B.

Legislative history

I President's message to the legislature

Nueno v. Angeles CASE: This is an action of quo warranto instituted by the four petitioners against the six respondents to oust the latter from their offices
as members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila on the ground that the petitioners are entitled to occupy and respondents are
illegally holding them.

FACTS
· Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel De La Fuente, Eustaquio Balagtas and Carmen Planas were elected as members of the Municipal
Board in the general election on Dec 1940, and qualified on Jan. 1941.
· Nueno and Planas subsequently resigned from their office to run for the House of Representatives on Nov. 1941, but they were
not elected.
· The President of the Commonwealth then appointed Nueno to fill the vacancy he created because of his resignation, and Delia
Dino to fill the vacancy created by Carmen Planas, since they were both from the same political party, “The Young Philippines.”
· On 1942, the Japanese Army invaded the country. The regular election as provided in the Election Code could not be held
because the Japanese still occupied the country. The special election likewise could not be held after the restoration of the
Commonwealth due to physical impossibility.
· Therefore the President of the Commonwealth appointed the six respondents to the Municipal Board. The four petitioners
instituted an action quo warranto against six respondents, averring that their term of office of three years has not yet expired since they
have not served for such period due to the Japanese occupation.
· They also assert their right to hold-over, or their right to continue in office until a successor has been elected. Also, that their
appointments are in contravention of Sec. 16, Act 357 since the party of Dino has not been represented, and that such appointments
were not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
· Respondents contend that petitioners have no right to hold public office since their term expired on Dec 1943, and that term of
office must be distinguished from tenure. Also that the appointments are valid under the emergency powers granted upon the
President.

ISSUES:
(1) Do the petitioners have a right to hold-over of office?
(2) Are the appointments of the President valid?

HELD:
(1) NO.
The term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim

1
to hold the office as of right and fixes the interval after the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The term of office is not affected by hold-over, and the
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by
which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war.

Sec. 27 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code provided for the right to hold-over of a municipal and provincial officer: “the
incumbent shall hold-over until a successor shall be duly qualified.”

Such phrase was suppressed by a subsequent amendment (Act No. 2774), but was provided by a different section in the act, so it was
still in effect. However, the foregoing provisions were all repealed by Sec. 184 of the Commonwealth Act No. 357.

It provided: “The officers elected shall assume office on the first day of January next following.”

(2) YES.
Sec. 16 of the Commonwealth Act provides for the appointments to be done by the President in case of vacancy in an elective or
municipal office. The vacancies enumerated thereof may be immediately filled in the manner provide, therefore there will be no
interregnum during which the office may be temporarily without an incumbent. The act provides for appointment during temporary
vacancy
of office under subsection(a) Subsections (b),(c), (d) and (e) provides for appointment to fill in a vacancy.

Subsection (a) cannot be applied in this case since no vacancy, temporary or otherwise, exists in this case.

Temporary absence is not the same as vacancy since in vacancy there is no incumbent in public office. The petitioners were also not
appointed under subsection (f), which provides for the appointed officer to serve for the “unexpired term of office ”Their terms, therefore,
expired already on Dec. 1943, and the subsequent appointments of the respondents are valid under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act
357.

DISPOSITIVE Action quo arrant is dismissed.

Jose Topacio Nueno and nine others were elected in the general election held on December 10, 1940, and qualified on January 1,
1941. Subsequently, Jose Topacio Nueno and Carmen Planas resigned to run for seats in the House of Representatives in the national
election held on November 14, 1941, but they were not elected. After the election, the President of the Philippine Commonwealth
appointed petitioner Nueno to fill the vacancy created by his own resignation, and petitioner Delia C. Diño to fill the vacancy in the place
of Carmen Planas, for the last two belonged to the same political party, "The Young Philippines."

On January 3, 1942, when the City of Manila was occupied by the Japanese Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese army proclaimed military administration under martial law over all districts occupied by the army, and in the proclamation it

2
was provided that "so far as military administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and
judicial institutions shall continue to be effective as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and and carry
on faithfully their duties as before."

