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THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON
By COLIN S. GRAY*
uously competitive in the arms race context. A somewhat more optimistic view is
provided by N. Petersen, "The Arms Race Implications of Anti-BallisticMissile De-
fences," in C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup, eds., Implications of Anti-BallisticMissile
Systems,PugwashMonographii (London I969), 40.
3 Alternativedefinitionsmay be found in ibid., 40; Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms
Races: Pre-Requisitesand Results," in Carl S. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds.,
Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass. i958), 4I; Arthur L. Burns, "A Graphical
Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," The Journal of ConflictResolution,
iII (December 1959), 326; Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, Strategic Terminology: A
Trilingual Glossary (New York i966), 35; Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute,SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, i968169 [here-
aftercited as SIPRI Yearbook] (Stockholm i969), 44. The definitionsof these authors
are all too exclusive; Huntington and Burns stress the interstatenature of arms race
phenomena, Schwarz and Hadik require participants to endeavor to stay ahead in
the race, and the SIPRI authors equate an arms race with the "action-reaction
phenomenon."
4The debate over the various ABM decisions announced by the U.S. Govern-
ment since September i967 has drawn attentionto the possible role of differentkinds
of Soviet-American interactivepatterns in strategic armaments. The strongest state-
ment endorsing an action-reactioninterpretationof the superpower arms race is to be
found in George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," ScientificAmeri-
can, ccxx (April i969), particularlythe diagram on 24. On the other side, consider-
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 41
bilateral
competition maybe stimulated by a seriesof trigger-events
originatingquitebeyondthesystem of theirarmscompetition. This
viewis easierto sustainifwe areanalyzing somegrossand undiffer-
entiatedmeasure of defense preparedness(forexample, percentage of
GNP allocatedto or expendedupondefensefunctions), ratherthan
oneor severalcategories ofmajorweaponsystems. It shouldbe noted
thatno setof armsraceadversaries can conducttheirexternaland
domestic policiesas iftheylivedin a "two-person" world.Othercon-
flictsmay triggera preparedness reaction.An interesting develop-
mentof thisargument is thewidelyacknowledged budgetaryphe-
nomenonof "fairshares." Thus,it is conceivable thatforthesakeof
bureaucraticharmony theAir Forcemightreceivea "compensation
package"(possiblyof armsrace relevance)becausethe Armyand
the Navy have expandedto fighta distantlimitedwar.
The finalpossibility amongthesedistinctions of numerical arms
raceparticipation is theapparentabsurdity of a unilateralarmsrace.
This possibilitycould referto a situation in whichone side was
"spurting"towarda levelof strength proclaimed by theotherto be
The unilateral
sufficient. natureof the racewouldofcoursebe spuri-
ous.For a timethepartycurrently aheadcouldeschewquantitative
competition,butmight,and probably would,be pursuing a qualita-
tivecompetitionso as tosecurea favorable technological andindustrial
positionforthenextround.Also,therehavebeensituations in which
a powerfeltboundtocompete withan adversary whobuilttoa legally
predetermined rhythm andwhoconsistently deniedthatitwasracing.
The fixedtempoof buildingprovidedby the GermanNavyLaws
of i898 and i900 Laws of
and the Supplementary i906, i908, and
I912placedGreatBritain, in theposition
at leastsuperficially, ofcon-
armsraceagainstan adversary
ductinga unilateral notsusceptible
to
"panics"or "holiday"proposals.15
(2) QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE/QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE
Logicrequires be sharply
thatthedistinction drawnin theory be-
andqualitative
tweenquantitative races.16
However, foran analysis to
haveanycontemporary itmustbe statedclearly
relevance thatall arms
15 Amongthemosthelpful guidesto Anglo-German naval rivalryare Jonathan Stein-
berg,Yesterday'sDeterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (London
i965); E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (London i964, firstpub].
I935) and ArthurMarder,From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I: The Road to
War, I904-I9I4 (London i96i).
16See Huntington (fn. 3), 65-79.
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 47
thedisruptive
standing undercurrents
of multiple-warhead
and ABM
technologies,
the periodfromi96i to I970 mightbe characterized
as
a periodof competitive quantitativeincreasein thesecondand third
generations of theICBM. Such a loftydisdainforimprovements of
modelsand sucha one-dimensional viewwoulddo considerable vio-
lenceto history.
A footnote ofpractical relevancehereis that,althoughit maynot
standout in traditionalmeasures of armsraceprogress, competition
in strategic
doctrine, and thechangesin organization and equipment
to whichit can lead,has beenan almosttotallyneglected aspectof
qualitativerivalry.
