MOCK BAR QUESTIONS IN CIVIL LAW

(Prepared by Prof. Elmer T. Rabuya)

I. (5%)

A. Discuss the similarities and distinctions between accion in rem

verso and an action based on solutio indebiti. (2%)

ANSWER:

The following are their similarities: (1) In both, the plaintiff suffers a loss
and the defendant is enriched; (2) In both, the enrichment by the defendant is
unjustified because the delivery or payment by the plaintiff is without just or legal
ground; (3) In both, the defendant has the obligation of returning to the plaintiff
what has been unduly delivered or paid; and (4) In the both, the objective is to
prevent unjust enrichment.

They differ as follows: (1) In the former, the source of the obligation is law
while in the latter, the source is quasi-contract; and (2) In the former, the delivery
or payment must not be by reason of mistake while in the latter, the delivery or
payment is by reason of mistake.

B. Melaware Plastic Products, Inc. (MPPI) and Jonnah Manufacturing

Corp. (JMC) are two neighboring factories producing plastic products. However,
the plastics produced by MPPI are used as automotive parts while JMC produces
kitchenware items. In view of the physical proximity between the two factories,
some of the employees of MPPI transferred to JMC and the latter eventually
developed familiarity with the former’s products. Subsequently, JMC deliberately
copied the products of MPPI with exactly similar designs and sold the same at
lower prices to same customers of the latter. In view of the losses it suffered,
MPPI sued JMC for damages on the ground of unfair competition. JMC
countered that it is not liable for unfair competition because MPPI’s products are
not protected by a patent. Is JMC liable to MPPI for damages due to unfair
competition? Explain. (3%)

ANSWER:

Yes. The Civil Code makes one liable for damages in case he is guilty of
unfair competition in conducting his business affairs. According to jurisprudence,
such liability does not require a patent because the concept of “unfair
competition” under the Civil Code is much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Instead, there is unfair competition under the Civil
Code if the following requisites are present: (1) the defendant causes injury to the
plaintiff who is his competitor or trade rival; and (2) the defendant’s act is contrary
to good conscience, shocking to judicial sensibilities, or otherwise unlawful. (Art.
28, Civil Code and Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.,
G.R. No. 195549, Sep. 3, 2014)

In the case at bar, JMC directly competed with MPPI because it

manufactured and sold the same products to same customers. However, JMC’s
way of competing with MPPI was unfair because it used unlawful means in
obtaining knowledge of how to compete with its trade rival which resulted into
injuries to MPPI because the latter suffered losses.

Hence, JMC has committed acts of unfair competition making it liable to MPPI
for damages.

II. (10%)

A. In 2010, Emil abandoned his wife Charis and left their conjugal dwelling in
Quezon City. In 2012, Emil obtained from a Tarlac court a judicial declaration of
Charis’ presumptive death. In the same year, he married Sharmaine, who was
unaware that Charis was still alive at that time. In 2015, Charis, upon discovery of
the existence of the second marriage, filed a petition to declare Emil’s marriage
to Sharmaine void on the ground of bigamy. Sharmaine opposed the petition on
the ground that under AM No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), Charis has no
personality to file the petition because she is not a party to the marriage subject
matter of the petition. In addition, Sharmaine agrued that the proper remedy of
Charis is to file an Affidavit of Reappearance in the appropriate civil registry.

(1) Is Sharmaine correct that Charis has no personality to file the said
petition? Explain. (2%)

ANSWER:

No. According to jurisprudence, the aggrieved spouse in the prior marriage

has personality to file the petition for declaration of the absolute nullity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Court explained that AM No.
02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, the
rule refers to the husband or wife of the subsisting marriage because the parties
to the subsequent bigamous marriage are neither the husband or the wife under
the law. [Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011 (J. Del
Castillo case) and Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013]

In this case, since Charis is the aggrieved spouse and she is rightfully the
wife of Emil, she has the personality to question the validity of the subsequent
marriage between Emil and Sharmaine. Charis must be given the right to file the
petition to declare void the second marriage on the ground of bigamy because
the parties to such marriage are not expected to file such action.

Hence, the contention of Sharmaine that Charis has no personality to file

the petition is not meritorious.

(2) If you were the court, will you grant the petition filed by Charis?
Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

Yes, because the marriage of Emil and Sharmaine is void for being a
bigamous marriage.

According to jurisprudence, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be

considered valid if the following requisites are present: (1) the prior spouse must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death at the time of disappearance; (2) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (3) there is a judicial
declaration of presumptive death obtained in a summary proceeding. In the
absence of any of these requisites, the subsequent marriage is void for being a
bigamous marriage. [Armas v. Calisterio, 330 SCRA 201 (2000); Santos v.
Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014]

In this case, although there was a judicial declaration of presumptive death

prior to the subsequent marriage, the spouse present was aware that the prior
spouse was not in fact dead and not an absentee at the time of the second
marriage. Hence, both the first and second requisites were not complied, making
the second marriage void for being bigamous. Since the second marriage is void,
Sharmaine’s contention that Charis should have filed an Affidavit of
Reappearance is not meritorious because the latter remedy applies only when
the subsequent marriage is exceptionally valid.

Hence, if I were the court I will grant the petition filed by the aggrieved
spouse.

B. Patricia was charged with the crime of bigamy. The information states
that she contracted two marriages, the first to a Korean national, Lee Ming Ho,
and the other, to a Filipino, Rico Blanco. It turned out, however, that an OFW
friend of Patricia, Bianca, made use of her identity and personal circumstances in
contracting a marriage to the said Korean national. Nonetheless, the prosecution
still claimed that Patricia is guilty of bigamy because she failed to secure a
judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of the first marriage before contracting
the second marriage. Is Patricia guilty of committing the crime of bigamy?
Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

No. According to Article 40 of the Family Code, the parties to a void

marriage are required to obtain a judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage before they can validly contract another marriage, otherwise, the
Supreme Court said, the crime of bigamy is committed because the prior
marriage, though void, is considered a subsisting marriage for purposes of
contracting another marriage. [Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 (2000); Abunado
v. People, 426 SCRA 562 (2004)]

In the case at bar, however, Patricia is not required to file a petition to

declare the prior marriage void on the ground that she was not the one who
contracted said marriage. In other words, there was no prior marriage involving
the true Patricia that could be declared void ab initio. As such, Patricia is not
required to comply with the requirement of Article 40 of the Family Code.
[Republic v. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605 (2014)]

Hence, Patricia did not commit the crime of bigamy.

III. (10%)

A. State the applicable property regime in the following instances. Explain briefly.
(6%)

(1) A void marriage by reason of psychological incapacity. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is that provided in Article 147 of the Family
Code. The said property regime applies to void marriages where the reason for
the nullity of the marriage is not absence of legal capacity, such as a void
marriage by reason of psychological incapacity in Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Art. 147, Family Code; Dino v. Dino, 640 SCRA 178 (2011)]

(2) A second marriage celebrated in 1990 without a marriage settlement

but one of the parties thereto had a prior void marriage which has not yet been
judicially declared void. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is absolute community of property

because the said property regime applies by default in the absence of a marriage
settlement for marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code.
Even though the second marriage is void for failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 40 of the Family Code, the latter kind of void marriage is
also governed by the same rules applicable to valid marriages for purposes of
determining its property regime. [Art. 50, in relation to Art. 43 (2), Family Code;
Dino v. Dino, 640 SCRA 178 (2011)]

(3) A second marriage contracted by the surviving spouse during the

effectivity of the Family Code and without a marriage settlement after the prior
marriage was terminated by reason of death but the surviving spouse failed to
liquidate the conjugal partnership of said prior marriage. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is complete separation. Under the Family

Code, if the conjugal partnership or the absolute community of the prior marriage
was terminated by reason of death and the surviving spouse failed to liquidate
the property regime within one year from the death of the deceased spouse, the
subsequent marriage shall be mandatorily governed by complete separation. [Art.
130, Family Code]

(4) A second marriage celebrated during the subsistence of a prior

voidable marriage. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is that provided in Article 148 of the Family
Code because the marriage is void for being a bigamous marriage under Article
35 (4) of the Family Code. The said property regime applies to void marriages
where the reason for the nullity of the marriage is absence of legal capacity, like
a bigamous marriage in Article 35 (4). [Art. 148, Family Code]

(5) When after the issuance of the decree of legal separation, the spouses
reconciled and obtained a decree of reconciliation from the court. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is still complete separation. After the

issuance of the decree of legal separation, the property regime of the spouses
shall be complete separation. While a decree of reconciliation sets aside the
decree of legal separation, the separation of property subsists, however, unless
the spouses have agreed to revive their former property regime. [Art. 66 (2),
Family Code; Sec. 23 (d), Rule on Legal Separation]
 (6) When after the issuance of the decree of reconciliation, the spouses
executed an agreement for the adoption of conjugal partnership of gains as their
new property regime and such agreement is approved by the court. (1%)

ANSWER:

The applicable property regime is still complete separation. After the

issuance of the decree of legal separation, the property regime of the spouses
shall be complete separation. Even when the spouses executed an agreement
for the adoption of conjugal partnership as their new property regime and the
same is approved by the court, the agreement is void because the law mandates
that such property regime can only commence at the precise moment of the
celebration of the marriage. Any agreement to the contrary, whether express or
implied, is declared by law to be void. [Art. 107, in relation to Art. 88, Family
Code]

B. When the spouses Bryan and Dyan started a family in 2000, they
purchased a house and lot for P280,000 in Navotas City. In 2010, SM
Development Corp. (SMDC) purchased the adjacent properties for the purpose of
putting up an SM Department Store. When the SM Department Store finally
opened, the current fair market value of the spouses’ property shoot up to P5
Million. In view of this development, Claro, an unsecured creditor of the spouses
for the sum of P1 Million applied for an order from the court for the sale of the
house and lot of the spouses to satisfy the judgment rendered in his favor,
invoking the provisions of Article 160 of the Family Code. If you were the court,
will you order the sale of the house and lot of the spouses? Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

No. While Article 160 of the Family Code authorizes the sale of the Family
Home pursuant to an order obtained by a judgment creditor not listed in Article
155 of the Code, the said provision, according to jurisprudence, will only be
applicable if the following requisites are present: (1) at the time of the constitution
of the family home, its actual value did not exceed P300,000 in urban areas or
P200,000 in rural areas; (2) after the constitution, its actual value increased
beyond said amount; and (3) the increase in actual value is by reason of
voluntary improvement. A voluntary improvement, as defined by the Court, is
such kind of improvement due to a voluntary action of any of the beneficiaries of
the family home. [Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015]

In the case at bar, while the first two requisites are present, the third
requisite is not complied because the reason for the increase in the actual value
of the family home is due to involuntary improvement, or one which is not due to
a voluntary action of the beneficiaries. Here, the value of the property
appreciated because of the action of a third person or by reason of the action of
SMDC.

Hence, the family home remains protected for its entire actual value and
cannot be ordered sold pursuant to Article 160 of the Family Code.

IV. (10%)

A young couple, Ramil and Kaye, purchased a house and lot from Amari
Development, Inc. (ADI) for P500,000 payable thru installments. The parties
executed a Contract to Sell. A year after the purchase, the spouses demolished
the original house delivered to them by ADI and constructed a bigger one costing
about P2 Million, with prior consent of ADI. Unfortunately, the spouses defaulted
in the payment of the monthly amortizations after 4 years of religiously paying the
same. This prompted ADI to issue a notice of cancellation thru a notarial act,
after giving the spouses 5 months grace period. The spouses questioned the
validity of the cancellation of the contract. Alternatively, the spouses are
demanding for the payment of the value of the house contending that they were
builders in good faith. ADI insists, however, on the validity of the cancellation.
ADI likewise argues that the spouses are not builders in good faith because they
knew that they were not the owners of the land at the time construction of the
house.

(A) Distinguish between the limited definition of the concept of a builder in

good faith and its expanded definition. (1%)

ANSWER:

Under the limited definition of the concept of a builder in good faith, the
builder must have a claim of ownership over the land because he has a title or a
mode of acquisition which turns turn out to be invalid because of a flaw or defect
but the builder is ignorant of the existence of such flaw or defect at the time of the
construction. Under the expanded definition, on the other hand, the builder has
no claim of ownership over the land because he is aware that he is not its owner
but the construction or building is expressly permitted or consented to by the land
owner. [Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, G.R. No. 176791, Nov. 14, 201,
ponencia by Justice Del Castillo; Department of Education v. Casibang, G.R.
No. 192268,Jan. 27, 2016]

(B) Is the cancellation of the Contract to Sell valid and effective? (4%)

ANSWER:
 No. The sale of real property thru installment payments is governed by
R.A. No. 8552, otherwise known as the Maceda Law. Under the Maceda Law, if
the buyer has paid at least two years of installments he is entitled to a grace
period of one month for every year of payment. After the grace period and the
installments remain unpaid, the seller may cancel the contract by sending a
notice of cancellation thru a notarial act but he must also pay to the buyer a cash
surrender value equivalent to 50% of total payments, with an additional 5% for
every year after five years but not to exceed 90% of the total payments.
According to jurisprudence, the cancellation is not valid and effective without the
payment of the cash surrender value. [Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, G.R.
No. 176791, Nov. 14, 201, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In this case, while ADI gave the buyers five months grace period although
the buyers are entitled only to four months of grace period, ADI did not pay any
cash surrender value to them. Hence, the cancellation of the contract to sell is
not valid and the contract, therefore, still subsists.

(C) Assuming that the cancellation of the contract to sell is valid, are the
buyers builders in good faith? Discuss the rights and obligations of the parties to
each other. Explain. (5%)

ANSWER:

Yes, the spouses are builders in good faith. Under the expanded definition
of the concept of a builder in good faith, even if the builder has no claim of
ownership over the land because he is aware at the time of the building that he is
not its owner, he is nevertheless considered a builder in good faith if the
construction is expressly permitted or consented to by the land owner. If both the
land owner and the builder have acted in good faith, the law grants the land
owner the following alternative options: (1) to appropriate what has been built
after payment of the appropriate indemnity; or (2) to compel the builder to pay the
price of the land, if the same is not considerably more than the value of the
building, otherwise he can only compel the builder to pay proper rent. [Art. 448,
Civil Code; Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, G.R. No. 176791, Nov. 14,
2012, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In the case at bar, the spouses are builders in good faith under the
expanded definition of the same concept because the land owner expressly
consented to the construction of the house. As such, ADI may choose any of the
two options mentioned above. Should ADI choose the first option, it is required to
pay the value of the new house constructed by the spouses minus the value of
the original house which was demolished by the spouses. Should ADI choose the
second option, the spouses are required to pay the current fair market value of
the land at the time of the election of the option.
 Hence, the buyers are builders in good faith but their rights shall depend on
the option that may be chosen by ADI.

V. (10%)

A. Katrina is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover with Plate Number
ZMG 272. In 2010, she entrusted the said vehicle to Jamie, a businesswoman
who owned a second-hand car sales showroom, to be sold in the market. Katrina
surrendered to Jamie the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining thereto, and a
deed of sale signed in blank, with full understanding that Jamie would offer and
sell the same to her clients or to the public. Upon acceptance of the foregoing
items, Jamie issued to Katrina two guarantee checks. Thereafter, Jamie was able
to sell the subject vehicle to Rosanna but she failed to remit the proceeds of the
purported sale nor return the vehicle. Rosanna then sold the vehicle to Bianca
who caused the registration of the vehicle in her name. When Katrina learned
that the ownership over the vehicle was already transferred in the name of
Bianca, she filed an action for replevin against the latter contending that she was
unlawfully deprived of possession of the vehicle. Is Katrina entitled to the return
of the vehicle? (4%)

ANSWER:

No. Under the law on agency, the act of the agent is also the act of the
principal. In addition, the law on possession also provides that the previous
possessor of a movable has the right to recover possession in case he is
unlawfully deprived of possession. However, according to jurisprudence, the
meaning of “unlawful deprivation” in Article 559 of the Civil Code cannot cover a
situation where there is a contract of purchase and sale because ownership is
transferred in a contract of sale upon delivery. [Art. 559; Sy v. Tomlin; G.R. No.
205998, April 24, 2017, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo; EDCA Publishing
and Distributing Corp. v. Santos, 184 SCRA 614]

In this case, the sale made by the agent, Jamie, is binding upon the
principal, Katrina, because the act of the agent is also the act of the principal.
Hence, when the agent sold and delivered the vehicle to Rosanna, ownership is
already transferred in favor of the latter. Since ownership is already transferred to
Rosanna, she can validly transfer the thing sold to Bianca. Hence, Katrina cannot
be said to have been “unlawfully deprived” of the car even if she was not able to
receive the purchase price from Jamie. The remedy of Katrina, an unpaid seller,
is to recover the payment from Jamie, her agent.

Hence, Katrina is not entitled to recover the vehicle from Bianca.

 B. When Leon died, he was survived by his siblings, Grace and Danica.
Upon the death of Grace, she was, in turn, survived by her grandson, Leonardo.
On the part of Danica, she was survived by two children, Pedro and Jose. When
Pedro died, he was survived by three children: Tisha, Abby and Alex. Jose, on
the other hand, was survived by a lone child, Kriz.

In 1989, John, the husband of Tisha, claimed absolute ownership of the

land left by Leon and transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the
property. These acts where followed by John’s witholding of the shares in the
fruits of the property of the other relatives of Leon and barring them from entering
the said property. In 2015, Leonardo filed an action for the partition of the above
parcel of land claiming ½ interest therein. John opposed the action for partition
on the ground that he already acquired exclusive ownership over the property
because he already made a repudiation of the co-ownership in 1989 and that
more than thirty years had lapsed since then.

Is John’s contention correct? Explain. (3%)

ANSWER:

No. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit
from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate
that was formed among the decedent’s heirs. [Ining v. Vega, G.R. No. 174727,
August 12, 2013, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In this case, when Leon died, his heirs are his siblings, Grace and Danica,
who thus inherited in equal shares. In turn, their respective heirs acquired their
undivided shares in the property upon their death and became co-owners of the
property. John, however, is not one of the co-owners because he is related to
Danica only by affinity. Not being a co-owner, his acts of repudiation did not
validly affect the co-ownership existing among the heirs of Grace and Danica.

Hence, the action for partition filed by Leonardo can still prosper because
the co-owner still existed at the time of the filing of said action.

C. A law was passed by Congress integrating two State-run schools in the

Province of Bataan, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic State College
(BPSC). The same law also called for the transfer of the titles covering the two
State-run schools in the name of BPSC. The Province of Bataan refused to
surrender the titles covering the said properties claiming that the same are
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, and as such may not be taken
by the National Government without payment of just compensation. The
Province of Bataan also pointed out certain obligations of the province to the
Land Bank of the Philippines were secured with a mortgage over said properties.
Is the Province of Bataan correct? Explain. (3%)

ANSWER:

No.

