Contents

US v Pablo, 35 Phil. 94 ........................................................................................................................... 2

US v Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 ............................................................................................................................ 5
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR. ...................................................... 7
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438 ...................................................................................................... 14
Liang v People, 335 SCRA 125 ............................................................................................................ 30
People vs. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617 .................................................................................................. 33
Gidwani v People of the Philippines ..................................................................................................... 56
Nuguid vs. Nicdao ................................................................................................................................ 61
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong vs. People ........................................................................................... 65
People vs. Tempongko, Jr ..................................................................................................................... 77
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections .............................................................................................. 82
Corpus v. People ................................................................................................................................... 87
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw ............................................................................................................... 107
U.S. v. Bull ......................................................................................................................................... 111
U.S. v. Look Chow ............................................................................................................................. 123
People v. Wong Cheng ....................................................................................................................... 128

1
 US v Pablo, 35 Phil. 94

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9201 March 3, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLO SUAN, defendant-appellant.

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal by the defendant, Pablo Suan, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Palawan
convicting him of the crime of seduction.

Aniceta Saldivia, the offended party, testified that she was 14 years old; that in 1911 she was one a pupil in
school at Coron, Palawan; that Pablo Suan was one of her teachers; that in the month of September, 1911,
he began making love to her and promised to marry her; that after the engagement in the following month
began having sexual intercourse with her; that Exhibit C to M are letters written to her by the defendant
and delivered to her by her cousin Alejandra Obispado, a school girl who lived at their house and who
knew of her illicit relations with the defendant; that she had sexual period of seven months; after she
became a pregnant the defendant stopped coming to her house; and that in June 1912, she gave birth to a
child. This testimony of the girl is true.

The defendant showed conclusively that the offended girl had illicit relations with various young men at
various times before he had carnal relations with her. Upon this point the trial court said: "The court cannot
shut its eyes to the fact that as no attempt was made on the part of the Government to deny the allegations
that Aniceta Saldivia had indulged in sexual intercourse with a number of persons apparently in a
promiscuous manner, the said Aniceta might well be regarded by the accused as more or less a public
woman. The fact remains that by his own confession he did not know this until after she and he had
entered upon their unlawful carnal relations. Nevertheless, the court is willing to regard the circumstance
as an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused."

The defendant, by means of a promise of marriage, had sexual intercourse with the offended girl. At the
time these illicit relations began the defendant did not know that Aniceta had been having illicit relations
with a number of young men prior thereto. Do these facts constitute the crime of seduction?

Paragraph 1 of Article 443 of Penal Code, under which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, reads
as follows:

The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under twenty three years of age, committed by an
person in public authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who in any
capacity shall have charge of the education of the woman seduced, or shall have her under his
care, shall be punished byprison correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.

Viada (vol. 3 p. 132 ), speaking of "seduction," says: "Should we have to define seduction we would say
that it should be understood in general to be unlawful carnal intercourse with an married woman or a
widow of good reputation more than 12 years of age and less than 23. We say with an unmarried woman or
widow, as should it be with a married woman, it would not be seduction, but adultery; we say that the
unmarried woman must be more than 12 years of age, as should she be younger, the act would not

2
constitute the crime of seduction, but that of rape; and finally, we say of god reputation, because should the
carnal intercourse be with a public woman or with one of corrupt practices the acts would constitute simply
fornication subject only to moral and religious penance, but by no means to a legal penalty."

In Webster's International Dictionary "virgin" is defined as "a woman who was had no carnal knowledge
of man: a maid."

The meaning of the expression "a virtuous . . . female," as used in reference to the crime of seduction, was
explained by the supreme court of Georgia in Washington vs. State (124 Ga., 423; 52 S.E., 910) as follows:
"The court instructed the. jury that it was a question for them to determine, from the evidence submitted,
whether the woman alleged to have been seduced was virtuous at the time of the alleged seduction — that
is, had she at that time had sexual intercourse with another man? If she had, she was not a virtuous woman;
if she had not, she was a virtuous woman. This charge was excepted to on the ground that it confined the
jury to consideration of her physical chastity, and eliminated all consideration of the jury of any fact or
circumstance tending to show her want a moral chastity. this exception was not to well taken. The court, in
this instruction, was giving to the jury the legal meaning of the expression 'a virtuous female,' as applied to
a woman who had never married, in reference to the crime of seduction, and the definition given was
substantially correct. The general rule is that 'unmarried females who are virgins are virtuous; and those
who, by their own consent, have ceased to be virgins, are not virtuous.' (O'Niell vs. State, 85 Ga., 383, 407,
408; 11 S.E., 856, 857.) 'The jury should treat (the woman alleged to have been seduced) as virtuous unless
the evidence, direct or circumstantial, should satisfy them that she had lost her virtue, by having illicit
intercourse.' (McTyier vs. State, 91 Ga., 254; 18 S.E., 140.)"

The supreme court of North Carolina in affirming the conviction of the one Crowell (State vs. Crowell, 116
N. C., 1052; 21 S.E., 502), who had been convicted of seduction under promise of marriage, remarked as
follows: "The precedents sustain the definition given by the court that an innocent and virtuous woman is
one "who has never had illicit intercourse with any man, and who is chaste and pure.' (State vs. Ferguson,
107 N. C., 841; 12 S.E., 574) the court properly refused to go further and charge that the prosecutrix must
have had 'a mind free from lustful and lascivious desires.' "

The case of Clemons vs. Seba (131 Mo. App., 378; 111 S. W., 522) was a civil case for breach of marriage
promise, accompanied with seduction. In that case the Kansas City court of appeals defines and comments
upon the crime of seduction as follows: "Seduction, in general terms, means to withdraw one from the path
of rectitude. It is a leading astray. And, as applied to intercourse with a woman under a promise of
marriage, it implies that a woman of previous chaste character, has been induced to consent to unlawful
sexual relations by persuasion and the promise to marry. Therefore, evidence of previous unlawful
intercourse with other destroys the very basis upon which seduction must rest, viz., previous chastity, and
would relieve the case of such aggravating circumstance. the evidence should have been admitted.
(State vs. Patterson, 88 Mo., 89; 57 Am. Rep., 374; Statevs. Wheeler, 94 Mo., 252; 7 S. W., 103;
State vs. Sharp, 132 Mo., 165; 33 S. W., 795; Broyhill vs. Norton, 175 Mo., 190; 74 S. W., 1024;
Cole vs. Holiday, 4 Mo. App., 94) . . . The case above cited (State vs. Patterson and State vs. Wheeler)
were based on a statute making one guilt of a felony who, under promise of marriage, seduces a woman
'good repute.' But the reasoning of the cases applies to a civil case of this character. Those words, or those
of like character, are not in the Michigan statute, and yet the supreme court of that State held that previous
intercourse with other men went to disprove seduction, as that word is understood to mean in this
connection. (People vs. Clark, 33 Mich., 112.) That case is quoted and approved in the State vs. Patterson."

The Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 35., p. 1294), after defining seduction, gives "other
definitions" in a footnote, among which is the following: "The word 'seduce,' as found in the statute,
imports not only illicit sexual intercourse, but it imports also a surrender of chastity; a surrender of the
woman's personal virtue. The statute is for the protection of the chastity of unmarried women, and the
existence of the virtue at the time of the intercourse is a necessary ingredient of the offense; for, as has
been often said, the woman who has lost chastity, the prostitute, may be the victim of rape, but is not the
subject of seduction."

3
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law (1st ed., vol. 21, p. 1046) sums up the decision as to what
is meant by chaste character in reference to the crime of seduction, in the following language: "The statutes
generally require that the woman seduced must have had a previous chaste character, and that must be
alleged in the indictment. Probably this averment must be made even though the statute makes no mention
of chastity, as that, as has been stated, is regarded by the courts as an essential feature of the offense; but it
is generally held that 'character,' as used in this statutes, means actual personal virtue and not merely
reputation, . . . ."

The authorities seem unanimous that prior absolute chastity on the part of the woman is an essential
element of the crime of seduction, especially s when made a requisite by the express words of the statute.
As we have seen from the authorities cited above, the reputation of the woman is not the test; it is a matter
of physical conditions, of past conduct, of actual purity. The fact that the man may have considered her a
virgin does not see, to change the rule. His ignorance of her previous immortal and unchaste practices
cannot make her a virgin in the eye of the law.

