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1. G.R. No.

173946 June 19, 2013


BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside:
(1) the Decision,1 dated 28 February 2006 and (2) the Resolution,2 dated 1 August
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88586. The challenged decision
granted herein respondent's petition for certiorari upon a finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's motion to dismiss the
complaint against her.3 Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the Orders, dated 8 November 20044 and 22 December 2004,5 respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:


On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo.
Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer7 in which she alleged, among others, that
her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that
Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. It appears that this motion
was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties.
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion to dismiss.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted by public
respondent judge as the same was in order. Considering that the obligation of Manuel
S. Toledo is solidary with another debtor, x x x, the claim x x x should be filed against
the estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.

The Ruling of the Court


We find merit in the petition.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of
the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the
court before a case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, "the proper remedy in
such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to
perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made
by the courts.
At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will
demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case.
A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that
jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals
and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the
controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to
resolve the issue of jurisdiction.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-
defendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it
ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for
by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Death of party;duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no
party to be substituted.

2. G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968


SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company
and defendant-appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:


On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment
was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of
the Rules of Court.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed
a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same
year.
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let
the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public


policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or.
694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243
U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.
Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
3. G.R. No. 183357 March 15, 2010
HONORIO BERNARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:


This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to assail
the validity of the Decision1 dated 21 April 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No.
R-00-035.
This controversy stemmed from a Complaint dated 14 November 2000 for accion
publiciana filed by respondent Heirs of Eusebio Villegas against petitioner Honorio
Bernardo, Romeo Gaza (Gaza) and Monina Francisco (Francisco). Respondents had
earlier filed an ejectment case against the trio, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-065 with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, which case was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for having been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive
period for filing a forcible entry case.
Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
46891 with an area of 18,369 square meters and situated in Barangay Pag-asa,
Binangonan, Rizal.
In his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any portion of the property of
respondents.
The trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
The appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that the portions of the land
occupied by petitioner and Gaza are owned by respondents. The appellate court
likewise ruled that respondents could not be guilty of laches considering that Estelito
Villegas, upon seeing for the first time in 1996 that petitioner was already building his
house on the premises, verbally asked him to discontinue the construction.10
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings.18 Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court
may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the
answer or in a motion to dismiss. 19 The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action.

However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure
affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The
Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
In Tijam, the Court held that it is iniquitous and unfair to void the trial court’s decision for
lack of jurisdiction considering that it was raised only after fifteen (15) years of tedious
litigation, thus:
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of
money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22
The principle of justice and equity as espoused in Tijam should be applied in this
case. The MTC dismissed the ejectment case upon its ruling that the case is for
accion publiciana. It did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have done
so based on the assessed value of the property subject of the accion publiciana. And
there was no showing, indeed, not even an allegation, that the MTC was not aware of
its jurisdictional authority over an accion publiciana involving property in the amount
stated in the law.
Moreover, petitioner did not bring up the issue of jurisdictional amount that would have
led the MTC to proceed with the trial of the case. Petitioner obviously considered the
dismissal to be in his favor. When, as a result of such dismissal, respondents brought
the case as accion publiciana before the RTC, petitioner never brought up the issue of
jurisdictional amount. What petitioner mentioned in his Answer before the RTC was the
generally phrased allegation that "the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the nature of the action in the above-entitled case.
Clearly, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
We note that the decisions of the RTC and of the Court of Appeals discussed
extensively the merits of the case, which has been pending for nearly ten (10) years. It
was handled by two (2) judges and its records had to be reconstituted after the fire that
gutted the courthouse. If we were to accede to petitioner’s prayer, all the effort, time and
expenses of parties who participated in the litigation would be wasted. Quite obviously,
petitioner wants a repetition of the process hoping for the possibility of a reversal of the
decision. The Court will not countenance such practice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 April 2008, affirming
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal dated 5 March
2007, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
4-6: see different docu. Nka pdf kasi, hndi ko maconvert
7. CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al.
(G.R. No. 180771 and 181527) DATE: 21 April 2015 PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS
 On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department
of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
 The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic
and magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tañon Strait was conducted.
 On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources
in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait.
 From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the area’s underwater composition.
 During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration
well. Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and
Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related
Measures and For Other Purposes.”
 On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon
Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of
the latter’s application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
 On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for
the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.
 From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with
a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
 On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking
that the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
 The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit
the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their
protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are: - A study made after the seismic survey
showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by 50-70% attributable to the
destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef. - The ECC obtained by the respondents
is invalid because there is no public consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction - FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing
within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated
than the 1.5- kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental
Examination
 The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose
L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-
allegations, among others, the “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no
legal standing to file the petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have a legal standing?
Ruling:
Yes. A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is
suing as representative of a real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or
defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not become the
real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest.
The representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of
another.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A
citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest
to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
“citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature: “Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

8. G.R. No. 201816 April 8, 2013


HEIRS OFF AUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN
MESINA vs. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET AL.

Statement of the Case:


The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their
lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian) two
parcels of land on installment.
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs, claiming ownership of the parcels of
land and taking possession of them––refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots
and denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to
turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina. Thus, on August 8, 2005,
Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action for
quieting of title and damages against the Heirs of Fian.
Thereafter, or on September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and that the case should
be dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
The CA erred in affirming the Order and Resolution of RTC in dismissing the case on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action;

Ruling:
Without the presence of all the heirs of spouses Fian as defendants, the trial court could
not validly render judgment and grant relief to petitioners. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. Hence, the court a quo correctly ordered for the dismissal of the action on the
ground that the complaint failed to name or implead all the heirs of the late spouses
Fian.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint
states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.
By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be
readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under any of the above
elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-
joinder of an indispensable party.
Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in
this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the
other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had
of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties
may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What
the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the
heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a
warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

9. NORBERTO ALTRES ET AL., vs. CAMILO G. EMPLEO ET AL.


G.R. No. 180986
December 10, 2008

Statement of the Case:


Sometime in July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career
positions in the city government to the CSC. The city government and the CSC
thereupon proceeded to publicly announce the existence of the vacant
positions. Petitioners and other applicants submitted their applications for the different
positions where they felt qualified.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod issued requesting a suspension of action on the
processing of appointments to all vacant positions until the enactment of a new
budget and another resolution holding transmission of all appointments.
The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the
appointments issued to petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of availability of
funds. Petitioners filed a Compliance Report as required.
Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59
petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing
petitioners. They thus move for the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they have a justifiable cause for their
inability to obtain the signatures of the other petitioners as they could no longer be
contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case
Issue:
Whether or not there is a defect in the verification and certification against forum
shopping?
Ruling:
Court held that in the present case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out of the
59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation;
that the pleading is filed in good faith; A and that the signatories are unquestionably real
parties-in-interest who, undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the petition.
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the
requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be
better served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith;
while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the
evils of forum shopping. On the requirement of a certification of non-forum
shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification
of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed
the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other
non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any action or
claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule, however, admits of an
exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
"For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the
jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with
the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against
forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or


submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily


render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect


therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs
or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. fellester.blogspot.com If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

10
SAMELCO II vs. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, G.R. NO. 173840
FACTS
Petitioners: SAMELCO Board of Directors
Respondent: Seludo (also a member of the BOD)
Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors passed Resolution
No. 5 Series of 2005, disallowing Seludo to attend succeeding meetings of BOD until
the end of his term. They also disqualified him for one term, to run as a candidate for
director in the upcoming district elections.
Seludo then filed a Petition for Prohibition against SAMELCO II in the RTC of Samar. It
was docketed and raffled to RTC Branch 33. He prayed for:
 Nullification of Res. No. 5 because it was issued without any legal and factual
bases
 TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin SAMELCO from enforcing Res.
No. 5
RTC Judge granted the petition and issued a TRO with 72 hours effectivity. The TRO
was then extended for another 17 days.
SAMELCO II filed an answer raising the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC over the subject matter. According to them, since it is an electric cooperative case,
it should be under the primary jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration
(NEA).
RTC sustained the jurisdiction of its court over the petition for prohibition of Seludo.
SAMELCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
They elevated the case to the CA (special civil action for certiorari), alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in issuing the assailed orders.
CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC orders. SAMELCO filed a motion for recon,
but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in interpreting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction (There are actually
three issues raised here, but they are all interrelated with each other. So sabi ng
SC, gawin nating isa na lang mga kapatid. Sayang kanu ti papel kuna da.)

RULING
Yes, the CA actually did err in interpreting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
PD 269 (National Electrification Administration Decree), as amended by PD 1645
clearly wants to broaden the powers of NEA.
The issue is actually not about w/n the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition filed by Seludo. The issue is which one of the two (NEA or RTC) has primary
jurisdiction.
P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the
NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well
as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives.
Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors
of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member of
the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing
election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within
the ambit of the powers of the NEA.
True enough, RTC has jurisdiction. However, NEA has the primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative agency.
In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss
the case without prejudice.
Corollary to doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review
can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed
for lack of cause of action.
Exceptions to the two doctrines:
DISCLAIMER: Exceptions are optional. It’s up to you guys if you’d like to write
them or not. 
a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant;
d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage;
h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
k) where strong public interest is involved; and
l) in quo warranto proceedings.
Respondent failed to show that the instant case falls under any of these exceptions.
Hence, petition is granted.

11
MANCHESTER vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75919
FACTS
In this case, Manchester filed a:
 motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the SC Second Division
 motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En
Banc
Manchester contends that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended
complaint (citing the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete) and not the original complaint.
NOTE: If you’ll read the whole case, you’ll see that the ponente actually
embedded the facts in the ruling already. So I just made a summary of the ruling.
Plus, there are actually 2 doctrines here, but the main one is the jurisdiction of
the court upon payment of docket fees. The other one, which is “incapable of
pecuniary estimation,” wasn’t explained much. So it’s up to you if you want to
include it or not. Thanks!
RULING
Magaspi case is different from the present one. Thus, it cannot be applied.
Comparison of the Magaspi case and the present case:
1) Magaspi was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land with damages.
Manchester is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with
prayer for TRO, etc.
2) Magaspi case prayed for payment of actual, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees arising in the amounts specified in the prayer.
Manchester case does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages sought,
although the body alleges over P78M damages suffered by plaintiff.
3) Magaspi case had an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action.
The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to
the main cause of action.
Manchester shows no difference of opinion. Allegations and designations of the
complaint clearly indicate that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The amount involved in a specific performance is not capable
of pecuniary estimation.
4) Magaspi case is an action for recovery of ownership and payment of damages.
Thus, the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Even if
the payment was insufficient, it was a result of an honest difference of opinion as
to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Therefore, the court acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter were proper and
regular. Moreover, the amended superseded the original complaint. The
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee.

Manchester case, no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the


allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is
an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
Main doctrine: Magaspi ruling overturned and reversed to avoid irregularities.
The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. The basis of
assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
To put a stop to the irregularities, all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that
fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

12
HEIRS OF REINOSO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 116121
FACTS
Complaint for damages arose from the collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck.
One of the passengers died (Ruben Reinoso).
The heirs of Reinoso filed a complaint for damages against Tapales (owner of the jeep)
and Guballa (owner of the truck). Guballa then filed a third party complaint against
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC).
RTC favoured the heirs and ordered Tapales and Guballa to pay for the damages.
FGAC became a 3rd plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability.
On appeal, the CA set aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid
down in Manchester vs. CA. In addition, the CA rules that since the prescription had set
in, petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.

ISSUE
W/N the CA misapplied the ruling in the Manchester case.
W/N prescription had set in.

Petitioner’s Contention for Issue No. 1:


The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have been applied
retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the promulgation of the Manchester
decision in 1987. They plead that said doctrine should be applied prospectively.
Petitioner’s Contention for Issue No. 2:
Alleged defect was never put in issue either in the RTC or in the CA.
RULING
The petition is meritorious.
1. The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that
where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time,
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This
ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.
Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court
explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.