In the earlier case of Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of

Zamboanga [131 Phil. 446 (1968)], the Court held that if the property is owned by
the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity, it is public and
Congress has absolute control over it; but if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control,
in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. Further more, it was held that property registered
in the name of the municipal corporation but without proof that it was acquired
with its corporate funds is deemed held trust by it in trust for the State.
[Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174964, October 5,
2016]

In the case at bar, since the subject properties are devoted to

governmental purposes, specifically for public education, the same is classified
as public properties of the municipal corporation. As such, Congress has
absolute control over said properties and may thus be transferred in favor of
BPSC without need of paying just compensation to the Province of Bataan.

Hence, the Province of Bataan cannot be said to have been deprived of

the subect propeties without payment of just compensation.

VI. (25%)

The marriage of Angelique and John was declared void because the latter
was declared to be psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. During their marriage, Angelique gave birth to two children, Dyan and
Karl. Unknown to John, Karl is Angelique’s child with John’s friend, David. On the
part of John, he fathered three children outside of the marriage, Sev, Raffy and
Don. In the birth certificate of Sev, John was mentioned as the child’s father.
Although John did not sign said birth certificate, he was the one who registered
the same in the civil registry. As to Raffy, he listed Raffy as one of his children,
together with Dyan and Karl, in his Personal Records with the Social Security
System (SSS Form E-1). As to Don, John mentioned in his diary that he is the
child’s father. Although said entry in John’s diary was entirely handwritten by him,
he did not sign the same. Aside from said hand written note, there is no other
proof of John’s paternity over Don.

In the will that John executed, he instituted as sole heirs to his entire estate
worth P18 Million his children Dyan, Karl and Raffy. When John died, Dyan and
Karl filed for the probate of the will. Sev and Don opposed the probate of the will
on the ground that they were preterited. They also questioned Karl’s right to
inherit from John on the ground that his true father is David and not John. Dyan
and Karl contended that the issues raised by Sev and Don cannot be resolved in
a probate proceeding.

(1) In the above case, can the probate court rule on the issue of preterition?
Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

Yes. As a general rule, the probate court can only pass upon issues touching
on the extrinsic validity of the will but not issues involving the intrinsic validity of
the will. However, according to jurisprudence, such rule is not inflexible. The
probate court may resolve an issue involving the intrinsic validity of the will when
practical consideration demands that such issue should be resolved, otherwise
the conduct of the probate proceedings may become a useless ceremony. One
such situation is when there is preterition and the entire estate is to be distributed
by intestacy because the institution of heirs is annulled in its entirety. [Morales v.
Olondriz, 783 SCRA 151 (2016)]

In this case, the decedent’s will does not contain any devise or legacy, hence
if there is indeed preterition the entire estate will be distributed by way of
intestacy and there will be no need for the conduct of the probate proceedings. In
this particular case therefore, the probate court must pass upon the issue of
preterition, otherwise the conduct of the probate proceedings may become a
useless ceremony.

Hence, practical consideration demands that the probate court must resolve
the issue of preterition.
 (2) Is the contention that Karl cannot inherit from John because he is not
related to the said decedent correct? Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

No. Under the Family, children conceived or born inside a valid marriage are
presumed legitimate [Art. 164, Family Code; Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No.
138961, March 7, 2002]. Said presumption also applies to children conceived or
born in a void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because said
children are expressly declared by Article 54 of the Family Code as legitimate
children. In addition, the right to impugn the child’s legitimacy is strictly a personal
right of the husband or the presumed father. [Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, supra.]

In this case, Sev and Don cannot question the legitimacy of Karl for two
reasons: (1) they do not have the personality to impugn Karl’s legitimacy because
the same is the exclusive right of the decedent; and (2) the matter of Karl’s
legitimacy is not subject to a collateral attack because the issue of legitimacy
can only be raised in a direct action.

Hence, the contention that Karl is not the child of the decedent is not
meritorious.

(3) Can Raffy, Sev and Don be allowed to prove their illegitimate filiation
after the death of John? Explain. (7%)

ANSWER:

Yes, as to Raffy and Sev; no, as to Don.

Under the Family Code, an illegitimate is allowed to prove his illegitimate

filiation with the father even after the death of the father if the proof of filiation is
based on the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code. However, the
same law requires the action to be filed during the lifetime of the alleged father if
the proof of filiation is based on the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code; otherwise, said action to prove illegitimate filiation is already barred.
[Article 175, Family Code; Uyguangco v. CA, 178 SCRA 684]

As to Raffy, he is still allowed to prove his illegitimate filiation with the

decedent after the latter’s death because the proof of filiation is based on the first
paragraph of Article 172, or through the SSS Form E-1 of the decedent where the
latter acknowledged his paternity over the child. In a case decided by the Court, it
was ruled that SSS Form E-1 is a public document of admission of filiation, hence
considered as competent proof of filiation. [Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169,
January 28, 2015, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]
 As to Sev, he is still allowed to prove his illegitimate filiation with the
decedent after the latter’s death because the proof of filiation is Sev’s birth
certificate showing the decedent as the child’s father, a proof based on the first
paragraph of Article 172. Even if the decedent failed to sign the said birth
certificate, he nonetheless participated in its preparation. In a case decided by
the Court, it was ruled that even if the illegitimate father failed to sign the birth
certificate showing him to be the child’s father but he was the one who registered
said certificate in the civil registry, he is deemed to have participated in the
preparation of the birth certificate. As such, said certificate is considered a
competent proof of filiation even if it is not signed by the father because the father
is deemed to have participated or involved in its preparation. [Arado v. Alcoran,
G.R. 163362, July 8, 2015]

As to Don, however, he will not be able to prove his illegitimate filiation

with the decedent using the entries in the diary of the latter. While the entries in
the diary of the decedent may be considered as a private instrument of
acknowledgment of paternity, the same does not bear the signature of the
decedent. In a case decided by the Court, it was held that if the private
instrument of acknowledgment of paternity is not signed by the father and it is the
sole proof of filiation, the same is not considered a competent proof of filiation
even if it is written entirely in the father’s own handwriting. In such a situation, the
Court declared that the requirement of signature in Article 176 of the Family
Code, in relation to Articles 175 and 172, must be strictly applied. [Dela Cruz v.
Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, reiterated in Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No.
200169, January 28, 2015, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

(4) Is there preterition in this case? Explain. (5%)

ANSWER:

Yes. Under the law, there is preterition when a compulsory heir in the
direct line is omitted from will. Consequently, the entire institution of heir shall be
annulled but without affecting the devises and legacies [Art. 854, Civil Code].
According to jurisprudence, an illegitimate child is a compulsory heir in the
directly line and his omission from the will is a case of preterition. [Morales v.
Olondriz, 783 SCRA 151 (2016)]

In this case, the omission of Sev from the will is a case of preterition
because Sev is allowed by law to prove his illegitimate filiation after the death of
the decedent. As earlier discussed, even if the decedent failed to Sev’s birth
certificate, he nonetheless participated in its preparation. Hence, it is considered
a competent proof of filiation falling under the first paragraph of Article 172. As
such, the action to prove illegitimate filiation can still be filed after the death of the
illegitimate father. [Arado v. Alcoran, G.R. 163362, July 8, 2015]
 As to Don, however, he is not preterited because he is not allowed
anymore to prove his illegitimate filiation with the decedent upon the latter’s
death. As discussed above, if the private instrument of acknowledgment of
paternity is not signed by the father and it is the sole proof of filiation, the same is
not considered a competent proof of filiation even if it is written entirely in the
father’s own handwriting. [Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009,
reiterated in Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015, ponencia by
Justice Del Castillo]

Hence, there is still preterition in this case because of the omission of Sev
from the will.

(5) Distribute John’s estate. (5%)

ANSWER:

Considering that there is preterition in this case, the entire estate of John
shall be distributed by way of intestacy because there are no devises and
legacies in the will.

Based from the discussions made in the previous questions, the following
are the legal heirs of John: (1) his legitimate children, Dyan and Karl; and (2) his
illegitimate children, Sev and Raffy. Angelique is no longer a legal heir of John
because the marriage has already been declared void, hence, Angelique is not a
surviving spouse. In intestate succession, the share of a legitimate child is double
than the share of an illegitimate child.

Applying the foregoing formula, the shares of Sev and Raffy shall be P3
Million each, while the shares of Dyan and Karl shall be P6 Million each.

VII. (10%)

Patricia entered into a 3-year lease contract with Thea over her parcel of land,
expiring on December 31, 2017. The lease contract was registered in the registry
of property. Sometime in January 2016, Patricia wrote Thea a letter saying “I am
giving you the opportunity to buy the leased premises for P5 Million but you must
decide not less than 2 years from the date of this letter.” A month after receiving
the letter, Thea offered to buy the property for P3.5 Million but Patricia never
made any reply.
 Around November 2017, Thea learned that Patricia sold the lease premises to
the latter’s daughter, Grace, for a lesser price of P500,000. Alleging that her right
of first refusal was violated, Thea filed an action to rescind the sale between the
mother and daughter alleging that said contract was in fraud of creditor.

(1) Distinguish between option and right of first refusal. (2%)

ANSWER:

An option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal
in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a
determinate price. Lacking these two essential requisites, what is involved is only
a right of first refusal. [Tuazon v. Del Rosario-Suarez, G.R. No. 168325,
December 8, 2010, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the
exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor’s
eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on
terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be firmed up. [Ang Yu
Asuncion v. CA, 238 SCRA 602 (1994)]

(2) In the above problem, is the privilege granted to Thea by Patricia a case
of a right of first refusal? Explain. (3%)

ANSWER:

No. An option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first
refusal in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period
and at a determinate price. Lacking these two essential requisites, what is
involved is only a right of first refusal. [Tuazon v. Del Rosario-Suarez, G.R. No.
168325, December 8, 2010, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In this case, what was granted to Thea is an option and not a right of first
refusal. Here, there was already a definite offer made by Patricia to Thea and
what is lacking is merely acceptance of such offer. In addition, the privilege
granted to Thea is for a fixed period. It cannot be a right of first refusal because in
the latter, there must no definite offer.

