When Crime Pays

Money and Muscle in Indian Politics

Milan Vaishnav | April 7, 2015

From jail to bailing out the government
An Indian political success story
 Law-makers & law-breakers
MPs with criminal cases MPs with serious cases
40%
35% 34%
Percentage of Lok Sabha MPs

30%
30%
25% 24%
21%
20%
15%
15% 12%
10%
5%
0%
2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Election Year
Source: ADR
 A widespread phenomenon

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

 Severity of charges is striking

Source: Sastry (2013)

A puzzling coexistence
Key questions

1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere?

2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records?

3. Why do voters vote for them?

4. What are the resulting policy implications?

5. What are the lessons for democracy and accountability?

Preview

• Vibrant marketplace for criminal politicians exists in India

• As with any market, there are underlying supply and demand

factors at work

• Existence of market does not mean that policymakers must

meekly accept the status quo

• Have to change incentives, not just information

1. Why do criminal candidates
enter the electoral sphere?
Criminals in politics not novel
Supply of criminals into politics


 Number of political parties

Source: ECI
100
150
200
250
300
350
450
500

400

0
50
1952

1957

1962

1967

1971

1977

1980

1984

1989

1991

1996

1998

1999
Surge in political competition

2004

2009

2014
 The end of hegemony
Number of parties Congress vote share
500 60.0%
450
50.0%
Number of political parties

400

Congress vote share

350
40.0%
300
250 30.0%
200
20.0%
150
100
10.0%
50
0 0.0%
1952

1957

1962

1967

1971

1977

1980

1984

1989

1991

1996

1998

1999

2004

2009

2014
Source: ECI
 “Silent revolution”

Upper/Intermediate Caste Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Caste

70

60

50
Percent of Hindi-belt MPs

40

30

20

10

0
1952

1957

1962

1967

1971

1977

1980

1984

1989

1991

1996

2004
1998

1999
Source: Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) Year
 Institutional decay

Source: NCRB
 Collapse of election finance regime

Source: Indian Express

Vertical integration
 Criminals in UP assembly

60
51
Percent of MLAs facing criminal cases

50 45

40 35 36 35
31
30

20
12
8
10

0
1984 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 2007 2012
Year

Source: India Today

 2. Why do parties nominate
candidates with criminal records?
A new dataset
 Parties as vital gate-keepers

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

 Crime does pay!

25%
22%
Probability of Winning Election

20%

15%

10%
7%

5%

0%
No Cases At Least One Case

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

 Serious crime seriously pays

30%
25%
Probability of Winning Election

25%

20% 19%

15%

10%
7%
5%

0%
No cases At least 1 case At least 1 serious case

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

 Growing electorate

1800000
Average number of electors

1600000
1400000
1200000
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
0

1996
1952
1957
1962
1967
1971
1977
1980
1984
1989
1991

1998
1999
2004
2009
2014
Year
Source: ECI
 Increasing competitiveness

30
26.1
25 23.9
Average Margin of Victory (%)

19.5
20 18.2
14.8 15.4 15.2
15 13.7 14.1
11.9 12.2
10.0 10.0 9.7
10

0
1962

1967

1971

1977

1980

1984

1989

1991

1996

1998

1999

2004

2009

2014
Year
Source: ECI
Rising expectations
The costs of democracy

Growing
competition

Parties want
“self- Increasingly
financing” costly elections
candidates

Parties
Finite party
motivated by
coffers
“rents”
 Money talks

30%
26%
Probability of Winning Election

25%

20%

15%
12%
10%

5% 4%
1% 1%
0%
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
quintile
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
From money to “muscle”
Increasingly
costly
elections

Criminal
candidates Finite party
have access to coffers
finance

Party elites
Parties
prioritize “self-
motivated by
financing”
“rents”
candidates
 The merits of money & “muscle”
20% 19%
18%
Proportion with Criminal Cases

16%
14% 13%
12%
10% 9%
8% 7%
6%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
quintile
Candidate wealth quintile
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
 Moving beyond money
Not facing serious cases Facing serious cases
45% 42%
Probability of Winning Election (%)

40%
35%
30% 26%
25% 24%

20%
15%
11% 11%
10%
5% 4%
5%
1% 2% 0%
0%
Bottom quintile 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile
Candidate wealth quintile
Source: Vaishnav (2015)
3. Why do voters vote for
criminal candidates?
Why is this man a success story?

