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ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

Ateneo Law School


CRIMINAL LAW I
Atty. Lorenzo U. Padilla

CHOOSE THE BEST ANSWERS

1. Not a penalty: (a) measures of prevention and safety under


Art. 24, RPC; (b) confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of crime under Art. 45, RPC; (c) bond to keep the peace
under Art. 25, RPC; (d) fine, under Art. 25, RPC.

2. Not a pecuniary penalty: (a) restitution; (b) reparation of


damage caused; (c) indemnification of consequential damages; (d)
fines and costs of proceedings.

3. Not a ground to deny probation: (a) having appealed the


court’s judgment of conviction; (b) having once been or having
previously undergone probation; (c) having been previously
convicted by final judgment of a light felony (i.e., crime carrying the
penalty of arresto menor and/or a fine not exceeding P200); (d)
being sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of six years
and one day.

4. Who is entitled to good conduct time allowance? (a) all


prisoners, whether serving sentence by final judgment or mere
detention prisoners; (b) only prisoners serving sentence by final
judgment, assuming good conduct; (c) detention prisoners only,
assuming they have agreed to abide by the rules applicable to
prisoners serving sentence by final judgment; (d) all detention
prisoners, even if they refused to abide by the rules applicable to
prisoner serving sentence by final judgment, although in the latter
case their entitlement thereto is reduced to 4/5 of time spent under
preventive detention.

5. When must the death of an offender, who is charged with a


crime in court, occur in order to extinguish criminal liability and his
personal penalties? (a) before final judgment; (b) after final judgment;
(c) on appeal; (d) anytime.

6. What is the penalty two degrees higher than reclusion temporal,


assuming a case of qualified theft involving the amount of P2,800,000.00
(representing the value of the truck and cargo thereof that were stolen by
the accused): (a) under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two [2]

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degrees higher than reclusion temporal is death; (b) the higher
penalty would be reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties for
said penalty, because Article 74 proscribes the imposition of the
death penalty resulting from the graduation of the penalty; (c)
reclusion perpetua but with the accessory penalties of death under
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code if the death penalty is
commuted, i.e., . perpetual absolute disqualification and civil
interdiction during thirty (30) years following the date of sentence,
applying Article 74; (d) reclusion perpetua for forty years with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code, which means, in fine, that the accused is not entitled to
pardon before the lapse of the forty-year period.

7. NP received from JV several jewels. Some of the jewels were


owned by JV and other belonged to strangers; all, however, came from JV
and were delivered to NP to be sold on commission, with the express
obligation on the part of the latter to pay to the former the proceeds of the
sale of said jewels, or to return them if unsold. NP, however, far from
complying with her duty, pawned the said jewels at various dates during
said months, as appears from the pawn tickets issued by the owner of HF's
pawnshop, where the jewels had been pledged. The jewels were thus
misappropriated, and the amount of the loan granted thereon embezzled, to
the prejudice of JV. Under the circumstances: (a) JV can recover the
jewels from the pawnshop, regardless of whether the latter may have
lawfully acquired the same from NP; (b) JV can no longer recover the
jewels from the pawnshop, which knew nothing of the arrangement
between NP and JV and had thought, at the time of the pledge, that
they were owned by NP; (c) JP can recover the jewels from the
pawnshop only if he is willing to reimburse the pawnshop for the
amount it has lent to NP; (d) JV’s remedy has been reduced to
reparation since the jewels can no longer be restored to him.

8. A Barangay Captain who, knowing the identity of persons who


committed the crime of arson within his jurisdiction and who merely
remained silent, is – (a) guilty as an accessory-after-the-fact for
concealing the crime of arson; (b) guilty of concealment of crime if
shown to have abused his official position; (c) guilty of dereliction of
duty, not merely concealment of crime; (d) not guilty of crime, even
as an accessory-after-the fact since mere silence is not a mode of
incurring criminal liability.

