POLITICAL LAW Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion.

Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not
give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position
Angel Abad Vs. Herminio Dela Cruz; G.R. No. 207422; March 18, 2015 become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the
appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid.
FACTS: Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed Herminio Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) as City Assessor of the City
Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent capacity on December 28, 2006. The City Assessor is given Who to appoint is “a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
the item of City Government Department Head III. authority can decide.” For the betterment of government service, the appointing authority may
consider other “abstract criteria,” aside from the minimum qualifications set by law in making
In Resolution No. 06-361, majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
appointments.
Government of Muntinlupa concurred in the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government
Department Head III. To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove his or
her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed. Being next in rank is a
Pursuant to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1235 granting the City Government of
legal conclusion that would be the result of inference from evidence properly alleged and proven. The
Muntinlupa the power to take final action on its appointments, the appointment of Dela Cruz was
burden of proof rests on the employee alleging that he or she is next in rank.
considered attested to by the Civil Service Commission.
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-in-rank. He failed to
Angel A. Abad (Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, wrote
prove that his position of Local Assessment Operations Officer V has been previously determined to be
the Civil Service Commission and requested the disapproval of Dela Cruz’s appointment as City
next-in-rank to the position of City Government Department Head III in the Office of the City Assessor
Government Department Head III. Abad alleged that the position of City Government Department Head
of the City Government of Muntinlupa.
III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela Cruz’s former position as
Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz’s Petitioner, therefore, has no right to protest the appointment of respondent.
appointment violated Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001,
which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than three (3) salary grades above
his or her former position.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Dela Cruz’s promotion to the position of City Government Department
Head III is void because it violated the next-in-rank rule.

SC: “Promotion is the advancement of an employee from one position to another with an increase in
duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary.”
Employees next in rank are those “who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group
under which the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational groups and
who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility.”

The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of merit and rewards in the civil
service. Since appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that the
appointments of employees next in rank are equally meritorious. Appointments that consider rank,
salary grades, and seniority promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service.
Angelica A. Fajardo Vs. Mario J. Corral; G.R. No. 212641; July 5, 2017
FACTS: Fajardo was designated as OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division of the Treasury
Department of the PCSO. Her duties included instituting procedures in actual payment of prizes,
conducting periodic check-up, actual counting of paid winning tickets, and requisitioning of cash for
distribution to paying tellers. She was also authorized to draw cash advance of PhP 3,000,000.00 (PhP
2,000,000.00 for payment of sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes, and PhP 1,000,000.00 for the PCSO-
POSC Scratch IT Project. For such accountability, Fajardo was bonded with the Bureau of Treasury for
PhP 1,500,000.00. In line with her duties, she was issued a vault, which she alone has access to as she
held its key and knew the combination to open the same, to keep the money and documents in her
custody.
On November 13, 2008, a team from the PCSO Internal Audit Department (IAD) conducted a spot audit
on Fajardo’s cash and cash items. The team discovered that Fajardo had a shortage of PhP 218,461.00.
After such audit, Fajardo did not report for work, so said team of auditors sealed her vault on November
17, 2008 and her steel cabinet on November 28, 2008.
Corral required Fajardo to report for work, to explain her shortage during the audit, and to be physically
present in the opening of her vault. Fajardo requested an additional five working days within which to
report back to work, but she failed to do the same despite the lapse of such extended period.
On January 8, 2009, another cash count was conducted, upon recommendation of the Commission on
Audit (COA). Said audit was held in the presence of Fajardo and representatives from IAD and COA.
During the said cash count, it was discovered that cash worth PhP 1,621,476.00 and checks worth PhP
37,513.00 were missing. As such, Fajardo had a total shortage of PhP 1,877,450.00. It was also
discovered that there were undetermined number of paid winning sweepstakes tickets amounting to
PhP 1,024,870.00 dating back from 2004, which were not processed for liquidation/replenishment.
Five days thereafter or on January 13, 2009, a letter was issued to Fajardo, which ordered her to
immediately produce the missing funds and to explain such shortage. However, Fajardo failed to
account and to produce the missing funds, and to give a reasonable excuse for such shortage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fajardo is guilty of serious dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service.
SC: A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported
by substantial evidence that the [petitioner] has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal
charge. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
differently.
In the case at bar, it is established that Fajardo, entrusted with the funds of PCSO, failed to account for
cash and cash items in the amount of PhP 1,877,450.00 and paid winning sweepstakes tickets in the
amount of PhP 1,024,870.00. When she was asked to expound on such shortage, she offered no
satisfactory explanation for the same.
The evidence presented were the two Certifications and Demands (Cash and Examination Count Sheet)
which were signed by Fajardo, stating. the shortage of funds on her account. It is undisputed that
Fajardo offered no explanation for such shortage of funds when demand was made and admitted her
accountability in a Letter dated January 27, 2009.
Fajardo reasoned that her act of signing the Certifications was no proof of admission of the shortage,
but a mere acknowledgement that a demand was made upon her to produce cash. Such argument,
which was copied entirely from the case of Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan without proper citation, is
flimsy. While the act of signing such certifications is not tantamount to admission of its contents, still,
the fact remains that there was shortage of funds on Fajardo’s account and that she failed to explain
the reasons for the same despite reasonable opportunity.
To Our mind, the facts established and the evidence presented support the finding of Fajardo’s guilt.
TAKE NOTE:
Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity
or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth.
Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer coupled with the elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element
of grave misconduct, consists in the official or employee’s act of unlawfully or wrongfully using his
position to gain benefit for one’s self.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service deals with a demeanor of a public officer which
“tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office”.
Geraldine Michelle B. Fallarme and Andrea Martinez-Gacos Vs. San Juan De Dios Educational
Foundation, et al.; G.R. Nos. 190015 & 190019; September 14, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners were hired by San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation, Inc. (respondent college),
for full-time teaching positions.
The appointment of petitioner Fallarme was effective at the start of the first semester of School Year
(SY) 2003-2004 as signified by a memorandum issued by the school informing her that she had been
hired. The memorandum did not specify whether she was being employed on a regular or a
probationary status. Aside from being appointed to a faculty position, she was also appointed to
perform administrative work for the school as personnel officer and to serve as head of the Human
Development Counseling Services.
Despite having served as a faculty member since SY 2003-2004, Fallarme was asked only on 1 March
2006 to sign and submit to respondent Chona M. Hernandez, dean of general education, a written
contract on the nature of the former’s employment and corresponding obligations. The contract was
denominated as “Appointment and Contract for Faculty on Probation” (appointment contract), and its
effectivity period covered the second semester of SY 2005-2006 – specifically from 4 November 2005
to 18 March 2006. The appointment contract specified the status of Fallarme as a probationary faculty
member.
After the expiration of the contract, respondent college informed her that it would not be renewed for
the first semester of SY 2006-2007. When she asked on what basis her contract would not be renewed,
she was informed that it was the school’s “administrative prerogative.”
Petitioner Martinez-Gacos taught at respondent college from the start of SY 2003-2004 and continued
to do so for a total of six semesters and one summer. Her engagement as a faculty member was
signified by a memorandum issued by the school, which informed her that she had been hired. The
memorandum, which was similar to that issued to Fallarme, did not specify whether Martinez-Gacos
was being employed on a regular or a probationary status.
Like Fallarme, even though Martinez-Gacos had been employed as a faculty member since SY 2003-
2004, it was only on 1 March 2006 that the latter was ordered by respondent Valeriano Alejandro III to
sign and submit a written contract on the nature of her employment and corresponding obligations.
The terms of the contract were similar to those in the contract signed by Fallarme. It was also
denominated as “Appointment and Contract for Faculty on Probation,” and its effectivity period also
covered the second semester of SY 2005-2006 – specifically from 4 November 2005 to 18 March 2006.
Under the appointment contract, the probationary status of Martinez-Gacos was likewise specified for
the first time.
After the lapse of the contract’s effectivity, she was similarly informed that her contract would not be
renewed for the first semester of SY 2006-2007. She was also told that the nonrenewal of her contract
was made on the basis of “administrative prerogative.”
ISSUE: If the dismissal of petitioners was for a valid cause, was the proper dismissal procedure
observed?
SC: In this case, the records bear out the following misdemeanors of petitioners:
(1) Both petitioners were remiss in their obligation to secure respondent college’s consent before they
sold computerized final examination sheets to their students. They failed to do so despite the prior
advice of their subject area coordinator that the dean’s approval must first be secured before
examination sheets could be sold.
(2) Petitioner Fallarme failed to secure respondent college’s consent before selling sociology textbooks
to her students during the second semester of SY 2005-2006. This rule was violated even after it had
been clearly discussed during their department’s general meeting held at the opening of SY 2005-2006.
The teachers were then told that they were prohibited from transacting business with any publishing
house or collecting any payment without informing their respective area chairs.
(3) Petitioner Martinez-Gacos organized out-of-campus activities with students, again without
respondent college’s permission and in violation of the school’s Student Handbook.
The above infractions imputed by respondent college to petitioners were admitted by the latter in their
letters to respondents and in their Petition before this Court. They made that admission in conjunction
with their defense that the supposed infractions did not cause serious damage to respondents and
were but a part of their academic freedom and freedom of expression, among others.
We find that these infractions committed by petitioners in connection with their jobs have been
established by substantial evidence and constitute willful disobedience or conduct analogous thereto.
This Court recognized that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an
educational environment conducive to learning. These rules and regulations are also necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property. Therefore, to disobey school rules and regulations,
as petitioners did in this case, is to go against this recognized mandate.
All told, not just one but three infractions show that the continued service of petitioners in respondent Taina Manigque-Stone Vs. Cattleya Land, Inc., et al.; G.R. No. 195975; September 5, 2016
college was inimical to its interest, as their actions indicated lack of respect for the school authorities.
FACTS: Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya) sent its legal counsel, to Tagbilaran City to investigate at the Office
It is settled that an employer has the right to dismiss its erring employees as a measure of self-
of the Register of Deeds in that city the status of the properties of spouses Col. Troadio B. Tecson and
protection against acts inimical to its interest. With respect to schools, this right must be seen in light
Asuncion Tecson (collectively, Tecson spouses), which Cattleya wanted to purchase. One of these
of their recognized prerogative to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers. The exercise of that
properties, an 8,805-square meter parcel of land located at Doljo, Panglao, Bohol, is registered in the
prerogative is pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution for schools to provide quality education and
name of the Tecson spouses.
its recognition of their academic freedom to choose who should teach pursuant to reasonable
standards. We find those standards to be present in this case. Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of
land, including the subject property. The Contract of Conditional Sale was entered in the Primary Book
Therefore, respondent college cannot be faulted for finding the performance of petitioners inimical to
of the Office of the Register of Deeds and later on the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
its interest as a school after the cited infractions.
the subject property which was also entered in the Primary Book.

However, neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor the Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated
on the certificate of title covering the subject property because the then Register of Deeds of Bohol
refused to annotate both deeds because of the writ of attachment that was annotated on the
certificate of title of the subject property.

The writ of attachment on the certificate of title to the subject property was, however, lifted, after the
parties in Civil Case No. 3399 reached an amicable settlement or compromise agreement. Even then,
however, Cattleya did not still succeed in having the aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale registered,
and in having title to the subject property transferred to its name, because it could not surrender the
owner’s copy of TCT No. 17655, which was in possession of the Tecson spouses. According to Cattleya,
the Tecson spouses could not deliver TCT No. 17655 to it, because according to the Tecson spouses this
certificate of title had been destroyed in a fire which broke out in Sierra Bullones, Bohol.

This claim by the Tecson spouses turned out to be false, however, because Atty. Cabilao, Jr. came to
know, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale at the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Bohol, that the owner’s copy of TCT No. 17655 had in fact been presented by
Taina at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol, along with the Deed of Sale that was executed by
the Tecson spouses, in favor of Taina covering the subject property

It appears that when Taina’s then common-law husband, Michael (Mike) Stone, visited Bohol sometime
in December 1985, he fell in love with the place and decided to buy a portion of the beach lot in Doljo,
Panglao, Bohol. They met with Col. Tecson, and the latter agreed to sell them a portion of the beach
lot for US$8,805.00. Mike and Taina made an initial downpayment of US$1,750.00 (or equivalent
P35,000.00 at that time) for a portion of a beach lot, but did not ask for a receipt for this initial
downpayment. On June 1, 1987, a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject portion was executed by
Col. Tecson in Taina’s favor. Subsequent payments were made by Mike totalling P40,000.00, as of
August 29, 1986, although another payment of P5,000.00 was made sometime in August 1987. The last
payment in the amount of P32,000.00, was made in September 1987. In 1990, Troadio Tecson, Jr., the
son of Col. Tecson and Taina’s brother-in-law, delivered to Taina the owner’s copy of TCT No. 17655.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in holding that petitioner is a mere dummy of Mike.
2. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in considering that the verbal contract of sale
between spouses Tecson and Mike transferred ownership to a foreigner, which falls within the
constitutional ban on sales of land to foreigners.
3. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in not considering that, assuming that the sale of
land to Mike violated the Constitution, the same has been cured by the subsequent marriage of
petitioner to Mike and by the registration of the land in the name of petitioner, a Filipino citizen.
SC: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that “[a]liens,
whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.”
In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the
subject lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the
deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and
this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt
or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or
purchasing lands in the Philippines.
Given the fact that the sale by the Tecson spouses to Taina as Mike’s dummy was totally abhorrent and
repugnant to the Philippine Constitution, and is thus, void ab initio, it stands to reason that there can
be no double sale to speak of here.
The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name of his Filipino spouse,
violates the Constitution and is thus, void.
Rizalito Y. David Vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Mary Grace Poe-Llmanzares; G.R. No. 221538;
September 20, 2016
FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found
her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m He later turned her over to Mr. and
Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant
was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON
SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS
PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET,
JARO . . .
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the Petition
for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.)
and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The Decision also ordered the change
in Senator Poe’s name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe. October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final
in a Certificate of Finality.
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years
old. The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter’s Identification Card for Precinct No. 196,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. Her passport was
renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.
Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was
subsequently given a United States passport.
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. She also “filed applications for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Grace Poe is a Filipino Citizen.
SC: Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for
an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides
its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications
of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally
governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.” This
definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage.
These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being
of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service,
and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public
offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2’s definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)’s reference to
parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born
to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must
show that both—not just one—of a foundling’s biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father
or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when
one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate its whole purpose.”
Julius B. Campol Vs. Mayor Ronald S. Balao-As and Vice-Mayor Dominador I. Sianen; G.R. No. 197634;
November 28, 2016
FACTS:
Campol served the Municipality of Boliney, Abra since 1999 as Secretary to the Sangguniang Bayan
(SB).[4] He held the position in a permanent capacity with salary grade 24.
During the 2004 elections, Ronald S. Balao-as and Dominador J. Sianen, won as mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively. They assumed office in July 2004. Shortly after this, the SB passed a resolution terminating
Campolas SB Secretary on the ground that he was absent without approved leave from August 1, 2004
to September 30, 2004. However, when the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (SP), it referred the matter to CSC-Abra. CSC-Abra then wrote Sianen informing him that
Campol cannot be removed from his position because he is protected by the Administrative Code. The
SP followed this advice. The DILG-Abra also took the same position. Despite the unanimous position of
these three agencies, Sianen issued Memorandum Order No. 001, Series of 2004, which dropped
Campol from the rolls.
Campol challenged this memorandum before the CSC-CAR, which ruled in his favor. Sianen, in tum,
elevated the matter before the CSC. The CSC granted his appeal and ruled that Campol was properly
dropped from the rolls.
Campol filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Campol contested
the allegation that he committed absences without any approved leave. To substantiate his claim,
Campol stated that he in fact received his salary for September 2004. He also sought to prove, through
the logbook of meetings that he kept as Secretary of the SB, that he was present on August 2, 9, 16, 23,
30 and September 6, 13 and 20, 2004. He also claimed that Sianen denied his application for sick leave
from September 16 to 24, 2004 so as to make it appear that he was absent for more than 30 days.
Further, even assuming that his absences without leave were true, Campol challenged the propriety of
his summary dismissal arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process.
The CA, in its Decision, reversed the CSC. The CA ruled that no ground exists to justify Campol’s
dismissal.
ISSUE: The only issue before us is whether Campol is entitled to reinstatement and to the payment of
his backwages from the time of his dismissal until he is reinstated.
SC: We rule that Campol should be reinstated. He must also be paid his backwages from the time he
was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement.
 The Law on Reinstatement
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states –
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
This constitutional provision captures the essence of security of tenure. An employee of the civil service
has the right to be protected in the possession and exercise of his or her office. He or she cannot be
removed from his or her employment save for causes allowed by law. A necessary consequence of the
importance given to security of tenure is the rule that an employee invalidly dismissed from service is
entitled to reinstatement.
TAKE NOTE: Reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee is proper even when another person is
already occupying the position. This is not a legal impediment to reinstatement. (Batungbakal v.
National Development Company)
A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right to
earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life. Furthermore,
prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be
to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no
circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as
Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP. (Canonizado v. Aguirre)
The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo Vs. The Commission on Audit and/or
Reynaldo A. Villar and Junanito G. Espino, Jr. in his capacities as Chairman and Commissioner,
repsectively; G.R. No. 185544; January 13, 2015
FACTS: Officers of Clark Development Corporation, a GOCC, approached the law firm of Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo for its possible assistance in handling the corporation’s labor cases.
Clark Development Corporation, through its legal officers and after the law firm’s acquiescence,
“sought from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel [‘OGCC’] its approval for the
engagement of [Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo] as external counsel.”
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel denied the request. Clark Development Corporation
then filed a request for reconsideration.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, through Government Corporate Counsel Amado D.
Valdez (Government Corporate Counsel Valdez), reconsidered the request and approved the
engagement of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. It also furnished Clark Development
Corporation a copy of a pro-forma retainership contract containing the suggested terms and conditions
of the retainership. It instructed Clark Development Corporation to submit a copy of the contract to
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel after all the parties concerned have signed it.
In the meantime, Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo commenced rendering legal services to
Clark Development Corporation. At this point, Clark Development Corporation had yet to secure the
authorization and clearance from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel or the concurrence
of the Commission on Audit of the retainership contract. According to the law firm, Clark Development
Corporation’s officers assured the law firm that it was in the process of securing the approval of the
Commission on Audit.
Clark Development Corporation requested the Commission on Audit for concurrence of the
retainership contract it executed with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. According to the
law firm, it was only at this point when Clark Development Corporation informed them that the
Commission on Audit required the clearance and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel before it could approve the release of Clark Development Corporation’s funds to settle the
legal fees due to the law firm.
Commission on Audit’s Office of the General Counsel, Legal and Adjudication Sector issued a “Third
Indorsement” denying Clark Development Corporation’s request for clearance, citing its failure to
secure a prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit and the approval with finality of the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. It also stated that its request for concurrence was made
three (3) years after engaging the legal services of the law firm.
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo appealed the “Third Indorsement” to the Commission on
Audit, Clark Development Corporation also filed a motion for reconsideration.
Commission on Audit rendered the assailed decision denying the appeal and motion for
reconsideration. It ruled that Clark Development Corporation violated Commission on Audit Circular
No. 98-002 dated June 9, 1998 and Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August
27, 1998 when it engaged the legal services of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo without the
final approval and written concurrence of the Commission on Audit. It also ruled that it was not the
government’s responsibility to pay the legal fees already incurred by Clark Development Corporation,
but rather by the government officials who violated the regulations on the matter.
SC: The Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 9 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-
255 - According to these rules and regulations, the general rule is that government-owned and
controlled corporations must refer all their legal matters to the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel. It is only in “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional cases” that it is
allowed to engage the services of private counsels.
Alexander A. Padilla, et al. Vs. Congress of the Philippines, consisting of the Senate of the Philippines,
as represented by Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, and the House of Representatives,
as represented by House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez/Former Sen. Wigberto E. Tañada, et al. Vs.
Alexander A. Padilla, et al. Vs. Congress of the Philippines, consisting of the Senate of the Philippines,
as represented by Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, and the House of Representatives,
as represented by House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez; G.R. No. 231671/G.R. No. 231694; July 25,
2017
FACTS: President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion
and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was
in session, President Duterte transmitted his “Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May
2017” (Report) to the Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives,
through House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (House Speaker Alvarez).
According to President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the declaration
of a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Mindanao ensued from the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against
civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf
and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and foreign armed affiliates, who have
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow lawless violence, terror, and
political disorder over the said region for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or
Islamic Province in Mindanao.
Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security officials of the
government were thereafter invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House of
Representatives for a conference briefing regarding the circumstances, details, and updates
surrounding the President’s proclamation and report.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
SC: The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in
joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President’s declaration or suspension.
By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress. is only required to
vote jointly to revoke the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the
role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, viz.:
a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President;
c. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner. extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty--four hours (24) following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.
There is no question herein that the first provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours
from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President
Duterte’s Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the Senate and
the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017.
The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual circumstances
which are not availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the initial proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and
the 17th Congress was still in session when President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23,
2017.
It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein: “The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.”
According to the plain--meaning rule or verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is
expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or “speech is the index of intention[,]” and verba legis non
est recedendum or “from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a “joint session.” While it may be
conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase “voting jointly” shall already be
understood to mean that the joint voting will be done “in joint session,” notwithstanding the absence
of clear language in the Constitution.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners’
argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President’s
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all
circumstances.
TAKE NOTE: Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President,
• as Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of
the armed forces, in recognition that the President;
• as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and
• as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to proclaim
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through
the same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the President’s power through the two
other co-equal and independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In
particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to
the Congress after his proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or
suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis tor
such proclamation and/or suspension.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
Jose M. Roy III Vs. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al.; G.R. No. 207246; November 22, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC No.
8 for not conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for having
been issued by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Roy seeks to apply the 60-40 Filipino
ownership requirement separately to each class of shares of a public utility corporation, whether
common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any other class of shares. Petitioner Roy also
questions the ruling of the SEC that respondent PLDT is compliant with the constitutional rule on
foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct the SEC
to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution in accordance with Gamboa.
SC: In turn, the Gamboa Resolution stated:
In any event, the SEC has expressly manifested that it will abide by the Court’s decision and
defer to the Court’s definition of the term “capital” in Section II, Article XII of the Constitution.
Further, the SEC entered its special appearance in this case and argued during the Oral
Arguments, indicating its submission to the Court’s jurisdiction. It is clear, therefore, that there
exists no legal impediment against the proper and immediate implementation of the Court’s
directive to the SEC.
xxxx
x x x The dispositive portion of the Court’s ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the
SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement
in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
To recall, the sole issue in the Gamboa case was: “whether the term ‘capital’ in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility.”
The Court directly answered the Issue and consistently defined the term “capital” as follows:
x x x The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-
voting preferred shares.
xxxx
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also
have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors.
The decretal portion of the Gamboa Decision follows the definition of the term “capital” in the
body of the decision, to wit: “x x x we x x x rule that the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).”
The Court adopted the foregoing definition of the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution in furtherance of “the intent and letter of the Constitution that the ‘State shall develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos’ [because a] broad
definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates
to control of the public utility.”[67] The Court, recognizing that the provision is an express recognition
of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national
security, also pronounced that the evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens
from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest.[68] Further,
the Court noted that the foregoing interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities;
and, as revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, “capital” refers to the voting
stock or controlling interest of a corporation.
In this regard, it would be apropos to state that since Filipinos own at least 60% of the outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote directors, which is what the Constitution precisely requires, then the
Filipino stockholders control the corporation, i.e., they dictate corporate actions and decisions, and
they have all the rights of ownership including, but not limited to, offering certain preferred shares that
may have greater economic interest to foreign investors – as the need for capital for corporate pursuits
(such as expansion), may be good for the corporation that they own. Surely, these “true owners” will
not allow any dilution of their ownership and control if such move will not be beneficial to them.
As owners of the corporation, the economic benefits will necessarily accrue to them. There is thus no
logical reason why Filipino shareholders will allow foreigners to have greater economic benefits than
them. It is illogical to speculate that they will create shares which have features that will give greater
economic interests or benefits than they are holding and not benefit from such offering, or that they
will allow foreigners to profit more than them from their own corporation – unless they are dummies.
But, Commonwealth Act No. 108, the Anti-Dummy Law, is NOT in issue in these petitions. Notably, even
if the shares of a particular public utility were owned 100% Filipino, that does not discount the
possibility of a dummy situation from arising. Hence, even if the 60-40 ownership in favor of Filipinos
rule is applied separately to each class of shares of a public utility corporation, as the petitioners insist,
the rule can easily be side-stepped by a dummy relationship. In other words, even applying the 60-40
Filipino- foreign ownership rule to each class of shares will not assure the lofty purpose enunciated by
petitioners.
The Court observed further in the Gamboa Decision that reinforcing this interpretation of the term
“capital”, as referring to interests or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a Philippine national in
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (“FIA”), which is explained in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the FIA (“FIA-IRR”). The FIA-IRR provides:
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the basis of
outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to
vote are considered.
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title
is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with
appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or
transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.
As worded, effective control by Filipino citizens of a public utility is already assured in the provision.
With respect to a stock corporation engaged in the business of a public utility, the constitutional
provision mandates three safeguards: (1) 60% of its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens; (2)
participation of foreign investors in its board of directors is limited to their proportionate share in its
capital; and (3) all its executive and managing officers must be citizens of the Philippines.
Ultimately, the key to nationalism is in the individual. Particularly for a public utility corporation or
association, whether stock or non-stock, it starts with the Filipino shareholder or member who,
together with other Filipino shareholders or members wielding 60% voting power, elects the Filipino
director who, in turn, together with other Filipino directors comprising a majority of the board of
directors or trustees, appoints and employs the all-Filipino management team. This is what is
envisioned by the Constitution to assure effective control by Filipinos. If the safeguards, which are
already stringent, fail, i.e., a public utility corporation whose voting stocks are beneficially owned by
Filipinos, the majority of its directors are Filipinos, and all its managing officers are Filipinos, is pro-alien
(or worse, dummies), then that is not the fault or failure of the Constitution. It is the breakdown of
nationalism in each of the Filipino shareholders, Filipino directors and Filipino officers of that
corporation. No Constitution, no decision of the Court, no legislation, no matter how ultra-nationalistic
they are, can guarantee nationalism.
TAKE NOTE:
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review and take cognizance of a case when the following
specific requisites are met:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the act or issuance;
(3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.

In the exhaustive review made by the Court in the Gamboa Resolution of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, the opinions of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, the opinions of the
SEC and the DOJ as well as the provisions of the FIA, its implementing rules and its predecessor statutes,
the intention to apply the voting control test and the beneficial ownership test was not mentioned in
reference to “each class of shares.” Even the GamboaDecision was silent on this point.
Joseph B. Timbol Vs. Commssion on Elections; G.R. No. 206004; February 24, 2015
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a
Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer, ordering him to appear before her office on January 17,
2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory
hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended that in the 2010 elections,
he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
Second District of Caloocan City. He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of
nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January
11, 2013. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from
the list and that his Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.
In the Memorandum dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol’s
Certificate of Candidacy be given due course.
Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable recommendation, Timbol’s name was not removed from
the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC’s website. With the printing of ballots for the
automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that
his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections.
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot,
considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.
SC: A case is moot and academic if it “ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” When a case
is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction over it.
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot and academic
cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest;
(3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and
the public; and
(4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
We may no longer act on petitioner’s prayer that his name be included in the certified list of candidates
and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner
filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began
printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with
the winners already proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth “controlling and
authoritative doctrines” to be observed by respondent in motu proprio denying due course to or
cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is
always subject to the alleged nuisance candidate’s opportunity to be heard — an essential element of
procedural due process.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, “[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]” This, however, does not guarantee “a constitutional right to run for
or hold public office[.]” To run for public office is a mere “privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law.” Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may
be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be “motu proprio or
upon a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an opportunity to be heard.”
The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.” In election cases, due process requirements are
satisfied “when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.”
Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of
candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona
fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013
when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17,
2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the
defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been
given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February
5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner’s Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had
already begun on February 4, 2013.
We understand the “insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications”
of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner’s name in the certified list of
candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots
previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are special as the have the capability of being
optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would,
indeed, be costly.
Still, “automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process.” Respondent should also balance
its duty “to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful” with the right of
a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared
a nuisance candidate.
TAKE NOTE: Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.”
Denmarks S. Valmores Vs. Dr. Cristina Achacoso, in her capacity as Dean of the College of Medicine,
and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo, Faculty of the Mindanao State University; G.R. No. 217453; July 19, 2017
FACTS: Denmark S. Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose fundamental
beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. As such, r Valmores joins the
faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and refrains from non-
religious undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.
Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of Medicine for Academic Year 2014-
2015. To avoid potential conflict between his academic schedule and his church’s Saturday worship,
Valmores wrote a letter to Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from attending his classes in the
event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a Saturday. At the same time, Valmores
expressed his willingness to make up for any missed activity or session due to his absence.
Between the months of June to August 2014, some of Valmores’ classes and examinations were moved
from weekdays to Saturdays. In one instance, Valmores was unable to take his Histo-Pathology
laboratory examination held on a Saturday. Cabildo was his professor for the said subject. Despite his
request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of the professors. As a result, Valmores
received a failing grade of 5 for that particular module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Thereafter, several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church sent a letter to Achacoso,
requesting for a possible audience with the members of the MSU school board. In addition, the church,
through Pastor Nietes, issued a Certification in connection with petitioner Valmores’ request for
exemption.
Valmores again wrote a letter to Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding his situation, reiterating
his willingness to take make-up classes or their equivalent in order to complete the requirements of his
course.
Despite the foregoing communications, Valmores’ requests fell on deaf ears.
Hence, aggrieved by Achacoso’s lack of consideration, Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED.
In an Indorsement the CHED Regional Office, through the Chief Administrative Officer, referred the
matter directly to the President of MSU as well as Achacoso and requested that the office be advised
of the action thus taken.
In response, Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed Achacoso to
enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.
Despite the foregoing correspondence, Valmores’ request still went unheeded.
Notwithstanding the lapse of several months, no written or formal response was ever given by extends to all people, from the theistic to the godless. The State must, as a matter of duty rather than
Achacoso. consequence, guarantee that such pursuit remains unfettered.

ISSUE: Whether or not Achocoso and MSU violated Valmores’ freedom of religion. As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the religious freedom
of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the responsibility to restrict its own academic
SC: The importance of education cannot be overstated. The Court has, on many occasions, ruled that
liberties, should they collide with constitutionally preferred rights.
institutions of higher learning are bound to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course
they seek to pursue, barring any violation of school rules by the students concerned.

In the landmark case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, the Court gave
weight to the religious convictions of students who were members of Jehovah’s Witnesses that refused
to participate in their school’s flag ceremony. Therein, the Court held that the expulsion of the affected
students based on their religious beliefs would run against the State’s duty to protect and promote the
right of all its citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all.

Here, in seeking relief, Valmores argues that he is bound by his religious convictions to refrain from all
secular activities on Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy by his church.

On the other hand, respondents’ refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday classes and
examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other Seventh-day Adventists who
had successfully completed their studies at the MSU-College of Medicine.

Without more, respondents’ bare arguments crumble against constitutional standards. As discussed
above, the Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual beliefs and proscribes
government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when public safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College of Medicine,
respondents herein were duty-bound to protect and preserve Valmores’ religious freedom.

Even worse, respondents suggest that the “sacrifices” of other students of the common faith justified
their refusal to give Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-sequitur. Respondents brush aside
Valmores’ religious beliefs as if it were subject of compromise; one man’s convictions and another
man’s transgressions are theirs alone to bear. That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their
creed is irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general rule,
and compromise, the exception.

Conclusion:

Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter where they may lead —
for the freedom to believe and act on one’s own convictions and the protection of such freedom
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City; A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC; March 7, 2017
FACTS: Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been
converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious
icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition
against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination,
or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed
that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to
other employees; that the public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees
and litigants of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC)
could not attend to their personal necessities such as going to the lavatories because they could not
traverse the basement between 12:00 o’clock noontime and 1:15 o’clock in the afternoon; that the
court employees became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle; and
that the water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass because the generator was
turned off to ensure silence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE AS WELL AS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY FOR THE
BENEFIT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION.
SC: The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and
State.
As earlier stated, Valenciano is against the holding of religious rituals in the halls of justice on the
ground that it violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a
sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. Indeed, Section 6, Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
The Court once pronounced that “our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us
that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will
use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and
aims.”
Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to regulate and closely monitor the holding of
masses and other religious practices within the courts does not promote excessive collaboration
between courts and various religions. On the contrary, this is necessary to ensure that there would be
no excessive entanglement.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and
commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation,
would be the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari’a courts, the National Commission for Muslim
Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy
would all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni
Cristo from joining a union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply
because we insist on strict separation.
That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-Catholics is no
reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without
regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is
emphatic in saying that “the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be
without discrimination or preference.” Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip
service.
One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same for
others.
In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not violate the constitutional principle of
separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
TAKE NOTE:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion --- In order to give life to the constitutional right of
freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of
the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can
be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply
means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish
a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity
or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice
religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization
or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official
religion.
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest.
The “compelling state interest” test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term
while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of
the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights – “the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights”, in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty.
Hon. Michael L. Rama, et al. Vs. Hon. Gilbert P. Moises, et al.; G.R. No. 197146; December 6, 2016
FACTS: President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). By
virtue of P. D. No. 198, Cebu City formed the Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in 1974. Thereafter,
the Cities of Mandaue, Lapu-Lapu and Talisay, and the Municipalities of Liloan, Compostela,
Consolacion, and Cordova turned over their waterworks systems and services to the MCWD. Since
then, the MCWD has distributed water and sold water services to said cities and municipalities. From
1974 to 2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board of Directors in
accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198.
The petitioners assert that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, being unfair, violated substantive due process;
that Governor Garcia could not determine the water needs of each of the LGUs within the MCWD; that
the provision allowed inequality of treatment of the cities and municipalities in relation to the province,
and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; that the provision unduly deprived
Cebu City of the power to determine the membership in the MCWD Board of Directors despite Cebu
City having the majority of the water service connections; that the Province of Cebu was given
unreasonable and unwarranted benefit despite Cebu City being independent from the Province of
Cebu; that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 did not distinguish whether the province contributed any
resource to the water district or not; that under the provision, if two or more provinces contributed to
the water district, they were not subject to the 75% requirement to avail of the power of appointment,
indicating that the power to appoint devolved only in the provinces; that this violated the guarantee of
equality of treatment in favor of the participating LGUs; that the provision created a privileged class
(the provinces) without any justification in reason; and that “the classification is not germane to the
purpose of the law and is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause.
SC: Substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law
would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” It demands the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to life, liberty or property. In short, to be determined is whether
the law has a valid governmental objective, like the interest of the public as against that of a particular
class.
On the other hand, the principle of equal protection enshrined in the Constitution does not require the
territorial uniformity of laws. According to Tiu v. Court of Appeals, the fundamental right of equal
protection of the law is not absolute, but subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid,
must:
(1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
We opine that although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided for substantial distinction and was
germane to the purpose of P.D. No. 198 when it was enacted in 1973, the intervening reclassification
of the City of Cebu into an HUC and the subsequent enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code
rendered the continued application of Section 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and
unfair. Clearly, the assailed provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because, firstly,
it ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the provincial government; secondly,
it failed to consider that the MCWD existed to serve the community that represents the needs of the
majority of the active water service connections; and, thirdly, the main objective of the decree was
to improve the water service while keeping up with the needs of the growing population.
Verily, the decree was enacted to provide adequate, quality and reliable water and waste-water
services to meet the needs of the local communities and their growing populations. The needs of the
communities served were paramount. Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true objectives of
the decree to still leave to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor
had administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for 16.92% of
the active water service connection in the MCWD. In comparison, the City of Cebu had 61.28% of the
active service water connections; Mandaue, another HUC, 16%; and Lapu Lapu City, another HUC, 6.8%.
There is no denying that the MCWD has been primarily serving the needs of Cebu City. Although it is
impermissible to inquire into why the decree set 75% as the marker for determining the proper
appointing authority, the provision has meanwhile become unfair for ignoring the needs and
circumstances of Cebu City as the LGU accounting for the majority of the active water service
connections, and whose constituency stood to be the most affected by the decisions made by the
MCWD’s Board of Directors. Indeed, the classification has truly ceased to be germane or related to
the main objective for the enactment of P.D. No. 198 in 1973.
TAKE NOTE: A law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution, like a presidential decree, is presumed to be
valid and constitutional on the theory that it was carefully studied by the Legislative and Executive
Departments prior to its enactment, and determined to be in accord with the Fundamental Law.
However, the presumption of validity and constitutionality is overturned and the law should be struck
down once it becomes inconsistent with the present Constitution and the later laws.
Samsoden Pangcatan Vs. Alexandro “Dodong” Maghuyop and Belindo Bankiao/Alexandro “Dodong”
Maghuyop and Belindo Bankiao Vs. Samsoden Pangcatan; G.R. No. 194412/G.R. No. 194566;
November 16, 2016
FACTS: Pangcatan commenced a Civil Case in the RTC to recover various damages he had suffered from
the vehicular accident caused by the negligence of the defendants. Defendants Maghuyop and Bankiao,
, were respectively the owner and driver of the passenger van that Pangcatan had hired to transport
himself and the goods he had purchased in Pagadian City to his store in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del
Sur. Based on the police report on the vehicular accident, Bankiao had stopped his vehicle in the middle
of the right lane of the highway in order to call for more passengers when the dump truck suddenly
bumped the rear of the van, causing Pangcatan to lose consciousness. After Pangcatan regained
consciousness in the hospital, he discovered that his right leg had been fractured, and that he had lost
all the goods he had bought in Pagadian City.
Pangcatan’s complaint alleged that his estimated daily income before the accident was P400.00/day;
that because of his injury, he could never sell again or engage in any other business; and that his medical
bills and the costs of his surgical operation would easily run up to P500,000.00. When he filed his
complaint in September 2002, Pangcatan also filed his Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper
Litigant, which the RTC granted through its order of September 4, 2002 under the condition that the
filing fees would constitute a first lien on any favorable monetary judgment that he would recover from
the suit.
Instead of filing their answer, Maghuyop and Bankiao moved to dismiss the complaint based on several
grounds, namely: (1) that the venue was improperly laid; (2) that the complaint stated no cause of
action against them; (3) that the claim or demand had been paid or otherwise extinguished; (4) that
the plaintiff was estopped from filing the case; (5) that the plaintiff did not comply with a condition
precedent; and (6) that the plaintiff, a well known businessman and resident of Margosatubig,
amboanga del Sur, was not an indigent litigant.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss because the movants did not substantiate the grounds of the
motion on the day of the hearing thereof.
Maghuyop and Bakiao did not file their answer subsequently, and were declared in default as a
consequence. Pangcatan then presented ex parte his evidence against them. Later on, they submitted
their Comment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Strike Out All
Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff, whereby they maintained that Pangcatan was not an indigent litigant
based on his offer of documentary evidence and his pleadings, and that, as such, he was not entitled
to the services and representation of any lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office; that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the non-payment of the required docket fees; and that
the complaint should be expunged from the records.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pangcatan was not a indigent litigant because his estimated daily earnings had
amounted to P400.00;
SC: Section 11, Article III of the Constitution has guaranteed free access to the courts, to wit:
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This guarantee of free access to the courts is extended to litigants who may be indigent by exempting
them from the obligation to pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone who claims to be indigent may
demand free access to the courts. In Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and
Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., the Court has declared that the exemption may be
extended only to natural party litigants; the exemption may not be extended to juridical persons even
if they worked for indigent and underprivileged people because the Constitution has explicitly premised
the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. To
prevent the abuse of the exemption, therefore, the Court has incorporated Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 in the Rules of Court in order to set the guidelines implementing as well as
regulating the exercise of the right of free access to the courts. The procedure governing an application
for authority to litigate as an indigent party as provided under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court have been synthesized in Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of
Naga.
• that in that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the
evidence presented by the applicant;
• that, afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence
adduced;
• that, in addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse party may later still contest
the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly
based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard;
• that, if the trial court determines after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact
a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court; and
• that if payment is not made within the time fixed by the trial court, execution shall issue or
the payment of the prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to other sanctions that
the trial court may impose.
To recapitulate the rules on indigent litigants, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of his application is mandatory.
On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under
Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
The Constitution holds sacrosanct the access to justice by the impoverished. Without doubt, the
unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized is one
of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured.

TAKE NOTE: Algura stipulates that when the application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the
trial court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to
determine if he complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19
of Rule 141:

• that his gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee; and
• that he does not own real property with a fair market value of more than P300,000.00;
• that if the trial court finds that he meets the income and property requirements, the authority
to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted, and the grant is a matter of right;
• that, however, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it
should then set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has “no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family;”
Republic of the Philippines Vs. Limbonhai and Sons; G.R. No. 217956; November 16, 2016
FACTS: Isidro Godinez was the original owner of property situated in Lapu-Lapu City. Sometime in the
1960s, the said lot was among 27 lots, covering more or less 36 hectares, which were the subjects of
an expropriation case filed before the then CFI of Cebu by the government against several lot owners.
The CFI ordered the government to take possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount
provisionally fixed by the court at P32,869.17, representing partial payment of the expropriated lots.
The court further stated that the sum is subject to amendment or increase based on the report of the
commissioners appointed by the court to appraise the value of the lots. Subsequently, the CFI issued
an Order fixing the reasonable value of the lots, including Lot No. 2498, at P1.50 per square meter.
Sometime in 1967, however, Godinez caused the judicial reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No.
2498. Consequently, OCT No. RO-0608 was issued in the name of Godinez. Later, Godinez sold the
property to Limbonhai under his former name Sy Tiong. Thus, OCT No. RO-0608 was cancelled and TCT
No. T-13178 was issued in the name of Limbonhai, under his former name Sy Tiong. After a decade,
Limbonhai, transferred the property to respondent corporation, Limbonhai and Sons. As a
consequence, TCT No. T-1317 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 82789 was issued in the name
of corporation.
Thereafter, in 1996 petitioner filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title RTC, Lapu-Lapu City, claiming
that it was the transferee and owner of subject Lot No. 2498 because it was one of the several parcels
of land allegedly expropriated by the government for airport purposes. It also averred that its
predecessor-in-interest had been in the material, continuous and uninterrupted and adverse
possession of said lot, which was later transferred to Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA), by virtue of its charter, Republic Act No. (RA) 6958.
MCIAA insisted that corporation’s claim of ownership over Lot No. 2498 has no basis in fact and law
because the same lot had already been expropriated by the government as early as 1967. It added that
the corporation merely holds the certificate of title in trust and is under legal obligation to surrender
the same for cancellation so that a new certificate of title can be issued in the name of the MCIAA.
However, the corporation points out that MCIAA failed to present any credible evidence that there was
a valid judgment of expropriation or payment of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether just compensation over the property was paid.
SC: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power
to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope
of such power has been comprehensively described as follows:
x x x It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of
eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for
constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries
relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to
the government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own
Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law.
Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict
construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the
extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in
which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, the Government, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has
complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain such as the payment of just compensation.
However, in the instant case, MCIAA is silent as to proving the payment of just compensation. During
trial, MCIAA failed to present any evidence of full payment of the just compensation for the property.
The only evidence on record consists of the Order of the Court, dated July 8, 1964 (Exhibit “B”), placing
the government in possession of Lot No. 2498, among others, after depositing P32,869.17, and the
Order dated January 7, 1967 (Exhibit “A”) declaring the reasonable value of the lots at P1.50 per square
meter.25 Other than these two Orders, MCIAA failed to produce any proof of payment of just
compensation. Even MCIAA’s own witness, Michael Bacarias, admitted during cross-examination, that
he has no personal knowledge on whether or not just compensation was fully paid by MCIAA in favor
of Godinez, and whether Lot No. 2498 was actually devoted for public use.
Even assuming arguendo that the government deposited the amount of P32,869.17 as partial payment
for the 27 lots subject of the expropriation case, no evidence were presented to prove that subsequent
payment for the lots was made based on the adjusted rate of P1.50 per square meter. Thus, considering
MCIAA’s failure to prove payment either by documentary of testimonial evidence, it can be logically
surmised that there was indeed no actual payment of just compensation.
TAKE NOTE: Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned it or has declined to assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert
a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.
That principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect
or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a
clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character
of the defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff’s long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so
would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
The doctrine of laches or stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and… is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim
or demand has become “stale” or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has
not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other words,
public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-
assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become,
under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
People of the Philippines Vs. Jehar Reyes; G.R. No. 199271; October 19, 2016
FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted at accused’s residence in Cebu. The team was composed
of Senior Police Inspector Arnel Banzon, PO2 Jesus Rodson Villahermosa and PO1 Januario Miro (both
poseur-buyers). The backup team was composed of Senior Police Inspector Glenn Mayan, SPO2 Jesus
Rojas, SPO1 Eduardito Brigoli, PO3 Danilo Lopez, PO2 Percival Charles, P03 Marlon Lumayag and PO2
Aristocles.
The following items were recovered from accused-appellant: three plastic packs (including the plastic
pack bought by the poseur-buyers from accused-appellant), containing a white crystalline substance;
and the buy-bust money of ten P100.00 bills. The total weight of the contents of the three plastic packs
was 1.44 grams. When subjected to laboratory examination, the contents tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu”. Accused-appellant was thereafter
charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Shabu under Article 2, Section 5, R.A. 9165.
PO2 Villahermosa, PO1 Miro, Banzon, PO3 Lumayag, and Jude Daniel Mendoza, testified for the
Prosecution. The evidence of the Prosecution is summarized thus: Several weeks before 27 November
2002, PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro conducted a 2-week surveillance on accused, a reported drug
pusher, residing at Sitio Cayam, Barangay Ward I, Tiber, Minglanilla, Cebu. The surveillance confirmed
accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. A team to conduct a buy-bust operation was
formed. PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro were designated as the poseur-buyers, while Banzon, Senior
Police Inspector Glenn Mayan, SPO2 Jesus Rojas, SPO1 Eduardito Brigoli, P03 Danilo Lopez, P02 Percival
Charles, PO3Lumayag, and PO2 Aristocles, were designated as back-up. The buy- bust money consisting
of ten 100.00 bills, was marked with the initials “J.C.R.” of SPO2 Rojas.
PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro proceeded on foot to the target site, the house of the accused-
appellant, while the back-up team members positioned themselves about 5 meters away to observe
the transaction.
PO2 Villahermosa approached the front of accused’s house and called out the latter’s name. Accused
went out of his house. PO2 Villahermosa told accused-appellant he wanted to buy 1,000.00 worth of
shabu. Accused took one plastic pack from his pocket, and gave it to PO2 Villahermosa. PO2
Villahermosa in turn, handed the ten pieces of P100.00 bills to accused-appellant. Upon receipt of the
P1000.00 buy-bust money, PO2 Villahermosa immediately accosted accused-appellant. PO1 Miro
removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal to the backup team, that the transaction had been completed.
PO2 Villahermosa informed the accused-appellant he was under arrest, and informed him of his
constitutional rights. He frisked accused, and recovered the following: two more plastic packs that
contained a white crystalline substance; and the buy-bust money of ten P100.00 bills.
Accused was brought to the police office, and PO1 Miro marked the items seized, as follows: “JR-B” (for
the plastic pack of shabu subject of the buy-bust); “JR-1” and “JR-2” (for the 2 plastic packs of shabu
recovered from the frisking). PO1 Miro prepared the letter-request tor laboratory examination.
On 27 November 2002, at 5:20 p.m., PO1 Miro delivered the letter-request for laboratory examination,
and the plastic packs marked “JR-B”, “JR-1” and “JR-2”, to PO1 Fiel, the clerk on duty at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. PO1 Fiel turned over the letter-request, and the three plastic packs, to the Chemistry
Branch for examination.
On 28 November 2002, Jude Daniel Mendoza, the forensic analyst, conducted the laboratory
examination on the contents of the three plastic packs. Per Chemistry Report No. D-2390-2002, the
contents of the three packets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Accused was thereafter charged with violating Article 2, Section 5 of R.A. 9165, or the crime of illegal
sale of drugs.
Cesar Cañada, and accused himself: testified for the Defense. The evidence of the Defense is
summarized thus: at around 2:00 p.m. of 27 November 2002, accused was sleeping at his elder sister’s
house, when several men suddenly barged in, and searched the premises. The men did not have any
search warrant. They did not find contraband, nor did they receive money from accused-appellant.
Cañada is a neighbor of the accused-appellant. At around 2:00 p.m., of 27 November 2002, he was at
a chapel about 10 meters from accused-appellant’s house. He heard a loud bang on the door of
accused- appellant’s house, and saw five men enter it. The five men later left the house with the
accused-appellant, on board a police vehicle.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in favor of the
arresting officers did not prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
SC: The accused charged with a violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 is always presumed
innocent of the crime charged against him. This presumption of his innocence, which has been
enshrined in Section 14, Article III (The Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, ensures that: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” It underlies our
system of criminal justice, and far outweighs any other presumption, particularly one that is essentially
a rule of evidence. In People v. Mendoza, we have fittingly explained the superiority of the presumption
of innocence over the lesser presumption of regularity of performance of official duty, as follows:
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the
members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Such presumption is based on three fundamental reasons, namely:
• first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed;
• second, an official oath will not be violated; and,
• third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental
department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of
such presumption.
But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to
perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the
procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because
such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance
the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be
presumed innocent. Trial courts are instructed to apply this differentiation, and to always bear in mind
the following reminder issued in People v. Catalan:
x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused.
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be
held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like
here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of
innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to
adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in favor of
the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a
presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an
established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic fact
that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity
committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have
earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
In view of the many notable serious procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team, the benefit of
the presumption of the regularity of the performance of duty by the arresting officers is indubitably
unwarranted.
TAKE NOTE: Compliance with the guidelines on the preservation of the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs subject of a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs must be clearly and
convincingly established by the State. Any lapse in the chain of custody must be affirmatively explained
by the Prosecution; otherwise, the chain of custody will be held to be broken and insufficient to support
a conviction of the accused. The presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty in favor
of the arr sting officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
National Power Corporation Vs. Sps. Margarito Asoque and Tarcinia Asoque; G.R. No. 172507;
September 14, 2016
FACTS: Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in Calbayog City.
The parcel of land has an area of 59,099 square meters and is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2376.
Sometime in November 1995, the National Power Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque’s land to
install transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project. The
National Power Corporation utilized 4,352 square meters for the project.
Spouses Asoque allege that beforehand, they were made to understand that the National Power
Corporation would pay them the value of the portion of the land used and all improvements that would
be destroyed for the National Power Corporation’s project. Spouses Asoque incurred actual damages
as a result of the National Power Corporation’s cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-
fruit-bearing plants during the construction. They were also prohibited from introducing on the 4,352-
square-meter area any improvement that could rise by a few meters from the ground.
Upon Spouses Asoque’s demand for just compensation, the National Power Corporation only paid for
the improvements destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352-square-meter area
utilized for the project. The National Power Corporation claimed that it was only liable to pay for right
of way at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR is liable only to pay for easements fees and not just compensation.
SC: NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the
basis that its acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents’ land was a taking
under the power of eminent domain.
While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an easement
of right of way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain under certain
conditions. In Republic v. PLDT:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way.
There is taking in the context of the state’s power of eminent domain when the following elements are
present:
(1) The expropriator enters a private property;
(2) The entrance into the private property is indefinite or permanent;
(3) There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
(4) The property is devoted to public use or purpose; and
(5) The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is material
impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an
indefinite period. The intrusion into the property must be so immediate and direct as to subtract from
the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or her exploitation of it.
Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an
indefinite period and expose the property owners’ lives and limbs to danger, just compensation must
be based on the full market value of the affected property.
TAKE NOTE: Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution provides a substantive guarantee that private
property that is taken by the state for public use should be paid for with just compensation. If the state
does not agree with the property owner on a price, the state, through the competent government
agency, should file the proper expropriation action under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action filed, the property owner may file its own
action to question the propriety of the taking or to compel the payment of just compensation. Among
these inverse condemnation actions is a complaint for payment of just compensation and damages.
National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay held that the National Power Corporation’s
surreptitious construction of a tunnel underneath the respondents’ land adversely affected the
respondent’s rights and interests. This is because the National Power Corporation’s subterranean
intervention prevented the respondents from introducing any developments on the surface and from
disposing of the land or any portion of it. Hence, there was a taking of the land as to entitle the owners
to just compensation.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
Leandro B. Verceles, Jr. Vs. Commission on Audit; G.R. No. 211553; September 13, 2016
FACTS: The Provincial Government of Catanduanes represented by then Governor Verceles, Jr.,
engaged the PENRO to carry out the province’s tree seedlings production project. The province and
PENRO entered into several Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to implement the project.
On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through Resolution No. 067-2001, gave blanket
authority to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province. The SP reaffirmed the
authority given to the governor through Resolution Nos. 068-2001 and 069-2001. On the same date,
the SP also resolved to give the governor the power to realign, revise, or modify items in the provincial
budget.
The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the Economic Development Fund (EDF) allocation in
the provincial budget for calendar years (CY) 2001 and 2002. The EDF is the 20% portion of the
province’s internal revenue allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent on development projects.
The COA held that the augmentations or realignments made by Verceles to fund the second, fourth,
and fifth MOAs were contrary to Section 336 of the LGC. The COA ruled that the disbursements also
violated Section 85 (1), of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445 or the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines and Section 305 (1) of the LGC. These provisions underscore the need for an appropriation
before contracts involving the expenditure of public funds may be entered into.
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) the authority of the governor as the local chief executive to enter into
contracts on behalf of the province; and (2) the power of the governor to augment items in the
provincial budget.
SC:
The authority of the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province
The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which
specifically covers the project, cost, or contract to be entered into by the local government unit.
Explained simply, the LGC requires the local chief executive to secure prior authorization from the
sanggunian before he can enter into contracts on behalf of the LGU. A separate prior authorization is
no longer required if the specific projects are covered by appropriations in the annual budget of the
LGU. The appropriation ordinance passed by the sanggunian is the local chief executive’s authority to
enter into a contract implementing the project.
If the project or program is identified in the appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then there is
no more need to obtain a separate or additional authority from the sanggunian. In such case, the
project and the cost are already identified and approved by the sanggunian through the appropriation
ordinance. To require the local chief executive to secure another authorization for a project that has
been specifically identified and approved by the sanggunian is antithetical to a responsive local
government envisioned in the Constitution and in the LGC.
On the other hand, the need for a covering contract arises when the project is identified in generic
terms. The covering contract must also be approved by the sanggunian.
In summary and to harmonize the two provisions: Section 22 (c) of the LGC requires the local chief
executive to obtain prior authorization from the sanggunian before he can enter into contracts in behalf
of the LGU. Section 465 (b) (1) (vi), on the other hand, allows the local chief executive to implement
specific or specified projects with corresponding appropriations without securing a separate authority
from the sanggunian. In the latter provision, the appropriation ordinance is the authority from the
sanggunian required in the former provision.
Undeniably, these SP resolutions gave the provincial governor the blanket authority to enter into
contracts on behalf of the Province. The question is whether a blanket authority is a sufficient authority
for the governor to implement projects that have no definite appropriations.
While a blanket authority is not per se ineffective, it does not suffice for purposes of implementing
projects funded by lump-sum appropriations. The nature of lump-sum appropriations vis-a-vis the
power of the purse of the SP (as the legislative organ of the LGU) requires the local chief executive to
obtain definite and specific authorizations before he can enter into contracts funded by lump-sum
appropriations. The exception is when the appropriation ordinance already identifies the specific
projects and the costs of the projects to be funded by lump-sum appropriations.
The power of the governor to augment items in the provincial budget.
Under Section 336, the general rule is that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose
for which they have been appropriated. The exception is when the local chief executive is authorized
by ordinance to augment any item in the approved annual budget from savings in other items within
the same expense class.
Article 454 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC states that augmentation implies the
existence in the budget of an item, project, activity, or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined to be deficient.
The question is whether the grant of authority to the local chief executive to augment items in the
annual budget can be belatedly granted. To answer this, we review the case of Araullo v. Sec. Aquino
III.
Construing Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Court laid down the requisites for a
valid transfer of appropriated funds at the national level, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
The crucial requisite as far as the fourth and fifth MOAs are concerned is the first requisite, i.e., the
existence of a law (in this case, ordinance) authorizing the governor to augment items in approved
budget. As to the second MOA, the crucial requisite is the third requisite, i.e., the existence of an actual
item to be augmented.
There was no valid augmentation made in CY 2001 that could have covered the cost of the second
MOA.
As discussed above, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not identify the specific projects or items
to be funded by the EDF. How could Verceles transfer savings from nonexistent items (in the EDF) to
augment the tree seedlings propagation project? The project that was supposed to be augmented was
also not identified in the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance.
The augmentation was legally impossible as there were no items from which savings could have been
generated from and there was no item to which such savings could have been transferred. The second
MOA was thus correctly disallowed.
TAKE NOTE:
I. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Secretary Ochoa, the Court had the opportunity to discuss the
characteristics of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as a lump-sum amount of money
given to individual legislators. We held that –
 [w]hat beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular
lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-item which the
President may veto.
II. Consistent with the strict construction approach, we rule that the requisite “authorized by
ordinance” does not necessarily and automatically include “ratified by ordinance.”
The exception clause of Section 336 states: “the local chief executive . . . may, by ordinance, be
authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget . . . .“ The key phrase is “by ordinance,
be authorized to augment.” We must therefore interpret this phrase in a manner that does not easily
erode the basic principle that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they
have been appropriated.
To “authorize” means “to empower; to give a right or authority to act.” It means “to endow with
authority or effective legal power, warrant or right; to permit a thing to be done in the future.”
Thus, strictly speaking, the governor must be duly authorized before he can make augmentations. We
highlight the words “to augment” suggesting that what is being authorized is an act that has yet to
happen.
Nevertheless, our ruling in the present case should not be taken to mean that the LGC prohibits the
ratification of previously unauthorized augmentations. We only want to underscore the necessity of an
existing authority before the local chief executive can make augmentations. The Court recognizes that
there may be narrow instances where past augmentations can be shown to have fully complied with
all the requisites (except for the authority by ordinance requisite) for a valid augmentation, in which
cases, ratification is allowed.
Republic of the Philippines Vs. Angeline L. Dayaoen, et al.; G.R. No. 200773; July 8, 2015
FACTS: Angeline Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan (Lawana) filed an
Application for Registration of three parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad,
Benguet.
The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since pre-war time by Antonio Pablo
(Antonio), the grandfather of Dado Pablo (Dado), husband of appellee Angeline. In 1963, Antonio gave
the parcels of land in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. From that time on,
they continuously occupied and possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977, appellee Angeline sold
Lots 6 and 7 to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana, pursuant to an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed of
Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land, respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in public, open, exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous possession
thereof in the concept of an owner. Appellees declared the questioned properties for taxation
purposes. There was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said parcels
of land. Neither did any other person have an interest therein, legal or equitable, or was in possession
thereof.
On the scheduled initial hearing, appellees adduced pieces of documentary evidence to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements of notices, posting and publication. Appellee Angeline testified on the
continuous, open, public and exclusive possession of the lands in dispute.
Trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision dated 6 November 2007, the court a quo granted appellees’
application for registration. Unflinching, the OSG moved for reconsideration but failed to attain
favorable relief as its Motion was denied by the court a quo in its Order dated 11 September 2008. On
even date, the court a quo rendered the assailed Amended Decision finding appellees to have the
registrable title over the subject properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land registration court gravely erred in granting the application for
registration of the three (3) subject lots despite respondents’ utter failure to prove that the said lots
are alienable and disposable, a mere annotation on the survey plan that the said lots are alienable and
disposable being insufficient to prove alienability.
HELD: Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The classification
and reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President may
at any time transfer these public lands from one class to another.
While in 1955 the President – through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 declared particular lands in
Baguio City as alienable and disposable, they may have been re-classified by the President thereafter.
This is precisely the reason why an applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation
is required to present evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for. such
as a certificate of land classification status from the DENR, which only the CENRO and the PENRO are
authorized to issue under DENR Administrative Order No. 38, series of 1990 (DAO 38).
must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity,
and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the
law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co.,
13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec. 576].)

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most
of the application is alienable or disposable. delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny.
Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free
In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in
the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the
the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
power, and to protect it from abuse. …(Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], Sec. 1040,
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, this Court reiterated this long-established
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable
principle, thus:
and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification The ‘taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an
through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of expropriation proceeding.’ In computing the just compensation for expropriation
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the ‘value of the land at the time of the
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment.’ ‘The time of taking is the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic.’
TAKE NOTE:

Eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government. However,

such power is not boundless; it is circumscribed by two constitutional requirements: “first, that there
must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.”

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual’s right to private property, a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity
and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, the need for its circumspect operation
cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila we said:

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule that case is that the authority