’ of HIV/Aids in South Africa

An African feminist agenda involves prioritising and exploring those features
of African cultural practice and tradition that emphasise the most human and
enduring aspects in the lives of women living in Africa. In this regard a critical
South African feminist psychology should seek to explore and deconstruct
those features of African culture which function to the detriment and subordi-
nation of African women. The intention must be one of strengthening and
adapting traditional values that promote or enhance African women’s empow-
erment, seeking to promote their needs through opening up further the
discursive space and strategies inherent in indigenous culture and resisting
those customs that oppress and degrade women.
299
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 300
Critical Psychology
Virginity testing
Nowhere is this more necessary than in the cultural constructions of female
sexuality which function to tie many African women to the dominant and
oppressive patriarchal system, through such gendered practices as virginity
testing (Leclerc-Madlala, 2001). An essentialised construction of female sexu-
ality as pure and chaste may, for instance, position many African women as
moral guardians for their respective cultural values and traditions. They are
By placing emphasis imbued with constructions of an ‘ideal’ womanhood with sole responsibility
on women’s gender for maintaining the moral sexual equilibrium as well as reinstalling lost
roles, men are
effectively absolved
cultural values of ‘chastity’. The invoking of a lost value system that needs to be
from any sexual ‘regained’ is inherent in a growing number of male African constructions of an
responsibility, not ‘African renaissance’. Even more disturbing is the self-regulation this pervasive
just with regard to discourse achieves, with many African women themselves actively promoting
curbing the spread
of HIV/Aids but
and organising virginity-testing ceremonies. Such practices are in effect cultur-
also in widespread ally prescribed gender-scripts that legitimate sexual violence against women.
deviant sexual By placing emphasis on women’s gender roles, men are effectively absolved
behaviour such as from any sexual responsibility, not just with regard to curbing the spread of
rape.
HIV/Aids but also in widespread deviant sexual behaviour such as rape.
BOX 5 Five-year sex ban for young Swazi women
Agence France Presse
In September 2001 the Swaziland government announced a five-year sex ban for
young women in a bid to combat the spread of HIV/Aids. The ban was
announced by the leader of Swaziland’s young women, Lungile Ndlovu, who said
the elders of the nation deemed it fitting.
‘During this period you will be expected to observe a five-year sex ban. No
shaking of hands with males, no wearing of pants and you will be expected to
wear woollen tassels wherever you go for the next five years,’ Ndlovu said at the
end of the lengthy celebrations to mark the Swazi king’s 33rd birthday. Ndlovu
did not specify what age group the ban targets, but said women in relationships
and older than 19 would be expected to wear red with black tassels. Those who
are still virgins will wear blue with yellow tassels. Her announcement was met
by howls of protest.
The ban follows an announcement by King Mswati III that Swaziland will
revive the umchwasho chastity rite to preserve virginity among girls and to
combat Aids. [...] Ndlovu said the tradition of preserving a maiden’s chastity,
known as Imbali YeMaswati (Flower of the Nation), will be policed by traditional
chiefs who still rule over much of Swazi society ...
Source: Women’s Health Project Review (2001) 7.
300
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 301

Challenging violence against women

‘It is an implicit assumption that the area of psychology which concerns itself
with personality has the onerous but necessary task of describing the limits of
human possibility. Thus when we are about to consider the liberation of women,
we naturally look to psychology to tell us what ‘true’ liberation would mean: what
would give women the freedom to fulfill their own intrinsic natures. Psycholo-
gists have set about describing the true natures of women with a certainty and a
sense of their own infallibility rarely found in the secular world.’
Naomi Weisstein Psychology constructs the female (1996)
The widespread nature of women’s oppression

All identities are gendered (Mama, 2002). Any psychological theory about
women’s liberation in Africa needs to be aware of gender-oppressive discourse
that seems to be finding voice in many indigenous traditionalist calls for a pre-
colonial African customary-law system. The inherent danger of such a
sex-gender system is that gender oppression is, in retrospect, constructed as
non-existent in indigenous customs as opposed to Western society. This is in
fact not the case. While patriarchy is far from universal in form, it is a social
fact that women are globally subordinated on the basis of their gender. In any
society – socialist/capitalist, communal/individualistic – a built-in power
inequality can be said to exist between men and women. Many African cultural
practices, for instance, still define intellectual pursuit as an exclusively male
domain. Male education is thus prioritised over female education, enabling
men to have far more competitive career opportunities than women.
301
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 302
Critical Psychology
The gender dimension to experience and politics

Psychological research now increasingly takes into account the gender-specific
influences of social phenomena and at almost every turn seeks to incorporate
gender as necessary to understanding social phenomenon (see, for example,
Harris, Lea & Foster, 1995). Gender relations in South Africa alone are seen to
have much significance for a nation-building agenda and issues pertaining to
gender have already received much political focus (Beyond Racism Report,
1994). But there are varieties of experiences and events that still need to be
acknowledged and explored as legitimate questions for psychological research,
such as cultural constructions of sexuality and how these have very often been
employed in legitimating a patriarchal system.
Links between race, gender, class

A feminist critical psychology in South Africa needs to engage with culture-
specific practices that are inherently gender-specific as well. Most research
topics inevitably require a gender focus and it seems theoretically limiting to
separate other significant categories such as race, class and physical location
from this focus of analysis. Hollway (1984, 1989) has shown how specific
gender discourses on male and female sexuality have served to legitimate both
male and female gender roles. In explaining differences between men and
women, psychological theories of biological determinism operate alongside a
society’s framework of constructing gender relations. This is another way of
saying we sometimes cannot begin to deconstruct a culture’s normalisation of
gender norms without also deconstructing the ‘expert’ theoretical framework
that either builds or supports it.
Gender in the South African Constitution

South Africa’s post-’94 Constitution – particularly its gender equity laws –
is certainly one of the most liberal in the world. This is also one instance
where we clearly see an influence and the workings of the liberal feminist
agenda, that is, the notion that all gender equality must begin with a change in
the legislation:
Gender justice, insist liberal feminists, requires us, first to make the rules of the
game fair and, second, to make certain that none of the runners in the race for
society’s goods and services is systematically disadvantaged ...’ (Tong, 1994, 2):
But this change in legislation has not done much for women’s liberation from
male domination. Not every woman has access to better a livelihood despite
the equality laws that have been enshrined in the new Constitution. There are
other equally significant social categories that still stand in many women’s way,
such as class, education, poverty etc. In other words, many women previously
302
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 303

discriminated against under apartheid still experience discrimination

precisely because they are still disadvantaged in multiple ways in post-
apartheid South Africa.
Male violence against women

In addition, many South African women are still plagued by ongoing male
violence. Legislation may have been erected that is meant to enforce women’s
protection, such as the new law that says rapists should get life sentences for
raping someone more than once (Beyond Racism, 1994). However, it is now
becoming increasingly obvious that female subordination does not stem exclu-
sively from legal constraints imposed on women. Women’s oppression is so
much more deeply entrenched than mere legislation:
The concepts and categories that developmental and other psychologists

generate very often have a deep impact on how societies function, as well as the
laws and legal identities that are constructed (Hook, 2001). The ‘normalising’
character of models of human development has significant meaning for who
and what we tend to consider right or wrong ways of living and developing or
mobilising notions of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. To quote from Hook (2001):
The danger of these scientific categories of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is that they
become very loaded terms.
... this scientific language is doing little more than replacing notions of
good/bad, right/sinful with new categories normal/abnormal (146).
303
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 304
Critical Psychology
Rape
This is especially crucial in a context and notion of rape as a social control
practice, and in many ways one that is socially sanctioned. Stereotypical views
about female and male sexuality are often employed in explaining the inci-
dence of rape, such as the idea that many rape victims ‘ask’ to be raped by
virtue of the fact that they are sexually active or promiscuous (the implicit
understanding being that the active sexual person is naturally male), or that
sexual aggression is merely another instance of men acting out their hormonal
natures (see Hollway, 1989). In South Africa a judge handed down a light
sentence on a 54-year-old father accused of raping his 14-year-old daughter
after his action was considered to embody no signs of any sexual deviance
‘outside the family unit’ by the ruling judge (Sunday Times, October 1999). In
another case, a young man was also given a light sentence for the repeated rape
of two 15-year-old girls, which was attributed to the man’s ‘virility’ and also
because one of the girls had been ‘stout’ (naughty) because she had had sex
with someone else two days before (Sunday Times, August 1999).
The above incidences seem to indicate a deep-seated shared understanding
about sexual aggression toward women, including to what degree this is
considered to be a matter to be sympathised with. The labelling of ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ behaviour is proving to be a site where women’s continued
oppression is allowed to continue, and one where feminist psychology can
begin to question the normalising practices a society might have. This is no
more evident than in the controversial anti-rape advertisement shown on
South African television and banned a few years ago after a group of men
accused the advertisers of ‘discrimination against men’ (Monitor, 1999).
Representations of rape in patriarchy

While the inherent message conveyed in the advertisement was that of rape
being endemic in South Africa precisely because so few men seem to take it
seriously and because it raised the crucial question of male complacency in so
pervasive a crime against women and children, many angry men complained
to the advertising board that they were being ‘smeared’, ‘insulted’ and ‘unfairly
labelled rapists’. As one young man put it: ‘I don’t want to be lumped with
them.’ This labeling of ‘normal’ (us) and ‘abnormal’ (them) men effectively
camouflages the complicity and complacency of many so-called ‘normal’ men
– and legal institutions – in the abuse of women (see Harris, Lea & Foster,
1995). Through forms of social arrangement and cultural traditions gender

relations are contextualised and accepted as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. The
system of patriarchy thus maintains and sustains structures of male domi-
nance through systems of collective ideas, and shared assumptions about
gender.
304
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 305

305
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 306
Critical Psychology
ESSENTIALISM IN THEORY: PSYCHOLOGY’S ENGAGEMENT WITH

DIFFERENCE
What is essentialism?
Essentialism: Fuss (1989) defines essentialism to be a ‘belief in the real, true essence of
mode of thought things, in the variable and fixed properties which define the “whatness” of a
that defines indi-
vidual existence as
given identity’ (9). In other words, essentialism is the idea that our identities
secondary to an are somehow fixed and unchangeable, that specific physical and social facts
essence. Essen- about who we are (such as gender, class and race) come to determine our
tialism assigns identities. Now while such facts are certainly relevant in trying to understand
essences to people
and explore identities – recognising the multiplicity of our identities – it
and/or experiences
as a means of would be essentialist for us to define these identities as determined by these
defining and categories or facts. Identity invariably has more to do with how we choose to
explaining them, behave and the kinds of resource (discursive and material) that might be
either through
available to us.
science or philos-
ophy/religion or The word ‘essence’ may be understood to refer to what is natural – already
politics, the existing, but that can be subjected to some or other kind of shaping. Reality is
assumption being therefore just waiting to be discovered. The social science researcher can go out
that people and and ‘discover’ identities, for instance. The word ‘construct’, on the other hand,
objects have an
essential or inherent implies building from scratch. We cannot just go out and discover identity, we
nature that can be must pay attention to the multiple, shifting and very often contradictory
discovered. meanings people draw upon and reproduce to understand themselves and
their social environment. We can do this only by having no preconceived
notions of what people’s lived experiences must be like – because people are
not defined by their race or class or gender or sexuality etc. We cannot simply
use these categories as determining the ‘whatness’ of people’s identities.
Social Essentialism versus social constructionism

constructionism: Essentialism is different from social constructionism in quite specific and signif-
there are many
different interpreta-
icant ways. In essentialism knowledge is discovered through experience, that is,
tions of this we come to acquire and know certain things as a result of having undergone a
concept. The particular event or situation by virtue of our experiences as specific individuals.
common meaning For example, a young black woman will experience markedly different life
underlying the
different ideas is a
events from, say, a middle-aged white man. The social constructionist view,
concern with the however, is that knowledge is constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed
processes by which through ideological discourse. We are not limited into specific roles of race or
human abilities,
class or gender, for instance. Our sense of who we are is in no way connected to
experiences,
an essence. And because ‘experience’ is subjective in nature – meaning we
common sense and
scientific knowledge attribute meanings to events based on the theoretical resources available to us –
are both produced it becomes difficult to tie knowledge and/or experience to an essence or fixed
and reproduced in property. After all we do not always share the same resources in constructing
human communities.
knowledge. This is irrespective of gender, race etc. Multiple and shifting
306
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 307

resources may also mean that knowledge may sometimes be dominantly opera- Essentialism hinders
tive at specific historical points in time. The central notion here is truth as any real and
universal (essentialism) versus truth as arbitrary (social constructionism). worthwhile social
change. It does this
quite simply by
Why is essentialism undesirable? constructing
‘If it’s natural we can’t change it.’ oppressive social
relations as natural
Lieven (1981, 203) and, by default,
unnecessary to have
Essentialism is undesirable for crucial reasons. Perhaps most significantly, to submit to any
essentialism hinders any real and worthwhile social change. It does this quite radical change.
simply by constructing oppressive social relations as natural and, by default,
unnecessary to have to submit to any radical change. Foucault (1984) has
described the ways by which women have been controlled historically by being
defined as either ‘hysterical’ or ‘frigid’. This was effectively legitimated through
an employment of medicalised discourses of sexuality. While this under-
standing of female sexuality may now be generally unpopular and regarded as
unscientific, other equally essentialist constructions of a natural female sexu-
ality may still be effective and dominant in patriarchal society. For instance, it
is not uncommon to hear women described as maternal, intuitive, vain, seduc-
tive and sometimes irrational.
The ‘discourse of nature’ as a means of oppression

These are all constructions that make use of a nature argument to define
female sexuality. Women are defined as naturally different. And it is because
they are naturally maternal that nurturing and familial roles are prescribed for
them. It is because they are naturally seductive to men – to the extent that they
may unwittingly ‘invite’ male sexual aggression – that their sexuality needs to
be controlled and watched over. If women are naturally irrational, then they
certainly cannot be allowed to occupy leadership positions over men. On the
contrary, they are in dire need of having decisions made for them by more
naturally rational (male) minds.
Guillaumin (1995) has argued that the surest route to legitimising any ille-
gitimate power over any group of people is to use the nature discourse – the
essence of what it means to belong to a particular racial or gender group is
futile to oppose what is natural. And trying to redress social injustice is of little
significance and a waste of economic resources precisely because we cannot

change nature. Because female subordination is seen to stem directly from
biological differences as opposed to social relationships themselves, it is
perceived to be both natural and unchangeable: ‘... if we are ever oppressed or
exploited, it is the result of our nature. Or, better still, our nature is such that
we are oppressed, exploited, appropriated’ (Guillaumin, 1995, 225).
307
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 308
Critical Psychology
The essentialising of identity

This essentialising of identity is not only restricted to gender. Fanon (1952) has
argued that racist language often employs such naturalist discourses as a legit-
imating tool for racial oppression. Racist language may ‘infantilise’,
‘primitivise’, ‘decivilise’ and ‘essentialise’ the black man by making him ‘the
eternal victim of an essence for which he is not responsible’ (Fanon, 1952, 35)
(see here Derek Hook’s chapter in this work: Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko,
Theory is a ‘psychopolitics’ and critical psychology). Being defined and understood solely
necessary tool for
the transformation in terms of an essence means that we become, again in the words of Fanon,
of both private and ‘trapped’ in categories we are unable to reject, we are reduced to that one
public conscious- defining category of ‘black’, ‘woman’, African’ etc. This is a trap many femi-
ness, and this may nists have been unable to get out of and one that proponents of an African
hopefully lead to a
disempowering of
feminism should continually be aware of. The term ‘African woman’ is a social
deeply entrenched category just like any other, and while we need to engage with the varied and
power structures in multiple life experiences of many African women, we also need to beware of
people’s lives. universalising these experiences and identities.
How race and gender combine in oppression

Any feminist agenda that seeks to explore and redress female subordination
should pay attention to the varied social realities of race, class and other social
categories, acknowledging these as different aspects of gender relations. A
feminist critical agenda is especially well placed to open up dialogue within which
these categories can be analysed in relation to gender identity. This process would
mean having to re-evaluate the old theoretical models that have constructed and
promoted the notion of a unitary model of women’s identities and experiences.
Feminist and critical race theorists often treat gender and race separately, to the
detriment of both feminist and anti-racist psychologies. African feminist practice
is significant in its emphasis on race as a critical aspect of female subordination.
The dominant trends in gender research

Finchilescu (1995) identifies two dominant theoretical trends in gender
research in South African psychology: essentialism (biological and social
differences) and social constructionism. The first kind of essentialism in theo-
rising gender is classified as biological essentialism, in which the purpose and
underlying theory of psychological research was to prove the significance of
biological differences between men and women, that is genetic and/or

hormonal explanations for sex-related behaviour. Research such as this relies
on a notion of ‘nature’ to explain and justify gender relations (Goldberg, 1996;
Guillaumin, 1995). Thus we might have studies seeking to explain male sexual
aggression in such biological terms as male hormones in overdrive (Hollway,
1989) or a naturally intuitive or maternal trait (Alldred, 1996).
308
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 309

The second kind of essentialist theorising is that which defines gender

difference as social as opposed to natural (Finchilescu, 1995). Gender roles are
recognised to be socially constructed and having some significant implications
for the way men and women live in society. This approach seeks to redefine the
negative connotations surrounding the notion of gender difference, with the
true essence of women constructed in positive terms. Another underlying Social creativity:
notion in this approach is the idea that all women are the same – in their attempt to redefine
existing group
essence – and there is no major difference to be spoken of. characteristics in
positive terms, as a
Social creativity means of changing
the negative social
The above approach employs Tajfel’s (1959) notion of social creativity as a identity of in-group
form of cognitive alternative. This notion basically argues that members of an members. A
out-group may sometimes employ a strategy of altering the negative stereo- common example of
types of the group by redefining some group characteristic in more positive this is the popular
‘Black is beautiful’
terms. For example, previous assumptions of women as naturally maternal
movement which
(which may have conveyed negative connotations) may be redefined by some seeks to define
women as something positive and of value. black culture in
The immediate problem with the above approach is that it does not seek to more positive terms
than it has
question the notion of a natural difference between men and women. This is
historically been
taken as a given. Thus the term ‘gender’ itself is not seen to be a social construct defined.
(see Shefer, 2001) and the category ‘woman’ is uncritically assumed. Further-
more this approach is often devoid of much politically progressive social
psychology in the sense that it does not consider the social, political, cultural,
economic and historical factors of social contexts (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, Cognitive
1992). alternative:
perception that the
Social context in gender status relations
between groups are
The second trend in psychological research is the social constructionist changeable to the
approach which emphasised the construction of the social context and the extent that a
separating of gender behaviour from the actor (Finchislescuieu, 1995). Gender complete reversal of
such status is
identity was now seen to be something constantly changing and in multiple
feasible. Change in
forms so that it becomes theoretically limiting to assume that all women are social identity is
the same. Identity was not something that could easily be stamped on an rooted in an
individual. individual’s first
perceiving that such
change is possible.
Awareness of how ‘difference’ might imply kinds of essentialism
Hollway (1989) has, however, cautioned against an essentialising practice

when theorising any form of identity. This is a crucial and ever-present pitfall
to be constantly aware of whenever one engages with the notion of ‘difference’.
However much we need to explore the gender experiences of marginalised
groups, we must be careful about reproducing essentialist constructions.
309
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 310
Critical Psychology
BOX 6 ‘All The Women Are White, All The Blacks Are Men, But Some Of Us Are Brave’
The above title is taken from a fairly recent class and religious minority: ‘... women who are
anthology by black American female writers, at risk of both race and gender discrimination
exploring their discontent with mainstream are also “doubly at risk of violence”, particu-
theoretical tendency to prioritise race over larly if they are from marginalised communities’
gender and vice versa. Indeed, psychology’s (report by Christina Stucky, Sunday Indepen-
reluctance to engage directly with issues simul- dent, 2001). The idea is not to exclude one form
taneously relating to both gender and race – of identity over another, but rather to point out
thereby emphasising the multiple forms of the impracticality of privileging and exploring
identity – has largely worked to the detriment one way of being-in-the-world as a human
of many marginalised women. At the World being. Different societies accord varying levels
Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in of importance to race, class, gender, ethnicity
Durban in 2001, attention was given to the etc, and therefore it makes sense to assume
double and triple discrimination many women that gender is experienced differently by
face globally because they were of a racial, women all over the world.
Another way of saying this is that in the quest to be ‘different’ feminists may
reproduce differences that are even more harmful than previous constructions
of differences. This is irrespective of approach. Hendricks et al (1994, 218)
emphasise this point further in their assertion that ‘[f]eminists who have
worked under the banner of “African Feminism” have developed essentialist
ideas very similar to those of womanists’.
More than this, we continually need to guard against a one-dimensional
approach to theorising gender issues in which a ‘romanticised’ view of the
social system only serves to further distort gender relations. This is in partic-
ular reference to feminist theories that have been developed as
counter-arguments to the mainstream, and which may often be in danger of
misrepresenting and silencing marginalised women’s experiences of gender.
While mainstream representation of a universal patriarchal system presents a
distorted lens of gender experience, it is equally misleading to assume that a
universal African patriarchal system exists or, even worse, was non-existent
until the advent of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Ogundipe-Leslie (1994,
216) has questioned: ‘What is feminism in the context of Africa ...? We must
define specificities ... we cannot generalize Africa.’
The central tenets of African Feminism at times seem to reinscribe the very
forms of cultural essentialism for which mainstream feminism has been
condemned. This is even more evident in the assumption that Western, white
feminists are unable to know or even represent African women’s experiences in
a truthful or sympathetic manner. This assumption in effect says ‘only black
African women can research their own experiences of gender’. This is a
misguided notion that inevitably may prove theoretically limiting for many
marginalised women. Post-colonial theorist Edward Said criticises this notion
310
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 311

as well when he says: ‘I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that
only a black man can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so
forth’ (cited in Moore-Gilbert, 1997, 53).
BOX 7 ‘Beyond the Essentialism of (some) Constructionists’
French feminist scholar Colette Guillaumin (1995) has questioned the tendency
towards essentialism evident not just in mainstream psychological theory but
also amongst feminist social constructionist debates. Many constructionists
equally fail to escape essentialism (Fuss, 1989). The practice is to
take diversity into account by fragmenting the subject into multiple identi-
ties: women of colour, white women, bourgeois women, proletarian women,
black proletarian women, and so on. But this operation [...] specifies, and
does not counteract essentialism, as each sub-category is seen as possessing
its own self-referential essence’ (16–17).
As a means of guarding against such reductionism we would need to engage

continually in a deconstructionist process regarding any knowledge system
that attempts to theorise identity and social relations. The focus here is on
contextualised knowledge-production, that is, the need to approach all knowl-
edge of identity-gender – as instances of discursive practice. It is through an
acknowledgement of power as embedded within all representations that we
can really begin to trace key origins of female subordination.
FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY

Double consciousness
It is also here that post-colonial theory can be applied as a particularly effective Post-colonial
means for deconstructing Eurocentric knowledge systems, as well as in seeking theory:
orientation critical
to explore marginalised women’s identities. Gilroy (1994) uses the notion of a to understanding
‘double-consciousness’ to explore that sense of marginal identity by which an the relationship
individual from an oppressed group seeks to understand him- or herself between colonisers
through the eyes of the dominant culture, thereby fostering and sustaining a and colonised, and
the psychological,
sort of self-loathing. This phenomenon of a double consciousness can be doubly
material and
experienced by many black women who would have to engage with subjective cultural effects of
inferioritisation on more than one level – manifested through racial and patri- these relationships.
archal ideology. Post-colonial theory can be deployed to explore this double

internalisation process by seeking to subvert racist and sexist constructions,
and at the same time emphasise the worthiness and autonomy of black women
– a process Hendricks et al (1994, 224) refer to as ‘mental decolonization’.
The post-colonial woman’s experience of gender is inextricably tied to
social categories of ‘race’, class and political inferiority. Both post-colonial
311
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:42 am Page 312
Critical Psychology
theory and feminism seek to explore and interrogate dominant power struc-
tures that continue to oppress historically marginalised groups in society.
Although the two schools of thought can hardly be said to be complementary
– certain post-colonial theorists would suggest that Western feminism has
itself served implicitly colonial interests (Gandhi, 1998) – they can arguably be
deployed in several respects to form an even stronger force than they tradi-
tionally might be on their own.
The phenomenon of
a double conscious-
ness can be doubly
experienced by
many black women
who would have to
engage with
subjective inferiori-
tisation on more
than one level –
manifested through
racial and patriar-
chal ideology.
A black womanist vision of humanity

This understanding of gender identity is one that has further been adopted by
Womanist theorists who emphasise the power of resistance inherent in any act
of self-naming. Womanist theory seeks to promote an awareness of African
women to the empowering process of self-definition: ‘Fundamental to
Womanist theory
seeks to promote an womanism is the realisation that to merely invert the terms of reference is not,
awareness of in itself, a successful mode of struggle’ (Abrahams, 2002, 60). Asserting one’s
African women to femininity or Blackness must involve a process of defining for oneself a black
the empowering
‘womanist vision of humanity’.
process of self-
definition: Critical psychology can promote an understanding and critical engagement
‘Fundamental to of how gendered and racially minoritised bodies can and do negotiate their
womanism is the identities and policies across varied historical and contemporary domains.
realisation that to Hendricks et al (1994) have observed that the feminist trend as is currently
merely invert the
terms of reference played out in South Africa is something resembling a contestation of experience
is not, in itself, a and not collaboration. On the one hand, white women feel caught in a defensive
successful mode of position within which they need continually to reaffirm their right to represent
struggle’ (Abrahams, everyone – white and black – and, on the other hand, black women testify to
2002, 60).
personal oppression as their right to speak for marginalised groups.
312
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:43 am Page 313

The dangers of ignoring difference

It is important to reiterate: if one ignores differences one distorts reality.
Choosing to ignore the power relations that have been built on these perceived
differences, however well intentioned one may be, would merely reinforce
these relations of power in the interests of those holding power. At the same
time, while we should avoid theorising such simplistic ideas of global sister-
hood and ignore relative power dynamics, this practice and principle must also
apply to any notion of a supposed sisterhood among ‘Third World’ women.
What is certainly needed is a reconceptualising of the notion of ‘difference’

between women. That is, we should seek to eradicate all difference between
women in the name of global sisterhood and yet, simultaneously, explore and
acknowledge the diverse national and cultural identities separating women. It
is with this same principle that Mohanty (1987, 31) has questioned: ‘Can I
speak of difference without speaking Difference? ’ For her, contemporary
feminism needs to ground itself in a ‘self-conscious politics of location’.
The interrelatedness of gender and race as factors of oppression

Perhaps we also need to move beyond an attempt to locate or pinpoint priori-

ties of oppression (race versus gender) but rather seek to explore the
interrelatedness of these two aspects of oppression as well as their interde-
pendency. Critical psychology’s strength should lie in a centring of the
experience of minority women in a variety of social sites, thereby seeking to
invite a broader examination of social space as well as avoid a homogenised
313
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:43 am Page 314
Critical Psychology
and typified construction of subjects we seek to represent – and in doing so

further ‘othering’ them. One way to counteract such a pitfall would be for
trained gender researchers to seek to involve untrained black women in
research as a means of sharing skills-research and theoretical concepts. Van
Niekerk (1991) has suggested a focus on trying to develop a broader range of
research and communication techniques. This is particularly significant in the
light of the fact that many rural African women do grapple with illiteracy and
most indigenous cultures are characterised by oral and dramatic traditions of
expression. Feminist theory can certainly be enhanced in such attempts at
exploring the worldviews of many marginalised women, especially in discov-
ering new and challenging gender identities.
CONCLUSION
Finally, by way of conclusion, Hendricks et al (1994, 217) re-adapt post-
colonial feminist Chandra Mohanty’s guidelines for exploring identity and
meaning. These are challenging issues worth repeating here:
How do different communities of women define feminism?
Whose history do we draw on to chart women’s engagement with
feminism?
How do questions of gender, ‘race’, nation and other identities intersect in
determining feminisms?
How do we produce knowledge about ourselves and others, and with what
assumptions?
What methods do we use to identify and describe different women’s
subjectivity and self-interests?
What are the politics of the production of this knowledge?
Which conventions limit our production of this knowledge?
Perhaps subscribing to the notion of African feminisms is like that of feminist
psychology in naming a site of critique, contestation and debate between its
terms, rather than claiming an integration or harmony between the two
standpoints. Feminist arguments necessarily challenge prevailing patriarchal
structures, while African-centred perspectives need to continue to press femi-
nists to address the cultural and political implications of frameworks that bear
the history and cultural privilege of their European and US-American origins.