To make it simpler:
GR: Manchester Ruling (The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.)
XPNs: The court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period
of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period if:
a) The plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees required.
b) The party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
payment of docket fees.
Rationale of the XPN: While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets
on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving
genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case
on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that
may result in injustice.
2. The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the
Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. The intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants
full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of
sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new
rules.
So basically, Manchester is the general rule and this case, together with the other
cases mentioned, lay down the exceptions to the doctrine of acquisition of
jurisdiction of the court by filing of docket fees.

13 LUI ENTERPRISES INC. vs ZUELLIG PHARMA CORP. and PBC

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

March 9, 1995: Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-
year contract of lease4over a parcel of land registered under the name of Eli L. Lui.
January 10, 2003: Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBC). Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank
asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui
Enterprises of the PBC’s claim. On January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig
Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’srent.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and PBC over the rental payments,
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati. In its
complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35
as rental payments.

PBC filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not
have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in
payment case pending with the RTC of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader
case.

In the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of
which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. Lui Enterprises argued
that the same issue was involved in the interpleader case. To avoid possible
conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial court on the
same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case
be dismissed.

To support its argument, Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction dated
July 2, 2003 issued by the RTC of Davao, ordering Lui Enterprises and the
Philippine Bank of Communications "to maintain status quo" with respect to the
rent. By virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it should
continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was resolved.

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the
motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. Under Rule 16,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the required time given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from
service of summons on the defendant. Summons was served on Lui Enterprises on
July 4, 2003. It had until July 19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss, but Lui
Enterprises filed the motion only on July 23, 2003.

Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15-day period to
file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default.

In its compliance dated September 15, 2003, the Philippine Bank of


Communications " joined Zuellig Pharm in moving to declare Lui Enterprise in
default, and in moving for the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss."
RTC:

The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within
the reglementary period. Thus, in its order dated October 6, 2003, the trial court
denied Lui Enterprises’motion to dismiss and declared it in default.

Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration of the order. Thus, the Makati trial
court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’participation.

Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation
with prayer dated April 15, 2004. It manifested that the Regional Trial Court of Davao
allegedly issued the order dated April 1, 2004, ordering all of Lui Enterprises’ lessees to
"observe status quo with regard to the rental payments" and continue remitting their
rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in payment
case was being resolved.

It was only on October 21, 2004, or one year after the issuance of the order of
default, that Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default in the
Makati trial court on the ground of excusable negligence. Lui Enterprises argued that
its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time "was caused by the negligence of Lui
Enterprises’ former counsel." This negligence was allegedly excusable because "Lui
Enterprises was prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting[its case. .

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to set aside order of default. It
argued that a counsel’s failure to file a timely answer was inexcusable negligence
which bound his client.

Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court
denied the manifestation with motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005 on the
ground that Lui Enterprises already lost its standing in court.

Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
manifestation and motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005.

In its decision dated July 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises was
barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments since it was declared in
default. Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA:

As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals


sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed its
motion to dismiss four days late.

With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court
ofAppeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence
that prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly
meritorious defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not
being a party to the nullification case.

Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals denied Lui Enterprises’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution
promulgated on August 13, 2010. Hence, this petition.

In this petition for review on certiorari, Lui Enterprises also claimed that the trial
court should have set aside the order of default since its failure to file a motion to
dismiss on time was due to excusable negligence.

DOCTRINE:

A defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either
presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was
prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, in either case, the court may declare the defendant in
default on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant.

A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the
defendant declared in default "does not waive all of his or her rights." He or she
still has the right to "receive notice of subsequent proceedings." Also, the plaintiff
must still present evidence supporting his or her allegations "despite the default of the
defendant. Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant but to enforce the
prompt filing of the answer to the complaint. For a defendant without good defenses,
default saves him or her "the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the
indefensible."

The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three
conditions. First is the time element. The defendant must challenge the default order
before judgment. Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his
answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Third, he must have a
meritorious defense.

Excusable negligence is "one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against." The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved.

#14 MANOTOC VS CA (2006)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a
foreign courts judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the United States District Court of
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v.
Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of
deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the
Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance,
sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39
of the then Revised Rules of Court.

July 6, 1933: The trial court issued a Summons on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner
at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

July 15, 1993: The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon
(Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit
mentioned earlier.

October 13, 1933: When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her
in default.

October 19, 1993: Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons.

The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of
business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la
Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident
of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted
service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5)
whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.

October 11, 1994: The trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the strength
of its findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes,
Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary
evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption that the
sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and
such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.

December 21, 1994: The trial court discarded Manotocs plea for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the CA on January 20, 1995, seeking the annulment of the October 11, 1994 and
December 21, 1994 Orders.

CA:
March 17, 1997: The CA rendered the assailed Decision, dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.The court a quo adopted the findings of the trial court that
petitioners residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the residence of her husband.

Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as
there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised
Rules of Court.

April 2, 1997: Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated October 8, 1997. Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for
review on certiorari.

DOCTRINE:

The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of


summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be
properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to
present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect ones
right to due process.

In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred


mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within
a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted
service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the
usual method of service. Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.

**Requirements for Substituted Service


(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot
be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month]
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several
attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be


left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. A person of
suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18
years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance
of a summons.

Discretion is defined as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible


choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read
and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible
time for the person to take appropriate action. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge


If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business,
then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the
person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the
office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual
must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

#15 MANUEL VS ONG (2014)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On December 21, 2009, respondent Ramon Ong filed with the RTC, La Trinidad,
Benguet, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses Manuel with
having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and
stealth — on a property he supposedly owned.

On January 19, 2010, Ong filed an "amended complaint."

On February 3, 2010, summons was issued directed to the Spouses Manuel.

On April 23, 2010, Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the
Spouses Manuel in default.

Per the sheriff’s return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along
with Ong’s counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a certain Federico Laureano,
attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in
Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however, requested
that service be made at another time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's
mother was then critically ill.

The sheriff’s return further indicates that on March 16, 2010, another attempt at
personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to
petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter
refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was
thus prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra
Manuel and to advise her to file their answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses
Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they be
declared in default.
On June 28, 2010, the Regional Trial Court issued an order granting Ong's motion to
declare the Spouses Manuel in default. Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte
presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted.

On September 13, 2010, the Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of
default.

In its order dated November 30, 2010,the RTC denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion
to lift order of default. It noted that, first, their motion was not sworn to, as required by
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and, second, they did not show that their failure to
timely file an answer "was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." In
its order dated February16, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses
Manuel’s motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.

As mentioned, the assailed June 28, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals dismissed
the Spouses Manuel’s Rule 65 petition for lack of merit. The assailed December 19,
2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration.

DOCTRINE:

Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14,


Section 6.

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is
served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the
defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign).
What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the
defendant, not the locus of service.

**Motion to set aside the order of default

Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "the remedy
against an order of default is a motion to set it aside on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence." However, it is not only the motion to lift order of
default which a defendant must file. The motion to lift order of default must "be
appended an affidavit showing the invoked ground, and another, denominated affidavit
of merit, setting forth facts constituting the party's meritorious defense or defenses."
The need for an affidavit of merit is consistent with Rule 8, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which requires that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be statedwith particularity."

CARSON VS RED RIBBON SECURITY (2017)

DOCTRINE:

In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.
However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service
and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not
have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted
service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of
personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the
office or regular place of business of the defendant.

**Reiterated Manotoc vs CA ruling

18.) Pacana – Contreras vs Rovila


G.r no. 168979 December 2, 2013

Satement of the Facts:

Petitioner:
Petitioner filed the case against Rovila Inorporation, claiming that their family has
long been known in the community to be engaged in the water supply business.
Petitioners alleged that Lilia their former employees claimed ownership over the
petitioners family business through a corporation named Rovila Water Supply Inc.,
which respondent surreptitiously formed to take over and illegally usurp the family
business registered name.
The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was
authorize by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and Special Power of Attorney.

Respondent:
The respondent filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over an intra – corporate controversy but the RTC denied such motion.

September 26, 2000


Lourdes Died.
October 2, 2000
The petitioners amended their complaint with leave of court to reflect this
development, but the caption of the amended complaint remained the same.

October 10, 2000


Luciano also died.

November 16, 2000


Respondent filed their answer.
The petitioner’s sisters also filed a motion for leave to intervene and her answer –
in – intervention was granted.

Pretrial:
Respondent manifested that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of
the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano. It seeks for the dismissal of the complaint because
the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case.

January 23, 2002


The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that
they have no valid cause of action against the respondent.

RTC:
Denied the Motion on the ground that:
1. There motion was filed out of time as it was filed only after the conclusion of the
pretrial conference.
2. The rule on substitution of parties only applies when the parties to the case die,
which is not what happened in the present case.
 The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the CA.
CA:
The court granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion on the ground that:
The petitioners are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring an
action in their own names;
 Petitioners should be first declared as heirs before they can be considered as
real party in interest. This cannot be done in the present civil case but in a
special proceeding.

Doctrine:
1.
A suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is
dismissible on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action.
In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioners are not the real
parties in interest because:
a. The petitioners should not have filed the case in their own names; and
b. The petitioners should first be declared as heirs.

But the S.C says that the present rules of court shows that the fundamentals of
the ground for dismissal based on the failure to state a cause of action has drastically
overtime.

Hence, Spouses Pacana which are not impleaded as parties-plaintiff in the case
at bar are indispensable parties as the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply, without
their inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination of the present case. Since
an indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest
because they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.

Doctrine
2.
Pursuant to section 1, rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss
based on the ground of failure to state a cause of action may be waived if
not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in their answer.

However, in the case at bar, the respondent did not allege or attached in their
answer the subject grounds they invoked in the present case, both in their motion to
dismiss and in their comment, that it was only during the pretrial stage that they verbally
manifested and invited the attention of the lower court on their grounds for dismissal.

17.) Ogawa vs Menigishi


G.R no. 193089 July 9, 2012

Statement of the facts:


Petitioner Ogawa and Respondent Menigishi were childhood friends and former
residents of Sorsogon City.

January 26, 2004


Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, breach of good human
relation and unjust enrichment before the RTC against respondent. Petitioner alleged
that respondent borrowed the following amount;
1. September, 2000 – P15,000.00
2. August 2001 – P100, 000.00
3. March 2003 – P8, 000.00
As partial payment for the properties, petitioner remitted the following amounts to
respondent:
1. October 23, 2003 – P150, 000.00
2. December 8, 2003 – P250, 772.90
The petitioner demanded for the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, but
respondent backed out from the deal.

Respondent:
The respondent denied her indebtedness to petitioner and claimed that it was the
latter who owed her P1000, 000.00 Yen, equivalent to about P500, 000.00 as evidenced
by a receipt, and that petitioner still have a balance of P100, 000.00. Respondent
therefore, sought the following:
1. Balance – P100, 000.00
2. Reimbursement of wedding expenses of petitioner –
P4, 000, 000. 00 Yen
3. Moral and exemplary and attorney’s fee
RTC:
Found respondent was indeed indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P150, 000.00 and P250, 772.90, or the total amount of P400, 772.90, and therefore the
court directed respondent to pay the total amount plus 12% interest, moral, exemplary,
attorney’s fees, docket fees and other fees from the date of the filing of the case.
CA:
Affirmed the decision of the RTC’s awards of the sums of P150, 000.00 and
P250, 772.90 in favor of petitioner, however, it gave probative value to the receipt for
P1, 000, 000.00 Yen and held it sufficient to establish petitioner’s indebtedness to
respondent. Considering the purported admission of the former’s counsel as well as
petitioner’s own failure to specifically deny the same under oath as provided for under
section 8, rule 8 of the rules of court. Consequently, it granted respondent’s
counterclaim of P1, 000, 000.00 Yen. Finally, having found both parties at fault, the CA
deleted the awards of damages and attorney’s fees.

Doctrine:
In this case, the RTC and the CA gave different interpretations on the context of
the receipt (Exhibit 1) executed by the parties and arrived at incongruent findings. On
one hand, the RTC considered it as having failed to establish any right on the part of
respondent to collect from petitioner the purported indebtedness of 1,000,000.00 Yen,
while on the other, the CA found it sufficient to confer liability.
A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or
good was delivered or received. Exhibit 1, upon which respondent relies to
support her counterclaim, sufficiently satisfies this definition.

However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both parties, a plain


reading of the contents of Exhibit 1 negates any inference as to the nature of the
transaction for which the 1,000,000 Yen was received and who between the parties is
the obligor and the obligee. What is apparent is a mere written and signed
acknowledgment that money was received. There are no terms and conditions found
therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be
considered an actionable document upon which an action or defense may be founded.

Consequently, there was no need to deny its genuineness and due


execution under oath in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:

Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is


founded upon a written instrument, copied in, or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does
not appear to be party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original is refused.

The S.C said that absent any other evidence to prove the transaction for which the
receipt was issued, the Court cannot consider Exhibit 1 as evidence of a purported loan
between petitioner and respondent which the former categorically denied. It is settled
that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a
counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the
defendant, by the quantum of evidence required by law, which in this case is
preponderance of evidence. On this score, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence provides:

Doctrine

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party


having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case,
the witness’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight
of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence."

From the evidence on record, it is clear that respondent failed to prove her counterclaim
by preponderance of evidence.

16.) MVRS Publication vs Islamic


G.R no. 135306 January 28, 2003

Statement of Facts:
A complaint was filed by Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., alleging
a libelous statement damaging to the muslims with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult
and disparage the Muslim and Islam as a religion in this country, in violation of law,
public policy, good morals and human relations.

The contention of MVRS Publication Inc., is that the article did not mention
respondents as the object of the article, and that the article was merely an expression of
belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,
prejudice or injury to Muslims not only in the country but the whole Muslims around the
world.

June 30, 1995


The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to
establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were
not specifically identified.

August 27, 1998


The CA reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that it was clear
from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic
faith. The libelous imputation which stated, “pigs were sacred and idolized as god by
members of the muslim religion,” undeniably applied to the plaintiff who were muslims
sharing the religious belief.

DOCTRINES:

Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which
tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in
the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation
of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to
have, of the plaintiff.

Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it
actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert


to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or
alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action
without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as
well as of the press.

There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar
article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class
allegedly disparaged. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate
and distinct in the community. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even
blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate
the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual
Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel.
Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not
have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.

DOCTRINE:

In order that a class suit may prosper section 12, rule 3 of the rules of court requires the
concurrence of three essential elements, namely: (a) whether the interest of the named
party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class;
and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of
the class.

There should be no room for apprehension on future litigations relating to the assailed
article in view of the fact that the instant suit is a class suit. In a class suit, each member
of the class for whose benefit the action is brought is a party plaintiff; the persons
represented are quasi parties or parties by representation. A suit brought in behalf of
others in a class gives the court jurisdiction of the whole subject matter, and all of the
parties, such that the judgment will be binding on all persons belonging to the class
represented. In other words, a judgment in a class action concludes upon all members
of the class, whether formally joined as parties or not. The class action has preclusive
effect against one who was not named representative of the class, as long as he was a
member of the class which was a party to the judgment.

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not
only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. But they
obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group and were
notable to demonstrate they have the same interests with the rest of Muslims.

19.

Tantuico vs. Republic of the Philippines


G.R. No. 89114

Case:
On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and
assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Civil case
for Recovery of Ill-gotten Wealth against the defendants Romualdez, Sps. Marcos and
petitioner Tantuico.
9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars alleging that the complaint
is too general and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal
basis of the case against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground
that the particulars sought are evidentiary in nature.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied. Hence, petitioner filed the
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Motion for Bill of Particulars?
Ruling:
Petition is granted. A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. It shall contain in a methodical and
logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. The
purpose or function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made
against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The rules on pleading speak of two kinds of facts - ultimate facts and evidentiary facts.
Ultimate facts mean the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact
is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which directly form
the basis of the primary right and duty of the defendant.
While evidentiary fact-- those facts which are necessary for the determination of the
ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are
based.
Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of
a cause of action--1) the legal right of the plaintiff, 2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant, and 3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the
complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed through
a motion. Where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of
conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a
bill of particulars.
Here, his allegations pertaining to petitioner are deficient in that they merely articulate
conclusions of law and presumptions not supported by factual premises. Hence,
without the particulars prayed for, the petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his
responsive pleading and for trial.
The particulars prayed for, such as the names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, specification of property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of
other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint,
are not evidentiary in nature. Those particulars are material facts that should be clearly
averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may be informed of the claims
made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

20.Vivencio Villagracia vs. Fifth Shari'a District Court


G.R. No. 188832

Case:
February 15, 1996, Roldan Mala purchased a parcel of land located in Shariff
Kabunsuan. March 3, 1996, Roldan was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the parcel of land.

At the time of the purchase, Vivencio Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. October
30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed and found that Vivencio was already
occupying the land.
To settle his conflicting claim, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceeding. Failing
to settle, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court where he alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim and
is the registered owner of the lot covered by TCT. Respondent court took cognizance of
the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. In its decision, it ruled that
Roldan is the registered owner. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property and pay
moderate damages.

January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment arguing that Shari’a
District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
The court denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim

Ruling:

No. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide
Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real
actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil
courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions is applicable solely when
both parties are Muslims.

Here, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that
Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that
he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim. Respondent Court should have
motu proprio dismissed the case when it became apparent that Vivencio is not a
Muslim.

That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after
respondent Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.

21.
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104818

Case:

In 1976, Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad while being married with Emerlina
dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been
working in Saudi Arabia.

Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in
1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.

In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto and separation of property. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the declaration of their marriage, which is void ab initio, is superfluous and
unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by
their union.

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary.


If in affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:

1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.

On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.

2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed.


22.G.R. No. 207376 August 6, 2014

AIDA PADILLA, Petitioner,


vs.
GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FILMAL REALTY
CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE and DEXTER L. LEE, Respondents.

Facts:

Respondents executed in favor of PNB several Deeds of Assignment 4 covering


accounts receivables in the aggregate amount of One Billion One Hundred Ninety-Five
Million Nine Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Pesos and Seventy-
two centavos (₱1,195,926,390.72). In the said instruments, respondents acknowledged
the total amount of One Billion Three Hundred Ninety FiveMillion Six Hundred Sixty-Five
Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-FourPesos and Sixty-nine centavos (₱1,395,665,564.69)
released to themby PNB in consideration of the aforesaid accounts receivables.

Respondents defaulted in the payment of their outstanding balance and delivery to PNB
of transfer certificates of title corresponding to the assigned accounts receivables, for
which PNB declared them in default under the CTS Facility Agreements. Subsequently,
respondents made partial payments and made proposals for paying in full its obligation
to PNB as shown in the exchange of correspondence between respondents and PNB.

PNB made a formal and final demand upon respondents to pay/settle the total amount
of ₱974,377,159.10 representing their outstanding obligation. In the course of credit
monitoring and verification, PNB claimed it discovered 231 out of 240 Contracts to Sell
to have either inexistent addresses of buyers or the names of the buyers are non-
existent or both.

Thereafter, PNB instituted Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV (Philippine National


Bank v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation, Filmal Realty Corporation, Delfin
S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee) for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment.

The Pasay City RTC issued an Order7 granting PNB’s application for issuance of
preliminary attachment after finding that defendants Globe Asiatique and Filmal
"through the active participation or connivance/conspiracy of defendants Delfin and
Dexter Lee from the revealing evidence presented by plaintiff are guilty of fraud in
contracting their outstanding loan applications to plaintiff Philippine National Bank
(PNB)." The writ of preliminary attachment was accordingly issued after PNB complied
with the posting of attachment bond as ordered by the court.

Defendants filed their Answer with Counterclaim with motion to dismiss,arguing that
PNB has no cause of action against them as there is nothing in the CTS Facility
Agreements that suggest they are personally liable or serve as guarantors for Globe
Asiatique and Filmal, and that they were just sued as signatories of the CTS Facility
Agreements. They likewise filed a motion to discharge preliminary attachment.

Defendants filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying PNB’s allegationsof fraud and
misrepresentation particularly after PNB had accepted payments from the corporations.
In their motion to discharge preliminary attachment, Globe Asiatique and Filmal
asserted that the allegations of fraud in the complaint are without basis and no proof
was presented by plaintiff on the existence of preconceived fraud and lack of intention
to pay their obligations, citing their timely payments made to PNB.

The RTC denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, motions to discharge preliminary


attachment and to expunge or suspend proceedings, as well as PNB’s motion to
expunge.

In succession, the parties in Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV filed the following
motions:

1) Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order;

2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial Conference;

3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment;

4) Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Amended Answer with


Compulsory Counterclaim;

5) Defendants’ Omnibus Motion (a) to discharge the writ of attachment on the


ground of newly discovered evidence; (b) set preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses pleaded in the amended answer; (c) issue preliminary attachment
against plaintiff on account of fraud in incurring the obligation as alleged in the
amended answer; and (d) render partial summary judgment on the compulsory
counterclaim;

6) Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, with Motion to Continue


with the Proceedings Involving Defendants’ Omnibus Motion;

7) Defendants’ Motion to Set for Hearing their earlier motion to discharge the writ
of attachment; and

8) Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge defendants’ Reply (on defendants’ motion to set


hearing).

Meanwhile, and before the Pasay City RTC could act upon the foregoing motions,
defendants Globe Asiatique filed a complaint for Damages in the RTC, the RTC issued
an Order resolving the pending motions, as follows:
1. The motion for reconsideration of the Order is denied insofar as the prayer to
reconsider denial of the motion to dismiss. However, the prayer to expunge the
Manifestation filed is granted thus, the Manifestation is expunged.

2. The motion for leave and to admit amended answer is denied. The motion for
reconsideration of the Order is likewise denied. The other prayers in the omnibus
motion to set preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses in the amended answer,
issuance of preliminary attachment based thereon and for partial summary judgment on
the compulsory counterclaims in the amended answer are denied. Plaintiff’s motion to
expunge defendants’ reply is likewise denied.

3. Hearing on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and hearing on defendants’


motion to discharge the writ of preliminary attachmentis were set.

4. Action on plaintiff’s motion to set the case for pre-trial is deferred until after resolution
of the motion for summary judgment.

In their Complaint against Judge Pedro De Leon Gutierrez and Aida Padilla (both sued
in their personal capacity), respondents claimed that Globe Asiatique and Filmal are
well-known and successful real estate developers whose projects were "being
continuously supported by various banks and other financial institutions prior to the
malicious and devastating unfounded civil action" filed by AidaPadilla (petitioner) which
wrought havoc to their businesses and lives. As to the CTS Facility Agreements with
PNB, respondents alleged that these were already novated by the parties who agreed
upon a term loan starting May 31, 2010 and to expire on April 30, 2012. But despite her
knowledge of such novation and that the obligation was not yet due and demandable,
petitioner with malice and evident bad faith still executed a "perjured" Affidavit in support
of the application for writ of preliminary attachment before the Pasay City RTC.
Respondents likewise sought to hold Judge Gutierrez personally liable for issuing the
writ of preliminary attachment in favor of PNB notwithstanding that the obligation subject
of PNB’s complaint was sufficiently secured by the value of realproperties sold to it by
virtue of the CTS Facility Agreements and deeds ofassignment of accounts receivables.

Respondents thus prayed for a judgment ordering petitioner and Judge Gutierrez to pay
moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorney’s fees and cost of
suit.

Judge Gutierrez moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the following grounds:
(1) respondents haveno cause of action against him; and (2) the Pasig City court has no
jurisdiction over the case and his person, movant being of co-equal and concurrent
jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed her Answer With Compulsory Counterclaims, praying for the dismissal of
respondents’ complaint.
Petitioner filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, contending that
respondents are parroting the very same arguments raised and relying on the same
evidence.

Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition, arguing that there is nothing in their


complaint that would slightly suggest they are asking the RTC to issue any injunction or
otherwise issue an order setting aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued, and
neither did they ask for a ruling on whether said writ is illegal or whether Judge
Gutierrez committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC issued an Order dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Counterclaims for Pre-Trial Conference.

The RTC denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration dismissing their complaint.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal under Section 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC issued the first questioned Order.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the second assailed
Order.

The Court remains unpersuaded of the propriety of proceeding to hear defendant


Padilla’s counterclaims.

Once more, under the principle of juridical stability, the Court is constrained to refuse to
hear defendant Padilla’s counterclaims. Verily, this Court cannot allow itself to interfere
– either directly, as desired by plaintiff, or indirectly, as defendant Padilla would have it –
with the acts of a co-equal court.

Ruling:

There is no dispute with respect to the fact that when an appeal raises only pure
questions of law, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.

In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction
of the RTC to entertain a certioraripetition filed against the interlocutory order of the
MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct application
of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated
the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certioraripetition against the denial
by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a
question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this
Court.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an


opposing party. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and
independent cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of
the answer.

Counterclaims may be either compulsory or permissive. Section 7, Rule 6 of the 1997


Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim.– A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being


cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.

Also in the case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, the Court discussed the situation
wherein the very filing of the complaint by the plaintiff against the defendant caused the
violation of the latter’s rights. As to whether the dismissal of such a complaint should
also include the dismissal of the counterclaim, the Court acknowledged that said matter
is still debatable, viz:

Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a
complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that the cause of
action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the
converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without
a cause of action cannot survive.

Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal of the complaint
somehow eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot
survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of action
then it should stand independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint.
Now, having been directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory
counterclaim by reason of the unfounded suit may prosper even if the maincomplaint
had been dismissed, we rule in the affirmative.

It bears to emphasize that petitioner’s counterclaim against respondent is for damages


and attorney’s fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent’s Complaint
against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already incurred
damages and litigation expenses such as attorney’s fees since it was forced to engage
legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons
upon it. Hence, the cause of action of petitioner’s counterclaim is not eliminated by the
mere dismissal of respondent’s complaint.

If indeed the Court dismisses petitioner’s counterclaim solely on the basis of the
dismissal of respondent’s Complaint, then what remedy is left for the petitioner? It
can be said that he can still file a separate action to recover the damages and
attorney’s fees based on the unfounded suit for he cannot be barred from doing
so since he did file the compulsory counterclaim in the present action, only that it
was dismissed when respondent’s Complaint was dismissed. However, this
reasoning is highly flawed and irrational considering that petitioner, already
burdened by the damages and attorney’s fees itmay have incurred in the present
case, must again incur more damages and attorney’s fees in pursuing a separate
action, when, in the first place, it should not have been involved in any case at all.

Since petitioner’s counterclaim iscompulsory in nature and its cause of action survives
that of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint, then it should be resolved based on its
own merits and evidentiary support.

In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have allowed petitioner’s
counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents’ complaint, the
same being compulsory in nature and with its cause not eliminated by such dismissal.It
bears stressing that petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig City RTC) even
while the dispute between PNB and respondents was still being litigated, and she
already incurred expenses defending herself, having beensued by respondents in her
personal capacity. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and
misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the application for writ of
attachment before the Pasay City RTC) – with hints at possible criminal prosecution
apart from that criminal complaint already lodged in the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office.
The Pasig City RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims upon the same
ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e.,lack of jurisdiction in strictobservance of the
policy against interference with the proceedings of a co-equal court.

With all due respect, the Honorable Court certainly has no such power over the Pasay
Court which is a co-equal court. While the power to determine whether or not a
judgment or order is unjust is a judicial function, the hierarchy of courts should be
respected:

"To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgment or order
is unjust – or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge’s
authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or
maliciously delayed the disposition of a case – is an essentially judicial function,
lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and
ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch,
nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or
decision – whether final and executory or not – and pronounce it erroneous soas
to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."

23.G.R. No. 189532 June 11, 2014

VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., Petitioners,


vs.
SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner H.S. Equities, Ltd., (HSE) is a foreign corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It is represented in this action by petitioner
Virginia S. Dio (Dio).

Respondent Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBME) is a domestic corporation,


duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws and is represented in this action
by its Chief Executive Officer, respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond).

SBME decided to expand its business by operating a beach resort inside the property
administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). For the business venture
to take off, SBME needed to solicit investors who are willing to infuse funds for the
construction and operation of the beach resort project. HSE (formerly known as
Westdale Assets Limited) thru its authorized director, Dio, agreed to invest the amount
of US$2,500,000.00. After HSE initially paid US$200,000.00 for its subscription, it
refused to further lay out money for the expansion project of the SBME due to the
alleged mismanagement in the handling of corporate funds.

Consequently, SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute before the RTC against


petitioners HSE and Dio. Before petitioners could file their answer to the complaint,
respondents impleaded its Corporate Secretary as additional defendant. In their
Amended Complaint SBME essentially alleged that HSE unjustly refused to pay the
balance of its unpaid subscription effectively jeopardizing the company’s expansion
project.

Petitioners maintained in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim6 that it would be


highly preposterous for them to dissuade investors and banks from putting in money to
SBME considering that HSE and Dio are stakeholders of the company with substantial
investments therein. In turn, petitioners countered that their reputation and good name
in the business community were tarnished as a result of the filing of the instant
complaint, and thus prayed that they be indemnified in the amount of US$2,000,000.00
as moral damages. Constrained to litigate to protect their rights, petitioners asked that
they be indemnified in the amount of₱1,000,000.00 in litigation expenses. Petitioners
likewise sought to recover their investment of US$1,500,000.00 since they were
purportedly inveigled by Desmond into putting in money to SBME under the pretext that
they will be accorded with minority protection rights.

After petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the RTC, instead of
setting the case for pre-trial, issued an Order motu proprio dismissing the case. The
dismissal was grounded on the defective certificate of non-forum shopping which was
signed by Desmond without specific authority from the Board of Directors of SBME.

Respondents moved that the case be reinstated and further proceedings thereon be
conducted. A copy of such authority was attached by respondents to their Motion for
Reconsideration.

For lack of merit, RTC denied respondents’ motion and affirmed the dismissal. In
refusing to reinstate respondents’ complaint, the court a quo ruled that the belated
submission of a board resolution evidencing Desmond’s authority to bind the
corporation did not cure the initial defect in the complaint and declared that strict
compliance with procedural rules is enjoined for the orderly administration of justice.

Aggrieved by the lower court’s refusal to reinstate their complaint, respondents elevated
the matter before the Court of Appeals assailing the propriety orders via Petition for
Review.

For failure of the respondents to file their appellants’ brief, the appellate court
proceeded to dismiss and considered the case closed and terminated in its Resolution.

After respondents failed to seasonably move for the reconsideration of the


aforementioned Resolution, the dismissal became final and executory.

The procedural incidents before the appellate court having been resolved with finality,
petitioners went back to the RTC to file a motion to set their counterclaims for
hearing which was opposed by the respondents on the ground that the filing of the
compulsory counterclaims was not accompanied by payment of the required docket
fees precluding the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

Acting on the motions filed by the opposing parties, the RTC granted the motion of the
respondents, thereby directing the dismissal of petitioners’ counterclaims but not on the
ground of non-payment of docket fees. In disallowing petitioners’ counterclaims to
proceed independently of respondents’ complaint, the lower court pointed out that in
view of the dismissal of the main case, which has already been affirmed with finality by
the appellate court, it has already lost its jurisdiction to act on petitioners’ counterclaim,
the compulsory counterclaim being merely ancillary to the principal controversy.

Ruling:

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, as


a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. A regard for judicial
hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it
admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions. In fact, Rule 41,
Section 2(c) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a decision or order of the RTC
may as it was done in the instant case, be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions
of law.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the whole situation. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

The dismissal of the complaint resulted from respondents’ failure to append to the
complaint a copy of the board resolution authorizing Desmond to sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping on behalf of SBME. The subsequent dismissal of the counterclaim,
in turn, erroneously proceeded from the ratio that since the main action has already
been dismissed with finality by the appellate court, the lower court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant any relief under the counterclaim.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is
based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional
flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from
dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing
the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is
justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from
peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

In all intents and purposes, such proposition runs counter to the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim in that it cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the
original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it
arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the complaint. It follows that if the court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same, then
the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must
likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under
the counterclaim.

The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court." This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the
proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.

Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to
entertain the main action of the case, as when it dismisses the same, then the
compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be
similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief under the
counterclaim.

As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal
of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim,
and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that
such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under
any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the
jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face,
including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main
action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim
independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own,
raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own
merits and evidentiary support.
24.G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991

JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,


vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO
DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Facts:

May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue?
This is the issue confronting the Court in the case at bar.

Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint against
private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of
sale involving a parcel of riceland the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for
private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's
demand.

Before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC
Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with
respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, affirmed the order of dismissal of his
complaint.

In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls
an equally erroneous finding of the trial court that the venue was improperly laid when
the defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor
waived the venue.

Ruling:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondet trial court on the
ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.

It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not
between the court and the

subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue
deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the
appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in
inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and
allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or
in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss,
the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to
the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

 Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural
short-cut by dismissing motu propriothe complaint on the ground of improper
venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court to take
its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of
cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require
that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not
only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.

25.GR No. 191388, Mar 09, 2011


ASIA UNITED BANK v. GOODLAND COMPANY

Facts

Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of land located in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 321672[5] and
321673[6] in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured the
obligation amounting to P250 million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI), doing
business as Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. The REM was duly registered on March 8,
2001 in the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.[7]
Goodland then filed a Complaint to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna for
the annulment of the REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in
contravention of the parties' verbal agreement.

While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its
obligation to AUB, prompting the latter to exercise its right under the REM to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.

Before AUB could consolidate its title, Goodland filed to the RTC of Biñan, Laguna,
against AUB and its officers. This Complaint sought to annul the foreclosure sale and to
enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of AUB. Goodland asserted the alleged falsified
nature of the REM as basis for its prayer for injunction.

A few days later, AUB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed properties and
obtained new titles, in its name from the Registry of Deeds of Calamba.

Petitioners then filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to a Temporary Restraining


Order in the Injunction Case. They brought to the trial court's attention Goodland's
forum shopping given the pendency of the Annulment Case. They argued that the two
cases both rely on the alleged falsification of the real estate mortgage as basis for the
reliefs sought.

The trial court acted favorably on petitioners' motion and dismissed the Injunction Case
with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.

AUB filed an Ex-Parte Application for Writ of Possession which was granted.

The CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which ruled in favor of Goodland and
ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case in the trial court. The CA conceded
that Goodland's Brief failed to comply with the formal requirements, which are all
grounds for the dismissal of the appeal. The CA further ruled against petitioners'
argument that the delivery of the foreclosed properties to AUB's possession has
rendered Goodland's appeal moot. It explained that the Injunction Appeal involving the
annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale can proceed independently of petitioners'
application for a writ of possession.
The CA then concluded that Goodland was not guilty of forum shopping when it initiated
the Annulment and Injunction Cases. The CA held that the reliefs sought in the two
cases were different. The CA further held that aside from the difference in reliefs
sought, the two cases were independent of each other because the facts or evidence
that supported their respective causes of action were different.

The appellate court also held that any decision in either case will not constitute res
judicata on the other. It explained that the validity of the real estate mortgage has no
"automatic bearing" on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.

Goodland filed an appeal of the dismissal to the CA, which appeal was granted. The
CA ordered on the reinstatement of the Annulment Case in the trial court

AUB then filed with this Court a Petition for Review, the Court's First Division reversed
the CA ruling and resolved the appeal in AUB's favor. The sole issue resolved by the
Court was whether Goodland committed willful and deliberate forum shopping.

Goodland counters that it did not commit forum shopping because the causes of action
for the Injunction and Annulment Cases are different. The Annulment Case is for the
annulment of REM; while the Injunction Case is for the annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, regardless of which party is successful, would not amount to res
judicata in the Injunction Case.

Issue:

Did Goodland commit forum shopping?


Decision:

Yes, Goodland committed forum shopping.

There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court.
26. 321 Phil. 938
Navao Vs. CA

GR No. 59255

Facts:

Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an action against petitioners for
collection of various sums of money based on loans obtained by the latter. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action and that plaintiffs had
no capacity to sue.

After private respondents submitted their opposition to the motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed
the case.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the order of dismissal "by
returning the records of this case for trial on the merits.

The instant petition alleges that respondent court erred: (a) in not dismissing the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction over the case which involves merely a question of law; (b) in not affirming the
order of dismissal for lack of cause of action; and, (c) in holding that private respondents have a cause of
action under the second to the sixth causes of action of the complaint.

Petitioners submit that private respondents failed to specify in their complaint a fixed period within
which petitioners should pay their obligations; that private respondents failed to make a formal demand
on petitioners to satisfy their obligations before filing the action.

Allegations Common To All Causes of Actions


That plaintiff Teresita got acquainted with defendant Olivia in the jewelry business, plaintiff Teresita sold
jewelries worth no less than P120,000.00 in no less than 20 transactions.

That defendant Olivia, on two occasions, asked for a loan from plaintiff Teresita, for the purpose of
investing the same in the purchase of jewelries, which loan were secured by personal checks of the
former; that in connection with these loans, defendant promised plaintiff a participation in an amount
equivalent to one half of the profit to be realized.

First Cause of Action

That defendant Olivia got from plaintiff Teresita, one diamond ring,
That the condition of the issuance of the check was if the ring is not returned within 15 days, the ring is
considered sold; that for the reason that the aforementioned check was not honored when deposited.

Second Cause of Action

That, plaintiff Teresita extended a loan to the herein defendant Olivia in the amount of P10,000.00,
secured by a Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank Check, PCIBANK. That this loan was extended
upon representation of defendant Olivia.

The check when deposited was dishonored; defendant Olivia should be held liable for interest at the
rate of 1% per month, from the date of issue until fully paid.

Third Cause of Action

Plaintiff extended to defendant Olivia a loan in the amount of P5,000.00, secured by PCIBANK. The check
when deposited was dishonored.

Fourth Cause of Action

Plaintiff extended to defendant Olivia a loan in the amount of P5,000.00, secured by PCIBANK. The check
when deposited was dishonored.

Fifth Cause of Action

Plaintiff extended to defendant Olivia a loan in the amount of P10,000.00, secured by PCIBANK. The
check when deposited was dishonored.

Sixth Cause of Action

Plaintiff extended to defendant Olivia a loan in the amount of P10,000.00, secured by PCIBANK. The
check when deposited was dishonored.

Seventh Cause of Action

Plaintiff Teresita suffered sleepless nights, mental torture and wounded feelings, for the reason that the
money used in said transactions do all belong to her; that this situation is further aggravated by the
malicious act of defendant Olivia, by having filed a complaint with the Manila Police, to the effect that
she (Teresita) stole the checks involved in this case; that as a consequence thereof, she was investigated
and she suffered besmirched reputation, social humiliation, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar
injuries, for which defendant Olivia should be held liable, as and by way of moral damages in the
amount of P80,000.

Eight Cause of Action

That as and by way of exemplary or corrective damages, to serve as an example or correction for the
public good, defendant Olivia should be held liable to pay to the herein plaintiff Teresita, the amount of
P10,000, as exemplary damages;

Ninth Cause of Action

Litigation fees

On the basis of the allegations under the heading Allegations Common to all Causes of Action above
stated as well as those found under the First Cause of Action to the Ninth Cause of Action.

That when these checks were deposited on their due dates they were all dishonored by the bank. As a
consequence, private respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay the amounts of the loans
granted to them plus one percent interest monthly from the dates the checks were dishonored until
fully paid.

Culled from the above, the right of private respondents to recover the amounts loaned to petitioners is
clear. The question now is whether petitioners committed an act or omission constituting a violation of
the right of private respondents.

All the loans granted to petitioners are secured by corresponding checks dated a month after each loan
was obtained. In this regard, the term security is defined as a means of ensuring the enforcement of an
obligation or of protecting some interest in property.

Petitioners failed to make good the checks on their due dates for the payment of their obligations.
Hence, private respondents filed the action with the trial court precisely to compel petitioners to pay
their due and demandable obligations.

The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of cause of action. Respondent Court of
Appeals therefore is correct in remanding the case to the trial court for the filing of an answer by
petitioners and to try the case on the merits.

Issue:

Petitioners Olivia M. Navoa and Ernesto Navoa seek reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which "modified" the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action. The appellate court remanded the case to the court a quo for private respondents to file their
responsive pleading and for trial on the merits.

Decision:

The petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dated 11 December 1980 remanding the
case to the trial court for the filing of petitioners' answer and thereafter for trial on the merits is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
27. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE v. FAR EAST BANK

GR No. 159926, Jan 20, 2014

Facts:

Bonier de Guzman the President of Pinausukan, executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioner's 517 square meter parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust
Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands).

When the unpaid obligation secured by the mortgages had ballooned to P15,129,303.67. The Bank
commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages, Regional Trial Court.
Thereafter, there was a public auction.

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the mortgages,
Pinausukan, represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman, brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action
for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only
in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukan's
consent through a board resolution.

The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing scheduled, despite having agreed
thereto. The order of dismissal attained finality.

The sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of Pinausukan.

Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and learned that Atty.
Michael Dale Villaflor , its counsel of record, had not informed it about the order of dismissal issued.

Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the order, stated
that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he
was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on the case.
Issue

Can extrinsic fraud be a basis to undo the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petitioner's action for
annulment of judgment through the assailed resolution.

Ruling

The appeals lacks merit.

1. Nature and statutory requirements for an action to annul a judgment or final order.

The remedy of annulment of judgment has been long authorized and sanctioned in the Philippines.

Deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

Finally, adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court could present his petition to the
Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not
thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside.

2. Pinausukan's petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective

A review of the dismissal by the CA readily reveals that Pinausukan's petition for annulment suffered
from procedural and substantive defects.

Supreme Court said that, such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not amount to extrinsic fraud
because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party, and did not occur outside the
trial of the case. Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the developments in the case was
Pinausukan's own responsibility. As a litigant, it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its
counsel, for it had the continuing duty to keep itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its
own interest in the litigation. It could have discharged its duty by keeping in regular touch with its
counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.
28. La Farge Cement Phil vs. Continental Cement Corp [G.R. No. 155173.
November 23, 2004]

LAFARGE CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly Lafarge Philippines, Inc.), LUZON


CONTINENTAL LAND CORPORATION, CONTINENTAL OPERATING
CORPORATION and PHILIP ROSEBERG, petitioners,
-versus-
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, GREGORY T. LIM and ANTHONY A.
MARIANO, respondents.

May defendants in civil cases implead in their counterclaims persons who


were not parties to the original complaints? This is the main question to be
answered in this controversy.

Facts:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC, seeking to nullify
the May 22, 2002 and the September 3, 2002 Orders of the RTC of QC (Branch 80) in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41103.

Briefly, the origins of the present controversy can be traced to the Letter of Intent
(LOI) executed by both parties on August 11, 1998, whereby Petitioner Lafarge Cement
Philippines, Inc. (Lafarge) -- on behalf of its affiliates and other qualified entities,
including Petitioner Luzon Continental Land Corporation (LCLC) -- agreed to purchase
the cement business of Respondent CCC. On October 21, 1998, both parties entered
into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA). At the time of the foregoing transactions,
petitioners were well aware that CCC had a case pending with the Supreme Court.

In anticipation of the liability that the High Tribunal might adjudge against CCC,
the parties, under Clause 2 (c) of the SPA, allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase
price a portion of the contract price in the amount of P117,020,846.84 -- the equivalent
of US$2,799,140. This amount was to be deposited in an interest-bearing account in the
Citibank for payment to APT, the petitioner.

However, petitioners allegedly refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT,
despite the subsequent finality of the Decision , in favor of the latter and the repeated
instructions of Respondent CCC. Fearful that nonpayment to APT would result in the
foreclosure, not just of its properties covered by the SPA with Lafarge but of several
other properties as well, CCC filed before the RTC of Quezon City , a Complaint with
Application for Preliminary Attachment against petitioners.
The Complaint prayed, among others, that petitioners be directed to pay the APT
Retained Amount referred to in Clause 2 (c) of the SPA.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it violated the
prohibition on forum-shopping.

After the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioners elevated the matter before the CA.

In the meantime, to avoid being in default and without prejudice to the outcome
of their appeal, petitioners filed their Answer and Compulsory Counterclaims ad
Cautelam before the trial court .

In their Answer, they denied the allegations in the Complaint. They prayed -- by
way of compulsory counterclaims against Respondent CCC, its majority stockholder
and president Gregory T. Lim, and its corporate secretary Anthony A. Mariano -- for the
sums of (a) P2,700,000 each as actual damages, (b) P100,000,000 each as exemplary
damages, (c) P100,000,000 each as moral damages, and (d) P5,000,000 each as
attorneys fees plus costs of suit.

Petitioners alleged that CCC, through Lim and Mariano, had filed the baseless
Complaint in Civil Case and procured the Writ of Attachment in bad faith. Relying on
this Courts pronouncement in Sapugay v. CA petitioners prayed that both Lim and
Mariano be held jointly and solidarily liable with Respondent CCC.

On behalf of Lim and Mariano who had yet to file any responsive pleading, CCC
moved to dismiss petitioners compulsory counterclaims on grounds that essentially
constituted the very issues for resolution in the instant Petition.

RTC dismissed petitioners counterclaims. However, the RTC clarified that it was
dismissing the counterclaim insofar as it impleaded Respondents Lim and Mariano,
even if it included CCC.

Hence this Petition.

Issues

[a] Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in refusing to rule that Respondent
CCC has no personality to move to dismiss petitioners compulsory
counterclaims on Respondents Lim and Marianos behalf.

[b] Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in ruling that (i) petitioners
counterclaims against Respondents Lim and Mariano are not compulsory.

The Courts Ruling


First Issue:
Counterclaims and Joinder of Causes of Action.

Petitioners Counterclaims Compulsory

Counterclaims are defined in Section 6 of Rule 6 of the ROC as any claim


which a defending party may have against an opposing party. They are generally
allowed in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to facilitate the disposition of
the whole controversy in a single action, such that the defendants demand may
be adjudged by a counterclaim rather than by an independent suit. The only
limitations to this principle are (1) that the court should have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the counterclaim, and (2) that it could acquire jurisdiction over
third parties whose presence is essential for its adjudication.

A counterclaim may either be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive if


it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim. A permissive counterclaim is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is


necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

However, while a compulsory counterclaim may implead persons not parties to


the original complaint, the general rule -- a defendant in a compulsory counterclaim
need not file any responsive pleading, as it is deemed to have adopted the allegations
in the complaint as its answer -- does not apply.

The filing of a responsive pleading is deemed a voluntary submission to the


jurisdiction of the court; a new party impleaded by the plaintiff in a compulsory
counterclaim cannot be considered to have automatically and unknowingly submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. A contrary ruling would result in mischievous consequences
whereby a party may be indiscriminately impleaded as a defendant in a compulsory
counterclaim; and judgment rendered against it without its knowledge, much less
participation in the proceedings, in blatant disregard of rudimentary due process
requirements.

Rules on Permissive Joinder of Causes of Action or Parties Not Applicable

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action.A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on
joinder of parties; x xx
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom
any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series
of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest.

The foregoing procedural rules are founded on practicality and convenience.


They are meant to discourage duplicity and multiplicity of suits. This objective is
negated by insisting -- as the court a quo has done -- that the compulsory counterclaim
for damages be dismissed, only to have it possibly re-filed in a separate proceeding.
More important, as we have stated earlier, Respondents Lim and Mariano are real
parties in interest to the compulsory counterclaim; it is imperative that they be joined
therein. Section 7 of Rule 3 provides:

Second Issue:
CCCs Personality to Move to Dismiss the Compulsory Counterclaims

A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail itself of all defenses
which are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to
him, or pertain to his own share. With respect to those which personally belong to
the others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for
which the latter are responsible.

The act of Respondent CCC as a solidary debtor -- that of filing a motion to


dismiss the counterclaim on grounds that pertain only to its individual co-debtors -- is
therefore allowed.

In summary:

1. The counterclaims against Respondents CCC, Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A.


Mariano are compulsory.

2. The counterclaims may properly implead Respondents Gregory T. Lim and


Anthony A. Mariano, even if both were not parties in the original Complaint.

3. Respondent CCC or any of the three solidary debtors (CCC, Lim or Mariano)
may include, in a Motion to Dismiss, defenses available to their co-defendants;
nevertheless, the same Motion cannot be deemed to have been filed on behalf
of the said co-defendants.

4. Summons must be served on Respondents Lim and Mariano before the trial
court can obtain jurisdiction over them.
29. FORTUNE CORP vs CA G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994 ( Case digest
by: Rosana Nabor)

FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner,


vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION,
respondents.

Facts:

This petition impugns and seeks the review on certiorari of the decision of
respondent CA, dated September 23, 1992, which affirmed the order of the RTC of San
Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito S. Teope, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of herein private respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation.

An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation


against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation, before the RTC of San Pablo City.
After respondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with
written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories
were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A.
Teope.

The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled for January 9, February 12


and April 22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice
to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination , notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at
San Pablo City, herein petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 24.

Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement


Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, dated March
27, 1992, alleging inter alia that : (a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one
mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the
claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason
or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would
cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent,
Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and
(e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial
on the merits.

The trial court thereafter issued on April 3, 1992 an order that the requested
deposition shall not be taken.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an original
action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
SC referred the case to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits.

CA render a decision, dismissing the petition.

Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not, absent the requisite element of "good cause" as mandated


by Section 16 of Rule 24, Rules of Court, a trial court has unbridled discretion to
forbid the taking of deposition upon oral examination as authorized under Rule
24, Section 15, Rules of Court.

Held:

Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good
cause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter
of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason — one that affords a legal
excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as
there is no hard and fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by
the term "for good cause shown."

We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere fact
that the court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not
justify the denial of the right to take deposition.

In the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to


annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting
aside of a notice to take deposition.

Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or


oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with:
(a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined;
(b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and
(d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

The fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City, whereas the
proposed deponent lives in Manila, is not sufficient to establish private
respondent's theory that the requested deposition was intended to annoy and
harass the proposed deponent.

Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid


objection to the taking of his deposition. No doubt, private respondent and its
representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties
when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the
deposition-discovery process. The mere fact that an officer of private respondent
would be required to attend the examination and thereby absent himself from
some of his usual business affairs during the taking of the deposition is utterly
insufficient to justify the court in ruling that he is being annoyed, embarrassed or
oppressed, within the meaning of this language. Something far beyond this is
required in this connection to grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has
signified its willingness to select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the
deposition in order to accommodate the proposed deponent.

30) LIANA’S SUPERMARKET vs NLRC [G.R. No. 111014. May 31, 1996]
(Case digest by: Rosana Nabor)

LIANAS SUPERMARKET,petitioner,
-Versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
respondents.

Facts:
LIANAs SUPERMARKET, is a departmentalized self-service retail market with
business outlets in Sucat, Paraaque, and Pasig City.

Sometime in 1980, 1981 and 1982 it employed as sales ladies, cooks, packers,
cashiers, electricians, warehousemen, etc., members of private respondent National
Labor Union.

However in the course of their employment they were allegedly underpaid and
required, among others, to work more than eight (8) hours a day without overtime pay
and deprived of legal holiday pay and monthly emergency allowance.

Starting late 1982 and early 1983 they aired their grievances to petitioner through
Peter Sy, its General Manager, and Rosa Sy, its Consultant, but were only scolded and
threatened with outright dismissal.

Consequently, they formed a labor union and affiliated it with respondent


National Labor Union. Thereafter they demanded from petitioner recognition and
compliance with existing labor laws.

On 30 April 1983 petitioner entered into a three-year contract with Warner Laputt,
owner of BAVSPIA International Services, to supply petitioner with laborers.
About November and December 1984 Rosa Sy met with the employees
individually and told them to quit their membership with the union under pain of being
suspended, dismissed or criminally prosecuted. When they refused, many were
dismissed without any charges and others were given memorandum on concocted
offenses and violations.

On 24 March 1984 respondent Union on behalf of its members filed a complaint


against petitioner and/or Peter Sy, Rosa Sy, BAVSPIA and Warner Laputt before the
Labor Arbiter for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, monthly
emergency allowance, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month
pay.

On 24 May 1984 the complaint was amended since respondent Union


manifested through its authorized representative that it was intended as a class suit.

On 28 August 1984 another case was filed, with Elorde Padilla, Jr., et al., as
complainants.

On 22 October 1984 a third case was filed, with Carmelita Reyes, Elizabeth
Mahanlud, Danny Sida, Omar Napiri and Edgar Mahusay as individual complainants.

On 12 December 1984 still another case was filed, with Gloria Estoque and
Estrellita Bansig as individual complainants.

Subsequently the four (4) cases were consolidated. Respondent National Labor
Union submitted two (2) lists of one hundred thirty-six (136) workers, seventy-three (73)
assigned at Sucat and sixty-three (63) at Pasig City. There were eighty-five (85) original
complainants in the lists. However sixteen (16) complainants later filed motions to
withdraw with prejudice and five (5) were found to be non-employees of petitioner. On
27 January 1987 three (3) other complainants settled with petitioner and moved to
dismiss their complaints. Thus, a total of twenty-four (24) complainants were dropped
from the lists thereby reducing the number to sixty-one (61).

But twenty-seven (27) more employees submitted their sworn statements


thus increasing again the number of complainants to eighty-eight (88).

On 6 February 1987, after the consolidated cases were submitted for decision,
petitioner filed what was purportedly a compromise agreement between itself and the
local chapter of respondent Union. It appeared to have been signed by representatives
of petitioner and the President, Vice President and another officer of the local chapter of
respondent Union with a prayer that the consolidated cases be dismissed.

On 28 February 1989 the Labor Arbiter held ordered petitioner to reinstate all the
complainants and to pay them backwages and all benefits reckoned from the date of
their respective dismissals until actual reinstatement but not to exceed three (3) years,
and if reinstatement was no longer feasible the complainants should be granted
separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service, a fraction
of at least six (6) months to be considered as one (1) whole year.1

On 30 June 1993 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission


affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the case filed is a class suit or representative suit.

Held:

According to petitioner, these cases do not fall under the term class suit as
defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court because the parties are not so
numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.

We disagree with petitioner. This is a representative suit as distinguished from


class suit defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court -Sec. 12. Class suit.

When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general


interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all. But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it
are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests concerned are
fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection
of his individual interest.

Sec. 3.Representatives as parties.- A trustee of an express trust, a guardian,


executor or administrator, or a party authorized by statute , may sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended;
but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be
made a party x xx.

A representative suit is akin to a class suit in the limited sense that the
phrases found in Sec. 12 of Rule 3, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all, and the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and
representative, are similar to the phrase may sue or be sued without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended found in Sec. 3 of the
same Rule. In other words, both suits are always filed in behalf of another or
others.

That is why the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably.

31.DAVID REYES vs. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER,
INC.
Facts:
Reyes, as the seller and Lim as the buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land
for P18 million, on which Harrison Lumber is also occupying as a lessee. Reyes gave
Lim P10 million as down payment and said he is willing to pay the balance. Lim learned
that Reyes had already sold the property to Line One Foods Corporation. Lim, in his
amended answer, prayed for the cancellation of the contract to sell and asked for the
issuance of preliminary attachment against Reyes. He also requested that Reyes be
ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the RTC of
Paranaque. The trial court granted this motion. Reyes filed a motion to set aside the
order but was denied. The trial court also denied his motion for reconsideration. Reyes
the filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari but it was dismissed for lack
of merit. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Reyes points out that deposit is
not among the provisional remedies enumerated in the 1997 Civil Procedure. He said
that the enumeration in the Rules is exclusive and that Rules 57 to 61 does not apply in
this case. Reyes also argues that a court cannot apply equity and require deposit if the
provisional remedies does not include deposit.
Ruling: The SC ruled that this is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the
Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the
courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
This calls for the application of equity which fills the open spaces in the law. The
trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may validly order the deposit of the
P10 million in court to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the
inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary
forms of ordinary law are inadequate. Moreover, there is no plausible or justifiable
reason for Reyes to object of the P10 million down payment in court because the
contract to sell can no longer be enforced because Reyes himself subsequently sold the
Property to Line One. Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite,
money paid by a buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because
he has subsequently sold the same property to another buyer. By seeking
rescission, a seller necessarily offers to return what he has received from the
buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it equitable, to
prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the money in judicial
deposit.

32.BULAWAN vs. AQUENDE


FACTS:
On March 1, 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and
damages against Lourdes Yap and the Register of Deeds, claiming that she is the
owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by TCT No. 13733, having bought the
property from brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco, who claimed to have inherited
the property from Yap Chin Cun. Lourdes Yap clarified that she owns the Lot No. 1634-
A of Psd-187165, which the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No. 1634. Lourdes
Yap mentioned that the trial court already declared Psd-153847 as simulated by the
Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No.1634-B was void. The RTC declared
Yap Chin Cun as the rightful owner and the stated Lot was sold to Aquende family. The
trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. Lourdes Yap appealed to the CA but was
dismissed. The decision of the trial court became final and executory and the trial court
issued a writ of execution. The Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trial courts
writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No. 40067 so that a
memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title. Aquende wrote a letter to the
Register of Deeds claiming that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property
having received no summons or notice thereof, nor he was aware of any adverse claim
as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.Aquende filed a Notice of
Appearance with Third Party Motion and prayed for the partial annulment of the trial
courts decision. He also filed a Supplemental Motion claiming that he was not a party in
the case and since the action was in per sonam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the
case are bound by the decision but was denied since the CA already affirmed the
decision. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due process and
claimed there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan failed to to implead him despite her
knowledge of the existing titile in his name and thus prevented him from participating in
the proceedings and protecting his title. He also added that he is an indispensable party
and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not
impleaded as a party in the case. The CA ruled in favor of Aquende.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Aquende is an indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action. It is one whose interest will be
affected by the courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either
as plaintiffs or as defendants. During the proceedings before the trial court, the
answers of Yap and the Register of Deeds should have prompted the trial court to
inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded.
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the
decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which
he is a stranger.
33.ADA vs. BAYLON
Facts:
This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Baylon, who
were survived by their legitimate children namely, Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila,
Ramon, and Lilia Ada(petitioner). Dolores died and was survived by her daughter,
herein petitioner Luz Adanza. Ramon died and was survived by herein respondent
Florante Baylon, as well as Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children,
namely, Ramon Jr., and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby,
all surnamed Baylon. Petitoners filed with the RTC complaint for partition, accounting,
and damages against respondent Florante, Rita, and Panfila alleging that spouses
Baylon owned 43 parcels of land. They claimed that Rita took possession of the land
appropriated the income derived therefrom. Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted, in their
answer, that the co-owned and the properties in question. On July 2000, Rita died.
Petitioners learned of the donation made by Rita in favor of Florante. They filed for a
Supplemental Pleading asking the court to rescind the Deed of Donation. The RTC
rendered a decision, finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition of
the estate of the spouses Baylon. It also rescinded the donation made. They appealed
to the CA, which set aside the decision and remanded the cases to determine
ownership of the lots.
RULING: The court deems it proper to address certain procedural matters that need to
be threshed out. This case involves two separate and independent actions- partition and
rescission. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action
is meant uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two
or more civil causes of action, each of would be made the basis of a separate
suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in
one declaration, complaint or petition. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits where
the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action
a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between
parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation
at minimum cost. While parties to an action may assert in one pleading as many
causes of action as they may have against the opposing party, such joinder is
subject to a condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil
actions governed by special rules. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action.
The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the
rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. The action for partition is
a special action under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, while an action for rescission is an
ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedures. The joinder of
these is prohibited to avoid confusion in determining what rules should govern.
Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. The court has the
power to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded
with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder of
action, then there exist no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the
erroneously joined causes of action.
The CA ruled that an action of rescission cannot be lumped up with the action for
partition through a mere supplemental pleading. The SC does not agree. Section 6, of
the Rule 10 of the Rules of Courts states that, upon motion of a party the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms are just, permit him to severe
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or event which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The
purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which
will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence,
any supplemental facts which would further develop the original right of action,
or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even
though themselves constitute right of action. Thus a supplemental pleading may
properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after
the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said
supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
34.) G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN vs STANDARD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE
Statement of the case:
Herein respondent filed an incident before the Talavera Police Station against
Pantranco North Express, Inc. stating that a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North
Express, Inc., overtook the jeepney that respondent was driving at that time. In so
doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard, the insurer of the
jeepney, paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from
petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted
respondents to file with the RTC of Manila, a complaint for sum of money.
Petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.
Doctrine: Test of Jurisdiction
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common
to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the
provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
The provision on joinder of causes of action presupposes that the different causes
of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether
respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of Rule 2
of the Revised Rules of Court. This paragraph embodies the totality rule as exemplified
by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions.
As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of
the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims.
Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale
is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand,
exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the instant case.

35.) G.R. No. 173399 February 21, 2017


CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK
Statement of the case:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure now before us was filed by the Central Bank Board of Liquidators
(CB-BOL). It seeks to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Orders of the RTC Makati which had admitted the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint filed by respondent Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino, or respondent). The CB-BOL alleges that by
admitting the complaint, the RTC erroneously included the BSP and its MB as
new parties to the consolidated civil cases and raised new causes of action not
alleged in the original Complaint.
On 14 February 1963, the MB of the then CB issued MB Resolution No. 223 allowing
respondent Banco Filipino to operate as a savings bank. Respondent began formal
operations on 9 July 1964.
However, on 27 July 1984, the CB issued MB Resolution No. 955 placing Banco Filipino
under conservatorship. Respondent bank filed with the RTC Makati a Complaint against
the CB for the annulment of such resolution.
Thereafter, on 25 January 1985, the CB issued MB Resolution No. 75 ordering the
closure of Banco Filipino and placing the latter under receivership. Because of its
impending closure, Banco Filipino filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus on 28 February 1985, seeking the annulment of MB
Resolution No. 75 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
Resolution.
On 22 March 1985, the CB issued another Resolution placing Banco Filipino under
liquidation. Respondent then filed another Complaint with the RTC Makati to question
the propriety of the liquidation.
Subsequently, during the pendency of the three consolidated cases, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act of 1993, took effect which abolished the CB and,
in its stead, the BSP was created.
More than 10 years after, Banco Filipino again filed a Motion to Admit Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil cases before the RTC to
include the BSP and its MB - "the purported successor-in-interest of the old CB" - as
additional defendants based on the latter's alleged acts or omissions.
The CA contended that with the transfer of assets from the CB to the BSP during the
pendency of the subject civil cases, the latter now became a transferee pendente
lite. Therefore, there were no new parties impleaded in the civil cases when the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint was admitted by the trial court.

Doctrine:Amendment and Supplement of Pleadings


The prevailing rule on the amendment of pleadings is one of liberality, 50 with the end of
obtaining substantial justice for the parties. However, the option of a party-litigant to
amend a pleading is not without limitation. If the purpose is to set up a cause of action
not existing at the time of the filing of the complaint, amendment is not allowed. If no
right existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit cannot be maintained,
even if the right of action may have accrued thereafter.
The option of a party-litigant to supplement a pleading is not without limitation. A
supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading.
Its usual function is to set up new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the kind of relief
sought with respect to the same subject matter as that of the original complaint
If the Court admits the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint under these
circumstances, there will be no end to the process of amending the Complaint. What
indeed would prevent respondent from seeking further amendments by alleging acts
that may be committed in the future?
Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be joined in a complaint involving
multiple parties, (1) the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and (2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all the parties.
In the instant case, Banco Filipino is seeking to join the BSP and its MB as parties to the
complaint. However, they have different legal personalities from those of the defunct CB
and its MB: firstly, because the CB was abolished by R.A. 7653, and the BSP created in
its stead; and secondly, because the members of each MB are natural persons. These
factors make the BSP and its MB different from the CB and its MB. Since there are
multiple parties involved, the two requirements mentioned in the previous paragraph
must be present before the causes of action and parties can be joined. Neither of the
two requirements for the joinder of causes of action and parties was met.

36.) G.R. No. 153867. February 17, 2005


WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, CHI TIM CORDOVA AND ROBERT TIONG
KING YOUNG vs EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION
Statement of the Case:
The case originated from a Complaint for Sum of Money filed on October 21, 1996,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, by respondent Equitable Banking Corporation
against the petitioners, Wood Technology Corporation (WTC), Chi Tim Cordova, and
Robert Tiong King Young.
The Complaint alleged that WTC obtained from respondent a loan in the amount of
US$75,000, with 8.75% interest per annum, as evidenced by a Promissory Note by
Cordova and Young as representatives of WTC. Cordova and Young bounded
themselves as sureties of WTC for the loan. Respondent bank made a final demand on
April 19, 1996, for WTC to pay its obligation, but petitioners failed to pay.
In the other hand, petitioners claimed that the promissory note and surety agreement
were contracts of adhesion with terms on interest, penalty, charges and attorneys fees
that were excessive, unconscionable and not reflective of the parties real intent.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent bank ordering petitioners to pay $75,000.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency and to pay the stipulated interest of 8.75% per annum
to be reckoned from the date that the obligation was contracted.
The CA affirmed the RTCs judgment.
Doctrine: Distinction between a Summary Judgment and Judgment on the
Pleadings
A judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading.
In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at
all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. This is the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment,
compared to a proper case for judgment on the pleadings.
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand,
and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case
for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case
for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure
of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case a of
a summary judgment, issues apparently exist or specific denials or affirmative defenses
are in truth set out in the answerbut the issues thus arising from the pleadings are
sham, fictitious or not genuine.
Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the
affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a
full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by
petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment? A genuine issue means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.

37 . HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. vs.


JUANA GONZALES,
Facts: Dr. Mariano Favis Sr. died intestate and left several children and
grandchildren. From the first marriage he had seven children and from his
second marriage to Juana he had one child, Mariano. A deed of donation was
allegedly made by the decedent transferring certain properties to Mariano and his
children. The deed of donation was contested by the children of the first
marriage. The RTC ruled in favor of the children of the first marriage, nullifying
the donation on the ground of vitiated consent.

Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial
court’s nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in favor
of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners’
nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by herein respondents
as appellant.

The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court justified its
order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the trial court even if they
are not assigned as errors in the appeal.

Issue: whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made.. The appellate courts’ decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code,
viz:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

HELD:

The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept
within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9.
That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for
a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so
words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a
motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to
dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable
from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

38 . Chua vs Torrres
Gr no 151900

Facts: The brother of Christine Chua issued a check to Jorge Torres for
purchases made at his gas station. The check bounced and Torres sent Beltran, his
employee in his sales and collection department, to demand payment of the check from
Christine. Christine ignored the demand as she did not issue the check. Without
bothering to ascertain who had actually issued the check, Beltran instituted against
petitioner a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22).
Subsequently, a criminal information was filed against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 50. The MTC then issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner. The police officers tasked with serving the warrant looked for
her in her residence, in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila
Central University where she was enrolled as a medical student, all to the alleged
embarrassment and social humiliation of Christine.
Beltrans purported negligence amounted to either malicious prosecution or
serious defamation in prosecuting Chrisitne resulting from the issuance of a check she
herself did not draw, served cause for a claim of moral damages. On the other hand,
Torres, as employer of Beltran, was alleged to have failed to observe the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent the damage suffered by petitioner. Exemplary
damages and attorneys fees were likewise sought, thus bringing the
aggregate total of damages claimed to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), plus costs of
suit.
Beltran and Torres, however moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that Jonathan Chua, impleaded as a necessary co-plaintiff by her sister, did not sign a
certification against forum shopping. The RTC dismissed the case.
Issue: whether the absence of the signature of the person misjoined as a party-
plaintiff in either the verification page or certification against forum-shopping is
ground for the dismissal of the action.
Held: It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party in interest that a
civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of
the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as a party plaintiff in an action. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to enforced.
The subject complaint does not allege any rights of Jonathan Chua violated by
respondents, present any rights of his to be enforced, or seek in his behalf any rights to
the avails of suit. In short, Jonathan claims nothing, and for nothing, in the subject
complaint. If he alone filed the complaint, it would have been dismissed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action, instituted as it was by a person who was
not a real party in interest.

But was it proper for petitioner to have even impleaded Jonathan as a co-plaintiff
in the first place? Petitioner alleged in her complaint that Jonathan was a necessary
party, and remains consistent to that claim even before this Court. She however fails to
demonstrate how Jonathan can be considered as a necessary party, other than by
noting that he was the one who really
issued the check in controversy. Such fact, if proven, may establish the malice of
respondents in filing the criminal case against petitioner for violation of B.P. 22, but
does not create the need to require Jonathans participation as a necessary party.

Instead, the Supreme Court may ruled that the absence of the signature of the person
misjoined as a party-plaintiff in either the verification page or certification against forum-
shopping is not a ground for the dismissal of the action. The RTC erred in dismissing
the instant complaint. There is no judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view. A
misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first
place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all
the requirements expected of plaintiffs.

39. Cruz vs Cruz


Gr no 173292

Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint
against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages. Memoracion died before the case could be
terminated. Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of
the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof. The defendant Oswaldo
then moved for the dismissal of the case citing that (1) the plaintiffs
reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death,
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the
case to continue would result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing
the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case. The RTC dismissed the case,
which was affirmed by the CA.

The Issues

The issues for resolution in this case are:


1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruzs
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a
purely personal action which did not survive her death; and

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming with modification the RTC
Order dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages.

HELD:
First issue: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental. If the case affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or
petitioner.

Second issue: If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the
deceased’s counsel to inform the court of such death, and to give the names and
addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted
by his heirs in the pending action.( Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure)
40. G.R. No. 200134 August 15, 2012

ROBERTO OTERO
vs.
ROGER TAN

FACTS:

A Complaint for collection of sum of money and damages was filed by Roger Tan (Tan)
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City on July 28, 2005
against Roberto Otero (Otero). Tan alleged that on several occasions from February
2000 to May 2001, Otero purchased on credit petroleum products from his Petron outlet
in Valencia City, Bukidnon in the aggregate amount of ₱ 270,818.01. Tan further
claimed that despite several verbal demands, Otero failed to settle his obligation.

Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of the said complaint, which per the records
of the case below were served through his wife Grace R. Otero on August 31, 2005,
Otero failed to file his answer with the MTCC.

On November 18, 2005, Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Otero in default
for his failure to file his answer. Otero opposed Tan’s motion, claiming that he did not
receive a copy of the summons and a copy of Tan’s complaint. Hearing on the said
motion was set on January 25, 2006, but was later reset to March 8, 2006, Otero
manifesting that he only received the notice therefor on January 23, 2006. The hearing
on March 8, 2006 was further reset to April 26, 2006 since the presiding judge was
attending a convention. Otero failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the
MTCC issued an order declaring him in default. A copy of the said order was sent to
Otero on May 9, 2006. Tan was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

Tan adduced in evidence the testimonies of Rosemarie Doblado and Zita Sara, his
employees in his Petron outlet who attended Otero when the latter made purchases of
petroleum products now the subject of the action below. He likewise presented various
statements of account.

MTCC rendered a Decision5 directing Otero to pay Tan his outstanding obligation in the
amount of ₱ 270,818.01, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and costs in
the amounts of ₱ 15,000.00 and ₱ 3,350.00, respectively. The MTCC opined that
Otero’s failure to file an answer despite notice is a tacit admission of Tan’s claim.

Undeterred, Otero appealed the MTCC Decision dated February 14, 2007 to the RTC,
asserting that the MTCC’s disposition is factually baseless and that he was deprived of
due process.

RTC rendered a Judgment6 affirming the MTCC.

Otero then filed a petition for review with the CA asserting that both the RTC and the
MTCC erred in giving credence to the pieces of evidence presented by Tan in support
of his complaint. Otero explained that the statements of account, which Tan adduced
during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, were prepared by a certain Betache
who was not presented as a witness by Tan. Otero avers that the genuineness and due
execution of the said statements of account, being private documents, must first be
established lest the said documents be rendered inadmissible in evidence. Thus, Otero
asserts, the MTCC and the RTC should not have admitted in evidence the said
statements of account as Tan failed to establish the genuineness and due execution of
the same.