9. FC was employed by RP, an army officer, to get a girl, AM, and


her aunt, VE, into the army barracks, where RP was. RP spoke English and
could neither speak nor understand the native language. FC acted as
interpreter, translating English to the native language, to make the woman

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and the girl understand RP's desire that AM remain with him as his querida
or paramour. FC, accompanied by several privates, at RP's order, arrested
FB and took him to the barracks to be then turned over to VF who, obeying
orders from the same lieutenant, which orders were translated by FC in
order that it may be understood by VF, proceeded to kill the prisoner in or
near the cemetery of the said town, by shooting him. Can FC be held liable
for participating in the killing of FB? (a) Yes, as a principal by direct
participation for acting as interpreter to convey the mastermind’s
criminal determination or if not, at least, by indispensable
cooperation, without whose services the criminal determination of
the mastermind could not have been conveyed to the actual
perpetrators of the crime; (b) Yes, as an accomplice, because by
serving as interpreter, he cooperated in the execution of the crime
by previous or simultaneous act, but not in the manner of a
principal; (c) Yes, but as an accessory-after-the fact only as it was
not shown that the accused took a direct part in the crime or
compelled any other person to commit it, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without which it would not have been
committed, or that he lent such cooperation by means of acts prior
or simultaneous to its perpetration; (d) No, because it cannot be
held that the act of interpreting, in obedience to orders of his
superior, the latter's criminal determination, so that it might be
understood by the actual perpetrator of the crime, constituted
cooperation in the commission thereof.

10. A light felony prescribes in: (a) one year; (b) five years; (c)
two months; (d) six months.

11. Republic Act 8294 on June 6, 1997, amended certain provisions


of P.D. 1866, a special penal law penalizing illegal possession of firearms.
With the passage of the aforementioned law, the penalty for simple illegal
possession of a low-powered firearm, such as "paltik", has been reduced to
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). If the accused is entitled to the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, how is the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence to be determined? (a) the court should
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall be the maximum fixed by said law; (b) the court
should sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law; (c) the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, should be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code; (d) the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence could be anywhere between
the minimum and the maximum term of the penalty fixed by said law.

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12. A disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and
sentence is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the
supervision of an officer appointed by the court to investigate such referral
for investigation or to supervise the convict: (a) suspended sentence; (b)
indeterminate sentence; (c) probation; (d) destierro.

13. Not a mode of extinguishing the penalty of fine: (a) payment;


(b) service of the equivalent period of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency where the financial circumstances of the offender
has improved thereafter; (c) prescription, whether the crime be
punishable under the RPC or under a special penal law; (d) amnesty.

14. What is the period of probation where the accused is sentenced


to a fine and applies for probation? (a) None, because probation
presupposes that the accused must have been sentenced to a penalty
of imprisonment not exceeding six [6] years; (b) It depends on the
amount of the fine which is first converted into an equivalent
number of days of subsidiary imprisonment, the length of which
determines the period of probation; (c) It depends on the period
fixed by the court, exercising solely its discretion on the matter; (d)
It depends on the period fixed by the court but it cannot be less
than, nor more than twice, the equivalent number of days of
subsidiary imprisonment.

15. Not a ground for partial extinction of criminal liability: (a)


conditional pardon; (b) commutation of sentence; (c) good conduct
time allowance; (d) partial service of the sentence.

16. Does not prevent the period of prescription for crimes


punishable under special penal laws from running: (a) institution of
proceedings against the guilty person; (b) non-discovery of the
crime, if not known to since the day of its commission; (c) dismissal
of proceedings for reasons constituting jeopardy; (d) absence of the
offender from the Philippine archipelago.