We therefore agree with the Attorney-General that the defendant did not commit the crime of seduction.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant acquitted while the costs de officio.

Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

4
 US v Sweet, 1 Phil. 18

EN BANC

G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.

Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at
the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military authorities in the Philippine
Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner
of war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that
both these facts are true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the
prosecuting attorney, by the court below.

Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the alleged offense was
committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in the record, the
contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two propositions:
First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense
under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military
character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts him from
the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character charged in
the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an
offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that under the provisions of
the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to
state, exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by
military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense
under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the
Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that article to indicate that it does not apply to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military
Justice above cited a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon
a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he
was amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an
infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if
committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these
provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed never had any
application to the Army of the United States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for them by
counsel for the appellant.

The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee of the United
States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision in the

5
legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects
employees of the United States military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts
of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not
aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application of the general
principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of
the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and America
and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express
legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that the acts
alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military
superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but
can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.

Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of the United States
would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is
not necessary to consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one government are attempting to
exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or employees of another and distinct government, because the
court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under the
authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to have been performed.

It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the present case nor
any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the findings
of the court below that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding general of the Division of
the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which
relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part of the
military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.

The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

COOPER, J., concurring:

I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that is said in the
opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order of his superior, unless the
illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would
know when he heard it read or given that the order was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done
within the scope of his authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the offense is
against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the discipline and efficiency of the Army, or rules
and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid military officers in the proper enforcement of the
custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100
Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however, may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining
whether the act alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances above
indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts appearing.

6
 ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM.
ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO
OBEÑA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of
negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes
IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena and
won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests"4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the
Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally
held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually
from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the
appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he
may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when
the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related
equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the
accused from the Senate;

7
 (c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention
at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of
the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or
coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of
his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the
press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the
Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in
the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance
between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may
wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of
confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is
not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and
related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of
the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to
three.7The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct
respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend
all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of
the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the
Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been
in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of
the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named
military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against
those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by
way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and
he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

8
 I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY

INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS

ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND,
THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT",
A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO

BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE

BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR

SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT

OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that
former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal,

9
when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence
is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of
Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances
which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.15

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners
and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

10
 As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was
decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow
accomplish legislative results.27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence
during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not
mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review
on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is
made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation
by the Commission on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he
voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was
allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29,
2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel
to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that
petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in
fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable
offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum
is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable
where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces
a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37 Petitioner’s petition for bail
having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing
him out.

11
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he
interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite
professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when
what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to
AFP’s apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers
provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that
pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate,
after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus
Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying
the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor."42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no
"prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and]
x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also
been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur
Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the
more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause.

12
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under
Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to
others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to
compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for

five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

13
 Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for
review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J.
Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212,
dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the

United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed
against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad

Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L.
Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint
under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and
made an integral part hereof as Annex A, committed as follows:

That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside

the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accuseds (sic),
being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of
force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and
taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual
intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-
year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-
162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address
at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said
Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

14
 Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998,
the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings.

During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States
Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith
to the trial court every time his presence was required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial,
rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the

prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT.
CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND
L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps
assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime
charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against

accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at
the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph
thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under
Article 41 of the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces

Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States,
accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate
Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such
facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily
committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to

indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount

15
 of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.[2]

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail
until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the
Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly
acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States
government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and
the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December
19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the

Government of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our
two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine
Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in
Manila.

(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006__

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of
America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces
Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the
Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe
(JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of
approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the

16
 clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail
authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the
place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with
the terms of the VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided
on January 2, 2007, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to

DISMISS the petition for having become moot.[3]

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after
which the parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant

L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora,[4] brought
by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis--
vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that
the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic,
as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement

between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

17
 The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience
in regard to the United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the
basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of
independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the
territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands
later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and
facilities, which the United States retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and
the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from
the cession and retained by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except

to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate,
a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it
concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to

the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to
the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was

adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory
shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State
involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms
and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory
were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

18
 Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the
question is whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine
territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5] the VFA was duly concurred in by

the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of
the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the
United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of
internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known
practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent
agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or
further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty
days from ratification.[6]

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was
signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and
the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter

of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples
and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in
the Pacific area.

19
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought
their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual
ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the
last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and

their common determination to defend themselves against
external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under
the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective

defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the
development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in
the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered

or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any
existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the

United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may
be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in
their international relation from the threat or use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of

this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their

deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either
of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of
either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the
Pacific.

20
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either

of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under
the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of

the Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes and will come into force
when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by
them at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either

Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the
other party.

IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have

signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

21
 For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of

developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the
provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the
instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is
simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter

of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen international and
regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty

of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States

armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the

Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United

States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:[9]

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual

Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for
advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the CaseZablocki Act
within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified

22
that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty,
and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of
our Constitution.[10]

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with

by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA
is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-
US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the
Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional
provision resulting from such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as
a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of

the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with
United States military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any
investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with
which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States
Government regarding custody, which the United States Government
shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial
proceedings are not completed within one year, the United
States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The
one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also,
the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled
trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after

23
 timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the
presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of

the Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to
adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec.
5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign
power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial

basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.[11]

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to

enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent
agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units
around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the
parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle
remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the
sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.[12]

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this
Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in
which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of
procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed
upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial
immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing

immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in
relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State,
diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State
allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

24
 Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a
different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment
the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the
following provision of the VFA:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities
of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on
by appropriate Philippines and United Statesauthorities. United
States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the
right to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between
custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided
for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed
on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by
Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in
the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such
detention is not by Philippine authorities.

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with
representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities
under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25,
2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not
automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing
or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

25
 G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et
al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel
Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit

within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the following
points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces

Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose
Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect
that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be
enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and
that, while treaties may comprise international commitments,
they are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention
that it be self-executory and is ratified on these terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law,

either because it is self-executory or because there exists
legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,

1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there
proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta,
J., no part.

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined

in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the
VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying
with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-

Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of
the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60

26
days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these
present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under
the Case-Zablocki Act.

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
subject matter of theMedellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are
not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus
lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to
by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional
Record, 82ndCongress, Second Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of

international law in domestic courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL
COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in

adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert
their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required
that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that,
it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the
enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under
international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v.

[13]
Rossi, an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United
States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of
the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the
US Bases here.

27
 Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the
US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of
the US Constitution.

2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements

of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the
Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into by

the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty
(60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki
Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be
implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,

military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done
through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of
implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court

of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2,
2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10,
1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA,
and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith
negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10
of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further
orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the

related matters pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the
appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.

No costs.

28
SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

29
 Liang v People, 335 SCRA 125

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at P2,400.00 per criminal
charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The
next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in
the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu

30
proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a
right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what
capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any
[1]

rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. [2]

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this
Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts

performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that
the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution
should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be
accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and
[3]

cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public

official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel,
[4]

the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the
DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,

assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside
his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is
[5]

not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,

suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right,
[6]

31
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is
[7]

required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence
[8]

of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
[9]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/2

32
 People vs. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN

LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms,

provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the
person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an
aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was
convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an
unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search
warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms.Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct
assault.

The Case

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the

September 17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga
City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged
against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The
first Information[3] was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads
as follows:

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan
Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this
City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his
co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and

33
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where
regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]

The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms

and ammunition. We quote it below:

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one
another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the
commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following
weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7)
rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one]
(21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five
(5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5)
empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live
ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38
Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade
launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit
therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned
law.[7]

The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was
worded thus:

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted
firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES,
JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1
RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and
there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other
assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies
of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the
Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a
person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance
of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the
Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person
of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder
directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful
purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of

34
their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-
named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by
the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police
officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan
Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were
subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T.
Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]

In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of

drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the
lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6,
1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed
Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y

MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN -

1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of

Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused
to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;

2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article
III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of
said crime with costs de oficio;

3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of

the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;

4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of

the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS

35
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)

Hence, this appeal.[12]

The Facts
Prosecutions Version

In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:

At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application
for the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does
(Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a
briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the
Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search
warrant.The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as
presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera
were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as
perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).

