enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he
No. L-52688. October 17, 1980.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Courts should distinguish between insanity and passion or eccentricity.—
“Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or
mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity.” People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
Same; Same; Imbecility or insanity defined.—According to the dictionary, an imbecile is a person
marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one who has unsound mind or suffers from a mental
disorder. “Imbecil vale tanto come escaso de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juicio.” An insane person
may have lucid intervals but “el imbecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de razon, pues en el no
hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juicio mismo” (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92).
Same; Same; Same.—Insanity has been defined as “a manifestation in language or conduct of
disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the
mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the
sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition” (Sec. 1039, Revised
Administrative Code).
Same; Same; The law presumes that every person is of sound mind.—“When there is no proof that
the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act charged to him, or that
he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was generally considered to
be insane—his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy—the legal presumption is that he acted
in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption” (U.S.
vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218).
Same; Same; Quantum of proof necessary to show insanity.—What should be the criterion for
insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing
the crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660). In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting
circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the
accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA
275, 286.)
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VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980 327
People vs. Ambal
Same; Same; Tests for determining insanity.—The latest rule on the point is that “the so-called
right-wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria
for determining criminal responsibility of a person of alleged mental incapacity.” “An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental
disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition considered capable
of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a
condition not considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of
injury or of a physical or mental disease.” (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S. 214 F. 2d. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430
[1954].)
Same; Same; Accused voluntary surrender and admission of the killing of his wife is evidence that
he is not insane.—The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-
was going to be punished for it.
Barredo, J., concurring opinion:
Criminal Law; The rulings in our jurisprudence on insanity provides enough basis for our
judgment.—I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local jurisprudence cited in the
main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly dissertation by Justice Aquino in his main opinion deserve full
study and consideration, but I prefer to livish myself to the rulings on insanity in our jurisprudence which
I feel adequately provide enough basis for clear judgment.
Abad Santos, J., concurring opinion:
Criminal Law; Evidence; The accused is entitled to two mitigating circumstances of obfuscation and
illness. His wife was often absent from the conjugal home and had the guts to tell the accused who was ill,
that it is better that he dies, and refused to buy him medicine.—The wife of the appellant appears to have
been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to a person is to have unbearable spouse. The deceased
was a neglectful wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at times and prior to her death she failed
to buy medicine for her husband who had influenza and even the gall to tell him, “Mas maayo ka
pangpatay.” This, together with the mental
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
condition of Ambal described in the main opinion, should entitle to two additional mitigating
circumstances, namely: obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6, R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the
presence of these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the reduction of the penalty because
Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code prevails over Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code. (People vs. Relador,
60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the circumstances the appellant is deserving of executive clemency and I
so recommend.
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting him of
parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand
pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the
house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48,
mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor,
went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter’s spouse that he (Honorato) had killed
his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
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VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980 329
People vs. Ambal
The policeman confiscated Ambal’s long bolo the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered
with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to
spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula’s failure to buy medicine
for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated altercation. Felicula told her
husband that it would be better if he were dead (“Mas maayo ka pang mamatay”). That remark infuriated
Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a
preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the
fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused’s counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in
the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter’s
mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a “passive-aggressive,
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality” (Exh. 1).
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period from February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November
3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was
normal (44-46 tsn November 3, 1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied:
“Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but
during the commission of the crime, that is what we call ‘Psychosis’ due to short frustration tolerance” (45
tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna, a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of
mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental
disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 tsn November 15, 1977). The doctor
concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 tsn). He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly
not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with
the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During
his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he
worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
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VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980 331
People vs. Ambal
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable, he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when
he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while
plowing. He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That
was the commencement of his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal’s behavior immediately after the incident that he was not
insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court’s conclusion.
“Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.” (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.*
According to the dictionary, an imbecile is a person marked, by mental deficiency while an insane
person is one who has an
________________
* Article 8 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 (from which article 12 of the Revised Penal Code was
taken) provides that “no delinquen, y por consiguiente estan exentos de responsabilidad criminal: (1) El
imbecil y el loco, a no ser que este haya obrado en un intervalo de razon.”
This was modified in the existing Spanish Penal Code which in its article 8(1) provides “que esta exento
de responsabilidad criminal el enajenado y el que se halla en situacion de transtorno mental transitorio, a
no ser que este haya sido buscado de proposito para delinquir” (1 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Ed.,
p. 495).
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. “Imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el que
ha perdido el juicio.” An insane person may have lucid intervals but “el embecil no puede tener, no tiene
estos intervalos de razon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juicio mismo” (1
Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as “a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic,
and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition” (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).
“The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary” (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305 308). The law always presumes
all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs.
Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs.
Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
“When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the
criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or
that he was generally considered to be insane—his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy—
the legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant
to overcome this presumption” (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
“Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition”
(U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
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VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980d 333
People vs. Ambal
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article
12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109
Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an
imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his
acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not insanity,
especially considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed
his wife. (Cruz case.)
“There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such
a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
who get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man,
often, if not always, acts like a madman, The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.
The popular meaning of the word ‘crazy’ is not synonymous with the legal terms ‘insane’, ‘non compos
mentis’,‘unsound mind’, ‘idiot’, or ‘lunatic’.” (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
“The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity.”
(People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
“One who, in possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shielded from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse
the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it
was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity.” (State vs. Stickley, 41 Iowa
232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-
year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders,
cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120 Phil.
14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, “What Medicine Can Do For The Law”, traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
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VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980 335
People vs. Ambal
“In the early stages of our law, wayback in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The
insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often
get one. He had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits. This was
what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense were
expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he
was incapable of appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right
and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was
sometimes said, between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there
was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.
“The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the House
of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of Mc-Naghten, who was tried for the murder
of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.”
In the M’Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: “To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the
act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.”
In the M’Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M’Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the
private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
minister. M’Naghten shot Drummoned, thinking he was Sir Robert. M’Naghten labored under the the
insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that the prime minister was one of them.
Medical evidence tended to prove that M’Naghten was affected by morbid delusions which carried him
beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was
incapable of controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the “test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is
the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act
which is the subject of the inquiry.” (Coleman’s case, 1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called “irresistible impulse” test which means that “assuming defendant’s
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty.” The commission of the crime is
excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease
he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie
Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that “the so-called right-wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible
impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person
alleged mental incapacity.” “An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his
unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having
such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement of
deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of in-
337
VOL. 100, OCTOBER 17, 1980 337
People vs. Ambal
jury or of a physical or mental disease.” (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430
[1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, “the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity
to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test.”
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M’Naghten case exists along with the “irresistible
impulse” test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although
he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
“Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or ‘Product’ rule, also permits inability to
distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that
topic, it would appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions
and that the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is
not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized.” (21 Am Jur 2d
118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence.
The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment
and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or
defect.
 The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going
to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser
penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of
aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ambal
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Concepcion Jr. is abroad. Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Barredo, J. (Chairman), I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local
jurisprudence cited in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly dissertation by Justice Aquino in his
main opinion deserve full study and consideration, but I prefer to livish myself to the rulings on insanity in
our jurisprudence which I feel adequately provide enough basis for clear judgment.

Abad Santos, J., concurring:

I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide and reclusion perpetua is the correct penalty.
However, I wish to add these observations: The wife of the appellant appears to have been a shrew. The
worst thing that can happen to a person is to have an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglecful
wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at time and prior to her death she failed to buy medicine
for her husband who had influenza and even had the gall to tell him, “mas maayo ka pangpatay.” This,
together with the mental condition of Ambal described in the main opinion, should entitle him to two
additional mitigating circumstances, namely: obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6, R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.)
To be sure, the presence of these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the reduction of the
penalty because Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code prevails over Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code.
(People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the circumstances the appellant is deserving of
executive clemency and I so recommend.
Decision affirmed.

[No. L-3246. November 29, 1950]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant and
appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITES.—In
order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely
of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to
the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
1. 3.ID. ; ID. ; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES.—Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding in his favor of the
mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code and the fact that the accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy,
he is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article—
that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; PENALTY.—The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code is composed only of two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusión perpetua to death. Altho
the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the said code is the one applicable and
must be applied.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO THE CASE.—When the court
believes that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next
lower to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner
he sees fit.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Palacio, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
659
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 659
People vs. Formigones
Luis Contreras f or appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusión perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The f ollowing f acts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wif e, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From
there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of
the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay
or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs
of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from
the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and
causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down
the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms,
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this
position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest
daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein
he admitted that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his
statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often
660
660 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Formigones
saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit
relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the def endant
entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the
provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and
that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in
the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself
without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from Inside
into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and
we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco
Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only f rom f eeblemindedness
and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the.time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code are copied
661
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 661
People vs. Formigones
from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We
quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on. the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to
48
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing 'the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; 18 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
be a total deprivation of freedom of the will For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or f reedom of
will, because mere abnormality of hismental faculties does not exclude imputability.19
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equalled to imbecility or
insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are
always reputed to be volun-tary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciuosly, in order
to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved."
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being- feebleminded or eccentric. or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United
States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil., 88), we quote the following syllabus-
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes 110 further than to indicate that the accused was
moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while
in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the
defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse."
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school
age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the
pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his wif e whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as
an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The f act is that he
believed her f aithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to
the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D,
it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones,
the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo
was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All
this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the
body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and
lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought
that she had betrayed him. Al though he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort
to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily
admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written
statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his
conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent on proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the
justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the
doubt and we therefore decline to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand,
the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his f avor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the
accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power."
To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article,—that of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently
killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246
for parricide, which is reclusión perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to
the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which f orms a period in accordance with the provisions
of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is
composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the
application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like
that of reclusión perpetua, to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present
case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil.
37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice
Arellano said the following:
"And even though this court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances
of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could
not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of
Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article
81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code). (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which,
under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph
2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and
"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition
be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in
the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the
next lower."
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in
affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusión perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusión perpetua, to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court
further observed:
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude
as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency
after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement."
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited,
and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention
of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusión
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes,and Jugo, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result.
Judgment modified.

G.R. No. 129291. July 3, 2002.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Exempting Circumstance; Insanity; The law presumes all acts to be voluntary
and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.—In considering a plea of insanity as a
defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated,
the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove
that he is legally so; What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense.—
Accused-appellant’s acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes
on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the
commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, “A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.” Then, too, the medical findings showing that
accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing
on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense.
Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he
should be held liable for his felonious acts.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Br. 47.
______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valledor
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin B. Padon for accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch
47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of murder,
attempted murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
“That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting
upon the latter stabbed (sic)wound on the chest, which was the immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”2
In Criminal Case No. 9401, for attempted murder:
“That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Ricardo Maglalang thereby inflicting
upon the latter physical injuries on the different parts of his body, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of murder directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance that
______________
1Penned by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
2Rollo, p. 12.
655
VOL. 383, JULY 3, 2002 655
People vs. Valledor
is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
In Criminal Case No. 9489, for frustrated murder:
“That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill with treachery
and evidence (sic) premeditation and while armed with a butcher knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic) Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his
right forearm, thus performing all the acts of execution which produce the crime of murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that
is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health.
Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty.5 Thereafter, the cases
were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand
trial.6 This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting
circumstance of insanity. The lower court thus conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the following
facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street,
Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together
with his first cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio
Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa
______________
3 Rollo, p. 13.
4 Rollo, p. 14.
5 Records, p. 54.
6
Records, p. 110.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valledor
was across the table. Antonio was on the left side, while Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right
side of Roger.7
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Roger’s nickname (“Jer”) and
immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on
the right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, “Ako akabales
den, Elsa” (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and
Antonio unharmed.8
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a
commotion and saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was wounded. Antonio learned from
the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise stabbed by accused-appellant.9
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated
for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm.10
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980, accused-appellant suspected
him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one occasion, Elsa
spat on and slapped accused-appellant.11
Accused-appellant’s defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
 Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Disoriented as to time, place and person
and employed as provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January 1990, Pacita
Valledor, his mother noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For days he was restless DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a
rapist and a thief. This prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to the National Mental Hospital,
practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that insanity runs
Metro Manila for proper medical care and evaluation soonest.17
______________
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on accused-appellant by Dr. Guia
Melendres of the National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of which reads:
7
TSN, September 26, 1995, pp. 24-27; November 17, 1995, p. 10. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATION:
8 TSN, September 26, 1995, pp. 28-32; 36-41.
9
TSN, November 17, 1995, p. 19.
10 Exhibit “B”, Records, p. 215.
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental and psychological examinations the patient
11
Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This
TSN, September 26, 1995, pp. 41-43.
is a thought disorder characterized by deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory
657
hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of
VOL. 383, JULY 3, 2002 657 insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This
People vs. Valledor
is characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by continued use
in their family. After examining accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering from despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical
“psychosis with schizophrenia.”12He prescribed a depressant known as Thoracin, which kept accused- problems.18
appellant sane for a period two months.13 Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting strangely. She left to buy likewise presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.19
Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to be found.14 ______________
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen swimming across the
river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuñez and Barangay 17 Exhibit “2”, Records, p. 65.
Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accused-appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat. 18
Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be Exhibit “1”, “1-e”, Records, p. 33.
19 TSN, July 11, 1995, pp. 4-9.
killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuñez, asked Councilman
659
Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a
jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction VOL. 383, JULY 3, 2002 659
I at the intersection of the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly, accused-
appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to chase accused-appellant, who immediately People vs. Valledor
boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody.15 On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by her thereof reads:
daughter who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and saw him “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby found guilty beyond
standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal
was “Pinatay niya kayong lahat.” Pacita dragged him inside the house and later learned that he killed and Case No. 9489; and of ATTEMPTED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9401 as charged herein. Accordingly he
wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the city is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9359; reclusion
jail.16 perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489; and imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN
______________ (10) YEARS in Criminal Case No. 9401. It is understood that the accused shall serve these penalties
successively or one after the other.
12
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon Rodriguez the
TSN, March 27, 1995, p. 6.
13
sum of P50,000.00 and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages,
TSN, February 28, 1995, pp. 5-8.
14
and the sum P15,000.00 for loss of income.
TSN, February 28, 1995, pp. 11-12.
15
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder at present as
TSN, February 21, 1995, pp. 7-19.
16 TSN, February 28, 1995, pp. 15-22.
certified to by the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, the service of his
sentence is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to Article 12 and 79 of the Revised Penal Code. He
658
(Enrico Valledor) is ordered shipped to and confined at the National Center for Mental Health,
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, for his treatment, until such time that he becomes fit for the service of
his sentence at the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. As to his civil liability, the same is
People vs. Valledor
subject to execution after this judgment shall have become final executory.
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa City interviewed accused- IT IS ORDERED.”20
appellant and thereafter made the following conclusions and recommendation, to wit: Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone assignment of error that:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY ILL, OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent THE (sic) TIME.21
The appeal has no merit.
______________
20
Rollo, p. 52.
21Rollo, p. 68.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valledor
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to
be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously.22
In People v. Estrada,23 it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be “so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.” He must be deprived of reason and act without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation
of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to
the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing
light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person’s general conduct and appearance,
his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as
well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means
of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether
the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.24
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably
show that accused-appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was
charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger
and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen
and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant, a
spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, “Ako akabales den, Elsa.” (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing
her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a
complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and
in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other
people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged,
but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by
calling out their names and uttering the words, “I had my revenge” after stabbing them. Finally, his act of
immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has
done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant’s acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his
clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the
time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, “A man may act crazy but it does
not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.”25 Then, too, the medical findings showing that
accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing
on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense.
Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he
should be held liable for his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and
not frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The
settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime
is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death.26
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an
attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Before
its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower would
be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. As there is no modifying circumstance, the
medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum, should be imposed. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for
attempted murder.27
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court correctly imposed upon
accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance was proven by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant’s civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated by evidence, the award
of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case
No. 9489, should be deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code may be recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen suffered some pecuniary loss but the
amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by way of
temperate damages should suffice.28
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly awarded by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to another P50,000.00 as moral
damages which needs no proof since the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of murder is
sufficient justification for said award.29 The heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled to the amount of
P29,250.00 representing actual damages30 based on the agreement of the parties.31
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1.In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2.In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages;
3.In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentneced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman) Vitug, Kapunan and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant. mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion
perpetua.
Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the
defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Br. 68.
the crime was committed.—Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
the very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered. The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting PANGANIBAN, J.:
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when
the crime was committed. Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for
Same; Same; Same; The alleged insanity should pertain to the period prior to or at the precise parricide with unintentional
moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter.—To repeat, insanity must have 583
existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must have been deranged even prior VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 583
thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible. Verily, his alleged insanity should have
pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at People vs. Robiños
anytime thereafter. abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the
Same; Same; Same; Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.
clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence.—Hence, appellant who invoked insanity
The Case
should have proven that he had already been completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim.
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely deprived of
Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo guilty beyond
intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to
confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence.
death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of
“WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
sanity.
parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
______________ of the victim; and P22,800.00 as actual damages.”3
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus
*EN BANC. inside her. It reads thus:
582 “That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Melecio
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robiños, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches
People vs. Robiños long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robiños, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the
Same; Parricide with Unintentional Abortion; Complex Crimes; Penalties; When a single act instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robiños, and the fetus inside her womb.”5
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty.7 After
imposed.—Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, due trial, the RTC convicted him.
the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in
accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: “When a single act ______________
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, x x x.” 1
Rollo, pp. 36-49. The Decision was written by Judge Cesar M. So-tero.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties 2
Also spelled “Robinos” in the records.
and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.—The 3 RTC Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 48-49; Records, pp. 196-197.
law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all cases in 4 Rollo, p. 11; Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose 5
Ibid.
one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 6
Atty. Domingo R. Joaquin.
The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed 7 Order dated July 27, 1995; Records, Vol. I, p. 30.
by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows: “In all cases 584
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof: x x x x x x x x x 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating 584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.” (Italics supplied) Hence, People vs. Robiños
when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed. Considering that neither aggravating nor