17. X, a detention prisoner who is not otherwise a recidivist or a


habitual delinquent refused to abide by the rules and regulations prescribed
for convicted prisoners serving sentence in the institution in which he is
detained. Should he be convicted of the offense he is charged with, would
he be entitled to credit for time spent in preventive detention? (a) No,
precisely because he refused to abide by the rules and regulations
prescribed for convicted prisoners serving sentence in the
institution in which he is detained, which disqualifies him from that
benefit; (b) No, because he is not a recidivist or a habitual

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delinquent; (c) Yes, but only to the reduced measure equivalent to
four-fifths (4/5) of time spent in preventive detention; (d) Yes, to the
extent of the full time spent in preventive detention as his refusal to
abide by the rules and regulations prescribed for convicted prisoners
serving sentence in the institution in which he is detained is
irrelevant, understandable and proper considering that he is a mere
detention prisoner.

18. Entitled to special time allowance for good conduct: (a)


detention prisoners who have escaped from confinement on the
occasion of disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other
calamities mentioned in Art. 158, RPC, as long as they gave
themselves up to the authorities within 48 hours from the issuance
of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe therein referred to; (b) all prisoners serving sentence by
final judgment who have escaped from confinement on the occasion
of disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other calamities
mentioned in Art. 158, RPC, but who gave themselves up to the
authorities within 48 hours from the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe therein
referred to; (c) all prisoners serving sentence by final judgment who,
on account of their loyalty to the penal institution, refused to escape
from confinement even on the occasion of disorders, conflagrations,
earthquakes, or other calamities mentioned in Art. 158, RPC; (d) all
prisoners, whether serving sentence by final judgment or not, who
gave themselves up to the authorities within 48 hours from the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe therein referred to.

19. Not among the civil liability arising ex delictu: (a) Restitution;
(b) Reparation for the damage caused; (c) Indemnification for
consequential damages; (d) Fines.

20. Does not prescribe even after ONE (1) YEAR: (a) offenses
under special penal laws punished only by fine or by imprisonment
for not more than one month or both; (b) libel or other similar
offenses; (c) light penalties; (d) crimes punishable with arresto
mayor.
21. A wife who prepared the way for the perpetration of a crime of
rape committed by her husband upon a 12-year old victim, by conducting
her by force and violence to a place apart among the trees, where she called
to her husband, the person chiefly interested in perpetrating the crime,
delivering the victim to her husband and then going away from the scene of
the crime so that her husband might freely consummate the pre-arranged
rape, as the latter did with violence and intimidation – (a) is a principal

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by indispensable cooperation; (b) is a mere accomplice; (c) is a
principal by direct participation; (d) is a principal by inducement.

22. Under Article 70, the period of perpetual penalties is: (a)
twenty years and one day to forty years; (b) forty years; (c) thirty
years; (c) twenty years.

23. The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an


imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art. 172, Revised Penal Code
(RPC)]. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in
ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. Where the public document allegedly
falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered on May 26, 2000 with the
Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, but filing of the complaint-
affidavit before the Prosecutor’s Office for falsification of a public document
was, however, filed only on October 18, 2011, one month after the victim
actually came to know thereof, then -- (a) the criminal action has
prescribed, considering the lapse of ten [10] years after the
document was registered with the Register of Deeds; (b) the criminal
action has not yet prescribed since the period of ten [10] years
counted from the moment the victim came to know thereof has not
yet lapsed at the time of the filing of the complaint-affidavit with the
Prosecutor’s Office; (c) the criminal action may be deemed to have
prescribed, considering the lapse of ten [10] years after the
document was notarized, which may be considered its date of
commission; (d) the criminal action has not yet prescribed because
the prescriptive period may only be considered to have started to run
since the victim came to know thereof (date of actual discovery) and
will only be interrupted upon the filing by of the Information in
court.

24. Not necessarily having a duration of six months and one day to
six years: (a) prision correccional; (b) suspension when imposed as an
accessory penalty; (c) destierro; (d) suspension when imposed as a
principal penalty.