After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police
Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at
Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22,
1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at
a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3,
1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10)
meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of
the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).

SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were
with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards
them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together
with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the
concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while
other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).

In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence
(Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and
Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel)

36
gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and
Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the
ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women
were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old
women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated
at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).

Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw
appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going
upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after
breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the
other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the
second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the
second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya
arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).

At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on
top of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial
No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the
chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the
magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty
(20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live
ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2)
in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).

After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea,
Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as
members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a
copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on
the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998,
pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded
aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different
denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38
caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single
rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4),
and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).

Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the

Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by
SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as

37
a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house
about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants
house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter
got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go
behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already
smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on
the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the
three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).

While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants
house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass
[through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant
told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran
away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran
towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a
tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).

The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed
an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997.

After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a
Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the
search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong
Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy
of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties
seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).

An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic

Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken
from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3),
giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination
(TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on
September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a
.38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38
caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm
M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a
serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).

With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police

Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each
containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1

38
to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline
stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).

The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and
Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for
license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry
[a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]

Defenses Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower
court.[15] Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:

Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave
his occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in
Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-
41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that
Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that
more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the
house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house
and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter
was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his
neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went
out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was
arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I
was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who
arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate.
He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in
Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo
Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from
[t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who
fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would]
die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own
the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at
them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15,
id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn,
pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition

39
(Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50)
aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil
case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white
crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just
produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They
were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag
containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they
just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)

Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension
house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the
extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is
Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid
when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know
prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him,
in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11,
id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling
shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in
selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them
is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).

After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he
stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at
the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette
a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by
his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station,
he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was
subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).

During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi,
and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan
Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do
not know his name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no
charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May
4, 1998).

Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan
Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is
the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small
children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they
kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were
armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things
and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried
to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the

40
room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan
Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A
Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just
before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late
in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was)
given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5,
1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost
sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry
and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from
Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).

Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock
[o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house
when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the
City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around
P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told
him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled
his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit
on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the
police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at
the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp.
25-29, May 5, 1998).

Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September
24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband
Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and the house of
Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam,
Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was
looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband
went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then
the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who
also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May
5, 1998).

Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children
playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver
was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle,
pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She
got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting
again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons
died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10,
May 5, 1998).

41
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o
clock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen
at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way,
they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen
were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate
already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach
Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the
house. When he went inside the house, he sawthe things that they (policemen)
searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the
Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the
search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a
table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed
the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-
18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went
to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of
Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).[16]

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September
24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the
lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one
specific offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. [18] The
court a quo ruled:

It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and
void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to
Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that
a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates
Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and
void.[19] (emphasis in the original)

Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized

that he had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search
warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police
officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory
report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant. [21]Additionally,
the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter
Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no
exchange of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the

42
testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants narration that he was not
in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant,
reasoning thus:

Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest
Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen
and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under
Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen
entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the
policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was
engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he
committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the
Search Warrant.[23]

As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also
deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live
ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines,
and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25] The trial court observed that these items
were in plain view of the pursuing police officers.Moreover, it added that these
same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and
therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a license to
possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his
residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the
items that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by
the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to
incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those
conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose
to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a
radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations,
saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug
den. It reasoned as follows:

43
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo
Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan
Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons
or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by
burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum
foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are
used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct
evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances,
including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation
among police officers.The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug
users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail
over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He
admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were
four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one
of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the
husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated
by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the
amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension house
was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.Denials,
if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight
over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As
between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]

In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:

x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were
about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with
direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused
and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted
murder.

The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime
of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of
Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as
amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total
weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering

44
that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20
which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were
not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the
accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for
the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing
fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20)
and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen
who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in
court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused
Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag
and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be
turned over to the National Treasury.[30]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

I

The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil
[had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search
warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the
police officer.
II

The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an
ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant
[was] located.
III

The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms
and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police. [31]

In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of
the request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and
(c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes
and penalties to be imposed on appellant.

The Courts Ruling

45
 The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular
inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would
have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the
scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the
light of the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular
that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject
premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house. [34] Viewing
the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings. [35] Moreover, the
question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized
to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to disturb
the exercise of that discretion.[37]

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution

witnesses.[38] Suffice it to state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is
generally accorded respect, even finality.[39] After carefully examining the records
and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot
exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of
these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching
police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado
Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said
you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.

xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

46
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague
Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran
[sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his
house[;] I saw two old woman.

xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground
floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our
group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the
house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence
and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and
jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.

xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?

47
 A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding
team and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to
manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo
Lacastesantos,[43] as follows:
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do
not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I
turned it over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.

xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.

48
 Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].

xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]

These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on

appellant and on the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as
the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for
gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open
court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun
powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person
[would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with
this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were]
black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.

49
 Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the
incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)

Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements [46] of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired
an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of
the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second
element was the prosecutions Certification[47]stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given
authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should be pointed out that
his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this
weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual. [49]

Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that

the main defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his
house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him
at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak,
since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove. [50] Absent any showing

50
of an improper motive on the part of the police officers, [51] coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be
given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we
conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his
statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the
trial.[53] He testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of
December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote:
that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were
directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons..
and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are
referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are
referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard
gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon
of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim,
my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya,
Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in
your neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in
[your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]

Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug
den, (2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of
firearms. We will discuss each of these.

51
Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug
den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His
guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino
Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a
drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers
testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before
the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent
credence to the prosecutions story.

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault [55] with
multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of]
firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve
a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted
homicide carries the penalty ofprision correccional.[57] Hence, for the present
complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious
crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.[58]

Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced
him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the
trial court should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of
the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its
amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal
communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA
8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of
the new law, which provides as follows:

52
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection

with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup detat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or
knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does
not cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with

53
multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited
provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession
cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the
provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is
not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple
illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same
time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should
be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide.It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering
that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it
seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder,
in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In
other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may
still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime
committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial
court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain
language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of
simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. [62] In this
case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new
law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its
amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was
committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already
been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. [64] In
other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which
justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other

54
crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866,
contained the specific proviso that no other crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this
Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms,
although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the
criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no
justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and
homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier
than that for direct assault.While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the
second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction
for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even
lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68] both of
which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily
arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts
review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct
assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is
sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2)
maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court
to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a
possible review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

55
 Gidwani v People of the Philippines

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195064 January 15, 2014

NARI K. GIDWANI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before us is a Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 and the subsequent
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32642 dated 17 September 2010 and 6
January 2011, respectively.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation GSMC), which is engaged in the
export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery services of El Grande Industrial
Corporation El Grande) and issued on various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 a total of 10 Banco
de Oro (BDO) checks as payment for the latter’s services worth an aggregate total of ₱1,626,707.62.

Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against a
closed account.

Thus, El Grande, through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10 issued checks:4

Date of letter BDO Check No. Date of Check Amount

24 September 1997 0000063646 4 September 1997 P 130,000.00

24 September 1997 0000059552 12 June 1997 412,000.00
0000063643 24 July 1997 138,859.69

0000063644 7 August 1997 138,859.69

0000063650 7 August 1997 144,457.56
0000063645 28 August 1997 138,859.68

8 October 0000063647 25 September 1997 130,000.00

0000063648 2 October 1997 130,000.00

On 15 October 1997,5 petitioner wrote to El Grande’s counsel acknowledging receipt of the 8 October
demand letter6 and informing the latter that, on 29 August 1997, GSMC had filed a Petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was a Petition for the Declaration of a State of Suspension
of Payments, for the Approval of a Rehabilitation Plan and Appointment of a Management
Committee.7 Acting on the Petition, the SEC issued an Order8 on 3 September 1997 ordering the
suspension of all actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order from the SEC Hearing

56
Panel. Petitioner attached this SEC Order to the 15 October 1997 letter. In short, GSMC did not pay El
Grande.

Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMC’s letter and explanation, El Grande still presented to the
drawee bank for payment BDO Check Nos. 0000063652 and 0000063653 dated November and December
1997, respectively.

