MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA v ATTY.

SYLVESTER PARADO

A.C. No. 10859, January 26, 2016

FACTS:

In June 2006 respondent Atty. Parado notarized the real estate mortgage over a parcel of land on which family
home was constituted. The mortgage was between RC Lending Investors, Inc. as mortgagee and the petitioner’s
sisters as mortgagors. Respondent Parado also notarized the affidavit allegedly executed by the mortgagors. RC
Lending eventually filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, which was granted.

Petitioner Fatima Japitana then filed a complaint, which was endorsed to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
complaint assailed that the signatures in the real estate mortgage as well as the affidavit were forgeries. She
alleged that: 1) Parado did not require the persons before him to present any valid identification; 2) her sister
Theresa Japitana was a schizophrenic; and 3) Parado had no notarial authority.

The IBP investigating commissioner noted that Parado had previously testified in court that the mortgagors and
the witnesses personally appeared before him and there was no proof that he lied before the court. However, he
was found to be dishonest when he testified that he was issued a notarial commission effective until 2008. This
claim was belied by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC of Cebu City. The IBP resolved to revoke
the notarial commission of respondent if presently commissioned. He was also disqualified from being
commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Parado is liable for notarizing documents without notarial commission?

HELD:

Yes. Under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, a person commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial
acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made. Commission either means
the grant of authority to perform notarial or the written evidence of authority.

Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. Atty. Parado knowingly
performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence of a notarial commission for the said period. Atty. Parado’s
misdeed run afoul of his duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public. He was remiss in his
professional duties and responsibilities.

Even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he should have required the presentation of competent
evidence of identity instead of merely relying on the Certificate of Community Tax (CTC). Section 12, Rule II of the
Rules of Notarial Practice defines competent evidence of identity as:

1) At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or
2) The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction,
who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally
knows the individual and shows to the notary public a documentary identification.

Apparently, CTCs are not competent evidence of identity.

Atty. Parado is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years and permanently disqualified from being
commissioned as a Notary Public.

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

Facts:

Complainants Spouses engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Orro to handle a case in which they
were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land. Upon receiving the
P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the RTC decided it in their
favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the CA, and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt
of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for

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the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount
requested.

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the
adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They endeavored to communicate
with the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional
P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such
motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually
resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00.

Issue:

WON Atty. Orro violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling:

Yes. Atty. Orro violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's Oath, by which
he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients."
If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and
confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve
his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord
with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and
to be diligent in handling the former's legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the
client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who
neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical
burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all
good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance
and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the
litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in
their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to
regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the
dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have
prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case.
As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various
omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the Philippines
to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the members of the Legal Profession. His
unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative
investigation of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings.

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He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. He should always
bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and
professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. He should never forget that his duty to serve his
clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court,
to the Bar, and to the public in general.

ACA v. ATTY. SALVADO

A.C. No. 10952, January 26, 2016
En banc

FACTS:

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel
Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman
engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty.
Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest
rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the
latter had various clients and investors.

Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not place his
reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in his business. This initial investment
yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011,
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with promises of high rates of return. As
consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or
a closed account.

Despite repeated demands, respondent fails to make good of his obligations with the complainant. The
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law
and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing
checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which
undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. The IBP-BOG, on the other hand, modified the period of
suspension to two years.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Salvado should be held liable for violating the CPR.

RULING:

YES. The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in part. A perusal of
the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only due to the unambiguous manner by
which the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The
public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected
to make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise.

Moreover, it must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of
the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people,
lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. Hence, the excuse of "gullibility
and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks,
he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience
that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. His issuance of the subject checks
display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

SPOUSES JONATHAN AND ESTER LOPEZ versus ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS

Facts:

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 Complainants alleged that sometime in June 2006, and while living abroad, they secured the services of
respondent as counsel in connection with their intention to adopt a minor child, Ethan Benedict Victore.In
consideration therefor, complainants, through a representative, paid respondent the aggregate amount of
P75,000.00, which was duly received by the latter. A few months later, or on October 6, 2006, they purposely came
back to the Philippines for a two (2)-week stay to commence the filing of the adoption case before the proper
court. However, despite payment and submission of all the required documents to respondent, no petition was
filed during their stay. Sometime in May 2007, complainants, through Jonathan's employer, received respondent's
letter dated March 6, 2007, requesting that complainants be allowed to come home to the Philippines to appear
and testify in court for the adoption case she purportedly filed on behalf of complainants before the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 30 (RTC), docketed as Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890. Thus, complainants
returned to the Philippines in June 2007, only to find out that: (a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for
the declaration of the presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to
file a petition for adoption on their behalf. Utterly dismayed, complainants withdrew all their documents from
respondent's custody and hired another lawyer to handle the filing of the adoption case. Moreover, complainants
demanded the return of the amount of P75,000.00 given as legal fees. However, respondent refused to return
such money, retorting that as a standard operating procedure, she does not return "acceptance fees." In view of
the foregoing, complainants filed the instant administrative case against respondent before this Court.

Despite
numerous directives to file a comment, respondent failed to do so; thus, the Court was constrained to dispense
with the filing of the same and to impose a fine in the amount of P2,000.00 against her. The administrative case
was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation, wherein respondent similarly disregarded the IBP's directives to participate in the Mandatory
Conference and to submit her position paper despite due notice.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation- The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, as she neglected the legal matter entrusted to her by complainants - i.e., the
filing of the adoption case - for almost a year until complainants finally withdrew their documents from
respondent and opted to have the filing of the case handled by another lawyer. Worse, respondent refused to
return the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees paid by complainants to her. In this relation, the
Investigating Commissioner added that respondent's liability was further aggravated by the fact that she: (a)
deceived complainants by informing them that a petition for adoption had already been filed on their behalf, when
in truth, there was none; and (b) failed to file any comment when the Court required her to do so. In a
Resolution dated October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation, without mentioning, however, of the IBP Investigating Commissioner's imposition of legal
interest on the amount to be returned.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.


Held: A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in June 2006, complainants secured the services
of respondent in order to file a petition for adoption of a minor child named Ethan Benedict Victore, and in
connection thereto, paid the latter the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the lapse
of almost a year and for reasons unknown, respondent failed to perform anything in furtherance of the legal
matter entrusted to her by complainants. As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
respondent's acts constitute a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.


Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Under the foregoing provisions, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for
a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.

In this relation, respondent also
violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed to return the amount of P75,000.00
representing legal fees that complainants paid her, viz.:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION.


Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.


Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the

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money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client - as in this case - gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality, as well as of professional ethics.

Even worse, respondent misrepresented to complainants that
she had already commenced an adoption proceeding on behalf of the latter, as evidenced by the letter dated
March 6, 2007 she sent to Jonathan's employer requesting that he, together with her wife, Ester, be allowed to
come home to the Philippines to appear and testify in court. She even provided them with a case number, Spl. Proc.
Case No. 2890, which was purportedly pending before the RTC. Such misrepresentation resulted in complainants
going through the trouble of coming back to the Philippines, only to find out that: (a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890
referred to a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and
(b) respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf. These deceitful acts of respondent clearly
violate Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provide:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell
short of such standard when she committed the afore-described acts of deception against complainants. Such acts
are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they reveal basic moral flaws that
make him unfit to practice law.

To aggravate further respondent's administrative liability, the Court notes that it
repeatedly required her to comment on complainants' petition, but respondent ignored such commands. Similarly,
when the instant case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, respondent again
disregarded the directives of the Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory conference and to submit a
position paper. Such audacity on the part of respondent - which caused undue delay in the resolution of the
instant administrative case - contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR, all of which read:

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, Rule
12.04 of Canon 12, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years,
effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.


CHERYL E. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10868 [Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]
January 26, 2016

FACTS:

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition.1 She
also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner,"
referring to Vasco-Tamaray.

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." 6 In February 2007,
Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty. Daquis. She
asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.

Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage from
Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly
signed and filed by her.

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty. Daquis,
and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided in
Muntinlupa City.10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City

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stating that she was "never ... a resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision,
Barangay Putatan."11 She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a
resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City . . . from 2000 till
present."

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea,
consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The
Petition states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[,]"14 which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were
received by Encamacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives of Leomarte Tamaray.

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself, and not
complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not
December 2006. With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized the
Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis' allegation was
supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena).

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client of Atty.
Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was provided by Vasco-
Tamaray.

