Doctrine: In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the
judge who deals directly with the parties. Held:
Topic: Guardians and Guardianship
G.R. No. 147148 January 13, 2003
PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner,
vs.
AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts:
Respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a petition for letters of guardianship. It
appears that Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center where she
is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a "mini"-stroke which she
suffered in the United States in early 1995. She was confined to her bed and cannot get
up from bed without outside assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair. She
owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an
aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos. She is not in a position to
care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests
in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises. The nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma
are her sisters of the full blood where all of whom have given their consent to the filing of
this petition.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition, thus, she filed an Amended
Opposition stating that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no
need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. And, therein petitioner
Gustilo is not fit to be appointed since their interests are antagonistic.
The Trial Court found Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of
herself and her property. MR was denied. On appeal, the CA affirmed said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that
respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of
Julieta.
Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship
No. In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge
who deals directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to
the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his
action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into
grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any
error.
Doctrines
1. A judicial guardian is clothed with authority to withdraw the ward’s earlier express
permission given to third persons to occupy a certain property.
Topic
GUARDIANS and GUARDIANSHIP
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
GR. No. 110427. February 24, 1997
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts
Carmen Cañiza was adjudged as incompetent by the RTC of Quezon City in a
guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista, because of the
former’s advanced age and physical infirmities. Consequently, Amparo was appointed as
the guardian of Carmen’s person and estate, which includes a house and lot occupied by
spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada. By virtue of her appointment, Amparo commenced a
suit to eject said spouses. The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent
Carmen as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo. In the complaint, it was
alleged that Carmen had allowed the spouses to reside in her house rent-free, out of
kindness and that the same had urgent need of house on account of her advanced age
and failing health. It was alsso alleged that Carmen sought the help of Amparo through
verbal and written demands to vacate the house because she needed the money for her
expenses but to no avail.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in
Carmen’s house since the 1960's and that in consideration of their faithful service they
had been considered by Cañiza as her own family. They also invoked that Carmen had
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executed a holographic will which bequeathed to the Estradas the house and lot in
question.
The MeTC ruled in Carmen’s favor and the Estrada’s were ordered to vacate the premises.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the same. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
1. Whether or not Amparo is clothed with authority to withdraw the ward’s earlier
express permission to occupy the house and lot given to spouses Estrada.
Held
Yes. It is settled that a will is essentially ambulatory and that at any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's intention to confer title in
the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And
that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
The Estradas’ possession of the house stemmed from the owner’s express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right;
and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the
latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Furthermore, it was ruled that
when Amparo was appointed by a competent court as the general guardian of the person
and the estate of her aunt, it installed her with the full authority to take possession of the
property of said incompetent person. By that appointment, it became Amparo’s duty to
care for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her
well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It
also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Carmen’s
property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage
the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from
anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.
Doctrine:. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even
Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship
then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth
by the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 194366. October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS,
ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS and
VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, petitioners, vs.HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY and JULPHA
IBRAHIM UY, respondents.
Nature of Case: PETITION for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision and
resolution of CA
Case Brief: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda, Rosa, Douglas, Eutropia, and Victoria seek to reverse and set aside
Decision and Resolution of CA which annulled the Decision of RTC and instead, entered a
new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s
fees against herein respondents, heirs of spouses Uy (heirs of Uy).
Facts:
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had 7 children, 2 from her first
marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and 5 from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties.
Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as
natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia,
and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale in 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, sold the properties to the late spouses spouses Uy for a consideration of
P80,000.00.
In 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of said sale against
spouses Uy assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period.
Heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period
from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties,
and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.
Actions of the Court:
RTC: ordered annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed
of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale
is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and
that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children.
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CA: reversed and set aside RTC Decision and dismissed the complaint of the Neri. CA
declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as valid and binding with
respect to Enrique and his children.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at
that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon
reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction
for a long period of time.
Issue: Whether Enrique, as natural guardian of his minor children, can sell their co-
owned property.
Held: NO.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of
the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval
of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the
duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians.―When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good
reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and
even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set
forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the
age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil
Code which provide:
Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxx
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation before the RTC,
they stated:
“Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri
concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other
plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we
both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore
the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned”; (Underscoring supplied)
In their Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
“That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have
any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their
family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979”; (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of the
estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its
execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of
Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for
lack of evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore,
not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been disposed in
favor of spouses Uy.
Dispositve Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and
October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL
and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy
and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri,
Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
Millan VALID;
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 3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri
as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties,
covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-
20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D.
Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the
respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16 shares of
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest at
6% per annum computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12%
per annum thereafter until fully paid.
G.R. No. 184528. April 25, 2012.
NILO OROPESA, petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, respondent.
Doctrine:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called
a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs
A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward
may personally require.
Persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other
similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by the
CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed Nilo
Oropesa’s, peitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of his father,
respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over
the property of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted
with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a
stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the
Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and
that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma
Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting
his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived
the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered;
To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the
Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid. A subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted.
The RTC granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case.
MR was filed by the petitioner and appealed the case to CA but failed.
Issue:
Whether or not, the respondent is considered an incompetent as per Sec. 2 Rule 92 who
should be placed under guardianship?
Ruling:
No. The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening.
Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
The SC have held in the past that a “finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his
father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who
were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s
former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies,
which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial
court of petitioner’s cause of action.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
TOPIC: GUARDIANSHIP
Subtopic: Termination of Guardianship
DOCTRINE:
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of
death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of guardian’s appointment since the
juridical tie created by the guardianship has already been dissolved.
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents
----------------------------.---------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 191993
December 5, 2012
Ponente: Reyes, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Brief:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April
19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No; 90145.
Facts:
On March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over
the person and properties of her aunt Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch 42 alleging that Maura, who is single, more than
ninety (90) years old is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business
affairs due to her advanced age.
Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship
RTC gave due course to the petition and scheduled it for hearing. After Abad formally
offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Oppositionin- Intervention. Subsequently,
on June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to
the Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad
alleging that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of
the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian and that Abad as Maura’s
guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon
City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad’s petition and
appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian on the ground that Biason is in better position to
be the guardian. Abad’s motion for reconsideration was denied. An appeal was filed to the
CA which subsequently affirmed RTC decision. Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied by CA.
On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court
challenging Biason’s qualification and the procedure by which RTC appointed him as
guardian of Maura. Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of
his residence.
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11,
2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion averred that Biason’s death rendered moot
and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be
dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
Action of the Court/s:
RTC- rendered a decision appointing Biason as the guardian of Maura
CA- affirmed the decision of the RTC, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
SC- the petition filed by Abad was dismissed because the issue of the petition becomes
moot and academic upon the death of Biason
Issue/s:
Whether or not guardianship ceases upon the death of the guardian thus, rendering the
petition moot and academic.
Rationale:
Page 5 of 6
The Court ruled on the affirmative.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and
value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Basically, the petitioner was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by
which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it
has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is
a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of
death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the
juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless
of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial
relief.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED.

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Rule 92-97: Guardians and Guardianship