Thereafter, sometime in November 1997, El Grande filed a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging petitioner with eight counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22) for the checks covering June to October 1997. El Grande likewise filed a similar Complaint in
December 1997, covering the checks issued in November and December 1997. Corresponding
Informations for the Complaints were subsequently filed on 1 October 2001.

For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses: (1) the SEC Order of Suspension of Payment legally
prevented him from honoring the checks; (2) there was no consideration for the issuance of the checks,
because the embroidery services of El Grande were of poor quality and, hence, were rejected; and (3) he
did not receive a notice of dishonor of the checks.

On 24 March 2008, after trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of violation of B.P. 22. It ordered him to pay the
face value of the checks amounting to P1,626,707.60 with interest at the legal rate per annum from the
filing of the case and to pay a fine of P200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.9 The
MTC held that the Petition for voluntary insolvency or a SEC Order for the suspension of payment of all
claims are not defenses under the law regarding violations of B.P. 22, since an order suspending payments
involves only the obligations of the corporation and does not affect criminal proceedings.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the findings of the MTC and likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.10

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42.

In its Decision dated 17 September 2010, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish that
petitioner had received only the 8 October 1997 Notice of Dishonor and not the others. The CA further
held that the prosecution failed to establish that the account was closed prior to or at the time the checks
were issued, thus proving knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.

Thus, the CA partly granted the appeal and acquitted petitioner of eight counts of violation of B.P. 22,
while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and ordering him to pay the total civil liability
due to El Grande. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 29, 2009 and its Order dated June 5, 2009 are AFFIRMED with modifications: (a)
sustaining accused-appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889; (b) acquitting him in
Criminal Case Nos. 371112-13, 301883-87 and 301890; and (c) ordering him to pay private complainant,
El Grande Industrial Corporation, the aggregate amount of P1,626,707.62 representing the value of the ten
(10) BDO checks with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from the date of the filing of the Information
until finality of this Decision, and thereafter, the total amount due, inclusive of interest, shall be subject to
12% annual interest until fully paid.

The rest of the Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.11

57
Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 11 October 2010,12 raising the following as his
defenses: (1) there was no clear evidence showing that he acknowledged the Notice of Dishonor of the two
remaining checks; (2) the suspension Order of the SEC was a valid reason for stopping the payment of the
checks; and, (3) as a corporate officer, he could only be held civilly liable.

On 6 January 2011, the CA denied the motion through its assailed Resolution.13

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises these two issues in the present Petition:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IS NOT A VALID REASON TO STOP PAYMENT OF A CHECK EVEN IF
SUCH ORDER WAS ISSUED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS
FOR PAYMENT;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING A CORPORATE OFFICER

PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL OBLIGATION OF THE CORPORATION. 14

We find the appeal to be meritorious.

The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:15

1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;

2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and

3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v. Co,16 in which we
said:

The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to prevent a creditor from obtaining
an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as
the interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough breathing space for the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again, without having to
divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora. The suspension would enable the management
committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or
extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow
such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation
receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation
instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.

Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to
prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, this
Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the

58
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.

Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined
within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime
could result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) The CA furthermore cited Tiong in this wise:17

Hence, accused-appellant cannot be deemed excused from honoring his duly issued checks by the mere
filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the SEC. Otherwise, an absurdity will result such
that " one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition
for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer." (Emphasis supplied.)

However, what the CA failed to consider was that the facts of Tiong were not on all fours with those of the
present case and must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, the presentment for payment and the dishonor
of the checks took place before the Petition for Suspension of Payments for Rehabilitation Purposes was
filed with the SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount covered by the checks. The criminal
action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet this obligation. The criminal proceedings
were already underway when the SEC issued an Omnibus Order creating a Management Committee and
consequently suspending all actions for claims against the debtor therein. Thus, in Tiong, this Court took
pains to differentiate the criminal action, the civil liability and the administrative proceedings involved.

In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters to
petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims. It was
incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the accounts were
closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances might have dictated his
liability for those checks.

Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a
contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
condition occurs – or a situation arises – warranting the termination of the suspension of the contract.18

In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event that
constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.19 Thus, at the time private respondent presented the
September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no
obligation due from petitioner.

Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application of
the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a way that
the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested by law with the
jurisdiction to issue the order.

Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations, petitioner may not be held liable for
the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks at the time this case arose. However, it
must be emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El Grande to pursue its claim
through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC proceedings regarding the application for corporate
rehabilitation.

59
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 7
September 2010 and the Resolution dated 6 January 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889 are DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the right of El Grande Industrial Corporation to file the proper civil action against
G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation for the value of the ten (10) checks.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

60
 Nuguid vs. Nicdao

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006

EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,

vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 23054:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated
May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated
January 11, 1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO

COSTS.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent
Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,3 this petition involves the following
facts:

xxx xxx xxx

Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August
thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and
asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by
them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former
her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the
total amount reached P1,150,000.00.

As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated
Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:

Check No. Amount

7277 P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7348 150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12118 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8812 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12102 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7255 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

61
 2286 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8128 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7254 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7278 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4540 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4523 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12103 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7294 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
P1,150,000.00

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-
mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977,
[petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling
P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
[respondent].4(Citation omitted)

After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for violation of
BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued against respondent.
On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.

In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to
pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation of BP
22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the lower
courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were overlooked by the trial
court. These circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different conclusion on the case.6

Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the
sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate
amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.

From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because
of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime
unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability
arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no
private person injured by the crime7). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of
everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.8

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.9

On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:

62
 [t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The
act is

malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued
is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the
checks are also irrelevant.10

On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.11 A person
acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof
required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil
liability (mere preponderance of evidence12). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's
acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense.13 If the acquittal is based merely on
reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit
the act complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.15

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the
accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.16

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her
supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the
appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had
already been completely relieved of civil liability:

[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the
stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous
obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to
substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same
amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-
serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous transactions
involving the subject amount.

Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis
but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that
[petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a daily basis. xxx In
any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
[petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees,
Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence
as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in
the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further
payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount.

From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more
than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were
never rebutted by [petitioner].

Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required
under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].

63
 xxx xxx xxx

By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a
pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full
payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary
evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.17 (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

64
 Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong vs. People

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by

MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from
the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before
the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband
and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband)
dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity?
Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate
of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa
against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit
1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn,
depose and state that:

1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y

Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated
June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.

2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate
Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as
property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.

65
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my
sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.

4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through
fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a
Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty
(20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land
in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of
the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because
William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that
time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to
November, 1992.

5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy,
my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez
who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.

6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that
they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in
fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the
property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of
(a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B.
Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series
of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of
absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from
the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00
for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT
No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the
proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].

9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise
turned over to William Sato.

10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato
has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she
was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her
father’s orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account
for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the
latter died on June 8, 1994.

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 13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds
of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and failed, and
continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my
sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3

Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the
deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-
affidavit of Mediatrix.

In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.4 On
appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315,
paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA
GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and
thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing
fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or
otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:

1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3147;

2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;

3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;

4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-
016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said
special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the
three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00,
[TCT] No. 3149 forP250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in
possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated
and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.

Contrary to law.7

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Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of
damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount
received by Sato.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was
an exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case:

The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of
affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of
the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-
Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-
law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only
civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony
and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by
a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no
criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG
12th Supp. 63;Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED
and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007,
dismissed it. It ruled:

[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by
affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the
application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
private respondent Sato.

We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law
and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida

68
dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the
protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the
criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the
Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her
aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William
Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.