The regular election as provided in the Election Code could not be held because the Japanese still occupied the country. The
special election likewise could not be held after the restoration of the Commonwealth due to physical impossibility. Therefore the
President of the Commonwealth appointed the six respondents to the Municipal Board.

The four petitioners instituted an action quo warranto against six respondents, averring that their term of office of three years
has not yet expired since they have not served for such period due to the Japanese occupation. They also assert their right to hold-
over, or their right to continue in office until a successor has been elected. Also, that their appointments are in contravention of Sec. 16,
Act 357 since the party of Dino has not been represented, and that such appointments were not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments.

The respondents contend that petitioners have no right to hold public office claimed by them, because their term of office had already
expired on December 31, 1943, and that the appointments of the respondents are legal and valid under the emergency powers granted
by Act No. 671 of the Congress of the Philippines upon the President of the Commonwealth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to hold-over as members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, notwithstanding the
expiration of their term of office on the last day of December of the year 1943.

HELD:
(1) NO. The term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right and fixes the interval after the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The term of office is not affected by hold-over, and the tenure may
be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the
term of an office may be extended by reason of war.
Sec. 2074 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code provided for the right to hold-over of a municipal and provincial officer
Section 2074 of the Revised Administrative Code (Provincial Law) provided:
Term of office of elective official. — The term of a provincial officer elected at any general election commencing with the year
nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, shall begin on the sixteenth of July following such election and shall end on the fifteenth of
the same month three years thereafter; but if a successor be not inducted at the time appointed by law, the incumbent shall
hold over until a successor shall be duly qualified.
Section 2177 of the same Code (Municipal Law) read as follows:
Term of elective officer. — The term of a municipal officer elected at any general election commencing with the year nineteen
hundred and thirty-seven, shall begin on the sixteenth of July following such election and shall end on the fifteenth of the same

3
 month three years thereafter; but if a successor be not inducted at the time appointed by law, the incumbent shall hold over
until a successor shall be duly qualified.

ii Explanatory note

People v. Purisima, supra Doctrine:

● Penal Statutes are to be constructed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused,because it is not to
enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts
(American jurisprudence)
● Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of the statute is within the statute, and this has to
be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions
● Salutary principle in StatCon:1) There is a presumption of undesirable consequences or oppressive results were never
intended by a legislative measure.2) A construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid
all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences
Facts:
● 26 Petitions filed by PoP, represented respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of
law.
● 3 Respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII (Amante Purisima), and XVIII (Maximo Maceren); and CFI of
Samar (Wenceslao Polo)
● Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of “Illegal Possession of
Deadly Weapon”, in violation of Presidential Decree No.9.
● The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their
own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting an offense
penalized until PD#9
○ This is due to failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s
residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
● The respondent-courts’ stand that PD 9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and
order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence.
○ The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
possession of deadly weapons.
○ Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon
was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder.
● The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is
basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute.
○ The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.

4
Issue:
W/N the informations filed by the people are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of
deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9

Held/Ratio:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him (Sec 19, Art IV, 1973 Consti.)
● Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation
of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
2. What makes the act or criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Respondent judges correctly ruled
that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to PD 9(3)
3. If there’s an ambiguity in the implementation of a statute, there will be a judicial task to take place to interpret its meaning and
scope.
4. In a construction of legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for to determine the intent and spirit of the law.
● Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of the statute is within the statute, and this has to
be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions (J. Teehankee in Hidalgo, v. Hidalgo)

● The preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081,
which aims to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and etc. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

5
iii Legislative debates, views, and deliberations

Palanca v. City of DOCTRINE:

Manila, supra CASE SUMMARY:
FACTS:
● From 1 July 1914 – 30 June 1916, Carlos Palanca has been engaged in the business of distilling
spirituous liquors in the city of Manila and the lawful holder of the distiller's license required for the
operation and conduct of said business, and that he has paid the taxes imposed upon holders of such
licenses. He conducted his business of wholesale liquor distiller at No. 1925 Calle Anloague, Manila,
● He also maintains a store at 538-540 Calle Pinpin, for the sale at wholesale of distilled liquors, as
hereinafter specified; which said store is not adjacent to plaintiff's said distillery, but is entirely separate and
distinct therefrom.
● That the said store at Nos. 538-540 Calle Pinpin was operated and maintained by Carlos and exclusively for
the sale at wholesale of liquors distilled by him at his said licensed distillery at No. 1925 Calle Anloague.
● The city of Manila, through the city assessor and collector, made demand upon plaintiff that he takes out a
wholesale liquor dealer's license and pay therefor at the rate of P1,200 a year, as a condition to allowing
plaintiff to operate and maintain his said store at Nos. 538-540 Calle Pinpin.
● Carlos paid to the city assessor and collector
ISSUE:
W/N taking out and paying for his license as a distiller, was entitled to sell the products of his distillery in a store
separate and distinct therefrom without the necessity of taking out and paying for an additional license as a wholesale
liquor dealer.

HELD:
No
RATIO:
● The judgment of the trial court permitted the plaintiff to recover the amount of the license fee paid under
protest with interest.
● In defining the meaning of the law, the SC found its intent in deliberations. Manila Liquor License Act was
taken from the State of Ohio. The legislative debates wherein the Act was taken from were used to define the
meaning.
● SC states that “That years before, Mr. Taft had taken part as counsel in a case before the Supreme Court of
Ohio, the result of which bears out the contention of the city fiscal; and that, accordingly, the statute adopted
from Ohio carried with it the construction there given to it. We agree that both pursuant to the Philippine Code
of Civil Procedure (secs. 275, 313, as amended by Act No. 2210, sec. 1) and the rules of statutory
construction, the courts could avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful import.”

6
iv Reports of commissions

Escalante v. Santos DOCTRINE:

● In construing the provision of the code as thus enacted, courts may properly refer to the reports of the
commission that drafted the code in aid of clarifying ambiguities therein.
CASE SUMMARY:
● The present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted by Arturo V. Escalante, who is in Bilibid Prison

FACTS:
● On November 14, 1928, Escalante was convicted of estafa and sentenced to two years, eleven months, and
eleven days of presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P4,836.53, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. This penalty is the minimum of the maximum degree
of the penalty provided in article 534, paragraph No. 3, of the Penal Code.
● Estafa in that amount (P4,836.53) not exceeding P6,000 is punished in the Revised Penal Code, in force since
the first of this year (article 315, paragraph 3), with a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in the maximum
degree to prision correctional in the minimum degree.
ISSUE:
● Is the retroactivity of laws applicable to the case of Escalante?
HELD:
● Yes.
RATIO:
● Inasmuch as the law in this case is more favorable to the accused, and the latter has not been shown to be an
habitual criminal, article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code now in force must be applied to the
estafa of which the petitioner was convicted; and inasmuch as he has already served that penalty, he must be
set at liberty immediately.
● Some light is thrown on the intentioned of the new law with referrence to its being retroactive when favorable
to the accused, by the interpretation of its provisions by the chairman and a member of the committee created
to draft the present Revised Penal Code. Judge Anacleto Diaz:
○ I was present when the proposed bill referred to was discussed in the Joint Committee as I had been
assigned to assist it in any way possible. I was present when the bill as amended by the Joint
Committee was finally submitted and approved by the two Houses, and I can positively say that the
two articles were accepted and passed without any discussion whatsoever. In view of this, I believe
that the two articles referred to must be construed, taking into consideration not only their literal
meaning but the purpose in view of the law-making body that first approved art. 22 (art. 23, P.C. of
Spain) as understood by the courts and the authorities called upon to construe the same.