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution’s version of how appellant assaulted his
pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
1. “1.On March 25, 1995, at around seven o’clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños
was in his parents’ house at Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was
cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños,
who were at the sala, quarrelling.
2. “2.Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, ‘Why did you come home, why don’t you just
leave?’ After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw
appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from
where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant’s attack on
his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother’s house where
he reported the incident.
3. “3.At around eight o’clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the
victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San
Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother’s
house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995,
appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while
Benjamin was at his mother’s house, he received the more distressing news that his own
sister Lorenza had been killed by appellant.
4. “4.Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he was
afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother’s house, which was about 150 meters
away from his sister’s home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, ‘It’s good you
would see how your sister died.’
5. “5.Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police station
at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other
members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro.
The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk,
proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of
appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant
failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall
from the
585
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 585
People vs. Robiños
1. part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of
the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.
2. “6.Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and
holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He
was uttering the words, ‘I will kill myself, I will kill myself.’ Lorenza, who was lying on her back
and facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.
3. “7.The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant
away from Lorenza’s body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SP03 Martin.
Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the
help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However,
before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant
admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his
wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.
4. “8.Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale and not
breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza’s body for
autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to
be taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.
5. “9.After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling,
Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
‘The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different
parts of her body. ‘That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came
home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered
forty one (41) stab blows.
‘Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
‘Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long including
handle.’
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Robiños
1. “10.During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who
conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños’ body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as
evidence.”8
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks
exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
“Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented the
testimonies of the following:
“FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had occasional
quarrels[.B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person went [sic] inside their
house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the same thing to his
mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and exchanged heated words.
“LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio
Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself, ‘laging
nakatingin sa malayo,’ rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
“BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the
accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o’clock in the morning up to 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of prisoners.
Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
“DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as the
accused’s inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was lying down,
sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.
“MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their house
and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he was charged for
the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember
______________
8 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-6; Rollo, pp. 119-122. This was signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez,
Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Vida G. San Vicente.
 587 A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant’s claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 587
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the
People vs. Robiños brutal killing of his wife.
when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife.”9 As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this Court for preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all
review.10 and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son
The Issues
Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo’s testimony in part as follows:
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:

______________
“I
12 People v. Danao, 215 SCRA 795, November 19, 1992.
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. 13
People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, December 8, 1999.
Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity 14 People v. Condino, G.R. No. 130945, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 325.
classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type. 15
People v. Medina, 286 SCRA 44, February 6, 1998.
16 People v. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312, January 28, 1998.

“II 589
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 589
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant’s defense of insanity.”11
2002
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. People vs. Robiños
Main Issue “Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance talked to one and the other?
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation that
A: Yes, sir.
he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the
commission of the complex crime of parricide with unin- ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: Did you hear what they talked about?
______________
A: Yes, sir.
9 Q: What did you hear?
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 81-82. This was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Amelia C.
Garchitorena and Eden B. Chavez—all of the Public Attorney’s Office.
A: ‘Why did you come home, why don’t you just leave?,’ Sir.
10 This case was deemed submitted for decision on August 24, 2000, which is the deadline given by
the Court for the filing of a Reply Brief, which, however, was deemed waived as none had been filed by COURT:
appellant within the given period. In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.
11 Ibid., pp. 8 & 83. Original in upper case.

588 ATTY. IBARRA:

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do?

People vs. Robiños A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir.”17
tentional abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her
liability. brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and “ATTY. JOAQUIN:
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who relies on
the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?
when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of A: Yes, sir.
the commission of the crime should the ex-empting circumstance of insanity be considered.14
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in the house
every person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
of insanity has the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was
A: Yes, sir.
committed.
Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?
A: Yes, Sir. What is that, knife?
Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead? A: It’s a double bladed knife, sir.
A: No, sir.
______________
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Why? 18TSN, August 3, 1995, pp. 13-14.
591
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 591
______________ 2002

17TSN, August 1, 1995, pp. 9-10. People vs. Robiños

590 xxx xxx xxx
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED COURT:
People vs. Robiños He admitted to you that he killed his wife?
COURT: A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that he was amok? Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that,in tagalog,
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir. ilocano or what?
Q: How? A: What I remember Sir he said, ‘Pinatay ko ni baket ko’ meaning ‘I killed my
A: It’s good you would see how your sister died, Sir.”18 wife,’ Sir.”19
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of
have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse—a natural sentiment of a husband who had his act. Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of
realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay commission of the crime. Except for appellant’s 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,20 all the other defense
KagawadRolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in
and to the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdez’s testimony prison.
proceeded as follows: To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused
must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible.21 Verily,
“Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños?
his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the police criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated
on the matter as follows:
officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going around the
“It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all
house and when we saw blood, some of our companions removed the walling of the house probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without
and at that time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down as if at that moment, the contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of
the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these
wife of Melecio Robiños was already dead, Sir. circumstances may have
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?
______________
A: We talked to Melcio Robiños, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx 19TSN, February 6, 1996, pp. 11-14.
20TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 12-15. Federico Robiños testified that on March 23, 1995, or two days
Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?
before the date of the commission of the crime, his father told him that there was a person who was going
A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he killed his to enter their house who wanted to kill the father.
21 Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 2000 ed., p. 53.
wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.
22 331 SCRA 142, April 27, 2000.
Q: What is that weapon? 592
A: Double bladed weapon, Sir. 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
COURT: People vs. Robiños
conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state
of accused-appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the
act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial
is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete
evidence on the mental condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the
crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor, x x x.”23 (Italics
supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the
evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.24
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of
the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time
of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the
commission of the crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of his
mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data on the
matter.26
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering from
psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion was not
definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations were merely
conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
______________
23 Ibid., pp. 153-154, per Bellosillo, J.
24
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 ed., p. 213.
25 TSN, December 12, 1995, pp. 26-27.
26
TSN, January 9, 1996, p. 14.
27 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
28
Id., p. 16.
593
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 593
People vs. Robiños
“The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center for Mental
Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robiños was still mentally ill;
that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is possible that the sickness
have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and in her opinion accused was suffering
from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not in
his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion, xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the
mental, physical and neurological examinations on the acused seven (7) months after the commission of
the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental
derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the
accused immediately before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her finding is
conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background examination of the mental condition of the
accused before the incident by interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate with him.”29
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely deprived
of reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that
he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is
required to establish its existence.31Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required
to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death
penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not only baseless,
but con-
______________
29
RTC Decision, p. 11.
30 People v. Bañez, 301 SCRA 248, January 20, 1999.
31
People v. Danao, supra.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Robiños
trary to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of
the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition of the death penalty.32
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance
with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: “When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.”
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated
to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
“In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.” (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.35
595
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 595
People vs. Robiños
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable with death.
The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death—two indivisible penalties, the
application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case
No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005.*
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Minority; For a minor over nine years of age and under
fifteen to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong.—Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and
under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor
is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the
minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption
is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime—the capacity to know what
is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the
sense in which the term is used in moral wrong. However, such presumption is rebuttable. For a minor at
such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his
overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding
the corpus delicti.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy
to discern what is right from what is wrong.—The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove
that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved
the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an
agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes capacity of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
117
VOL. 448, JANUARY 13, 2005 117
Jose vs. People
the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution
failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he
conspired with his co-accused.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gatpayat & Bering Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch
36, convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article
IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing
98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis
(retired) and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. People
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
. . . [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received
an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former
Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug pushers from
Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2
William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was
provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe “money
bills” supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo
Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300
van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at
the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996,
pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny
Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga.
Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with
him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1
Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative.
He showed the aforecited bundle of “money bills.” Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out
the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle
of “money bills.”
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 22.
119
VOL. 448, JANUARY 13, 2005 119
Jose vs. People
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was
consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna
approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose. The buy-bust bundle of “money bills” and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp
Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13).
P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the
specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp.
31-36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic),
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered
them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph
Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
 They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another
car while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards
Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves
compartment of Sonny Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. He
tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro
even showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga’s mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarraga’s cellular
phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if
she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to
withdraw money from the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 83-84.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. People
bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw
the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarraga’s release. The agreement did not
materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the
money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted
the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought
them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga’s jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny
Zarraga’s car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using
Sonny Zarraga’s ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged
and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the
confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.”6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 84-85.
6 Id., at p. 88.
121
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Jose vs. People
I VOL. 448, JANUARY 13, 2005
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF
THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG
WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2
MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.7
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate
court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13)
years old when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when
the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The
appellate court denied the motion.
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 24-25.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. People
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that—
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13
YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED
SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.8
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over
nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from
criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as
provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege
in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the
prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that he
acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made
no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information that
the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabu subject of the Information
sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for the public
prosecutor to allege specifically in the Informa-
_______________
8 Id., at p. 8.
123
123
Jose vs. People
tion that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the A Yes, Sir.
acts he committed were wrong. Q Tell us.
The petition is meritorious. A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police officers?
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with A Yes, Sir.
a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove Q Please tell us.
his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.
of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime—the capacity to know what is wrong as Q And after that, what happened?
distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.13
the term is used in moral wrong.9 However, such presumption is rebuttable.10 For a minor at such an age ...
to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened11 to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
that it was wrong.12 Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts Q Who made the request for its examination?
before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the shabu?
the corpus delicti. A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container was it contained?
was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.14
the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale
he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car
which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the
and white soft paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white
handed the same to the poseur-buyer: paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu? bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions
A The two of them, Sir. for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer:
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them? ATTY. VERANO:
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir. Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?
Q And what was your response? A No, Sir.
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir. Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
Q And what happened next? A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.
A After that I showed my money, Sir. Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically . . . I withdraw that. A I don’t know, Sir.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?
question? A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not surprised that a young
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response? boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir. FISCAL:
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu? It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
A Yes, Sir. ATTY. VERANO:
Q What happened to the shabu? May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic) selling
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga. 100 grams of shabu.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu? COURT:
A He handed it to me, Sir. The witness may answer.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next? WITNESS:
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money, Sir. A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.15
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to? Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir. circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the public
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next? prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioner’s answers thereto:
A I made signs to my companions, Sir. FISCAL:
Q What signs did you give? Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir. COURT:
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal? Please proceed.
FISCAL: The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern
that you went to Manuela at 5 o’clock in the afternoon? right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to
WITNESS: commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy
A Yes, Sir. to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People
City, at 12 o’clock? v. Estepano,17 we held that:
A No, Sir. “Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s mental capacity to fully appreciate the
Q What time did you leave? consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to
A After lunch, Sir. show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police, you said that at April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he
one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
is that correct? prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this
A Yes, Sir. regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.”18
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the day that IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
you were arrested? CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone. 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.19
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car? No costs.
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male person at
the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the
key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM Megamall, is
that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?129
A No, Sir.
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not made any call?
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed that there was
already this group which met you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who arrested you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?
A No, Sir.
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
FISCAL:
No further question, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
No re-direct, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In support
of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an examination?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.16

G.R. No. 166040. April 26, 2006.*
NIEL F. LLAVE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Rape; The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses,
especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case.—While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any
abrasion or laceration in the private complainant’s genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s
testimony that the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does
not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case. According to Dr.
Castillo, the hymen is
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
377
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 377
Llave vs. People
elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting to its original form. The doctor testified that her
report is compatible with the victim’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner.
Same; Same; Witnesses; When the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen
to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credit to their account of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
to which they testified is not true.—Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on
record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of
substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a
nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that when the offended party is young and immature,
from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.
Same; Same; Same; There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their
daughter before she testified.—There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their
daughter before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the
tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would
damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.
Same; Same; Same; Rape is not a respecter of time and place.—That petitioner ravished the victim
not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner.
Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and even in
occupied premises. The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the odious act.
In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto
even as commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llave vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the
perpetrator.—Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be
offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical
certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible.
Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator. Thus, even without
the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence
beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; Minority; The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.—Article 12, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance
is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a
felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Carlo Bonifacio C. Alentajan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
379
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 379
Llave vs. People
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was
filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
“That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F.
LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by means of
force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to law.”3
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.4 One of their children, Debbielyn,
was born on December 8, 1994.5 In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary
School in Pasay City6 and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
2
Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez.
3
Records, p. 2.
4 TSN, November 18, 2000, p. 2.
5 Exhibit “H-2,” Records, p. 153.
6 TSN, October 24, 2002, p. 4.
7
TSN, November 4, 2002, p. 11.
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 20 TSN, November 6, 2002, p. 6.
Llave vs. People 21 TSN, November 11, 2001, p. 5.
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church.8 Adjacent 22
Id., at pp. 6-7.
to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 23 TSN, November 13, 2002, p. 10.
p.m.9 Next to Teofisto’s residence was a vacant house.10 24 TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 6.
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her 25 Id., at p. 7.
clothes and proceeded to her mother’s store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container 26 Exhibit “K,” Records, p. 156.
with the unsold quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, 27
TSN, November 18, 2002, pp. 4-5.
she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant 28 Id., at pp. 12-13.
house. There was a little light from the lamp post.12 She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner ordered her to lie 29
Id., at pp. 5-6.
down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his
382
own. He got on top of her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.15 She felt pain
and cried.16 She was sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time. 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl’s cries. He rushed to the place
Llave vs. People
and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of the
the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.17 She
Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed the victim who told her “Masakit
told her father about the incident.18 Her par-
ang pepe ko,” “Ni-rape ako.”30 Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child, and found no
injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia
_______________ minora.31 There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 o’clock position near the anal
opening.32 She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force or penetrating trauma (such
8
Id. as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body33) was applied to the perineal area34 not more than six
9 November 11, 2002, p. 4. or seven days before.35 The abrasion could have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no
10 Exhibits “M” and “5,” Records, pp. 158-159.
spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia;36 neither did she find any other injury
11 TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 11-12.
or abrasion on the other parts of the victim’s body.37 She concluded that her findings were consistent with
12 Id., at p. 19.
the victim’s claim that she was sexually abused by petitioner.
13 Id., at p. 18.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002, Marilou Santos
14 Id., at pp. 12 and 20.
arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been raped by petitioner who was then
15
Id., at p. 20. in his aunt’s house at Cadena de Amor Street. BarangayCaptain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay
16 Id., at p. 13.
Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody, and they did
17 Id., at pp. 13-17.
as they were told.38
18
Id., at p. 17.
381 _______________
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 381
30 TSN, October 30, 2002, p. 7.
Llave vs. People 31
Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 147.
ents later reported what happened to the police authorities.19Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was 32 TSN, October 30, 2002, p. 10.
a bad boy because he was a rapist.20 33 Id., at p. 15.
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their house to get 34
Exhibit “G,” Records, p. 152.
his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.21 He rushed to the 35
TSN, October 30, 2002, p. 21.
place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her 36 Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 147.
anus.22 The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, “Hoy, bakit ginawa mo ’yan?”23 Petitioner hurriedly 37 TSN, October 30, 2002, p. 21.
put his shorts on and fled.24 Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived.25 Later, Teofisto gave a 38
TSN, November 19, 2002, pp. 2-5.
written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident.26
383
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house. His daughter,
Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house by petitioner.27He VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 383
rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that
Llave vs. People
she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then left. 28 He then looked for petitioner
and found him at his grandmother’s house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to The Case for the Accused
the barangay hall.29 On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the abrasions in the
Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo. perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim.39 She explained that
the distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.40 The abrasion was
_______________ located at 1/4 of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High School.41 He had
19 been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best in
Id., at p. 18.
Mathematics.42 He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion from the
Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.43 He denied having raped the private complainant. ity, this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8)
He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice in years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).”53
the carinderia44and he saw her on his way back.45 He also met his father, who asked him what he had done The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim
to their neighbor. He was also told that the victim’s father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered
him.46 He did not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de petitioner’s declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.54
Amor Street in going to his aunt’s house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as appellant
aunt’s house.47 Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunt’s house and therein:
brought him to the barangay hall. He did
I
_______________
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY
39
TSN, November 21, 2002, p. 18. OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF
40 Id., at p. 22. BLEEDING.
41
Id., at p. 43.
42 Id., at pp. 54-55.
II
43
Exhibit “12,” Records, p. 91.
44 TSN, November 21, 2002, p. 45.
45 Id., at p. 48.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
46 Id., at pp. 46-47.
WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
47
BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTER’S FAMILY/RELATIVES.
Id., at p. 70.
384
III
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llave vs. People THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING
not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.48 CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.55
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.49While confined at the Pasay City Youth The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him.
Home during trial, he had a crush on “Issa,” a young female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog)
about half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm.50 _______________
Nida Llave testified and identified her son’s Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears that he was
born on March 6, 1990.51 She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and 53 Records, p. 269.
Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the 54
Id.
private complainant. She went to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who 55 CA Rollo, p. 53.
threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de 386
Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.52
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. The 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
decretal portion of the decision reads: Llave vs. People
“FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the x x x Niel “WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant
Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot, is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent who is correccionalmedium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayormedium as the
only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted with the Death penalty. maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the amount of
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minor- SO ORDERED.”56
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,57 contending that the prosecution failed to adduce proof
_______________ that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in
a Resolution58 dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
48
Id., at p. 72. “As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his conduct during and
49 Id., at p. 49. after the “crime” betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have the mental
50 Records, p. 52; TSN, October 29, 2002, pp. 6-7. faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the
51 Exhibit “I,” Records, p. 154. prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his
52
TSN, November 21, 2002, pp. 8-9. grandmother’s house intimates that he knew that he did something that merits punishment.
385 Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient of several
academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of]
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 385
intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his
Llave vs. People age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.”59
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before this Court: VI

_______________ PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.60

56
Id., at p. 135. _______________
57 Id., at pp. 138-156.
58 Id., at pp. 191-193. 60Rollo, pp. 14-15.
59
Id., at pp. 192-193. 388
387
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 387
Llave vs. People
Llave vs. People The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) whether he was deprived
of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant,
ISSUES and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the
penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to
I the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation
before the Information against him was filed.
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points.
II He points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the
point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo’s report stating that there was no evidence
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE of injury on the victim’s external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victim’s testimony and
AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT. that of Dr. Castillo’s report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual basis of
III conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim’s testimony lacks credibility in view of her
admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through the protective
covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her testimony before
ARGUMENTS the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that
she did not understand the meaning of the word “rape” and its Filipino translation,
I 389
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 389
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE
MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE. Llave vs. People
“hinalay,” and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latter’s parents.
II Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud’s testimony has no probative weight because and had an ill-
motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house
rented by Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim’s parents to
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an inquest
III investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the
Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the absence of external
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT. injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim.
Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative
IV evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony
will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she was, in
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY. effect, saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioner’s evidence to prove ill-
motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible
that the victim and her parents would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofisto’s proddings.
V
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the rape based
on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
“Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is
presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with discernment. In the
instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence presented by the prosecu-
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llave vs. People
tion to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: “the discernment
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years
of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong” (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but
below fifteen years of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra
v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 476). Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his
annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that “discernment is more than the mere
understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and
15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act” (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G.
4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by
considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his
behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during
the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as his behavior
during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecution’s witness,
Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents
became aware of the charges against him and that private complainant’s father was looking for him,
petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmother’s
house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of
going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that
he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he was not least
aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would have immediately
391
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 391
Llave vs. People
confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent honor
student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation further bolstered that he acted
with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several
academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of
intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age
could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a
minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that
he had the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. This is important in
cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the
second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: “The second element of dolus is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability” (Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner was being held
for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment before, during and after
the rape incident. For a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. In
this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not,
therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner
acted with discernment.61
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin and not in
the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no consum-
_______________
61
Rollo, pp. 128-131.
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llave vs. People
mated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that the accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not
enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary
investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.—When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may
be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint
may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply
for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation
with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification62 of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the Information,
petitioner did not
_______________
62
Records, p. 1.
393
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 393
Llave vs. People
execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information was
filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition
for bail.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from finding
out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such
preliminary investigation.64
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant as
charged in the Information. In People v. Morata65 the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how slight,
or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs past
Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the
conclusion that the rape was consummated.66 6:00 p.m.?
From the victim’s testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner’s penis touched the middle
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the
extent of the penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?
of consummation.67 She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant A: The things she used in selling.
house and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina: Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?
A: Yes, Sir.
_______________
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
63 Id., at pp. 13-17. A: Totoy pulled me.
64
See People v. Arce, Jr., 417 Phil. 18; 364 SCRA 550 (2001). 395
65 G.R. Nos. 140011-16, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 259, 275.
VOL. 488, APRIL 395
66
People v. Rafales, G.R. No. 133477, January 21, 2000, 323 SCRA 13, 27.
67 See People v. Morata, supra. 26, 2006
394 Llave vs. People
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q: Pulled you where?
Llave vs. People A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
Fiscal Barrera: Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?
Q: From what time up to what time? A: He told me to lie down on the cement.
A: From 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m. Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to school from A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.
12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.? Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school. happened next?
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you? A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
A: I went home. Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins, Maricaban, A: It was painful.
Pasay City? Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did he do to you?
A: Yes, Sir. A: He kissed me on my lips.
Q: And what did you do after you went home? Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips,
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother. what did you do?
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went? A: I cried.
A: It is near our house, walking distance. Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your
Q: What is your mother selling in that store? vagina and kissed you on your lips. What happened next?
A: She sells quail eggs. A: Somebody heard me crying.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling quail Q: Who heard you crying?
eggs? A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
A: Yes, sir. Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already? A: Totoy ran away.
A: Yes, sir. Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
 A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
parents. A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you? Q: Where is your “pepe”?
A: Yes, Sir.68 A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
_______________
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
68TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 11-13. Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case
396
penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus?
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A: Yes, Sir.
Llave vs. People Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis
On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
touched any part of your anus?
ATTY. BALIAD:
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.70
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his penis inside While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainant’s genitalia,
your vagina? such fact does not negate the latter’s testimony that the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The
absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a
A: I was lying down. young girl as in this case.71 According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time? reverting to its original form.72 The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victim’s
testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:
A: He placed on top of me.
Atty. Baliad:
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or “Totoy”
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.69 _______________
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus, the victim
declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of petitioner 70
TSN, November 6, 2002, pp. 2-3.
penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged: 71 People v. Osing, G.R. No. 138959, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 310, 318.
72 TSN, October 30, 2002, pp. 22-23.
Atty. Baliad:
398
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or “Totoy”
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
Llave vs. People
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
_______________ Q: Where is your “pepe”?

69 A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Id., at p. 20.
397 Q: Where is your anus?
VOL. 488, APRIL 397 A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
26, 2006 Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in
Llave vs. People your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir. A Both are my signatures, Sir.73
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant’s anal orifice
of your anus? could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir. Fiscal Barrera:
xxxx Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person
Fiscal Barrera: inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on the abrasion could have been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the
report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the evening vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?
of September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, A: It is possible, Sir.
you interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic) Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator is
“masakit ang pepe ko, ni- rape ako,” would your findings as contained in this Exhs. “B” and “C” a 12-year-old minor?
be compatible with the allegation if the min or victim that she was sexually abused on A: I only found it out, Sir, when I testified.
September 24, 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.? Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his
Atty. Baliad: penis?
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother. A: Yes, sir.
Court: Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person
What is your objection? can have erection?
Atty. Baliad: A: Even infants have an erection.74
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who made the
_______________
complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera: 73TSN, October 30, 2002, pp. 13-14.
74TSN, November 21, 2002, p. 23.
The answer were provided. . . . .
400
399
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 488, 399
APRIL 26, Llave vs. People
Petitioner’s contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into testifying is barren
2006 of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous
Llave vs. People manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable
counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.
Court: It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven-year old Grade II pupil, could have
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true.75 The Presiding Judge of the trial court
observed and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found her testimony
of the minor. Overruled. Answer. credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its assessment of
Witness: the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings,
are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked,
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor. misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision.
Fiscal Barrera: We have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen,
courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to
Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. “B” and “C,” at the lower portion of these which they testified is not true.76
Neither do we lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication and
two exhibits there appears to be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella concoction of the private complainant’s parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that
Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that doctor? the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus, petitioner testified as follows:
_______________
75See People v. Pardillo, Jr., 346 Phil. 971, 984; 282 SCRA 286, 297 (1997).
76
People v. Doqueña, 68 Phil. 580, 583 (1939).
401
VOL. 488, 401
APRIL 26,
2006
Llave vs. People
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias
Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of
any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?
A: I don’t know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn’s
parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any reason
as to why they would file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old
daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.77
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter before she testified.
No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s
psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.78
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by petitioner,
Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife reported the matter to
the barangay authorities. This manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for
his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate
the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be
committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises.79 The presence of people nearby does not
deter rapists from committing the odious act.80 In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the
private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that
a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to
prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical certificate,
her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible.
Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.81 Thus, even without
the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence
beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofisto’s testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the
demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave
a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and
narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner.82 In the absence of proof of
improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.83
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal
knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial court’s ruling.
_______________
79 People v. Belga, G.R. No. 129769, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 678.
80 Id., at pp. 683-684.
81
See People v. Reñola, 367 Phil. 415; 308 SCRA 145 (1999).
82 Exhibit “K,” Records, p. 156.
83
People v. Jamiro, 344 Phil. 700, 720; 279 SCRA 290, 309 (1997).
403
VOL. 488, APRIL 26, 2006 403
Llave vs. People
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under
fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the
exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is
an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. 84 On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and during the trial.85 The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s
cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the
pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his
dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled
from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his
grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay
tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even received
awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in
a quiz bee contest.86 At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment in
raping the victim under the following facts:
“Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question,
he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof,
and during the time he was studying therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that
the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his
behalf during the trial of this case.”88
The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the
People; hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.

G.R. No. 158057. September 24, 2004.*
NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Self-Defense; There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of
criminal law.—The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he
adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA—by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in
complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the
trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories—(1) that he killed the victim
to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
95
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 95
Toledo vs. People
hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time
because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense
in the realm of criminal law.
Same; Same; Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means.—Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He
is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme
and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends.
Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; The basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence
of negligence on the part of the accused.—The basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence
of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or
culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency,
an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Same; Same; Same; Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove,
with clear and convinving evidence.—Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under
Article 12, paragraph 4
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Toledo vs. People
of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial
and appellate courts for resolution.
Same; Same; Same; By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or
without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses.—
By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without intention of causing
it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his
affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Self-defense; To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened
to prove the essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to
prevent or repel the aggression.—To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the
essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel
the aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
97
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 97
Toledo vs. People
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23742 affirming
on appeal, the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, in Criminal
Case No. OD-861, convicting the petitioner of homicide.
In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with homicide allegedly
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay
Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F. GUARTE, which causes (sic) his untimely
death.
Contrary to law.”3
In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which was synthesized by the
appellate court as follows:
“On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When he went
home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September 4, 1998, p. 2), appellant saw
the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house of the
Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. Appellant’s house is about five (5) meters away from
the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise.
Thereupon, appellant proceeded inside his house and went to sleep
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired), with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Francisco F. Fanlo, Jr.
3 CA Rollo, p. 39.
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 against the door to block the entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands
Toledo vs. People
and body. The petitioner ran to the upper portion of their house and got his bolo.5 He returned to the door
(ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived at the Guarte house and
and pushed it with all his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand,
asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo
towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to
finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about
the floor.
twelve (12) meters away from the Guarte home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky came
back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down
for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) _______________
times (TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-3). Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant
4Id., at pp. 93-96.
stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked
5
appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the Exhibit “A”.
doorstep of his (appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and, without any 100
warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 8). Eliza had followed his son 100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard
Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and Toledo vs. People
supporting his body with his hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani
asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00 a.m. on September 17, 1995.
arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the
Romblon Provincial Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the decision
At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky had
reads:
sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated on (TSN,
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a MedicoLegal Certificate showing the injuries
homicide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and is meted the indeterminate penalty
sustained by Ricky, thus:
of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long, irregular-edged
(1) day of reclusion temporalminimum, as maximum.
at 8th ICS, left penetrating (operative findings):
Accused is condemned to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil liability to the heirs of the victim.”6
(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of the liver
The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner that his bolo
(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower lobe of the left lung.
accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
. . .”
On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:
99
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 99 OF RICKY GUARTE7
Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed the
Toledo vs. People
victim by accident; hence, he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied the
(Exhibit “C”) petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to
prove that he acted in self-defense.
The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death as:
CAUSES OF DEATH: _______________

Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest 6CA Rollo, p. 47.

7
Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock Id., at p. 31.
101
Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 101
injury 2º to stab wound
Toledo vs. People
(Exhibit “B”)4
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not finding
The Evidence of the Petitioner that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be acquitted of the
The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his way crime charged.
home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s friends, Michael The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house, having a drinking spree. He homicide based on the evidence on record.
ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went to his house, locked the door with The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of the
a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from RTC convicting him of homicide, on its finding that he failed to prove that he acted in complete self-defense
Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and admonished them when the victim was hit by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in complete self-defense when his
not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed; he pulled out bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set
 For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense
with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the
RTC is correct.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA
that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:
In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower court, it is our humble
submission that the death of Ricky Guarte was merely a sad and unwanted result of an accident without
fault or intention of causing it on the part of accused-appellant. We submit, there were clear and
indubitable factual indi-
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Toledo vs. People
cators overlooked by the lower court, bolstering the theory of the defense on accidental death.8
However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense, thus:
A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted in self-defense.
The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Silvano, 350 SCRA 650)9
However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
_______________
8Rollo, p. 39.
9Id., at p. 15.
103
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 103
Toledo vs. People
on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a
different point of view. To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse
party.10
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in
the trial court and foisted in the CA—by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-
defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and
appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories—(1) that he killed the victim to defend
himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said
defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of
criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate
and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use
of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate
acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human
affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins
when necessity does, and ends where it ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, in-
_______________
10 See Chua v. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 54 (2003); Roxas v. Court of Appeals,391 SCRA
351 (2002); Bacaling v. Muya, 380 SCRA 714 (2002).
11 People v. Javier, 377 SCRA 300 (2002).
12 Bishop, A Treatise on Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 9th ed., pp. 559-560.
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Toledo vs. People
jures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed
not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand,
the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence
of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The
basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent.
The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but
there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute
free will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16
Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and appellate courts
for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without
intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused
fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.
The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on his
part to cause it.
_______________
13
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1970 ed., p. 149.
14
Id., at p. 213.
15 Id., at p. 214.
16 Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 375 (1999).
105
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 24, 2004 105
Toledo vs. People
The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the
exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz.:
 1. 1.A person is performing a lawful act;
Q With his left hand?
2. 2.With due care;
3. 3.He causes an injury to another by mere accident; A With his both hands and body.
4. 4.Without fault or intention of causing it.
Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance, the left side of
the body was the first to fell (sic) down, correct?
To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, thus:
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door and you ran away?
Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?
A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) downstairs and got my
A Yes, Sir.
bolo and at that time the body of Ricky Guarte was at the entrance of the door and accidentally
Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position, correct?
the bolo reached him.
A No, Sir, pointing the door.
Q Where did you get the bolo?
Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?
A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house.
A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.
Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him?
Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door, correct?
A Not hacking but accidentally.
A “Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang,” meaning I was able to get away from hitting any part of the door.
Q What do you mean by accidentally?
Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you were pointing
A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the bolo which I was
directly your bolo at the door, not any part of the door hit the bolo (sic), correct?
carrying hit him accidentally.
ATTY. FORMILLEZA:
Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?
It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.
A In the stomach.17
COURT:
...
Answer.
Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the center part of the
A No, Sir.
door, correct?
107
A No, Sir.
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 107
Q Where was your right hand?
24, 2004
A Holding a bolo.
Toledo vs. People

_______________ PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:

Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it,
17
TSN, 4 September 1998, p. 6.
correct?
106
A Yes, Sir.
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of
Toledo vs. People
your body hit the door, correct?
Q Where, in what part of the door?
A No, Sir.18
A Right side.
The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and threatened to kill him as the
Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened? said victim pushed, with his body and hands, the fragile door of his house:
A It was opened. Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?
Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct? A I was at the door.
A No, Sir. Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?
Q Now, why was it opened? A Yes, Sir.
A Because he was pushing it. Q What did he do, if any?

A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab you?
Q What did you do?
A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or telling you not to make
noise.
Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you?
A He pushed the door.
Q Whose door did he push?
A My own door.
Q Where were you when he pushed the door?
A Inside our house.19
We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.
First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and
the victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to adduce
real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical
injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.
Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top
of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The
claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his claim
that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to them
that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:
Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your bolo, you did not
surrender to the police, correct?
A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the afternoon.
Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to surrender,
correct?
A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.
Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have surrendered, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the police what
happened, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of September 16,
1995, correct?
A No, Sir.21
Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit the
victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay captain or the police authorities. Such failure
of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim and that he acted
in self-defense.22
Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether complete
or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the
CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete:
The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was
established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give a semblance of
verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at
appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw
stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility
may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in
any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s
want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon
was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing
Ricky. Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression. In People
vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held:
“x x x (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, [un]expected attack or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr.,
supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149[1989]) and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of
real aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful aggression must be such as
to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or of a relative sought to be
defended and not an imagined threat.”
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life necessitating
his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack
or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such
element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.
Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-
defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.25
Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty
of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.

G.R. No. 136844. August 1, 2002.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 RODOLFO CONCEPCION y PERALTA, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Exempting Circumstances; Requisites to be entitled to the exempting
circumstance of accident.—The existence of accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction
of the court. For this to be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere
accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.
Same; Same; Treachery; Conditions to be present to constitute treachery.—To constitute
treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that give
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder,
under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance only.—We note that treachery, though stated in the information, was not
alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No. 130523,
January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 69, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and
the acts and omissions constituting it, but should also specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to
murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Consequently, the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not
murder.
Same; Same; Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1,
2000, every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances.—We find that the trial court misappreciated as an aggravating circumstance the fact that
appellant was a policeman on duty at the time of the killing. The information charging appellant bears no
mention of this aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took
effect on December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must
______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
75
VOL. 386, AUGUST 1, 2002 75
People vs. Concepcion
state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given
retroactive effect in the light of the well-settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of official position, not having been alleged in the information, could
thus not be appreciated to increase appellant’s liability.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Br. 65.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal
Case No. 9776, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On January 22, 1998, an information2 for murder was filed with the trial court charging him with
murder allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about November 24, 1997 between 10:00 and 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. Cut-Cut II,
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with his Armalite rifle Lorenzo Galang hitting him at the different parts of his body and
as a result of which said Lorenzo Galang died instantly.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter trial commenced.
The prosecution relied mainly on the eyewitnesses Maximo Sison, Jr., an employee of Hacienda
Luisita, and Arturo Yarte, a
______________
1Rollo, pp. 53-57.
2
Id., at 4-5.
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Concepcion
tricycle driver, both of Barangay Cut-cut II, Tarlac City. Other prosecution witnesses were Orlando Galang,
brother of the victim Lorenzo Galang, and Concordia Galang, his mother.
Both MAXIMO SISON, JR. and ARTURO YARTE testified3 that between 10:00 and 11:00 in the evening
of November 24, 1997, Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got involved in a quarrel at the town
plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for questioning by Barangay Captain Remigio Capitli.
Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of
Lorenzo, who was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, appellant thrust the barrel
of the gun against the abdomen of Lorenzo. Then there was an explosion. Lorenzo was shot in the thigh.
At least three more shots were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According to Sison and Yarte, appellant
shot Lorenzo deliberately. Lorenzo died instantly.
ORLANDO GALANG, the victim’s brother, recalled that he arrived at the scene of the crime after
Lorenzo was slain.4 According to him, his brother was not brought to the hospital.5 Orlando testified on
the anguish he suffered for having lost his brother.6
CONCORDIA GALANG, mother of the victim, testified that Lorenzo worked at the Hacienda Luisita and
was earning P1,000 more or less a week.7 According to her, Lorenzo was 27 years old when he died. He
was married and had two children.8 As a result of Lorenzo’s death, the Galang’s incurred expenses
amounting to approximately half a million pesos.9 Concordia Galang presented a list of these expenses
amounting to P257,259,10 but without supporting receipts.
In his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION claimed that the shooting was only accidental.
According to him, he was investigating Lorenzo for the latter’s disorderly behavior at the town plaza when
it happened. He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and unruly, and even verbally challenged him to fight. At
this juncture, according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his
gun. The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit.11
Defense witnesses ESTELITA BALUYOT and MILAGROS VILLEGAS corroborated appellant’s story. They
said they witnessed the incident because they were among the bystanders who saw the event happen
from the time Lorenzo was brought to the barangay hall for investigation until he was shot.
Estelita and Milagros testified that Lorenzo was seated while being questioned and pacified by
appellant. Appellant was then standing. All of a sudden, according to the lady-witnesses, appellant fired
two warning shots in the air. Lorenzo stood up and grabbed the barrel of the gun which was then pointed
upwards. When it fired, Lorenzo was hit.12
On November 10, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of
murder. Its fallo reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder punished and
defined by Article 248 in relation to RA 7659, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 for his loss
Q: Earlier, you stated at the time you arrived at the barangay hall, Rodolfo Concepcion was eight
of life; P120,000.00 as expected income; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.”13 (8) meters away from Lorenzo, at that time Rodolfo Concepcion shot Lorenzo Galang, how far is
Seasonably, appellant filed his notice of appeal. In his brief, he makes but one assignment of error:
Rodolfo Concepcion from Lorenzo Galang?
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED
WERE UNINTENTIONALLY INFLICTED WHILE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS IN THE A: He was near him because he approached him, sir. He was very near.
xxx
______________
Q: How many times did Rodolfo Concepcion shot (sic) Lorenzo Galang?
11
TSN, November 5, 1998, pp. 2-10. A: The first firing were two (2) shots, sir.
12 TSN, October 15, 1998, pp. 2-13; TSN, October 20, 1998, pp. 2-8.
13
Q: Was Lorenzo Galang hit?
Rollo, p. 57.
78 A: No sir.

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q: At the time Rodolfo Concepcion fired these two (2) shots, according to you, it was near his left

People vs. Concepcion ear?

COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS LAWFUL DUTY AS A POLICE OFFICER.14 A: Yes, sir.
The sole issue in this case is whether appellant is exempt from criminal liability. Under Article 12 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, among those exempted from criminal liability is: Q: How far is the barrel from the ear of Lorenzo Galang when he fired those two shots? Will you
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without indicate by pointing your left ear?
fault or intention of causing it.
A: Less than a foot, sir.
Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt
of the accused.15 However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises Q: When you are referring to the barrel of the gun which was pointed at the left ear of Lorenzo,
an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident
how far is the barrel of the gun from the ears of Lorenzo?
as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance
under Article 12 (4) of the Code. A: The barrel was “lampas tainga” so Lorenzo was not hit, sir.
The existence of accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this to
Q: What happened after that?
be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused
was performing a lawful act with due care: (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there A: He put down and thrust the barrel of the gun toward the stomach of Lorenzo Galang, sir.
was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.16 Appellant must convincingly prove the presence of Q: After Rodolfo Concepcion thrust the barrel of his gun towards the abdomen of Lorenzo Galang
these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. However, his defense
utterly failed to discharge this burden. Thus, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court. what else transpired?
By appellant’s own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, appellant had an armalite and a A: Because he was hurt he tried to push the barrel of the gun, sir.
handgun. It is highly inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who is heavily
armed. Q: That did Lorenzo Galang use in pushing the barrel when Rodolfo Concepcion thrust it towards
We note, that appellant’s gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victim’s body. Was the stomach?
the discharge purely accidental? We don’t think so. As observed by the trial court, recklessly appellant had
put his finger on the trigger of his cocked and loaded rifle. In that state, with the slightest movement of A: He just pushed a little bit to remove the barrel of the gun from his abdomen, sir.
his finger,17 the rifle would fire readily. And it did not just once but several fires. Q: After that what happened?
Appellant claims that the victim Lorenzo, who was drunk at the time, was brought to the barangay
hall for investigation. Lorenzo became unruly while being questioned, so appellant was constrained to fire A: After pushing the barrel of the gun simultaneously the firing and hitting Lorenzo at his right
two warning shots in the air to frighten him. However, the latter stood up and immediately grabbed the thigh, sir.
nozzle of the gun and pulled it towards him. The gun accidentally went off and hit Lorenzo in the body. To
buttress his claim, appellant rationalizes that he could have killed Lorenzo immediately while creating Q: What did Lorenzo Galang do after he was hit on the right thigh?
trouble at the plaza, if that was indeed his intention. Since he did not, appellant posits that there was no A: Because Lorenzo was seated, he was lifted from his seat, sir.
intent on his part to kill Lorenzo.
But we note patent inconsistencies in his claims. He testified on query by the trial court that when he Q: Incidentally at that time when Rodolfo Concepcion placed the barrel of his gun about a distance
was pacifying the victim, his rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel, with its barrel pointed to the away from the ear of Lorenzo, how far was Lorenzo Galang positioned that time?
floor. At that instance, the victim grabbed the barrel of the gun which accidentally fired.18 However, on
A: He was leaning on the chair sir.
direct examination by his defense counsel, he testified that the victim grabbed his rifle only after he had
fired the two shots in the air. Q: What about Rodolfo Concepcion how was he positioned when he fired those first two shots?
His claims do not square with and could not overcome the testimony of prosecution witnesses on this
score. Note that Maximo Sison, Jr., an eyewitness, categorically declared that he saw appellant shoot the
A: He was standing, sir.
victim with an M-16 armalite.19 On direct examination, Sison testified as follows:
 27 People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, 350 SCRA 679, 696 (2001).
Q: Now after the right thigh of Lorenzo Galang was hit by third shot what else transpired? 28 ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances.—The following are mitigating circumstances:
A: He again thrust the barrel of his gun on the chest or towards the chest of Lorenzo and xxx
20 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that
simultaneously fired the gun.
he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
The autopsy report corroborates Sison’s testimony that the victim had three gunshot wounds: one at the
prosecution.
right nipple, another at the mid-femur (thighbone), and another above the knee.21 Likewise, Sison’s
xxx
declaration on material details coincide with those narrated by Arturo Yarte, a, barangay tanod who also 29
People vs. Barnuevo, G.R. No. 134928, September 28, 2001, p. 10, 366 SCRA 243, citing People vs.
witnessed the shooting incident. There is no proof of ill motive on the part of Sison and Yarte that could
Espanola. G.R. No. 119308, 271 SCRA
have impelled them to falsely testify against appellant. In fact, Sison was appellant’s childhood friend.22
84
The trial court found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. As hereafter explained,
however, in this case treachery is only an aggravating and not a qualifying circumstance. 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
To constitute treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means People vs. Concepcion
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.23 Here, treachery was clearly present considering Lorenzo was 27 years old at the time of his death. His mother testified that he was earning P1,000 a week
that the victim was totally unprepared for the barrage of gunshots made by appellant. It was undisputed during his lifetime or an annual income of P48,000. In the absence of proof of his living expenses, his net
that the victim was brought to the barangay hall for questioning. He had submitted himself to the authority income is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income.30 Using the above formula, we fix the indemnity
of the barangay officials and to the police authorities. He was seated, thereby excluding any insinuation for loss of earning capacity of Lorenzo at P848,000, thus:
that he was violent and unruly. He was weak from drinking at the time so that he had very little physical Net earning capacity = 2 (80 - 27) x [P48,000 - P24,000]
ability to cause harm to anyone, more so in the presence of the barangay captain, barangay tanod and a
police officer in the person of appellant.24 3
From the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with the prosecution that appellant consciously = 2(53) x P24,000
and purposely adopted the means of attack to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
3
However, we note that treachery, though stated in the information, was not alleged with specificity
as qualifying the killing to murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No. 130523, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA = 35.33 x P24,000
69, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions
= P848,000
constituting it, but should also specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Since the information
We find the award of P50,000 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to be in accordance with
in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under the present
existing jurisprudence.31 This civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim without
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,25 treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance
need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. 32 As for moral damages, the
only. Consequently, the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not murder.
amount should be reduced to P50,000 also in accordance with existing jurisprudence. 33 The award of
Further, we find that the trial court misappreciated as an aggravating circumstance the fact that
P10,000 as attorney’s fees is sufficient and justified.
appellant was a policeman on duty at the time of the killing. The information charging appellant bears no
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9776,
mention of this aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took
convicting appellant Rodolfo Concepcion of the crime of murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
effect on December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also
Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
the aggravating circumstances.26 This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
day of reclusion temporal , p. 14, 372 SCRA 344; People vs. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, December 5,
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.27 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of official
2001, p. 23, 371 SCRA 480.
position, not having been alleged in the information, could thus not be appreciated to increase appellant’s
as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity,
liability.
P50,000 as moral damages, P848,000 as lost earnings, P10,000 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.
At any rate, appellant’s immediate surrender to police authorities after the shooting should be
SO ORDERED.
credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal Code.28
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza and Corona, JJ., concur.
In sum, we find appellant guilty of homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and one
aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant’s sentence should be within the range of prision mayor as
minimum, and the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.
As to the award of damages, the trial court offered no explanation for the award of P120,000 as
expected income. This figure is without basis. The victim’s lost earnings are to be computed according to
the formula adopted by the Court in several decided cases, to wit:
Net earning = 2/3 x (80 - age of the a reasonable portion of the annual net income
capacity at the time of his x which would have been received by the heirs for
death) support29

______________

[No. 1352. March 29, 1905.]
THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS ET AL., defendants and
appellants.
1. 1.COERCION.—Held upon the evidence that the defendant Baculi was exempt from
responsibility under article 8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code.
1. 2.EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS.—Extrajudicial confessions not made voluntarily can not be
received in evidence. (Act No. 619, sec. 4.)
1. 3.FAILURE TO REPORT A CRIME.—Failure to report to the authorities the commission of a crime
is not an offense punished by the Penal Code.
freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on
a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission.)
352
352 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Osborn
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to
be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally
liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Defendants acquitted.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Hipólito Magsalin, for appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

MAPA, J.:

The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years
of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger,
because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the
burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears
351
VOL. 4, MARCH 29, 1905 351
United States vs. Caballeros
that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only
does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro
Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the
Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but
that he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots
he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the
latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force
(par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any
way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the
contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in
the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt,
made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter
states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says
that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It
appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that
the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other
defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made

G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004.*
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Defense of Uncontrollable Fear; Requisites for the defense
of acting under an uncontrollable fear to be invoked.—The only question of law raised—whether the
defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability—has to be
resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent;
and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.—
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear
for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful,
or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that
it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
221
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 221
Ty vs. People
Same; Justifying Circumstances; State of Necessity; Requisites to exempt the actor from liability
under par. 4, Art. II of the Revised Penal Code.—The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to
exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it.
Same; Same; Same; If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.—In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option
to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Same; Same; Same; For the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared
should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor.—For the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.
Same; Bouncing Checks Law; Evidence; It is presumed, upon the issuance of the checks, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.—As to the issue
of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates
a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration or for value. In
alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration. She must
present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
Same; Same; Same; The law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.—The law punishes the mere
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. People
act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within
its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. As this Court
held in Lim v. People of the Philippines, “what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and
the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element
under B.P. Blg. 22.”
Same; Same; Same; Knowledge of insufficiency of funds legally presumed from the dishonor of the
checks for insufficiency of funds.—Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
Same; Same; Same; The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and
intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.—The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack
of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an
offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice
and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.
Same; Same; Penalty; Administrative Circular 12-2000, adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals and Lim v. People, authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases
subject to certain conditions.—We agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of
imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad
faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000, adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v.
People, authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain
conditions.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Marvin L. Herrera for petitioner.
223
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 223
Ty vs. People
The Solicitor General for the People.
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (“Ty”) filed the instant Petition for Reviewunder Rule 45, seeking to set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July
2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before
the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465.
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
“That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on
account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to
Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
_______________
 1 Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R. Bello, television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of
Jr. her mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s
2
Entitled “An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds suspending medical treatment of her mother. The “debasing treatment,” she pointed out, so affected her
or Credit and for Other Purposes.” mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not
224 be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the
hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
checks to effect her mother’s immediate discharge.11
Ty vs. People Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that
Contrary to law.”3 Ty issued the checks
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The
data are hereunder itemized as follows: _______________
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
9
Supra, note 3 at p. 61, citing Exhibits “E” and “E-1”.
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 P30,000.00 10
Id., at pp. 46-47; See also Respondent’s Comment, Rollo, pp. 60-61 and Respondent’s
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00 Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 90-91.
11
Id., at pp. 47 and 49.
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
226
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
Ty vs. People
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00 subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.004 defense.12 Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.5 of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila “CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid
Doctors’ Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient’s daughter, Ty obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7)
signed the “Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment” in the Contract of Admission dated 30 counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
October 1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in the imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
amount of P657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 SO ORDERED.”13
May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the two patients Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her
amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed defense that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury.” She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when
evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee
_______________
had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not
have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and equity.14
3 Rollo, p. 44; See also Rollo, pp. 92 and 109. In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
4 Ibid.; See also Rollo, pp. 62 and 93. modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty “to pay a fine of sixty
5
Id., at pp. 44, 62, 93. thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.”15
6
Id., at p. 46; Exhibits “C” and “C-1”.
7 Ibid.; Exhibits “D”, “D-1” to “D-3”.
8 Exhibit “D-4”.
_______________
225 12
Id., at p. 48.
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 225 13
Id., at pp. 44-45; Written by Honorable Zenaida R. Daguna, Presiding Judge.
14 Id., at p. 51.
Ty vs. People 15 Id., at p. 53.
payment of the obligation in installments.9 To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several
227
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the
amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 227
bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the “Account Closed” advice.
Ty vs. People
Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand
letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.10 In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater the checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes
injury.” She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum.
hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor
alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.16
 Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance
of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.17
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v.
Court of Appeals18wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P.
22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.19
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of
Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
1. A.THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR
COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
2. B.THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A
GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
_______________
16
Id., at pp. 51-52; Citations omitted.
17 Id., at p. 51.
18 G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656, 659.
19 Supra, note 3 at p. 53.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. People
1. C.THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
2. D.IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK
OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
3. E.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD
NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check
issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as
an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment,
the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an
obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.21
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially
affect the disposition of the case.22 Jurisdiction of
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 90-102; Dated 11 September 2002.
21
Id., at pp. 95-96; Citations omitted.
22 Spouses Villarico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999, 309 SCRA 193; Lim v.
People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436.
229
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 229
Ty vs. People
this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law
ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at
by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that
the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable
consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a
greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial
court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and
rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice
below, rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised—whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant
her exemption from
_______________
23
Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127523, 22 March 1999, 305 SCRA 118; Perez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107737, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 43; Baguio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
119682, 21 January 1999, 301 SCRA 450; Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436.
1
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. People
criminal liability—has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must
be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.25 It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s life or limb.26 A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote.27 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.28It
must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she
was compelled
_______________
24People v. Petenia, No. L-51256, 12 August 1986, 143 SCRA 361, 369.
25U.S. v. Elicanal, No. 11439, 35 Phil. 209, 212, 213 (1916).
26
People v. Abanes, No. L-30609, 28 September 1976, 73 SCRA 44, 47; People v. Loreno, No. L-54414,
9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311, 321, 322; People v. Serrano, No. L-45382, 13 May 1985, 136 SCRA 399, 405.
 27 People v. Jesus, No. L-2313, 88 Phil. 53, 56 (1951); People v. Palencia, No. L-38957, 30 April 1976, 71
SCRA 679, 690; See also Aquino, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1997 Edition, Vol. 1, p. 234 and
Gregorio, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 1997 Edition, p. 79.
28 People v. Tami, G.R. Nos. 101801-03, 2 May 1995, 244 SCRA 1, 23.
29 People v. Villanueva, No. L-9529, 104 Phil. 450, 464 (1958), Citation omitted; People v. De Los
Reyes, G.R. No. 44112, 22 October 1992, 215 SCRA 63, 70; See also People v. Nuñez, G.R. Nos. 112429-
30, 341 Phil. 817, 828; 276 SCRA 9 (1997).
231
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 231
Ty vs. People
to issue the checks—a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged—for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment
of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words,
the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She
did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very
own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.30 And if indeed she was coerced to open an
account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid
involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result
in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor
issue postdated checks “because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem.” 31 Besides,
apart from petitioner’s bare assertion, the record is
_______________
30
Supra, note 3 at 15 and 112; See also TSN dated September 19, 1994, p. 24.
31 TSN dated September 19, 1994, p. 25.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. People
bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petitionand Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in
this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability
under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be
greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.32
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought
to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable.33 Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks
to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not
have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.34 In
this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s
hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been
half as bizarre had Ty been able to
_______________
32 Par. 4, Art. 11, REVISED PENAL CODE.
33
Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1998 Edition, Book 1, p. 191.
34 Id., at p. 192.
233
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 233
Ty vs. People
prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances,
however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted
the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case35 for damages
filed by Ty’s mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench.
While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported
by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from
liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.36 Section 2437 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same
for a consideration38 or for value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were
issued without considera-
_______________
35
Entitled “So Un Chua v. Manila Doctors’ Hospital,” Civil Case No. 63958, Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 159.
36 Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436; Sec. 24, THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW.
37 SEC. 24. Presumption of consideration.—Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to
have been issued for valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have
become a party thereto, for value.
38
SEC. 25. Value; What constitutes.—Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or preexisting debt constitutes value, and is deemed such whether the instrument
is payable on demand or at a future date.
39 SEC. 191. Definitions and meaning of terms.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
xxx
“Value” means valuable consideration.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. People
tion. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. “Valuable
consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility,
to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable
consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract,
such as the maker or indorser.”40
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the
care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with
them and by force of her signature on her mother’s Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility
for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because
she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v.
Vann, et al.41 tells us that “it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that
there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was
a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the
promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the
release and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the
requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation
for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.”
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as
to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely
guarantee the obligation.43 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting
them into circulation.44 As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,45 “what is primordial is that
such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time
of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.”
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of
B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. 46 If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.47
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds
with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank
is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the
offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.48
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals49wherein this Court inquired into the
true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to
persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not
warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are
different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued
to cover a “warranty deposit” in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the
deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while
privatelyfinancing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus
became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a leasepurchase agreement. The maker
did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and
not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual “account or for value.”
Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks
were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof
that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-
2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals51 and Lim v. People,52 authorizes the non-
imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the
Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-200153 which clarified
Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide
that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be
deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or
otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused
unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions
on subsidiary imprisonment.54
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant,
Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing
the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed with modifications.

No. L-54414. July 9, 1984.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL
y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Robbery with double rape; Exempting Circumstances; Acting under the compulsion of
an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury; Nature of
the compulsion and the force, to be exempt from criminal liability.—A person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force must be
irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Same; Same; Same; Admission of appellants as to their participation in the commission of the crime
of robbery and rape and absence of threat and assistance from the man who allegedly forced or threatened
appellants, and other established facts, negate the claim of appellants of having acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury.—A perusal of the appellants’ statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint
brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery
and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent
with appellant’s claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible fores and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or
_______________
*EN BANC.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
greater injury. x x x The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno
brought Beata Monge to the master’s room and the teacher’s room where he made her open the trunk
and the “aparador” with her keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the
sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after
the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher’s room and seeing Cristina
Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Direct proof of conspiracy, not necessary where appellants’ acts, though
separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of
interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions; Liability of conspirators as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation.—All these demonstrated the
voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though separately
performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest and
concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the
need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the
accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of
interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, and
the degree of actual participation by each of the conspirators is immaterial. Conspiracy having been
established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
Same; Same; Penalty; Aggravating Circumstances; Crime of robbery with double rape committed
by more than 3 persons, all armed, in conspiracy with each other, aggravated by band, nighttime and
dwelling, punishable by death; Death penalty, however, was commuted to reclusion perpetua for lack of
votes.—The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was committed on January 7, 1978 by more than
three persons, all armed, in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by
death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
313
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 313
People vs. Loreno
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y
Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape,
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe,
who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation
upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his family and on
the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry
away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth ....................... P 400.00
Two birthstones rings worth ................................................ 700.00
One wedding ring with name ‘MONDING’ ........................ 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape ........................................... 100.00
Two pieces of necklace gold worth ..................................... 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net ................................................. 70.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted .............. 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth ........................... 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration ....................................... 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle ............................................. 30.00
One caserole ........................................................................ 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case ................................................... 12.00
Two cans of rice .................................................................. 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries ................................. 30.00
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED

People vs. Loreno
Two bottles of Johnny Walker wine .................................... 450.00
Two T-shirts one mark Marlboro and plain white ............... 20.00
Five bags of assorted sizes ................................................... 200.00
One lady’s wrist watch Bulova ............................................ 50.00
One men’s wrist watch Enclock 17 jewels .......................... 150.00
One eagle pin US gold ......................................................... 200.00
One baby wallet containing cash ......................................... 57.00
Three live chickens .............................................................. 30.00
One waterproof jacket reversible 40.00
.........................................
Cash money in assorted denominations all paper bills 7,000.00
........
TOTAL ................................................... P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the
aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all
against their will.”1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea
of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of
which read:
“ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided
by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO
(2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 8-9.
315
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 315
People vs. Loreno
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias Monge
in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment. In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify
Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each.”2
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, are as follows:
“In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single,
then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance to
be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge,
was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The
other occupants present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then
13 years old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fabie. Cristina was
then vacationing at her parents’ house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o’clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fabie
saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias
Monge saying that there was a letter from the chief (hepe). Fabie called Elias Monge who was in the sala,
informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the
other in dark sweater, came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark
sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark
sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony
(pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22,
_______________
2Decision, pp. 4-5.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
1979 AM; pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When he and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica
to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: “Kami mga
NPA”, which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her just what she came to
know about their visitors. Cristina Monge attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held
back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. When
Elias Monge turned to look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those
inside to lie on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 12-13, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
In the meantime, outside at the balcony the man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass of water, and
the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of water, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the
sala. Hence, Fabie himself went inside the house to fetch the glass of water. But, as he went inside the
sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in
red clothes poked his gun on Fabie’s back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he was
pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala. which was lighted, Fabie saw and recognized the man
in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw
and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark
sweater. All the occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain
lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM;
pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM; p. 5,
tsn, Oct 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied
them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby’s hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which
he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim’s hands together behind their backs. Thereafter, the
man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog away. Loreno held Fabie
and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp. 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; p. 6, tsn, Oct.
19, 1979 AM).
 On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the
person of Jimmy Marantal. Fabie immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who
317
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 317
People vs. Loreno
remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fabie, and
seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the ground.
Marantal kicked Fabie who managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno
lifted Fabie bodily from the ground, and brought him back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 13-
14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fabie returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and
dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied. Inside
the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was
none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her.
Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then made her lie on the floor near the bed.
After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but
he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with her. She could not do anything to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he
was through with her, she noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM; pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM; pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge’s parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle she
put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling
them not to rise if they wanted to live. Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and
then to the teacher’s room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador and
the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala, holding on
to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms were poured on the floor of
the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct 18, 1979 AM; pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM;
pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM; pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair
was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for
a can of pineapple juice from the aparador in the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned
his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented by school teacher
Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City).
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled
although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which caused
her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she regained consciousness,
the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (pp. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 11-12, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher’s room, a third man
entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead
a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and
when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and
he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as
he was still tied. Reacting to Monge’s reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar
plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the
house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany
Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling
her husband not to go along. Loreno desisted from his plan to go to the nearby neighbor’s house. Elias
Monge did not recognize the identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM;
pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark
sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch her
private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was
approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her
daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by
one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the
sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not
to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the
place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
319
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 319
People vs. Loreno
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was on the ground near the fence of the house
calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall. Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he was not
feeling well, and Agapito left. Elias Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others.
Fabie then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized
Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them.
Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when
they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly
sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct 19, 1979 AM; p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at P1,000.00’ two mosquito nets, P70.00; three blankets, P200.00; one caldero
of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach
towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500.00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or
less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter’s daughter married a member of the
youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already known Loreno
whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place booby traps in his (Monge’s) place
to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house. Monica Monge and Cristina Monge
also had already known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often
saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where she was studying. Fabie
had also known Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth
organization, and he (Marantal) even married one of its members. He had engaged Marantal in
conversation many times (p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979 AM; pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of his daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful evening,
Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC
detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk to there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at
Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
and his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC to
the hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina
Monge was informed that there was no need for her to submit for physical examination because she was
already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979
PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company, stationed
at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was informed by
Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the robbers
in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to identify two of the
robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same
day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal
and brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly
identified upon confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters
Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper Fabie. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to
give their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias
Monge, Francisco Fabie, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being
identified both said suspects told their victims if they could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge
replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family. The two
suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM;
pp. 1-5, 6, 8-12, tsn Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination’s result was negative. But the doctor
found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as “resolving hematoma, right cestal
region”, a close wound, already spread out but in the process of healing, located on the right side of the
middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as
there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical
certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit “A”; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; p. 19, tsn, Oct, 18, 1979 AM).
321
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 321
People vs. Loreno
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital, examined Monica Monge on
January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen, she
found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock locations and, inserting her
index finger inside her patient’s sex orifice, it easily admitted her forefinger. She had the patient’s vagina
smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination. The doctor observed that the
lacerations did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish
and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible
penetration of a male’s penis into the patient’s vagina. The doctor further explained that the laceration of
the hymen heals after five days. She also explained that male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina
at the most for 72 hours. She stated that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual
intercourse, any sperm must have already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10,
1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-
28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit “B”).3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted
that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978,4 but they were only forced by
a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People’s
Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families
would be killed. We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without
will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
_______________
3 pp. 6-18, Appellee’s Brief.
4 p. 2, Appellants’ Brief.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.5
A perusal of the appellants’ statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief
(pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and
rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent
with appellant’s claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. 1.Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark
sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun
to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p, 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979
PM).
2. 2.When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned
himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to
Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned
himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary
participation in the criminal acts.
3. 3.Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the
hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he
got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. 4.When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she
was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno’s immediate reaction was to point
his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted
to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the
master’s room and the teacher’s room where he made her open the trunk and the “aparador” with her
keys and got the contents which he
_______________
5People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450.
323
VOL. 130, JULY 9, 1984 323
People vs. Loreno
brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina
Monge in the teacher’s room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and
tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fabie went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the
flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his
flashlight on the approaching Fabie. Upon seeing Fabie, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing
him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal’s reaction towards Fabie was due to the fact that Fabie had
recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fabie who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a
warning to Fabie not to report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the
authorities.
 Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of
Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two
companions who earlier went up the house. As a “lookout” or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions
effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing
that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The
foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed
their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which
constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be
inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and
concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to
establish the existence of conspiracy,7 and the degree of actual participa-

_______________

6
People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.
7People vs. Verzo, 65 SCRA 324.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Loreno
tion by each of the conspirators is immaterial.8 Conspiracy having been established, all the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was committed on January 7, 1978 by more than
three persons, all armed,10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by
death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the accused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With
costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova,Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., no part.
Makasiar, J., partial dissent. Appellant Jimmy Marantal is guilty of robbery only; no clear proof
that he knew Monica Monge was being raped and even if he did, he could not prevent it if he was on the
ground outside the house as look out.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on official leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
 to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant
[No. 1481. February 17, 1004.]
Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown,
THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. LIBERATO EXALTACION ET AL., defendants and
dressed as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the
appellants.
forest and there compelled.him by threats of death to sign the document now on page 2 of the record;
that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano
CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; DURESS.—The defendants were captured by brigands, who
and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that
compelled them, by threats of death, to take and subscribe an oath to support the Katipunan Society,
as soon as they were released they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the
an organization created for the purpose of subverting the Government by force: Held, That the duress
presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and
under which the defendants acted relieves them from criminal liability.
reported to him the fact that they had been captured.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon—of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
whom the last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Señor Testa, the president of
Alberto Barretto, for appellants.
Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him—all testified to the same fact and
Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to
President Testa and to the witness Morales.
TORRES, J.: The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the
accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an inf ormation penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below.
charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, 342
subsequently to the
342 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
340
340 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Querido vs. Florendo
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnaped by brigands who belonged to
United States vs. Exaltacion the Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity,
4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct
Government of the United States. in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently
purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the
case made and provided. bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and
that the two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before having that of the def endant Tanchinco nor the fact that Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he
captured a number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, a so-called general of bandits, was captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.
situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been
papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must
the said documents when they were exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of
they had signed the said documents under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to this decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information and
obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this statement was made in the house of the parish priest guidance. So ordered.
of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination Arellano, C. J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
as witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had Defendants acquitted.
signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been
captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such
in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnaped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in
Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to
carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of
the mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and
alleged that they did so under compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that
the defendant Tanchinco was captured
341
VOL. 3, FEBRUARY 17, 1904 341
United States vs. Exaltacion
in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who
asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place
called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been unable

No. L-22947. July 12, 1979.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO BORJA, PEDRO FUSTIGO, INOCENCIO DEMEN,
RUFINO PAVIA, FELIPE BENAVIDES, DOMINADOR DE LOS SANTOS, JOHN DOE, and RICHARD DOE,
defendants-appellants.
* EN BANC
341
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 341
People vs. Borja
Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Aggravating circumstance of promise or
reward although not alleged in the information but proven during the trial can be considered generic
aggravating circumstance.—We reject the contention of the five accused; for while it is true that the
aggravating circumstance promise or reward was not alleged in the information, nevertheless, it was
proven during the trial, and therefore can be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance, though
not a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, et al., L-20860, November 28, 1964,
12 SCRA 530).
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Lack of Instruction; Extenuating circumstances as lack of
instruction must be proven postively; Lack of instruction refers not only to illiteracy but also to lack of
intelligence.—The five accused contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor:
lack of instruction; fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive. We find no merit in this contention. The
argument of lack of instruction is based on the allegation that the five accused did not finish primary
education. But the defense adduced no proof to establish the existence of this circumstance, leaving in full
force the holding that extenuating circumstances must be proven positively and cannot be based on mere
deduction or inference. (PP. vs. Sakam, et al., 41566, December 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27). If by “lack of
instruction” the defense refers to illiteracy, it is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance, for
there must also be lack of intelligence. (PP. vs. Gorospe, L-10644-45, February 19, 1959, 105 Phil. 184; PP.
vs. Ripas, L-6246, May 26, 1954, 95 Phil. 63; PP vs. Semañada, L-11361, May 26, 1958, 103 Phil. 790; PP.
vs. Tengyao, L-14675, November 29, 1961, 113 Phil. 465).
Same; Same; Same; Fear not considered a mitigating circumstance; Reason.—The second
mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is “awe and fear of Pedro Borja.” But the element
of fear is not one of those enumerated as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article
13. If the defense refers to the element of “uncontrollable fear or duress” which is an exempting
circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12, the argument is still invalid, for it has been held
that the element of duress should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb and
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. (PP. vs. Quilloy, No. L-2313, January 10, 1951, 88 Phil.
53). We find no evidence to support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the other accussed.
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
Same; Same; Flight; Flight is an admission of guilt; Conspiracy; When conspiracy attaches, it is
unnecessary to prove previous agreement to commit the crime.—He eluded his trackers for more than two
months until his capture, To flee the fold of the law is to admit that one has transgressed that law. (PP. vs.
Wilson, et al., 30012-15, March 7, 1929, 52 Phil. 907). Borja’s uncontested actions would be gratuitous and
illogical, unless located within the frame of conspiracy, which is their only reasonable context. The
evidence shows that Borja acted in concert with the other accused in pursuance of the same objective.
Hence, conspiracy attaches and it is no longer necessary to obtain proof as to the previous agreement or
decision to commit the crime. (PP. vs. Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388; PP. vs. Peralta, L-19069,
October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP. vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812).
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Conspiracy; When there is conspiracy,
treachery is considered against all the offenders.—Treachery was present because Gancayco was killed
while he was unarmed, and surrounded by enemies with firearms, including two grease-guns. Thus,
Gancayco was deprived of any means of defense while his enemies were exposed to no risk arising from
the defense which the offended party might have made. True, Borja was inside the bodega when the
shooting took place; but his physical absence does not exonerate him, for it was he who ordered the
execution. Moreover, where there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders. (PP. vs.
Carandang, et al., 32039, February 26, 1930, 54 Phil. 503).
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; Capture of accused, after killing
another and being a dangerous fugitive are not indicia of voluntary surrender to entitle accused to a
mitigating circumstance.—Lastly, Borja contended that, assuming he is criminally liable, the trial court
erred in not according him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. We do not
view this as error. It appears that Borja did not surrender but was captured on February 27, 1959. His own
witness, Captain Eliseo Farol of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, testified that he received a report that
Borja was holed up at Barrio Sumakap, Cavinte, Laguna. Accordingly, he sent a ranger team which located
the house and called on Borja to come down. As the house was surrounded by soldiers, Borja offered no
resistance. Capt. Farol also testified that while Borja was at large, he killed a PC soldier in an armed
encounter at Catanuan, Quezon, as a result of which he was in-
343
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 343
People vs. Borja
dicted for murder in the court of first instance in that province. Capt. Farol also declared that a
prize of P2,000.00 was put on Borja’s head for being a dangerous fugitive. These are not indicia of the
personality seeking voluntary surrender.
Barredo, J., separate opinion:
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; The imposition of death penalty would amount to a cruel one
where for 19 years the appellants have been under detention prisoners under deplorable conditions in the
national penitentiary.—As stated in the main opinion, all the appellants have been under detention for
more than twenty years. More than that, they have been living under the shadow of a sentence of death
since September 8, 1960, almost nineteen years ago. In the light of these facts, I hold that while
unquestionably, appellants deserved the death penalty at the time they were sentenced by the trial court,
the passage of so many years of mental torture under the deplorable conditions obtaining in the national
penitentiary during all those years has transformed that penalty into a curel one within the contemplation
of the human proscription of the Constitution against the inflicting of cruel and unusual punishment.
(Section 21, Bill of Rights.)
Same; Same; Same.—It was certainly no fault of appellants that proceedings leading to their final
conviction by this Court now have been prolonged beyond the reasonable period for the purpose. And it
is hardly of any materiality at this juncture, to inquire where the fault for such a happenstance actually
lies, for it cannot lessen the extreme agony they have already undergone. I do not believe it can be denied
that living under the shadow of a sentence of death for more than ten years, what with the deplorable
conditions in the death row and other parts of our national penitentiary, is a life that can be worse than
death itself. Indeed, such as unusually long waiting amounts to cruelty, which should never be added—
and the law, I dare say, does not contemplate that it may be added—to the penalty of death.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Supreme Court has to hasten decision on appeals involving capital
offenses.—It goes without saying that the Supreme Court can itself prevent the occurrence of such
situation as herein contemplated—by hastening the disposition of the unusual number of appeals
involving capital offenses pending before it. That is easier said than done. Multiple compelling factors have
contributed to cause such a lamentable backlog, and while
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
remedial measures being taken may eventually minimize or altogether solve the problem, what is
important at the moment is that we cannot escape the reality that until the desired improvement shall
have materialized something has to be done for the poor innocent victims of the situation, in the interest
of humanity and justice.
APPEAL from the consolidated decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay. Quicho, J.
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. People vs. Borja
Manuel M. Antonio for appellant Borja. secret meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following morning at the
Isidro T. Bangayan (Counsel de Oficio) for other appellants. Hacienda San Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco, Albay. That same evening,
Demen cleaned a .45 caliber pistol The conference over, all eight men slept in the bahay-pulungan.
ABAD SANTOS, J.: When they woke up the next day, December 19, 1958, the eight men held an early-morning
conference. Balimbing aired to Borja his grievances against Santiago Gancayco, Jr. the manager of the
hacienda. Balimbing charged that it was Gancayco who killed Balimbing’s cousin at Rawis, Tabaco, Albay.
This is an appeal from the consolidated decision of September 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of
Balimbing further complained that it was Gancayco who ordered that the camote plantations of the
Albay, in Criminal Case No. 2578 for murder, and Criminal Case No. 2590 for frustrated murder, both
hacienda squatters—who were related to Balimbing—should be bulldozed. It appears that Balimbing was
bearing the identical titles, PP. vs. Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe
only rehashing what he had already related to Borja several months before, at the AFAG regional
Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, John Doe and Richard Doe.
headquarters at Pili, Camarines Sur.
The decision convicted the accused, as follows:
That same morning, the eight men left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. They were armed as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 2590, the Court, fully convinced that Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen,
Borja had two pistols tucked in a shoulder holster; Pavia had a .45 caliber pistol; Balimbing had a hunting
Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and Dominador de los Santos, are guilty beyond the peradventure of
knife with a scabbard; and Fustigo had a pistol. They were attired as follows: Borja wore a khaki suit, black
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, hereby sentences each of them to jacket, buri hat, and sunglasses; Demen wore a khaki suit; Fustigo wore a blue shirt and khaki pants; de los
undergo imprisonment ranging from six (6) years, one (1) month, and eleven (11) days of prision mayor,
Santos wore a red T-shirt, brown jacket, and maong pants; Benavides wore denim pants and printed polo
as the minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal,
shirt; Pavia wore a striped polo shirt and denim pants with jacket; Balimbing wore white pants; and Oljina
as the maximum; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended party, Salustiano
wore a brown polo shirt and khaki pants.
Isorena, in the sum of P5,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, severally and jointly, but not to
In Tabaco, the group went to Barrio San Jose, where they ate breakfast at the house of de los Santos’
undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, by reason of the nature of the penalty imposed;
brother. Upon Borja’s instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by Mariano Burac, who observed
and to pay the costs of this proceeding on equal basis.
at the trial that the eight men acted suspiciously and conferred sotto voce among themselves. They
In Criminal Case No. 2578, the Court after having been convinced beyond the realm of reasonable
crossed the bay, and the group disembarked at the hacienda. At a seashore conference, they agreed to
doubt of the guilt of Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides pose as members of the Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to inspect the firearms of the
345
hacienda. At this time, Borja started to wear a pair of white gloves. They proceeded on their way, and
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 345 Balimbing tried to open the bamboo gate of the
347
People vs. Borja
and Dominador de los Santos, of the crime of murder, as principals, deeply hurting as it is, hereby VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 347
sentences each of them to the maximum penalty of death; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to People vs. Borja
indemnify the offended parties, Mercedes Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her children in the sum of
fence surrounding the manager’s house. He was accosted by Emilio Lanon, a security guard and barrio
P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago Gancayco, Jr., as a matter of law and practice, and another amount in
lieutenant of the hacienda, who was later one of the principal eyewitnesses for the prosecution. Balimbing
the sum of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, both severally and jointly, but not to undergo
and Lanon knew each other. Balimbing introduced his companions as PC soldiers, identifying Borja as a
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, by reason of the nature of the penalty imposed; and to pay
major and Pa via as a sergeant.
the costs of this proceeding on equal basis.
On Lanon’s advice, Balimbing proceeded to the office and emerged with Salustiano Isorena, the
In the decision, the trial court—pursuant to the Revised Penal Code, Article 5—recommended to the hacienda overseer. Isorena told Lanon to inform Gancayco about the presence of the visitors. Then, on
President, through the Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los Santos, “that
Pavia’s advice, he and Isorena went to the house, where Isorena informed Mrs. Gancayco about the
executive clemency be extended to him, or that at least his death penalty be minimized or commuted to
visitors. On Mrs. Gancayco’s suggestion, the group went to the office to await for Gancayco, who arrived
life imprisonment.” The court so recommended because “the testimony of this accused had contributed
later.
in a large measure to the Court in its pursuit of truth and justice in these cases.” It should be stated here
Gancayco shook hands with Borja and Pavia. He offered Borja a pack of cigarettes, from which Borja
that by resolution of January 24, 1966, the Court noted the contents of de los Santos’ motion withdrawing
took one stick. Informed of the group’s alleged mission, Gancayco instructed Isorena to present the license
his appeal in this case.
of the firearms. But Isorena failed to find the license in the office, so Gancayco went to the house to look
It appears that on December 18, 1958, the Anderson FilAmerican Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general
for it there. While in the house, he instructed his wife to prepare a meal for the guests.
meeting at the bahay-pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio Buragwis, Legaspi Gancayco returned to the office, gave the license to Isorena, and then left. Isorena presented the
City. The locale of the meeting was so chosen because many AFAG members are also Watawat members.
license to Borja, who remarked that the license listed only five firearms, as against reports received at the
One of the accused, Pedro Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a hundred
headquarters in Albay that there were ten firearms in the hacienda. Borja then ordered Isorena to produce
members. Borja, who has the rank of a full colonel, is the AFAG head for the entire Bicol region, which is
the firearms for inspection; Isorena, in turn, instructed Lanon to get the firearms. Lanon went to the house
said to have 36,000 members. He had good news for the members: he announced that their backpay was
and obtained a carbine, the magazine of which he removed; as well as a shotgun.
forthcoming at the rate of P36,000.00 for a ranking officer, and a lesser amount for those of lower rank.
On his way back to the office, he met de los Santos and Oljina, who took the firearms and the magazine
When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and members,
from him. Isorena again instructed Lanon to get the other firearms. In compliance, Lanon sent Jaime Rawit
including the other accused Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe Benavides, Dominador
to get the grease-gun from Lanon’s house, while Lanon himself went to Gancayco’s house to get another
de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina. (The last two, now deceased, are referred to in the title of grease-gun which had no magazine. Rawit and Lanon met at Gancayco’s house and from there, while
this case as John Doe and Richard Doe). At the
Lanon was carrying the two grease-guns, he met Demen and Benavides, who took them away.
346
348

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
The group had now succeeded in obtaining possession of four of the five firearms, and they were not able
to get the one remaining firearm only because it was with an hacienda employee guarding cattle some
kilometers away. An atmosphere of menace descended on the hacienda as the men loaded the firearms
and took a hostile stance. An apprehensive Isorena asked the equally perturbed Gancayco for instructions,
but was only cautioned to remain calm and deal courteously with the group, as Gancayco had already sent
someone to Tabaco to request police assistance.
During this time, Balimbing was investigating Lanon inside the bodega. Lanon was surrounded by
Balimbing with a hunting knife, Pa via with a .45 caliber pistol, and Benavides with a grease-gun. In the
course of his interrogation, Balimbing told Lanon that they were going to kill Gancayco, Isorena, Lanon,
and one Pablo Balimbing, chief herder of the hacienda, because these employees were bootlickers to the
Gancaycos. Then Balimbing pushed Lanon out of the bodega.
Gancayco and Isorena were talking at the balcony of the house. They were approached by Demen
who had a grease-gun, and Oljina who had a shotgun. De los Santos with a carbine posted himself under
the citrus tree near the water tank in front of the house. Gancayco asked to see a search warrant from
Demen and Oljina, who referred him to Borja. So Gancayco and Isorena descended and inquired for the
warrant from Borja, who was standing in front of the house. Instead of replying, Borja talked to Pavia, who
was near the guardhouse. Borja then called Balimbing and, referring to Gancayco and Isorena, ordered
him to “fix them up” since it was already getting on towards noon. Borja herded the other men of the
hacienda inside the bodega, where they were guarded by Benavides who was armed with a grease-gun,
and Fustigo with a pistol. Borja faced the hacienda personnel, holding in readiness his two pistols. Lanon
stood in front of him, facing out of the bodega.
In the meantime, Balimbing, Pavia, Demen, de los Santos, and Oljina escorted Gancayco and Isorena
towards the office. Isorena went up the stairs and turned around when he reached the top; behind him,
de los Santos held a carbine in a ready
349
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 349
People vs. Borja
position. Benavides asked Gancayco for the magazine of the grease-gun he was holding. When Gancayco
answered that it had no magazine, Benavides accused him of lying and sideswiped him with the grease-
gun. Then Benavides left for the bodega.
Now the men surrounded Gancayco in front of the office. Facing him was Balimbing, who was
swinging his hunting knife. Also facing him, to Balimbing’s right, was Pavia whose jacket, draped over his
left arm, concealed his right hand which held a .45 caliber pistol. To Pavia’s right was Demen, who was
aiming the grease-gun at Gancayco. Slightly behind Demen, Oljina aimed the shotgun at Gancayco.
Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing’s cousin, and demanded that Gancayco produce the
.45 caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the death. Gancayco explained that it was not
he but Solon Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing’s cousin, and that Gancayco had no such pistol.
Pavia interjected that it was unbelievable for Gancayco, as manager of the hacienda, not to have such a
pistol. But Gancayco insisted that there was none.
While this exchange was taking place, Gancayco, who was unarmed, stood with his back towards the
foot of the stairs. He was surrounded by Balimbing who held a hunting knife; Pavia who held a .45 caliber
pistol concealed beneath his jacket; Demen who held the grease-gun with his arms down and the muzzle
of the gun pointed slightly upward; and Oljina who held a shotgun. The four men were about two meters
away from Gancayco. Up in the balcony, de los Santos stood guard with a carbine in ready position,
standing slightly back of Isorena. Gancayco and the four men were about four meters away from Isorena
and de los Santos.
Gancayco had insisted that he had no .45 caliber pistol. At this fateful moment, Pavia suddenly jerked
his right hand upward and fired point-blank with his .45 caliber pistol at Gancayco. Hit, Gancayco stooped
to holed the pit of his stomach and cried, “Aray ko po.” Instinctively, he stepped backward and was turning
around when Demen fired at him with a grease-gun. He ran away in a crouching position towards the citrus
plantation, while Demen continued firing at him. Then
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
Demen aimed rapid fire at Isorena, who fell flat on the balcony floor. Demen’s line of fire accidental caught
de los Santos in the forehead.
At the outburst of gunfire, Borja rushed out of the bodega. He saw Gancayco running towards the
citrus plantation and he shouted: “Habulin! Habulin!” The men carrying their firearms gave chase; they
were led by Demen and included de los Santos. They ran along the road towards a cluster of houses in the
northern part of the hacienda, but they stopped in front of the house of Estrella Cortezano. Balimbing
asked Cortezano whether she saw where Gancayco went, but he got a negative answer. As the men ran in
pursuit, Gancayco traversed the citrus plantation and reached the cluster of houses. Although he was
bleeding profusely, he managed to cross the road and to open the gate by removing one of the bamboo
railings. He then turned towards the trail that wound through the abaca plantation at the left side of the
road.
While the pursuers tracked their prey, Lanon left the bodega by the back door and went to Gancayco’s
house. Mrs. Gancayco told him to close all the windows and take the children downstairs, and he complied.
Then he left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in the abaca plantation, climbing a small
hill towards another cluster of houses at the hilltop. Lanon found Gancayco bleeding profusely in the
breast.
Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda, were able to
rendezvous at the seashore. They got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards Tabaco, in the
hope of taking the wounded men to the hospital there. But this was not to be, for en route, Gancayco died
in the arms of his wife. His body was brought to Manila, where it was examined and autopsied by the
National Bureau of Investigation. Although seriously wounded, Isorena survived. He received first-aid
treatment at the Tabaco Hospital and was airlifted the next day to Manila where he was confined, first at
the North General Hospital, and then at the National Orthopedic Hospital Dr. Casiano Flaviano, a resident
Physician at the National Orthopedic Hospital who treated Isorena testified that the latter would have died
from his injuries had he not received immediate medical attention.
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VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 351
People vs. Borja
While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of eight men reached the seashore and chanced upon a
motorboat anchored there. Balimbing wrapped the four firearms in some anahaw leaves. When the men
discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline, they looked for another and dragooned
Bienvenido Taller into transporting them. Taller observed that the eight men were excited and
apprehensive. Balimbing told him, with some braggadocio, that they had just killed Gancayco and Isorena.
The men alighted at the lighthouse at Malinao and immediately afterwards, Taller reported to the police
authorities of the town. However, he was advised to report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had
jurisdiction over the case.
The eight men reached the poblacion of Malinao. On Borja’s orders, they bought a jute sack where
they placed the firearms. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen to make their separate way towards Barrio
Buragwis. Before he left with Demen, Pavia left his .45 pistol with Balimbing. The remainder of the group
boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi.
As the bus stopped near the market at Tiwi, another car overtook it and policemen from Tabaco,
headed by Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud voice called
for the surrender of all those in the bus responsible for the killing at the Hacienda San Miguel. He was
suddenly fired upon by Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him on the right cheek, and he
ordered his men to return fire. The encounter resulted in the death of Balimbing and Oljina; the capture
of Benavides and de los Santos; and the escape of Borja and Fustigo. Lt. Melanio Rey of the Tabaco police
confiscated the firearms, magazines, and ammunition taken from the hacienda; the .45 caliber pistol and
its shell; the hunting knife and its scabbard from the dead body of Balimbing; and other paraphernalia
from the dead bodies of Balimbing and Oljina.
 The encounter in Tiwi took place in the afternoon of December 19, 1958. Subsequently, the rest of
the band fell one by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo were arrested, and Borja, the
last one to fall, was captured on February 27, 1959 after a nationwide manhunt.
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
The trial judge characterized this narration of the shooting of Gancayco and Isorena as both watertight
and airtight. He found that the tenor of the evidence presented—consisting in the main of the testimoy
Isorena, an eyewitness; and of the accused de los Santos, who testified for the state during Borja’s separate
trial—was confirmed by the testimonies of the medico-legal expert and the ballistician. He noted that the
five accused who were separately tried from Borja admitted all the facts leading to the shooting, but
interposed the common defense of fear of Borja, who, they claimed, had threatened disobedient AFAG
members with death. The trial judge was not persuaded and he discounted this common defense,
characterizing it as “an after-thought to save their respective skins in the face of the overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution pointing to their voluntary participation in the commission of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder.” Instead, the trial judge found that the five men participated in the killing
“because they were inspired by the juicy thought or pro-mise of an enormous amount of backpay for
each.”
Borja, who was still at large at the time the five accused were being tried, had a separate trial. The
trial court found that he “has a version entirely distinct and separate from that of the five accused, which
version in turn is astronomically far from the evidence presented by the prosecution.” Borja washed his
hands of any complicity in the killing which he sought to lay at Balimbing’s door. Conveniently for Borja,
Balimbing is dead and cannot tell his tale. But like his colleagues, Borja failed to convince the trial judge.
Noting that Borja was the commanding officer of eight AFAG regiments in the entire Bicol region, while
Balimbing was just a sergeant, the trial court refused to believe that Balimbing openly defied Borja by
instigating the sanguinary episode at the hacienda. Instead, the trial court declared: “The contrary was the
real and painful truth. Pedro Borja was the leader of the group that raided Hacienda San Miguel, and he
was the very one who ordered the liquidation of Santiago Gancayco, Jr. and Salustiano Isorena.”
The trial court found that conspiracy was “conclusively established” and that “the guilt of all the
accused has been established by proof above the shadow of doubt.” It found
353
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 353
People vs. Borja
that the killing of Gancayco constitutes murder, while the shooting of Isorena constitutes frustrated
murder. The trial court held that either evident premeditation or treachery qualifies the crimes to murder
and frustrated murder; since the law requires only one qualifying circumstance, the other should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The trial court found five aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and
de los Santos, to wit:
1. (1)the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were committed by a band, or with the aid of
armed men;
2. (2)means were employed to weaken the defense, wherein is included taking advantage of
superior strength;
3. (3)craft, fraud and/or disguise were employed;
4. (4)there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and
5. (5)there was treachery or evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify
the crimes to murder and frustrated murder.
With respect to Pedro Borja in both cases, the trial court considered against him four aggravating
circumstances, consisting of the five above-mentioned, but excluding the promise of backpay. It found
another aggravating circumstance in the case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling. Hence, in the case of
frustrated murder, it found six aggravating circumstances against Fustigo. Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and
de los Santos; and five aggravating circumstances against Borja.
All the five accused in the first trial admitted practically all the evidence for the prosecution in their
testimonies in their own behalf, and additionally in their respective affidavits narrating their individual
participation in the commission of the two crimes. Moreover, they freely and voluntarily re-enacted the
crime at the hacienda, in the presence of the trial judge. The re-enactment proceedings were
photographed and tape-recorded, and bore out the version testified to by Isorena and Lanon,
eyewitnesses for the prosecution.
In the Brief for all accused-appellants except Pedro Borja, John Doe, and Richard Doe (John Doe and
Richard Doe refer
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
to Alejo Balimbing and Tito Oljina, who were killed during the encounter at Tiwi), the five accused—
Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos—do not deny their culpability for the offenses
charged. In their Brief, they prayed for the reduction of the penalty from death and its accessory penalties,
to reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties. They admitted with candor: “The finding of facts in the
decision of the trial court having been found to be a faithful narration of the incident as related during the
trial of the case and given in the two ocular inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it
would seem a useless endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts, . . .” (Brief for the Accused-Appellants,
except Pedro Borja, pages 6-7).
The five accused controverted the findings of the trial court that there were five aggravating
circumstances in the case for murder. Instead, they contended that the trial court should have appreciated
only three aggravating circumstances. They reasoned that any of the alleged aggravating circumstances
should necessarily be absorbed to qualify the crime of murder, thereby leaving only four aggravating
circumstances. Moreover, they argued that the aggravating circumstance of promise of backpay was not
alleged in the information, and consequently should not be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
We find that the trial court correctly considered that either treachery or evident premeditation
qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the other alternative circumstance should be considered as
aggravating. We reject the contention of the five accused; for while it is true that the aggravating
circumstance of promise or reward was not alleged in the information, nevertheless, it was proven during
the trial, and therefore can be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance, though not a qualifying
circumstance. (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, et. al., L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 530).
On the other hand, as Borja contends, infra, the other aggravating circumstances are absorbed
by alevosia or treachery. Hence, if it is treachery which is considered as the qualifying circumstance, there
remain two generic aggravating circumstances which attended the com-
355
VOL. 91, JULY 12, 1979 355
People vs. Borja
mission of the two crimes with respect to the five accused: evident premeditation; and promise or reward
(which does not apply with respect to Borja.)
The five accused contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor: lack of
instruction; fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive. We find no merit in this contention. The argument of
lack of instruction is based on the allegation that the five accused did not finish primary education. But the
defense adduced no proof to establish the existence of this circumstance, leaving in full force the holding
that extenuating circumstances must be proven positively and cannot be based on mere deduction or
inference. (PP. vs. Sakam, et al., 41566, December 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27). If by “lack of instruction” the
defense refers to illiteracy, it is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance, for there must also
be lack of intelligence. (PP. vs. Gorospe, L-10644-45, February 19, 1959, 105 Phil. 184; PP. vs. Ripas, L-6246,
May 26, 1954, 95 Phil. 63; PP. vs. Semañada, L-11361, May 26, 1958, 103 Phil. 790; PP. vs. Tengyao, L-
14675, November 29, 1961, 113 Phil. 465).
 The second mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is “awe and fear of Pedro Borja.”
But the element of fear is not one of those enumerated as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised
Penal Code, Article 13. If the defense refers to the element of “uncontrollable fear or duress” which is an
exempting circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12, the argument is still invalid, for it has
been held that the element of duress should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s life
or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. (PP. vs. Quilloy, No. L-2313, January 10,
1951, 88 Phil. 53). We find no evidence to support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the other
accused.
The third alleged mitigating circumstance is lack of motive. We are hard put to discuss this contention
because the Revised Penal Code, Article 13 does not include “lack of motive” as one of the mitigating
circumstances. Finally, the defense argues that “the undiplomatic attitude of Gancayco and Isorena,
bordering on provocation” should be considered as another mitigating circumstance. This contention is
not borne out by
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356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
the evidence; on the contrary, it appears that instead of being “undiplomatic”, Gancayco was pacific, and
he counselled Isorena that “the best thing for us to do is to talk to them peacefully and follow them,
whatever they want.” (T.s.n. p. 1466). This leaves as the only remaining assertion of the five accused the
claim that “the alleged premeditated conspiracy to kill Gancayco was not clearly revealed in the records
of the case.” We shall discuss this assertion in dealing with the defense of Borja.
In the Brief for the defendant-appellant Pedro Borja, the defense contended that since a separate
trial was held for Borja, the trial court erred in rendering a single decision on which the findings of facts
respecting Borja, based on evidence adduced during his separate trial, are not distinctively set forth,
thereby prejudicially impairing Borja’s substantial rights. We find no such impairment of the rights of the
accused. The evidence shows that the prosecution established the same facts in the two separate trials.
Isorena and Lanon testified as eyewitnesses to the incident of December 19, 1958; de los Santos testified
as an eyewitness not only to the same incident, but also to events before and after the shooting, showing
conspiracy among the accused. Other persons testified in both trials to supply corroborating evidence.
Borja also contended that the trial court erred in not according credence to Borja’s defense and in
finding him guilty on the basis in part of what is alleged to be incompetent evidence adduced not at his
separate trial but at that of his co-accused, and in not acquitting him upon the ground that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is a blanket allegation which can be dealt with summarily,
because the testimonies of common witnesses in both trials clearly establish facts incriminatory to Borja.
More specifically, Borja contended that the trial court erred in finding that a conspiracy existed between
Borja and his co-accused. We find this contention to be an excursion outside the perimeters of credibility.
Borja was the AFAG commander for the Bicol region. After the second secret conference, he donned
spurious armed forces get-up, complete with uniform and two guns. When he was introduced to the
hacienda personnel as a PC major in command of the group, it does not appear that he raised any protest.
Instead, the evidence shows that he issued the order to Balimbing to “fix them up,” referring to Gancayco
and Isorena; and he also issued the order “Habulin! Habulin!” when Gancayco ran for his life. Borja
consistently acted the leader as he led the dash for illicit freedom. He led the group in fleeing the island;
instructed that the firearms should be secreted away in a jute sack; and ordered his men to separate into
two groups when his group was surrounded by Tabaco policemen near Tiwi, where Borja led the gunfight.
He eluded his trackers for more than two months until his capture. To flee the fold of the law is to
admit that one has transgressed that law. (PP. vs. Wilson, et al., 30012-15, March 7, 1929, 52 Phil. 907).
Borja’s uncontested actions would be gratuitous and illogical, unless located within the frame of
conspiracy, which is their only reasonable context. The evidence shows that Borja acted in concert with
the other accused in pursuance of the same objective. Hence, conspiracy attaches and it is no longer
necessary to obtain proof as to the previous agreement or decision to commit the crime. (PP. vs. Cadag, L-
13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388; PP. vs. Peralta, L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP. vs.
Alcantara, L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812).
Borja further contended that assuming his criminal liability, the trial court erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation; and the generic aggravating
circumstances of band or aid of armed men; use of means to weaken the defense; craft, fraud, and/or
disguise. This contention for the first part flies in the face of the evidence. Treachery was present because
Gancayco was killed while he was unarmed, and surrounded by enemies with firearms, including two
grease-guns. Thus, Gancayco was deprived of any means of defense while his enemies were exposed to
no risk arising from the defense which the offended party might have made. True, Borja was inside the
bodega when the shooting took place; but his physical absence does not exonerate him, for it was he who
ordered the execution. Moreover, where there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the
offenders. (PP. vs. Carandang, et al., 32039,
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358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Borja
February 26, 1930, 54 Phil. 503). The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was sufficiently
proved, for prior to the shooting on December 19, 1958, the accused met in two secret conferences and
discussed the raid on the hacienda in order to avenge themselves by exacting redress from Gancayco for
allegedly killing Balimbing’s cousin and bulldozing the camote plantations of Balimbing’s relatives.
However, Borja’s contention for the second part is well taken. The defense argues that the
circumstance of band and aid of armed men, cannot be taken separately from the circumstance of use of
means to weaken the defense, and advantage of superior strength. It was correctly pointed out that all
these circumstances are absorbed in treachery and may not be considered independently. (U.S. vs. Estopia,
et al., No. 9411, September 29, 1914, 28 Phil. 97; U.S. vs. Oro, No. 6781, August 14, 1911, 19 Phil. 548; U.S.
vs. Vitug, et al., No. 5430, September 8, 1910, 17 Phil. 1; PP. vs. Sespeñe, No. L-9346, October 30, 1957, 102
Phil. 199; PP. vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764; PP. vs. Agustin, L-18368, March 31,
1966, 16 SCRA 467; PP. vs. Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 32). It was also correctly pointed
out that treachery absorbs the circumstance of craft, fraud and disguise. (PP. vs. Malig, et al., L-2083, May
30, 1949, 83 Phil. 803). Nonetheless, this leaves the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
which applies to all the accused; and the aggravating circumstance of promise of backpay, which applies
to all the accused, except Borja.
Lastly, Borja contended that, assuming he is criminally liable, the trial court erred in not according
him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. We do not view this as error. It
appears that Borja did not surrender but was captured on February 27, 1959. His own witness, Captain
Eliseo Farol of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, testified that he received a report that Borja was holed
up at Barrio Sumakap, Cavinte, Laguna. Accordingly, he sent a ranger team which located the house and
called on Borja to come down. As the house was surrounded by soldiers, Borja offered no resistance. Capt.
Farol also testified that while Borja was at large, he killed a PC soldier in an armed encounter at Catanauan,
Quezon, as a result of which he was indicted for murder in the court of first instance in that province. Capt.
Farol also declared that a prize of P2,000.00 was put on Borja’s head for being a dangerous fugitive. These
are not indicia of the personality seeking voluntary surrender.
Mr. Santiago Gancayco, Jr., manager of a 1,700-hectare hacienda and scion of a prominent family, is
dead. His demise when he was only in his early thirties was rendered more tragic in that he breathed his
last in the bosom of his grieving family, consisting of his wife and six small children, in the course of his
flight from ostensible visitors who had suddenly been transformed into cold-blooded killers. Dr. Rizalino
Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who performed an
autopsy on the body of Santiago Gancayco, Jr. testified that his death was due to hemorrhage, severe,
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds of the body and that shock, traumatic was contributory. It was
abundantly established in the trial court that his killing was attended by treachery, which qualifies the
crime committed by the perpetrators into murder.
Five of the accused, namely: Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and
Dominador de los Santos have been in custody since December 19, 1958, or shortly thereafter; while Pedro
Borja was apprehended on February 27, 1959. It can thus be seen that all of them have been under
detention for over twenty years.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 2590 is hereby affirmed in toto;
that in Criminal Case No. 2578 is modified in respect of the principal penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua for lack of necessary votes, and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P 12,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