1. ‘Perhaps the paradox is inherent: in challenging a system of subordination

by gender, feminist psychologists have attempted to re-mediate a sex bias in
research and to demonstrate a uniquely feminine experience. But
construing gender as a property of individuals, rather than as a set of inter-
active processes that form a system of subordination, leads back to
314
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap11 11/2/04 10:43 am Page 315

questions about the nature and meaning of difference that have preoccupied
feminist psychology for so long’ (Crawford in Gergen & Davis, 1997, 281).
Using this quotation as a springboard, critically discuss the range of
debates that feminist researchers are compelled to engage with in pursuing
their research (and its consequences) as a form of feminist activism.
2. ‘Anti-essentialism is the key to democracy.’
Critically discuss the ways in which feminist psychology, including the
theories of black and ‘Third World’ women, may be seen sometimes to
reproduce essentialist notions of gender and experience and how theory
can seek to avoid such a non-liberating approach to theorising gender expe-
riences.
3. ‘The destabilisation and uncertainty of accommodating difference and
deconstructing stable categories and concepts have generated anxiety
about whether feminism will abandon its political thrust’ (Hendricks &
Lewis, 1994, 63).
In what ways can a South African critical feminist psychological agenda
be seen to address and speak directly to the particular needs of South
African women while also addressing original feminist principles of a
universal oppression shared by women?
Squire, C. (1989). Significant differences: Feminism in psychology. London:
Routledge.
Tong, R. (1998). Feminist thought: A more comprehensive introduction. 2nd
edition. Oxford: Westview Press.
Burman, E., Alldred, A., Bewley, C., Goldberg, B., Heenan, C., Marks, D.,
Marshall, J., Taylor, K., Ullah, R., & Warner, S. (eds) (1996). Challenging
women: Psychology’s exclusions, feminist possibilities. London: Open
University Press.
Mama, A. (1995). Beyond the masks: Race, gender and subjectivity. London:
Routledge.
Ogundipe-Leslie, M. (1994). Re-creating ourselves: African women and critical
transformations. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Acknowledgement
The author acknowledges the contribution of Erica Burman to this chapter.
315
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 316
Chapter
12
Critical reflections on
community and psychology
in South Africa
Thabani Ngonyama Ka Sigogo & Oscar Tso Modipa
‘South African researchers should be less concerned with chasing

Nobel Prizes than getting their hands dirty with the less fame-producing
but more essential process of doing work relevant to the vast problems
posed by our own needs as a third world community.’
Dutkewitz (in Dawes, 1986, 44)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to:
Describe and explain critical views in community practice in the context of commu-
nity psychology
Discuss an Africanist perspective on community
Understand challenges to community practice within the African context
Critique community practice within an Africanist perspective.
316
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 317
Critical reflections on community and psychology in South Africa

INTRODUCTION: THINKING ABOUT ‘COMMUNITIES’

Community psychology in this chapter focuses on issues of subjectivity and on
how communities in South Africa are influenced by sociocultural, socio-
economic, political and historical events. The concept ‘community’ refers to a
sense of coherence that enables people to make sense of their social actions,
social interactions and thought processes. Shared experiences among people
gathered in ‘community’ contribute to the creation of a ‘common character’.
Recently, in the South African context, the term has acquired political meaning
and reflects the political histories and beliefs of people in a given sociopolitical
context (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). In addition, the concept is used to refer to
African communities, in their diversities, interacting with different political
environments.
Problematising ‘communities’
It is important here, at the very outset of this chapter, that we discuss some of
the possible connotations of this term. It seems that the use of the term
‘community’ in South Africa has come almost automatically to refer to
economically disadvantaged groups, which, given the history of apartheid, and
the ongoing economic divisions characteristic of the post-apartheid era, are
typically those of black South Africans. As a result, we need to be aware of how
the idea of ‘community’ can come to operate as a code for race and, more than
this, how it might start to work as a term that connotes certain ideas of racial
difference. This is one objection to the term – that it might be a way of
discretely anchoring a sense of racial differences (for how often does one speak
of ‘white communities’, particularly within the domain of South African
community psychology?). This example in fact directs us to a second possible
objection to the use of the term ‘communities’ – that it might be seen as playing
a role in a greater discourse of avoidance of issues of race and privilege. Again,
the fact that one hardly ever hears mention of ‘white communities’ in South
African psychology should alert us to the fact that there is a pressing history of
structural privilege and dispossession in South Africa that should not be
neglected in imagining that all social groupings in South Africa have shared the
same social, political and economic benefits. Every community provides an
opportunity for the development of practices that are critical of power, and the
task of critical psychology is to introduce reflexive critique into the heart of the
community itself.
The state of the discipline in South Africa

There have been concerted efforts among practitioners of mainstream
psychology to reflect on the state of the discipline in view of social and political
changes that have taken place particularly in South Africa. Questions about the
317
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 318
Critical Psychology
discipline’s legitimacy have revolved around its relevance and commitment to

addressing the practical needs of marginalised communities (Dawes, 1986;
Ivey, 1986). For example, psychology is criticised for failing to engage actively
in the struggle to change the circumstances of the poverty-stricken and
oppressed majority within the African context. Holdstock (2000) notes that
often the agendas of practitioners and the priorities of communities differ.
Other authors accuse psychology of exploiting rather than serving the needs of
African communities (Berger & Lazarus, 1987; Bulhan, 1985; Nicholas, 1990;
Nsamenang 1993, cited in Bakker, 1996). These authors in turn have called for
a psychology that will serve as an instrument of liberation, with an emphasis
on restructuring and developing communities which have suffered under
exclusionary political and economic systems (Martín-Baró, 1994).
Challenges to community psychologists

Rhoads (1997) challenges practitioners to (1) situate their practice within
the communities they serve, (2) rethink their relationships with these
Social communities and (3) focus on social transformation. Social transformation
transformation: refers to the initiatives that are aimed at helping to reorganise human rela-
refers to the
initiatives aimed at
tionships through challenging oppressive structures or relationships and
helping reorganise changing the systems that represent injustice (Prilleltensky & Nelson,
human relationships 1997). In addition, Bakker (1996) believes that in Africa psychologists
through challenging themselves are alienated, oppressed and in need of liberation. In order for
oppressive
the psychologists to remedy this situation, Bakker challenges them to take
structures or
relationships and their services to communities.
changing the It is of particular importance that community psychology has only rela-
systems that tively recently been introduced into South Africa (Bhana & Kanjee, 2001), and
represent injustice. not in Africa as a whole for a long time. However, despite the importance of the
novel perspective reflected in this understanding of psychology, it must not
undermine the longstanding practice of community work of black African
people evidenced until recently, by their communal lifestyles, their values, and
their traditions. To claim that community practice or community work is new
among African people would be exaggerating and mystifying our role as
academics in the project of knowledge-production. Academics have been criti-
cised for engaging in knowledge-production that is self-serving with little
regard for the role of the communities in these processes. Seedat (1997)
critiques the tendency of psychologists to exclude marginalised groups at the
level of knowledge-production. Equally significantly, he notes that the

psychologies of Europe and US-America are cultural derivatives of Western
value systems. African communities are rich with practices that are not
adequately documented and often inaccurately represented in mainstream
psychological literature. For example, indabas – traditional courts and
cleansing ceremonies – are a familiar social restoration process among the
318
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 319

people of southern Africa. They have been part of African societies for
centuries. Folklore, as another example, has sustained and enriched the
learning process of African children. One challenge for psychologists seeking
to value these contributions would include the careful documentation of such
practices and, where possible, participation in the reconstruction of local or
indigenous knowledge. This process of knowledge reconstruction is thus
informed by the traditional cultural practices of the peoples about whom we
write. Their traditional practices are the ordinary ways of doing things or, in
the words of psychologists and sociologists, the everyday practices of daily
living among people who have grown to understand, value, and accept them-
selves and their ways of being and doing.
BOX 1 Sociocultural rituals
Certain sociocultural rituals bring a sense of relief and well-being into commu-
nities. Such rituals may act as means of psychosocial adjustment in the face of
continued misfortunes. Particularly important here is the spiritual symbolism of
rites that enable people to communicate with the celestial world. For example,
beer brewing is practised in some African communities to cleanse a family from
bad luck. When there are several unexplained deaths in the family or accidents
that are perceived to be too frequent, such rites are engaged in to rebuild
confidence and a sense of well-being in the family. Ukuthethela is a long- Ukuthethela:
standing tradition among the Nguni people. The ceremony is usually conducted pleading for
after a harvest. The beer for the ceremony is usually made by an elderly woman spiritual well-being
in the community. Specific seeds from sorghum are selected from the harvest and support from
to brew this kind of beer. The seed would be put in water to soak and the owner ancestral spirits.
of the homestead would call all the relatives to report to the ancestors that the
family is in the process of preparing the special beer for the ritualistic
ceremony. If there is any woman occupying the position of a grand mother, she
will be requested to bless the ceremony. The owner of the homestead wakes up
early in the morning and approaches the spiritual beast in the kraal (inkomo
yamadlozi) to report on the occasion of the ceremony, including its purpose.
The beast symbolically stands as a medium of communication between the
living and the ancestral spirits. (For a more detailed discussion of these issues,
Community
see Ndlovu, Ndlovu & Ncube (1995).
psychologists can
play a useful role in
fostering
Community psychologists can play a useful role in fostering and reflexively community
questioning community narratives that re-present such practices – thereby narratives that re-
present such
revitalising local practices and communities. We must situate ourselves in the

practices – thereby
context of writing the stories narrated by local people without denying a safeguarding
human face to the stories that we hear nor the reality that we are able to see historic traditions
through collaborating with these informants. This chapter brings these issues and revitalising
to the fore through articulating community practice, theory and methods of local practices and
communities.
conducting such practice, as informed by critical psychology.
319
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 320
Critical Psychology
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Within the broad framework of community psychology, community
psychology practitioners can choose from a range of intervention strategies,
each of which has implications for the relationships that the practitioner can
and will develop with the communities with whom they work. Such choices are
influenced by the practitioners’ values, belief systems, and professional orien-
tations. For example, some practitioners adopt the position of advocate or
activist, with a focus on challenging the state’s policies in relation to affected
communities.
Community practice as activism

This chapter seeks to address community practice as advocacy or activism,
types of community practice that are all too often taken for granted or
dismissed as nostalgia for the past. One reason for this dismissal is that some
mainstream psychologists view any reference to the past as ‘idealised retro-
spection’. We would argue, in contrast, that this position prioritises European
and US-American psychology at the expense of indigenous psychologies. There
is a relationship of dis-ease between the emerging indigenous knowledge
system grounded in the African experience and academic knowledge systems,
with the latter subjugating the former. Academic knowledge has a distinct
advantage in this relationship, particularly because of being written and well
documented. A post-modern or contemporary psychology is thus challenged
to seek dialogue with practitioners of local customs and traditions and genera-
tors of indigenous or local knowledge, towards developing an understanding
of their underlying subjectivity and meaning-making. Academic psychological
knowledge must recognise the importance of learning about local cultures and
of understanding them from within their ‘own frame of reference’ (Kim, 1990,
379). Towards that goal we identify and discuss several major assumptions
about community as well as selected local or traditional practices emergent
from a number of African communities. We clarify some of the ways in which
the practice of community psychology as advocacy and activism helps us value
these communities while elucidating the meaning of their practices for
Western psychological understanding.
African social life is richly contradictory, and experience is relayed through
proverbs that maintain and challenge how a community understands itself
(see Box 2).
Ritual as a socialisation rite

One of the major assumptions about community in an African setting is that
social behaviour is greatly influenced by practices that have a long-standing
historical origin. Despite external, modernising influences, certain traditions
320
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 321

BOX 2 Ndebele proverbs
Proverb Translation Meaning
Emuva kuphambili What was behind is now in front Past deeds often have a way of catching up
with a person; so one must take heed how
one acts here and now. Be pleasant to people
now so that they have pleasant memories of
you. Treat someone badly today, tomorrow he
may seek a way of getting his revenge
Induku kayilamuzi/ The knobkerrie has no kraal/home One who keeps beating his wife will end up
Induku kayakhi muzi The knobkerrie does not build a home with no wife and no children
Inkunzi emnyama A black bull spoils the calves A bad leader wields bad influence
iyawona amathole
Kwabo kagwala There is no mourning at the place A coward would not place himself in danger
akulasililo of the coward in any campaign, but he would then preserve
his life. Discretion is better than valour.
Prevention is better than cure
Ubukhosi ngamazolo Kingship is dew Use your power or authority wisely lest it
disappears and you suffer the treatment you
dished out to others under you
Inkomo ehambayo The beast on the move doesn’t Don’t be worried when the unexpected
kayiqedi tshani eat all the grass visitor turns up; he won’t ‘eat you out of
house’, so entertain him with kindness
Isisu somhambi The stomach of a traveller is not When a traveller found himself in a strange
kasinganani, large, it’s only the size of a small place, and was hungry, he would approach
singangophonjwana horn of a goat a kraal, enter and greet the occupants
lwembuzi with this greeting, thus explaining his needs.
Don’t refuse to help a stranger who asks for
sustenance
Kusinwa It is danced and then they give This is the way a dance goes, each person
kudedelwana way to others in turn showing his or her skill and then
giving way to the next. Be fair and let others
have a turn (to speak, to act etc)
Umunwe kawuzikhombi A finger doesn’t point at itself One who points the accusing finger at others
in order to avoid admitting his own faults or
crimes
Source: Adapted from Pelling (1977).
and customs have been passed on from one generation to the next and
continue to be valued by the community. For example, circumcision in the
Xhosa community has been regarded by those who practise it as having major
321
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 322
Critical Psychology
psychosocial implications in the development of personhood for young men

within the community. As an initiation rite it informs and is informed by
socialisation beliefs and practices for young men. Current distortions that crit-
icise the practice as being dangerous notwithstanding, a closer look at the
underlying value of this practice shows that it plays an important educational
role and should not be reduced to its biological function, that is, the cutting of
the fore skin. Such initiation processes inform us about the development of a
person to a stage of being given responsibilities that adult life demands of a
member of the community. During the initiation the person is taught how to
handle social responsibilities such as taking care of the homestead, how to
communicate with other people and nurture relationships (Ncube et al, 1995).
The social and cultural significance of this event – as in the Hebrew tradition
of circumcision – cannot simply be dismissed. Social transformation of this
practice may engage the community in looking at the conditions under which
the practice is done, including the instruments used, in order to safeguard
young boys undergoing the ritual.
BOX 3 Nguni death rituals
Given that adult life is considered sacred to the ately closed, and their knees bent into a squat-
Nguni people, the death of a member of the ting position. The person is not buried the
social community is viewed as something of a same day she or he dies for the sake of relatives
threatening event. This is particularly the case who need to bid farewell. If the deceased is the
given that adults are seen as playing an impor- owner of the homestead, the person would be
tant role as protectors or ‘shields’ of the buried next to the kraal before his cattle are
community. If the person is very old and taken for grazing. He or she would be covered
happens to be sick, both the person and the with the skin of the cow that is slaughtered
community are helped to prepare for the death. during the preparation for death ceremony.
All the children of the ill person are called and Historically, the slaughtering of the beast is
informed about the possible end of life. Histor- viewed as extremely significant, as it is
ically, and depending on certain circumstances, believed that the person is going on a long
a cow would be slaughtered and the sick person journey to another world different from the
given its liver in the belief that her or his spirit earth. She or he needs something to eat on the
was waiting, or needing, to be given some way or to carry food for those people ahead of
blood before the ascension to the next world. If the deceased. People would eat after the burial.
the person does not die after this event, then All the tools used for the burial are kept under
one of the pieces of wood (uthungo) that a granary waiting for cleansing, which is
support the roof directly above the door accompanied by cleansing beer (utshwala
entrance is broken. After the eventual death of bamanzi). (For a more detailed description see
the person in question, their eyes are immedi- Ndlovu, Ndlovu & Ncube (1995).)
Collectivism
Another important assumption underlying African community and well-being
is the sense of collectivism. This sense of collectivism has implications for the
322
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 323

social interaction of members of the community and is perceived as fostering Ilima:

social harmony and social continuity. Continuity here refers to the need for the social gathering of
community to see itself extending in generations through various social forma- neighbours to work
tions. The importance of collectivism is thus reflected in multiple community on an activity or
project on behalf of
practices. For example, individual decisions are very powerfully informed by their neighbour
the wishes of the significant others within the family and the community. Prac- which is usually
tices such as collective rearing of children and ilima have direct implications followed by feasting
for survival and continuity within the African communities. Problems within and social drinking
of beer or
families are hence as much the concern of the extended family as they are of the
refreshments.
broader community. Any disruption in the nuclear family is viewed as unset-
tling the broader community, and this opens the opportunity for something
new to appear.
The needs and concerns of rural African communities have for far too long been
marginalised by Eurocentric forms of psychology.
Multiple forms of life

In a reciprocal and dialectic manner, the issue of personhood has direct impli-
cations for collectivism and, more particularly, for harmonious social relations
within the community. Problems are resolvable through community systems
and structures that interpret social behaviour within its sociocultural meaning
systems. Moreover, there is a strong sense of connectedness between human

life, nature and the spiritual and celestial world. It is a common understanding
‘that physical and mental illness is a result of a distortion or disturbance in the
harmony between’ human nature and the cosmos (Ebigbo 1989, 91). Ebigbo
(1989) suggests further that there is a sense of harmony – between the various
facets of living and non-living, natural and supernatural, health and disease.
323
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 324
Critical Psychology
(For further discussion of African metaphysics, see Nhlanhla Mhkize’s chapter

Psychology: An African perspective.)
African meaning-making
This brief discussion of assumptions underlying life within some African
communities is introductory, not comprehensive. We offer it as a starting point
for community psychology practitioners who seek to develop relationships with
local African communities. We argue that these community psychologists must
also adapt a critical point of departure and work as advocates and activists. This
is necessary because the sense of meaning-making and of being in African
communities or what other psychologists have called the African worldview has
been silenced, distorted and disparaged by the colonial discourse. Practitioners
and theoreticians seeking to develop a critical psychology within an African
context need to engage this material and local communities with a certain
degree of curiosity – and humility. The task of a critical community psycholo-
gist is to be able to speak with members of a community against oppressive
practices, not to lecture them about where they have gone wrong.
CRITICAL COMMUNITY PRACTICE

Community professionals
Many professionals engage in community practice, while no profession has
claimed it exclusively as its own. Social workers are involved in projects that
reach out to communities with the intention of assisting them in dealing with
their problems (Lombard, Meyers & Schoeman, 1991). Public health practi-
tioners focus on developing strategies for ensuring that the public benefits
through health promotion, a subfield now known as ‘community health
Empowerment: promotion’. Notions of empowerment are now more explicitly used in the
the simultaneous public health arena than ever before (Butchart & Kruger, 2001). By empower-
development of a
certain state of
ment here we mean to refer to those processes by which structural conditions
mind (feeling are modified so that a reallocation of power is made possible; this process also
powerful, involves a subjective component, a sense of personal empowerment, through
competent, worthy being able to take on a great social agency for social change and power. These
of esteem) and
are among some of the many professions that are currently regarding commu-
modification of
structural nity practice as central to the appropriate delivery of services.
conditions in order Community psychology offers multiple resources for engaging in commu-
to reallocate power nity practice. Some practitioners have developed a combination of methods
(eg modifying the
and strategies that draw families, groups and communities together in order to
structure of
opportunities open articulate needs and problems through processes that draw on their local prac-
to people). tices and beliefs. For example, popular theatre that is culture-specific has been
used in certain communities to help them express their needs and identify
strategies for confronting the problems being faced (see, for example, Hinsdale,
324
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 325

Lewis, & Waller (1995) or Mda (1993)). Alternative methods and strategies for
engaging the community challenge models for conceptualising and responding
to the needs of the community that treat the community as objects of investiga-
tion rather than as subjects of their own realities (Lykes, 1997; Lykes, 2000).
Developing an identity for community psychology

In South Africa the practice of community psychology has struggled to develop
its identity. The professional practice of psychology, primarily clinical treatment
of white affluent patients, has attracted suspicion from the liberatory-oriented
academics for some decades (Seedat, 1997; Seedat, 1998). For community
psychology to be accepted, it had to express itself differently, creating a
discernible distance from more conservative practices of psychology. The intro-
duction of a critical community perspective on practice offers community
psychologists a set of assumptions for developing a praxis that has the potential
to render liberatory services with and for the community. These assumptions
question the established ways through which human service practitioners view
community practice and their traditional strategies for developing relationships
with the communities and of collaborating with other professionals from other
disciplines. This understanding also calls for redefinition of the roles of human
service providers, as it requires of them to take on multiple roles as direct service
providers, consultants, trainers, advocates and activists. This approach further
calls for practitioners to be critical of and address the systemic and/or structural
sources of human and community problems, and to ‘strive for promotion of
enlightenment, [while] condemn[ing the] psychic mutilation of the individual
by sociopolitical structures’ (Ivey, 1986, 24).
The political challenges of community psychology

The challenge of developing a truly critical community psychology can be seen
within a three-decades-old historical debate calling for a relevant community
practice within the African context (Dawes, 1986). Psychologists such as Dawes
(1986) have called for continued dialogue and debate that informs praxis,
emphasising issues of accessibility and the appropriateness of practice. For
example, some have argued that the political struggles of the past four decades
have justified and contributed to the development of relevant and accessible
community psychology in South Africa (Swartz & Gibson, 2001). Others point
out that despite some changes, psychology remains predominantly white and
the services are to a large extent not accessible to the majority of black people in
South Africa (Seedat, 1998). Still others point out that in order to be successful,
community practice must be South African (Swartz & Gibson, 2001). Yet South
Africa is diverse, with more than 22 languages and many cultural traditions.
Thus some challenge this call for the Africanisation of psychology, arguing that
it reflects intolerance of what is regarded as non-African.
325
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 326
Critical Psychology
While attempts are being made to correct the wrongs of the past, contem-
porary practitioners and academics seem to have difficulties shaking off the
politics of exclusion, which have been typical of apartheid South Africa. Critical
community practice is challenged to recognise that inclusion is a central tenet
of progressive psychology. This core value of theory and practice is reflected in,
for example, work with African immigrants who are often treated as outsiders.
They constitute South Africa as much as South Africa constitutes what is
African. This core value of a critical community psychology intersects with the
African tradition of hospitality towards outsiders, as exemplified in African
Amazwahlaka- wisdom (amazwahlakaniphileyo). Thus we see, in this concrete example of
niphileyo: work among immigrant communities a possible articulation between critical
words of wisdom.
community psychology and indigenous practices, reflecting the integration of
two knowledge systems towards the development of a third. Moreover,
through this example, we argue that any psychological practice that does not
articulate South Africa’s connections with the rest of the continent can never
be described as progressive, critical or liberatory.
Xenophobia – that is, the fear

or hatred of other nationalities
or immigrants – features as a
dominant problem of social
prejudice in contemporary
South Africa. It is one of the
many political issues that is of
crucial concern to community
psychologists.
Critical community psychology and political correctness

Community practice discourse must transcend political correctness and a
sense of being part of political movements. Clearly, community psychology
326
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 327

should avoid becoming merely the instrument or the handmaiden of a polit- Critical community
ical party, and should keep its allegiances firmly fixed on the basic needs of psychology needs to
the members of the communities in which it works. Highly proclaimed polit- be aware of the
ical movements that were identified with the people’s struggles in one exclusionary kinds
of practice and
historical moment can become reactionary and out of touch with the realities discourse that
of everyday life in African communities today. One might take the example of surround political
the ANC government’s contrary position to supplying anti-retroviral drugs to situations such as
sufferers of HIV/Aids or, as another example, the seemingly xenophobic African immigrants
seeking exile in
attitude of the Department of Home Affairs to African immigrants seeking
South Africa. Such a
exile in South Africa. critical community
In diverse sociocultural environments such as South Africa, a critical practice would need
community psychology must rescue itself from an ideology which problema- to be aware of how
the concept of
tises otherness in the absence of a praxis of constructive social engagement
‘otherness’ comes to
across diversities. A critical community psychology would want to be aware of be perpetuated and
the exclusionary kinds of practice and discourse that surround political situa- reified around
tions such as the above, of African immigrants seeking exile in South Africa, of exactly such
the cause of sufferers of HIV/Aids. And, furthermore, such a form of critical political situations.
community practice would want to be aware of how the concept of ‘otherness’
comes to be perpetuated and reified around exactly such political problems.
Within this framework community practitioners enter local contexts with
certain risks and are prepared to do things differently from their ‘comrades’ of
the recent past. Such positioning not only requires a certain level of ideological
sophistication but also a courage and humility that is almost absent in the
writings of scientific and mainstream psychology.
327
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 328
Critical Psychology
Multiple challenges in local communities

Community practice is multi-layered and involves multiple challenges. It is
understandable, for example, that community health workers are known
internationally for their ‘short stays’ in local communities. Several factors have
been attributed to high turnover in the practice of community work, including
overload and scarce resources (Binedell, 1991). One might conclude from this
that the practice of community work has been hindered by a lack of apprecia-
tion of the complexities and the diversity of the problems that are found in the
local community. Some suggest that community practice largely depends on
role clarity and the availability of resources. Others view such arguments as
naïve and justifications for quitting the field.
Transcending professional roles

In addition to these more practical challenges, critical community practice in
psychology must continue to transcend rigid professional roles to address
issues of ethnicity, gender and race, while remaining politically inquisitive and
socially engaged. The practice looks above the possibilities of psychological
treatment that are guided by rigid relational boundaries with individuals and
small groups. Without politicising its practice – at least not in a partisan sense
of politicising – critical community workers must sustain political awareness
and develop a critical understanding, with local people, of their histories.
Political understanding – that is, a broad and well-developed understanding
of social structures of power and oppression in a given sociocultural and
historical setting – will give us the tools to analyse the workings of power as
well as the social origins of psychological difficulties (Smail 1994). The
methods of investigation need to be rooted in a sociopolitical analysis. There
is a pressing need not to see social impediments and inequities as separate
from the difficult political histories of the communities that we seek to
accompany to their destinies.
The project for the restoration of the dignity of the unheard and oppressed
people within the African contexts will continue to compete with other needs
coming from other role-players who may be more privileged. This means that
problems and needs will continue to be addressed on the basis of a politics of
marginalisation. We need to be highly aware here that efforts at transforma-
tion may be influenced by competitive needs for social justice from a variety of
role-players, some of whom may have previously been involved in the destruc-
tion and distortion of the values and traditions of black people. This will make
the project of rewriting the histories of the community ever challenging in that
we need to be well aware of the insidious levels of racism that, for instance,
elevate the needs and concerns of white constituencies over those of
black groups.
328
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 329

Zapiro’s cartoon
draws attention to
the fact that a
variety of
constituencies are
calling for forms of
reparation or special
consideration in the
new South Africa.
Some of these
constituencies may
previously have
been involved in
the destruction and
distortion of the
values and
traditions of black
people.
AFRICANIST COMMUNITY PRACTICE

Sociocultural problems and their solution
There is a common saying which alludes to the fact that the lenses through
which one looks at the world will determine how one understands and
responds to that world. Put differently: the perspective one takes towards a
particular phenomenon to a large extent influences one’s understanding of and
response to that phenomenon. For example, communities who perceive the
death of young, educated adults in their neighbourhood as the ‘work of the
people’ (ie caused by jealous people, relatives or neighbours) are likely to
respond by consulting a traditional doctor to determine whether anyone is
responsible for such events. This type of problem and its ‘solution’ are preva-
lent among indigenous African people and a reflection of the inextricable link
between the individual and his or her sociocultural environment, on the one
hand, and the link between the conceptualisation of problems and attempts at
solving them, on the other.
Intergenerational traditions
Within an Africanist perspective one foundational principle is reflected in the
statement, ‘if you raise your child correctly, the child will look after you in the
future.’ If that intergenerational connection is broken, there is a lack of satis-
faction and a sense of self-blame for this failure. The same principle extends to
the community at large, that is: if you look after me well, I will do the same in
turn. However, such an expectation is not expressed through spoken language
but rather through behaviours. Moreover, when a stranger asks for help, it is
329
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 330
Critical Psychology
one’s duty to take care of the stranger. This creates a sense of community conti-
nuity. These implicit rules govern the behaviour of members of the community
and are taken as givens. A child learns these rules through everyday living and
is expected to follow familial norms and values as doing his or her part in
fostering the continuity of the family and to learn that the family is not always
the best model of what a community is.
Community engagement
Community involvement or engagement is a major feature of African commu-
nities. If there is work to be done at home, one calls community members to
help while having a social drink, referred to above, called ‘ilima’. The
ploughing of fields is a key social event in this regard; indeed, traditional
African communities pride themselves on this event. Here, the sense of
community is further demonstrated by the fact that excess in one family’s
harvest means that neighbours will not starve. Neighbours are invited to
collect baskets of food for their children, thereby ensuring the community’s
continuity while acknowledging its co-existence. It is normative that in the
event that one does not have mealie meal, in such community contexts, one
asks one’s neighbour for assistance. In situations such as this, one is typically
welcomed with a basketful of food, regardless of what time you arrive. When
the harvest improves, you can always do the same in the return of the basket as
an expression of reciprocity and gratitude. This acknowledgement extends to
those outside of the community, as the insistence is to be embracive because ‘a
traveller’s stomach is smaller than the horn of goat’. Rhoads (1997) says that
‘[h]ow we serve others and what we do in action with and for others needs to
reflect what they desire and what they see as important’ (130).
Creating partnerships: Local African community and critical

community practitioners
Critical community practitioners recognise that community members are an
invaluable source of information. They are ‘experts’ of their communities in
terms of their lived experiences and thus can no longer be seen as passive recip-
ients of services. Any form of intervention, if it is to have the desired impact
needs to be planned with community members and implemented by them.
Mutual participation in defining the issues and finding solutions to their
problems can have a number of positive spin-offs, such as creating a sense of

community, ‘group spirit’ among community members, as well as an aware-
ness that they have the knowledge, power and skills to change conditions in
their communities (King, 1999; Santiago-Rivera, Morse & Hunt, 1998). As
Bakker (1996) notes, this could also have reciprocal benefits in helping
‘psychologists become connected to communities, no longer marginalised but
330
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 331

be recognised as important role players in community building’ (5). Lewis, Community research
Lewis, Daniels & D’Andrea (1998) argue that the greatest contribution practi- as it has been
tioners of psychology can make to society rests in their willingness and ability practised over the
to foster the development of healthy communities. However, Berkowitz & years tended to
objectify
Wolff (1996) note that the track record of psychology as a profession in communities,
building and empowering communities is unimpressive. This they attribute to, particularly
amongst other factors, forms of professional training which do not engender communities
the spirit of critical practice. marginalised from
power and resources
Africanist communities thus offer critical community psychologists
(ie the poor, the
multiple resources and multiple challenges. We have identified some of these illiterate, the
resources and several of these challenges. In what follows we discuss specific disabled).
methods that can be helpful towards developing a psychology that integrates
an Africanist perspective and a critical community psychology towards trans-
formational praxis.
CRITICAL COMMUNITY RESEARCH METHODS

Community research as it has been practised over the years tended to objectify
communities, particularly communities marginalised from power and
resources (ie the poor, the illiterate, the disabled). Such communities were
frequently sites where practitioners tested their theories, with total disregard
of the benefits to those communities. Critical community practice questions
this approach to community research. In his discussion of the notion of a
relevant psychology in South Africa, Dawes (1986) raised the interesting
question of whether any African community can afford the luxury of engaging
in research activities which provide no immediate relief to pressing needs. In
response to Dawes, we propose that researchers who accord the marginalised
communities an opportunity to articulate their problems must also take into
consideration the material needs of the people whose stories constitute the
subject of their investigations. For people in marginalised situations, the
research may be viewed as an opportunity to bring about tangible change, but
this must not accord the researcher an opportunity to exploit the people’s
subjectivities and experiences. As Dutkewitz (cited in Dawes, 1986, 44) has
noted, ‘South African researchers should be less concerned with chasing Nobel
Prizes than getting their hands dirty with the less fame-producing but more
essential process of doing work relevant to the vast problems posed by our own
needs as a third world community.’

