Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
- versus -
Promulgated:
February 4, 2009
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional
Officer-National Commission on
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN
GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN
and LAZARO BAWAS,
Respondents.
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued
by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the
demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas,
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of
the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City,
without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69
of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No.
1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
main actions for injunction such as the one filed by private respondents. They
claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending
before it.
Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter.
Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the
provisions of the IPRA.
Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from
ancestral claims as it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few
remaining forests in Baguio City and is the citys main watershed.
Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to
the police power of the local government.
Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to
order the demolition of certain structures is not absolute. Regard should be
taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be issued building permits
precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a
requirement for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building
Code.
Petitioners Reply to Comment[11] dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their
previous arguments.
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights
and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.[12] In
order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent
to the NCIPs assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto
shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have
obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.[13]
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in
accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of
the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of
ICCs/IPs. In their petition[14] filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members
of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of
portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands.
Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the
enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced
private respondents ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their
possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands. The petition also
alleged that private respondents claim over these lands had been recognized by
Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as
having claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation.[15]
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,[16] squarely qualify
it as a dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states:
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP shall have the
power and authority:
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against
the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over
which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause
them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing
Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect
and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of
ICCs/IPs.
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even
provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any
inferior court against the NCIP in any
case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the
interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral
domains.[17]
Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA,
and necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which
states:
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own
charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced
because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the
citys charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the
Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.[19] The declaration
of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private
property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to
adjudicate forest lands.
All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are
entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.
On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the
RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and
dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential
Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the
ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its
behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied
the same on April 19, 2004.This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order
to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.[2]
CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of
its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.[3]
In a March 14, 2008 decision,[4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review
on certiorarifiled directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions
lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The
CA added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely
on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a
pure question of law.
CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it
denied the same,[5] prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing
its action for prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same
time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional;
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand
that it has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption
that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results,
which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the
RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA
from which the present petition was brought dismissed CMUs appeal on some
technical ground.
Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[6] vests in the
CA appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-
judicial bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law,
recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this
Court. The question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order
of dismissal raises purely questions of law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2)
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise factual
issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of
lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this proclamation
in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were
located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and
presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for
assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law,
indeed lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived
it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that
Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points
out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard.NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with
CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction
case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the
proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a
factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain
from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground
that it raised pure questions of law.
The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU
v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[7] the DARAB, a
national government agency charged with taking both privately-owned and
government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries,
ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court
nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands,
being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational
institution. Said the Court:
xxxx
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly
among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic
programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly,
there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside
the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless
peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as
CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had
been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet
uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and
jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted
by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become
inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in
scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to
be alienable public lands.
Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or
Republic Act 8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within
the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be
recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been
vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the
indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.
Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several
tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities in the course of the proceedings
for the titling of the lands in CMUs name. Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares
were titled in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than 300
hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims
of those tribes.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March 14,
2008 decision and September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for
being contrary to law and public policy.
BENGUET CORPORATION, G.R. No. 163101
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT VELASCO, JR., JJ.
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
and J.G. REALTY AND MINING Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents. February 13, 2008
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DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The instant petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the
December 2, 2002 Decision[1] and March 17, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources-Mining Adjudication Board (DENR-MAB)
in MAB Case No. 0124-01 (Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01)
entitled Benguet Corporation (Benguet) v. J.G. Realty and Mining
Corporation (J.G. Realty). The December 2, 2002 Decision upheld the March 19,
2001 Decision[3] of the MAB Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which canceled the Royalty
Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) dated June 1, 1987[4] between
Benguet and J.G. Realty, and excluded Benguet from the joint Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application over four mining claims. The March 17,
2004 Resolution denied Benguets Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP, wherein J.G.
Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims respectively named as
Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of 288.8656
hectares, situated in Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The parties also executed a Supplemental
Agreement[5] dated June 1, 1987. The mining claims were covered by MPSA
Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claimowner and
Benguet as operator.