25. A father simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in
combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!". After the father spoke those
words, his son drew a firearm and shot his adversary. Under those
circumstances: (a) the father is responsible for the injuries
committed by the son after such advice was given, under the facts
presented; (b) the father is not necessarily responsible unless
sufficient facts be shown upon which to affirm that the father
foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced

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him to use said weapon; (c) the father cannot be held responsible
simply for uttering those words in the excitement of the moment; (d)
the father is necessarily responsible because inducement to the
commission of the crime by means of which a person may be
considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the
act itself can be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, or in
words of encouragement.

26. A fine of P6,000.00, whether imposed as a single or as an


alternative penalty, is: (a) a light penalty; (b) a grave penalty; (c) a less
grave penalty; (d) a correctional penalty.

27. When is the penalty of arresto menor to be served in the house


of the defendant? (a) never, since arresto menor means imprisonment
from one day to thirty days; (b) if so provided in the decision of the
court; (c) if so requested by the defendant; (d) if the defendant to be
punished with that penalty is a minor over 15 but under 18, who had
acted with discernment in committing the crime.

28. The deceased, C, coming upon V and L cleaning a caua said to


them, "What of it if you throw away the water as I also can get water as
easily as you can?" V, indignant at this allusion replied. "Do you want a
fight? Wait there." Immediately proceeding to the house, V procured a
revolver and returned to the field. A brother of V, M, attempted to gain
possession of the revolver and was killed (probably accidentally) for his
pains. Loading the revolver anew, V pointed it at C wounding him in the
stomach. The wife of C tried to succor her husband, but the other brother,
L, stopped her and attacked C with a bolo. C's nephew, U, was also
wounded. Considering that C was wounded by a pistol fired by V, and it was
a mortal wound, and C, almost immediately after receiving the pistol shot,
was wounded with a bolo by L, this likewise being a mortal wound, and the
death of C could only be attributed to "to the wounds", then: (a) both V
and L should be convicted and held liable as co-conspirators in
causing the death of C because when several persons act in concert
conspiracy is implied and the act of one is the act of all; (b) both V
and L should be convicted but held liable individually in causing the
death of C because where several individuals, acting independently,
do acts which are calculated to produce the death of another, each is
responsible for the consequences of his own acts; (c) both V and L
should be acquitted because if two or more persons acted
independently, and the actual perpetrator of the homicide cannot be
identified, all must be acquitted, although it is certain that one of
them was guilty; (d) V, who first inflicted the mortal by firing the
pistol shot, should be held liable for causing the death of C, while L

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should be acquitted as his act of inflicting the second mortal would
with a bolo was no longer necessary to kill C.

29. When is the penalty for failure to give bond to keep the peace,
whenever the convict is so obligated under his sentence, a period of
detention not exceeding THIRTY (30) DAYS? (a) if the accused shall have
been prosecuted for a grave felony; (b) if the accused shall have
been prosecuted for a less grave felony; (c) if the accused shall have
been prosecuted for a light felony; (d) if the accused shall have been
prosecuted for grave threats or light threats under Arts. 282 and
283, respectively, RPC.

30. X, a former Treasurer of a municipality, malversed public funds,


which were carried out of the country by his wife, Y, and deposited in
another country. Under the circumstances, Y, assuming she knew the
source of the funds but had no participation whatsoever in the commission
of malversation, would: (a) be an accessory-after-the fact under Art.
19, RPC, but nevertheless exempt, as such, from criminal liability
under Art. 20 thereof; (b) be liable as an accessory-after-the fact
under Art. 19, RPC, being excepted from the exemption extended
under Art. 20 thereof in view of the nature of her participation; (c)
be exempt as an accessory-after-the fact under the RPC, in view of
her relationship to the principal, but liable for obstruction of justice
under PD1829; (d) not liable as a accessory-after-the fact as she
merely acted as a fence, who is liable, instead, under PD 1612.

31. An instance where a penal law favorable to the accused may not
be applied retroactively: (a) the offender is a habitual delinquent; (b) a
final sentence had already been pronounced upon the offender upon
publication of such law or the offender is already serving sentence
by final judgment at that time; (c) the law fails to expressly provide
for its retroactive application; (d) the offender is already undergoing
probation at the time the law takes effect.