Research offers a context for developing an understanding of the relation-
ships between the definition of social problems and the community’s
attempts at resolving them. For a long time research in psychology seems to
have been conceived of as a tool for making ‘scientific discoveries’ about
human behaviour and a way of advancing in the professorate. As a result, the
331
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 332
Critical Psychology
researcher wielded so much power that the ‘subjects’ were at her or his mercy.
In particular, the marginalised who were in certain instances regarded as
‘deviant cases’ were researched with no consideration of their status as poten-
tial beneficiaries. A call for the reconceptualisation of research methodologies
in the light of general developments in the field of psychology poses serious
challenges to those conducting research in culturally diverse communities, as
is the case in Africa.
A continual concern of a critical community psychology is that of the marginalisation,

or ‘otherisation’, by psychology and other value systems, of minority groupings within
society. Women, and particularly poor black women, are one of the groups that most
frequently suffers this kind of marginalisation. The same holds for people who have
special needs, or apparent ‘disabilities’.
Five principles underlying community research

The ‘expert researcher’ is therefore challenged to collaborate with the commu-
nity through participatory approaches to research. Critical community
research practice requires that researchers take cognisance of the potential
impact that their research may have on the community involved in the study –
always striving to ensure that community members benefit from the research
undertaken with and in their communities. Dalton, Elias & Wandersman
(2001, 80) identified five principles that should (authors’ emphasis) underlie
community research:
Community research is stimulated by community needs.
Community research is an exchange of resources.
Community research is a tool for social action.

Evaluation of social action is an ethical imperative.
Community research yields products useful to the community.
As Calvino (1998) cautions, the study of the community should not be a goal
in itself, that is, community research should not be solely about contemplation
332
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 333

and knowledge construction about communities. Rather, it should focus on The study of the
helping communities to transform and improve themselves. Calvino (1998) community should
alludes to the fact that the training of psychologists tends to centre on psycho- not be a goal in
logical variables and this seems to blind practitioners to other necessary itself, that is,
community research
dimensions of the community such as economic, political and cultural factors, should not be solely
as well as to the traditions that have sustained the lives of community resi- about contempla-
dents. One strategy for dealing with this ‘professional deficit’ is the tion and knowledge
introduction of multidisciplinary teams, by which other professionals would construction about
communities.
address other dimensions of the problems identified.
Rather, it should
focus on helping
Collaborative researcher-community relationships communities to
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, critical community practice transform and
improve themselves.
suggests that practitioners from various fields need to develop even closer
working relationships among themselves to facilitate a collaborative relation-
ship with community members. Yet multidisciplinary team efforts pose
serious challenges and are often difficult to develop and sustain due to,
amongst other things, competition between various professions. It is against
this background that community practitioners are challenged to put profes-
sional interests second to community interests. The ultimate goal in critical
community research should be social restoration and transformation through
strategies that ensure citizen representation and engagement. Social restora-
tion will entail, amongst other things, re-evaluation of personhood, values,
traditions, customs and belief systems, with a view to revitalising those social
systems.
SUMMARY
Debates on the relevance of community psychology need to continue. Such
debates must include the communities’ needs to access any assistance that they
may require from academic institutions. However, this desire for access should
not be interpreted by academics as an invitation to institutionalise commu-
nity-based knowledge-production. The knowledge generated within local
communities should remain under the control of the people who are co-gener-
ating it. Appropriate tools for creating wider access to that knowledge should
be influenced by a genuine interest among community psychologists to partic-
ipate in a helping process. Political awareness of the people’s circumstances is
vital for this process to be successful. Critical community practice in collabo-

ration with African communities needs to be broadly envisioned. It should not
be a vehicle for charity but rather an attempt by practitioners and communi-
ties to collaborate in order to meet the immediate and long-term needs of
individuals, groups and communities. Helping communities make connec-
tions between immediate difficulties they experience and larger sociopolitical
333
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap12 11/2/04 10:39 am Page 334
Critical Psychology
and cultural forces is an integral aspect of critical community practice. The

ultimate goal is ensuring social restoration and transformation that is guided
by citizen representation and involvement.
Critical thinking questions

1. How do we foster a community’s belief in itself, that is, that its knowledge
is still critical to ensuring its continuity and development?
2. How do we educate practitioners who are expert in facilitating the commu-
nity’s capacity to initiate projects and develop itself, without creating an
expectation that the practitioner is indispensable or that the community
must expect the practitioner to do things for it?
3. How can critical community practice help communities appreciate and
celebrate diversity without overemphasising differences among communi-
ties?
4. In what ways can community praxis within African communities inform
the development of a critical community Africanist psychology that is both
liberatory and transformational?
Acknowledgement
The authors thank Brinton Lykes for her detailed comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft of this chapter.
334
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 335
Chapter
13
The role of collective action in

the prevention of HIV/Aids
in South Africa
Catherine Campbell
‘… individual change is most likely to come from projects in which

people collaborate not only to change their own behaviour but
also to understand and challenge the social circumstances that
place their health at risk.’
Freire (1973/1993)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explain what is meant by the concept of a ‘health-enabling community’
Identify and explain the psychosocial and community-level processes underlying
the impact of collective action on health
Illustrate how each of these processes operates in relation to the promotion of
sexual health and the prevention of HIV/Aids
Elaborate on the way in which each of these processes is shaped by the power rela-
tions associated with poverty, gender and stigma
Justify why health-enhancing social change is most likely to be achieved through
a combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ efforts
Speculate about what forms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ changes might take to
reduce HIV-transmission in the community in which you live and/or work.
335
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 336
Critical Psychology
INTRODUCTION: WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ‘CRITICAL’ HEALTH

PSYCHOLOGY?
Stigma:
The starting point of this chapter is the field of critical health psychology, with
attitudes of fear, a particular focus on the role of psychology in understanding the HIV/Aids
contempt or epidemic in South Africa. There are two ways in which the chapter seeks to be
disrespect for ‘critical’. First, it seeks to be critical of society, drawing attention to the way in
members of an out-
group which are
which social factors such as poverty, gender and stigma make it difficult for so
often associated many people to protect their sexual health. Secondly, it seeks to be critical of
with intolerant, and mainstream health psychology, which has sought to explain health-related
discriminatory behaviours (such as using condoms or accessing treatment quickly when a
behaviour towards
person has a sexually transmitted infection, or STI) in terms of properties of
out-group members.
Members of the individual, ignoring the role of social factors in shaping these behaviours.
stigmatised groups In explaining high-risk sexual behaviours, mainstream health psycholo-
may ‘internalise’ gists tend to focus on individual-level factors (Norman, Abraham & Conner,
these negative 2000; Rutter & Quine, 2002). Thus, for example, they might say that the likeli-
judgements, leading
to increased lack of hood of a person engaging in unsafe sex is determined by the accuracy of their
self-confidence and knowledge of the risks of HIV/Aids or the extent to which they feel personally
low self-esteem – vulnerable to HIV/Aids. They might also focus on the individual decision-
which further making processes underlying the decision to use a condom or on the degree to
exacerbates their
situation of rejec-
which a person feels confident or motivated to negotiate safe sexual encoun-
tion and isolation. ters. There is no doubt that individual factors such as knowledge and
confidence play a key role in shaping sexual behaviour. However, such indi-
vidual factors are heavily shaped by the social context in which a person is
located. Thus, for example, a man may choose not to act on information about
the risks of HIV/Aids due to the social construction of masculinity, which
dictates that a ‘real man’ should have sex with many women, and should not
be afraid to take risks. A woman’s confidence to assert her rights to sexual
health may be undermined in contexts where she depends on gifts from male
sexual partners to support herself and her children. A young person’s motiva-
tion to attend a clinic for STIs may be reduced in a social context here adults
Top-down (ranging from parents to clinic nurses) refuse to acknowledge the existence of
social change:
youth sexuality and where STIs are heavily stigmatised.
social change driven
by powerful social In a review of HIV-prevention science, Waldo & Coates (2000) highlight the
actors (eg leaders way in which mainstream health psychology has hindered the HIV-prevention
in politics, industry struggle. Individual-level explanations of sexual behaviour lead to individual-
or religion) or level interventions seeking to bring about individual-level change. Such
agencies (eg
government, legal
interventions seek to change individuals by increasing their knowledge about
institutions). They HIV/Aids or their perceived vulnerability to infection or their ability to act
use their power to assertively in sexual encounters. However, such interventions fail to take
influence social account of those features of social context that enable or support the indi-
events and
vidual’s ability to act on this newly acquired knowledge or this increased sense
relations.
of personal vulnerability to HIV/Aids or to transfer the lessons from
336
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 337
The role of collective action in the prevention of HIV/Aids in South Africa

Zapiro’s biting
commentary on the
government’s
HIV/Aids policy
reminds us that
macro-structures are
a crucial part of any
effective HIV/Aids
intervention and
that marginalised
communities often
have little political
or economic
influence over
more powerful
stakeholders.
assertiveness training courses to real-life contexts where factors such as gender

and poverty limit their freedom to act. Individuals are social creatures; society
has a key influence on the way in which we behave. If this is indeed the case,
then attempts to change the behaviour of individuals need to go hand in hand Participation:
with attempts to bring about social change – transformations in the social taking part in a
joint activity with
contexts that limit people’s ability to act in ways that protect their sexual health.
other people.
WHAT ARE THE DRIVERS OF SOCIAL CHANGE?

Social change through top-down and bottom-up efforts
In short, ideally, HIV-prevention interventions should aim not only to change
individuals but also to create health-enabling social contexts – environmental
Bottom-up
conditions that make it easier for people to act in ways that protect their sexual social change:
health (Tawil, Verster & O’Reilly, 1995). This involves the challenge of working social change driven
to combat the impact of social factors such as poverty, gender and stigma on by demands and
peoples’ health-related choices. What strategies are needed to drive attempts to initiatives of
ordinary grassroots
bring about social change of this nature? Social change needs to come through people. They
a combination of top-down and bottom-up efforts. Top-down efforts involve mobilise themselves
high-level efforts by powerful leaders, policymakers and agencies to develop on the basis of
strategies for social change through instruments of government, politics, law or common problems
or discontents, and
economics. Bottom-up efforts involve the participation of members of margin- work from their
alised communities (who usually suffer from the worst health) in collective position at the
action to improve their health. Such collective action involves collaboration by bottom of the social
grassroots people in identifying the way in which social conditions under- hierarchy to lobby
for social changes.
mine their health and well-being, and in working towards improving such
337
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 338
Critical Psychology
Collective action:
conditions. Such improvements, as will be discussed below, are most likely to
collaborative action result from the twin processes of (1) strengthening grassroots communities
by a unified group from within and (2) building bridges between such communities and more
to fight for social powerful actors and agencies in the public and private sectors and civil society
changes that will
realise their quest
who are best placed to assist them in achieving their goals.
for better living
and/or working The need to challenge power
conditions.
This chapter is concerned with the bottom-up drivers of social change and,
more particularly, with the issue of grassroots participation in collective action
for change. This focus on the bottom-up dimensions is justified for two
Grassroots: reasons. First, an emphasis on bottom-up drivers of change is important
the majority of because the voices of grassroots communities have a key role to play in moti-
ordinary people who
form the mass of
vating social change (Beeker, Gray & Raj, 1998). This is because many of the
citizens of a hierar- social factors that shape peoples’ health-related behaviour are linked to the
chically structured unequal distribution of economic and political power – often in favour of a
society, lacking any small group of highly educated and/or wealthy persons, mostly men. The
exceptional social
advantages or social
social changes needed to promote health-enabling communities often involve
power. an increase in the political and/or economic power of women relative to men,
or of poor people relative to wealthier ones. As Bulhan (cited in Seedat, 2001,
17) has argued: ‘Power is never conceded without a demand.’ Elites rarely give
up power without strenuous challenges from those who are exploited or
oppressed. For this reason, the voices and demands of grassroots communities
and their strategic allies have a vital role to play in struggles for sexual health.
Secondly, this chapter focuses on bottom-up drivers of social change
because it is these that fall within the boundaries of critical psychology, the
Individuals are
social creatures.
Attempts to change
their behaviour
need to go hand-in-
hand with attempts
to bring about
social change –
transformations in
the social contexts.
338
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 339

focus of this book. The top-down drivers fall within the boundaries of
economics, political science, law, development studies and social policy.
However, as this chapter’s case study will illustrate, efforts to achieve social
change through bottom-up strategies have little hope of succeeding unless they
are supported by top-down efforts. For this reason there is a lot of room for
collaboration between critical psychologists and colleagues from other disci-
plines in developing theories and strategies of change which support and
reinforce one another.
HOW DOES PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION IMPACT ON THE

SEXUAL HEALTH OF A COMMUNITY?
Defining ‘grassroots’ and ‘community’
The remainder of this chapter has two goals. First, it seeks to outline the social ‘Power is never
psychological and community-level processes underlying the potential impact conceded without a
demand.’ Elites
of participation in collective action on the health of grassroots communities. rarely give up power
Secondly, it seeks to provide an illustration of the way in which this framework without strenuous
has been used to evaluate a community-led participatory HIV-prevention challenges from
programme in the South African mining community of Summertown. In this those who are
exploited or
chapter, the term ‘grassroots’ is used to refer to the mass of ordinary people that
oppressed.
make up the majority of citizens in any society and who generally have relatively
limited access to political and/or economic power, despite their numbers. A
community is defined as a group of people who live and/or work in a common
geographical place. Whilst it is often argued that ‘communities’ are better
Peer education:
defined as ‘communities of interest’ (eg the Christian community) than
non-traditional
‘communities of place’ (eg the residents of Summertown), for reasons related to educational
pragmatism and resources, health-related community development projects approach where
usually focus their energies on geographically bounded spaces. For this reason, people are taught
this is the definition preferred here. Geographical communities tend to consist by their peers rather
than by outside
of diverse groups of people, constantly debating and negotiating ways of living experts. Ideally,
and working together in varying degrees of harmony and conflict. peer educators use
participatory
Forms of community participation educational tech-
niques – where
Two forms of community participation are increasingly advocated in the field learning grows out
of HIV prevention. The first of these is the participation of grassroots people in of democratic
the design and implementation of HIV-prevention efforts. A popular strategy action, debate and
within this tradition is that of community-led peer education, in which health discussion amongst
learners and
programmes are delivered by ‘peers’ rather than health professionals (UN Aids, educators rather
1999). Ideally, peer education uses participatory and democratic educational than through more
techniques where educators and learners are seen as equals and where both powerful or learned
parties are required to be equally active in the learning process. This approach educators instruct-
ing learners.
stands in contrast to more traditional education techniques, where the
339
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 340
Critical Psychology
educator is active and the learner is passive, and where the educator is regarded
as superior to the learner. Thus, for example, youth peer educators are trained
in participatory education techniques, such as games, dramas or role-plays,
which enable them to facilitate sexual health education with their peers. Peer
educators seek to promote the sexual health of other youth of a similar age and
social status rather than youth having to rely on the interventions of more
distant adults such as teachers or nurses. Rather than telling their peers how to
behave, peer educators aim to generate debate and discussion about the range
of sexual behaviours available to young people and about the advantages and
disadvantages of each of these options. Thereafter, programme participants are
left to make their own decisions about which option they will pursue rather
than being instructed how to behave by the educators.
The fight against
HIV/Aids requires
collaboration
between colleagues
from a variety of
disciplines in
developing theories
and strategies of
change, prevention
and treatment that
support and
reinforce one
another.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships
The second strategy of community participation involves what are often
Stakeholder: referred to as ‘multi-sstakeholder partnerships’, in which representatives of key
someone who lives local constituencies (eg youth, women, churches, local health departments,
and/or works in a
schools, local industry and so on) work together to support and co-ordinate
particular commu-
nity and has a local HIV-prevention activities such as peer education, STI control, home-
commitment to the based care of people living with HIV/Aids and so on. The rationale for the
health, success and partnerships approach rests on two insights. The first of these is the insight
general well-being
that the causes and impacts of the HIV/Aids epidemic are too complex and
of other community
members. multi-faceted to be dealt with by any single constituency, and that communi-
ties have the best chance of effective responses if they pool the insights,
resources and efforts of as wide a range of groupings as possible. The second
340
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 341

insight is that an epidemic is an extraordinary event, which arises because The causes and
existing understandings of health, and existing health services, are inadequate impacts of the
for addressing it. For this reason dealing with an epidemic involves innovative HIV/Aids epidemic
and creative responses which are most likely to arise through the cooperation are too complex and
multi-faceted to be
of a wide range of actors, networks and agencies (Gillies, 1998). dealt with by any
single constituency.
Communities have
TOWARDS A ‘SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION’ the best chance of
Psychosocial processes underlying the impact of participation effective responses
on health if they pool the
insights, resources
How might the very public activity of participation in collective action impact and efforts of as
on the very intimate and private nature of the sexual act? The aim of this wide a range of
section is to outline the psychosocial and community-level processes that groupings as
possible.
underlie the potential impact of participation in strategies such as peer educa-
tion and stakeholder partnerships on sexual health. The case study of the
Summertown HIV-prevention programme which follows below will seek to
illustrate how each of these processes are enabled and constrained by the wider
social context within which communities are located, with particular emphasis
on the unequal power dynamics around which South African societies are
structured – particularly the relationships between men and women and
between rich and poor. The view of participation presented in this chapter is
underpinned by the work of the Brazilian social theorist and activist Paulo
Freire (1970, 1973). He argued that individual change is most likely to occur
when people participate in collective action aiming not only to change them-
selves as individuals but also to challenge those negative social conditions that
undermine their interests and well-being.
In critical
community
interventions it is
crucial that we bear
in mind the unequal
power dynamics
around which South
African societies are
structured –
particularly the
relationships
between men and
women.
341
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 342
Critical Psychology
Social identity:
Social identities
knowledge that one Our social identities consist of those aspects of our self-definitions that arise
belongs to a from our memberships of social groups (eg age-linked peer groups or occupa-
particular social
group. This
tional groups such as mineworker or sex workers) or from our positioning
knowledge usually within networks of power relationships shaped by factors such as gender,
goes together with ethnicity or socioeconomic position. Different identities or positionings are
being engaged in a associated with different behavioural options. Thus, for example, a male
set of group-related
behaviours. It may
identity is associated with a different range of behaviours to a female identity.
also be associated In many contexts, males are allowed to be open about their enjoyment of sex
with a sense of and to behave accordingly. Women are given far less opportunity for public
emotional commit- expression of their sexual desire (the denial of the existence of female sexual
ment to in-group
desire is common in many contexts). A woman is far more likely to behave in
values and a sense
of solidarity with a way that hides her sexual activities from the public eye, particularly if she has
other group several partners. All of these identity-linked behaviours have a range of poten-
members. tial consequences for people’s vulnerability to HIV/Aids.
Socially constructed norms and values

In contrast to mainstream psychological approaches, which explain health-
related behaviours (such as sexual behaviour) solely in terms of individual
choices or decisions, researchers in the social identity tradition emphasise that
a person’s sexual choices or decisions are often deeply influenced by the
socially constructed norms or values of liked and trusted peers who share a
common identity (Allen, 1997; Stockdale, 1995). Such norms and values are
constructed and reconstructed in the ongoing interactions between a group of
people united through a sense of perceived common interests or a shared
social position. The peer education approach builds on this insight. Ideally,
peer education provides a context in which a group of peers who share a
common identity can debate the possibility of constructing new sexual norms
and values which are less damaging to their sexual health.
Peer education
Thus, for example, a group of like-minded women who feel unable to insist on
condom use with their (unfaithful) sexual partners may use peer education
settings as a forum for sharing ideas about ways in which they might assert
themselves in their relationships, or about developing income-generation strate-
gies which make them less dependent on these men. Such discussions may form
the basis of new systems of norms and values in which women have more confi-
dence and power to protect their sexual health. To cite another example, peer
education might result in a group of young men coming together to discuss the
way in which the social construction of masculinity places pressure on them to
indulge in high-risk sex (by perpetuating the notion that ‘real men are not afraid
342
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 343

to take risks’). They might make a group decision to challenge this stereotype, Macho:
sharing their uncertainties about where to find condoms and how to use them, description of iden-
and engaging in role-plays to develop strategies for responding to friends who tities or behaviours
might tease them about their new risk-avoiding stance. associated with an
exaggerated
interpretation of
Reconstructing social identities masculinity. In
In other words, social identities are not necessarily static or permanent. In some cases these
certain circumstances they can be changed, and collective action strategies are positive (eg an
exaggerated desire
such as peer education can serve as important strategies for bringing about to provide support
such change (Melucci, 1995). In principle, it should be possible for a group of and protection for
young men or young women to make collective decisions to reconstruct the old one’s family). In
social identities that are not consistent with their health or well-being. others, they may be
negative (eg
However, as will be discussed below, there are variations in the degrees of
exerting undemo-
freedom that people have to change their identities and associated high-risk cratic power over
behaviours. A woman whose sexual partners assist her in supporting herself women, or treating
and her children will have limited freedom to refuse sex with a condom- them as sex objects
resistant partner. A young man whose confidence has been dented by repeated rather than as
equals).
failure to find work might be reluctant to give up the macho identity and
behaviours which place his sexual health at risk but which lead to the approval
and admiration of his youth gang.
Given the close relationship between a person’s social identity and the Power-relations:
power-relations characteristic of the society in which they live, attempts to relations between
individuals or
change identities are most likely to be successful if they take place hand in groups – in a
hand with attempts to challenge the social relations that limit people’s degree hierarchically
of freedom to act in ways that meet their needs and interests. Ideally, as will be structured society –
discussed below, peer education efforts should go hand in hand with more with different levels
of access to wealth,
general efforts to improve people’s material life circumstances or to raise the
political influence
levels of respect and recognition they receive from other social groups, as and/or symbolic
women or as youth, for example. respect and
recognition.
Empowerment
The renegotiation of social identities and associated norms and values needs to
go hand in hand with the development of people’s confidence and ability to act Health-enhancing
on collective decisions to engage in health-enhancing behaviour change. behaviour:
People are most likely to feel they can take control of their sexual health if they all behaviours (eg
have positive experiences of exercising control in other areas of their lives condom use,
seeking appropriate
(Wallerstein, 1992). Many people, particularly those who are marginalised on treatment for other
the grounds of poverty or gender, may have had few such experiences. Peer STIs) that reduce
education seeks to empower participants by transferring health-related knowl- the chance of HIV-
edge and teaching methods – usually the province of health professionals and infection and
promote good
experts – into the hands of ordinary people. It also provides opportunities for
health.
the exercise of leadership (in local health initiatives) by members of tradition-
343
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 344
Critical Psychology
Critical
ally excluded social groups – such as youth out of school or commercial sex
consciousness: workers. In so doing it gives people a sense of ‘ownership’ of the problem of
understanding of HIV/Aids, and increases the likelihood that they will feel the problem is their
the way in which own responsibility rather than the responsibility of the more distant agencies
social circumstances
of government or health departments.
serve as obstacles
to people’s health In addition to promoting a more general sense of empowerment, peer
and well-being. education should also empower participants more directly in relation to
Ideally, such an providing them with the practical skills they need to engage in safe sexual
understanding goes behaviour. For example, youth peer education may include role-plays and
hand-in-hand with a
vision of alternative discussions seeking to enhance participants’ assertiveness or sexual negotia-
social relations in tion techniques, familiarising them with condoms, where to obtain them, how
which people’s to use them, and so on. They may also include discussions of the importance
living and/or of prompt and appropriate treatment for other STIs, as well as familiarising
working conditions
were better, as well
participants with the whereabouts of clinics and preparing them for the more
as some insights embarrassing aspects of the STI clinic encounter, such as having to show one’s
into the strategies private parts to a stranger or having to deal with a clinic nurse who is preju-
that might be used diced against sexually active women or young people, for example.
to make such
changes happen.
Critical thinking
People are far more likely to be able to change their behaviour if they have a
realistic understanding of the obstacles that stand in the way of behaviour
change, a belief that such obstacles can be overcome and a vision of alternative
behavioural options (Freire, 1970, 1973). Such understandings constitute a
state of critical consciousness that Freire argues is a precondition for mobil-
Freire sees a state
of ‘critical ising marginalised groupings in collective action to improve their health. In the
consciousness’ as a context of HIV/Aids, this might involve a group of peers developing under-
precondition for standings of the ways in which factors such as the stigmatisation of sexuality
mobilising margin- and STIs, gender inequalities and poverty undermine their sexual health – and
alised groupings in
collective action.
the development of a vision of social relations that were less damaging of their
‘Critical conscious- well-being. Thus, for example, a successful peer education programme might
ness’ involves a provide a group of men with the opportunity to discuss the way in which the
realistic under- achievement of masculine identities was limited by poverty and unemploy-
standing of the
ment, as discussed above. Through debate and discussion these men may
obstacles to behav-
iour change, a belief develop insights into the way in which they compensate for this by adopting an
that such obstacles overly macho and controlling attitude to women in sexual relationships. Such
can be overcome understandings would form the starting point from which men could collec-
and a vision of
tively work towards redefining their masculine identities in ways that were less
alternative behav-
ioural options. endangering of their sexual health.
HIV/Aids stigma
A key obstacle to the HIV/Aids prevention struggle is the stigmatisation of
people living with HIV/Aids (Vetten & Bhana, 2001) (see Box 1). The fear and
344
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 345

loathing of HIV positive people serves to drive the disease even further ‘under- Empowerment:
ground’, discouraging others from going for testing or from facing up to the psychosocial state
possibility that they too could become infected and should therefore take in which a group of
precautions. It also causes untold misery for HIV/Aids sufferers. The area of people feel confi-
dent and motivated
stigma is an important arena for critical thinking and debate, in the interests that they can
of raising people’s awareness of the way in which it serves as a key social achieve important
obstacle to the prevention of HIV and to the support of people living with Aids. goals they set
Ideally, peer education could raise participants’ awareness of the importance of themselves, and
where they have the
creating a climate of tolerance and compassion for people living with Aids and
skills and opportu-
developing understandings of the way in which stigma indirectly serves to nities to do so.
hinder people from taking control of their sexual health.
Community:
BOX 1 The social psychology of stigma group of people
who are united
A combination of fear and ignorance has led to a situation in which many through a common
HIV/Aids sufferers are treated with high levels of disrespect and rejection. Joffe identity, interests
(1999) explains stigma in terms of the human fear of the random and uncertain or geographical
nature of life and death, a fear that is dramatically exaggerated in the context residence. The last
of the HIV/Aids epidemic. She says that people cope with this situation by of these is most
projecting their worst fears onto clearly identifiable out-groups, who are then frequently used in
subjected to prejudice and discrimination. This process of stigmatisation or the field of public
‘othering’ is said to result in feelings of comfort and security. It serves to health and health
distance people who hope that they are HIV/Aids-free from a sense of danger, promotion.
giving them a sense of personal invulnerability to the threat of HIV/Aids, a
threat that might otherwise appear too terrifying to contemplate.
Symbolic power:
extent to which
Community-level processes underlying the impact of participation members of
particular social or
on health identity groups
Dimensions of power have access to
respect and the
What are the community contexts most likely to facilitate the processes of recognition of their
identity reshaping, empowerment and critical consciousness outlined above? worth and dignity
And what contexts are most likely to support the goals of participatory HIV- from other members
prevention strategies such as peer education? The arguments in this section of society. Lack of
symbolic power may
rest on two assumptions. The first is that HIV/Aids often tends to flourish in characterise the life
marginalised social groupings (such as young people or women) (Barnett & situations of poor
Whiteside, 2002). These are the social groupings that often have the least people in a
access to three interrelated dimensions of power – economic power (access to materialist society,
women in a sexist
money and paid work), political power (access to formal political influence)
society, black
and symbolic power (access to respect and recognition from other social people in a racist
groups). For this reason it is extremely unlikely that groups of multiple- society, or people
disempowered youth or women will have the power or influence to promote living with Aids in a
the development of health-enabling environments without the support and context of
stigmatisation.
assistance of more powerful groups. For this reason it is vitally important that
345
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 346
Critical Psychology
Social capital:
community-based HIV-prevention programmes provide opportunities for the
community-level building of alliances or partnerships between local HIV-vulnerable groups and
strengths or more powerful constituencies.
resources such as
trust, mutually
Micro- and macro-dynamics of power
supportive
relationships, a The second assumption is that the HIV/Aids epidemic – with its roots in a
positive local series of complex processes ranging from the micro-dynamics of human sexual
identity and high
levels of partici-
desire to the macro-dynamics of gender, economics and politics – is too
pation in informal complex a problem to be solved by any single constituency, such as peer educa-
and formal social tors or schools or health departments. Addressing the challenge requires the
networks of various co-operation of a wide range of sectors both within local communities and
kinds (eg friends or
between local communities and a range of national and even international
neighbours;
voluntary associa- actors and agencies. Building on these two assumptions, it will be argued
tions linked to below that efforts to engage grassroots communities in collective action to
personal develop- achieve improved sexual health are most likely to succeed in communities
ment; activist
characterised by bonding and bridging social capital, and where strong organ-
organisations).
isational initiatives exist to support the mobilisation of collective action.
Social capital
Health-enabling community contexts
It has been argued that people are most likely to undergo health-enhancing
behaviour change if they live in communities characterised by high levels of
social capital (Baum, 1999). Such ‘health-enabling community contexts’ are
believed to enable and support the renegotiation of social identities and the
development of empowerment and critical consciousness outlined above. Social
capital is defined in terms of participation in local networks and organisations
(Putnam, 2000). These may include informal networks of friends and neigh-
bours, voluntary associations linked with hobbies, leisure and personal
development, or community activist groupings concerned with matters of local
interest. Such participation is associated with increased levels of trust, reciprocal
help and support and a positive local community identity amongst local commu-
nity residents. High levels of local participation are associated with high levels of
Perceived
collective efficacy or perceived citizen power (see Box 2). This is a characteristic
citizen power:
situation in which of communities where people feel that their needs and views are respected and
grassroots people valued and where they have channels to participate in making decisions in the
believe they have context of the family, school and neighbourhood, as well as influencing wider
the power to
political processes which shape their daily lives (Campbell, 2000).
influence the laws,
policies and events
that shape key Creating new social capital
aspects of their
An important determinant of the success of participatory health promotional
lives.
interventions – such as peer education – is the extent to which they mobilise or
346
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 347