[No. 6082. March 18, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ISIDRO ViCENTILLO, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.MUNICIPAL PRESIDENTS; ARRESTS WlTHOUT WARRANT.—The Case of U. S. vs. Fortaleza (12
Phil. Rep., 472), followed as to the authority of a municipal president to make an arrest
without a warrant for an offense committed in his presence, the municipal president being
held to have all the usual powers of a public officer for the making of arrests without warrant.
was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on
both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were
controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the
uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to
one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the
120
120 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. 2.ID.; ID.; ARRAIGNMENT AS SOON AS "PRACTICABLE."—Held, That under all the circumstances
of this case, as set forth in the opinion, the defendant, after having arrested the complaining
witness without a warrant, brought him before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable"
thereafter, notwithstanding the fact that three days were expended in doing so.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION AS TO NECESSITY FOR ARREST.—In the absence of all evidence to the
contrary, this court will not presume that, in a particular case of defiance of local authority
by the unlawful violation of a local ordinance even where the offense thus committed is, in
itself, trivial and unimportant, it may not have been necessary or at least expedient to make
an arrest and bring the offender forthwith before the proper judicial officer.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Low, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
C. W. Ney, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Sytiar Clemente vs. Marasigan.
arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in
the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing In this record upon which to base a finding that
this defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due
performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfuly authority in the premises. The
trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but
keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident
occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace,
or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not
necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the
peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the f orces of law and
order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the def fendant must be reversed and he
is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed; defendant acquitted.

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary
detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful
authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the
complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we under-
119
VOL. 19, MARCH 18, 1911. 119
United States vs. Vicentillo.
stand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual
powers of a police officer for the making of arrests without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the
case of U. S. vs.Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must, therefore, be reversed, unless the evidence
discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged,
caused the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought
before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested.
But so far as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact
brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were
expended in doing so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the
local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of
either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence
discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then
to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being
due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner,

[No. 45186. September 30, 1936]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant and
appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; INFANTICIDE AND ABANDONMENT OF A MINOR; WHEN PUNISHABLE.—
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who
commits them, under said circumstance, must be in the full enjoyment
531
VOL. 63, SEPTEMBER 30, 1936 531
People vs. Bandian
1. of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
1. 2.ID, ; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.—The law exempts from criminal liability any
person who acts under the circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving
birth to a child in a thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other
cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility, with no fault or
intention on her part. She has in her favor the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Misamis. Roxas, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J,:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusión perpetua, and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said
sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
1. "I.In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that
she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
2. "II.In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her
to reclusión perpetua, with costs."
The facts of record may be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw
the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later,
he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back,
staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid
532
532 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bandian
and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and
placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened
to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant
in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant.
Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of
it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found
her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were
full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it
for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been
living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had
amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him
that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date abovestated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose
testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the
prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court
furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree
with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor
under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death
of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found on the body of said child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites of animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously,
or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstance,
must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may
be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to
kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to
her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she
considers him her husband as he considers her his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when
he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that
he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to
be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom
that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the
appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear
how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact
that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she became
pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long
illness as well as the profuse hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstance
that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and
as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover
Luis Kirol—a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day—is uneducated and could not supplant
with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could not teach her, undoubtedly
were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute
the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where
she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according
to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place
and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere
accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child
therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be
held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that
under such circumstances said appellant has the f ourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor,
she is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and
as she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal
liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent
a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her
said lover knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting f or the arrival of the happy day when the
fruit of their love should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and
dizzy. On January 31, 1936, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered
a thicket about four or five brazas away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature.
After some minutes the accused emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to support
herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerge therefrom, ran to help
her, supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what had happened
to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her,
Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to
stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a
newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a few moments before.
Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her was hers, the appellant
answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that the child was
born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young
primiparse who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process or
expulsion of the fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call
of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Légale, pages 799-781; Annales de Médicine
Légale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicología, vol. I, pages 512-514).
There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into the
thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon
defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she did nothing
more than to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she returned home staggering
for lack of strength to support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a
newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the already
dead child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies,
which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being
deceit when the act is perf ormed with deliberate intent, and f ault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to
the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime
of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because according to the abovecited legal provision,
there is deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever
and from dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and,
consequently, she could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was
ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily
committed it because, as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in
defecating—a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural—she might expel the child she carried in
her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to use his
reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of
the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as
a consequence of the she be considered negligent because negligence is the omisrough weather or of the
cruelty of the animals. Neither can sion to do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies
knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the
accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying with her legal and moral
duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because,
having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child in a
thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill because she did not
know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural
physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused the fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural
physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the
exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which caused its death. As the child
was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberatey abandoned the
child, her accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said
child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance
of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge
of the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that
is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands.
In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to the child, is that she
care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child,
neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full
enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from
complying with her duties by herself, or from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable
impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her
there was subjectively no cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure
to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she
had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the
child.
IMPERIAL, J.:I concur in the preceding opinion of Justice Villa-Real.
LAUREL, J.: I vote for the acquittal of the accused on the grounds stated in the foregoing opinion of
Justice Villa-Real.
Judgment reversed; appellant acquitted.