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte Tamaray
but she refused to do so. Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray
requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request because she did
not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an
illegitimate son with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo
Aranda signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate.

Vasco-Tamaray filed a complaint affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007.
The Commission on Bar Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers, but based on record,
only Vasco-Tamaray complied. The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the complaint
because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the
Resolution dated September 27, 2014.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held administratively liable for making it appear
that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

RULING: This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.

1. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Application
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte
Tamaray's counsel but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court
process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray.
When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise,
she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.

2. CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
...

Application
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The
records of this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards issued

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 by the University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." In her Complaint-
Affidavit against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray."

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c"
and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the documents 50 attached to the records consistently
appear to be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c." 51 Hence, it seems that complainant's signature
on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact
remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and
notarized. In doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.

3. CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Application
Respondents act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is
tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.

4. CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Application
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her
appearance as counsel for complainant68 even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. 74 When the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for complainant. 75
If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in
violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.

5. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him

Application
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who
is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.

The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.

NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN vs.

ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA,
AC No. 5325, February 9, 2016

Doctrine: The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an
officer of the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession.

Facts:

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Spouses Floran filed a complaint against Atty. Ediza regarding the complainants’ 3.5525 hectare parcel of land in
Misamis Oriental. The said land was not registered.

The Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale
transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza
received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants into thinking that
he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. Such proceeds amounted to
P125,463. These actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as
unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

In its 2011 resolution, the Court, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six months, effective upon
receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to complainants the two sets of documents that he misled them
and Sartiga Epal into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38,
representing the amount he deceived them into paying him, with legal interest. The Court further warned Atty.
Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Ediza was able to serve his suspension. However, he failed to return the documents and the money to the
complainants. More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision, Atty. Ediza has yet to comply with
the Court's directives. As such, the complainants kept on sending the letters to the Chief Justice to follow up with
the case. In response to the letters of the complainants, the Court kept on ordering Ediza to return the documents
and the money.

Despite repeated orders of the court, he still failed to deliver the documents and the money. Some of the reasons
provided by Ediza everytime he was asked to show cause include: (1) vagueness of the description on the
documents that should be returned; (2) finding new evidence to reopen the case and support his defense; and (3)
demanding that he should not be ordered to return the same for already complying with the suspension.

Issue: Whether or not Ediza should be disbarred

Held: Yes. The Court finds that Ediza should be disbarred because he failed to obey the orders and processes of the
Court. As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of this Court
without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST
IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

x x x x

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.

In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the
interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision
over him.

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the
Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer from the practice of law. The provision states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for

8
 the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. However, Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and
unwillingness to comply with the Court's directives, which we deem to be an affront to the Court's authority over
members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an
officer of the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession. Clearly,
Atty. Ediza's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession.chanrobleslaw

A.C. No. 9574, June 21, 2016

MYRNA M. DEVEZA v. ATTY. ALEXANDER M. DEL PRADO.

FACTS:

Myrna M, Deveza filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Alexander M. Del Prado for dishonesty and for
acts unbecoming a lawyer.

According to the complainant, respondent del Prado bought a land from the complainant which is located at
Malvar St. Brgy. Camarin, Caloocan City for P1,500 per square meters on installment basis. To document the sale
both parties executed a Contract to Sell wherein Atty. Del Prado took all the copies on the pretext that he will have
the document notarized but he never gave a copy of the said document to the complainant. Eventually, Atty. Del
Prado defaulted in his obligation by leaving a balance of P 565,950. Consequently, complainant sent a demand
letter to the respondent for the payment of the unpaid obligation and/or rescission of the sale.

Upon receipt of the demand letter, respondent called respondent and told her to meet at Jollibee, Munoz Branch
for him to pay the unpaid balance. Respondent likewise asked complainant to bring the title of the property.

In the meeting, respondent brought a completely filled up Deed of Sale where he asked the complainant to sign it
before he will give the full payment. Afterwich, Atty. Del Prado gave the complainant only P 5,000 and told her
that the complete payment will be given once the document has been notarized. However, Atty. Del Prado never
paid the balance of the purchase price for the lot he bought from the complainant. Worst, Atty. Del Prado used
the Deed of Sale he made the complainant sign by means of fraud as evidence in the civil case filed by the
complainant against him for the rescission of the contract that misled the court.