BOX 2 The impact of ‘perceived citizen power’ on health
In a small pilot study of community-level influences on health in England,

Campbell, Wood & Kelly (1999) compared levels of social capital in two commu-
nities that were matched in terms of socioeconomic status and employment
levels. Despite these similarities, levels of health were higher in one community
than the other. The most striking difference between the two communities lay in
levels of ‘perceived citizen power’. Residents of the less healthy community had
little experience of local community activism and were seldom aware of the exis-
tence of organisations or channels through which people might express their
views on local facilities, services or quality of life. In comparison, many residents
of the healthier community expressed the view that ordinary people ought to get
involved in local community politics. They cited examples of ways in which they
might do this, and expressed the view that such activist involvement had the
potential to yield benefits for both the individuals involved as well as other
community members. The authors conclude that much research remains to be
done in exploring links between perceived citizen power and health.
create social capital. Ideally, peer education programmes mobilise existing Collective efficacy:
sources of social capital by drawing on existing community strengths and power or ability of
networks. Ideally, they also create new social capital in the form of strong and a group (or
collection) of
valued peer education networks. Such networks impact on health directly people to succeed
through their efforts to promote healthy behaviours. They also impact on in achieving goals
health indirectly through creating generalised social cohesion and trust that of mutual interest.
not only increases the likelihood of positive health behaviours (eg condom use
in relation to HIV prevention) but also reduces health-damaging stress (which
may undermine the immune systems of people living with HIV/Aids).
Processes of enablement and constraint

However, social capital is not equally distributed in any community (Bourdieu,
1986; Saegert, Thompson & Warren, 2000). People who are marginalised by
virtue of poverty or gender or social stigma may have reduced opportunities Social capital is
for positive and empowering participation in local community life. It is vitally not equally
important that policies and interventions that advocate participation as a distributed in any
community. People
means of promoting health are not blind to obstacles to such participation by who are margina-
socially excluded groups (Nelson & Wright, 1995). Different social groups hold lised by virtue of
different levels of power to engage in collective action and to construct life poverty or gender or
projects to meet their needs and interests (Kelly & Van Vlaenderen, 1996). social stigma may
have reduced
Community development approaches and participatory strategies such as peer
opportunities for
education tread a thin line between the processes of enablement (grassroots positive and
community agency) and constraint (structural obstacles resulting from empowering
unequal power relations or resistance to social change by powerful groups). It participation in
is often at the very moment that local community development programmes local community
life.
open up the possibility of the empowerment of local people to take control of
347
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 348
Critical Psychology
Bonding social
their sexual health that they simultaneously come up against a series of insti-
capital: tutional barriers to such change.
trusting, supportive
relationships Bonding social capital
(‘bonds’) among
members of a group Jovchelovitch (1996) points to the ‘double-edged’ nature of power. Power can
who live/work in be a negative force, something that constrains people and holds them back.
similar conditions, But it can also be ‘a space of possible action’, where previously marginalised
who feel a sense of
commonness with
local people can act together to maximise their collective voice and their collec-
one another and tive impact. The concept of power is relevant to the distinction between
who have similar bridging and bonding social capital. This distinction provides a useful way of
access to economic, conceptualising the types of local community relationship that might
political and
contribute to the development of a health-enabling community (Putnam,
symbolic power (eg
young people in 2000). Bonding social capital refers to inward-looking social capital located
school; sex workers). within homogenous groups, whose members are united through a common
social identity and similar levels of access to the three forms of social power
outlined above (‘within-group’ social capital). Such social capital binds similar
people together in strong horizontal peer groups characterised by trust, recip-
rocal help and support, and a positive common identity. Such relationships
result in the benefits and resources that flow from close trusting relations with
similar others.
Bridging social capital

Bridging social The second form of social capital is called bridging social capital. It refers to
capital: links that occur between diverse social groups. Such links bring together
compared to
diverse groups with varying levels of access to economic, political and
bonding social
capital, bridging symbolic power (‘between-group’ social capital). Bridging social capital brings
social capital refers people in contact with the resources and benefits that result from having a
to ‘bridges’ between wide and varied range of social contacts. It is associated with trusting and
small local
supportive relationships amongst groups whose worldviews, interests and
groupings and more
powerful actors and access to resources might be very different but who have some sort of overlap-
agencies who have ping mutual interest.
the political and/or Thus, for example, bridging social capital might bring together representa-
economic power to tives of youth peer groups, local employers, local civic groupings and
help them meet
their goals. government health and education representatives. These groups may tradi-
tionally have little in common, but HIV/Aids provides a special context in
which they are united by their mutual interest in promoting healthy sexual
behaviour in the local community. Bridging social capital ensures that tradi-
tionally isolated and disadvantaged groups (eg young people or sex workers)
are put in touch with vertical networks of political and economic influence and
expertise that will assist them in maximising their efforts to address particular
problems.
348
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 349

This bonding/bridging distinction is vital for clarifying those forms of partic-

ipation and collaboration most likely to further the goals of community-led
health promotion. It is through the development of bonding social capital that a
group of people take the first step towards developing a critical consciousness of
the economic, political and symbolic obstacles to their health and well-being and
begin to develop both the insight and the confidence to address these obstacles.
Two forms of bridging social capital

However, it is vital that participatory projects also seek to promote the devel-
opment of two forms of bridging social capital. The first is the development of
bridges between small peer education groups with more powerful groups – in
their local geographical area – who may have the power and resources to assist
them in their quest to develop more health-enabling community contexts.
These powerful groups might include local government representatives or
local employers. The second form of bridging social capital links small local
groups into networks of influence beyond the geographical location of the local
community. Here we refer to the importance of developing channels through
which umbrella alliances of small local peer groups can add their voices to
extra-local debates about regional and national policies and interventions that
are supportive of their local efforts. Local youth peer education networks
might link into regional or national networks and channels through which
they could pressurise the government to provide better skills training and
employment opportunities for youth. More directly related to HIV/Aids, such
youth groups might develop extra-community links through which they
sought to pressurise health departments into providing more youth-friendly
sexual health services, and in training STI clinic workers to treat sexually active
youth with respect and tolerance. Local groups of people living with Aids A vital dimension of
successful
might seek to link up with the national Treatment Action Campaign to lobby
participation is
government to provide affordable drug treatment for Aids patients or to speed developing
up the delivery of government grants to full-blown Aids patients. opportunities for
According to Paulo Freire, a vital dimension of successful participation small local groups
to influence wider
includes the development of opportunities for small local groups to influence
initiatives for
wider initiatives for positive social change beyond their immediate community positive social
contexts. He argues that the activity of participation is most likely to be change beyond their
successful when it enables people simultaneously to change themselves, their immediate commu-
local communities and the wider societies in which they live. nity contexts.
Organisational initiatives
The role of an external change agent
What forces are most likely to initiate and drive forward the processes of indi-
vidual and collective change that Freire cites as the hallmarks of successful
349
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 350
Critical Psychology
community development programmes? Ideally the motivation and

momentum for such changes should come from within the local communities
themselves, who should get together to identify publicly the nature of the
problem and then develop a collective strategy for addressing it. However, such
motivation and momentum will not always be present, particularly in relation
to a taboo topic such as HIV/Aids, where the high levels of stigma and denial
around sexuality, death and STIs make it unlikely that those who fear they are
at risk, or those already affected, will stand up in public and confidently and
openly publicise their condition. In such a situation, an external change agent
may be necessary to bring together local people and support them in working
out ways in which the problem can best be identified and tackled. External
change agents are generally organisations associated with government, the
private sector or non-government organisations (NGOs).
Trust and confidentiality

The success of such organisations in mobilising local people to work for change
to improve their sexual health will be influenced by at least two factors
(Campbell, 2003). The first of these is the extent to which the organisation is
trusted by local people. The second is the extent to which the organisation’s
goals and strategies resonate with the needs and experiences of local people.
The experience of many NGOs working in the HIV/Aids field suggests that a
great deal of time and effort is necessary to build such trust and to formulate
goals and strategies that local people feel they are able to identify with and
openly associate themselves with. In relation to a stigmatised disease such as
HIV/Aids, trust is often closely linked to the extent to which people believe
that the organisation’s workers will respect the confidentiality of those who
approach them for help.
The fact that many local people will often only associate themselves with
such organisations in conditions of secrecy makes the organisations’ goals of
mobilising people for assertive collective action to address common goals a
very difficult task. Some organisations have responded by attempting to
disguise their focus on HIV-prevention and Aids-care, presenting themselves
as youth organisations or health organisations for example. Support groups
for people with Aids emphasise that their goals are to support people who are
‘infected or affected by HIV/Aids’, enabling those who wish to disguise their
status to elicit the support they need under the guise of claiming that they are
indirectly affected by the HIV-positive status of a friend or relative rather than

being directly affected themselves. Much work remains to be done in
addressing the stigma that makes people reluctant to be open about their
sexual health needs, and that undermines the possibility of open and confident
collective action by people who believe either that they are already infected or
that their future sexual health is at risk.
350
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 351

Social factors such

as poverty and
homelessness make
it difficult for many
people to protect
their sexual health.
CASE STUDY: PEER EDUCATION BY COMMERCIAL SEX WORKERS IN

SOUTH AFRICA
This section reports on a three-year study of a peer education programme
amongst commercial sex workers in an isolated 400-person shack settlement
in a gold mining community, where more than six out of ten women were HIV
positive (Campbell, 2003; Campbell & Mzaidume, 2001). Women lived in
conditions of poverty and violence in makeshift tin structures without running
water or sanitation. Most came from extremely deprived backgrounds charac-
terised by physical or emotional abuse. Relationships between sex workers
were often unsupportive and competitive in a context where women competed
fiercely for a short supply of paying clients. They had little formal education
and few skills. Sex workers made their living from the sale of sex and alcohol to
migrant workers on a nearby gold mine. The harsh working conditions of
underground mining led to strongly macho identities amongst mineworkers,
associated with reluctance to using condoms in commercial encounters (see
Box 3). Sex workers lacked both economic and psychological power to resist
clients’ wishes, and condom use was virtually non-existent at the start of the
peer education programme.
Aims of the programme

At the psychosocial level, the aims of the programme, co-ordinated by a

nursing sister employed by a local NGO, were threefold. These were: to
increase knowledge about sexual health risks and a sense of perceived vulnera-
bility to HIV infection; to encourage people to seek out early diagnosis and
appropriate treatment of other sexually transmitted infections, which increase
vulnerability to HIV; and to encourage the use of condoms, and make them
351
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 352
Critical Psychology
HIV-transmission: BOX 3 Miners, masculinity and HIV-transmission

spread of a
predominantly A study of HIV-transmission on the gold mines (Macheke & Campbell, 1998)
sexually transmitted examines why some miners continue to take risks with their sexual health,
virus through a despite being well informed about the risks of HIV. Several aspects of the social
complex and multi- construction of masculinity on the mines influence sexual behaviour. Thus, for
layered series of example, regular flesh-to-flesh sex is seen as necessary for a man’s good health
causes, ranging as well as his pleasure. Macho identities serve as mechanisms by which men
from individual
cope with the dangers of underground work. ‘Real men’ are regarded as brave,
behaviour to macro-
fearless and willing to risk death in order to fulfil their role as breadwinners.
social relations.
Associated with this macho masculinity is the notion of a man having a
powerful drive to desire sex with many women. Within such a context, many
miners choose not to use condoms.
freely available. The programme aimed to achieve these goals through the
processes outlined above. The first of these was to provide opportunities for
the renegotiation of the social and sexual identities that made it unlikely that
sex workers would assert their health interests in the fact of client reluctance.
This would involve examining the way in which both their identities as
women, in a male-dominated society, and as workers in a highly stigmatised
profession undermined their confidence and their negotiating power. The
programme hoped to increase a sense of empowerment amongst women
through placing health-related knowledge – usually the province of outside
experts – in their hands, and through providing them with the opportunities
to exercise leadership of an important health initiative. The dialogical nature
of the peer education approach would encourage development of a sense of
critical consciousness of the social obstacles to behaviour change, and of the
need for collective action to begin to challenge the ways in which these
impacted negatively on their sexual health.
Finally, and most importantly, the programme sought not only to build
bonding social capital within sex worker communities but also to build
bridging social capital to link sex workers to sources of power and influence
beyond their marginalised local settings. This would be created in two ways.
First, through putting this particular sex worker peer educator group in touch
with other similar groups in the region. Secondly, through involving a wide
range of more powerful local community ‘stakeholders’ in supporting the
programme. These would include representatives of the provincial and

national health departments, the largest local employer, namely the mining
industry as well as a range of local civic, religious and political groupings. A
central goal was to ensure that parallel peer education efforts were imple-
mented amongst mineworker clients. This was because clients held both
psychological power (as men) and economic power (as paying customers) over
352
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 353

sex workers. Efforts to promote behaviour change amongst sex workers would
have very limited impact without simultaneous efforts to promote such behav-
iour change amongst men. In addition, the programme sought to reduce
women’s total economic dependence on clients through providing opportuni-
ties for alternative forms of income generation (such as savings clubs and small
business opportunities).
Challenges of setting up the programme

The nursing sister employed to facilitate the programme struggled against
great odds to develop a strong and united team of peer educators. The shack
community was run by a group of unelected armed men, who served as gate-
keepers to the settlement, and much effort had to go in to getting their
permission for the project to be set up. Women had little experience of
working collectively to achieve mutually beneficial goals. Much work had to
STDs/STIs:
go into team building, and developing codes of conduct in the chaotic and sexually transmitted
conflict-ridden community, with high alcohol use and fighting, and low levels diseases or infec-
of trust. Despite many setbacks, the peer educator team developed into a tions, including
strong and respected group of local women. They worked tirelessly to HIV/Aids and other
diseases (eg
distribute condoms and to educate their peers about the risks of STDs, using
gonorrhoea, syphilis
participatory methods. It was through such methods that the programme or herpes) which
sought to promote a critical awareness of the way in which gender relations increase
and the stigmatisation of sex work undermined women’s confidence and vulnerability to
HIV-infection.
ability to protect their health.
353
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 354
Critical Psychology
Disappointing outcomes: Varying impacts of poverty on people’s

ability to change
However, despite these efforts, the programme had little success in increasing
condom use or reducing STDs over a three-year period. Programme evaluators
have identified a complex array of reasons for its disappointing results at each
level of analysis (Campbell, 2003). A detailed account is beyond the scope of a
short case study, but some key points are raised here, all related in some way
or another to the impact of poverty on people’s abilities to change their life
circumstances. The programme had great success in uniting a small group of
women in a motivated and dedicated group who met regularly and worked
tirelessly at promoting peer educational activities. They also actively involved
themselves in regular meetings with similar sex worker peer education teams
in the region, participating in the training of new peer educators in other
regions, with teams from different local communities providing important
support and advice for one another.
However, despite this partial success, some sex workers did not collaborate
with the peer education team. In hindsight, in relation to its goal of providing
contexts for the renegotiation of social identities, the programme probably
began with the unrealistic expectation that women in such a divided, compet-
itive and highly stigmatised community would automatically constitute
‘peers’, simply by virtue of the fact that they were all sex workers. The concept
of a ‘peer education’ presupposes the possibility that a collection of people
might have enough of a sense of a common identity and mutually defined
interests to learn to work together in pursuit of collaborative goals. The forces
dividing the programme’s intended ‘peers’ were often greater than those
uniting them. One major dividing force was the fierce competition for clients,
which undermined the likelihood of women forming a divided front against
condom-averse clients. If a sex worker refused to have sex without a condom,
the customer would simply move on from shack to shack until he found
someone who agreed, and in conditions of severe poverty turning away a
paying client was not always an option.
Programme goals ran strongly against the strategies that some women had
developed to deal with their harsh lives. One way in which some sex workers
chose to cope with the stigma and contempt associated with sex work was to
conduct their profession in secret. They loudly dissociated themselves from an
openly sex worker led health promotion programme as part of their ongoing
struggle to maintain an image of respectability. Ironically, the programme

rationale of working with women to feel more open and assertive about their
work as a means of improving their confidence succeeded with some sex
workers, but had the unintended consequence of alienating others. In this
community, the sale of alcohol was a key economic survival strategy, and the
use of alcohol was a psychological strategy for dealing with ongoing stresses.
354
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 355

Yet people were far less likely to use condoms when they had been drinking. There is a need for
Another survival strategy in a context of poverty and violence – where women insights into sys-
had little control over their lives – was an attitude of fatalism. This fatalism tems of incentives
discouraged some women from believing that they had any power to control and accountability
that might motivate
their sexual health. powerful groupings
Attempts to generate alternative means of income generation for women – to collaborate with
through setting up child-care schemes or vegetable stalls in the local shack marginalised
settlement – met with little interest. Sex workers pointed out that fellow shack communities who
residents had already exploited existing commercial opportunities to their have little political
or economic power
utmost limit. They saw mainstream income-generating activities as unre- or influence over
warding drudgery in comparison with sex work which, for all its more powerful
disadvantages, yielded financial rewards which were not only immediate, but stakeholders.
also far in excess of what could be raised in a small business.
Lack of collaboration by powerful community stakeholders

The greatest obstacle to programme success was continued mineworker
refusal to use condoms. Despite its ambitious goals, in reality the project,
under the auspices of a small and humble NGO, had little influence on the
powerful mining industry. The latter group had little commitment to imple-
menting peer education amongst the vast majority of mineworker clients.
Mine medical doctors responsible for sexual health were unfamiliar with the
social understandings of disease transmission and prevention which underlie
the peer education approach. Within this context, they dismissed peer educa-
tion as ‘vague social science’, and preferred to throw their HIV-prevention
energies into biomedical STI-control programmes, which had little impact on
reducing STIs amongst mineworkers over our three-year study period. Such
attitudes, combined with a lack of mineworker trade union commitment to
participating in project management, meant that the majority of miners were
not exposed to peer education, as outlined in the original project proposal. Yet
it was male miners who held both economic and psychological power in
encounters with female sex workers. Much remains to be learned about the
factors shaping the likelihood that powerful stakeholders will collaborate in
partnerships with marginalised community groups in addressing social
problems such as HIV-transmission (see Box 4). There is a need for insights
into systems of incentives and accountability that might motivate powerful
groupings to collaborate with marginalised communities who have little polit-
ical or economic power or influence over more powerful stakeholders.

This case study has illustrated the way in which the conceptual framework
outlined above served to inform the evaluation of a community-led peer educa-
tion programme in a highly marginalised and disorganised community. In
short, while the programme went some way to promoting bonding social
capital amongst some women within this community, as well as bonds
355
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 356
Critical Psychology
BOX 4 Maximising the potential of multi-stakeholder partnerships
In the HIV/Aids field there is currently a strong social dimensions of disease transmission
emphasis on the importance of involving a wide and prevention.
range of stakeholders in prevention efforts. (3) Programmes benefit when they have skills
Whilst such an emphasis makes excellent theo- and capacity in areas such as organisa-
retical and political sense, much remains to be tional development, project management
learned about the complexities of implementing and conflict mediation – which are re-
multi-stakeholder projects, and how best to quired to coordinate groups who may have
avoid the obstacles that inevitably arise when very different skills and worldviews.
diverse groups of people seek to work together. (4) Collaborative projects need to be backed
Five factors are likely to maximise the success up by health systems infrastructure to
of multi-stakeholder HIV-prevention program- facilitate this coordination.
mes (Campbell, 2003): (5) Projects should ensure that there are well-
(1) There should be equal levels of commit- established incentives and procedures to
ment by all stakeholders. ensure the accountability of stakeholders
(2) Programmes should not be dominated by to each other and to grassroots project
biomedically trained people who do not beneficiaries.
always have a strong understanding of the
A health promo- between this group of women and similar sex worker peer educators in similar
tional strategy of settlements in the region, its goals were crucially undermined by its lack of
community partici- success in building bridging social capital, and in particular in mobilising
pation should seek support from more powerful local constituencies, such as the gold mining
not only to change
the behaviour of
industry and its workers.
individuals but also
to promote the
development of CONCLUSION
‘health-enabling This chapter began by specifying the author’s commitment to contributing to
community and
a health psychology that was ‘critical’ through its commitment (1) to high-
social contexts’
which support lighting how social conditions often make it very difficult for people to behave
people’s efforts to in health-enhancing ways; and (2) to broadening the individualistic focus of
be healthy. traditional health psychology to take account of this insight. Within this
context the chapter has focused on community participation as a health
promotional strategy which seeks not only to change the behaviour of individ-
uals but also to promote the development of ‘health-enabling community and
social contexts’ which support people’s efforts to be healthy.
This interest in community participation has been located within the
context of Freire’s contention that individual change is most likely to come

from projects in which people collaborate not only to change their own behav-
iour but also to understand and challenge the social circumstances that place
their health at risk. The framework outlined in this chapter has drawn on the
concepts of social identity, empowerment, critical consciousness and social
capital as conceptual tools for a ‘social psychology of participation’, with
356
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 357

particular emphasis on the way in which these processes are enabled and
constrained by unequal power-relations. The chapter has illustrated the way in
which this conceptual framework informed the evaluation of a community-led
peer education programme amongst sex workers in South Africa. In this
programme, peer education failed to achieve its intended effects in reducing
levels of HIV and other STDs.
One of the many lessons arising from this case study relates to the impor-
tance of building bridging social capital. This lesson highlights the limitations
of behaviour change programmes which focus narrowly on psychosocial and
community-level processes without succeeding in mobilising more powerful
actors and agencies (both inside and outside the community) to assist in
working towards programme goals. The brief case study provided above sought
to highlight the ways in which poverty, stigma and gender oppression under-
mined attempts to promote the collective identity and critical empowerment of
sex workers that underlie successful peer education. Within such a context, it
was unlikely that marginalised sex workers would succeed in improving their
sexual health without significant efforts to change the behaviour of their
psychologically and economically more powerful male clients, for example.
357
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 358
Critical Psychology
Hierarchy:
Collective action by members of marginalised social groupings is unlikely to be
set of social effective in the absence of alliances with more powerful social groupings, which
relations characte- have access to the economic and political power necessary for the success of
rised by an unequal programme goals. As stated earlier in the chapter, attempts to drive social
distribution of
economic power
change through ‘bottom-up’ strategies are unlikely to be successful unless they
and/or political are reinforced by parallel ‘top-down’ efforts to promote the kinds of social
influence. In many changes which are necessary to maximise the possibility of health for all.
societies hierarchical This emphasis on the need for a combination of bottom-up and top-down
social relations can
efforts to promote social change for health is consistent with the UN Aids
be symbolised by a
triangle, with the (2000) analysis of the common features of initiatives that have succeeded in
numerical majority reducing HIV transmission. This analysis highlights the mobilisation and
of less powerful participation of local communities as a necessary precondition for successful
people occupying
HIV prevention. However, on its own, it is not a sufficient condition. Commu-
the broad base of
the triangle, and a nity action is not a ‘magic bullet’. The UN Aids report emphasises that the
decreasing number potential for grassroots participation to bring about health-enhancing social
of increasingly change is shaped and constrained by the quality of the partnerships or alliances
powerful people that local communities develop with a wide range of actors – in government,
occupying the space
as one moves the private sector, civil society and (where appropriate) among project donors.
towards the Participants and facilitators of social psychological and community-level inter-
triangle’s sharp tip. ventions – such as peer education – need to stand side-by-side with a much
wider range of agencies and actors if they are to have optimal benefits in
reducing health inequalities and improving the health of marginalised groups.
The UN Aids emphasis on the role of appropriate alliances and partner-
ships in successful community health interventions resonates with frequently
voiced criticisms of many so-called community action programmes that seek
only to promote local grassroots participation in community health projects.
Such programmes are condemned for failing to pay adequate attention to the
way in which the ability of marginalised communities to improve their health
is constrained by political and economic power relations that lie beyond the
boundaries or influence of local communities (Campbell & Mzaidume, 2001).
They are also criticised for failing to take steps to challenge the political and
economic inequalities that often prevent marginalised people from improving
their health. They have also been charged with ‘victim-blaming’ through
suggesting that politically and economically disempowered groupings are
capable of taking control of their health – when in fact the social contexts in
which they live make it unlikely that they can do so (Seedat, 2001). The sex
worker programme outlined above illustrates the strength of this critique.

