Co v HRET
was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the
private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989,
found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22,
1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose
Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from
China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought
from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan
to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his
childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural
born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose
Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable.
As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In
the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he
cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take
his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath
of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose
Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from
other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of
the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took
and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his
family in Manila.
 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in
Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If
one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred
the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article
IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for
the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would
have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
Re: Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar Vicente D. Ching, petitioner
Facts: Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino
mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April
11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935
Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on
July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the
bar if he submit to the Court the following documents
as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of
Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The
oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath. He was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese
citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the
age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under
the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which
the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be
declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether or not he has elected Philippine
citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Rulings:
No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to
elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time.
The reasonable time means that the election should be
made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected
Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of
majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file
the same with the nearest civil registry.
Republic v Lim
Facts: Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed
a petition to the court for correction of four erroneous
entries in her birth certificate to wit: 1) her surname
“Yu” was misspelled as “Yo” 2) her father’s name was
written as “Yo Diu To” (Co Tian) when it should have
been “Yu Dio To” 3) her nationality was entered as
Chinese when it should have been Filipino 4)that she
was a legitimate child when she should have been
described as illegitimate considering that her parents
were never married. After the trial court conducted the
appropriate proceeding, it granted the petition sought
by respondent to set the records straight and in their
proper perspective. However, petitioner herein filed an
appeal specifically on the correction of her citizenship
(from Chinese to Filipino) not having complied with the
legal requirements for election of citizenship. It cited
Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935Constitution and Sec 1,
CA No. 625 which provides the election of citizenship of
a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father
upon reaching the age of maturity.
Issue: Whether or not respondent needs to elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority?
Held: The constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. The case at bar clearly states that respondent
is an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien
father. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth.
Tecson v Comelec
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on
6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824,
would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to
be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the
Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth
of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made
by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the
time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe
was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The
petitions were dismissed.
Yu v Defensor-Santiago
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his
naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality
as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed,
specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu,
in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the
Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition.
When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person
has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this
Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to
look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient.
Maquiling v. COMELEC
The use of foreign passport and its impact on dual
citizenship, effective renunciation, and holding of public
office under RA 9225
The use of a foreign passport after taking the oath of
allegiance and executing an affidavit of renunciation
under Republic Act No. 9225, or the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," is a positive
act showing the applicant's continued possession of a
foreign citizenship. While it does not divest him of his
reacquired Filipino citizenship, it negates his
qualification to run for an elective post or be appointed
to a government position. This, in a nutshell, is the
ruling in the 2013 case of Maquiling vs. Comelec, et. al.
(G.R. No. 195649), penned by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
In the Maquiling case, it has been established that
private respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen. Subsequently, however, he was
naturalized as a US citizen, thereby losing his Filipino
citizenship. In July 2008, with the intention for
repatriation, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. His application was
approved. In April 2009, he again took an oath of
allegiance and executed an affidavit of renunciation of
his US citizenship. In November 2009, he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in a certain town in
Mindanao.
In April 2010, another mayoralty candidate (and also
private respondent), Linog Balua, sought the
disqualification and/or the cancellation of Arnado’s
cerficate of candidacy. Apparently, Arnado used his US
passport in entering and leaving the Philippines
between the period April 2009 and June 2009, July 2009
and November 2009, January 2010 and March 2010.
Balua presented as evidence a computer-generated
travel record and a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID).
In so declaring that Arnado is disqualified from holding
public office and even from being a candidate during
the 2010 elections, C.J. Sereno explained:
“Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his
foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he
filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation
he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American
citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted
by the United States of America.”
xxx
“While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of
the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country
to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
“When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009,
or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that
he “absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA” and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full
employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.”
“We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport.”
With that, C.J. Sereno passionately said:
“The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to
be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a
full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by
the foreign country which granted the citizenship.”
“Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right
of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to
public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other.”
Republic v Dela Rosa
FACTS: September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition
for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63
before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for
hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should
be at least 6 months before the date of the said
hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel
the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May
1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the
hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or
copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to
annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to
nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same
date.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to
his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was
marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the
last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
observing the two-year waiting period.
Labo v Comelec
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of
Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that
Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best
he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that
even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost
when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts
that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted
for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second
highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in
the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of
evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as
an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an
Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance
to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that
he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost
his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized
or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an
act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His
claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome
the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of
Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously,
would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he
is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through
the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification
because Lardizabal obtained the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the
basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea
in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election.
Mo Ya Lim Yao v Commissioner of
Immigration
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In
the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into
the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond
in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the
period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed
to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction. At the hearing which took place
one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either
English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could
not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court
of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as
a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of
her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime
she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as
of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Bengzon v HRET
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the
HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when
the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he
was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith.
He reacquired Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected
as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz
was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927),
and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none
of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of
a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
Altajeros v Comelec
FACTS
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe
Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San
Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to
disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he]
was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a
foreign country."
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter 1
from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident
visa, an Alien
Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on
November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of
Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by
the Bureau of Immigration.
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer stating,
among others, that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as mayor
because as early as
December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate
of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner
claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already
restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the
May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal
of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to
submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner
did not file one within the required period. Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum subsequently.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and
loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed.
HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that
Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not
lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3)
mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing
Philippine citizenship.
The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states
“Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no
retroactive effect.
The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

Aznar v Comelec

FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed

his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the
position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on
the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.

In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal

Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commission that
Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the
evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a
Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio
Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and been continuously residing in
the Philippines since birth and that he has been a
registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for

Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and
for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not
s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning
candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.