In a Resolution dated September 3, 2012 the Court required Atty. Del Prado to comment on the complaint but he
failed to do so. Thus, the Court issued a Resolution on November 18, 2013 to refer the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. When the mandatory conference was set
only the counsel of the complainant appeared despite due notice was given to the respondent. Atty. Del Prado did
not heed to the order of the IBP.

The IBP issued its Report and Recommendation stating that Atty. Del Prado’s failure to answer complaint despite
notices and his continuous absence on the scheduled hearings shows his flouting resistance to the lawful orders of
the court and illustrates his dissiliency for his oath of office as a lawyer. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Del
Prado be suspended from practice of law and as member of the bar for a period of 2 years. The Court agrees with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

9
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates all lawyers to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same code prescribes a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. They should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.

In the present case, Atty. Del Prado committed an act which fell short of the standard of the norm of conduct
required of every lawyer. He deceived the complainant by making her sign the deed of sale and making her believe
that he would pay in full the balance of the purchase price after he had the document notarized. Complainant
waited for Atty. Del Prado to make good his promise to pay but despite several demands, he continued reneging
on his obligation which prompted her to file a case against him.

Moreover, Atty. Del Prado wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the Court and IBP-CBD to file his comment
and position paper and to appear in the mandatory conference despite due notice. His continued defiance of the
orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD is a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court's authority which
cannot be tolerated. Atty. Del Prado should bear in mind that he is a lawyer and an officer of the court who is duty
bound to obey and respect the court processes. He must acknowledge, at all times, the orders of the Court and the
IBP-CBD in deference to their authority over him as a member of the bar.

Respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado was found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, hereby was suspended by the court from practice of law for Five (5) years
effective upon receipt of the decision with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016

ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.

Principles:

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."

FACTS:

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF)
branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A
meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was
duly authorized by BHF.

Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further
negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be
entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise
agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the court.

On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed
an Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet
the terms of their agreement.

Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that
Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any
money in behalf of BHF.

This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement
payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so

10
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
- Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any
responsive pleading.

On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner... found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos
committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's... prejudice by concealing or omitting to
disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on
behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant.

On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the
practice of law?

RULING:

To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for she
had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v.
Atty. Limos and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF.

Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same
to the complainant despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully
well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as
counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense.

It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ
deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well
of a member of the Bar.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat
offender. Considering the... serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which
grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely
establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the

Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately. This Decision is immediately executory

A.C. No. 10373

[Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2280]

FLORA C. MARIANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ, Respondent.

FACTS: Before us is a Complaint Affidavit for Disbarment dated August 25, 2008 1 filed by Flora C. Mariano (Mariano)
against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez (Atty. Echanez), for violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial
acts on documents without a notarial commission. In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several
documents to show proof that Atty. Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission.

11
Also attached to the complaint is a document containing the list of those who were issued notarial commissions
for the year 2006-2007 where Atty. Echanez's name was not included as duly appointed notary public. 6

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CED) ordered Atty. Echanez to submit his
answer to the complaint against him.7 Atty. Echanez moved for extension to file his Answer but nevertheless failed
to submit his Answer. Thus, the IBP-CBD, deemed Atty. Echanez to be in default.8 On July 24, 2009, during the
mandatory conference, only Mariano appeared. The IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their position papers
but again only Mariano submitted her verified position paper.

In its Report and Recommendation,13 the IBP-CBD found Atty. Echanez liable for malpractice for notarizing
documents without a notarial commission. The IBP-CBD further noted that Atty. Echanez ignored the processes of
the Commission by failing to file an answer on the complaint, thus, it recommended that Atty. Echanez be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and that he be permanently barred from being commissioned
as notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Enchanez committed unauthorized notarial acts which merit the imposition of
disciplinary sanction.

RULING: YES. Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine
act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. 15

In the instant case, it is undisputable that Atty. Echanez performed notarial acts on several documents without a
valid notarial commission. 16 The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized
notarizations was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges in the
territory where Atty. Echanez performed the unauthorized notarial acts. 17

Atty. Echanez, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for and in Cordon, Isabela,
when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further committed a form of falsehood which
is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."18

In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their
territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. Atty. Echanez, despite notices, did not even attempt to
present any defense on the complaint against him. He did not even attend the mandatory conference set by the
IBP. He ignored the IBP's directive to file his answer and position paper which resulted in the years of delay in the
resolution of this case. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money
or malice.

