DIZON V.

SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering

possession. Where the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission
but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing
an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita
Sison entered into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita
received the ring and issued a receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the
return of the ring but the latter refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return,
Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the pledge and she found out
that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the niece
of Clarita’s husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon for
P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return
of the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during
the pendency of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA
on appeal. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the
CC which states that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor
of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the
current possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence
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would require him to inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by
pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was
no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit,
he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain if the right of the true
owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:

Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.
> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is
sought to be bound.

> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.
Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

> Interpretation of the “unlawfully deprived” in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to include
all cases where there has been no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature
intended interpretation to be that of the French Code, it certainly would have adopted and
used a narrower term than the broad language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and the accepted
meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.

DE GARCIA V. CA
37 SCRA 160
FACTS:
Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring with white gold mounting, solitaire 2-
karat diamond as well as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a relevant date, while
she was talking to Garcia, an owner of a restaurant, she recognized the ring on the latter’s
finger and asked how she acquired the same. Garcia averred that she bought it from her
comadre. Guevarra made Garcia know that the ring was stolen from her place days before.
It was ascertained the ring was indeed Guevarra’s but despite written demands, Garcia
refused to return the ring.
HELD:
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same
from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if
he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. Guevarra who was unlawfully deprived
of the ring
was entitled to recover it from de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The
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only exception provided by law is when the possessor acquired the property through a
public sale, in which case, the owner cannot recover without reimbursement.

DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost or Stolen Goods

(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover
the same from the possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it
and it has been obtained by the latter in good faith at a public sale wherein the former
needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.

:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.

FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamond-
solitaire, and 4 brills. Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house.
Luckily, on October 1953 (barely a year after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena,
on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo De Garcia.

Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it.
When the ring was handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around,
she brought her husband and Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring from, to
verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens
and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the very ring that he had sold to
the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De Garcia did not
deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica likewise refused to
deliver the ring.

According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another Miss
who in turn got it from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was
nowhere to be found. She boarded three months at the first buyer’s house but left a week
after her landlady bought the ring. The first buyer did not even know Aling Petring’s last
name nor her forwarding address.
De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is
equivalent to title.

[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased
and at the time it was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamond-
solitaire with a heavier stone.]

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The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner,
Guevara. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Who has a better right?

RULING: Guevara (owner)

Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to
the general rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY
EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.

There is no merit in the contention that De Garcia’s possession is in good faith, equivalent
to title, sufficed to defeat the owner’s claim. Possession in good faith does not really
amount to title for the reason that there is a period for acquisitive prescription for movable
through “uninterrupted possession” of 4 years.

The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive
title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
Besides, De Garcia’s “title”, if any, was weak. Her source, Aling Petring, was dubious. She
did not make a comment when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer Guevara’s
letter asserting ownership of it. Her testimony was weak!

Other facts
1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with 1 2.05 cts. diamond-
solitaire, and 4 brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullida’s experience in the jewelry business = 30 years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakeña restaurant
4. Weight of the diamonds:
5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevara’s) = 2.05 cts
7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and costs, P1,000 (atty’s fees) & P1,000
as exemplary damages

GABOYA V. CUI- Usufruct

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FACTS:

Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his children became
co-owners of the property. Don Mariano executed a deed authorizing the children to apply
for a loan w/ mortgage with a stipulation reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The
children then constructed a building on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof.
Much later, when Don Mariano died, his estate was claiming the fruits of the building.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?

RULING: NO.
The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He only owned the
rent for the portion of land occupied by the building; thus, the estate could only claim the
rent on that piece of land and not on the entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to
the rents of the building. (A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building.

There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent due and owing
to the Don Mariano’s estate is still unliquidated and undetermined. The trial court has the
discretion to grant the debtor (children) a period within which to pay the rental income from
the portion of land owned by the building because the same has not yet been determined.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the right to rescind but subject to the period that the
court will grant.

Moreover, on the issue of co-ownership, the court held that a co-owner cannot
simultaneously be a usufructuary of the same land owned.

VDA DE ALBAR v. CARANDANG, 106 PHIL 855- Usufruct

The reparation or indemnity given in exchange for the destruction of the building is the
substitute for the building itself. The indemnity is the capital which belongs to the naked
owner while the interest on the capital is the fruits which belong to the usufructuary.
Notes:
The Civil Code contemplates a situation where the owner pays for the construction of a
new building. However, the twist in this case was that the naked owner did not have to
construct a new one because the Chinaman had one built at his own expense. This is the

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reason why the court had a difficult time ascertaining who had the right to the indemnity
given by the government for the destruction of the building due to the war.

Majority Opinion: The reparation should be treated as fruits. Usufructuary should get 6%
of the reparation (from the time it was actually received to the tend of the life of the usufruct)
because it was not used to construct a new building. Otherwise, the naked owner is
enriched twice – first from the reparation and second from the fruits if payment of rent stops
when the building is constructed. Thus, the new building should be considered as the
capital, and the reparation as fruits. The naked owner should share the reparation with the
usufructuary to prevent unjust enrichment.