There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from
criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under
Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in
1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the
exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts
would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is
most favorable to Sato.14

The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party.
Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida
Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner
because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her
mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the
mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.

Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida
extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship
between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.

For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability
provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that
Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal
case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation
sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a family member committing theft,
estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.

The petition has merit.

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The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In
particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by
affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.

Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious
mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by
virtue of his relationship to the offended party.

In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the
exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability
is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who
commits theft against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with
him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23

Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by
marriage or

a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection
with the institution of marriage and family relations.

If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is
why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the
matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino
author observed:

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are
some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the
marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial
authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases
with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec.
288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses
where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a
spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one
spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the
living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.28

70
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by
affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of
the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to
be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.30

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of
laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in
Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the
said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is
couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of
one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.

Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to
strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy
that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332
is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless
and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another
that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the
accused.

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since
the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation
that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity
created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of
either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20
also of the same Code.)

71
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility
of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its
right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.39

The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What controls is
not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the
exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the
prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on
the court.44

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa
but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the
Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:

(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to
sign and thumbmark the same;

(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was
in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;

(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA
in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;

(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds
to Manolita nor accounted for the same and

(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of Manolita.

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita
(who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her.
Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression
of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the
affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document
which she could not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her taxes.
In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the
representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature
and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a document to
settle her taxes.

72
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter
Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise
disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the
SPA.

Moreover, the allegations in the Information that

(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents,
[Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and

(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the
presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited
therefrom, was the author thereof.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now
state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000,
Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s
properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by
making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.

Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato
resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of
sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.

Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from
criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is
required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused
resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.

However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and
of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally
liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for

73
the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332.
In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the
component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges
of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally
liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in
the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved
is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action provided
under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is
limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes
beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the
offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to
violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332.

In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there
may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and
result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the
concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one,
subject to a single criminal liability.

As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which
violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a
violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in
itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are
considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex
crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same
criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is
only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls
under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal
intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter
category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or
concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on
which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently
termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

—∞——∞——∞—

74
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime
in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of
the offender is only one.54

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the
elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be
determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex
crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the
liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime
and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the
distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the
felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.

Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under
Article 315 (3[a])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document
be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be
considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.

The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of
public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and
carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to
sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification
of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a
public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to
the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial

75
document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not
by the falsification of the document.621avvphi1

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of
public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the
same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the
SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was
yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the
subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to
facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a
deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would
have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto.
Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand,
absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining
to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the
crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution
dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

76
 People vs. Tempongko, Jr

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69668 October 2, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HUMBERTO TEMPONGKO, JR., defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Adriano Pagarigan for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:p

The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. He claims it was not he who
erred but the trial court. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the evidence,
resulting in the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. He prays for a reversal.

At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the complainant, Lolita Dacoycoy, was an 18-year
old senior student at the Manuel L. Quezon High School and undergoing citizen army training (CAT)
under the command of the appellant. 1 The appellant was 43 years old, married, with five children, and
commandant of the said course, besides being the owner of a tailoring shop. 2

These are the facts as the trial court saw them.

On November 9, 1981, the complainant and her friend, Rosalita Quinto, went to the appellant's tailoring
shop in accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. This was about 7 o'clock in the
evening. Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual. Upon arrival one hour
later, the appellant offered them beer, which they drank. Lolita became dizzy and the appellant suggested
that the two girls stay for the night. The appellant then left, at about 11:30 o'clock. Lolita slept on the sofa
while Rosalita slept on the floor about two arms length from her. It was at dawn when Lolita felt the
weight of a person on her whom she immediately recognized as the appellant. She pleaded, "Huwag mong
gawin sa akin iyan, sir." The appellant kissed her and bit her lower lip. Lolita boxed him in the back and he
boxed her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. She did not scream or call for help because it all
happened so fast. When she woke up, the deed was done and she was bleeding. The appellant was seated
on the sofa totally naked. She moaned presumably in anguish and pain, and Rosalita woke up. Rosalita
embraced and consoled Lolita. She turned on the light and upbraided the appellant who at that time was
already putting on his trousers. The appellant soon left without saying a word, looking very nervous. As
Lolita's jogging pants were bleed, Rosalita left to get her some clothes. Lolita stayed until past noon and
when Rosalita did not return decided to leave the office. She proceeded to the house of another friend, a
certain Cecile, where she stayed for five days until she was fetched by her stepfather, Delfin Dalisay. This
was Lolita Dacoycoy's testimony. 3

Continuing the story, Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10, Rosalita and her mother informed him
of Lolita's rape. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita's misfortune, and Rosalita and her mother left in a huff. Five
days later, Cecile's sister informed them at their market stall that Lolita was in their house. He fetched
Lolita from there and later, upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been referred by a friend,
he and her mother took Lolita to the National Bureau of Investigation, where she underwent a medical

77
examination. 4 Part of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy, Lolita's mother, who also
testified on the civil damages suffered by the complainant. 5

According to the medical report as explained by Dr. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in layman's terms, the
complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape. This witness also testified that the
claimed blow inflicted on the complainant's stomach would not necessarily leave any external sign or
mark. 6

Testifying for himself, the appellant denied the charge, saying he was at home with his family when the
rape was supposedly committed. He did not deny that he offered the two girls beer and allowed them to
sleep in his office in the night of November 9, 1981. He declared, however, that having left his office at
about 11:30 p.m. of that date, he returned thereto at about 9 o'clock in the morning of the following day
and not earlier. In fact, he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time. 7

The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but it seems they did him more harm
than good. We shall go to that later.

The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the supposed intercourse, but
it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9, 1981, was hardly maidenly or at least discreet.
First, she went to the office of a man she did not know very well at 7 o'clock on a Sunday evening. Then
she accepted beer instead of a soft drink, which would have been the proper refreshment for her and her
companion, considering their age and sex. Not only that, instead of taking a few sips just to be polite, what
she did was drink about three-fourths of the glass, as a result of which she felt dizzy. Then, instead of
going home with her companion, she decided to stay and sleep in the strange office of this person who, to
repeat, was by her own narration not close to her.

There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken her home that night.
In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of being dizzy. 8 The appellant's office on
C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant's house on Vicente G. Cruz, which could have been reached
by one jeep ride. Alternatively, she had a telephone at her house and could have called one of her relatives
to fetch her if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves. 9 It is incredible that she did not even
trouble to tell her parents of her whereabouts. One might expect such thoughtless conduct of an
experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl the complainant was supposed
to be.

The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. By her own account, she was raped
on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and in the same
room. 10The implication is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but also of
discovery by Rosalita. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant although she
had just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having been boxed in the stomach, she
had already been ravished. Strangely, the appellant was then still seated on the sofa and apparently taking
his time about dressing.11 She also said she was desperate for clothing because her jogging pants were
bloody. 12 Yet it did not occur to her to get other attire, which must have been available in abundance in
the place where she was then, which was a tailoring shop. In fact, the shop was a contractor for the
supplying of, precisely, CAT uniforms. 13

Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal reaction of a young woman subjected
to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay with a friend, the mysterious Cecile. 14 She stayed there
for five days and did not communicate with her mother even once. Neither did her friend Cecile. In fact, it
was only on the fifth day that Cecile's sister saw fit to tell the complainant's family where Lolita was
notwithstanding Lolita's alleged condition at the time. If, according to Delfin Dalisay, the complainant was
"tulala" when he saw her, it would have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform Lolita's family of her
state of shock as soon as possible.

78
One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant's companion on the night of the alleged rape, and
who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed she was ravished, was not presented as
a witness by the prosecution It is not often that the prosecution has the good fortune of an actual
eyewitness in cases like this, and yet neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to
corroborate the testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented only the parents of Lolita who testified on what
happened after, and not before and during, the alleged rape.