Atty. Echanez's failure to attend the mandatory conference and to submit his Answer and Position paper without
any valid explanation is enough reason to make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with
all the lawful directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof but more so because IBP is the Court-
designated investigator of this case.24 As an officer of the Court, Atty. Echanez is expected to know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but anorder which should be complied with promptly and completely.
This is also true of the orders of the IBP. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public,
effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with severely.

DIONNIE RICAFORT vs. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA (A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016)
FACTS:
*The Complainant alleged his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City. Respondent
alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka
makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left. Manuel
Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car. Complainant later learned
that the driver of the car was the provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.

12
The complainant alleged that respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct.
*A letter signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte
Chapter said that the respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. Thus, respondent should
be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority. Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter
were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.
*In his Report IBP Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Commissioner found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident.
*The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution adopting and approving with
modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation as to the suspension (30 days).
ISSUE: Whether respondent shall be held administratively liable
HELD: Yes. He shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers
with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of
misconduct are established. A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she
enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath. Thus, the burden of proof still rests
upon complainant to prove his or her claim.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, or evidence
that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other.”
In this case, complainant discharged this burden. The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in
detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit; complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized
Affidavit of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of
respondent's plate number.
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent, Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent
by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded" because of respondent's
act of slapping complainant. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and
adopted this finding. The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's
allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced
complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature
of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no
longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment
committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that
disregards the human dignity of another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"
("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying,
harassment, and discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of
the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the
public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. This Court has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions
to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to
remain officers of the court.
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. They are
neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as
a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of
being a court officer. As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere
witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of

13
administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings.Hence, complainant's absence during the
hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.

ARTHUR S. TULIO v. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHANGIN

Facts:Petitioner sought his legal advice concerning a property owned by his mother who was then transferred in
the names of third parties. Respondent prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights signed by all of his
siblings in his favor. Thereafter, petitioner engaged the services of respondent to represent him in filing a case for
specific performance and damages. To petitioner’s surprise, respondent was the counsel of his siblings concerning
the same subject property, filed a rescission of the waiver of rights that the Respondent himself prepared and
notarized. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify him. Subsequently, respondent filed a petition as counsel for the
siblings of the petitioner for conflict of interest.

IBP in its Report and Recommendation recommended that Atty. Buhangin found Atty. Buhangin to have violated
not only his lawyer’s oath but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be meted
the penalty of suspension for two (2) months.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling:The court ruled, respondent Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Can on 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Patrick Caronan v Richard Caronan a.k.a Patrick Caronan, July 12, 2016

Facts:

 On 2013, a complaint was filed by the real Patrick A. Caronan against his brother Richard A. Caronan a.k.a.
“Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
 Patrick said he learned from Richard that the latter had enrolled at St. Mary’s University College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya using Patrick’s name and college records from the UM and that he passed the
Bar Exams in 2004. (the complainant knew that his brother was using his name gyud)
 In 2009, he said he was ordered to report to the head office of Philippine Seven Corporation, operator of
7-11, which informed him that the National Bureau of Investigation had requested his appearance in
relation to its investigation of a certain “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” for qualified theft and estafa. Aside
from using his name, Patrick said that his brother was also facing charges for gun- running and violation of
Batas Pambansa 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
 Complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name
and identity, and illegal practice of law
 In his Answer, respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD
Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed[30] the administrative case[31] filed by
Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in
A.C. No. 10074
 IBP found respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic
record and recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being
admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that the name “Patrick Caronan be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys;

2. Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that the name “Richard Caronan” be barred from being admitted to
the Bar.

Ruling:

14
No, the IBP did not err in both orders.

The foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records
to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations,
the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

Here, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later
and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. [56] Clearly, respondent has not
completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn
a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational
records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. [57] Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character (at least common honesty).

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years.

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to
be a lawyer.

GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO (A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 2015)

DOCTRINE: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

FACTS:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio
(Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973 - On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the
Bar Confidant. Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing
of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed.
In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed
a Second Amended Complaint against him.