In short, while critical health psychologists have a vital role to play in
contributing to understandings of the psychosocial and community-level
aspects of health promotion and social change, they also need to have a realistic
understanding of the limits of their discipline. Much work remains to be done in
building links between critical health psychologists and thinkers and activists in
358
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap13 11/2/04 10:38 am Page 359

terrains such as economics, politics, social policy and development studies. Such Collective action by
links are essential for the development of understandings and strategies for members of
synthesising top-down and bottom-up efforts to create community contexts marginalised social
which are most likely to support and enable healthy sexual behaviours. groupings is
unlikely to be
effective in the
absence of alliances
1. Speculate about some of the economic, political and legal obstacles to with more powerful
effective HIV-prevention in South Africa. To what extent do existing laws social groupings,
which have access
and social policies (in fields such as health, welfare, education, gender and
to the economic
social development) provide an effective starting point for the fight against and political power
HIV, or to what extent are new laws and policies necessary? Which factors necessary for the
stand in the way of the implementation of those positive laws and policies success of
that already exist? programme goals.
2. What kinds of top-down social change are necessary to support the
psychosocial and community-level processes underlying local collective
action, particularly in relation to the challenges of reducing the spread of
HIV and of providing better care and support for people living with Aids?
3. Many would argue that the key factors that facilitate HIV-transmission and
the stigmatisation of people living with Aids lie beyond the disciplinary
boundaries of critical psychology. Outline how you would respond to a
critic who said that psychology had no role to play in the struggle to limit
HIV-transmission in South Africa.
4. Speculate about the processes and mechanisms by which ‘perceived citizen
power’ may (or indeed may not) impact on people’s health – either in terms
of reducing health-damaging stress or in terms of increasing the likelihood
that people will engage in health-enhancing behaviours.
For a fuller outline of the conceptual arguments laid out in this chapter see
Catherine Campbell (2003) Letting them die: Why HIV/Aids prevention
programmes often fail (Cape Town: Double Storey/Juta). This book also
provides an illustration of the way in which this conceptual framework has
been used to understand the challenges of HIV-prevention amongst youth and
mineworkers, as well as the complexities of creating bridging social capital
amongst the residents of marginalised local communities and more powerful
social actors and agencies.
Paulo Freire’s (1970/1996) Pedagogy of the oppressed (Harmondsworth:

Penguin) provides a valuable account of the role and possibilities of collective
action as a strategy for improving the life chances of marginalised social group-
ings. While the author was an activist in the field of adult education rather
than health, the book is full of generalisable insights.
359
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 360
Chapter
14
South African psychology and

racism: Historical determinants
and future prospects
Norman Duncan, Garth Stevens & Brett Bowman
‘[O]rganised professional psychology’s historical role and evolution has

often mimicked and mirrored socio-historical developments within
the South African social formation at different historical junctures, and
in this way has acted as a microcosm of South African society
at different points in time.’
Suffla et al (2001, 28)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Explore the historical interface between South African psychology and racism
during the pre-apartheid period
Understand the factors that influenced South African psychology’s active contribu-
tions to and ongoing perpetuation of racist ideologies during the apartheid years
Examine the future prospects for deracialising South African psychology at the
organisational, academic and professional levels.
360
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 361
South African psychology and racism: Historical determinants and future prospects
INTRODUCTION
Two basic aspects of critical psychology
As way of beginning we might isolate two fundamental aspects of critical
psychology. One is an issue of content – a question of subject-matter, the other
is a means of access – a matter of approach. To deal with the content issues
first, critical psychology, is, at its most basic, about the power-relationships
constituted by psychology as a form of knowledge and practice. In the South
African context, this means that a pre-eminent objective of critical psychology
is the critique of how the knowledge, the practice and the organisational struc-
ture of psychology itself came to perpetuate what must be South Africa’s most
characteristic form of power: racism. This, after all, is the particular form of
social asymmetry that has come to condition virtually all aspects of social exis- Social asymmetry:
tence in our country. The second aspect of our attentions here concerns the lack of balance or
symmetry in
question of approach, a method of critical psychology. And the particular
relations of social
means of access we have in mind here, as exemplified in the works of Rose power.
(1991, 1995), is that of historical overview and, more precisely, an overview of
the institutional history of South African psychology. In other words, we are
here concerned not only with the kinds of knowledge produced by the disci-
pline – although this is, of course, of overwhelming importance – we are
concerned also with its own formal and informal conditions of restraint,
oppression and omission, that is, South African psychology’s own inner
politics.
In view of the above approach, then, this chapter traces the history and
trajectory of South African psychology, focusing on its ideological complicity
with the broader racist conditions and discourses that characterised apartheid
South Africa. After examining the history of South African psychology as both
instrument and outcome of the apartheid state, this chapter interrogates the
degree to which South African psychology may be extricated from the racism
so overtly identifiable in its formative years. The possibilities for the establish-
ment of a ‘new’ South African psychology as a discipline of equity and
liberation rather than as an instrument of continued exclusionary practice
inform the concluding discussions of the chapter.
Defining racism
As will become apparent in the chapter, there are a great many types of racism,
and a great number of ways in which racism can be implemented. Further-

more, because of its multi-faceted and constantly changing manifestations,
racism defies easy description. To make matters more complicated still, there
are many different ways of approaching and understanding the subject of
racism, many of which have been reviewed from a psychological perspective by
Foster (1993). As such it is important that, right form the outset of this chapter,
361
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 362
Critical Psychology
Racism:
we clarify exactly what we mean by racism. Here, as elsewhere (Duncan, Van
ideology by means Niekerk, De la Ray & Seedat, 2001), we understand racism to be an ideology by
of which racial means of which racial domination is organised and justified. In more precise
domination is organ- terms, and following Foster (1991), we see racism as
ised and justified.
More precisely, a set [a]n ideology through which the domination or marginalization of certain ‘races’
of ideas and discur- by another ‘race’ or ‘races’ is enacted and legitimated ... a set of ideas and discur-
sive and material sive and material practices aimed at (re)producing and justifying systematic
practices aimed at inequalities between ‘races’ or racialized groups (Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Ray
(re)producing and
& Seedat, 2001, 2).
justifying systematic
inequalities between This approach to racism has at least two distinct advantages. First, it highlights
‘races’ or racialised
groups. Inextricably
the widespread issues of power related to the maintenance, functioning and
tied to processes of perpetuation of racism (Thompson, 1984). In much the same way, it indicates
social, political and the very pervasiveness of racism. Furthermore, despite enormous disagree-
economic domina- ments about the nature of racism, this approach emphasises an aspect that
tion/marginalisa-
most social scientists agree on, namely that racism is linked to processes of
tion, racism involves
skewed relations of social, political and economic domination and marginalisation (Thompson,
power in all spheres 1984). Hence, racism involves systematically skewed relations of power in all
of social major spheres of social organisation. Lastly, despite it seeming an obvious
organisation.
point, one needs to emphasise that any act of racism is an act which has a
victim and a beneficiary. Put slightly differently, in Memmi’s (1982) terms, the
ideology of racism operates ‘to the benefit of the racist and to the detriment of
Ideology: his/her victims’. The benefits that accrued to whites as a result of apartheid,
set of ideas and and the massively destructive effects that racist policies had, and continue to
discursive and have, on the material, social and psychological reality of black South Africans
material practices more than attest to this fact.
aimed at
(re)producing and
justifying certain PSYCHOLOGY AND RACISM PRIOR TO 1994
systematic social
Psychology at the service of humanity
inequalities
between groups of Since its birth more than a century ago, psychology has, in the words of Nell
people. (1990), been viewed as the ‘bright morning science’ (128). Psychologists, in the
same vein, have been seen as ‘eager young scientific evangelists’ (129) offering
up knowledge and delivering humankind towards a ‘shining world’ (129), free
of human suffering and pain. A reading of most basic psychology texts penned
by apartheid era South African psychologists (see, for example, Du Toit & Van
der Merwe, 1976; Louw, 1987; Tyson, 1987) and quite a number of ‘specialist’
texts (see, for example, Kriegler, 1988; Mauer, 1987; South African Institute of
Clinical Psychology [SAICP], 1986; Strümpfer, 1981), would show that, while
Nell’s choice of words might be somewhat unusual, he was not far off the mark
in his description of the role generally attributed to and claimed by psycholo-
gists and their discipline. A close reading of these texts would show that, in the
main, psychology was traditionally seen as playing ‘an ... important role in the
362
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 363
solving of human problems’ (Atkinson, Atkinson & Hilgard, 1983, 5), striving
for ‘the preservation and protection of fundamental human rights’ (SAICP,
34), and being of benefit to humanity (cf Suffla, Stevens & Seedat, 2001).
Psychology and the reproduction of asymmetrical relations

of power
However, history shows that South African psychology certainly did not Psychology aided
consistently play this salutary role in relation to racism and other racialised the reproduction of
social asymmetries (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; Suffla et al, 2001). As racism not only
Nicholas (in Baldwin-Ragaven, De Gruchy & London, 1999) observes, rather through its routine
denial of the
than playing any meaningful role in addressing issues of institutionalised centrality of the
racism during the years of apartheid, South African psychology – like the other phenomenon in
social sciences in South Africa (Magwaza, 2001; Savage, 1981; Welsh, 1981. cf South African
Gramsci, 1978; in Hall et al, 1984) – played a pivotal role in the perpetuation, society but also
through to the
elaboration and reproduction of racism. Psychology aided the reproduction of academic
racism not only through its routine denial of the centrality of the phenomenon justifications or
in South African society, but also through to the academic justifications or ‘authorisation’ that
‘authorisation’ that it provided for the phenomenon. This ‘authorisation’ was it provided for the
phenomenon.
evident also in terms of the highly racialised nature of its own disciplinary and
professional practices and organisation (Magwaza, 2001).
BOX 1 South African psychology’s architect of apartheid
The School must equip the Bantu to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose
upon him ... there is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.
What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is absurd
(Verwoerd, cited in Harrison, 1981, 194).
The collusion of psychology with racism during the apartheid period has been
widely documented in a range of reviews and studies (e.g. Baldwin-Ragaven et
al, 1999; Cooper, Nicholas, Seedat & Statman, 1990; Duncan, 2001; Durrheim
& Mokeki, 1997; Magwaza, 2001; Nicholas, 1990, 2001; Seedat, 2001; Suffla et
al, 2001). Given space constraints, we shall not provide an in-depth discussion
of these reviews and studies here. However, by way of illustration, we shall
briefly consider some of the key findings of five of these studies (also see Boxes
1 and 2). Racialised:

imparting a racial
dimension, and
South African psychology’s silence over racism typically a racist
In a thematic trend analysis of all the articles published in the South African dimension to an
Journal of Psychology and in Psychology in Society between 1983 and 1988 aspect of social or
professional life.
Seedat (1990) found that there was an almost exclusive focus on the psychological
363
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 364
Critical Psychology
experiences of ‘whites’ by the publications of that time and a deafening silence in

respect of the negative impact of racism on the lives of South Africans in general
and black people in particular (cf Durrheim & Mokeki, 1997). An extension of
this analysis to a further five widely disseminated psychological journals
published between 1948 and 1988 confirmed these trends (Seedat, 2001).
Racisms of omission and commission

Magwaza (2001) analysed the submissions of psychologists as mental health
service providers under apartheid to the South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission (TRC). First, her results indicated that apartheid-era South
African psychology could be implicated in the perpetuation of apartheid racism
through the racially skewed processes of knowledge-production and training
that it generated. She notes that apartheid-era South African psychology was
disconcertingly silent about the poor facilities for training black psychologists
and the resultant underrepresentation of blacks in the discipline and profes-
sion. Furthermore, like Seedat (2001), she found that South African psychology
failed to address the psychological implications of apartheid. In this regard, she
argues that apartheid-era South African psychology was guilty of complicity in
the perpetuation of apartheid racism, perhaps more through omission than
commission, that is, possibly more through what it failed to do than through
what it did do. However, her research indicated that South African psychology
could also be implicated in serious human rights violations committed in the
service of the apartheid state and its racist policies (Magwaza, 2001). In fact, she
notes: ‘A former South African Police psychologist admitted to the TRC that
some work involving torture and interrogation was contracted out to psycholo-
gists outside the police service’ (2001, 40).
Racist diagnostic systems

This active role in the perpetuation of apartheid ideology extended into the
production and activation of differential diagnostic systems for whites and
blacks (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999). The analysis by Baldwin-Ragaven et al
(1999) of a number of transcripts submitted by psychologists to the TRC
revealed an ‘entire racist language and terminology’ and a range of fundamen-
tally racist beliefs about ‘the mental health of black people’, including the belief
that black people do not get depressed and the preposterous notion that
symptoms of stress in the black population could be attributed to a ‘racial’

condition named ‘bantu hysteria’ (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999, 164).
Blacks as the negative Other

In a study that analyses a corpus of texts produced during the apartheid period
by South African psychologists in relation to issues of racism, Duncan (2001)
364
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 365
BOX 2 Psychological research and scientific racism
R.W. Wilcocks formally recommended in the Psychological Report focusing on

the poor white problem that severe penalties on sexual intercourse between
the races should be put in place, social legislation be revised and extended
to keep ‘racial groups’ apart and ensure the domination of whites and that
blacks should not be allowed to compete for work with whites (Wilcocks,
1932). J.A.J. van Rensburg’s research confirmed the ‘supposed’ intellectual
inferiority of blacks and buttressed the self-serving belief that blacks were
suitable only for manual repetitive labour (Nicholas, 2001, 29).
found that in their very attempts to understand the phenomenon these

psychologists, in varying degrees and ways, reinforced various elements of the
ideology. In addition, he found that, more frequently than not, they
constructed black people in South Africa as ‘different’, ‘alien’ and negative
Other, and in the process reproduced one of the key elements of the ideology
of racism (cf Guillaumin, 2002).
Psychology’s racist organisational structure

In his study, Nicholas (1990, 2001) details how professional psychology in
apartheid-era South Africa reproduced the racism of broader South African
society in its organisational structures (for example, through who it included
and excluded from its structures). Additionally, he shows how it also played a
central role in the ‘scientific’ pre-formulation of the racist policies advanced by
the apartheid state, a role amply illustrated in the discussion to follow.
The ‘poor white’ problem

The complicity of South African psychology with racism had a number of early
historical markers, and the contribution of South African psychologists to the
Carnegie Commission of 1928 was arguably the most significant of these. In
1927, the President of the Carnegie Corporation indicated to a South African
educational psychologist, E.G. Malherbe, that the Carnegie Corporation
intended investing funds in the investigation of a key societal problem in South
Africa. On asking Malherbe what the most pressing social concern was in
South Africa at the time, Malherbe tellingly indicated that, without any
question, it was the ‘poor white’ problem. Funding was subsequently made
available for an inquiry into the ‘poor white’ problem. The inquiry involved
various social scientists, including a significant number of psychologists. This
inquiry, in the words of Louw (in Cooper et al, 1990), certainly provided South
African psychologists ‘with the opportunity to prove their usefulness in the
solution of societal problems’ (3 – 4). However, through its choice of the ‘poor
white’ problem as the social problem most deserving of attention, and through
365
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 366
Critical Psychology
the recommendations that it subsequently made, it also laid the foundations

for the ideological trajectory of South African psychology as a discipline that
apparently would not have any qualms about privileging the concerns and
needs of whites over those of blacks.
South African psychology at this time, in short, was a discipline that would
not have any qualms about advancing the fundamentally racist polices of the
social order in which it was located (Cooper et al, 1990; Nicholas, 1990, 2001).
Among the many recommendations that the inquiry made were that ‘severe
penalties on sexual intercourse between the races should be put in place’; that
‘social legislation be revised and extended to keep “racial groups” apart’; and
that ‘blacks should not be allowed to compete for work with whites’ (Wilcocks,
in Nicholas, 2001, 29; Dubow, 1995). It is telling that many of these recom-
mendations were subsequently transformed into law, and that they became
the bases of some of the key pillars of grand apartheid (Cooper et al, 1990).
Why did South African psychology not resist apartheid?

The question that obviously can be posed at this juncture is: Why did South
African psychology respond in this manner to issues of ‘race’ and racism
during the period under consideration? Specifically, why was the dominant
response of South African psychology in many instances that of silence in the
face of the excesses of the racism of apartheid? Worse yet, why, in some cases,
the overt support of these excesses?
According to Cooper et al (1990), Magwaza (2001), Nicholas (in Baldwin-
Ragaven et al, 1999) and Savage (1981), there was a range of factors, which
during the apartheid years would have exerted considerable pressure on South
African psychologists to respond to the issues of ‘race’ and racism in the
manner they did. It is the consideration of these factors that will now consti-
tute the focus of discussion.
Determinants of South African psychology’s response to racism

Psychologists, as Dawes (1985) and Savage (1981) observe, do not function in
a social vacuum – nor do they start their careers with what one might call a
‘blank slate’. Like everyone else, they too were socialised by and into the
prevailing dominant ideologies; and it is unlikely that they would have been
Constituent
discourses: left unaffected by the impact of these ideologies and their constituent
very basic forms of discourses and material practices (Essed, 1987; Katz, 1976; Van Dijk, 1991). It
knowing, of is important that we bear a series of fundamental facts in mind here. First,
understanding, of racism permeated all facets of the lives of everyone in South Africa during the
making sense of the
world, which carry a period of apartheid. Secondly, we need be aware of the social class positions of
great deal of weight psychologists in apartheid South Africa, that is, predominantly that of the
in a given society. white middle class, and therefore among the principal beneficiaries of
366
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 367
apartheid racism. (At the end of the 1970s less than two percent of all regis-
tered psychologists in South Africa were black (Ebersohn, 1983) and at the end
of the 1980s blacks constituted a mere ten per cent of all registered psycholo-
gists (Seedat, 1990).) Thirdly, that such psychologists were the products of an
irredeemably racist society would have made it very likely that South African
psychology would have been motivated to support and in fact reproduce
aspects of the apartheid state’s racist practices and policies. Fourthly, South
African psychology formed part of an international psychology community
that, to this day, still struggles to come to terms with, and consequently, to free
itself of the fetters of, its past collusion with racism in its various manifesta-
tions (Holdstock, 2001; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994).
BOX 3 Eugenics: A genetic argument for racism
There is nothing either in the history of domestic animals or in that of evolution to make us doubt that a
race of sane men may be formed who shall be as much superior mentally and morally to the modern European,
as the modern European is to the lowest of the Negro races (Galton, 1869, x).
Local and international racisms of psychology

While their influence is substantial, the social sciences constitute a relatively
small and fairly structured system, with ideas emerging in one part of the
system circulating reasonably effortlessly throughout the system. As Essed
(1987, 3) observes, social scientists from around the world form ‘a social
group’, and in this group they do not only ‘compete with each other through
persuasive argumentation’, but they also ‘communicate and identify with each
other’ through the work that they produce.
Thus, if one wishes to understand pre-1994 South African psychology’s
response to racism, it would be useful to understand the response of
psychology internationally to the phenomenon. How did psychology interna-
tionally respond to racism? While the discipline’s response was undoubtedly
complex, the predominant response, in Howitt & Owusu-Bempah’s (1994)
opinion, was that psychology was complicit with racism, either through the
advancement of overtly racist theories and discourses or through a misleading
pose of ‘scientific detachment’, which often merely served as ‘a smoke-screen
for psychology’s racist work’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, 3).
Psychology and the inferiorisation of blackness

Indeed, research shows that many of the acclaimed ‘founding fathers’ of
modern psychology played quite an active role in the elaboration of racist
theories (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). For example, Herbert Spencer, who
endorsed the appropriation of the eugenics movement by academic psychology
367
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 368
Critical Psychology
Psychology has
in his Principles of psychology (1870), argued that ‘selective breeding’ was
been complicit with necessary to eliminate ‘unfit’ ‘races’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). In his
racism, either thinking, black people were inferior to ‘the least worthy white person’ (Howitt
through the & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, 5). Similar to Spencer, Edward Thorndike, who is
advancement of
overtly racist
frequently lauded as a pioneer in the fields of educational and child psychology,
theories and advocated the compulsory sterilisation of the poor and underprivileged ‘races’
discourses or as an alternative to other possible psychological and educational interventions
through a (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994) (also see Box 3). Another educational
misleading pose of
psychologist, Arthur Jensen, also proposed a variation of Spencer’s basic thesis.
‘scientific
detachment’ which Specifically, he argued that impoverished black American children performed
has served as a more poorly on learning tasks than their more privileged white counterparts,
‘smokescreen for not because of their depressed environments and racial discrimination but
psychology’s racist
because they were genetically inferior to whites (Holdstock, 2001).
work’ (Howitt &
Owus-Bempah,
1994). Psychology and genocide
From the 1930s, the discipline of psychology also appeared to provide Nazi
Germany with some of its most ‘authoritative’ ‘scientific’ justifications for its
genocidal policies which, as we know, culminated in the activation of the ‘final
solution’. In fact, ‘Nazism deferred consistently to the expertise of psychology
in making some of its most genocidal decisions’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah,
1994, 20). It comes as little surprise, then, that the discipline of psychology
burgeoned under German National Socialism between 1932 and 1942 (Guil-
laumin, 2002; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994).
It was within this international context, characterised by the overt collu-
sion between North American and European psychology and the most
inhumane forms and processes of brute racism, genocide and misanthropy,
that South African psychology was born and established itself. It was with this
community of psychology that South African psychology identified and within
which it ensconced itself.
Dissension within psychology

While we believe that the world and social systems in which psychologists of
the apartheid era were socialised undoubtedly must have had a profound effect
on the manner in which they would understand and deal with the issue of
racism, it is important to note here that it is certainly not our intention here to
imply that all psychologists, by virtue of their location in South African society,
necessarily would have succumbed to the influence of apartheid racism, and
that they would not have opposed it. That would obviously be too simplistic a
perception to be of much help. As Van Dijk (1987) argues, social scientists’
responses to social inequalities are generally relatively variable and at times
conflict out-and-out with prevailing dominant ideological positions. This is
368
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 369
BOX 4 Psychopathology and racism
In the midst of the politics of slavery in the American South, Dr Cartright (a

leading psychiatrist at the time) identified drapetomania as a psychopathology
endemic to slaves. This pathology’s most powerful symptom, according to
Cartright, was ‘an irrestrainable propensity on the part of the slaves to run away
to escape from slavery’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, 21).
largely attributable to the fact that social scientists do not constitute a homog-
enous group (Therborn, 1980). For example, while the majority of
psychologists in apartheid South Africa emanated from the apartheid-
privileged ‘white’ ‘racial’ group and could consequently have been expected
generally to support the policies that favoured them or their group (Seedat,
1990), it could also have been expected that there would have been a number
of psychologists who, because of their links with or, possibly, membership of
the apartheid designated ‘ssubaltern’ racialised groups or, perhaps because of Subaltern:
the dictates of perceived professional ethics and traditions (given the generic term for all
those groups that
dominant view of psychology as a ‘helping’ profession) would have opposed
have been made
these policies (Simon, 1982; Van Dijk, 1991). There were quite a few singular subordinate in
representatives of this grouping of psychologists (Magwaza, 2001). terms of class,
However, to minimise the potential threat which this latter group of gender, race,
ethnicity, religion,
psychologists could have posed to the maintenance of the prevailing racialised
caste etc.
power relations, the apartheid state created many external restraints or checks
to ensure its control over this group as well as the latter’s academic and profes-
sional activities and productions (Baldwin-Ragaven, 1999; Savage, 1981;
Seedat, 1990; Welsh, 1981). This leads to the rest of the factors which might
have had some influence on South African psychology’s responses to the
racism endemic to apartheid society.
Constraints related to the training of psychologists

During the apartheid era, as is the case today, most of South Africa’s psycholo-
gists were trained at its universities; and it is here where a significant
proportion of psychological research and knowledge dissemination took place
(De la Rey, 2001; Savage, 1981). Because of the apartheid state’s ever-increasing
need for control, particularly of institutions of training and knowledge produc-
tion, it went to extreme lengths to create a climate of research and training at
universities which would be conducive to the production of the types of ideas

and social scientist that would best serve its interests and the maintenance of
the prevailing relations of domination (cf Gramsci, in Simon, 1982). Of para-
mount importance here were the racialised relations of domination that would
maintain the institutionalised hierarchies of racial privilege and which South
Africa would become increasingly notorious for.
369
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 370
Critical Psychology
One of the more important measures employed by the apartheid state in

South Africa to ensure that such a climate was created was to replicate the
racial hierarchies that prevailed in broader society at the country’s universities
(cf Coetzee & Geggus, 1980; and Ralekheto, 1991). And it was essentially to
this end that the Extension of University Education Act No 45 of 1959, which
predicated the dispensing of university education along racial lines, was passed
in 1959 (De la Rey, 2001). Not only did this Act ensure that universities
reflected the racial divisions of broader South African society but it further
ensured that all the other racially based inequalities endemic to broader South
African society were also replicated at these institutions and through the
latter’s academic productions.
With the passing of the Extension of University Education Act whites were
predictably allocated the best university facilities while blacks were provided
with the poorest. So poorly resourced were the universities intended for blacks
that they were disparagingly referred to as ‘bush colleges’. Four times more
money was spent annually on white universities than on black universities
(Savage, 1981). This state of affairs, together with the fact that black students
generally entered university with a considerable backlog, and were significantly
fewer in number than whites, ensured that most of the country’s psychologists
were white. We might reiterate this point by referring to a recent (1990) survey
which showed that, at the time, 31,3 per 1 000 whites in South Africa were
enrolled at university whereas corresponding figures for ‘Africans’ and
‘coloureds’ were only 2,6 and 4,6 per 1 000, respectively (UWC Bulletin, 1990).
In the light of the preceding discussion on the psychologist as ‘racialised’
subject within a racist social order, the implications that this state of affairs had
on South African psychology’s response to racism should be obvious.
Racism through curriculum

It was not merely by providing unequal facilities at the country’s universities
that the apartheid state attempted to create the type of academic climate at
these institutions that would ensure the production of research, academic
discourses and views that would bolster the prevailing relations of domination.
The type and content of courses typically offered at South African universities
often also aided in the attainment of this objective. Rather than preparing
students to embark on an honest and critical study of prevailing social
problems, the courses normally offered at these universities over the years
instead proved to be extremely conservative. Examining the prospectuses of

most South African universities at the time, for example, reveals that until the
early 1990s none of these universities offered any substantive courses that
dealt exclusively and systematically with the problem of racism and its delete-
rious consequences in South Africa (Ralekheto, 1991; Savage, 1981).
370
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 371
Racism at the level of institutional structure

This ‘status quo-preserving’ or conservative nature of the courses generally
offered at South African universities in the past was, of course, not accidental.
The apartheid state went to extreme lengths to ensure that the type of courses
offered to students prepared them passively to accept or become consenting
defenders of the status quo rather than critical thinkers who would be
prepared to address the plethora of social problems endemic to South African
society. Consider here, for example, the fact that for a very long period of time
black universities – traditionally considered the hub of political activism and
protest – were staffed and controlled virtually exclusively by graduates from
the notoriously conservative and pro- (Nationalist Party) government
Afrikaner universities (Legassick, 1967; Ralekheto, 1991). Consider also the
fact that some psychology departments at these universities were for a very
long period in their history dominated by members of the decidedly racist
Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (cf Jansen, 1991).
The apartheid state did not merely have to depend on the strategic place-
ment of its organic intellectuals at universities considered to be the breeding
ground of black radicals to ensure its ideological hegemony. It very frequently
also had recourse to various forms of political pressure and persecution, such
as the denial of appointments and promotions and the detention of ‘too
radical’ university teaching staff to ensure that the courses offered at universi-
ties did not pose any serious threat to the prevailing racialised power-relations
in South Africa (Cloete, Muller & Orkin, 1986; Cooper et al, 1990; Oakes,
1988).
The ‘career socialisation’ of racism

Given the above and bearing in mind that, as Berger & Luckmann (1981)
observe, the socialisation which future social scientists are normally subjected
to at universities entails not only the process by which certain career-oriented
roles are acquired but also the internalisation of certain relatively clearly
circumscribed beliefs and discourses, it can be appreciated why writers such as
Savage (1981) postulated that it would have been extremely difficult for most
of the products of South African universities not to have participated (in some
way or other) in the reproduction of the phenomenon of racism as it mani-
fested itself in this country.
The conservative nature of the training afforded students and prospective
practitioners and researchers in apartheid South Africa was reinforced not

only by the harassment of opponents of state policy and the appointment of
conservative whites at black universities but also by a vicious system of censor-
ship which effectively prohibited the use of many key works essential for the
adequate training of students.
371
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 372
Critical Psychology
Legal censorship and censure

Various censorship laws such as the Publications Act No 42 of 1974 and the
Suppression of Communism Act No 50 of 1951 gave the state untrammelled
powers in preventing a wide range of essential works from being used by
students and researchers in psychology. It is estimated that by 1980 a minimum
of some eighteen thousand books had already been banned in South Africa,
including many important works related to racism such as those of Frantz
Fanon, R.E. Simons, and I.B. Tabata (Kuper, 1974; Oakes, 1988; Welsh, 1981).
Legislation in this country, however, did not only have a very restrictive
effect on scholars in terms of the references which the latter were allowed to
consult, but it was also extremely constraining in terms of the types of
discourses and research it allowed them to produce (Baldwin-Ragaven et al,
1999; Welsh, 1981). There are, for example, several recorded cases where the
South African Police and the courts of law relentlessly harassed researchers
because their academic works were deemed to place the apartheid state and its
racist policies in an unfavourable light. Undoubtedly, the most sensational of
these cases is the one that involved Barend van Niekerk, a law professor, who
in 1970 was prosecuted for publishing his research on racist discrimination in
the administration of justice in South African courts of law (Welsh, 1981). The
charge instituted against him was that of ‘contempt of court’ – and this for
allegedly bringing the South African judiciary into disrepute. Van Niekerk was
finally acquitted of the charge brought against him.
The most important aspect of this trial, however, was not its outcome but
the state’s clear warning as to what would happen to scholars who, through
their research and discourses, dared to attack or threaten the racist status quo
prevailing in South Africa (Savage, 1981). This implicit threat was in fact under-
lined five years later when Van Niekerk was once again prosecuted: this time for
having ‘defamed’ the Minister of Justice by implying that racist discrimination
played a role in a government decision to recommend clemency for a convicted
white murderer but not for a black man convicted for having participated in the
same crime. On this occasion Van Niekerk was convicted. Given events of this
nature, as Savage (1981) observes, it became increasingly unlikely that social
scientists would risk incurring the disapproval of the ‘powers that be’ by
producing research, publications and training programmes that could have
been construed as constituting an attack on the state’s racist policies.
Academic racism by avoidance

Apart from legal censorship and the South African government’s tendency to
muzzle or censure dissenting or critical scholars, the censorship which South
African psychologists traditionally seemed to have imposed on themselves (the
ultimate testimony to the power of dominant group ideological control) can
372
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 373
also be considered to have had the potential of limiting their ability to respond
to issues such as racism in a critical manner (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999;
Seedat, 1990). In his content analysis of the articles published over a five-year
period in what was certainly the most progressive psychology journal at the
time, namely, Psychology in society, Seedat (1990), for example, noted that
very few of these articles in fact dealt with the issue of racism. Moreover, none
of the handful of articles dealing with racism so much as mentioned the contri-
butions in this field of study of any black psychologist of note: not even the
works of Bulhan and Fanon, who are both acknowledged as pioneers in the
field of the psychology of racism (Seedat, 1990).
The regulation of research funding

Another potential constraint placed on psychologists interested in producing
what may have been considered as critical studies and publications dealing
with the phenomenon of racism was that of funding. Here it should be
stressed that the problems experienced by scholars in this regard in most
cases did not really stem from the availability of adequate funding for their
research but rather from the restrictions placed upon them by the funders
who eventually sponsored their research, which at the time was normally the
state or big business.
For a long time the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) was one of
the major state agencies providing funds for research and study in the social
sciences. Though the HSRC’s stated aim was ‘to encourage and stimulate
research in the social sciences by free and independent scholars’ (in Welsh,
1981, 33), its activities during the apartheid period, however, proved the
contrary to be true. Most of the research that the HSRC funded showed proof
of anything but the fact that it encouraged free and independent academic
activity. Rather, the bulk of the research which this institution tended to fund
was ‘marked by a deep conservatism and at times overt commitment to
apartheid’ (Savage, 1981, 50–51; cf Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999; Cloete et al,
1986; Louw & Foster, 1992), which is hardly surprising if it is considered that
for a long period the organisation was controlled by fairly conservative
elements, and also if statements such as the following, which regularly
emerged from this organisation’s publications, are considered:
... an exceptional intellect can only be utilized to the optimal benefit of society if its
possessor ... is guided by a Christian Nationalist philosophy [the philosophy that

in part guided Nationalist Party apartheid policies] of life (HSRC, in Savage, 51).
Systematic bias in research funding