For its part, the defense was none-too-convincing either and, in the view of the trial court, fatally flawed.
The appellant relied on alibi, an inherently feeble excuse that cannot prevail as against the positive
Identification of the accused. Moreover, the appellant was living in Sisa, in Sampaloc, only two kilometers
or so from his office, 15where the rape was allegedly committed. It could have been reached from his
house in a matter of minutes, as the trial court observed, considering the light traffic at 5 o'clock in the
morning or thereabouts.

The appellant's first witness, Remy Oriola, testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in the appellant's office in
the morning of November 8, 1981, and that the appellant returned thereto the following morning of
November 9, 1981. 16 By contrast, the appellant's testimony was that the two girls slept in his office on
November 9, 1981, and that he returned thereto the following morning of November 10, 1981. 17 And
whereas the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a paper bag containing
clothes, 18 the witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag. 19

The testimony of the other defense witness, Rolando Hermilo, was not only practically useless but in fact
prejudicial to the appellant. In the first place, he testified only up to the time he left the appellant's office at
about 11 o'clock in the night of November 9, 1981, and not on what happened later to the girls who were
left behind. 20But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission that he learned of the charge
against the appellant, and was asked to testify for him, only on the date itself of the hearing, in the very
morning when he was presented as witness, 21 and this was more than two years after the alleged rape. On
top of this, he was by his own admission reading the transcript of the appellant's testimony before he was
actually called to the witness stand. 22

The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not; that he would not have
attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in the very room where the crime was
supposedly committed; and that there were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the complainant's
stomach.

On the other hand, he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft drinks would have
been more appropriate, and also why he allowed them to sleep in his office when they were just trainees
under his command and had no special ties with him. His claim was that they had left home because Lolita
had been scolded by her mother was belied by his own testimony that he heard Lolita calling her mother on
the telephone to say she was sleeping with a friend. 23

It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties and virtually limited
itself to the defense of alibi, which it declared to be untenable. There should have been a more careful
analysis of the other evidence to get to the truth of this unfortunate mess where there is more than meets
the eye. This is not a pat case, so to speak. There are many unanswered questions. The conduct of both the
complainant and the defendant, as narrated by the requires not a little explaining. The trial judge should
have probed deeper instead of simply relying on the question of alibi, which is only part of the intriguing
mosaic.

The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it
fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces
the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner
of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,

79
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the
accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the evening of November
9, 1981; that he there offered them beer, which they drank; and that he permitted them to sleep there that
night.

The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as
commandant of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate
refreshment for the young ladies, especially since such beverages were easily available. And if it is true, as
he says, that the complainant asked to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by her mother, the
appellant, exercising as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant, should have counseled
her to go home. Failing that, he should have at least caged up the complainant's mother to tell her that
Lolita was in his office.

But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions and not crimes. Serving
beer instead of soft drinks and snowing the use of one's office for sleeping purposes are not indictable
offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also not prohibited under our criminal laws. More
importantly, all these indiscretion do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant raped the
complainant in the morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The connection is too far-fetched.

The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was deflowered on or
about the time of the alleged rape, but that is all. The rest of its case is based on the improbable testimony
of the complainant, whose conduct, even before the alleged rape, was hardly befitting a proper young lady,
to say the least.

The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if we go by the recorded testimony. After
being informed of Lolita's rape, they did not immediately look for her; and when they did, their efforts
were hardly energetic. The mother testified that they later searched for her but did not elaborate beyond
saying that they asked her friends. They did not inquire from her classmates in MLQ They did not talk to
the alleged rapist, whom Rosalita had Identified. In fact, when she and her mother informed Delfin Dalisay
that Lolita had been raped, he did not ask where she was — a most natural and logical question to ask at
that time. All he did, by his own account, was blame Rosalita for the incident.

It was only five days later that they teamed of her whereabouts, and this because Cecile's sister came to see
them and informed them. As for Cecile, in whose house the complainant supposedly stayed for five days,
she was not even presented as witness to corroborate Lolita's testimony. It is significant that although she
and Rosalita Quinto played key roles as it were in this case, they were strangely silent and absent at the
trial.

The trouble with the appellant, according to the trial court, is that he could not prove his defense of alibi.
But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with his family. At five o'clock in the
morning, where else could he have been? How could he have produced third parties as witnesses to testify
that he was fast asleep in his own house? His presence in his own bedroom at that time was not incredible
or even improbable but perfectly believable.

What does strain the imagination is the complainant's own implausible story: of a virgin who visited a
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening; accepted and drank beer
with him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened by the weight of a person on top of her whom she
immediately recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the dark; suffered a
blow in her stomach and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped by the appellant who was
still seated on the sofa totally naked; could not leave because her jogging pants were bloodied
notwithstanding that she was in a tailoring shop where clothes were available in abundance; finally went to
a friend's house instead of straight to her mother from whom she normally would have sought solace. Most
significantly, the alleged rape was committed within two arms length of her companion, Rosalita Quinto,

80
who was sleeping with her in the same room, and could have awakened any time and in fact did so,
according to Lolita, when she moaned after her ravishment.

The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this
Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this
appellant The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and
the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. The
appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point
of moral certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution
cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of
doubt that he is guilty.

WHEREFORE, the decision' of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

81
 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections
EN BANC

SPOUSES CARLOS S. G. R. No. 167011

ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.
ROMUALDEZ, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
- versus - TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DENNIS GARAY, December 11, 2008
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Spouses

Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May 2008 from the Decision
of this Court dated 30 April 2008, affirming the Resolutions, dated 11 June
2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.

82
We find that petitioner has not raised substantially new grounds to justify the
reconsideration sought. Instead, petitioner presents averments that are mere
rehashes of arguments already considered by the Court. There is, thus, no
cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration of this Courts Decision.
Similarly, we reject the contentions put forth by esteemed colleagues Mr.
Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissent, dated 2 September 2008, which are also
mere reiterations of his earlier dissent against the majority opinion. Mr. Justice
Tingas incessant assertions proceed from the wrong premise. To be clear, this
Court did not intimate that penal statutes are beyond scrutiny. In our Decision,
dated 30 April 2008, this Court emphasized the critical limitations by which a
criminal statute may be challenged. We drew a lucid boundary between an on-
its-face invalidation and an as applied challenge. Unfortunately, this is a
distinction which Mr. Justice Tinga has refused to understand. Let it be
underscored that on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes, as is sought to be
done by petitioners in this case, may not be allowed. Thus, we said:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate. We have so enunciated in no uncertain
terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-
for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction.
In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was
vague.Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a
statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not
because of vagueness.

83
 Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a
mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the
courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be
made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. InYounger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and

requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of

statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated
must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant
has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)[1]

Neither does the listing by Mr. Justice Tinga of what he condemns as

offenses under Republic Act No. 8189 convince this Court to overturn its
ruling. What is crucial in this case is the rule set in our case books and
precedents that a facial challenge is not the proper avenue to challenge the
statute under consideration. In our Decision of 30 April 2008, we enunciated
that the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported
ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed
as a facial challenge.[2] On this matter, we held:

An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be

limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic
Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded
examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case
would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised,
there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[3]

In conclusion, I reiterate that the doctrine embodied

in Romualdez and Estrada remains good law. The rule established in our

84
jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who
are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial
challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to
deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied
to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the
law is clear as applied to him.

As structured, Section 45 enumerates acts deemed election offenses under

Republic Act No. 8189. The evident intent of the legislature in including in the
catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of
proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this
score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law
articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list
of voters.

In People v. Gatchalian, the Court had the occasion to rule on the validity
of the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, which in like manner speaks of a
willful violation of any of the provisions of this Act. This Court upheld the
assailed law, and in no uncertain terms declared that the provision is all-
embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in the Act which
embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.

Finally, as the records would show, petitioners managed to set up an

intelligent defense against the informations filed below. By clearly enunciating
their defenses against the accusations hurled at them, and denying their
commission thereof, petitioners allegation of vagueness must necessarily be
rejected. Petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. The constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.

85
 The phraseology in Section 45(j) has been employed by Congress in a
number of laws which have not been declared unconstitutional:

1) The Cooperative Code

Section 124(4) of Republic Act No. 6938 reads:

Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no
penalty is imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the discretion
of the Court.

2) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371 reads in part:

Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions
of this Act, such as, but not limited to

3) The Retail Trade Liberalization Act

Section 12, Republic Act No. 8762, reads:

Any person who would be found guilty of violation of any
provisions of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than eight (8)
years, and a fine of at least One Million (P1,000,000.00) but not
more than Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00).

For reasons so stated, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

86
 Corpus v. People

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him
on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner
shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.
When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the
value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo
Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of
said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid
jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

87
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a
blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against
him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of
Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private
complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of
San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison
term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition
stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND

APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315
(1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

88
 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES
OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION

AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE

INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD

AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-
arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense
and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a
receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected
to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by
private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in
his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said
receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5

89
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed
against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were
supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to
by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that
a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does
not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within
which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred
against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation
or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made
by the offended party on the offender.8

90
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was
able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5
July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

91
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it
may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made
upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need
not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust,
is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof,
such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all
the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same
within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within
or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the
quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario
L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the

92
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would
be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make
that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the
situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court
as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence
but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time,
of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the
duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there
can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that
the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the
Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the
above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties
fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular
statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may
fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly

93
appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current
inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any
moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the
legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable
acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is
apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder,
from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-
Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions
state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value
of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

94
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty
proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the
minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its
medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover,
under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from
the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under
the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft
and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts,
which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty
imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the
damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:

1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision

mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision

correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24

3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).

4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium
to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and
1 day to 6 months).

6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties
are not changed, as follows:

1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by

prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26

95
 3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has
four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions
asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite;
the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier
penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the
same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the
IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law
was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in
Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should
be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that
the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to
legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to
go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional
because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

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Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00)
Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

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... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00)
Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

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Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has
expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to
the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to
decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of
the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took
into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check.
Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a
$5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense
is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the
fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones
and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a
higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter
of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the
crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public
official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

99
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful
acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing
law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the
act of embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a
special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the
penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should
not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of
the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is
dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the
thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may
likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this
kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if
the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main
justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a
penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the
unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And,
if the value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which
simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of
Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense
is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also
amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the
same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the
damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum),
Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article
318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215
(Prohibited Transactions),

100
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable
officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest
products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under
the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the
Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value
of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of
Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned
because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative
because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and
other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its
effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless,
this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by
merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not
within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings
on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend
or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the
times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the
oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now
pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed
change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon
the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

101
 (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies,
in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim
could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil
indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the
suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can
be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages
under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative
of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental
penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00.
As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will
no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice
would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from
the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal
basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the
Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still,
from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel
punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition
and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative
of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those

102
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern
time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary
values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values
could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its
socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive
at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-
equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies
and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take
into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

103
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those
economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One
Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a
power that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

104
Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of
the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to
prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty
three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of
a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons,
which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the
proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively
discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs
to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a
kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties
because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors.
Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted
in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The
RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its
medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
one (1) year for each additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article
65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the
latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

105
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed
to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved
is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that
a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess
of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the
prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The
Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it
may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court
dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

106
 People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw

EN BANC

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain
Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so
as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession.
In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and
children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There
the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship
and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two
women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the
thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and
to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this
court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani

107
generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not
at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical

injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and
in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain
is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according
to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a
transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a
corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace
in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114
U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of
President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

108
 Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such
as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until
they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to
be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1.
See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of
the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law,
and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory
provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that
the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima
Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art.
I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided
that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec.
290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members
of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of
nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of
articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which
would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with
a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154,
to be still in force in the Philippines.

109
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There
are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for
us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as
amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into
consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital
punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant
and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall
be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the
offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

110
 U.S. v. Bull

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where
under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to
hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then
and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a
foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master
of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila,
aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head
of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H.
N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit
and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there
cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and
permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied
or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of
some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying
such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to
the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and

111
 fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked
to the time of their final debarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon
which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to
load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or
chains attached to the thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails
to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a
penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States
money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First
Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a
port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and
licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S.vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the
offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed
upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public
law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in
the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction
over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the
neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses
or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she
came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana
ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her
crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political
agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters
the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her
voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense,
assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element
necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden

112
act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the offense and the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the
jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of
the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to
strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it
is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of
all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was
not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796
Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a
foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op.
U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to
the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7
Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels
enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the
Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels
of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded
on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan,
Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise
but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification
in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation
which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not
require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined
theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and
practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs.
The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.),
secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse,
Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British
Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have
sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —

It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so
soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on
all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it
is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence
or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U.
S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.)
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

113
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting
the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they
visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which
concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the
nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities,
unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
(Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between the members
of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p.
318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many
events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the
crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not
by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel
in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States
district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings
dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of
similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16,
1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a
breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was
prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship
while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the
local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were
made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of
State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:

I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the
views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause
of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from
personal violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges
or abitratorsin such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where
such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it
must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in
the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local
order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction
of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the
offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

114
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that
any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the
appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands
deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of
the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a
constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that,
with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wongvs. City of Astoria (13
Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance,
that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To
'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I think that it
would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94
Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the
assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the
hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that
what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state
the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such
form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce
judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia,
4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully,
and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were
cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and
cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."

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The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with
failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios
adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the
context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact
that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide
"suitable means for the protection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems
to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute
penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports
of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the
legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section
3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional
principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus
presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the
nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional
doctrines are established.

The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the
power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to
the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its
government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory
by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create
a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U.
S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It
has been customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with
which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of
the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation
enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic
act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and
itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of the
history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be
seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the
liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182
U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or
place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Limavs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S.,
516.)

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This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of
the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States."
When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the
war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with
the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898,
and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then
devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt
assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of
December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the
city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish
sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the
Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the
treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214
U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief.
Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its
legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power.
The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or
civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the exercise of the
legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determination of
right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined.

President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a
commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority
to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the
Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, until such time as complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise provided.
The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the
appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to
secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and
establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the
military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for
the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in
the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;

117
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no
person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for
a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the
Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such
person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall
direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said
Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the
authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official.
The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until
by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in
connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had
erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in
organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative
power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the
Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and
Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was
expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and
after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8,
1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincolnvs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until
otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided."
In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of
"By the authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature
consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of
the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not
incorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution
of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress,
both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before
Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the
formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it

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exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment
of a constitution in the United States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism
with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State
governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls
legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over
legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is
a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and
Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven
best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
priviliges.

In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the
limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under
the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted.
The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of
legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions
it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other
constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the
protection of rights under a free and orderly government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the
courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises
such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while
the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former operates
under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the
Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a
State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its
enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly
disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation,
or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated
upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative
authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation
was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress
from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative
power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress
the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by
the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power
and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend
the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or

119
by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United
States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the
Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its
power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such
territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in
this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon
goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is
left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such
legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission
and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with
foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act
was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called
legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
(Crossvs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between
foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275,
is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to
the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of
Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial
court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and
into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid,
brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of
Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then
and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also
that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the
deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of
said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the
city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in
the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and cross-

120
 cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching
and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the
animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf
of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss
whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that
according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not
maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied
or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship
if transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

121
122
 U.S. v. Look Chow

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5889 July 12, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW ( alias LUK

CHIU), Defendant-Appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J. : chanrobles virtual law library

This case is a separate part of Case No. 5887 and bears No. 5889 on the general
docket of this court, and No. 377 on the docket of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The complaint in this case states:

That, on or about the 18th of August, 1909, within the boundaries of the
municipality of Cebu of this province and judicial district, the said Look Chaw
( alias Luk Chiu) did, without having obtained authorization from the Collector of
Internal Revenue and without being authorized in any manner and traffic in the
same.