A.C. No. 10457 - Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his
sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage
in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-
CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C.
No. 7973. In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty
was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that

15
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme
malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, the IBPCBD further ruled that
homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed
the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading
to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude.

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been
convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

ISSUES: whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

RULING: YES

The court adopted the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19
dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not
do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

The court cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute
and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these
cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the
executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.

As regards Disbarment, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Hence, Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, BRION, J.

Facts:
Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty.
Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's

16
admissionhttps://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/apr2015/ac_10303_2015.html - fnt4 to the Bar and receipt of
his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29,
2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Gimeno further
submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still
appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan)
filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide’s statements constitute intemperate,
offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were
superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to
simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of
his clients and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his
notarial registers. Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her
counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of
Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's
partners. He denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.

Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable
for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language
in his pleadings. The IBP Board of Governors (Board) modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two
years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration of the
Board's resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent resolution.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Zaide should be administratively liable.

Ruling: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly
confirms them.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as
a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have
obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002. Atty. Zaide could not have
notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several
offices. Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides
that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act
of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI. The Notarial
Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the
entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public
from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on
his behalf.

Representing conflicting interests

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law
firm's client. The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ.
Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any
way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings

17
 As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and
immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel: Her declaration in Public put a
shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System x x x This clearly confirms Atty.
Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. While
a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.

Atty. Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

A.C. No. 10187 July 22, 2015

[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3053]

CELINA F. ANDRADA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO CERA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint1 filed by Celina F. Andrada (complainant) against
Atty. Rodrigo Cera (respondent) for allegedly engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Antecedents

Sometime in late 2009, the complainant hired the respondent to represent her in an annulment of marriage case
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Baguio City.

In order to file the annulment case, the complainant needed to submit National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of
her children's birth certificates – documents which could not be obtained from the NSO because of her husband's
failure to completely accomplish the certificates resulting in the non-registration of the births of their two children,
Juliane Lourdes and Jose Sebastian. The complainant gave the respondent the amount of three thousand pesos
(₱1,000.00) to process the registration and issuance of her children's birth certificates with the NSO. The
complainant also gave the respondent, through a friend, the amount often thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) as
advance payment for the hiring of a psychologist and/or the conduct of psychologist tests for herself and her
children.

In July 2010 when the complainant herself followed up with the NSO the release of her children's birth certificates
she was asked to present the corresponding receipt for her request. Knowing that the respondent had the receipt,
the complainant called him up but she failed to get even the receipt number because the respondent allegedly did
not have it in his possession at that time. However, the respondent reassured the complainant that the necessary
payment had been made for the processing of the birth certificates.

The complainant repeatedly asked the respondent for the NSO receipt, but the latter would always give an excuse
not to turn the receipt over to her.1âwphi1 This prompted the complainant to request confirmation of payment
from the NSO. She found out that the respondent never paid nor filed applications for birth certificates.

On May 29, 2011, the complainant, through her father Freddie J. Farres, wrote a demand letter2 to the respondent

18
for the surrender of the NSO receipt and the return of the ₱10,000.00 that was supposedly for the administration
of the psychological tests, within two (2) days from receipt of the letter. The respondent received the demand
letter on May 30, 2011.

On June 7, 2011, after the respondent refused to heed the complainant's demands, the complainant filed the
present administrative complaint3 against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (JBP-CBD). The complainant alleged that the respondent's deceitful, irresponsible, and unprofessional
conduct in handling her case - his failure to file the necessary application with the NSO for the issuance of her
children's birth certificates, and to provide for a psychologist to administer psychological tests on herself and her
children, as well as his tardiness or absence during hearings – resulted in the unwarranted delay of her case and
forced her to file anew an annulment case against her husband.

The IBP-CBD called the case for mandatory conference where the complainant and her counsel appeared.
However, despite due notice, the respondent failed to appear at the conference; he also failed to submit an
answer to the affidavit-complaint.

In April 2012, the respondent returned to the complainant the amount of seventeen thousand two hundred and
eighty pesos (₱17,280.00), pursuant to a compromise agreement4 that the parties entered into in exchange for the
dismissal of the criminal case for estafa filed by the complainant against the respondent. As part of the settlement,
the respondent agreed to secure the birth certificates of the complainant's children, an obligation which the
respondent has not yet fulfilled up to the present.