A possibility thatincorporates featuresof both quantitativeand
qualitativerivalryis thatof an extended deployment race.In other
words,theoverallsizeoftherivalarsenals mayremainstaticand the
modelsmaynothavebeenimproved, buttheremaybe a racetoestab-
lish,initially,
a "presence" in a region,and eventuallytheremaybe
competitive regionalincreases in quantities
of weapons.
(3) PARTICIPANTS: INTER-ADVERSARY/INTER-ALLIED/INTER-SERVICE/
INTER-GROUP
Oneofthemostfruitful toaskis,"Between
questions whomarearms
racesrun?"The obviousand standard answeris, "Betweenmutually
perceived enemies."It is worthnotingthatarmsracebe-
potential
havioris alsodiscernible
in therelationsamongformalallies,among
"sister"services,and among organizedgroupswithinthe same
society.
For theinputsof manpower and treasure requiredby armscom-
theoutputs
petition, in competition
of goal-satisfaction betweenallies
maybe enhancedauthority withinthealliance,or attractiveness
(as
opposedto rival,less well-armedcontenders)to potentialally-
recruiters.
It maybe arguedthatthemostunambiguous exampleofqualitative
weaponscompetition liesnotin interstate butin therelations
relations,
ofthedevelopment programs of"sister"
armedservices.
In sucha com-
the qualityof the weapon,admittedly
petition, amongotherless
reputable shouldresultin a budgetary
criteria, victory reflected
in
favorable aboutprocurement
decisions and operatingresponsibility."
Evena briefglanceat therelations betweentheUnitedStatesArmy
21 For a case study of just such an example see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of
Weapons Innovation: The Thor-JupiterControversy(New York i969').
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 49
sideinturn.Thisdiscussiondoessomeviolencetothehistorical
record,
in thatalthoughthetwo sideshave a closelycomparable recordof
the kindsof systems developed,
the decisionsaboutsizablearsenal
acquisitionhavebeenverydifferent indeed.
The thirdpossibilityin thissection,identified
as "independent"
actions,is thatof armsrace movesthatmaywell be reactive, yet
neitheroffset,in a directway,an adversary'sactualor anticipated
capabilitynoremulatehisactivities.
An examplein thiscategorymight
have been the Sovietstressupon high megatonnage in the early
I96o's. 33
(8) EMBRYONIC/ONGOING
Lewis F. Richardson
identified
the periodI945-I946 as one in
which Soviet-American
arms competitionwas in embryonicform.34
The dilatoriness
ofSovietdemobilization
and thesecrecy
withwhich
the UnitedStatessurroundedits atomicprogramwerebothunan-
nouncedand possiblyunrealized
basesforan armscompetition that
wouldverysoonbe widelyvisible.The datetakenbyRichardsonand
his followers
as markingtheopeningof the Soviet-Americanarms
race is I948.
Thereis muchsensein labellinga periodofrisingpoliticaltensions
and military
moves(in theirwidestmeaning),preparatory to a burst
ofarmscompetition,oneofarmsrace"inembryo." An armsracemay
notbeginwiththepublicannouncement of an ambitious weapons-
buildingprogram-aprogram thatbothat thetimeand in retrospect
maybe seenas an unambiguous armsrace challenge, markingthe
openingofthecompetition. Instead, in thewordsofQuincyWright's
A Studyof War,therewillbe "acceleration in all countriesinvolved
of therateof armament growth. A largerproportion of theproduc-
tiveenergyof statesis devotedto military affairs . . . thoughthe
boundarieseitherin time or in space could not be veryclearly
defined."35
Despitethe greatuncertainty attaching to an embryonic period,
furtherresearchmayindicatethatformanyracestherewas a last
clearchancefortheaverting of thecompetition. I discussthispossi-
ofan armsracein embryo
bility becauseitshouldbe emphasized that,
33 An excellenttheoreticalanalysis of the arms race significanceof high-yieldweapons
is in Colonel Glenn A. Kent, On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible
Arms Agreements,Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for International Affairs,Harvard
University(March i963).
34Lewis F. Richardson, "Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting?" Nature,
CLXVIII (September 29, I951), 567-68.
35Wright(fn. 8), II, 690-9i.
56 WORLD POLITICS
in thesamewaythatacuteinternational
crisesand warsdo notoccur
withoutpreviousstormwarnings,
neitherdo armsraces.
(9) PRIMITIVE/SOPHISTICATED"
in thiscategory
The principle maybe statedas follows:to some
important thenatureoftheweapon(s)in termsofwhichthe
degree,
areracingwill determine
competitors thevelocityof therace.How-
ever,theimportanceof thedampingfactorwill restnotonlyupon
thenatureof theweapon,but also upon theobjectives
of thecom-
petitors.
In a dampedarmsraceanyattempt at superiority
shouldbe dis-
couraged cost.In otherwords,so longas thecompeti-
byitsexorbitant
36 Schelling (fn. 25), 476.
37 Herbert F. York, "MilitaryTechnology and National Security,"ScientificAmerican,
ccxxi (August i969), 26.