7
 ○ There seems to be no doubt that the purpose of art. 366 is to give the benefit of the retroactivity of a
penal law as expressly and unmistakably stated in art. 22 to any person that may be found under the
circumstances therein provided.
● Representative Quintin Paredes, member of the committee in charge of drafting the new Code:
○ In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, just received yesterday, I wish to inform you that I believe the
members of the House Committee on Revision of Codes which introduced and recommended the bill
that was later enacted as the "Revised Penal Code" intended to give said code retroactive effect in so
far as it favor a person guilty of a felony, although at the time of its enactment a final sentence has
already been pronounced and the convict is serving the same, provided that he is not an habitual
criminal. To emphasize this intention, section 366 providing that "felonies and misdemeanors
committed prior to the date of this code shall be punished in accordance with the codes or acts in
force at the time of their commission" was preceded by the saving clause "without prejudice to the
provisions contained in article 22 of this Code," which to my mind means that while felonies and
misdemeanors committed prior to the date of effectiveness of the Revised Penal Code shall be
punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission, the same
should not be the case if such Code or Acts are unfavorable to the guilty party, for the general
principle on the retroactivity of favorable penal laws, recognized in article 22, should then apply.
● Representative Quintin Paredes adds the following:
○ The use of the words "penal laws" in general, instead of "this Revised Penal Code and any other penal
laws" in article 22, may give room for a doubt as to whether said article meant to include in the phrase
"penal laws" the same Revised Penal Code that was establishing the provision. But this doubt, I think,
should not be entertained inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code is itself a penal law and the phrase
"penal laws" is broad enough to include all laws that are penal in character.

v Prior laws from which

statute is based

People v. Manantan DOCTRINE: House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
G.R. No. 14129 section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing
Regala, J. election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the
meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to
a mere draft of a bill.

FACTS:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims
that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court

8
 denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army,
no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in an election or take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein,
"No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices
of peace from its operation.

ISSUE: Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: It is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of
the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes
all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial
authority. This term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including
justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts

vi Change in phraseology by
amendments

Political Law – Election Laws – Right of Suffrage – Extension of Voters Registration

AKBAYAN – Youth v.
Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 147066, March 26,
2001
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for
denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and
are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall
be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-

9
election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189
which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to
the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the
special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again,
verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information
sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of
the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still,
the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was
attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the
voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they
are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court.
The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

10
vii Amendment by deletion

People v. Desiderio DOCTRINE:

CASE SUMMARY:

FACTS:
● Ignacio Desiderio, on or about November 28, 1958, in Zamboanga City, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess, receive, conceal, buy, sell (after illegal importation) eleven (11) cases and twenty (20) cartons of
Chesterfield cigarettes and eleven (11) cartons of Camel cigarettes of foreign brand and manufactured in a foreign
country, knowing that the same have been imported contrary to law."
● A plea of not guilty was entered by the accused.
● Accused presented a motion to quash on the ground that his criminal liability had been extinguished by a compromise
agreement with the Collector of Customs, on February 10, 1958, in accordance with Section 2307 of the same Republic
Act 1937.
● Court granted the same in its order, dismissing the case.
Section 3601, penalizing smuggling, provides:
● · SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. — Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or
assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary
to law, shall be punished by a fine of not less than six hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years and, if the offender is an alien, he shall be deported
after serving the sentence.When, upon trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to have had
possession of the article in question, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction,
unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court.
Section 2307, relied upon by the accused, is as follows:
● SEC. 2307. Settlement of Case by Payment of Fine or Redemption of Forfeited Property. — If, in any seizure case, the
owner or agent shall, while the case is yet before the Collector of the district of seizure, pay to such Collector the fine
imposed by him or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, or, if after appeal of the case, he
shall pay to the Commissioner the amount of the fine as finally determined by him, or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the
appraised value of the property, such property shall be forthwith surrendered, and all liability which may or might attach
to the property by virtue of the offense which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might have been
incurred under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect to such property shall thereupon be deemed to be
discharged. Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely
prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law.

ISSUE::Whether or not the settlement of the case under Section 2307 extinguishes criminal liability under Section 3601, both of
Republic Act 1937, otherwise called the Tariff and Customs Code·
HELD: Order appealed from is reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the Court a quo for further proceedings. No

11
 costs

RATIO:
Section 2307 expressly states what are deemed discharged thereunder, namely, "all liability which may or might attach to
the property by virtue of the offense which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might have been incurred
under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect to such property." It limits the effects of the aforesaid settlement to
the liability that attaches to the property, or to the bond that replaces the property. It does not speak of the liability that falls
on the person or offender. Clearly, therefore, the interpretation of the accused is not supported by the law.