Anant Singh, three-time member of the Bihar state assembly from Mokama
constituency and well-known strongman
Criminality as credibility
 The Bihar case

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

“Chhote Sarkar”
Mechanisms of credibility

• Redistribution
– Willingness and ability to bend rules to skew
benefits to co-ethnic base

• Coercion
– Ability to use reputation to coerce rivals in Politics of dignity
context of multi-ethnic competition
Credibility grounded in politics
of dignity and self-respect
• Social insurance
– Capability to act as de facto social safety net

• Dispute resolution
– Enhanced capacity to adjudicate disputes
 Criminality as credibility

- “Anant Singh is not a murderer. He merely manages

murder” (Interview with JD(U) party worker)

Source: Vaishnav (2015)

 Uncovering support for criminal candidates

• “Would you vote for a candidate who delivers

benefits to you even if s/he faces serious
criminal cases?”

– 26% responded “Yes”

Source: Lok Foundation

 Detecting social biases

• “Would you be troubled if a [Upper

Caste/OBC/SC/other social group] candidate
wins the election in your constituency?”

– 38% responded “Yes”

Source: Lok Foundation

 Criminality & credibility

Source: Sircar and Vaishnav (2015)

4. What are the resulting
policy implications?
Paradoxical Indian state
 Over-bureaucratized
160
142
140

120
120
Ease of Doing Business ranking

100
90

80
62
60
43
40

20

0
South Africa Russia China Brazil India
Source: World Bank
 Public employees per 10,000 residents

200
400
600
1000
1200
1400
1600

800

0
Russian Federation

Canada

Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)

France

United Kingdom

Germany

United States
Under-manned

Italy

Brazil

China

Australia

Argentina

Turkey

Mexico

Japan

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Indonesia

India
Rule of law “supply chain”

Laws Judges Prosecutors Police

Rule of law “supply chain”

Laws
 Outmoded laws
Apprentices Act, 1961; Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; Beedi Workers Welfare
Cess Act, 1976; Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Child
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 1933; Cine-Workers and
Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981; Cine-Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1981; Cine-
Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981; Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948; Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970; Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948; Dock
Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Employers' Liability Act, 1938; Employment Exchanges
(Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act,1959; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Factories Act, 1948; Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Inter-
State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979; Iron Ore Mines,
Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore
Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Labour Laws (Exemption from Furnishing
Returns and Maintaining Registers by Certain Establishments) Act, 1988; Limestone and Dolomite Mines
Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Mica Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1946;
Mines Act, 1952; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965;
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Personal Injuries (Compensation Insurance) Act,
1963; Plantations Labour Act, 1951; Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; Sales Promotion Employees
(Conditions of Service) Act, 1976; Trade Unions Act, 1926; Weekly Holidays Act, 1942; Working Journalists and
Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955; Working
Journalists (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Source: Bibek Debroy (n.d.)

Rule of law “supply chain”

Laws Judges
 Slow wheels of justice
33,000,000
Pending Cases (Supreme, High, and

32,000,000
District/Subordinate Courts)

31,000,000

30,000,000

29,000,000

28,000,000

27,000,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Source: Supreme Court of India

Rule of law “supply chain”

Laws Judges Prosecutors

Politicized prosecutors
March 2007:
CBI files
?????
corruption
case

July 2008: SP
September
provides
2013: CBI
support to
closes case
UPA

December December
2012: SP 2008: CBI
allows FDI withdraws
retail bill case

Spring 2011:
March 2011:
seat-sharing
CBI reverses
spat for UP
withdrawal
elections
Rule of law “supply chain”

Laws Judges Prosecutors Police

 Police shortfalls

Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)

 Opaque political finance

534.99
Income from known
donors
1082.58
Income from other
known sources
4368.75
Income from
unknown sources

Source: ADR
Weeding out the rascals

• Criminal candidates make mockery of rule of law

• Proposals to disqualify candidates with serious cases

• Restricting candidate entry could violate the rule of

law

• Hindering democracy to save it?

 5. What are the lessons for
democracy & accountability?
Bad politicians & accountability

Democratic
Access to Ability to punish
accountability
information "bad" politicians
preserved

Provide support Success of

Voters armed with
for "bad" "partial"
information
politicians accountability
The “governance” election
 Is sunlight the best disinfectant?

Source: ADR
The “Robin Hood” phenomenon
Thank you!

mvaishnav@ceip.org

@MilanV

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/vaishnav