38 Hoag (fn. 9), 508, 5I5.
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 57
Americanmilitary definition,stability
maybe understood to be the
stateof a strategicrelationship in whichthe"first-strike bonus"was
eithernonexistent or extremely low.This definition holdsthatstabil-
ityis theproductof themaintenance of mutualassured-destruction
capabilities.
Thus,tolinkthetwotermsofthediscussion, a sufficiency
of assureddestruction capabilitiesinsuresstability. Unfortunately,
as
I notedabove,theSovietnotionof stability appearsto restuponthe
maintenance of strategic forcessufficient
notonlyto assureconsider-
able destruction,butalso to disruptan intended surpriseattackin a
preemptive manner andtodefendthehomeland in theeventofwar.40
Armsracestrategies arenotdevisedin a political vacuum;hence,even
if bothsuperpowers maintained the doctrine of assureddestruction
throughhostagecities,the military-technical logic of a deterrent-
sufficiencywouldbe unacceptable. The veryhighlevelofurbanization
in theUnitedStatesshouldmeanthatwhatwouldbe enoughto the
SovietUnionwouldbe farlessthantheUnitedStateswouldneedto
maintainher levelof assureddestruction. Apartfromthe counter-
force-potentialof a greatAmerican numerical superiorityin missiles,
itis inconceivablethattheSovietUnionwouldfinda grossnumerical
asymmetry politicallytolerable.
A widerinterpretation of thetermwouldholdthatstability refers
to thebeliefscurrent regarding the proximity of war. Thus,quite
apartfromanyarmament "improvements," interstatetensionmight
be low following politicalconsultationor good-will gestures.
Clearly,
sucha stability wouldbe extremely fragile.Finally,it mightbe held
thata rapidsuccession ofweapon-generations is inherentlydestabiliz-
ing,in goodpartbecausetheknownand familiarmilitary environ-
mentwouldbe changingfasterthanwouldthestrategic or tactical
viewsofmilitary planners and politicians.
As an interesting additionto theabovecomments uponsufficiency
and stability,we cannotbutnoticethefactthatmuchcontemporary
armsrace theorizing is conditioned by some aspectsof deterrence
theory. In theWestat least,thereis a verywideconsensus totheeffect
thatbyengagingin a nucleararmsraceone is doingso solelywith
theobjective ofcontinuing an effective
deterrence ofinimicalmilitary
and diplomatic In
actions. short, there is no questionof racingto
"win" or to avoid the worstconsequences of a nuclearwar. This
meansthatsufficiency maybe identified as thatsizeand configuration
ofthearsenalthatwill guarantee unacceptable damage-anymargin
40
Note the speculation on the preemptionpoint in one recent and excellent analysis,
Wolfe (fn. 5), 437, fn. 45.
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 59
In practiceit is difficult
to give a precisemeaningto parity,even
withinthe narrowcontextof the quantityand qualityof weapons.
We mightargue thatthe Soviet-American militarybalance today is
bestdescribedas beingin a stateof parity.It could be statedthatboth
partieshave pursuedsimilarmilitarytechnologies and thatnumerical
differences among the relativesizes of particularcomponentsof their
arsenalsare unimportant. On the otherhand,we mighthold thatthe
UnitedStatesmaintainsan important qualitativeedge in multiplewar-
head technology, in missileaccuracy,possiblyin ABM technology,
and certainlyin numbersof separatedeliverablewarheads.Further-
more,it is necessaryto recognizethat different statesacquire their
strategicforceswithdifferent ends mind. weaponsparityis not
in A
necessarilya parityof diplomaticeffect.In otherwords,the United
Statesas a conservative,
status-quopowermayfeeltheneedfora meas-
ure of superiority in orderto counterbalance the perceived(or mis-
perceived)ambitionsof more activeadversaries.
"Aboveall,it [thearmsrace]keptalivetheanachronistic
idea that
wars were inevitable."53
". . . the most dangerousresultof the arms race-the mounting
fearor 'tension'
whichit creates."54
Thereis no provenrelationship
between
armsracesandwars.How-
51U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Intelligence and the ABM, Hearing,
gist Cong.,ist Sess. (Washingtoni969), 63 [June23, i969].
52 Quotedin Woodward (fn. I5), 235.
53 Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London I958), 74.
54Ibid., 78.