Ponente’s Opinion: The reparation should be treated as capital (NCC). Only the interest
on the reparation up to the date that the new building was constructed time should be given
to the usufructuary, not the interest until the end of the usufruct. The reparation itself which
is considered as the capital (which rightfully belongs to the naked owner) intended to
replace the old building. The intention was fulfilled when the Chinaman constructed a new
one. It was not the naked owner’s fault that he need not use the reparation to construct a
new building. The owner is not doubly compensated because it was not his fault.

Dissenting opinion: There is double benefit in either case. In the first, the usufructuary will
be receiving interest on the reparation and rent from the building. In the second, the naked
owner receives value for the building and the construction of a building at no expense to
him.

Payment of interest should continue during the life of the usufruct (not just 6%) because
the war damage is the equivalent to the building. The construction of the new building does
not relieve the owners of the land used in the war damage payment from continuing the
payment of interest. If they had used it to construct the building, they would have been
freed from paying interest – but they did not.

*********************************

FACTS:
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building
and improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she
devised the naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al.
but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for life.

During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of
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Manila, the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other
improvements that were not destroyed by the fire.

One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the
same time agreeing to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as
well as the usufructuary sign the agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains
that she has the exclusive right to cede the property by lease and to receive the full rental
value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on the other hand the naked owners maintain
that the right of usufruct was extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right of
the usufructory being limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials,
in order that the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary
compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly
rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly
rental. It was likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the building to be
constructed would accrue to the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot
covered by the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked owners but
subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the right to
litigate their respective claims after the termination of the contract of lease to determine
which of said claims was legally correct.

By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War
Damage Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to
the property, paid to and received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary
paid the real estate taxes due on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary
(FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the
usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?

HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that
when the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin
and Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the
land on which it is erected for indeed the building cannot exist without the land. And as this
Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable part of the rented premises cannot be
considered as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the
term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well. (Diccionario
Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the
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usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land as well, then the usufruct is
not deemed extinguished by the destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article 603, old
Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is
addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and
purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property. This has been clarified in the
case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536, which was litigated between the same
parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the will has been the subject of
interpretation.

The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the
real estate taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years
previous to the present litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners
not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by
the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez
David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the same properties
subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was approved by
the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real
estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the necessary
repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said
agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.

VDA. DE ALBAR V. CARANGDANG

106 PHIL 855

FACTS:
Dona Rosario Fabie was the owner of a parcel of land with a building constructed thereon.
Upon her death, she bequeathed the naked ownership to Rosario Grey while the usufruct
to Josefa. Thereafter, a fire broke out and the building constructed on the land was
destroyed. Then a Chinaman offered to lease the property and Josefa nows demand a
share in the rentals given by the lessor.

HELD:
A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the building located on a certain place includes
the rentals on both the building and on the land on which it is erected, because the building
cannot exist without the land. Hence, the usufruct isn’t extinguished by the destruction of
the building, for under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing
subject of the encumbrance.

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RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way

Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a

continuous easement.

FACTS:
Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by
an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been
using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in
the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by
means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the
easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road,
closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired
by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because
its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

Minority Opinion (including the ponente):

Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the
introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of
Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no
distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear
to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path
or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by
mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said
party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.

“The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute

adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period,
but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the
use.” (17 Am. Jur. 972)

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"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by
prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public,
continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claimants'."

GARGANTOS V. CA- Easement

FACTS:
Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was
sold to Tengtio, whol sold to Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was
sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem
arose when latter asked from the Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in
order to construct a higher one. Yan Yung opposed for it would block his window and impair
his right of loght and view.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established

RULING:
Yes. Again, Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one
person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house contructed
on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the
time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house,
doors, windows which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in
the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent
sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title.
108 Phil. 888

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Juan Gargantos appeals by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Romblon.
The record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land
containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in
the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to
different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold
it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was
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sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side,
doors and windows overlooking the third-portion, which, together with the camarin and
small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan
Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor of Romblon for a permit to
demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore
down the roof of the camarin. On May 11,1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of
Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house
and warehouse on his lot Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting
of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain
him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and
enjoying the view through the windows of his house, unless such building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff
and defendant, and to enjoin the members of the Municipal Council of Romblon from
issuing the corresponding building permit to defendants. The case as against the members
of the Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with concurrence of plaintiff's
council. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint and ordering plaintiff, to pay defendant the sum of P12,500.00 by way of
compensatory, exemplary, moral and moderate damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless "he erects the same
at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property, in
conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."
So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate Court's decision. The focal
issue herein is whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light
and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.
The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent never acquired any easement either
by title or by prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise,
neither petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby
they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final judgment to that
effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that
respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally
forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement,
hence the prescriptive period never started.
It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine
in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by
petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person,
Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the
northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging
to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which
serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when
respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed of sale did not provide that
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the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case
covered by Article 541, O.C.C. (now Article 624, N.C.C.) which provides that the existence
of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of
both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will
continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made
to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows
on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible
and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence
(Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however, that while the law
declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time
only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement
to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates (Article 530, O.C.C., now Article
613, N.C.C.).
We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against
petitioner's property. By reason of this easement, petitioner cannot construct on his land
any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the
boundary line separating the two estates.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.

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