Hence, the privilege granted to Thea is an option and not a right of first
refusal.

(3) If you were the court, will you rescind the sale between Patricia and
Grace? Explain. (5%)
 ANSWER:

No. According to the law and jurisprudence, if the option is not supported
a consideration distinct and separate from the consideration of the contemplated
contract, the option is not binding. Nonetheless, there is still an offer which may
be accepted if not withdrawn prior to acceptance. [Art. 1324, Civil Code; Tuazon
v. Del Rosario-Suarez, G.R. No. 168325, December 8, 2010, ponencia by
Justice Del Castillo]

In this case, what was granted to Thea is an option and not a right of first
refusal. However, the option granted to Thea is not supported by a consideration
distinct and separate from the consideration supporting the contemplated
contract. Hence, said option is not binding. While there is a holding that even if
the option is not binding, there is still an offer that may be accepted if the same
has not been withdrawn prior to withdrawal. In this case, however, the offer of
Patricia is already terminated by reason of Thea’s counter-offer. Under the law, a
counter-offer has the effect of rejecting the original offer and it is in the nature of
making a new offer. Clearly, Patricia never accepted Thea’s new offer. Hence, no
perfected contract ensued.

In view of the foregoing, Thea is not entitled to rescind the sale between
Patricia and Grace.

VIII. (5%)

While Jasmine Reyes was walking along Sampaguita Street, United

Paranaque Subdivision in Paranaque, she was hit by a Mitsubishi L-300 van,
driven by Jimmy Bautista. Reyes died because of the injuries she suffered in the
said incident. Upon investigation, it was found out that the registered owner of the
van was Caravan Travel & Tours, Inc. and Bautista is Caravan’s employee.

The parents of Reyes sued Caravan for damages. After trial, the court
ordered Caravan to pay damages to the parents of the victim after the plaintiffs
have proved that Caravan is the registered owner of the vehicle. In its motion for
reconsideration, Caravan argues that the complainants failed to prove that
Bautista, the driver, acted within the scope of his assigned tasks, a requirement
for the liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In opposing
the motion for reconsideration, the complainants argued that there is no need to
prove the same because Caravan’s liability is based on the registered-owner rule
– that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of
their vehicles.

If you were the court, will you grant the motion for reconsideration? (5%)

ANSWER:

No. According to jurisprudence, in cases where both the registered-owner rule

and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves
ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article
2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. [Caravan Travel
& Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016;
reiterated in Greenstar Express, Inc. v. Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No.
205090, October 17, 2016, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

In this case, the complainants were able to prove that Caravan is the
registered owner of the vehicle. As a consequence, the vicarious liability of the
employer under Article 2180 attaches. The burden of proof is then shifted to
Caravan to deny such liability by proving: (1) the absence of employer-employee
relationship; or (2) that the employee acted outside the scope of his assigned
tasks; or (3) that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee. As such, it is Caravan who has the burden of proving that the driver
acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks.

Hence, if I were the court I will deny the motion for reconsideration.

IX. (5%)

In 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with
the Tecson spouses for the purchase of a parcel of land in Panglao, Bohol. In
1993, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said property.
Cattleya could not register the sale because according to the Tecson spouses
the title to the property had been destroyed in a fire. It turned out, however, that
said property had already been sold to Mike Stone, an American citizen, and the
title to said property had been delivered to Stone’s common-law wife, Taina
Manigque. In the meantime, Taina and Mike got married.

In 1994, Taina filed a Notice of Adverse Claim over the subject property. In
1995, she sought to register a Deed of Absolute Sale in her name and presented
the title to the property. This prompted Cattleya to file an action for quieting of title
against Taina. Arguing that there was a double sale, Taina contended that she
was the first one to acquire constructive possession of the lot pursuant to Article
1544 of the Civil Code.

Is the contention of Taina meritorious? Explain. (5%)

ANSWER:

No. According to jurisprudence, in order for a double sale to exist, the

following requisites must be present: (1) both sales transactions must constitute
valid sales; (2) both sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject
matter; (3) the two buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (4) the two or more buyers
at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must have bought from
the very same seller. [Cheng v. Genato, 360 Phil. 891 (1998)]

In the case at bar, there is no double sale to speak of because the only valid
sale is that in favor of Cattleya. The earlier sale made to Mike Stone is invalid
because Mike, being a foreigner, is prohibited by the Constitution from acquiring
private lands in the Philippines. Although the sale is made in the name of Taina,
the latter merely acted as a dummy for Mike Stone. Given the fact that the sale
by the Tecson spouses to Taina as Mike’s dummy is totally repugnant to the
Constitution, and is thus void ab initio, there can be no double sale to speak of.
[Taina Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc., G.R. No. 195975, September 5,
2016, ponencia by Justice Del Castillo]

Hence, the rightful ownership over the subject property belongs to Cattleya as
Taina’s contention is totally without merit.

