IPI No.

12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY.
HOMOBONO ADAZA I

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono
Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation,2 we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect
contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely performing his duty as
Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty.
Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but instead
of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit
Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated
his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty.
Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of
his client’s case.

Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us of his innocence
from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main
cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing
the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact
that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to
do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of
this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the
motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not
substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.4 While a lawyer has a duty to
represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law.5 He is also duty-bound to impress
upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the
law and legal processes.6

A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always
decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant
to the merits and the developments in the case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to
impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the
judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of
him in acting for his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task.1âwphi1 We have to strike a
balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect
the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should
not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in
their favor, but neither should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people
who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of
erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should these
litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why
they should not be cited for contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of thecasethat,when read together
with the administrative complaint heprepared,shows that his complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the
administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first,
against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order
unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for
alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client, disclosethat there was more
to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his
predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this
conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus
constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts
constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a member of the
bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our
concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should
not be cited in contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a
disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a
disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense,
whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and
given ample opportunity to explain his side.11

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,12 a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for
a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,13 and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two
proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose
from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the
Court. The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in
general.14 Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice;15 thus, it may be
instituted against any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence describes a
contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also
apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be
appealed in the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal.17

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to
determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the
Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest.18 Thus, unlike a contempt
proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking
reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a
subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.1âwphi1 Contempt of court
is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law
are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.20

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a
frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay,
within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of ₱5,000.00. The respondent is also
WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings
against him.

SO ORDERED.
ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO,
This is a disbarment[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,
for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty. Unto
guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law or, at the very
least, a severe reprimand against him.[2]
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a demand-letter from the
respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondents letter[3] reads:

Dear Mr. Ong:

This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for your only child,
Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss Garganian is demanding from
you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child
with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.

I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be
dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and moral obligations to your son with
Miss Garganian.

May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to her house her
television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and without her knowledge and
consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court
against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the above address or
you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the preliminary matters in connection with
all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.

I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure or
refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your absolute refusal really.

Expecting you then.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City

WITH MY CONSENT:

NEMESIA GARGANIAN

A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the
complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against
the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to
comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondents second letter
reads: [4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):

1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of P1,500.00 should be up to
the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is subject to adjustment when the son is already in
the secondary course or up to his college course).

2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her planned business
venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any government position because
of her status, having a child without being lawfully wedded. x x x.

3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian, without the presence of
Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my Law
Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.

Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be
withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a time.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the complainant
merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant
then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint[5] with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors Office)
of DumagueteCity against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta
for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the Bureau of Domestic
Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General.[6] According to the
complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the complainant
alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or extort
money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used against him in the
aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they
could get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters of
the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganians affidavit where she denied any
knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly
prepared by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganians
son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law;and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant
who claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the
respondent, with an offer to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To
further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental
Affidavit,[7] citing several cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties.[8]
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint lodged against
him.[9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista,
to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. After denying the respondents third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent was duly
notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the respondents turn to present evidence,
notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office
in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not be located,
although his wife received some of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them inhibiting from
the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed
the respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the
investigator recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least,
be severely reprimanded.
 The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General.[10] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted
the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper disposition, conformably with adopted policies
and procedures.[11]The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and recommendation in toto.[12]
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the importance of the legal
profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held:

In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to
the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious
study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his
family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the
social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that
every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United
States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other
hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the
bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with
great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[14] It mandates lawyers
to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in
handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply
with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his
warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We
find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing
or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon
19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs
counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding[15] and he
shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.[16] In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,[17] we held:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his
clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by
ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

(emphases ours)

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]
 Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the
motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings
against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers
who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in
mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not
be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity
befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month suspension or
reprimand.We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy
thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, vs ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR.,

This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching to almost a
half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted
Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.

The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the Supreme Court, states:

xxx xxx xxx

The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes,
Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for
annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated annulling
the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.

On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, regarding the same
property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc.
No. 831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this
case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was
decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662,
affirming the decision of the Lower Court;

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil
Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty.
Gregorio Centeno.

Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs;

That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971;

That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11,
1972;

That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for specific
performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by
the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;

Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same persons mentioned
above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458.
This case is still pending before said court.

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am
constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine
Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on may part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan.
They can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still
pending in Court.

In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action.

xxx xxx xxx 1

In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the respondent Montalvo was
required to file an Answer within ten days from notice. 2

In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were done.
 at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking,
diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest
and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice — certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from their
land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and
declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the
complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has
been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and
take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the
deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3

In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court Decision in G.R.
Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4
As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the
petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had been decided by the Court. 5

But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already
settled by final judgment. 6

In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other plaintiffs in
this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty.
Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills inclusion herein as a p
plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7

This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M
of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the
CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases.

On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of disciplinary case
against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8

It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No. 1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to
the Clear of Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same
cause of action:

1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate but was subsequently appealed.

2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision was affirmed.

3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court, upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the
due execution the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.

4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.

5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.

6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the
nullity of the Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of
the collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.
 8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5,
1974 which was a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the
name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.

Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues
long laid to rest by final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules
of Court. 9

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even
Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs.

A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have
thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the
administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such
mindless fashion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an
honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions
among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.

WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished
public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.

Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
 JOY T. SAMONTE vs ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL

For the Court’s resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent),
praying that the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC
Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana
plantation.2 Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid
him the amount of P8,000.003 as attorney’s fees.4 Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the
submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same.5 As such, on January 25,
2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision6 based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable
to the workers in the total amount of P633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling,
the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of respondent’s neglect, complainant
claimed that she was left defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the
foregoing judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.

In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to
submit his Answer to the complaint.

In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on behalf of
complainant. However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant’s failure to adduce credible
witnesses to testify in her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an
Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness; nevertheless, respondent was
instructed that the contents of Romeo’s affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter
would not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant’s uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who
was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was
deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.13

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively liable
and, accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Essentially, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.15

In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report
and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in order to
account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their
importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair
and honest means to attain lawful objectives.18These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as follows:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent when
the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the
amount of P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client’s case and accepts money
representing legal fees from the latter,19 as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to
“serve his client with competence and diligence,” and in such regard, “not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.”

However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the necessary
position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein
complainant. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in
support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his client’s
cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant’s case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and
defend the latter’s interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.20 In Abay v. Montesino,21 it was explained that regardless of a lawyer’s personal view, the
latter must still present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause:

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.22(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively
liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.

Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that he
indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant’s
intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De
Vera,25 the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood, viz.:

The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of
emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.”26 (Emphases supplied)

Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any
person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)

On this score, it is well to stress that “notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.”27

Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.

The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1)
year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v.
Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the
required pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the
penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,30 where the notary public therein notarized an irregular
document, the Court hereby revokes respondent’s notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIEDfrom
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.