66 WORLD POLITICS
This is a strictly
hypothetical I couldfindno example
possibility;
ofone,two,ormoreparties recoilingin economic ruinfroman arma-
mentscompetition: a conclusionalso reachedbyLewisRichardson.60
To the extentthatan armsrace raisestensions and focusespublic
attention uponan adversary, theboundary of tolerationof taxation
can proveremarkably elastic.The yearsI949 throughI953 in the
UnitedStatesshoweda bewildering succession state-
of authoritative
mentsuponthesubjectof"whattheeconomy can stand."6
Armsrace competitors are rarelyin a positionof approximate
equalityregarding theresources thatmaybe invested in themilitary
dimension ofthenational Eachcompetitor
security. willhavedifferent
domestic circumstancesand different foreigncommitments. For ex-
ample,despitean approximate equality in nationalincomes,Germany
spentroughly onlyhalfas muchas did GreatBritainon hernavy
didnothavetwolandfrontiers
fromi910 to I9I4:62 Britain todefend.
Withregardto the contemporary nucleararmsrace,the estimated
GNP's of the UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion for i968 were $86i
For i968 therespective
billionand $430 billionrespectively. estimated
were $79,576millionand $39,780 million.63The
defenseexpenditures
Americanfigureis inflated
by approximately $25 billionbecauseof
Vietnam;theSovietfigurerefersonlyto declareddefenseexpendi-
becauseof the uncertainty
tureand is questionable regarding the
ofrublesfordollars.Furthermore,
properexchange-rates thereis some
evidence of strategic
thatin thecategory delivery theSoviet
systems,
59Huntington (fn. 3), 63-65.
60
Richardson (fn. 26), 6i.
61See the three studies in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder,
Strategy,Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York i962).
62 Wright (fn. 8), I, Tables 58-59 on 670-7I.
63 The Institutefor StrategicStudies (fn. 24), I, 5, 57. Also see Joenniemi(fn. 24).
68 WORLD POLITICS
(3) VICTORY/DEFEAT
In the same way thatwars and crisescan be won or lost,so arms
racesmay be won or lost.However,historyprovidesveryfew exam-
ples of a party'sbeingunambiguously defeatedand thensinkingback
into a positionof sullen and near-permanent Indeed,the
inferiority.
conventional notionof victoryor defeatmustreallybe adaptedto the
particularstrategiesthat were being followed.I mentionthe possi-
bilityof clearvictoryor defeatbecauseit providesa limitingcase,not
one frequently encountered.Anglo-German naval relationsfromi898
to I9I4 would appear to providea good example of an arms race
victory:the German navy never succeededin passing throughits
"dangerzone."" Some membersof the Americandefensecommunity
were persuaded that the failure of Premier Khrushchev'sCuban
gamble and the "threeenvironments" Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
i963 marked a decisiveand possiblyenduringarms race victoryfor
the United States.The statisticsof ICBM and SLBM deployment
sincei966 have demonstrated the prematurenatureof such a belief.
There is no evidencethat the SovietUnion acceptedthe victory/
defeatlabels.However,thepost-i963Sovietbuild-upin ICBM's (SS-9,
SS-II, SS-I3) and SLBM's (deployedin the new "Y"-class nuclear
64See JohanH6lst and WilliamSchneider,Jr.,eds., Why ABM? (Elmsford,New
York i969), chap.7; Lee (fn. 4), I73; Foster(fn. 4), 248; ThomasW. Wolfe,"Soviet
Approaches to SALT," Problems of Communism, xix (September-October I970), I-3.
The imageryof bankruptcy
65 continuesto stalk the halls of arms race rhetoric:
"If we do not adopt morediscriminationin choosingthesemanyweaponsystemswe
So said SenatorSymington
are goingto bankruptthecountry." and Foreign
in Strategic
Policy Implications of ABM Systems (fn. I7), Part I, 57.
66 Woodward (fn. '5), 43I.
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 69
restricted
definition
is maintained
concerning
themilitary
instruments
thatare to be precisely
balanced.For example,theAnglo-American
equalityof tonnageagreedupon in Washingtonin I922 maybe taken
as the outstanding, if not totallyhappy,example of the "one-power
standard."Parity,as a likelyarms race outcome,has attractedcon-
siderableattentionas a resultof acceleratedSovietmissiledeployment
in the late i960's and the Americanarms race move of deployinga
limitedABM screen.Indeed,it is probablenow thatthe SovietUnion
will negotiatean arms-limitation package on the basis of nothing
shortof an acknowledgedparity.For the negotiationof an agreed
freezeupon numbersof nucleardeliveryvehicles,therivaldelegations
to the StrategicArms LimitationTalks would have to consider,as
besttheycould,the performance parametersand growthpotentialof
each separatedeliverysystem.Also, theywould have to be informed
of the missionsthateach side desiresits varioussystemsto be able to
accomplish.The difficulty with mathematicalparity,as suggested
above by AdmiralRichmond,is thatit mustignoresuch disturbing
parametersas geostrategiclocation,asymmetry of dislike,and im-
balance of strategicintelligenceprovision.
(5) RESOLUTION OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES