Emotion Regulation
BP Doré and KN Ochsner, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
ã 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Glossary
Amygdala A subcortical emotion generation region that
registers arousal and stimulus salience.
Domain-general control regions Prefrontal, parietal, and
cingulate regions of the brain that support controlled
processing in general, including the implementation of
emotion regulation strategies like reappraisal.
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) A prefrontal
control region that detects conflict and signals adjustments
in controlled processing.
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) A prefrontal
control region that supports maintenance and manipulation
of information in working memory.
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) A brain region
that supports reappraisal and is known to underlie mental-
state judgments.
Emotion generation The process by which a situation is
selected, attended to, and appraised as goal-relevant, giving
rise to an emotional response.
Emotion generation regions Cortical and subcortical
regions of the brain that support emotion generation and are
modulated by regulation strategies like reappraisal.
Emotion regulation The recruitment of strategies that
influence one or more stages of the emotion generation
process and thereby modify emotional responses.
Many of history’s greatest minds hold that life is tragic. Some of
life’s tragedies are major, like losing a loved one. And many of
them are small, like arriving at work and realizing that you
forgot your keys at home. These events elicit emotional
responses ranging from grief to sadness, anger, and frustration,
among many others. How, exactly, does the brain enable us to
regulate these emotions? The answer to this question has
implications for our mental and physical well-being (DeSteno
et al., 2013; Gross & Munoz, 1995) and our scientific under-
standing of brain function. In recent years, an entire field of
research has emerged devoted to understanding this ability.
Here, we summarize this research and outline a brain-based
model of emotion regulation that focuses on the neural sys-
tems underlying the cognitive control of emotion.
The Process Model of Emotion
Emotion Generation
Before turning to how emotions can be regulated, it is useful to
consider what emotions are and how they arise. Some theorists
distinguish between affective responses, which are valenced (i.e.,
positive or negative) evaluations that reflect an assessment of
the momentary goodness or badness of a stimulus, and emo-
tions, which entail a richer appraisal of the meaning of the
stimulus along multiple dimensions (see, e.g., Barrett, 2012;
Brain Mapping: An Encyclopedic Reference http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-397025-1.00153-6
Emotional response A psychological state that involves
subjective experience (e.g., feelings of valence, arousal, and/
or particular categories of emotion), behavior (e.g., facial,
bodily, and verbal), and peripheral physiology (e.g., heart
rate and respiration).
Inferior parietal cortex (iPC) A parietal control region that
supports controlled shifts of attention.
Insula A cortical emotion generation region that supports
integration of affective and visceral–somatic information.
Lateral temporal cortex A brain region that supports
reappraisal and is known to reflect semantic and perceptual
processing.
Reappraisal A particularly powerful and well-studied
emotion regulation strategy that involves changing the way
one thinks about the meaning of a stimulus.
Ventral striatum A subcortical emotion generation region
that supports encoding and construction of stimulus value.
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) A prefrontal
control region that supports the inhibition and controlled
selection of semantic information.
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) A brain region
that may underlie individual or group differences in
reappraisal ability and is known to underlie fear extinction,
value computation, and self-processing.
Lazarus, 1991). Given that we are at a relatively early stage of
brain-imaging research on emotion and its regulation, we take
an inclusive stance and group both terms under the umbrella
category of emotional responses that can be regulated.
As shown in Figure 1, contemporary views hold that emo-
tion generation involves at least four distinct stages (adapted
from Gross, 1998; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012). An emo-
tion is generated when (1) a situation is encountered (i.e.,
stimuli embedded within a context are perceived), (2) one or
more features of this situation are attended to, (3) these fea-
tures are appraised as positive or negative in a variety of ways
depending on their relevance to current and chronic goals, and
(4) a corresponding pattern of experience, behavior, and/or
peripheral physiology is produced. Although in prototypical
emotional responses this pattern is described as coordinated
(e.g., feelings of fear, escape behavior, and increased heart rate
arise together upon seeing a snake), research on this topic
suggests that coherence of these variables may be less than
originally hypothesized (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm,
& Gross, 2005).
Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation involves the modification of emotional
responses via the recruitment of strategies that influence par-
ticular stages of the emotion generation process. Figure 1
53
54 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE | Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation
Situation selection Attention
and modification deployment
Situation Attention
Emotion generation
Figure 1 The process model of emotion. See text for details.
Emotion generation
Figure 2 Brain mechanisms of emotion regulation. See text for details.
illustrates four such families of emotion regulation strategies,
organized in terms of the stage of the emotion generation
process that they impact. Note that although the goal to regu-
late one’s emotions and the strategies used to do so could
theoretically be activated and operate implicitly and automat-
ically, almost all neuroscience studies of emotion regulation
have focused on strategies that are explicitly motivated, cued,
and implemented (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011).
The most forward-thinking families of strategies, situation
selection and modification, entail efforts to influence the kinds of
situations that one will experience or to modify relevant fea-
tures of those situations once you are in them. Next, attention
deployment involves directing attention toward or away from
features of a given situation, as when distracting oneself. After
that, cognitive change strategies target our appraisals, changing
the ways we think about an attended stimulus in order to
change its emotional impact. The prototypical cognitive
change strategy, reappraisal, involves deliberately changing
one’s interpretation of and/or personal connection to a stimu-
lus. Finally, response modulation strategies target and modulate
the behavioral component of the emotional response, for
example, emotional facial expressions.
Brain Mechanisms of Emotion Regulation
Although behavioral studies have examined how the strategies
listed in the preceding text differ in terms of their impact on the
emotional response (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; Kross & Ayduk,
2008; Richards & Gross, 2000), to date, the majority of brain-
imaging research has focused on the prototypical cognitive
change strategy, reappraisal. Recent meta-analyses of over 40
brain-imaging studies of reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2013;
Cognitive Response
change modulation
Appraisal Response
Domain-general control
and other relevant regions
Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011; Kalisch, 2009) in
healthy adults suggest that implementing reappraisals involves
recruitment of domain-general control regions, including the pre-
frontal, parietal, and cingulate cortices, in order to influence
activity in the subcortical and cortical emotion generation
regions, including the amygdala, ventral striatum, and insula
(Figure 2).
Emotion Generation Regions
First, we consider brain regions that support the valenced eval-
uation of stimuli and thereby the generation of emotional
responses. Activity in these regions is associated with the expe-
rience of emotional states (Kober et al., 2008) and is modulated
by regulation strategies like reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2013;
Diekhof et al., 2011; Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2012).
The amygdala. The amygdala is a subcortical region that
detects affectively salient stimuli, modulates activity in percep-
tual and memory systems for further processing of these stim-
uli, and can trigger appropriate behaviors (Cunningham, Van
Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008; Whalen, 1998). Although early theo-
ries of amygdala function emphasized its role in negative affect
(e.g., LeDoux, 1998), it has become clear that this region also
responds to positive, novel, and ambiguous stimuli (e.g.,
Phelps, 2006). Amygdala activity is modulated by reappraisal
in studies that use negative stimuli as well as studies using
positive stimuli, although studies of the latter are far less repre-
sented in the current literature (Ochsner et al., 2012). In the
context of emotion regulation, amygdala activity is thought to
reflect the current salience and arousal level elicited by the
viewed or regulated stimulus.
The ventral striatum. The ventral portion of the striatum is
involved in encoding and constructing representations of
 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE | Emotion Regulation
stimulus value that guide learning and motivate behavior. As a
key region of the mesolimbic dopamine reward pathway, the
ventral striatum receives dopaminergic input from the midbrain
ventral tegmental area (Haber & Knutson, 2009; Schultz, Dayan,
& Montague, 1997). Functional imaging studies show that the
ventral striatum responds to expectation and receipt of a wide
variety of rewards, including sweet liquids, money, music,
attractive faces, and social fairness (e.g., Cloutier, Heatherton,
Whalen, & Kelley, 2008; King-Casas et al., 2005; O’Doherty,
2004; Salimpoor, Benovoy, Larcher, Dagher, & Zatorre, 2011).
Although emotion regulation studies have reported modulation
of the ventral striatum much less commonly than modulation
of the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2013) – in large part because they
have infrequently utilized appetitive/positive stimuli – studies
employing mediation analysis support the idea that the reap-
praisal of aversive stimuli can rely on independent pathways of
amygdala and ventral striatum modulation (Kober et al., 2010;
Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008).
The insula. The insula is a cortical region hidden beneath
overlying folds of the temporal and parietal cortices. Based on
patterns of anatomical connectivity (Augustine, 1996; Craig,
2009) and meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies (e.g., Chang,
Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013), it has been proposed
that the insula supports the integration of affective and
visceral–somatic information involved in interoceptive states,
like emotion (Garfinkel et al., 2013; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner,
2012), including the experience of disgust and pain. In studies
of reappraisal, insula modulation has been observed far less
commonly than modulation of either the amygdala or ventral
striatum (Ochsner et al., 2012).