32. The Sandiganbayan found AM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of


violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in all of eight (8) informations filed by
the Provincial Fiscal against AM and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan imposed a penalty that totals fifty-six (56) years and
eight (8) days of imprisonment. Under the circumstances: (a) the
Sandiganbayan obviously erred because such penalties can be
impugned as contrary to the three-fold rule; (b) the Sandiganbayan
obviously erred because that the duration of the aggregate penalties
for all convictions should not exceed forty [40] years; (c) the
Sandiganbayan obviously did not err because courts can impose as

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many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a
corresponding penalty is prescribed by law; (d) it is not obvious
whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred unless the individual
penalties for each convictions are known, as only then will it be
possible to apply the three-fold rule.

33. The prosecution seeks to hold four of the accused, XM, XN, ZS,
and US, criminally liable for the killing of JA and YN, particularly as co-
authors thereof by inducement, considering that they attended the
conferences and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme while, after
the commission of the murders, they joined with the other accused in
celebrating with a fiesta, although aside from this, these four did not
cooperate in the commission of the crimes, nor is it certain that, as relatives
or retainers of XA, the four had any influence over XS and YS, and that any
of the four said or did anything that determined the commission of the
crimes. Can they be considered as co-authors within the meaning of article
[17] of the [Revised] Penal Code? (a) Yes, their presence at the
conferences and the fact that they entered no opposition to the
nefarious scheme and, after the commission of the murders, they
joined with the other accused in celebrating with a fiesta, make them
liable as principals by inducement; (b) Yes, because their presence at
the conferences and the fact that they entered no opposition to the
nefarious scheme, being part and parcel of the development of the
crime, could be considered active participation in the commission of
the crime itself; (c) Yes, because their actions constituted joining in
a conspiracy and where there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of all; (d) No, because although what the four did amounted to
joining in a conspiracy, the [Revised] Penal Code, in Article [8], does
not punish conspiracy as such.

34. The rate at which fine will be converted into subsidiary


imprisonment in case of insolvency: (a) one day for each eight pesos of
fine; (b) one day for each amount of fine equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of
finality of the judgment of conviction; (c) one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the
Philippines at the time of conviction by the trial court; (d) one day
for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate
prevailing in the Philippines at the time such insolvency is
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trial court.

35. Two vehicles collided at an intersection. X, driver of the vehicle


found to be at fault, was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property. Y, the prevailing party, unable to collect

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civil indemnity from X, seeks to enforce the same against X’s employer. Can
X’s employer be held subsidiarily liable for the payment of civil indemnity?
(a) only if X’s employer is engaged in a business or industry and does
not exclusively use the automobile for private ends; (b) only if X’s
employer is found guilty of negligence in the selection and
supervision of X; (c) only if X’s employer has been charged as co-
principal in the crime; (d) only if X’s employer has been impleaded in
the civil aspect of the criminal case.
36. RB is one of the several persons accused in more than one
hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents
before the Sandiganbayan. In the meantime, RB run for and was elected as
mayor in a town in Cavite. Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Big. 195 was
passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019,
providing that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal-
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. On that basis and in all
cases pending before the Sandiganbayan in which RB is one of the accused,
the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers
"from their public positions or from any other public office that they may be
holding ... for ninety (90) days ". Under the circumstances: (a) the
Sandiganbayan may issue an order directing the suspension of all
the accused including RB "from their public positions or from any
other public office that they may be holding ... for ninety (90) days",
as long as the informations in question are shown to be valid and
regardless of when they were filed as such suspension does not
constitute a penalty; (b) the Sandiganbayan can issue an order
directing the suspension of all the accused including RB "from their
public positions or from any other public office that they may be
holding ... for ninety (90) days" because such suspension amounts to
a penalty and no penalty can be imposed which was not prescribed
by law for the offense at the time of its commission; (c) to apply the
provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would
be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an
ex post facto law and, therefore, the Sandiganbayan is not obligated
to apply the provisions thereof and grant the motion; (d) being
unfavorable to the accused, the amendatory provision of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195 should be applied prospectively; besides, such
suspension deprives the people of the services of an elected official
and may not, therefore, be applied in this case.