Such interpretation, if adopted, would aggravate the problem of smuggling and pave the way to national economic ruin. For
it would encourage unlawful importation, since by the mere expedient of redeeming their seized importation the smugglers
would be freed from personal criminal liability for the offense. Such a course we cannot in the least sanction

Position of the accused become untenable when it is considered that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 1937 on July 1,
1957, the applicable law contained a provision allowing the Commissioner of Customs to compromise the criminal liability of the
offender in cases of unlawful importation. We refer to Section 1369 of the Revised Administrative Code. Its elimination in
Republic Act 1937 clearly shows the intent of Congress henceforth not to allow compromises of the offender's criminal liability in
said cases. Settlement of the administrative proceedings does not, in the absence of express provision to that effect, amount to
settlement of the criminal liability.

viii Adopted statutes

People v. Pagpaguitan DOCTRINE: Adopted from US techniques- Proof of handwriting is admissible to count as evidence in front of the
G.R. No. 116599 September court.
27, 1999 CASE SUMMARY: To prove that Evelyn and Pagpaguitan are not lovers and there was consummated rape, the
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
court asked Evelyn for her handwriting, to differentiate, if it was the same with the alleged love letters the
accused showed.

FACTS
-Pagpaguitan and Salazar, neighbors of Evelyn, are guilty of the crime of rape
-Evelyn, minor, was assisted by her father to file the case
-Respondents conspired, confederated, and mutually helped each other so that Pagpaguitan can have sexual
intercourse with Evelyn-without her consent.
-They threatened to kill her if she would not go with the two men although Salazar was merely an observer to
Pagpaguitan’s crime.
-a metting between the parents of Evelyn and Pagpaguitan was held, wherein he also proposed to Evelyn that
they should get married
-Evelyn’s testimony that she was forced which constituted rape

12
 -Pagpaguitan’s testimony showed love letters proving that they were alleged sweethearts and the intercourse
was consensual
-The court asked Evelyn to personally show her handwritting to be compared to the love letters shown by
Pagpaguitan
-RTC did not believed in Pagpaguitan’s testimony

ISSUE
Did the RTC erred in relying heavily upon its verdict the genuineness of Evelyn’s handwriting

RULING
-NO
-victim denied writing any letter to Pagpaguitan
-Evelyn’s handwriting as ordered by the Judge was different from that of the love letters
-Charged with the crime of Rape

RATIO
-comparison of writing is a national method of investigation
-comparison is permissible with or without the aid of an expert witness
-Rules of evidence having been drawn mainly from American Sources

ix Principles of common law

Aznar v. Yapdiangco DOCTRINE:

CASE SUMMARY:

FACTS:
HELD:
RATIO:

De Garcia v. CA DOCTRINE:
CASE SUMMARY:

FACTS:
HELD:
RATIO:

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AKBAYAN v COMELEC DOCTRINE:
CASE SUMMARY:

FACTS:On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for
denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are
now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic
Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts
including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.

HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189
which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.
Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the
special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again,
verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information
sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of
the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good.

Furthermore still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s
pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the
fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their
pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
RATIO:

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ix Principles of common law

Aznar v. Yapdiangco DOCTRINE: If there is conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails.
CASE SUMMARY:
● This is an appeal, on purely legal questions, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IV,
declaring the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, entitled to the possession of the car in dispute.

FACTS:
● Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. After the advertisement, a certain de
Dios, claiming to be the nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the residence of Santos and expressed his uncle’s intent to
purchase the car.
● Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo (son of Theodoro) who talked with de Dios. On being informed, Santos
advised his son to see Marella, which the son did.
● Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed of sale was prepared and Irineo was instructed by his father
not to part with the deed and the car without receiving the price from Marella.
● Upon arriving at the house of Vicente Marella, he said that his money was short and that he had to borrow from his
sister. Marella then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the supposed house of the sister to obtain the money with an
unidentified person. He also asked Irineo to leave the deed to have his lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of
Marella, Irineo did as requested.
● Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to be sister, de Dios and the unidentified person then disappeared
together with the car. Santos reported the incident to the authorities.
● Thereafter, Marella was able to sell the car to Aznar. While in possession of the car, police authorities confiscated the
same from him.
● Aznar filed an action to recover the car. Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In the
course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos was allowed to intervene by the lower court.
● Lower court ruled in favor of Teodoro Santos saying that he has been unlawfully deprived of his car and he retains
ownership of the same.
ISSUE:
● Should Aznar suffer the consequences given that he was involved because of the fraud committed by Marella?
HELD:
● YES.
RATIO:
● Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another,
is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express
provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the

15
 latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.