Domain-General Control Regions
Next, we turn to a set of brain regions previously identified as
critical in the ability to exert cognitive control over the contents
of memory, focus of attention, and language functions. Meta-
analyses support the idea that reappraisal is implemented by
these domain-general control regions (Buhle et al., 2013;
Diekhof et al., 2011; Kalisch, 2009), including the dorsal ante-
rior cingulate cortex (dACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC), inferior parietal cortex (iPC), ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (vlPFC), and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC).
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex.
When reappraising an affectively salient stimulus, a set of cog-
nitive control regions are engaged. Chief among these are the
dlPFC and iPC, which together form the brain’s frontoparietal
network thought to underlie goal-directed (i.e., top-down) con-
trol of attention and working memory (Corbetta & Shulman,
2002; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004). Of the two compo-
nents of this network, studies suggest that the dlPFC is involved
primarily in the maintenance and manipulation of information
in working memory (Ptak, 2012; Wager & Smith, 2003) whereas
the iPC is more involved in triggering shifts of attention between
external stimuli and internal representations (Ptak, 2012; Wager
& Smith, 2003). In the context of emotion regulation, the dlPFC
and iPC may work together to attend to, maintain, and manip-
ulate semantic information related to stimulus qualities,
appraisal representations, and regulatory goals.
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Another region subserving
mechanisms of controlled processing, the vlPFC is involved in
55
language production (Snyder et al., 2010) and, more generally,
the selection and controlled retrieval of information from
semantic memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007). This region is
also known to support controlled inhibition of prepotent
behavioral responses (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Levy
& Wagner, 2011). Reappraisal is theorized to depend deeply on
memory and language processes to support the generation of
alternative narratives about the meaning of affective stimuli,
which also involves the inhibition of representations that gen-
erate one’s initial affective response. As such, it is likely that
vlPFC activation in studies of reappraisal reflects computations
supporting some or all of these functions.
The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Implementing control dur-
ing reappraisal may require detection of conflict between com-
peting responses. Models of dACC function emphasize its role
as a nexus region that detects and signals the need for adjust-
ments in cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger,
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). In the context of emotion regu-
lation, dACC may serve to signal the conflict between one’s
initial appraisal of a stimulus and a desired reappraisal of it or
conflicts between current and desired levels of affect.
Other Regions Relevant to Emotion Regulation
Two regions that do not map cleanly onto cognitive control
systems – the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the
lateral temporal cortex – also are consistently observed to
increase their activity during reappraisal. A third region, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), has not been consis-
tently observed during reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2013), but has
been variably proposed to support affect generation or con-
trolled regulation or to act as a mediator of the effects of
control regions on emotion generation regions (see Diekhof
et al., 2011; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012).
The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. The dmPFC is a cortical
region known to support mental-state judgments about tran-
sient or enduring qualities of oneself or other people (Denny,
Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Mitchell, 2009). Activation in
this region is also reliably observed during reappraisal, alongside
domain-general control regions, suggesting that processes
recruited to support introspection about and assessments of
mental states also support emotion regulation. This observed
activity may reflect attempts to judge one’s own emotional state
during the reappraisal period or to gauge and reconsider the
mental states of individuals depicted in the evocative stimuli.
The lateral temporal cortex. Reappraisal also consistently
engages a swath of the lateral temporal cortex, an area of the
brain thought to support abstract representation of semantic
and perceptual information (Binder & Desai, 2011; Visser &
Ralph, 2011). This pattern of findings suggests that the cogni-
tive control of emotion involves using control systems to mod-
ulate semantic and perceptual processing of a stimulus, which
in turn leads to modulation of emotion generation regions like
the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2013).
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The vmPFC is known to
directly track reward outcome magnitude in a variety of contexts
and is thought to compute an integrative value signal that takes
into account stimulus history and context (Fehr & Rangel, 2011;
Schoenbaum, Saddoris, & Stalnaker, 2007). Interestingly, this
56 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE | Emotion Regulation
region is crucial to reversal learning and extinction of condi-
tioned fear, as well as placebo analgesia (Delgado, Gillis, &
Phelps, 2008; Diekhof et al., 2011; Schiller & Delgado, 2010).
Although several theorists have proposed that the vmPFC plays
a role in emotion regulation broadly construed, this region is
not consistently activated in studies of reappraisal (Buhle et al.,
2013). However, this region is known to relate to individual
and group differences in reappraisal efficacy (Erk et al., 2010;
Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Wager
et al., 2008) and may play a general role in implicit forms of
emotion regulation (Gyurak et al., 2011).
Extending the Model to Other Regulatory Phenomena
Having established a model of the basic brain mechanisms
underlying emotion regulation, research has begun to ask
how these brain systems may contribute to other forms of
regulatory and social cognitive phenomena.