IBP's Recommendation

In a report and recommendation5 dated November 21, 2012, IBP Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera
found that the respondent had engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct against his client's
interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. The Investigating Commissioner also found the respondent guilty of
misappropriating the funds entrusted to him by his client and of failing to account for and to return his client's
money upon demand, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. Commissioner Antiquiera recommended the imposition
of three (3) years suspension from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-233 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Commissioner Antiquiera's findings of administrative liability but modified the recommended penalty of
suspension from three (3) years to one (1) year.6

Our Ruling

We sustain the IBP Board of Governors' findings of administrative liability, as well as its recommended penalty of
one (1) year suspension from the practice of law.

When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his client's rights. Failure
to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy
of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession,
the courts, and society.7

It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client's case and completely reneged on the
obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary application and
payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant's children. Despite the
complainant's repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist
to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant's
annulment case.

Clearly, these actions show the respondent's negligence and lack of zeal in handling the complainant's case, for
which he should be made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which

19
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the complainant's
money. The money given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes, as could be gleaned from
the NSO's non-issuance of birth certificates8 of the complainant's children, and by the non-administration of
psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These omissions confirm the presumption that the
respondent misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust
of all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. The respondent, likewise, violated
Rule 16.039 of Canon 16 (which provides that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand") when he failed to return the complainant's money upon demand. We note that it was only after
a year that the respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him, returned the complainant's money.
The respondent's restitution cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned the complainant's
money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the respondent's
personal record. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA
[A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014]

Facts:
Atty. Juan S.D ealca entered his appearance in criminal case then pending in Branch 51 of the RTC in Sorsogon City,
presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. Aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused,
Atty. Dealca also moved that the criminal case be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC considering the adverse
incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."

Judge Madrid denied denied the motion to re-raffle. Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the
Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for
the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. The IBP
Commissioner found out that Atty. Dealco had been filing filing several frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints against judges and personnel of the court

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. Atty. Dealca also maintains that Judge Madrid
should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary."

Issues:
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No.
2006-6795?

Ruling:
1. Yes.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to
weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts
taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of
cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s
complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of

20
 idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for
vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed
out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession
had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore,
that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts
upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless,
false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility thus wise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of
justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and
temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of
initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges
against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex
and harass them, among other things.

2. Yes.

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and
to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersignedx x x.

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that
judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed
between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been
assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general.
Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does
not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced
with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty.
Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify
Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36
The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the
evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the

21
 contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11
and Rule 11.04, supra.

The Court suspended him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a
STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 7184, September 17, 2014

FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney’s
Office,2 for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer,
alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina, notarized the
acknowledgment of the document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda.
De Nieva”3 dated “25th day of 1999” (subject document), stating that he is a “notary public for and in the City of
Marikina.”4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint 5 dated August 14, 2003 filed in
Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled “Esperanza Nieva Dela Cruz [(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T.
Llantada [(as represented by complainant)].” To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification 6dated May
26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, certifying that
per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned notary public for the City of Marikina from March 30,
1994 to the date of issuance.

The Court required respondent to file his Comment 8 which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after
proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the subject
document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. 9 Further, respondent, thru
the comment, incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment
of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.

IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s oath,
reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject document in Marikina City as it was
outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. Moreover, respondent likewise violated the lawyer’s oath,
specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood.

In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years
from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public, the
Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate revocation
of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for two (2) years.

On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing,
instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for the decreased period of one (1) year.

ISSUE: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING: The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was
commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and
Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of
Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The
territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice:23cralawred

22
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,24 of which Section 240, Article II states:

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive
with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said
city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
(Emphases supplied)

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when
it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood
which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court instructively expounded on
infractions similar to that of respondent:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place
outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification. While perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the
Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much apropos:

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it.
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with
a formality definitely more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case,
take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, 28 the
Court finds that suspension for a period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In
addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked. 30cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and
violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is
likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION

FACTS:

23
 For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the
practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage
with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts
constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy 3 which the
Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent
filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly,
denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012. On December 18, 2012, the same petition
was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into
the substantive merits of the case.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 9 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in applying the foregoing standards to this case, the instant petition meritorious.