C.J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, testified that Vicente Base took to the
governor of Cebu a can of opium containing 200 grammes of the said drug, in
order to show him that the accused had sold opium to Base, and the governor
called the witness in order that he might take part in this case. After the accused
was arrested, he confessed before the witness and the provincial fiscal that he had
sold to Vicente Base thirty cans of opium on the 15th of August, 1909, but that he
had received the price thereof, and that the money which was found in a box of his
on board the British steamship Erroll, P1,500 in amount, was obtained in Manila
and was seized by the captain of the vessel. According to the accused, he had
purchased in Hongkong 137 cans of opium for the purpose of introducing it as
contraband into Mexico, the destination of the vessel, but that as the latter changed
its route touching first at Manila, the opium arrived at Cebu. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Vicente Base testified that he had negotiated with the accused with respect to the
sale of the three sacks of opium which were seized while in the latter's possession
an were the subject matter of the previous cause; that these three sacks were not
taken ashore, because the accused would not permit this to be done without

123
previous delivery of the whole price of P1,000, of which witness had only paid
P533; that he therefore only took one can from one of the said sacks. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced the accused to one year's
imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P2,000, with additional subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the trial. It was ordered in the judgment
that the exhibits connected with the case should be confiscated, and that, in case of
an appeal, and even after the sentence had been served, the defendant should not be
released from custody, but delivered to the customs authorities for the purpose of
the enforcement of the existing immigration laws. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant appealed and has alleged before this court that he can not punished
in accordance with section 15 of Act No. 1761, under which the complaint was
drawn. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This said section 15 reads thus:

( a) No person shall import, cook, or prepare opium, or engage in the business of

purchasing or selling opium or of dealing or trafficking therein, unless he shall first
have secured from the Collector of Internal Revenue a license to transact such
business and shall have paid the license tax prescribed by this Act. . . .

To make an isolated sale, says the appellant, is not to engage in the business of
selling. To negotiate the sale of opium does not mean clandestinely to sell opium
once.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In our opinion, the act defined in section 15 is distinct from that penalized in
section 5; the act referred to in the latter is any act of sale, while that concerned in
the former relates to the business of selling, in an habitual, professional manner, as
one of an undertaking or occupation, without license.

SEC. 5. ( a) It shall be unlawful to sell, transfer, give, or deliver opium to any

person except to a duly licensed and practicing physician, pharmacist, or second-
class pharmacist, or a duly licensed dispensator of opium, or duly registered
confirmed user of opium in a licensed opium dispensary for consumption therein
only, and in accordance with the provisions of this Act: . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( b) Any person violating the provisions of the preceding subsection shall be

punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court: . . .

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The crime concerned in this case, according to this section 5, is compromised
within the language of the complaint which charges the act of selling opium
without the authorization of the Collector of Internal Revenue. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other ground of the appeal is that the confession of the accused were taken into
account for the purpose of his conviction. The trial court pronounced its sentence
after considering that "sufficient proof has been furnished by the evidence,' and the
evidence did not consist solely in the confession that the accused, on the day and at
the place mentioned in the complaint, contracted with Vicente Base for the sale of
the opium, the subject matter of the present prosecution; and as this finding does
not appear to be erroneous nor contrary to the conclusions reached from the
evidence, it is accepted by this court in order that thereby the judgment appealed
from may be dully affirmed, as we do affirm the same. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This disposes of the appeal; but, in the opinion of this court, the defense of double
jeopardy alleged by the accused in first instance, with exception to the order
disallowing it, can not but be taken into consideration, although in this instance, on
appeal, that defense was not reproduced with the allegation that its disallowance
was an error committed by the lower court in its judgment. This point appears to
involve a question of jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Before separating the two causes, as related at the beginning of this decision, there
was but one single complaint and there would have been only one trial for the
possession of opium and for the sale of opium. But the defendant's counsel set up a
demurrer, arguing that the complaint was defective inasmuch as it charged two
distinct crimes, for according to the defense, it was alleged to be one crime to
possess opium and another different crime to sell opium; and the court deferred to
this pretension and ordered the filing of two complaints, one for the possession of
opium and another for the sale of opium; that for the possession of opium was the
one first tried by the lower court.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In answering the second complaint for the sale of opium, the defendant alleged that
he had already been in jeopardy.

The defendant was convicted yesterday," said his attorney, "for the violation of law
committed, of possessing opium, and has already been sentenced by this court to
five year's imprisonment and in addition to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos.
According to the principles of penal law, when a crime has been committed which
is necessary in order to commit another, the delinquent, of course, can not be
punished for the two crimes, but must suffer for the crime for which the greater
penalty was provided.

The court rejected this allegation: first, because the prosecution of two crimes
instead of one was brought about by the defense itself; and second, because, in the

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opinion of the trial judge, if the defendant had first been convicted for selling
opium, he certainly would have been in jeopardy in the cause prosecuted for
possessing opium, for the reason that really one can not sell opium without
possessing it, while, if the terms are inverted, the same result does not follow,
because one may posses opium without selling it, and consequently in the present
cause the allegation of double jeopardy is an admissible. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by section 31
of the Act, and another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 of the same Act
before cited.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when
one of them is a necessary means for the commission of the other, only the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed, in its maximum degree,
and thus, he who smokes opium in a pipe, by one single act lays himself liable to
three penalties of the law, one of them, merely for the fact of possessing opium,
another, for the mere possession of a pipe in which opium is smoked, and the
other, for the act of smoking opium; but the penalties corresponding to these three
crimes ought not to be imposed upon the defendant in this case, and only the
penalty for the most serious of these crimes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But the illegal possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of 30 cans of
opium, which are two acts confessed by the accused, are not one act which
constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a necessary means for the commission
of another. They are two isolated acts, punishable, each of them, in themselves.
Only in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its
totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being
delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agree upon, could it be said,
in the opinion of this court, that the possession of the opium was a necessary
means to effect the delivery by reason of the sale, and that the sale agreed upon
was the sole reason for the possession of the opium seized. The possession of the
quantity contained in the pipe can not be considered as a different crime from that
of smoking opium in a pipe, nor the possession of the pipe, as a crime different
from that of smoking opium in a pipe. But if the person surprised in smoking
opium in a pipe was also surprised in the possession of the thirty cans sold by the
accused, it could not properly be inferred that the possession of these thirty cans,
which in itself is a crime, was a necessary means for the commission of the other
crime of smoking opium in a pipe, and that the person in whose possession the
thirty cans were seized, possessed the same solely and exclusively for the purpose
of smoking opium in a pipe. It might very well have been that he had acquired the
drug for the purpose of inhaling, injecting, chewing, swallowing, or other uses, and
that only by chance did it occur to him to try to smoke it in a pipe, on the very
occasion when he was surprised, this being the evident fact of the commission of
the crime which can not, in its essence, include the existence of thirty cans, not

126
then contained in the pipe, each can certainly being susceptible of other various
uses, every one of which might by its nature constitute a different crime. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We consider this doctrine equally applicable to crimes which are evils by their very
nature, as well as to those which are merely malum quia prohibitum; because it not
only aims at a more or less strict application of a penal precept which,
undoubtedly, in the practice of this court, usually tends toward the lesser severity
and, occasionally, the greatest benignity when the second class, or conventional
crimes, are concerned, but also because that doctrine is the logical result of the
process of the intelligence in the derivation of consequences from the principles
constitute of the nature of things. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus it is that we find the institution of this cause, and its separation from the
previous one, to be founded on law and juridical principles, and the judgment
appealed from, to be in accordance with right and equity, except with regard to the
amount of the penalty, which we reduce, in harmony with the provisions of section
5 aforementioned, to six months' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 Philippine
currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, with the understanding that the imprisonment and the fine imposed shall
be, respectively, six months and P1,000 Philippine Currency, we affirm, as to all
the rest, the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., concurs in the result

127
 People v. Wong Cheng

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in
which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the
case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will
or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein
involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of
this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a
territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three
miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was

128
 within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International
Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch.
1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency.
...

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the
Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of
the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the
ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede
that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the
same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is
committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of
the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two
countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes
to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are
permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said
territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of
the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public
order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

129
 . . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of
Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a
foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke
opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

130