Affect labeling. Even in the absence of a goal to regulate,
simply verbally labeling feelings can have a regulatory effect in
some circumstances. Recent research demonstrates that engag-
ing in affect labeling when viewing an affective stimulus leads to
increases in vlPFC activity, decreases in amygdala activity
(Torrisi, Lieberman, Bookheimer, & Altshuler, 2013), and
attenuated intensity of self-reported emotional experience
(Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011), suggesting
that verbally labeling affective responses leads to the incidental
regulation of affective responses to them.
Self-serving biases. Self-enhancement, or the motivated ten-
dency to judge oneself in an unrealistically positive light, repre-
sents another pervasive phenomenon that relates to affect
regulation (Taylor & Brown, 1994). Interestingly, the most con-
sistent neural marker of unrealistically positive social cognition
seems to be a reduction in vmPFC activity (Hughes & Beer,
2012; Somerville, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2010), which has
been interpreted as reflecting reductions in integration processes
that can be used to overcome self-serving biases (Beer, 2012).
Self-regulation. Given that many domains of regulation rely
on similar regions of the brain, recent studies that have
attempted to use brain imaging to examine the neural basis
of the prominent limited resource model of self-regulation hold
that repeated attempts at regulation draw on and eventually
exhaust a common regulatory resource (Baumeister & Heather-
ton, 1996; Heatherton, 2011). Recent imaging work supports
this idea by showing that engaging in an effortful self-
regulation task leads to exaggerated amygdala responses to
negative images and reduced functional connectivity between
the amygdala and the vmPFC (Wagner & Heatherton, 2013).
Conclusion and Future Directions
In this article, we have outlined research demonstrating that
the brain mechanisms of emotion regulation involve interac-
tions between emotion generation regions that support emo-
tional responding and domain-general control regions that act
to modulate activity in these generation regions. Available
research suggests that this model, derived primarily from
studies of reappraisal, may generalize to diverse social and
emotional contexts, but the particular regions recruited (and
the interplay between these regions) are likely to vary across
emotion categories, stimulus types, regulatory goals, and spe-
cific regulatory tactics.
Although research on this topic has expanded dramatically in
recent years, several areas merit even closer attention. An impor-
tant goal for translational research will be to understand how
dysfunction in either bottom-up emotion generation or top-
down control might underlie patterns of emotional changes
observed in psychopathology. Such a direction is already being
pursued in studies of emotion regulation across various disorders,
including borderline personality disorder (e.g., Koenigsberg et al.,
2009), major depression (e.g., Heller et al., 2009), bipolar disor-
der (e.g., Townsend et al., 2012), and anxiety disorders (e.g., Etkin
& Wager, 2007). Similarly, there will be a growing value in
research that investigates brain changes underlying life-span
changes in emotion experience from childhood and adolescence
(e.g., McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; Silvers et al., 2012) to
young adulthood and old age (e.g., Mather, 2012).
In addition to these translational directions, several basic
questions about the regulation of emotion remain understu-
died. First, among the constellation of distinct regions that
support reappraisal, the mechanistic contributions of particu-
lar regions remain relatively unclear; this could be addressed by
applying conjunction analyses to reappraisal and cognitive
control tasks and by developing more controlled paradigms
that fractionate reappraisal into distinct component processes
(see Cohen, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2012). Second, it will be
important for future studies to determine the impact of stimu-
lus valence and regulatory goals on activity in control regions
and emotion generation regions, as well as intermediary
regions that may mediate these effects. Third, it will be impor-
tant to use neuroscience to address fundamentally new ques-
tions about how emotion regulation operates. For example,
although theories of emotion regulation emphasize the impor-
tance of recognizing appropriate contexts to regulate and acti-
vating and sustaining a goal to implement regulation, little is
known about the mechanisms underlying these abilities. For
another, while it is clear that regulation strategies have large
immediate effects on emotional responses, few studies have
attempted to determine the long-term effects of practicing
regulation on responses to previously regulated or novel stim-
uli. Lastly, although virtually all of the research on this topic
looks at explicit regulation, it will be important to understand
the neural mechanisms underlying more implicit or automatic
forms of regulation, which may be less prone to failure under
certain circumstances. In addressing these and other questions,
it is our hope that this field will continue to inspire theoretical
and empirical work that builds a nuanced and comprehensive
understanding of the contribution of specific brain mecha-
nisms to emotion regulation successes and failures.
See also: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE: Emotional Experience; Self-Regulation and Self-
Regulation Failure; INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS: Brain Mapping
of Control Processes; Emotion; Reward; Salience Network.
 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE | Emotion Regulation
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