37. On the occasion of a student demonstration being held in the


vicinity of Feati University, tragedy struck unexpectedly. FS, a 16-year old

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student of the Philippine Science High School, along with MF, CL, and EG,
also students of the same school, were hit by a pillbox bomb causing the
instantaneous death of FS and physical injuries to others. "Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder" was filed against AR, a security guard of Feati
University, who threw the pillbox bomb at the student demonstrators who
were then marching, resulting in an explosion, which act was so sudden and
unexpected. In his signed confession, AR admitted throwing the pillbox, but
only to scare the student demonstrators; unfortunately, he miscalculated his
aim and distance, as it fell on the head of and killed the victim, as well as
caused physical injuries to three other student demonstrators. If convicted
of murder and multiple frustrated murder, would it be necessary to consider
whether AR should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed? (a) Yes, since AR
did not aim the pillbox at a particular student and merely wanted to
scare the demonstrators, but unfortunately miscalculated his aim
and distance, it appears, therefore, that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed, which should be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance; (b) Yes, because the result
simply cannot be expected from the means he employed to
accomplish his purpose; (c) Yes, because there is a demonstrated
disproportion between the means he employed to attain his purpose
and the result obtaining, which satisfies the indispensable
requirement of this mitigating circumstance; (d) No, by committing
a complex crime, the imposable penalty is already raised to the
maximum of the most severe penalty for said crimes, which is death;
hence, there should be no occasion to consider further any
mitigating circumstance.

38. AA, EM, and ZM were charged, together with others, in the
killing of VA, but it is claimed that there is no evidence to show that they
took any actual part therein. It appears, however, that they were present
from the time VA was taken from his house until the time he was killed.
Under the evidence in the case, can they be considered as principals? (a)
No, immediate participation in the criminal design entertained by
the slayer is essential to the responsibility of one who is alleged to
have taken a direct part in the killing, as a principal, but who has
not himself inflicted an injury materially contributing to the death;
(b) No, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not give rise to
criminal liability; (c) Yes, one who shares the guilty purpose and aids
and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of
its perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in
its material execution, is guilty as a principal; (d) No, mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to
give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not
constitute the cooperation required for complicity in the commission

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of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has
kept silent.

39. X was pardoned by the Chief Executive, after his conviction for
plunder, for which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. X wanted to run
for office and feels he can do so because the terms of the pardon are silent
about the matter or otherwise does not expressly prevent him from doing
so. Therefore -- (a) X can run for public office inasmuch as the
pardon, not being subject to a condition, should be regarded as
absolute and, therefore, extinguished his criminal liability and all
the effects thereof; (b) X cannot run for public office because though
pardon by the Chief Executive extinguished his criminal liability and
the effects thereof, the right to run for public office can only be
restored if expressly remitted in the pardon; (c) X cannot run for
public office because although pardon extinguished his criminal
liability, it does not erase the effects thereof; (d) X can run for public
office because the pardon in question extinguished his criminal
liability and does not expressly prevent him from running for a
public office.

40. Where three persons planned to rob a house but in carrying it


out, only two of them went into the house to break open a trunk and carry
off its contents, while the third merely remained downstairs to engage the
owner of the house in a conversation to distract her attention, the latter –
(a) is merely an accomplice because he did not directly participate in
the robbery nor cooperate therein in an indispensable manner and
there is no proof that robbery was committed upon his inducement;
(b) is a principal because of conspiracy and direct participation; (c)
is not liable for the robbery by his mere presence at the scene of the
crime for, after all, he did not directly participate in robbing the
house; (d) is a mere accomplice, because while acting
simultaneously with the two who went into the house to rob it, his
act was not indispensable.