X. Conditions at time of enactment

Commissioner of Customs v. FACTS: In August 1956, the steamship "Chi Chung" arrived in Manila, from Formosa, carrying 1,200 metric
Superior Gas tons of industrial salt consigned to Superior Gas & Equipment Co. (Sugeco). With official permit, the cargo was
discharged and delivered shipside, within the harbor sea wall but outside the breakwater, into four lighters of
the Luzon Stevedoring Co. for final unloading at the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. at Punta, Sta.
Ana, Manila.

Sugeco was required to pay and did pay the sum of P2,400.00 as wharfage fee on August 23, 1956.

Respondent contends that its importation should not pay wharfage fees because it made no use of the facilities
of government wharves or piers, the cargo having been discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf
Co.

Petitioner-appellant, invoking the decision under the Tariff Act of 1909 in the Sugar Centrals case, claims that
even if not loaded from a Government wharf, goods exported (or imported) shall pay wharfage fees.

ISSUE:Is Sugeco required to pay the wharfage fees?

RULING: No. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. We have laws enacted at different times, under dissimilar
circumstances. At the time the Tariff of Act of 1909 was approved, the Government had no wharves of its own;
therefore, the wharfage fee imposed by it could not have meant charges for the use of Government wharves,
which was the generally accepted idea; so this Court in view of the surrounding circumstances believed and
held (in the Sugar Centrals case) that the charges were payable even if no Government wharf be used,
because they were meant to be used as a trust fund "for the purpose of acquiring and constructing wharves by
the Government of the Philippine Islands." However, at the time Republic Act 1371 was approved, the
Government had wharves; and the discussions in the Legislature showed the intention not to levy wharfage
fees on merchandise unloaded at places other than Government wharves or without making use of pier
facilities. Therefore, Sugeco is not required to pay the wharfage fees.

xi History of the times

De Los Santos v. Mallare, CASE: This is an original action of quo warranto questioning the legality of the appointment of respondent Gil R.
supra Mallare to the office of city engineer for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still
occupying.
The real issue however is the legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be the effect of
Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand. It is the petitioner's contention that under the Constitution he
cannot be removed against his will and without cause. The complaint against the other respondents has to do merely
with their recognition of Mallare as the lawful holder of the disputed office and is entirely dependent upon the result of

16
the basic action against the last-mentioned respondent.

FACTS:
· Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President,
appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6.
· On Aug. 23, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.
· On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position,
after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to
report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
· Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-
defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.

ISSUE: Does the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another position violate Section
4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law"?

HELD: YES. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions
of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code
provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that
"The classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671
described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of
bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law vested in the
President of the Philippines alone."

Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are
excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by
the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A
confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute
policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid
down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally,

17
 the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess
a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is
employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

C. Contemporary Construction

Madrigal v. Rafferty,
G.R. No. 12287, August 7,
1918.
Facts: Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno were legally married prior to January 1, 1914, contracted under the provisions of
law concerning conjugal partnerships. In 1915, Madrigal filed a sworn declaration with the CIR showing that his total net income
for the year 1914 was P296,302.73. Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the said P296,302.73 did not represent his
income for the year 1914, but was in fact the income of the conjugal partnership existing between himself and his wife Susana
Paterno, and that in computing and assessing the additional income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913,
the income declared by Vicente Madrigal should be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be considered the income of
Vicente Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno.

After payment under protest, and after the protest of Madrigal had been decided adversely by the CIR, action was begun by
Madrigal and his wife Paterno in the CFI of Manila against Collector of Internal Revenue and the Deputy Collector of Internal
Revenue. CFI decided against Madrigal and Paterno.