HELD:

The Court finds the instant petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession
and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also show that after his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care
of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the
Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took
an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of
dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer;
and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court
finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years
ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of

24
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to
it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded
that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

TEJANO vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA

A.C. No. 8235, January 27,2015

FACTS: Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court against his counsel, Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his]cause”, and Judge Dominador Arquelada
of acting in conspiracy to take possession of his property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge’s
court.

The Court required Atty. Baterinato file a Comment on the complaint to which he explained that he had been
recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. The Court, found Atty. Baterina’s
explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives” and referred the
case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, which found sufficient ground for disciplinary action
against Atty. Baterina.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel to his client

RULING: The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty. The Code of
Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE ANDDILIGENCE.

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a
commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is
duty-bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.”

A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until
the case becomes final and executory.”

Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their
case and advise them to retain another counsel.

A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not “sit idly by and leave
the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.” 27 The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead
must be “adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.” 28

Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any
effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’
behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility 29 and renders him subject
to disciplinary action.30 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from
warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment. 31

Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a member of
the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s
disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded
court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.

25
Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have sufficed.
Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.

Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.” 32 As
such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should
be complied with promptly and completely.”33

Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five
(5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E.
Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in
1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court
Dr. Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the
latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married
Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy
should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no
longer any impediment to their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef
Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to
legally adopt their son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the
said petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter 10 written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to

26
obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of
his marriage to Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments,
which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property.
She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may
have and comfort it may provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the
Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if
he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October
2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and
that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed
out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she
told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said
that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his
law firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the mandatory conference
of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the
parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already
submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days
from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and
October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule

27
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez
still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt
or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must
display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have
definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow
the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior
valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious
outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community. 29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the
alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He
pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status
of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez
and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses
itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.

28
This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” 35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed
again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first
marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in
the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven
and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a
blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that
Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr.
Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with
the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral
conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez.

29
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted
when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne
him a child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his
legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and
not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration.
Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render
disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to
prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having
an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of
the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty.
Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty.
Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

30
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B.
Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and
should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint
prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of
worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De
Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera.3cralawred

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month
until fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to borrow the
amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena
City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also
issued at least two more checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7cralawred

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the amount of
P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006
for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De
Vera.8cralawred

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being
drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks
were dishonored because the account was closed. 9cralawred

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita
to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred

The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day,
an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court. 11cralawred

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for violation of her
oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.12cralawred

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint. 13cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty.
De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across Northern and Southern
Luzon.15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that
Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for
application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per site. 16cralawred

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006. 17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at
least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required for the application of
building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site. 19cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera
and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave was that she
had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the loan. 20cralawred

Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister. 21 She only lent Teresita another check as
"additional guaranty for the five sites[.]"22cralawred

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were
not meant to be deposited.23cralawred

31
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the
proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have the
opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.24cralawred

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there
any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position
against the interests of the complainant."25cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that [Atty.
De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De
Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De
Vera]."27cralawred

On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the]
records[.]"28cralawred

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where
the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29 Upon the termination of the mandatory
conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their respective verified position papers within a period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the Order."30.

Both parties failed to file their position papers. 31cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found
Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year from the practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but
mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.

. . .

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary
obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the payment of the
loans.

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that
is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented
for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the
provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

. . .

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer
and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34 The Investigating Commissioner found
that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

32
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and

Recommendation36 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended that she be
suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law. 37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath
and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for Reconsideration 41 dated September
21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors denied the parties' respective motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution .subject of the motion, they being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover,
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is
a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original)
cralawlawlibrary

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable
for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the
recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and
the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of
the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations
of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of."44cralawred

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks,
punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated
checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent
Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far
as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is concerned. Since she had
admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount
thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious
misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; 47 it is serious or gross when it is

33
flagrant.48cralawred

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative case
against a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment
for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious
and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed
a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

. . .

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did
not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in character and application. His issuance
of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference
towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his
Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. 49(Citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita. Atty. De
Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by denying the existence of
the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show checks." 51 However, she failed to present evidence to
prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00, 53 and on which
Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate transaction between
Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane
only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita and
Atty. De Vera.55cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to
Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the
consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored upon presentation
for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity.
"Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode
the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer to him.'"57cralawred

34