41. GJ, JV, and CI together with the two deceased DF and FR, were
fencing the land of GF, father of deceased DF. The place was in the
boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by GF. At the place of the
fencing is the house and rice drier of MN. At that time, MN was taking his
rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he
arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on,
MN would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his
ricemill. So, he addressed the group, saying “Pare, if possible you stop
destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,”
addressing FR, who is compadre of MN. DF, however, answered: “No,
gademit, proceed, go ahead.” MN apparently lost his equilibrium and he got

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his gun and shot DF, hitting him. As DF fell down, FR ran towards the jeep,
and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, MN fired at FR, likewise hitting
him. Both DF and FR died “as a result of the shooting”. Can MN, after
admitting having shot DF and FR from the window of his house with the
shotgun under the foregoing circumstances, claim that he did so in defense
of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from
criminal liability? (a) Yes, the assault on MN's property amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law and, therefore, gives
occasion to the lawful exercise of defense that MN did; (b) No,
defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and
defense of property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some
form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property; (c)
No, MN's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable since not all
the elements for justification are present; he should therefore be
held responsible for the death of his victims, although he could be
credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense; (d) No, the defense of property, whether complete or
incomplete, to be available, must be coupled with an attack by the
one getting the property on the person defending it and, in this case,
there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much
less made upon the person of MN, while the mere utterance "No,
gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which
entitles MN to the plea of self-defense.

42. Penalty for an impossible crime: (a) penalty for the crime
intended to be committed in its attempted stage; (b) penalty for the
crime intended to be committed in its frustrated stage; (c) penalty
for the crime intended to be committed but mitigated by lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong; (d) arresto mayor or a fine from
200 to 500 pesos.

43. MB and the victim, EA, were together at a restaurant, until


about 0:00 of the same evening, when MB and EA left for EA’s house. EP,
the housemaid of the victim, opened the door for them; she saw MB and EA
immediately proceed to EA’s room. The next morning, EP rose to wake her
mistress. She knocked at the door. She found that EA was lying on her bed,
facing downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart, with a
broken figurine beside her head. There was no eyewitness account of the
killing. The extra-judicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I
thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her,
and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I
picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and
I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face". Although a figurine was
found broken beside the victim’s head, the medical report, however, does
not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial

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hemorrhage. It is established, however, that MB had anal intercourse with
EA after she was already dead. The muscles of the anus did not close and
also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by the
medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report,
clearly established the coitus after death. MB had a notorious advantage of
height accused had over his hapless victim, EA, he being 6 feet tall and
weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall. Under the
circumstances, the crime committed is: (a) homicide only, considering
that no qualifying or aggravating circumstance could be proved; (b)
murder, qualified by outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the
victim; (c) murder, qualified by abuse of superiority and aggravated
by outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim; (d) murder,
qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of superiority and
scoffing or outraging at the corpse of the victim.

44. RB was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof.


Pending appeal of his conviction, RB died. As a result: (a) both the
criminal and civil aspect of the case should be dismissed as the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
only his criminal liability but also his civil liability; (b) only the
criminal aspect should be dismissed, while the case may proceed as
regards the civil liability of the accused, the obligation to respond
therefor being transmissible to RB’s heirs; (c) only the criminal
aspect should be dismissed, while the case may proceed as regards
the civil liability of the accused, but the obligation to respond
therefor is transmissible to RB’s heirs only to the extent of what they
may inherit from him; (d) only the criminal aspect should be
dismissed while the survival of the civil liability depends upon
whether or not those who have the right to demand it insist on
pursuing the civil liability against RB’s heirs.