As Savage (1981) seems to suggest, while the apartheid government dealt with
those academics who flagrantly criticised its racist policies by persecuting and
373
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 374
Critical Psychology
Apartheid has
come and gone but
racism remains a
reality for most
South Africans.
It manifests itself
in all facets of
human activity.
jailing them, the HSRC appeared to have tried to keep the rest in line by means
of the bestowal or withholding of the funds which it had at its disposal.
Various academics in fact openly accused the HSRC of victimising social
scientists who were critical of the South African government’s policies (espe-
cially its policy of apartheid) by refusing to grant them research funding (cf
Cloete et al, 1986). Now, even though it would be difficult to prove the veracity
of these allegations – the HSRC typically only recorded the studies that it
funded and not those that it did not fund – what is important here is the fact
that for a very long time many social scientists were firmly convinced of this
bias on the part of the HSRC (Cooper et al, 1990). Needless to say, this factor
must have played a significant role in the type of research and publications on
racism that these social scientists produced (cf Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999).
Even though it cannot be proved that the HSRC, in its allocation of study
grants, was systematically biased against academic endeavours that were
critical of the apartheid government’s policies, this organisation none the less
had a reputation for being unscrupulously loyal to the government when
editing the reports of projects that it had funded (Cloete et al, 1986). Research
reveals a number of instances where the HSRC had in fact refused to publish
reports of research conducted with its funds where these reports listed banned
publications in their bibliographies or where they were too critical of govern-
ment policies (Savage, 1981; Welsh, 1981). This bias is, of course, completely
understandable if it is considered that the HSRC’s primary sponsor was the
government and that it was largely controlled by National Party intellectuals
(Cloete & Muller, 1991; Welsh, 1981).
374
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 375
The role of the private sector

The former South African government had through the years, however, not
only influenced research and other academic activities via the funding agencies
that fell directly under its control. There exist numerous accounts of how the
government, from time to time, also exerted considerable pressure on the
private sector not to fund academic activities that were deemed to pose a threat
to the continuation of its policies. Consider in this regard, for example, the
public appeal which Kent Durr, a National Party Member of Parliament, made
in 1978 to the private sector:
Business men [sic] should prevent their grants to universities being used by
socialist [read: all those opposed to the government] thinkers (in Savage, 1981, 62).
Not that the private sector had over the years needed much of this type of
encouragement, because for a very long period in the history of this country it
had been a very active and willing supporter of government policies, and this
by virtue of the fact that these policies were inordinately well suited to its needs
(Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999; CAL, 1987; O’Meara, 1983).
Publishing as constraint
Publications can be considered to constitute one of the most vital aspects of
academic – and, in particular, research – activity. Publications provide
academics with the opportunity to subject their productions to peer evaluation
and public scrutiny. Furthermore, publications can also be considered to be of
vital importance because they constitute an important criterion for the
appointment and promotion of most academics. In fact, apart from academic
qualifications, publications seem to have always been the single most impor-
tant measure of academics’ worth (Seedat, 1990).
If, however, publications have always represented an important measure of
the academic’s abilities, then, by the same token, they potentially also consti-
tuted one of the biggest obstacles to critical and independent thinking with
which the apartheid-era academic had to contend. Precisely because they were
so important to academics, publications inevitably became the means by
which the apartheid state, through overt and covert pressure on publishing
agencies, universities’ publications boards, and the editorial boards of main-
stream subject journals, could ensure that academics did not pose too much of
a threat to the policies of the government of the day. Consider here, for
example, the following illustrations: during the early 1970s, the Oxford Univer-
sity Press decided to excise Leo Kuper’s chapter on African Nationalism from
its publication, The Oxford history of South Africa; and this simply because it
contained too many quotations from banned sources (Kuper, 1974; Savage,
1981)! In 1965, a post-graduate student at the University of Pretoria experi-
enced similar problems when submitting a thesis for evaluation and
375
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 376
Critical Psychology
publication. Here the problem apparently was that his thesis contained too
many quotations from individuals restricted under the Suppression of
Communism Act. The University of Pretoria ultimately decided that while the
thesis would be examined, the student would not be allowed to have it
published (Welsh, 1981).
Twenty years later, a University of Cape Town academic psychologist, Don
Foster and other collaborators produced a report on detentions and torture in
apartheid South Africa. However, when Foster presented the report at the
Psychological Association of South Africa’s 1985 Conference, it came under
severe public condemnation by the Minister of Police, who had received
advanced warning of the report. Many fellow-psychologists continued the
attack in the ensuing period. Faced by this type of pressure, it should be
expected that very few academics would have been willing to undertake
research on a ‘contentious’ issue such as racism (cf Chesler, 1976).
Professional organisations
The professional psychology organisations that functioned in apartheid South
Africa all had relatively short life spans, and histories that were not particularly
commendable. In order to appreciate these organisations’ potential impact on
South African psychology’s research, training and authorship endeavours,
especially in relation to racism, it would perhaps be apposite to consider
briefly some of the more pertinent aspects of this history. (For a more detailed
account of the history of these organisations see Baldwin-Ragaven et al (1999),
Cooper, et al (1990), Nicholas (1990), and Suffla, et al (2001).)
The first organisation that attempted to organise and represent psychol-
ogists in South Africa, the South African Psychological Association (SAPA),
was founded in 1948 (Ebersohn, 1983). At its establishment it had a total
membership of 34 psychologists, all of whom were white. Soon after its
formation, however, SAPA was confronted by – in the organisation’s own
perception – a major problem. Somehow the association, when drawing up
its constitution, had omitted to specify whether membership would be
restricted to whites or not. When the question of black psychologists’ affilia-
tion to SAPA consequently arose, the executive of the association did not
know what it stood to do. SAPA’s membership itself was effectively split in
two. On the one hand, there were those who contended that when the asso-
ciation was formed the assumption had been that its membership would be
restricted to whites and that the executive therefore had no obligation

towards, and indeed, had no right to admit blacks to the association at that
stage. On the other hand, there were those who felt that as SAPA’s constitu-
tion did not contain any explicit limitations in respect of the ‘race’ of
potential members, the association should be open to anyone wishing to join
it (Psygram, 1962). After several years of drawn-out and rather rancorous
376
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 377
debate – in which black psychologists were not once asked to present their
views – SAPA eventually decided, in principle, to open its doors to black
South African psychologists. Very revealing to note here, however, is the fact
that one of the more important factors that ultimately led to this decision
was the fear of jeopardising the association’s membership of the Interna-
tional Union of Scientific Psychology (J. Louw, 1987; Nicholas, 1990;
Psygram, 1960).
SAPA and PIRSA

The above resolution immediately, however, led to the formation of an ‘anti-
integration’ action committee (led by a few very well-known and respected
figures in South African academia), which embarked on an aggressive
campaign to have the resolution revoked. Part of this campaign involved: (1)
recruiting as many anti-integrationist psychologists as possible as members
of SAPA (so as to overturn SAPA’s ruling to admit blacks to the association by
means of a majority vote); and (2) appealing to the then Prime Minister and
former psychology professor, H.F. Verwoerd (see Box 1), to extend the Group
Areas Act No 77 of 1957 to organisational meetings so that ‘meetings where
blacks and whites were to confer together’ (Nicholas, 1990, 53) would effec-
tively be rendered illegal. By June 1962, however, when it became clear to the
organisers of this campaign that the majority of SAPA members in fact
supported the anti-integrationist lobby, these actions were dropped in favour
of forming a separate, exclusively white organisation, the Psychological
Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA) (Baldwin-Ragaven et al,
1999; Cooper et al, 1990; J. Louw, 1987; Psygram, 1962; Suffla et al, 2001).
The establishment of this organisation, it is very interesting to note, followed
very soon after Verwoerd’s resignation as honorary member of SAPA in
protest against the association’s move ‘towards [‘racial’] integration’ (J. Louw,
1987, 347).
What can be considered very telling of white South African psychologists’
attitudes with regard to racism at organisational level during the period under
consideration is the fact that by 1976 SAPA had a total membership of 338, of
whom less than half accounted for full memberships, while PIRSA had a
membership of 500, three-fifths of whom accounted for full memberships
(Cooper et al, 1990).
However, even though SAPA and PIRSA remained organisationally
divided, with each organisation publishing its own journals and organising
its own congresses, they collaborated in various ways, such as the hosting
of joint conferences and the establishment of a single statutory council to
register psychologists (Nicholas, 1990). In 1983, just more than two decades
and several changes to the South African political scenario later, the two
associations merged to form one organisation, namely, the Psychological
377
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 378
Critical Psychology
Association of South Africa (PASA), which was open to all South African
psychologists. Given organised psychology’s patent failure to create the
conditions for the training of black psychologists, however, there were not
many blacks from whose ranks PASA could recruit members (Nicholas, 1990).
An absence of any institutional challenge to apartheid

It is important to note that though the three organisations mentioned above,
through the years, ostensibly might have differed quite fundamentally from
one another, they shared two important traits, namely, their patent inability or
unwillingness to make psychology more accessible to blacks and their
apparent incapacity openly and systematically to challenge the South African
government and its racist policies and to expose the impact of these policies on
the well-being of the majority of South Africans (Baldwin-Ragaven, et al, 1999;
Nicholas, 1990). And it is in this sense, Nicholas (1990, 2001) argues, that
these associations can be seen as having had a relatively constraining influence
on South African psychology, particularly in relation to its response to the
phenomenon of racism as it manifested itself in South Africa.
Organisational support for apartheid

In fact, rather than stimulating their members into addressing the social
problems created by the apartheid state’s policies, these organisations
constantly invoked them to contribute, via their research, publications and
training programmes, towards the academic justification for these problems.
In 1967, P.M. Robbertse, the then president of PIRSA, for example, made an
impassioned appeal to psychologists to conduct research which could provide
academic support for the government’s policy of apartheid because, as he put
it, the very existence of whites in this country depended on it:
I wish to encourage members of the Psychological Institute of the Republic of
South Africa to conduct more extensive studies in the area of [‘race’ differences], so
as to provide the scientific bases for separate development, which is fundamentally
linked to our [whites’] continued existence (translated from Afrikaans, 11).
Avoiding the political

It was not only that PIRSA invoked its members to gear their research towards
the academic legitimation of the government’s racist policies. Occasionally,
PASA too would seem to have made itself guilty (albeit less flagrantly) of this
(mal)practice. Consider here, for example, Biesheuvel’s (1987) keynote address
to PASA’s annual congress in 1986. Certainly, in this address, Biesheuvel (1987)
did not make an overt appeal to psychologists to support and legitimise
apartheid in the way that Robbertse (1968) did. However, to the extent that he,
in this speech, exhorted psychologists to steer clear of politics and of criticising
378
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 379
apartheid, he can certainly be seen as having solicited South African psycholo-

gists’ complicity in lending indirect support to apartheid through their silence.
SAPA, PIRSA and PASA’s potential influence on psychologists’ academic
activities and responses to racism should, of course, not be seen as having been
limited to verbal injunctions at conferences – far from it. Their direct control
of the leading mainstream psychology publications, such as the South African
Psychologist (PIRSA), PIRSA Monograph (PIRSA), Psygram (SAPA) and the
South African Journal of Psychology (PASA), as well as their strong represen-
tation on the Professional Board of Psychology, would have added
considerably to the restraining influence that they exercised over psychologist
(Nicholas, 1990, 2001).
Given the above, it should be clear why writers such as Cooper et al (1990),
Magwaza (2001), Savage (1981), Seedat (1990), and Welsh (1981) contend that
it was virtually inevitable that South African psychology in the main would
have responded to the problem of racism through either inaction or more overt
collusion.
PSYCHOLOGY AND RACISM: POST-1994

Post-apartheid racism in psychology
Following the failure of the vicious attempts by the South African state to
prolong the life of apartheid in the late 1980s, sociopolitical reform and trans-
formation was ultimately ushered in by the first ‘free and fair’ democratic
elections in South Africa in 1994. This signalled the demise of apartheid as a
legalised form of institutional racism in South Africa, and simultaneously
raised the hopes for newer forms of social organisation that would transcend
the old racialised divides. Despite the expectations associated with these
landmark events, ‘race’ and racism continue to mark the way in which social
relations are structured in contemporary South Africa.
Psychology’s minimal engagement with issues of racism

The following illustrations reflect the ongoing relationship between
psychology and racism in post-apartheid South Africa. A recent review of the
South African Journal of Psychology from 1990 to 2000 (Stevens, 2002)
revealed that of the articles that dealt with ‘race’ and racism overtly or periph-
erally, a significant proportion continued to address ‘race’ as an unproblematic
social construct and to utilise methodologies and analyses that were frequently
devoid of any critical assessment of racism. In addition, less than one-third of
the total submissions during this period dealt with ‘race’ or racism, with even
fewer having ‘race’ or racism as a central focus. This trend is extremely discon-
certing, given that many of the institutional constraints on psychologists
referred to in the previous section had all but disappeared, and given that
379
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 380
Critical Psychology
South African society had become somewhat fixated on issues of racialisation,

deracialisation and reconciliation during the post-1994 period and that
psychology had clearly struggled to contribute to these debates meaningfully.
A further manifestation can be seen in the apparent inertia and indifference on
the part of psychology (Magwaza, 2001, 41), when submissions from the
health sector were requested by the TRC. The implicit denial of culpability
from within South African psychology and the limited engagement from
psychologists around information that was emerging from the TRC that could
have been beneficially utilised by psychologists to assist collective healing, was
a missed opportunity for South African psychology to rupture from a past in
which it had actively colluded with the apartheid regime. This denial of racism
is in itself a discursive manifestation that prevents adequate redress in circum-
stances where racial oppression has occurred.
BOX 5 Psychology as ‘prism’ for politics
Holdstock (2000) advances an argument that (1992) cite a study conducted in the late
the practice and knowledge of psychology often Thirties which concluded that ‘objective data
operate as something of a ‘prism’ for politics. point to a marked inferiority on the part of the
Psychologists, he argues, are not neutral truth Native in comparison with Europeans’ (63). In
seekers who follow a value-free pursuit of the same study ‘white’ poverty was understood
knowledge. Rather, it is the case that as a result of the conflict between civilised and
psychology as a ‘neutral science’ can and has uncivilised races. Further still, Nicholas (2001)
been diverted, ‘hijacked’ to serve causes that observes that on the basis of research findings
many psychologists would abhor. Furthermore, such as this, prominent SA psychologists
he draws on Gill & Levidov (1987) to argue that endorsed racial segregation and even recom-
the distinction between science and politics is mended that penalties be imposed on sexual
false in that psychology often replicates and intercourse between races. South African
reproduces precisely the patterns of greater psychology of that time is hence rightly referred
social asymmetry set in place by politics. The to as ‘an apartheid psychology’ in that it could
flourishing of psychology in the apartheid era is, not be freed from the ideology on which it was
for him, a case in point. He (2000) cites Louw’s based, and within which it functioned. Hence
(1997) suggestion that psychological testing the South African situation ‘illustrates in no
played an important role in legitimising uncertain fashion the dangers involved in a
apartheid’s policies – particularly those of psychology that claims to be a science free of
education. Nicholas (1990, 1993) provides values and without acknowledgement of its
ample evidence of how psychological knowledge, ideological foundation’ (Holdstock, 2000, 58).
about racial intelligence, for example, was Underscoring his argument he reiterates that
produced to serve the ideological interests of ‘Political priorities guide and eventually deter-
the state. As Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & mine what is regarded as science and what is
Seedat (2001) point out, psychological research researched. Supposedly value-neutral science
into group differences in intelligence informed can ... serve racist society in many subtle ways
racist government policies in the 1920s and and engages the teacher and pupil in main-
1930s. In a further example, Louw & Foster taining structural racism’ (Holdstock, 2000, 57).
380
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 381
Extricating psychology from racism Structural:

Given that many of the structural preconditions that determined the relation- of the underlying
ship between psychology and racism during the pre-1994 period had structures or
organisation of
disappeared, this section of the chapter will examine the degree to which post- society, the
apartheid South African psychology has and can extricate itself from its past underlying social,
complicity in the reproduction of racism. In particular, the section examines economic and
such possibilities for the organisational, academic and professional facets of political relations
that ‘pattern’
psychology, so heavily racialised in South Africa’s apartheid past. society.
The possibility of organisational transformation

Throughout the period of reform in the early 1990s, similar processes of trans-
formation were occurring in many other sectors of South African society as
they reflected the mood of the broader social landscape. Psychology as an
organised sector was no exception in this regard. Suffla et al (2001, 28) argue
that:
[o]rganised professional psychology’s historical role and evolution has often
mimicked and mirrored socio-historical developments within the South African
social formation at different historical junctures, and in this way has acted as a
microcosm of South African society at different points in time.
This process was realised when factions of progressive psychologists began
mobilising for a reformation of institutional psychology. It entailed direct
engagement, confrontation and open critique of PASA. The role of psychology
in political transformation became the critical objective of these groups. Strate-
gies for the attainment of these objectives included directly challenging the
hegemony of PASA by offering support and solidarity to high-profile victims of
human rights infringements, the wide dissemination of knowledge on the
effects of violence, and the implementation of various training courses designed
to transmit and popularise psychological skills to those not considered eligible
by the apartheid educational framework (Stevens, 2001). These marginalised Marginalise/
groups of psychologists responsible for the wide-ranging acts of resistance Marginalisation:
to relegate to a
began to contemplate the establishment of a collective body that would serve
lower social
formally to represent the increasingly dissident voices of South African standing/relegation
psychology. This culminated in the formation of the Psychology and Apartheid to a lower social
Committee and the Organisation for Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA), standing.
two collectives that began formally to challenge the authority of PASA.
The objectives of OASSSA, PASA and PsySSA

As precursors to a more representative professional organisation that was
launched in 1994, one of the primary objectives of both these groupings was to
challenge the control of PASA. However, they were both still essentially organ-
ised along racial lines, with Psychology and Apartheid numbering 400
381
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 382
Critical Psychology
predominantly black psychologists and OASSSA consisting of a majority white

membership. Upon greater reflection these movements were integrally organ-
ised by the very racialisation that they had sought to undermine, and brought
into focus the challenges of extricating organised psychology from the racism
that had characterised its early formation and that had subsequently rendered
it an instrument for its perpetuation.
In 1992, PASA adopted a resolution to dissolve in principle and to create a
new organisation that had as its objective the creation of a broad-based organ-
isation that more legitimately represented South African Psychology. The
dissolution of PASA followed in 1994, paving the way for the immediate inau-
guration of the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA).
The manner in which psychologists were previously organised along
racialised lines was abolished in favour of an organisation that was intended to
guide the discipline and profession as it attempted to act in a more socially
relevant and responsive manner to the priorities facing the majority of the
South African populace. However, administrative and logistical duties have
informed the bulk of PsySSA’s concerns since its inception. In essence, the
anticipated political potential of a post-apartheid psychology has been partly
marginalised by the prioritisation of regulation and control of the discipline
rather than a direct engagement with the redress of its own racially skewed
history, as well as the social legacy of racism in South Africa (Suffla et al, 2001).
In addition,
the profession has recently witnessed internal struggles within its ranks. These
have manifested in the polarisation of a group of predominantly white psycholo-
gists in the form of a recently established action group on the one hand, and the
predominantly black leadership of PsySSA on the other. There may be multiple
ways in which to understand this current schism in South African psychology,
which no doubt serves as a threat to future unity within the profession (Suffla et
al, 2001, 33–34).
These internal struggles serve to exemplify the unresolved shadows of ‘race’
and racism in new forms in both broader South African society and organised
psychology. A contemporary racial divide within the discipline is reminiscent
of the ease with which psychology was historically organised, with ‘race’ being
a central marker for division in decision-making and general organisation.
This suggests that the historically racialised nature of South African
psychology and its historical complicity with apartheid has yet to be fully
acknowledged and addressed. In the absence of a comprehensive and visible

strategy to address the racialisation and deracialisation of the organisation and
South African society at large, organised psychology is unlikely to make a
meaningful break from its racialised past. In this regard, its ability to provide
sound, legitimate and meaningful leadership to South African psychology will
continue to be compromised (Suffla et al, 2001).
382
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 383
Academic prospects
A further facet of psychology in which racism has historically been embedded
and perpetuated is through the academic pursuits of research and publishing.
Whilst the skewed racialised patterns of knowledge-production have to some
extent been challenged through recent initiatives, research and publishing
remain areas that will require serious redress if we are to prevent the rein-
scription of racialised patterns of knowledge-production.
In the past several years, numerous authorship initiatives have been estab-
lished and successfully completed involving the inclusion of previously
marginalised groups such as women and black authors (see for example,
Duncan, Seedat, Van Niekerk, Gobodo-Madikezela, Simbayi & Bhana, 1997;
Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat, 2001; Duncan, Gqola, Hofmeyr,
Shefer, Malunga & Mashige, 2002). Such developments have found a fertile
ground for a number of reasons. First, the publishing context is no longer char-
acterised by the same degree of constraints that existed during the apartheid
period. In fact, black and female authors have been actively courted by some
publishing houses, as they attempt to diversify their authorship portfolios to
reflect South African society more appropriately, so as to increase their profits.
Secondly, previously marginalised authors are now asserting themselves more
visibly, especially in receptive contexts that are coupled with mentorship and
in the presence of a growing body of work that indicates that black and female
scholarship can be successfully undertaken in South Africa. With regard to
research funding, direct funding from the various science councils in South
Africa aimed at increasing the number of black, female and emerging
researchers has increased significantly, thereby increasing access to grants that
were previously not available to large sectors of the research community.
New forms of marginalisation

However, Duncan & Hofmeyr (2002) note that ongoing under-representation
of black authors in publishing trends in psychology is attributable to a wide
array of factors, including the reality that black academics are still a minority
in academia (Bengu, 2002; Simbayi, 1997); that many black authors are first-
generation academics who lack publishing experience; that many black
academics are still located at historically disadvantaged universities where
research and publications are less prioritised because of the structural
constraints of these institutions (MacGregor, 1997). Another factor of impor-

tance here is that of the increasing commodification of education – the stress
placed on gaining increased student numbers so that universities may generate
increasing amounts of revenue. This situation has resulted in many black
academics at these institutions devoting significant amounts of time to pack-
aging teaching courses for the purposes of student consumption (Southall &
383
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 384
Critical Psychology
Symbolic racism:
Cobbing, 2001); and the negative experience of black academics in mainstream
systematic circula- publications has often resulted in their either avoiding publication processes
tion of values, or publishing on the margins of the discipline. Where black academics do find
representations and themselves in positions at historically privileged, white universities, they are
ideas that are
antagonistic towards
also often perceived as affirmative action appointments. The negative attitudes
a certain grouping and opposition to this type of equity process frequently result in such candi-
of people. Symbolic dates being characterised as underqualified and unworthy of the position
racism also takes (Franchi, 2002), thereby further marginalising them to the fringes of potential
very insidious forms,
such as the constant
publication processes. Ultimately, racialised patterns of knowledge-production
devaluation or continue to be perpetuated, and no doubt impact on the content of research
marginalisation of conducted in South African psychology.
ideals and values With regard to research and research funding, black academics are increas-
traditionally associ-
ated with a
ingly being expected to function on the same playing field as many white
particular racial academics, often without their historical disadvantage being considered or
grouping of people. adequately redressed. This denial of and failure to acknowledge the impact and
legacy of racism, as well as the consequent resistance to processes of redress,
can themselves be construed as expressions of symbolic racism (Sears, 1988).
BOX 6 Psychology’s racisms
Holdstock (2000) distinguishes between a and pathology. The black family has ... become
series of different types of racism as perpetu- the primary focus of social pathology’ (32).
ated by psychology. Biological racism, to Symbolic racism refers to the circulation of
begin with, ‘expresses itself in terms of the values, representations, ideas that are antago-
notion of a defective genetic structure’ (32). nistic towards a certain grouping of people.
This form of racism is based on a series of Edward Said (1978), for example, calls our
constructions of physical, bodily or genetic attention to the ongoing circulation of
notions of inferiority. Cultural racism refers to negative racial stereotypes of Arabs within the
the degradation of and assault on another American news media, as an example of sym-
race’s culture, their history, language, arts, bolic racism. Importantly, however, symbolic
their modes of expression, their traditional racism also takes very insidious forms, such as
values and ideals as inferior or worthless. Hold- the constant devaluation or marginalisation of
stock provides an example here (2000) – ‘for ideals and values traditionally associated with a
instance ... black family culture has been particular racial grouping.
demeaned as the focus of allegations of deficit
Biological racism: Holdstock (2000) also refers to the concepts of metaracism, aversive racism
form of racism and regressive racism:

based on a series of
constructions of Metaracists are those who are not overly prejudiced but nonetheless acquiesce in
physical, bodily or the larger culture that continues the work of racism. Aversive racism is evident in
genetic notions of the negative affect towards [racial minorities] that motivates avoidance rather
inferiority. than intentionally destructive behaviours on the parts of racists, while regressive
racism manifests under conditions of emotional arousal (32).
384
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 385
The role of language is also a major issue here – the continued assertion of Cultural racism:
English as the language of instruction and publication in mainstream systematic
psychology in South Africa obviously favours certain groups over others. degradation of
Furthermore, the introduction of rating systems for researchers by various another race’s
culture, history,
science councils further entrenches research hierarchies, which are then language, arts,
invariably racialised. In addition, the growing pressures to ‘publish or perish’ modes of expression
impacts negatively on the content of research being conducted in many or traditional values
instances. Often, critical social theorising is abandoned for more sterile forms and ideals as
inferior or
of social inquiry, thereby limiting the value of the research as it pertains to
worthless.
deeply entrenched social phenomena such as racism. Even though legal
censorship no longer acts as an obstacle, it is clear that internal forms of
censure still function in an insidious manner to limit critical social theorising Aversive racism:
and publications, as academics are increasingly compelled to ‘write for the form of racism that
market’. Van Dijk (1987) recognises that social scientists’ responses to social centres not on
inequalities such as racism are relatively variable, and it is important to note intentionally
destructive
that South African psychologists remain racialised social agents that have
behaviours but
either benefited from or been disadvantaged through racism, even in post- rather on avoidance
apartheid South Africa. However, whatever the degree of variability in of people of other
responses and the levels of benefit or disadvantage, psychologists’ responses races, or of issues
to racism are likely to continue to reflect the dominant social responses to this or social problems
of racism.
phenomenon in contemporary South Africa. This is critical, as South African
society has thus far generated no comprehensive and systematic strategy
to address the legacy of racism, other than through constitutional and legisla-
Metaracism:
tive guarantees and sporadic interventions by a few community-based not explicit or
organisations. overly prejudiced
form of racism,
Professional prospects rather the
acquiescence in a
A further critical realm within which the interface between psychology and larger culture that
racism is maintained is within the training of professionals. It is in this arena continues the
that the reproduction and transmission of certain forms of knowledge occur, perpetuation of
where professional psychologists are able discursively to perpetuate this racist ideas and
values.
relationship.
With regard to training of psychologists in South Africa, most tertiary insti-
tutions in South Africa have (for whatever reasons) adopted some form of
Regressive racism:
employment equity policy that has increased the number of black staff involved racism of emotional
in the training of students, especially at previously privileged, white institu- arousal, when more
tions. In addition, several institutions have also attempted to incorporate more sophisticated and
contextually appropriate models of training that are more responsive to the insidious forms of
racism fail, and a
psychosocial needs of a South African population, with varying degrees of prejudice of strong
success. Finally, with regard to standardising training in South Africa, decisions emotion, ie hate,
pertaining to earlier exit points for students – for example, a four-year qualifi- predominates.
cation to practise as opposed to a six-year qualification – also creates the
385
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 386
Critical Psychology
Discursively:
potential to broaden the base of potential service deliverers in many communi-
through the means ties that have been historically underresourced.
of ‘knowledge’, that
is, through the The continued use of European and US-American models
means of formal or
informal kinds of Despite the above initiatives, several structural and ideological obstacles
understanding of continue to exist. Stevens (2001) points out that despite the discourses of
the world. transformation and social relevance within professional training courses for
clinicians, most institutions continue to use European and US-American
models that are not always congruent with the context of practice in South
Africa. The result for many black candidates is an alienating and ambiguous
experience, after which they struggle to integrate training within their contexts
Selected focus: of service delivery. Stevens (2001, 53) notes that:
insidious form of
racism in which the This alienates [black] practitioners from organic knowledge that they may have
knowledges acquired as products of these contexts, but also alienates the users from the prac-
produced by South titioner and the discipline.
African psychology
have traditionally Furthermore, the content of most training programmes does not actively facil-
focused on the itate addressing the psychosocial priorities for the majority of people in South
issues and problems Africa. In this sense, training frequently retains its focus on individualised
germane to the
white population,
interventions, and aspirant clinicians are ‘socialised’ into rationalising this
and that have deficit in training. The comment amongst aspirant clinicians that ‘they may
rendered the black not be able to contribute to solving the major psychosocial priorities facing the
subject marginal, if populace, but they would be content with enhancing the functioning of just
not in fact totally
one person’ is not an uncommon articulation, but it does reflect the challenges
invisible. How
South African in transforming training in South Africa to become truly more responsive to
psychology has the legacy of racism as well as to other psychosocial priorities.
been put to work
caring predomi- The continued existence of racialised professional divisions
nantly for ‘white
patients’ in unequal As part of its regulatory functions, PsySSA has focused on a range of issues,
and segregated including training, education and credentialling. In recognising the need to
mental health create greater accessibility to psychological services for the broad population,
services.
earlier exit points for psychology students are being envisaged at the end of
their fourth year of study. While this appears to be addressing a need at face
value, there has been a simultaneous extension of professional training by an
additional year at a doctoral level. In so doing, the possibilities for excluding
candidates (many of whom would be black) increases, due to the additional
expenses and time costs associated with professional training. The potential
for reinscribing racialised division between predominantly white professionals
and black fourth-year graduates therefore becomes a highly plausible, and
highly worrying, outcome in the future. The role of professional organisations
in perpetuating certain patterns of racialisation within professional training
should not be underestimated, as is evident from our earlier discussion.
386
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 387
BOX 7 ‘Racial expertise’ and ‘selected focus’
It is not only the case that South African patients’ in massively unequal and segregated
psychology may be characterised, retrospec- mental health services. Similarly, ‘selected
tively, by a blatant historical racism; it remains focus’ refers to how knowledge has been
threatened to this day by more insidious forms of produced in South African psychology, in ways
racism. Stevens (2001) identifies two strategies that render the black subject marginal, if not
of this ongoing racism: ‘racial expertise’ and totally invisible. The exception to this form of
‘selected focus’. ‘Racial expertise’ refers to the exclusion was the situation where blacks were
nearly complete correspondence between ‘white- objectified as workers, re-examined in such a
ness’ and expertise. In clinical training, for way that the black psychic make-up was ‘made
example, the trainability of potential black to fit into and serve colonial industry’ (Terre
students was the preserve of white gatekeepers, Blanche & Seedat, 2001, 74). It is in view of
who would select candidates according to critical analysis such as this that Duncan, Van
cultural constructs such as psychological sophis- Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat (2001) warn that
tication. As Stevens (2001) comments, black the racist ideology and practices of South
trainees would need to censure racial interpreta- African psychology have persisted, that the
tions of interactions with white supervisors, and racism of today exists as the residue of white
would often find that racist stereotypes individuals and groupings that have been carried
pertaining to the competence of black practi- over from the past. This makes for a stern
tioners was still in evidence. Racial expertise, in warning against apathy towards issues of race,
terms of questions of trainability, competence prejudice and insidious racism within South
and professional standards, rather than blatant African psychology. More than this, it makes for
racism per se, justified racial practices. a challenge to continue, and to renew, the
‘Selected focus’, on the other hand, refers transformation of the discipline in line with the
to how South African psychology has been put democratic ideals of South Africa’s post-
to work caring predominantly for ‘white apartheid constitution.
CONCLUSION Racial expertise:

This chapter has used the historical journey of South African psychology to insidious form of
racism in which one
amplify the understanding that, while psychology as a science and a helping
finds a nearly
profession professes to be primarily about people, often it is far more centrally complete
about politics. It is imperative to consider this dialectic when contemplating correspondence
the role and function of post-apartheid South African psychology. In the midst between ‘whiteness’
and expertise –
of the legitimised racist practices of apartheid that undeniably resulted in the
racist stereotypes
mental anguish of so many, South Africa’s ‘helping profession’ actively pertaining to the
contributed to the perpetuation of an ideology that protected and enhanced competence of
the privileges of a specified few. black practitioners.
The complicity of South African psychology with this form of prejudiced

philanthropy, and its role in the organisational, academic and professional
reinforcement of racism, acts as solemn warning to psychologists who believe
that their everyday activities are free from the racist ideologies that effectively
seduced and then aligned themselves to this ‘helping profession’. South
African psychology became both an outcome and a vehicle for the production
387
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap14 11/2/04 10:37 am Page 388
Critical Psychology
and perpetuation of discrimination, separatism and racism. It is this racism as

a constant feature of the landscape of South African psychology’s history that
must be acknowledged and addressed if it is to reorganise itself as a discipline
capable of making a meaningful contribution to the future of a deracialised
and egalitarian South Africa.