In the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims
and/or otherwise acquire the mining rights to the mineral claims. Within 24 months
from the execution of the RAWOP, Benguet should also cause the examination of
the mining claims for the purpose of determining whether or not they are worth
developing with reasonable probability of profitable production. Benguet undertook
also to furnish J.G. Realty with a report on the examination, within a reasonable time
after the completion of the examination. Moreover, also within the examination
period, Benguet shall conduct all necessary exploration in accordance with a
prepared exploration program. If it chooses to do so and before the expiration of the
examination period, Benguet may undertake to develop the mining claims upon
written notice to J.G. Realty. Benguet must then place the mining claims into
commercial productive stage within 24 months from the written notice. [6] It is also
provided in the RAWOP that if the mining claims were placed in commercial
production by Benguet, J.G. Realty should be entitled to a royalty of five percent
(5%) of net realizable value, and to royalty for any production done by Benguet
whether during the examination or development periods.
On March 19, 2001, the POA issued a Decision,[10] dwelling upon the issues of (1)
whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction over the case; and (2) whether Benguet
violated the RAWOP justifying the unilateral cancellation of the RAWOP by J.G.
Realty. The dispositive portion stated:
Therefrom, Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal[11] with the MAB on April 23, 2001,
docketed as Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01. Thereafter, the MAB
issued the assailed December 2, 2002 Decision. Benguet then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Decision which was denied in the March 17,
2004 Resolution of the MAB. Hence, Benguet filed the instant petition.
The Issues
Restated, the issues are: (1) Should the controversy have first been submitted to
arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case?; (2) Was the cancellation of
the RAWOP supported by evidence?; and (3) Did the cancellation of the RAWOP
amount to unjust enrichment of J.G. Realty at the expense of Benguet?
The Courts Ruling
Before we dwell on the substantive issues, we find that the instant petition can
be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question of law
may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
However, this Court has already invalidated such provision in Carpio v. Sulu
Resources Development Corp.,[13] ruling that a decision of the MAB must first be
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, before
recourse to this Court may be had. We held, thus:
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the
MAB Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that [n]o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and consent. On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that
decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a petition for review by
certiorari. This provision is obviously an expansion of the Courts appellate
jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-
judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it
does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The
aggrieved partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still
have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129
as amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved
in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked
to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By
including questions of fact among the issues that may be raised in an
appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly
expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may
be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the
decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the
instant petition must be denied.
Even if we entertain the petition although Benguet skirted the appeal to the
CA via Rule 43, still, the December 2, 2002 Decision and March 17, 2004 Resolution
of the DENR-MAB in MAB Case No. 0124-01 should be maintained.
xxxx
11.02 Court Action
Thus, Benguet argues that the POA should have first referred the case to voluntary
arbitration before taking cognizance of the case, citing Sec. 2 of RA 876 on persons
and matters subject to arbitration.
On the other hand, in denying such argument, the POA ruled that:
While the parties may establish such stipulations clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, the same must not be contrary
to law and public policy. At a glance, there is nothing wrong with the
terms and conditions of the agreement. But to state that an aggrieved party
cannot initiate an action without going to arbitration would be tying ones
hand even if there is a law which allows him to do so.[17]
Moreover, the MAB ruled that the contractual provision on arbitration merely
provides for an additional forum or venue and does not divest the POA of the
jurisdiction to hear the case.[19]
In its July 20, 2004 Comment,[20] J.G. Realty reiterated the above rulings of the POA
and MAB. It argued that RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is a special
law which should prevail over the stipulations of the parties and over a general law,
such as RA 876. It also argued that the POA cannot be considered as a court under
the contemplation of RA 876 and that jurisprudence saying that there must be prior
resort to arbitration before filing a case with the courts is inapplicable to the instant
case as the POA is itself already engaged in arbitration.
Moreover, the contention that RA 7942 prevails over RA 876 presupposes a conflict
between the two laws. Such is not the case here. To reiterate, availment of voluntary
arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the
government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.
As stated in Secs. 6 and 7 of RA 876:
Section 6. Hearing by court.A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or
refusal of another to perform under an agreement in writing providing for
arbitration may petition the court for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days notice in
writing of the hearing of such application shall be served either personally or by
registered mail upon the party in default. The court shall hear the parties, and
upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement or such failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the
making of the agreement or default be in issue the court shall proceed to
summarily hear such issue. If the finding be that no agreement in writing
providing for arbitration was made, or that there is no default in the
proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the finding be
that a written provision for arbitration was made and there is a default in
proceeding thereunder, an order shall be made summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
xxxx
In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary
arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion
of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such
contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the
court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.