45. Five different thefts were committed. It has been proved that X,
knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen by the
persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to
continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and
contributed on five different occasions to the realization of the said thefts.
The physical authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age. They
acted upon the suggestions of X without discernment or judgment of their
own. What is the liability of X? (a) X is not criminally liable because
her act would have made her an accessory-after-the- fact but there
can be no accessory without a principal; (b) X is a principal by
inducement, which inducement not merely favored the execution of
the crime but determined its commission; (c) X is a mere accessory-
after-the-fact for having benefitted from or assisted the principals
(albeit themselves exempt from criminal liability) in benefitting from

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the proceeds of the crime; (d) although not liable under the Revised
Penal Code, under which the liability of an accessory is subordinate
to that of the principal, she is nevertheless liable as a fence under
PD No. 1612.

46. The spouses W and Z, coming from Nasugbu, returned to their


house in Balayan, and before entering the same called to X, W’s sister, who
they knew was there. Receiving no reply, they went up into the house, the
husband leading the way and opening the door, followed by his wife who,
once inside, lit a match and then a small kerosene lamp there was in the
house. In the meantime, the husband approached the place where X was,
who, startled, immediately awoke and, believing that her honor was in
danger, seized a pocketknife used in spinning hemp, which was in a box at
her side, and with it, attacked and struck Z, who was near her, a blow in the
breast. Under the circumstances, can X plead self-defense? (a) No,
there was, in the first place, no real need of wounding with the said
weapon him who had merely caught her arm, and perhaps did so to
awaken her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her sister's
calls; (b) Yes, although the criminal act is not altogether excusable,
she should at least be entitled to the benefit of an incomplete self-
defense against what, at least, in her mind, she thought to be an
unprovoked unlawful aggression against her chastity; (c) Yes,
because although mistaken, had the facts been as she had thought
them to be, she would have been perfectly justified in so acting in
defense of her honor or chastity; (d) No, she is not entitled to invoke
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, because the fact
shows the actual absence of unlawful aggression, which is a
primordial or indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.

47. In a murder case committed by several persons, those who were


present from the time the victim was taken from his house until the time the
victim was killed but who did not take actual part in the said killing, are
nevertheless guilty as principals; however, those who did not accompany the
rest of the party to the place where the victim was killed, but who were
only detailed to guard the victim's companion at a point some distance from
the place where the killing of the victim took place – (a) cannot be
convicted as co-principals, absent proof of inducement, for lack of
actual participation nor indispensable cooperation therein; (b) can
be convicted as accomplices for having committed acts simultaneous
to the commission of murder, but not indispensable thereto; (c)
cannot be convicted of any crime because mere presence at the
scene of the crime is not sufficient to give rise to criminal liability;
(d) can be convicted as co-principals by direct participation because
their voluntary presence lent moral aid to the commission of crime.

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48. In case of accident under Article 12(4), Revised Penal Code --
(a) there is no criminal liability incurred but there is civil liability;
(b) there is neither criminal nor civil liability incurred; (c) a crime is
committed but there is no criminal liability incurred; (d) there is
civil liability despite the absence of crime.

49. The mother of a thief who helped the latter in selling stolen
goods is – (a) always exempt from criminal liability as an accessory-
after-the-fact by reason of her relationship to the principal of the
crime; (b) is liable as an accessory-after-the-fact if she acted with
knowledge of the stolen character of the goods, but is exempt from
criminal liability in view of her relationship to the principal of the
crime; (c) is liable as an accessory-after-the-fact if she acted with
knowledge of the stolen character of the goods and is not exempt
from criminal liability as such despite her relationship to the
principal of the crime; (d) is a fence and, therefore, guilty under the
Anti-Fencing Law.

50. On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and


the incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and
quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. In the Philippines, the following theory applies: (a) insanity as a
defense is a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is
established, and when the defense of insanity is not made out
beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows; (b) an affirmative
verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence,
and therefore, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable
doubt; (c) the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt because, while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists
at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of
the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential
ingredients; (d) where the accused claims and introduces evidence
to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

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