1. This chapter has approached the question of racism from many different
perspectives. Bearing in mind this broad understanding of how racism may
be understood, generate your own definition of racism.
2. In the introduction to this chapter, racism was described as being linked to
processes of social, political and economic domination. Can you think of
any other possible dimensions at which the ‘skewed relations of power’ of
racism might exist? Furthermore, can you provide concrete examples of
your own experience of racism that correlates with these various dimen-
sions of racism? Give some thought to what the connections between these
various levels of racism might be.
There is a strong established tradition of an anti-racist critical psychology
within South Africa. Three texts in particular are worth mentioning here.
The first is the 1990 volume edited by Lionel Nicholas & Saths Cooper entitled
Psychology and apartheid, which includes contributions by Mohammed
Seedat, Victor Nell, Alex Butchart and Hussein Bulhan and covers a range of
issues from the idea of psychologist as activist to an engagement with the
psychology of colonialism, the impact of political imprisonment and the hopes
of an Afrocentric form of psychology.
The second title – L.J. Nicholas & S. Cooper (eds) Psychology and apartheid
(1993) – is in many ways an extension of the first, and includes weighty contri-
butions on psychology’s role as a means of racism and oppression, and on how
this might be contested in South Africa. Lionel Nicholas contributes a number
of chapters and Don Foster offers a particularly useful overview of the history
of psychology’s conceptualisation of racism.
The most recent book to engage with South African psychology and racism
is ‘Race’, racism, knowledge production and psychology in South Africa
(2001), edited by Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat. Advancing further
arguments, this text provides both an invaluable historical overview of
academic racism in South African psychology and a look at issues germane
to the implementation of an anti-racist psychology in post-apartheid
South Africa.
388
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 389
Chapter
15
About black psychology

Kopano Ratele
‘[It is] impossible to understand the lifestyle of black people

using traditional psychyological theories developed by white
psychologists to explain white people.’
White (1980, 5)
‘I have little interest in the fashionable but sterile notion of a

“relevant” psychological theory and practice for this country.’
Manganyi (1991, 121)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Sketch the outlines of the development of black US-American psychology
Discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of black US-American psychology in
relation to contexts other than US-America
Describe the state of (black) psychology in South Africa
Explore the possibility of a radical or critical black-conscious psychology in South
Africa in relation to the need to develop critical/black communities.
389
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 390
Critical Psychology
INTRODUCTION: INSIDE OUTSIDERS, BLACK CONSCIOUS

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Have you ever experienced yourself as – in the phrase popularised by rap music
genre producer and hip-hop star now known as P Diddy and put to song by
kwaito star Zola – ghetto fabulous, culturally, politically or psychologically
speaking? If you have ever experienced yourself as such, was this associated
with your skin colour or your racial identity? Have you, in other words, ever felt
that you are in or, more to the point, thought of yourself as radical because you
are one of the few black or African individuals in a group of persons who are
not black or African?
In this chapter, which has an oblique connection with the hip-hop or
kwaito music genres, one of the objectives is to look into the past and discuss
possible futures of black psychology – and thus black social science and intel-
lectual practice in general. The chapter will then also deal (again indirectly)
with what I believe ‘coming in’ from the outside (by which I suggest the obverse
of what gay pride discourse has as ‘coming out’) has meant for US-American
black psychology. Looking at what ‘coming in’ entails leads us to focus on the
experience of, if you will, the outsider who overstays. Focusing on the experi-
ence of being an outsider leads us to put the spotlight on the party who wants
to stay being a stranger while he or she has, at worst, become an overly self-
conscious insider. Since the self-conscious inside outsider is what I think
ghetto fabulous adds up to, I shall explore lessons it might reveal for black
psychology as what US-American black psychology might share with black
cultural, social, political and intellectual lives outside of the United States of
America (USA). Lastly, I shall discuss what these lessons might mean for our
practice as critical black conscious psychologists, and the promise they might
hold for enhancing or entrenching critical/black communities.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part takes a brief look
at the origins and development of black psychology in the USA, its home
(referred to here as ‘black US-American psychology’). This part includes a
subsection on early black US-American psychologists. The middle part turns to
psychology in South Africa. The objective set for this part is to respond to the
question of whether there is anything that can properly be characterised as black
or, for that matter, African psychology in South Africa. The third and last part is
Knowledge always a response to the preceding parts in so far as it indirectly speaks about the kind
tracks power, and
of psychology that I believe has always been needed in this country and on this
power structures
knowledge. There is continent, as much as anywhere else in the world by black and African people.
a deep connection
between political
and social power THE BIRTH OF BLACK US-AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
and scientific and
The discipline that is called black psychology is a phenomenon of the USA. As
professional truth.
a discipline, its birth can be cautiously dated to the late 1960s. This other birth
390
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 391

BOX 1 What is ghetto fabulous?
For South African youth, the phrase ghetto the song was, of course, that township life is,
fabulous was not popularised by the artist again to use the language, ‘all that’ or
formerly known as Puff Daddy as much as it was ‘happening’. Ghetto fabulous, in other words, is a
by kwaito exponent, Bonginkosi Dlamini. celebration of (a certain kind of) black cultural
Dlamini, otherwise known as Zola, is an actor, and social life just the way it is. It is also a cele-
television presenter and musician who comes bration of what, again, hip-hop has baptised as
from Zola township, Soweto. The phrase caught ‘bling-bling’ – the fast life evinced by wearing
on because Zola titled a popular song of his gold jewellery, expensive clothes and partying
‘Ghetto fabulous’. While it was the gritty televi- hard. While we do delve into the connections of
sion youth series Yizo Yizo that brought him to this view of black life to black psychology in the
the attention of the youth public, his social and later sections, take a moment now and think,
cultural (if not political) star shone brighter using ‘mind-maps’ or in a couple of paragraphs,
because of the song’s catchy if trite refrain, about the relation of mainstream psychology to
‘Thin’ ekasi, si ghetto fabulous.’ The message of the black ghetto or townships and villages.
(for there is an earlier birth of black psychology which we shall talk about
shortly) follows the wave of black power struggles in that country. It is impor-
tant to take a note of this: that the development of black psychology tracked
black political struggles. The larger point which you may not have been aware
of is not that black psychology is politically informed but rather that knowl-
edge always tracks power, and power structures knowledge. In other words,
there is a deep connection between political and social power and scientific
and professional truth. This is a good place to start, then: at the social, polit-
ical, cultural and, of course, existential and psychic desires that led to the
creation of black psychology.
To be black in the USA

The concerns and yearnings black psychology comes to express are very closely
tied to the historical conditions and development of African American politics
of identity and self-definition. These conditions, which include slavery, segre-
gation and white racism, underlie and fundamentally shape the experiences of
black people in the USA. Black psychology therefore arose out of what can be
seen as the existential but also political, social and cultural desire of black US-
American scholars to see, hear and think about black people in that country,
about how they conceive of and practise their discipline, from a ‘true’ black
viewpoint (see eg Du Bois, 1903/1996; Gates & West, 1996; Jones, 1980).
The desire to develop a discipline could be seen, then, as having been more
than just about perspective. It was part of the same longing and permanent
struggle of women and men to be true to themselves and their lived experience.
This is the point that Wade Nobles (1980) made that while back about
developing a black psychology based on African philosophy and values.
391
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 392
Critical Psychology
The discipline of
black psychology
arose out of the
existential,
political, social and
cultural yearnings
of black US-
American scholars
to conceive of and
practise psychology
from a ‘true’ black
viewpoint
Photograph by Zenzo
Deficit theory: Wade Nobles and black psychology

theory that seeks to Wade Nobles wanted black psychology to be seen as a positive or proactive
show a failure,
defection,
discipline rather than one that is reactive, a wish that, as we shall see, has been
inadequacy, or lack difficult to realise. Black psychology’s ‘unique status is derived not from the
in an individual’s negative aspects of being black in white America’, Nobles said, ‘but rather from
performance or the positive features of basic African philosophy which dictate the values,
attributes when
compared to a
customs, attitudes, and behaviour of Africans in Africa and the new world’
certain standard (1980, 23). After this gesture towards positive development, Nobles slid into
that the theory and entangled himself with what I think are unfortunate conceptions about
assumes: for rhythm, oral tradition, mysteries of spiritual energy or soul, the extended self,
instance, when
women are
and the natural orientation of African people to ensure the survival of the tribe.
compared to men, He ends by contending that black psychology must examine the elements and
blacks to whites, dimensions of the experiential communalities of African peoples.
and homosexuals to I do not believe many of us would have much to disagree with in the
heterosexuals,
deficit theory
hypothesis that ‘Black psychology must concern itself with the mechanism by
would focus on which our African definition has been maintained and what value its mainte-
what it assumes nance has offered black people’ (Nobles, 1980, 35). I also suspect that very few
are the former would have challenged Nobles’ proposal that ‘the task of Black psychology
groups’ failure,
defection,
[was] to offer an understanding of the behavioural definition of African philos-
inadequacy, or lack ophy and to document what, if any, modifications it has undergone during
because the latter experiential periods’ (1980, 35). What should be taken exception to, though,
groups are taken to are nature-seeking conceptions of Wade Nobles. This is especially so when we
be the standard.
come to realise his arguments suggest that African people in Africa, as opposed
392
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 393

to African people in the USA, were supposed to have stopped changing and It is ‘impossible to
developing at some unspecified tribal past. (Note that arguments that seek to understand the life-
show the nature of black or African people are not confined to black US- style of black
American psychologists. In fact, they are quite common throughout the people using
traditional
continent as they are among South African psychologists, both white and psychological
black ones. Indeed, the idea of ghetto fabulous also buys into and recycles a theories developed
certain naturalised notion of urban black people as a hip, happy, fun-loving by white
bunch.) (Descriptions of how certain categories of people come to be natu- psychologists to
explain white
ralised, or essentialised, are discussed by a number of other writers in this
people’ (White,
volume; see particularly Kiguwa & Burman’s Feminist critical psychology in 1980, 5).
South Africa.)
US-American psychology and authentic black experience

In an article that first appeared in the black glossy magazine Ebony, Joseph
White (1980) also spoke about his and many black people’s disenchantment
with psychology’s understanding and distortion of the experience of being
black in the USA. (Parenthetically, the idea of talking to a wider public than
one’s professional colleagues or other academics is something for which any
psychologist, for that matter any social scientist, who moves out of the pages
of professional journals, should be commended.) White saw this disenchant-
ment as central to the need to develop a psychology out of the authentic life
experience of black US-Americans.
There is a problem surrounding this notion of authentic experience,
though: it seems to be one thread of the same overwashed fabric of the overall
tendency to mythologise tribal Africa, which we shall return to later. Yet it is
easy to understand what White, like other proponents of black psychology in
particular and black studies in general, was arguing for. That argument has
been that it is ‘impossible to understand the life style of black people using Cultural
traditional psychological theories developed by white psychologists to explain deprivation:
white people’ (White, 1980, 5). way of life that is
seen as lacking
something that
White psychology’s explanations of black people must be present,
desired or enjoyed.
White was saying that the problem is that when these psychological theories
developed by white psychologists theories are used on black people they are
too often, at their best, plain wrong. Most of the time white psychology’s expla-
Matriarchal
nations of black people and its other Others tend to be dominated by weakness families:
or deficit theory, focused at showing black people’s inferiority in relation to families headed or
whites, specifically white males, whose experiences and behaviours serve as the centred on a
touchstone for most behavioural theory and research findings. What White woman, especially
an elderly woman
was against, then, were theories that explained black experience and behaviour
who is respected.
as resulting from cultural deprivation or matriarchal families. These theories
393
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 394
Critical Psychology
Black psychology argues that it is not possible to understand the lifestyle of black people using traditional
psychological theories developed by white psychologists to explain white people.
Photograph by Zenzo
he saw as illustrating the need for psychological explanations and analyses of

black lives which arise out of the black lived-experience.
In a paper first read at a colloquium on the black lifecycle at the University
of California, Berkeley, Robert Guthrie (1980) also reasserted these sentiments
of many black North American psychologists. On psychological testing, in
particular, Guthrie noted that ‘there exists a wealth of data that indicates that
psychology’s time honored psychometric tools are not only biased against black
people but fall short of providing any useful data in predicting talents, capabil-
Anthropomorphic:
ities, or skills for the majority of black youngsters’ (1980, 15). As he pointed out,
having or ‘early anthropomorphic research ... contributed biases to the psychology of
representing a black US-Americans by correlating such physical factors as skin color differ-
human form. ences, hair texture, and the size of lips to psychological conditions’ (19).
On the different waves of black psychology’s development

According to Hayes (1980), the development of black psychological thinking
should not be seen as riding one single wave. His view was that it rode two,
For Hayes (1980) it overlapping waves or approaches. The first about querying the conclusions of
is in psychology’s white psychologists whose work ‘specified some deficit, deficiency, and/or
mentalistic and
distortion in the psychological makeup of black people as compared to whites’

reductionistic
explanations of (37). This, as we saw above, is one of the criticisms that Joseph White (1980)
human beings where levelled at psychology. The second overlapping wave Hayes saw directed itself
we find the origins at the philosophical and epistemological assumptions upon which white
of psychology’s psychologists based their work. In addition to challenging the presumption of
biases and racisms.
white science about the nature of black people and black life, some
394
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 395

psychologists and social scientists argued for an alternative or oppositional Pseudo-science:

route: that, as suggested above, of going back to African philosophical and conclusions about
value systems. phenomena
Hayes proposed that black psychologists should get on a new wave: exam- supposed to have
the status of truth
ining the ‘rules of science adopted by western psychology’ (1980, 37). This was, simply because they
and still is, a sound move to make. Hayes said the problem with most white are deduced from
psychology is that it is not rigorous enough, that it is, at best, a pseudo-science. what are regarded
To an extent, I agree. Hayes went on to say that psychology’s scientific posture as methods of
science or simply
and elitism, which can be seen in its mentalistic and reductionistic explana-
spurious science.
tions of human beings, is where the origins of the problem of bias and racism
lie. Again, so far there is no problem with agreeing with him.
Radical behaviourism as response to the racisms of psychology?

The upshot of Hayes’ position, the alternative he calls for, is something called
RBB: radical black behaviourism. Hayes sees RBB as ‘the antithesis of the most Scientism:
excessive belief in
damaging and oppressive components of American psychology’ (1980, 41). the power of the
RBB ‘is limited to the study of behavior that can be observed, measured, and methods of the
reproduced’ (43); it ‘rejects the specification of previous life events as causing physical sciences
behaviour as unscientific and harmful to the well-being of black people’ (44). It and the insistence
that they should be
is easy to see how, as Hayes argues, psychology is given to scientism,
applied to the study
mentalism, just as it can be shown to be phallogocentric, anti-black and as of human actions
possessing bad faith in dealing with those it turns into its ‘Others’, but to say and relations.
behaviourism is not reductionist must have left many puzzled.
These, then, are some of the responses black US-American psychologists
offered in the 1970s and 1980s to the question of being African in the USA, to
the situation of not being seen or treated as fully US-American. This, it must be
emphasised, is very important to keep in mind when we read about the disci-
Phallogocentric:
pline of black psychology. Indeed, such a perspective should always be borne centred on the
in mind when we do any psychology – when we read any psychological theory phallus as a symbol
and research, interact with one another as learners, as students and teachers, of male superiority.
talk to one another as professionals, and when as clinicians and counsellors we
work with clients. But you would do well to remember my caution about the
other date of the birth of black psychology.
The question you might want answered is, what about before the Seventies
and Eighties, was there nothing happening before then? Were there no black
Reductionism:
psychologists before the Black Panthers came along? Who were they and did they principle of
say something similar or anything different from the black power psychologists? analysing or
breaking up
complex phenomena
Early black US-American psychologists into simper
The formal history of black US-American psychology can be dated – June 1920 constituents or
isolated parts.
– more than forty years before the inauguration of the discipline of black
395
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 396
Critical Psychology
psychology. One might entertain oneself with the potential significance of the
date of the birth of black psychology, being the year the founder of ‘white’
psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, died. But I really do not think there is any impor-
tance to the date. What is of importance is that it was in 1920, forty-one years
after the ‘birth’ of mainstream psychology (see Box 2), that Francis Cecil
Sumner became the first black American to get a doctorate in psychology.
Sumner, who for this reason wears the mantle of the father of black
American psychology, studied under G. Stanley Hall. Hall was then president
of Clark University. Hall himself was the first man to receive a PhD in
psychology in the USA, studying under Wundt and later William James.
Among other feats Hall is known for in psychology is as the organiser of the
famous Clark University Conference where he had invited Sigmund Freud, Carl
Jung, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi and others. For this, and that he estab-
lished the first psychology laboratory in the United States, the first psychology
journal in the United States, and was the first president of the American
Psychological Association, Hall is taken to be the father of organised
psychology as a science and profession; in addition, he was considered by
many to be the father of child and educational psychology in the USA.
The domination of psychology by whites

Up until the 1920s, psychology had been entirely dominated by whites. But as
you may well be aware, although this total domination is no longer the case, a
great part of psychology land is still ruled by white people. After eight years at
what is now West Virginia State College, Sumner went to work at what is some-
times called the ‘black Harvard’, Howard University – from 1928 to 1954. Even
though Sumner was said to be an intelligent man, full of book learning, and a
Political university teacher, he was also a supporter of the ideas of Booker T Wash-
accommodation:
political arrange-
ington. Washington is important here because he was the most acknowledged
ment where a group black political leader of his, and, some have said, of all time in the USA. His
or party opts for a reputation as a black leader was solidified for the most part by his 1895 Atlanta
compromise or Exposition address. The politics of Washington did not let him object very
adjustment rather
much to segregation. He believed, for instance, in political accommodation as
than changing to
the status quo. regards civil and political rights; he did not insist on enfranchisement; and,
most importantly for us in relation to our discussion on Sumner, Washington
worked for an industrial education and trades, founding Tuskegee Institute,
the most widely recognised institution for black vocational training for black
people in the USA back then.

Enfranchisement:
state of being The politics of Washington and, cautiously, by extension those of Sumner,
granted the rights are thrown into bold relief when one looks, for instance, at WEB Du Bois.
of a citizen, Where Du Bois argued for the ‘talented tenth’ (see Du Bois’ 1903 essay ‘The
especially the right Talented Tenth’ and his address to the Nineteenth Grand Boulé Conclave
to vote.
Sigma Pi Phu in 1948, in Gates & West (1996)) to lead the race for political and
396
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 397

BOX 2 On the fathers and many births of psychology
While the notion of father of this or that disci- accorded the mantle of father. His was for
pline or subdiscipline or school of thought is bringing to birth a part of psychology, that is,
one that tends to be used easily, it is intriguing the fact that he offered the first course on
and not without its troublesome aspect. The psychology in 1875 at Harvard.
first thing, of course, is that it rarely happens But among the names many students of
that it is the person who ends up being called psychology will have read about is one Wilhelm
a father who claims parentage of a theoretical Wundt and, of course, next to it, the title of
movement or discipline. As it is said, Karl Marx father of psychology. Wundt, under whom Hall
was not a Marxist and Jesus Christ was not a also studied, started his professional life as a
Christian. Another intriguing aspect of this physiologist and philosopher. Wundt was inter-
situation is that you will hardly hear about ested in the study of conscious experience or
mothers of disciplines or movements. Further- consciousness. This appears to be what led him
more, when it comes to the issue of the to campaign to make psychology an inde-
‘parentage’ of a discipline or school of thought, pendent field of study from under philosophy or
there is no agreed test of what exactly makes physiology. It is important to make a note of
one a father. the fact that Wundt believed that psychology
The title of father of black psychology is should be modelled after physics and chemistry,
accorded to Francis Sumner not because he a notion that lies at base of the scientistic
championed black upliftment nor because he inclinations that psychology maintains up to
wrote a searing treatment of slavery and on this moment. And, of course, this need for
white racism. Sumner became a ‘father’ because scientific respectability is related to the fact of
he was the first black American to be awarded Wundt establishing a laboratory for psychology
a doctorate in psychology (although, again, as studies at the University of Leipzig, Germany,
you will see later in this chapter, the politics of as well as founding the first psychology journal.
Sumner undermine his paternal status to a Interestingly, Wundt’s fatherhood of psychology
psychology). After some racial troubles Sumner comes not from founding the journal but rather
managed to study under G. Stanley Hall for having put up that first psychological labo-
(discussed above). Hall was a student of ratory and, hence, bringing to birth the
William James. James is another who has been discipline of psychology in 1879.
social power, Washington counselled silence about inequality and getting a

trade. When Du Bois pushed for self-assertion and higher education for black
people, Washington championed working hard, arguing that education for
black Americans should emphasise training in agriculture and in vocational
trades. Sumner, then, who got his PhD at age 24, believed that the black race
was lower on the ladder of civilisation than the white race, that the Negro was
the inferior and, following Washington, that higher education for African
Americans should be limited to industrial and moral training. (By the bye, it is
interesting to note that the views of Sumner and Washington on education
politics bear an uncomfortable similarity to those of Hendrik Verwoerd, ‘the
father of apartheid’, who as Minister of Native Affairs in 1953 famously asked
what the use was of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when they could not
use it in practice.)
397
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 398
Critical Psychology
Still, it was Sumner under whom Kenneth Clark, another early black
psychologist or, better still, a politically aware psychologist, sometime studied.
If he should go into the black psychology Hall of Fame, it would be because
Sumner supported Kenneth and Mamie Clark in their famous work on racial
preference, identification and attitudes.
Developmental race awareness

The Clarks popularised what is known as the doll technique experiment. In the
experiment, the Clarks used a number of dolls of the same mould and clothes
but with different colours to determine the development of racial awareness
and preference of children between the ages of three and seven years (1939,
1940). They found that awareness of race differences is present among Negro
children as young as three years and that by seven years of age this knowledge
is clear and stable. Similar results have been obtained for white children
(Aboud, 1988).
The importance of the work of Kenneth and Mamie Clark cannot be exag-
gerated. Of the greatest importance, Kenneth Clark’s study was cited by the
Supreme Court of the USA in reaching its epoch-making decision in the
famous Brown vs Board of Education case and other school segregation cases,
something that has resonance for people coming out of apartheid (see Clark,
1955). These were landmark cases for civil rights in the USA. On the basis of
the study by the Clarks, among other things, the court ruled that the segrega-
tion of white and Negro schoolchildren was unequal and therefore a violation
of the constitution of that country. Essentially, the court concluded that
racially separate education was skewed in favour of white people. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court ordered the integration of public schools in that
country. As you might imagine, this generated a lot of debate, which continues
under different guises today, about the role of social science in government and
judicial affairs.
We must now leave the USA and look at some of the debates about
psychology here. As indicated at the beginning, the objective of this next part
of the chapter is to look at whether there is anything that can properly be char-
acterised as black, or African, psychology in South Africa. And if there are no
features that can be characterised as black psychology, the question becomes
‘Why not?’
PSYCHOLOGISTS SANS A PSYCHOLOGY

I have argued at some length elsewhere that despite what may appear to be
evidence in support for what could be called a ‘South African psychology’, there
is in fact really nothing like that, except in a nominal sense (Ratele, 2001). There
is, that is to say, no South African psychology save for those instances where
398
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 399

that is supposed to mean that there are professionals in the country who have
masters and doctoral degrees in psychology and are employed as psychologists.
The irony, you should know, is that I am one of this group of individuals.
Alienation of psychologists from what they know and what they do

How can it be so, though, you may ask? How can you have psychologists
without a psychology? This is a longstanding predicament. To be sure, we have
already gestured to the dilemma of psychology sans a psychology in our discus-
sion of black US-American psychology. As we said, the longing to found a
psychology by black US-American scholars emerged out of the universal fount What we are
of struggle by human beings to be true to who they are and how they live. talking about in
the case of South
Everyone is aware that individuals can do something, such as a work in a gold
African black
mine, to keep things going and body fed, without the work expressing psychologists is
anything about their lives or their identities, alienated from the products of simple: the
their labour. (For a more detailed explanation of the notion of alienation see alienation of
Hayes’ chapter on Marxism and critical psychology.) psychologists from
what they know
The answer to the question (how can it be so?), therefore, is that psycholo- and what they do.
gists in South Africa are more like gold miners than gold mine-owners. To be
like gold miners would actually not be a bad thing. But what we are talking of
is not a ‘consciousness’ or solidarity with the working class. Instead, what we
are talking about is simply the alienation of psychologists from what they
know and what they do. In that sense, psychologists are like mine workers who
labour just to keep getting paid, their knowledge at times contradicting what
they see around them, hear from those they interact with, and think about
their conditions, exactly what black American scholars were saying when they
set out to create a psychology in the USA.
Talk of South African psychology: What is at stake?

This is not the heart of the predicament, though. We have already signalled at
the heart of the problem in two places above when we focused on who they are
and when we used the term, ‘identities’. One other way to exemplify the
predicament of psychologists without their own psychology is by asking
oneself a question such as this: Is a person who does a great job dressing
wounds, advising on remedies, delivering babies, and being involved in many
more doctoring activities in a town or village a South African medical practi-
tioner? The answer is ‘Of course not.’ But why not? Because the words before
medical practitioner need another answer, one that goes to the identity of the
medical practitioner as well as to that of his or her practice. You may also be
aware that because of the trek of many medical practitioners from South Africa
to greener pastures abroad, some persons who have been brought to help in
our rural hospitals are not South African doctors but Cubans.
399
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 400
Critical Psychology
The example of medicine, rather than one about miners, is perhaps

germane as it goes to the heart of the issue of universalism and particularism,
which we shall make our way to in our conclusion. It is most pertinent, as most
people would easily agree, that medical practice is medical practice is medical
practice in Cuba, Cato Manor, China or anywhere else in the universe. So while
they may be more people (in regard to psychology than medicine) who would
give an inch about psychology being psychology everywhere in the world, the
questions to practitioners of both disciplines are similar.
What makes a South African psychologist?