X. (5%)

St. Luke’s College of Medicine entered into a Memorandum of Agreement

with the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for the construction and operation of
a community clinic in Cabiao. Under said agreement, St. Luke’s shall operate the
Cabiao Community Clinic. In 2010, St. Luke’s sent 4 of its fourth year students to
complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic. While in Cabiao, the
students occupied the second floor of the clinic as their temporary residence. In
the early morning of February 9, 2010, while the students were sleeping, a fire
ensued in the clinic which resulted into the death of 2 students of St. Luke’s who
were trapped in the second floor of the building. An investigation revealed that all
the windows in the second floor were covered by permanent iron grills and that
there were no fire exits, fire alarms, fire extinguishers, sprinklers and emergency
lights.

The parents of the victims sued St. Luke’s College of Medicine for damages.
Is St. Luke’s liable? Explain. (5%)
 ANSWER:

Yes. The relationship between the school and its students is based on the
enrollment contracts. Under said contract, the school has a built-in obligation of
providing a conducive atmosphere of learning and that such atmosphere is free
from constant threats to life and limb and one where peace and order is
maintained. While the school is not the school is not the insurer of its student
against all risks, it is necessary however that the breach of its contractual
obligation must not be due to its negligence. [St. Luke’s College of Medicine –
William H. Quasha Memorial Foundation v. Perez, G.R. No. 222740, September
28, 2016]

In this case, the school failed to ensure the safety of its students. Hence,
there was breach of its contractual obligation under the enrollment contract. It is
also clear that the school’s breach of its contractual obligation is due to its own
negligence for failing to inspect the premises before allowing its students to
occupy the same as their temporary residence. Had St. Luke’s only exercised
due diligence, it would have discovered that the second floor of the clinic is a
virtual fire trap.

Hence, St. Luke’s is liable for the death of its students because it failed to
exercise due diligence in ensuring the safety of its students.

XI. (5%)

Benjamin borrowed money from the Magtalas sisters, Charito and Vilma in
the amount of P600,000. As collateral, Benjamin delivered his parcel of land to
the sisters. In their agreement (Kasulatan Ukol sa Utang), the Magtalas sisters
shall have the right to the fruits of the subject land for six years or until the loan is
fully paid.

Several months after the execution of the agreement, Benjamin died. After the
death of Benjamin, his brother, Bienvenido inspected the land and discovered
that the Magtalas sisters and their respective husbands were cultivating the land.
Alleging himself to be the sole heir of the decedent, Bienvenido made a demand
upon the Magtalas sisters (and their husbands) to vacate the property.
Bienvenido refuses to honor the agreement entered into by his brother on the
ground that he is not a party to said agreement.
 (1) What is the nature of the agreement entered into between Benjamin and
the Magtalas sisters? Explain. (2%)

ANSWER:

The agreement is a contract of antichresis. In antichresis, there is an

agreement that the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s immovable
property with a right to acquire the fruits of the said property but he is obliged to
apply said fruits to the payment of the interest and principal of the loan. In
antichresis, the creditor is entitled to retain the property until the loan is paid in
full. [Arts. 2132 and 2136, Civil Code; Reyes v. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, G.R.
No. 219071, August 24, 2016]

In this case, the Kasulatan between Banjamin, the debtor, and the Magtalas
sisters, the creditors, authorizes the latter to take possession of the former’s
parcel of land with a right to acquire the fruits of the said property to apply the
same to the payment of the loan. All the essential elements of the contract of
antichresis is present in the case.

Hence, what the parties had entered into is a contract of antichresis.

(2) Is Bienvenido already entitled to the possession of the property being

the sole heir of Benjamin? Explain. (3%)

ANSWER:

No. Rights and obligations arising from a contract are transmissible to the
heirs except when the same are intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation or
by provision of law [Art. 1311, par. 1, Civil Code]. In addition, the debtor cannot
reaquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he
owes the creditor [Art. 2136, par. 1, Civil Code].

In the case at bar, Bienvenido, being the sole heir of the debtor, is bound
by the contract entered into by the latter with the Magtalas sisters considering
that the contract of antichresis is not extinguished by the death of any of the
parties. Since Bienvenido is bound by the said contract, he is not entitled yet to
the delivery of the property until the loan is paid in full because the creditors are
entitled to the possession of the same during the existence of the loan.

Hence, Bienvenido cannot as yet demand for the delivery of the parcel of
land.

END