Besides, in BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we already ruled:
In this connection, it bears stressing that the lower court has not lost
its jurisdiction over the case. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 876 provides
that proceedings therein have only been stayed. After the special
proceeding of arbitration has been pursued and completed, then the lower
court may confirm the award made by the arbitrator.[22]
J.G. Realtys contention, that prior resort to arbitration is unavailing in the instant
case because the POAs mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving mineral
agreements, is misplaced. A distinction must be made between voluntary and
compulsory arbitration. In Ludo and Luym Corporation v. Saordino, the Court had
the occasion to distinguish between the two types of arbitrations:
Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC,
compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement
of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to
investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties,
and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. While a
voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor
departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services
provided for under labor laws.[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
[Any controversy with regard to the contract] shall not be cause of any
action of any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but
shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a Board of
Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by
BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be
selected by the aforementioned two arbiters so appointed.[24] (Emphasis
supplied.)
There can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the
DENR, an administrative agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to
arbitration, freely entered into by the parties, must be held binding against them.[25]
In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntary
arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is
governed by RA 876, the arbitration law.
However, we find that Benguet is already estopped from questioning the POAs
jurisdiction. As it were, when J.G. Realty filed DENR Case No. 2000-01, Benguet
filed its answer and participated in the proceedings before the POA, Region
V. Secondly, when the adverse March 19, 2001 POA Decision was rendered, it filed
an appeal with the MAB in Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01 and again
participated in the MAB proceedings. When the adverse December 2, 2002 MAB
Decision was promulgated, it filed a motion for reconsideration with the
MAB. When the adverse March 17, 2004 MAB Resolution was issued, Benguet
filed a petition with this Court pursuant to Sec. 79 of RA 7942 impliedly recognizing
MABs jurisdiction. In this factual milieu, the Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA
and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What
Benguet should have done was to immediately challenge the POAs jurisdiction by a
special civil action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the
dispute. To redo the proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of
seven years from date of institution of the original action with the POA would be
anathema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Second Issue: The cancellation of the RAWOP
was supported by evidence
The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds: (1)
Benguets failure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining claims; and (2)
Benguets failure to seriously pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over the
mining claims.
As to the royalties, Benguet claims that the checks representing payments for
the royalties of J.G. Realty were available for pick-up in its office and it is the latter
which refused to claim them. Benguet then thus concludes that it did not violate the
RAWOP for nonpayment of royalties. Further, Benguet reasons that J.G. Realty has
the burden of proving that the former did not pay such royalties following the
principle that the complainants must prove their affirmative allegations.
With regard to the failure to pursue the MPSA application, Benguet claims
that the lengthy time of approval of the application is due to the failure of the MGB
to approve it. In other words, Benguet argues that the approval of the application is
solely in the hands of the MGB.
Evidently, the RAWOP itself provides for the mode of royalty payment by Benguet.
The fact that there was the previous practice whereby J.G. Realty picked-up the
checks from Benguet is unavailing. The mode of payment is embodied in a contract
between the parties. As such, the contract must be considered as the law between the
parties and binding on both.[26] Thus, after J.G. Realty informed Benguet of the bank
account where deposits of its royalties may be made, Benguet had the obligation to
deposit the checks. J.G. Realty had no obligation to furnish Benguet with a Board
Resolution considering that the RAWOP itself provided for such payment scheme.
Notably, Benguets claim that J.G. Realty must prove nonpayment of its
royalties is both illogical and unsupported by law and jurisprudence.
In the instant case, the obligation of Benguet to pay royalties to J.G. Realty
has been admitted and supported by the provisions of the RAWOP. Thus, the burden
to prove such obligation rests on Benguet.
It should also be borne in mind that MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 has been
pending with the MGB for a considerable length of time. Benguet, in the RAWOP,
obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims and/or otherwise acquire
the mining rights to the mineral claims but failed to present any evidence showing
that it exerted efforts to speed up and have the application approved. In fact, Benguet
never even alleged that it continuously followed-up the application with the MGB
and that it was in constant communication with the government agency for the
expeditious resolution of the application. Such allegations would show that, indeed,
Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application and clearly failed to
comply with its obligation in the RAWOP.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the cancellation of the RAWOP was based on
valid grounds and is, therefore, justified. The necessary implication of the
cancellation is the cessation of Benguets right to prosecute MPSA Application No.
APSA-V-0009 and to further develop such mining claims.
In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, we
defined unjust enrichment, as follows:
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the
RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further
developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP.
Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.