Appellees contend that the taxes imposed by the Income Tax Law are as the name implies taxes upon income tax and not
upon capital and property; that the fact that Madrigal was a married man, and his marriage contracted under the provisions
governing the conjugal partnership, has no bearing on income considered as income, and that the distinction must be drawn
between the ordinary form of commercial partnership and the conjugal partnership of spouses resulting from the relation of
marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the additional income tax should be divided into two equal parts because of the conjugal partnership

Held: Income as contrasted with capital or property is to be the test. The essential difference between capital and income is that
capital is a fund; income is a flow. A fund of property existing at an instant of time is called capital. A flow of services rendered
by that capital by the payment of money from it or any other benefit rendered by a fund of capital in relation to such fund
through a period of time is called an income. Capital is wealth, while income is the service of wealth.

Susana Paterno, wife of Vicente Madrigal, has an inchoate right in the property of her husband Vicente Madrigal during the life
of the conjugal partnership. She has an interest in the ultimate property rights and in the ultimate ownership of property
acquired as income after such income has become capital. Susana Paterno has no absolute right to one-half the income of the
conjugal partnership. Not being seized of a separate estate, Susana Paterno cannot make a separate return in order to receive
the benefit of the exemption which would arise by reason of the additional tax. As she has no estate and income, actually and
legally vested in her and entirely distinct from her husband's property, the income cannot properly be considered the separate
income of the wife for the purposes of the additional tax. Moreover, the Income Tax Law does not look on the spouses as
individual partners in an ordinary partnership. The husband and wife are only entitled to the exemption of P8,000 specifically

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Maceda v. Macaraig, G.R. No.
88291, May 31, 1991
granted by the law. The higher schedules of the additional tax directed at the incomes of the wealthy may not be partially
defeated by reliance on provisions in our Civil Code dealing with the conjugal partnership and having no application to the
Income Tax Law. The aims and purposes of the Income Tax Law must be given effect.
FACTS: On November 3, 1986, Commonwealth Act No. 120 created the NPC as a public corporation to undertake the
development of hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources.
Effective March 10, 1987, Executive Order No. 93 once again withdrew all tax and duty incentives granted to government and
private entities which had been restored under Presidential Decree Nos. 1931 and 1955 but it gave the authority to FIRB to
restore, revise the scope and prescribe the date of effectivity of such tax and/or duty exemptions.
On June 24, 1987 the FIRB issued Resolution No. 17-87 restoring NPC's tax and duty exemption privileges effective March 10,
1987. On October 5, 1987, the President, through respondent Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr., confirmed and approved FIRB
Resolution No. 17-87.
Though the issues raised was resolved by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 88291, the issues was again brought to the Supreme
Court for the second time by the petitioner in G.R. No. 88291.
ISSUE: Whether or not the powers conferred upon the FIRB by Section 2(a), (b), and (c) and (4) of Executive Order No. 93
"constitute undue delegation of legislative power and is, therefore, unconstitutional.”
RULING: No.
With the growing complexities of modern life and the many technical fields of governmental functions, as in matters pertaining
to tax exemptions, delegation of legislative powers has become the rule and non-delegation the exception. The legislature may
not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide direct and efficacious solutions to many problems
attendant upon present day undertakings. The legislature could not be expected to state all the detailed situations wherein the
tax exemption privilege would be restored. The task may be assigned to an administrative body like the Fiscal Incentives
Review Board (FIRB).
When E.O No. 93 (S'86) was issued, President Aquino was exercising both Executive and Legislative powers. Thus, there was
no power delegated to her, rather it was she who was delegating her power. She delegated it to the FIRB, which, for purposes
of E.O No. 93 (S'86), is a delegate of the legislature. Clearly, she was not sub-delegating her power.
And E.O. No. 93 (S'86), as a delegating law, was complete in itself — it set forth the policy to be carried out 85 and it fixed the
standard to which the delegate had to conform in the performance of his functions, 86 both qualities having been enunciated by
this Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. 87
For delegation to be constitutionally valid, the law must be complete in itself and must set forth sufficient standards.
Certain aspects of the taxing process that are not really legislative in nature are vested in administrative agencies. In this case,
there really is no delegation, to wit: a) power to value property; b) power to assess and collect taxes; c) power to perform details
of computation, appraisement or adjustment; among others.
19