Regarding psychology, what is at stake is what makes the person sitting in front
of you listening to your troubles and offering counselling a South African
psychologist? What is at stake is the identity of the person, of course; but, more
importantly, the identity of his or her practice. What is at stake when talking
of a South African psychology is, in other words, the identity of this woman
who teaches Freud or Piaget to your class and this group of researchers that
undertakes a study and publishes an article on, say, the attitudes of first-year
students at the University of Port Elizabeth. But more than that, what is at
stake is the identity of psychology course she is teaching you and the research
work of the group.
The issue I want us to think about is, is it that these people carry a South
African citizenship and have gone through a training programme at the
University of Zululand, Rand Afrikaans University or at Yale University that
makes them South African psychologists? Is it that they work in South Africa
and deal or interact with South African patients, clients, other psychologists,
or students that gives them that identity? Or is being a South African psychol-
ogist about something else?
South African psychology and its relation to being black

in South Africa
Local psychologists may take issue with the above contention. I doubt, though,
if there will be many who dispute the fact that there is nothing that can be called
black or African psychology in this country, in the way that we have indicated
there is a black psychology in the USA. This is one proof, then: if in a country
where there is more than a handful of black people (and since the mid-1990s, a
country now governed by a former liberation movement of largely black people)

whose experiences and lives remain outside the ambit of mainstream
psychology; if, that is to say, there is no politically and socially ethical psychology
of black people here, there can therefore be no truly ‘South African psychology’.
This position, as you can see, articulates with the arguments that led to the
origination and development of the discipline of black psychology in the USA.
400
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 401

If there is no
politically and
socially ethical
psychology of black
people in South
Africa, there can be
nothing that can
truly be called a
South African
psychology.
Photograph by Zenzo
As in the case of the USA, what I am pointing out the exclusion, neglect, and/or
distortions of black and African experience from and within (white)
psychology.
But the larger context of this position is, of course, that of imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and white racism. The larger context, to put it
simply, is that of the deep-running connection of economics and politics on
one side, and social and cultural (including intellectual) production on the
other side, which is to say, power’s intimate relation with knowledge. To
connect again with the discipline of black US-American psychology, we said it
arose as part of black people’s worldwide powerlessness and struggle against
white capital. We said black US-American psychologists operated without a
psychology of their own because they were part of the group that was, and to
some extent still is, on the receiving end of the abovementioned forces. Simi-
larly, the situation we have in this country is one of an entire tribe of
psychologists without a psychology, not in any real sense, because they are at
the wrong end (though not uniformly) of international capital, North-South
relations, and of black South Africans, racism.
What about white South African psychology students and

professionals?
What you may want to argue about is the position of whites. For instance, you
may want to know what I think a white psychology student at Rhodes Univer-
sity is doing, then when he or she proposes to study the preferences or
identification of a group of young AmaXhosa boys and Basotho girls, or when
an academic at the University of Cape Town conducts a study into authori-
tarian personality of the Afrikaner, or when psychologists meet once a year to
401
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 402
Critical Psychology
give papers and address each other about our work. Is this not South African
psychology? Is it not so by the simple fact that it is done by South African
psychologists or students of the discipline psychology? And, of more impor-
tance, what is to be made of the body of knowledge produced locally within the
discipline of psychology?
To respond to the questions altogether, let us simply say historically there
has been little psychological theory in South Africa that is original. More
crucially, there has been almost no ethically just psychology in our country.
That is to say, even where there has been a spark of original understanding,
psychological work has for the most part been anti-black. (In this connection
see also Duncan, Stevens & Bowman’s chapter: South African psychology and
racism.) If it has not been, at its best, it has been blind to actual black life. All
From the beginning of this is tied to the fact (commented on by several progressive psychologists)
the institutions and
instruments that whatever psychological understanding of black people that has gone on in
of psychology were the past has not been in the service of alleviating their oppression (see eg
co-opted in the Anonymous, 1986; Bulhan, 1993; Nicholas, 1993; Nicholas & Cooper, 1990;
development, Seedat 1993). How can such psychology be a South African psychology? I
elaboration and
justification of
suspect there will be more than a few people who concur that such a
relations of psychology is not for those who have been oppressed with its active collusion
domination or because it stayed silent. And I suspect there will not be many who will agree
between the latter with the reactionary view which would argue that even if it was brutally
class and others.
oppressive that does not make it any less South African.
Psychology against minorities

What the above amounts to is that, like most ‘South Africanised’ institutional
enquiry, the discipline of psychology as historically deployed in this country
has been used against black people. Of course, psychology has also stood
against poor people, against women, against ‘sexual deviants’, against workers,
and nearly anyone else who was not a white-collar, white, heterosexual,
working male. From the beginning the institutions and instruments of
psychology were co-opted in the development, elaboration and justification of
relations of domination between the latter class and the others. The chances
are that, in the absence of a critical consciousness, any white psychology
student, from any university in the country or anywhere in the world, studying
the preferences or identification of any group of young AmaXhosa boys or
Basotho girls is probably not going to be of help to any of them, or of black
people in general for that matter, except him- or herself. Such a psychological
study is probably not going to make our lives better any way.
The matter of racist psychologists and psychologies

On the relation of psychology to racial capital and cultural power, which is one
crucial aspect of the relations of South African practitioners and scholars to
402
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 403

The discipline of psychology as historically deployed in this country has been used
against black people as it has been used against poor people, against women, against
‘sexual perverts’, against workers, and nearly anyone else who was not a white-collar,
white, heterosexual, working male.
Photographs by Zenzo
‘global’ psychology, Donald Foster (1991) once asked, ‘Have psychologists over
the course of this century contributed to racism?’ Over and above showing the
way psychology has focused on individualism and operated within a positive
science framework, Foster adds his voice to those who have said there has been
a more or less obvious support from psychology for anti-black discrimination
and racism (Bulhan, 1981; Nicholas, 1993). This, Foster (1991) said, can be
read in the form of biologistic and naturalistic explanations, in pathogenesis, Pathogenesis:
the mental testing movement, and the plain prejudice and well-known racism production and
of specific ‘leading’ psychologists. development of
It is not the case that overt racism has vanished in South Africa. That disease.
racism is far from a spent force can be read from the Human Rights Commis-
sion’s conferences and investigations into racism, which events contradict
such a wish. One can also read it in the media replete with (reports of ) racist
discourses, practices and events. And many would attest that not just ‘new
style’ subtle racism but the blatant form of racism continues to be a political
403
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 404
Critical Psychology
and economic problem and an issue in everyday life (Duncan, 2002; Durrheim,
in press; Nicholas & Cooper, 1993).
I am rushing us over racism because racism in its overt manifestations is a
more or less recognisable phenomenon. And since it recognisable, it can be
and is being challenged on many fronts. We can either dismiss it with the disre-
spect it deserves or come down hard on the work of people who are or were
well-known bigots. Perhaps the main reason we can afford to do this is that
good work has been done on them by black critical scholars (see eg Duncan,
2002; Nicholas & Cooper, 1993). For instance, in his doctoral study into
discourses on racism, Norman Duncan (1993) robustly tackles the question of
racism for contemporary South African life. What meanings, he asks, have
South African psychologists given to racism in its local manifestation? In
answer to this question, Duncan traces some of the historical and contempo-
rary factors surrounding psychological research in South Africa and the
reproduction of racist ideology in discourses of psychologists he studied.
(Again, see here Duncan, Stevens & Bowman’s chapter: South African
psychology and racism.) In a way, then, all that is needed to be done with
blatant racists is to out them.
The racist history of South African psychology

Yet, of course, the fact of the numbers of racist psychologists who were more or
less central actors in the development of psychology in South Africa, and the
weight of white South African male psychologies masquerading as universal
psychology, impels one to mention them and briefly discuss their role in
building the discipline and profession. For example, there is the Psychological
Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA). This was the whites-only
psychology body. PIRSA broke away from the supposedly progressive South
African Psychological Association because, after many serious struggles, the
latter was going to allow black psychologists into its ranks. The two organisa-
tions later reunited. PIRSA was led by known members of the Afrikaner
Broederbond (Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1991). The Broederbond, as is well
known, was a secret organisation of Afrikaner leaders.
There is also ‘scientific’ work that was done in support of apartheid in one
way or another by specific individuals, such as W.A. Willemse (Nicholas, 1993;
Seedat, 1993; Terre Blanche, 1994; Whittaker, 1991). Willemse’s work, for
instance, was directed at founding a set of precepts around crime supportive of
Afrikaner nationalism. Somehow this seems to resonate with some of the

current (2003) talk about the crime problem. There is also G. Cronje, who was
viewed as key in South African race science in the 1940s. E.G. Malherbe and
R.W. Wilcocks were instrumental in the investigation into the problem of poor
whites. Then there was the group of Fick, La Grange, Robbertse, Van Rensburg,
De Ridder, Roux and many others who showed ‘scientifically’ the intellectual
404
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 405

inferiority, backwardness or ‘difference’ of black people (Nicholas, 1993; Terre

Blanche & Seedat, 1994).
Although it looks interesting at first sight, the problem posed by the work The problem of
psychologists
of Simon Biesheuvel does not hold the attention for long. Biesheuvel was without their own
another well-known and, it is said, one of the more liberal psychologists. original psychology
Amongst other things, he championed a politically uninvolved psychology. He affects the group of
regarded black people as blameworthy for their poverty. He wrote that the life theories and sets of
practices by those
of the mine labourer is carefree (Biesheuvel, 1958, 1987; Hayes, 1986). who write them as
It is not as easy to dismiss one of the leading white lights in the discipline well as the
of psychology, H.F. Verwoerd. The name ‘Verwoerd’ is, of course, one that is oppressed group
well known in the history of South Africa. First as Minister of Native Affairs against whom they
are written.
(the ministry incorporated the Department of Bantu Education) and then as
Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd helped elaborate – if not almost single-handedly
wrote – the key laws of the policy of apartheid. The effects and traces of these
laws are still being felt (Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1991).
But I have rushed over this important history to get to the point that,
having to deal with racist psychologies and racist psychologists then and now,
over there in the USA and here in South Africa, conceals a deeper problem.
One way to put the problem is to say, as we have said, there has never been a
South African psychology up to the present. The deeper, double-edged irony is
that the problem of psychologists without their own original psychology
affects the group of theories and sets of practices by those who write them as
well as the oppressed group against whom they are written, although, of
course, to differing extents and in differing ways. In the only South African
textbook on social psychology in the 1990s, a collection of work from local
psychologists which he co-edited with Louw-Potgieter, Foster (1991) notes a
variation of the same problem. The subdiscipline of psychology, he states, is
dominated by formulations and findings from the North. In contrast, he notes,
little research and even far fewer theoretical insights have come out of South
Africa, over and above the fact that local researchers have depended overly on
work produced overseas (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991).
What about black South African psychologists?

What about black psychologists? (though, again, one should really try to
avoid posing the question as though they were one homogenous group). None
the less, the question is interested in those who have expressed themselves
against apartheid in their professional capacities as psychologists and politi-

cally as members of the larger black community? As we have already
indicated, there have been many others who have made enquiries into what it
is that is needed of this group and of their discipline. There has been a wide
range of responses here, from an almost total rejection of psychology as we
know it to those who want to tweak it here and there to fit local conditions
405
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 406
Critical Psychology
(Cooper, Nicholas, Seedat, & Statman, 1990; Laubscher & McNeil, 1995;
Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1990).
Manganyi’s psychology
One of the earlier leading African psychologists, Chabani Manganyi (1991),
opined that the best of the psychology practised in South Africa has been a
transplant of Anglo-Saxon (which, of course, extends to the USA) psycholog-
ical theory, research and apparatuses. The best original scholarship, Manganyi
said, has been either racist or apologias for apartheid. The task facing psychol-
ogists, according to him, has been the production of a critical discipline,
something with which we cannot disagree.
On another note, Manganyi made an interesting point about calls for
relevancy:
Dialectic:
I have little interest in the fashionable but sterile notion of a ‘relevant’ psycho-
in the sense that
Hegel, and later logical theory and practice for this country. This form of intellectual tinkering in
Marxists, meant it, the past produced isolated interventions of the ‘Jim-comes-to-Jo’burg’ variety, so-
‘dialectic’ is the called cross-cultural explanations as well as notions about African abilities and
term given to the personality. Others sought, in the idea of a relevant psychology, an opportunity
logical pattern that to reinvent the traditional healer. Yet others have, more recently, sought the
thought follows. spirit of relevance [in] the role of the professional activist inspired more often
Thought, Hegel, than not by a vulgar Marxism (Manganyi, 1991, 121).
said, proceeds by
contradiction and While being wary of vulgar Marxists, and although he favoured a materialist
the reconciliation of psychology, Manganyi might have considered himself a Marxist at one time or
contradiction, the
overall pattern another. He referred to Czeslaw Milosz’s observations about the great yearning
being one of thesis, of every ‘alienated’ intellectual to be with the masses at some point. We sense
antithesis and from his work that, though he had scant regard for such intellectuals,
synthesis. Manganyi positioned himself as a psychologist of the people (Manganyi,
1991). Still, the call he made for a historicised critical discipline that goes
Dialectic beyond moral indignation continues to be relevant and urgent. Such a disci-
materialism: pline would be supported by a dialectic materialist conception of action. And
doctrine held by
Marxists which last, of course, such a psychology would declare itself opposed to oppressive
asserts that matter conditions – and we would add ‘in any guise’.
is fundamental, that
mind is (the highest
form of) matter,
Pretences of political neutrality
that there are laws Over a decade later we cannot but conclude that most of psychology remains
that govern the ahistorical, and a psychology of black people’s history and everyday remains a
development of
matter, and that
thing of the future. Psychology as practised in our country continues blindly to
these laws are not insist on political neutrality. It recklessly holds on to a belief in objectivity. It
mechanistic but continues arrogantly to assume the status of a science, that is to say, after the
rather dialectical manner of physics and chemistry, rather than that of what are rightfully its
(see Dialectic).
sister disciplines, sociology and anthropology. These are assumptions, values,
406
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 407

claims and forms of practice which we continue to inculcate in our students in Psychology as
prescribing the textbooks we do (see Smith, 1998; Weiten, 1998). These practised in our
assumptions and claims underlie professional practice despite evidence to the country continues
contrary (Bulhan, 1985; Foster, 1986; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; blindly to insist on
political neutrality.
Nicholas & Cooper, 1990; Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1990). In the face of It recklessly holds
these intransigent lies, of political neutrality, objectivity and scientificity, to say on to a belief in
psychological theories and research work are related to practices of politics, the objectivity. It
economy, and social identification is no longer enough on its own. So what continues arrogantly
to assume the
should we be saying?
status of a science.
A psychology that risks it

Having come some way from where we began, let us reach back and pick up
some of the important points we made along the way. The heart of black US-
American psychology is, we said, in the right place. Its soul, obviously, is also
an anti-racist one.
We also said, the major objective of black psychology was one of an
empathic perspective on African Americans in the white USA. That is to say,
black US-American psychology has been a discipline fighting on the back foot.
In essence, US-American black psychology was a minority studies programme
and, like all minority studies, projected a defensive posture. But it had to take
this stance, of course, for it was created by people who rightly feel (see Box 3)
that their society is anti-black, their lives invisible, their experiences not taken
seriously (see eg Du Bois, 1996; Franklin, 1999).
BOX 3 Psychology as discipline of marginalisation
From a reading of an introductory textbook on the international edition of Barry Smith’s

psychology a student will be forgiven for (1998) textbook, Psychology: Science & under-
believing she or he is going to be the first black standing:
psychologist or psychoanalyst. A student is
The psychological study of women’s issues
almost never likely to run into names such as
exemplifies the growing recognition in the
Frances Sumner, Mamie Clark, Frantz Fanon or field of the importance of human diversity.
Kenneth Clark in the history of US-American Men and women are different, and they are
psychology. But it is still surprising that, so in scientifically verifiable ways. So are
although one might find a few white women African Americans and whites, Asians and
such as Mary Whiton Calkins, the first woman to Hispanics, Europeans and Americans.
be elected president of the American Psycho- Recognizing the importance of differences
logical Association in 1905, and Margaret Floy in cultural and subcultural background and
Washburn, the second woman to serve as pres- experience is taking psychology increas-
ident of the Association, one will find reference ingly in the direction of studying these
to black psychologists under headings such as individual difference[s] systematically and
new horizons, culture, diversity, or not at all. including them in theories of human
Take, for instance, these paragraphs taken from behavior (Triandis, 1993). It is important to
407
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 408
Critical Psychology
BOX 3 Psychology as discipline of marginalisation (continued)
note, however, that in psychology the cate. A middle-class American clinical or

emphasis is on the study of the individual, counseling psychologist who can effectively
not the group. Cultural background is thus treat middle-class American patients may
an individual difference variable that may be far less effective in treating Asian,
affect behavior of the person (Lawrence, African American, or Hispanic patients. The
1997). growing recognition of the importance of
cultural variables will greatly inform and
The idea that cultural differences are impor- enhance theory, research, and clinical
tant is a relatively new one in psychology. practice as we move rapidly toward the
Historically, the field has been dominated twenty-first century. A discussion of
by white, middle-class males (Walker, research on cultural diversity appears in
1991), who have tended to study other Chapter 2 (19).
white, middle-class males, mostly college
The paragraphs are contained under the
students (Graham, 1992). One problem with
heading, ‘psychology and human diversity’. Why
this historical situation is that we may not
be able to generalize scientific findings in do you think Smith prefers the word ‘human’
groups of white, male college students to, and ‘culture’ to ‘race’? You will also have
for example, black females in Africa. In noticed that there are no white Americans, and
fact, it is increasingly clear that different that Americans do not, on the other hand,
cultures – and different subcultures within automatically include African Americans. Why
American culture – teach very different do you think this is the case? At least Wayne
patterns of behaviour. Knowing how white, Weiten (1998), whose book was used for some
middle-class women communicate with time at the University of the Western Cape, has
each other may tell us very little about how a picture of a black psychologist in his two-
poor white or African American women page graphic-spread ‘overview of psychology’s
communicate, let alone how men communi- history’.
A double-consciousness psychology
But, we suggested, one of the eyes of black US-American psychology is black
while the other is generically US-American. One of the eyes it keeps on the
larger US-American society and the other on itself being watched by that
society. This double consciousness (see Du Bois, 1903/1996) is a condition of
any group that is oppressed or on the margins of a society. Thus, black US-
American psychology flourishes, if it does, from within the belly of the beast
(as the left-leaning hip-hop artist Wyclef Jean chants in his song on murders of
black people such as Biko and Diallo by the police).
Because of its struggles against racism and to express the ‘authentic’ expe-
riences of black people, its defensive stance and its doubleness, black
US-American psychology at times feels insulated and perhaps self-
worshipping. Although I would not say black studies in general are narcissistic,
as the African American essayist Stanley Crouch (1998) puts it, I shall say a
psychology that sets out to battle the lies of mainstream should not try to find
many uses for the sob stories but also for the drumming.
408
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 409

It has been shown many times over that most of psychology has been white
and anti-black; it is true that black lives are on the margins of mainstream
psychology; and there is now little argument that the experiences of anybody
else other than white middle-class individuals are not taken that seriously. But
perhaps it is time, especially in South Africa, to quit crying. With regard to
crying, it is one of the dangers of black psychology, just as it is of black US-
American studies. bell hooks speaks on the same phenomena in her essay
‘Loving blackness as a political resistance’:
They wanted to talk black self-hatred, to hear one another confess (especially
students of color) in eloquent narratives about the myriad ways they had tried to
attain whiteness, if only symbolically. They gave graphic details about the ways
they attempted to appear ‘white’ by talking in a certain way, wearing certain
clothing, and even choosing specific groups of white friends (147).
Here hooks is talking specifically about how her students were more interested
in discussing black self-hatred and fear and desire to be white than to love
blackness. Although I think it may be right that love may actually be necessary
for radicals, again, we should tread carefully for we might fall into self-idolatry.
Loving our selves, as rebelling against white mainstream psychology, is not an
individual thing. To be effective it should be tied to critical political conscious-
ness and action. As Henry Louis Gates & Cornel West (1996) have it, ‘loving
one’s community means daring to risk estrangement and alienation from that
very community, in the short run, in order to break the cycle of poverty,
despair, and hopelessness’ (xvi). Black psychologists and black social scientists
generally seem not to want to take enough risks.
A psychology of critique
The warning sounded in the opening paragraph of questions (whether you
have ever experienced your self as in, culturally, politically, or psychically
speaking, because you are black) is exactly this: that if it does not come through
to us as dull clan cheerleading or weeping at the graveyard, black social science ‘[T]here is a
at times feels like ghetto fabulous elevated to the level of politics. If black disturbing tendency,
psychology is uncritical as it seems to be of itself and of certain black practices, in many quarters, to
speak of the black
it can never get out of its birthplace, and more importantly, the ghetto, American as if there
however it is dressed, will never get out of black psychology. This is also to say, was some
if we do write ourselves out of the margins, it will not be because of our black monolithic social
emblems. Rather, what will make us burgeon in the future in spite of the cruel group involved’
(Guthrie, 1980, 20).
past is hard, rooted, creative critique.
Examples of the risks we have to take to build a psychology with a radical
conscience are not plentiful but they are there. It is fortunate, I would say, that
when one reads some of the work of black US-American scholars who are for
black psychology one finds enough disagreement in spite of the presumption
409
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 410
Critical Psychology
of unity about the experiences of being black in the USA. And dissension is
crucial. It is more so when our lives depend on laagering. In this regard, it must
noted that Robert Guthrie, whom we saw is a supporter of black psychology
himself, did warn that ‘there is a disturbing tendency, in many quarters, to
speak of the black American as if there was some monolithic social group
involved’ (1980, 20) Guthrie counselled against this flattening, homogenising
instinct for he saw that ‘there is much diversity in the black community as
there is in any other community. The common bond of blackness and its
resulting strengths have brought about unified concerns across many dimen-
sions, yet differences occur’ (1980, 20).
Close by and more recently, the psychologist and chair of the African
Gender Institute at the University of Cape Town, Amina Mama, has articulated
this criticism in her work on black identity. The Nigerian-born Mama (1995)
has argued that the discipline of psychology, being permeated by racist
discourse as it is, ‘has often legitimised dominant racist assumptions and
construed the African as a single generalised Other in stereotyped ways’ (43).
Mama captured the point we made about the two eyes of US-American black
psychology when she showed that ‘that both mainstream and black
psychology assume a unitary subject – the black man – about whom a great
many generalisations have been made’ (Mama, 1995, 43).
Developing and widening critical/black communities

At this stage you may have decided that we should abandon any attempt to
develop a psychology for black people and South Africans. You may also be
wondering what to do about studying life as we know it; expect taking intel-
lectual risks, and perhaps social and political ones too? What is to be done, you
might be asking, except for putting an end to crying, to a politics of complaint,
to looking critically at ghetto fables, if we want to understand our conditions
and our selves?
One of the points we have suggested is that when we read the work of those
we simply assume share our view of the world from, such as black psycholo-
gists from the USA, we should do so with our heads not too close to the page
as to lose sight of the bigger plot. One of the things such a reading strategy is
likely to reveal about assumption such as the above is the mundane terror of
race employed as epistemic foundation and blackness as ontology. This is to
say in certain moments of uncritical sympathy with those who appear to be

part of us we might be seduced that race is life, and everything else doesn’t
really matter that much. In other words, what critical reading strategies and
political consciousness do is show that when race is taken to be all of reality
and all the truth you need to know, it can be terrifying even while it connects
one to others. Hence the questions that go with the last pair are: Are there
410
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 411

really no commonalties whatsoever between black and white citizens and When we read the
scholars? Are there no lessons, for instance, that queer intellectuals and black work of those we
heterosexual psychologists can learn one from another, no chance of helping assume to share our
each other to understand their different struggles better? view of the world,
we should be aware
of race employed as
Communities of consciousness epistemic founda-
This is what the idea of ‘communities of consciousness’ answers to, the idea tion, of blackness
as ontology.
being a little more than what I believe Nobles (1980) intended by communali-
ties of experience. But communities of consciousness is an old idea really. It is
in part the idea that communities are formed not naturally but out of a shared
history, or a shared environment, or shared feeling brought about by looking Communities of
at a legacy in a particular manner. Gay and lesbian communities, black consciousness:
idea that commu-
communities, working class communities are not natural entities. So, for
nities are formed
instance, where I have been writing of ‘we’, I am really not sure who I am not naturally but
addressing and including in this. What I am certain of is my attempt to culti- out of a shared
vate a community which cuts across these constructed divisions of sex, race history, or a shared
environment, or a
and class. I am trying to persuade you that we, whoever we are, from these
shared feeling
‘Other’ communities, should come to share a certain emotion about and a way brought about by
of looking way at society, at history, at ourselves looking at society and history. looking at a legacy
I am writing not merely to say something about black psychology and black in a particular
manner.
people, traditional psychology or white people. I am writing to produce a
certain psychology, a certain way of looking at blackness and race, a certain
way of seeing. I am trying to persuade you, then, that I share with you reading
these lines, or that you shall come to share me as this chapter’s author, a way of
thinking. This, then, is one other resource which feeds into or is fed into by the
use of the plural then; it also indirectly suggests that the contributors in this
book to some extent share among each other, a community, a way of thinking
about us, our condition, that they pay due regard to the efforts of both black
and white, male and female scholars and activists on the continent and else-
where who continue to struggle to reverse the ravages and distorting effects of
capitalist, racist, homophobic sexist, and ethnocentric psychology; we, I am
saying, are the ones who committed to true radical liberation and social justice.
A critical black-conscious psychology

How to respond to history, community and other persons is then a matter that
I increasingly find occupies my mind. The matter (of how to answer to our
collective and personal past, our given community, and to others one comes
into contact with) arises, for instance, in the context of teaching mostly ‘black’
students – the marks signalling a potential problem. The problem is that some
of these students express their feeling that they do not want to be called black,
while others are never quite sure about whether they are included in my refer-
411
Account: s7393698
CP_Chap15 11/2/04 10:36 am Page 412
Critical Psychology
A commitment to
ence; and yet others believe it is only them whom I refer to. How I think one
social

(Derek Hook) Critical Psychology (B-Ok - Xyz)

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

(Derek Hook) Critical Psychology (B-Ok - Xyz)

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Critical Psychology

or applicable copyright law.

Introduction to Critical Psychology

© Juta and Compant, Ltd

1st Floor, Sunclare Building

ISBN: 978 1 48510 228 1 (Parent

Project management: Fiona Wakelin

Indexing: Ethné Clarke

Section 1: Theoretical resources ......................................................... 1

The principle of cosmic unity...................................................................... 44

Critical thinking tasks ................................................................................. 51

3 Sociocultural approaches to psychology:

4 Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and

5 Fanon and the psychoanalysis of racism ...................................... 115

6 Psychoanalysis and critical psychology ........................................ 139

Essentialist psychoanalysis: Opportunities and dangers............................. 147

7 Marxism and critical psychology ....................................................... 162

8 Psychology and the regulation of gender ...................................... 187

9 Foucault, disciplinary power and the critical pre-history

Disciplinary power ...................................................................................... 216

10 Governmentality and technologies of subjectivity ..................... 239

Section 2: The South African context ............................................... 273

11 Feminist critical psychology in South Africa ................................ 278

12 Critical reflections on community and psychology in

Philosophical assumptions.......................................................................... 320

13 The role of collective action in the prevention of

14 South African psychology and racism:

15 About black psychology....................................................................... 389

Section 3: Forms of practice ................................................................. 415

The irrelevance of psychology ..................................................................... 427

17 Participatory Action Research and local knowledge in

18 Community psychology: Emotional processes in political

19 Discursive practice: Analysing a Lovelines text on

sex communication for parents ......................................................... 487

The text ....................................................................................................... 502

20 Writing into action: The critical research endeavour ................ 523

21 Human development in ‘underdeveloped’ contexts .................... 540

22 Liberation psychology .......................................................................... 559

Introduction ................................................................................................ 560

Psychological consequences of oppression.................................................. 585

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 603

Catherine Campbell is an External Professor at the University of KwaZulu-

Anthony Collins is a lecturer in Psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,

Norman Duncan holds an Associate Professorship at the Institute for Social

Don Foster is Professor of Psychology and Head of Department at the Univer-

Kerry Gibson is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Cape

Grahame Hayes lectures at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. He was

Mambwe Kasese-Hara is currently a lecturer in Developmental and Health

Peace Kiguwa is a tutor in Psychology at the School of Human and Community

Nhlanhla Mkhize is a registered counselling psychologist. He teaches

Ian Parker is Professor of Psychology in the Discourse Unit at Manchester

Kopano Ratele lectures in the Psychology Department at the University of the

Thabani Ngonyama Ka Sigogo is a community psychologist who teaches in

Garth Stevens is a clinical psychologist and researcher at the Institute

Leslie Swartz is Professor of Psychology at the University of Stellenbosch and

Oscar Tso Modipa is a community psychologist with interests in cross-cultural

Lindy Wilbraham has lectured in Social, Developmental and Health Psycholo-

‘Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions,

Summary: Theoretical resources

effects of conceptual systems. Furthermore, critical thought involves ques-

After explaining the differences between Western and African ideas of

away from the idea of cognitive development as a purely internal process to

people to relate to others through harmful stereotypes. Fanon’s question is