CA denied the petition and held that any defense which Otero may have against Tan’s
claim is already deemed waived due to Otero’s failure to file his answer.

Otero never denied that his wife received the summons and a copy of the complaint. He
did not question the validity of the substituted service. Consequently, he is charged with
the knowledge of Tan’s monetary claim. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that defenses and objections not pleaded are deemed waived.
Moreover, when the defendant is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant.

Issues
1. Whether Otero, having been declared in default by the MTCC, may, in the
appellate proceedings, still raise the failure of Tan to authenticate the statements
of account which he adduced in evidence.
2. Whether Tan was able to prove the material allegations of his complaint.

Ruling

1. The CA, in denying the petition for review filed by Otero, held that since he was
declared in default by the MTCC, he is already deemed to have waived whatever
defenses he has against Tan’s claim. He is, thus, already barred from raising the
alleged infirmity in the presentation of the statements of account. SC do not
agree. A defendant who fails to file an answer loses his standing in court.

Section 3, Rule 9: Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in
its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. x x x (Emphasis ours)

A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the
court in default. Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party
litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the consequence of an order of default.
A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings,
and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his
pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute
evidence or motions filed against him.

A defendant who was declared in default may nevertheless appeal from the
judgment by default, albeit on limited grounds. Nonetheless, the fact that a
defendant has lost his standing in court for having been declared in default does
not mean that he is left sans any recourse whatsoever. In Lina v. CA, et al., this
Court enumerated the remedies: a) Motion to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; b) Motion for new trial;
c) Petition for relief; d) Appeal from the judgment.

A defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
judgment by default. However, the grounds that may be raised in such an appeal
are restricted to any of the following: first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and
third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed
for.17 In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of
evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of
his evidence.
A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any other
ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since, otherwise, he would
then be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after
he was declared in default.

Here, Otero, in his appeal from the judgment by default, asserted that Tan failed
to prove the material allegations of his complaint.

While the RTC and the CA, in resolving Otero’s appeal from the default judgment
of the MTCC, were only required to examine the pieces of evidence that were
presented by Tan, the CA erred in brushing aside Otero’s arguments with respect
to the admissibility of the said statements of account on the ground that the latter
had already waived any defense or objection which he may have against Tan’s
claim.

The evidence of the plaintiff, presented in the defendant’s absence, cannot be


admitted if it is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a
position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be
considered against him.

Otherwise, it would be meaningless to request presentation of evidence every


time the other party is declared in default.

The statements of account presented by Tan were merely hearsay as the


genuineness and due execution of the same were not established.

Anent the admissibility of the statements of account presented by Tan, this Court
rules that the same should not have been admitted in evidence by the lower
tribunals.

2. In view of the inadmissibility of the statements of account presented by Tan, the


remaining question that should be settled is whether the pieces of evidence
adduced by Tan during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, excluding the
said statements of account, sufficiently prove the material allegations of his
complaint against Otero.

SC rule in the affirmative.

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered
by their opponent.26 This rule holds true especially when the latter has had no
opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the
extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so much as has been alleged
and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Tan likewise adduced in evidence the testimonies of his employees in his Petron
outlet who testified that Otero, on various occasions, indeed purchased on credit
petroleum products from the former and that he failed to pay for the same. It
bears stressing that the MTCC, the R TC and the CA all gave credence to the
said testimonial evidence presented by Tan and, accordingly, unanimously found
that Otero still has unpaid outstanding obligation in favor of Tan in the amount of
₱ 270,818.01.

Well-established is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and
will generally not be reviewed on appeal.

The petition is denied.

41. [G.R. No. 125567. June 27, 2000]

ANTONIO (ANTONINO) SAMANIEGO, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, JOHN SAMANIEGO,


ERNESTO SANTOS, MACARIO DE LA CRUZ, ANDRES PASTORIN, BENETRITO
DE LA CRUZ, JESUS BATAC and RODOLFO LAGUISMA

vs.

VIC ALVAREZ AGUILA, JOSEPHINE TAGUINOD and SECRETARY OF THE


DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS:
Petitioners are tenants in a landholding with an aggregate area of 10.4496 hectares,
more or less, in Patul (now Malvar), Santiago, Isabela. The land belongs to Salud
Aguila, whose children, Vic Alvarez Aguila and Josephine Taguinod, are private
respondents.

It appears that the land in question was identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR)-Region 2 as covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program of the
government. In 1976, Aguila, in behalf of her children, herein private respondents, filed
a petition for exemption from the coverage of P.D. No. 27. Petitioners opposed the
application on the ground that Aguilas transfer of the title to the lands to her children
was in violation of the rules and regulations of the DAR.

In its August 21, 1991 decision, the Regional Director granted the application for
exemption. On appeal to the DAR, the decision was affirmed in a decision dated
September 28, 1992. However, on motion of petitioners, the DAR reversed its ruling and
denied private respondent’s application for exemption and declared petitioners the
rightful farmer-beneficiaries of the land.

On private respondents appeal, the Office of the President set aside DAR’s order with a
modification that subject landholdings are not covered by the OLT program of the
government pursuant to P.D. No. 27.

On petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. CA held that it is
clear from the allegations in the Petition for Review that the questioned decision and
resolution were both issued by the Office of the President. As such, the Office of the
President is an indispensable party to the case. Failure to implead said Office is fatal to
the petitioners cause and, hence, should be dismissed since the joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. Unless they are impleaded, the action cannot
proceed and the omission is fatal to the plaintiffs cause.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, contending that under Administrative Circular


No. 1-95, the Office of the President need not be impleaded. However, their motion was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the Office of the President is an indispensable party in an appeal from its
decision and, therefore, must be impleaded pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

RULING:

SC holds that it is not.

First, At the time petitioners brought their case to the Court of Appeals, the procedure
governing appeals to said court from quasi-judicial agencies was embodied in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provides that the petition for review shall state
the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either
as petitioners or respondents.

Thus, it is clear that petitioner’s failure to implead the Office of the President does not
warrant the dismissal of the case as it is in accordance with this circular. It is not true
that the Office of the President is not included within the scope of this circular.

Second. The Court of Appeals held that in appeals from decisions of the Office of the
President, the latter is an indispensable party. This is error. Under Rule 7, 3 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action without that party being impleaded. Indispensable
parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.
"Interest", within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a
plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject matter
or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings
require the presence of such party on the record.

In the case at bar, even assuming that the Office of the President should have been
impleaded by petitioner, it is clear that the Office of the President is merely a pro form
party, in the same way that a respondent court is a pro forma party in special civil
actions for certiorari.

The issue in the petition before the Court of Appeals is whether a private land should be
exempted from the coverage of P.D. No 27. Whatever happens to that case and
whoever wins would not bring any prejudice or gain to the government.

The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to decide the case on the merits.

42.G.R. No. 153690 August 26, 2008

DAVID LU
vs.
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, ET. AL. & LUYM
DEVELOPMENT CORP

FACTS:
LLDC is a family corporation founded by Paterno Sr. and his brothers (the fathers of
Rosa, Silvano and David), primarily to hold real estate for the family. 8 In 1997, LLDC’s
Board of Directors authorized the issuance of its 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued
shares at par value of P100.00 per share. The Lu Ym father and sons subscribed to and
paid most of such shares. David, et al., however, claimed that the 600,000 LLDC stocks
were issued in favor of the Lu Ym father and sons for less than their real values. Hence,
the complaint9 filed on August 14, 2000, by David, Rosa Go (Rosa), Silvano Ludo
(Silvano) and CL Corporation (CL Corp.) against the Lu Ym father and sons, namely:
Paterno Sr., Paterno Jr., Victor Lu Ym (Victor), John, Kelly, and LLDC, for Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution, before the RTC of Cebu City. The
case was raffled to Branch 5 and was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-25502. In said
complaint, David, et al. asked that the issuance of said shares be nullified. 10 They
further asserted that the Lu Ym father and sons gravely abused their powers as
members of LLDC’s Board of Directors by issuing such shares, to the prejudice of
David, et al. They, therefore, asked for the dissolution of the corporation as their
ultimate remedy to obtain redress for their grievances.11 To protect the interest of the
corporation during the pendency of the case, David et al. asked that a receiver for the
corporation be appointed.

On August 25, 2000, the Lu Ym father and sons moved to dismiss the complaint for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court on the required certificate of non-forum
shopping, since only one of the four plaintiffs signed the same, without any showing that
he was authorized to sign on behalf of the other parties. They, likewise, contended that
the case was dismissible because they did not exert earnest efforts toward a
compromise.

In a Resolution dated December 4, 2000, the court denied the motion solely on the
ground that the case was exempt from the observance of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. In another Resolution15 dated March 2, 2001, the court held that the
signature of only one of the plaintiffs was a substantial compliance with the rules on the
certificate of non-forum shopping.

On February 16, 2001, the court, on motion of David, et al., placed LLDC under
receivership pendente lite. Consequently, the court appointed Atty. Edward U. Du and
Mr. Luis A Cañete as receivers.

Aggrieved, the Lu Ym father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
assailing the court’s resolutions denying their motion to dismiss and their motion for
reconsideration; and placing the corporation under receivership and appointing two
persons as receivers. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64154, but the same
was dismissed on the ground that the verification and certification against forum
shopping were signed by only two petitioners.18 They later refiled the case. This time, it
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64523.

The appellate court initially dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC when it denied the Lu Ym father and sons’ motion to dismiss and
because of the prematurity of the petition on the issue of receivership (since there was
still a motion for reconsideration pending before the RTC). However, on motion of the
Lu Ym father and sons, the court reconsidered its earlier ruling and, consequently,
reinstated the earlier petition.The Lu Yms then filed a Supplement to their petition.

On December 20, 2001, the CA granted the Lu Ym father and sons’ petition and, thus,
dismissed the complaint filed by David Lu, et al. for the parties’ (except David Lu) failure
to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. In ruling for the dismissal of the initiatory
pleading, the court applied Loquias v. Ombudsman. As a consequence of the dismissal
of the complaint, the appellate court likewise annulled the resolutions placing the
corporation under receivership and appointing the receivers. On May 28, 2002, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by David Lu, et al. Hence, the petition for
review on certiorari before this Court filed by David Lu alone.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING


THE RTC CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT IT TO PROCEED
AS TO PETITIONER DESPITE PETITIONER’S EXECUTION OF A CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING FOR THE COMPLAINT AND THE FACT THAT THE
RTC CASE INVOLVES ONLY A PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES.

RULING:

Lu Ym father and sons’ petition (in CA-G.R. SP No. 64523) before the CA should not
have been entertained because of the following fatal defects: 1) the petition questioning
the approval of the receivership was prematurely filed because of the pendency of their
motion for reconsideration before the RTC; 2) their motion and supplement were filed
without asking leave of court to do so; 3) considering that the motion and supplement
contained new allegations, there was a failure to attach a new certificate of non-forum
shopping; and 4) the motion and supplement were filed out of time. 49

SC finds the procedural issues raised by David to be of no moment. Basic is the rule
that a motion or the reconsideration of an assailed order may be filed by an aggrieved
party within the reglementary period. No motion for leave to file such motion is required
under the Rules or in any other circular of the Supreme Court. As long as the same is
filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed order, there is no reason for the
courts not to entertain it. In fact, in some exceptional cases as when substantial justice
so requires, a motion belatedly filed may still be taken cognizance of. As to the
supplemental petition filed without leave of court, suffice it to state that the CA
entertained the same, required David to comment thereon, and decided the case on the
basis thereof. Such actions of the appellate court adequately show that the
supplemental petition was admitted. Lastly, as to the lack of certificate of non-forum
shopping in the motion for reconsideration and supplement to the petition, SC reiterates
that the certificate is required only in cases of initiatory pleadings.
Lu Ym father and sons questioned the admission of the aforesaid amended complaint
before this Court, the same was done only through an Urgent Motion. Under the Rules
of Court, the proper mode to challenge such an order, which undoubtedly is
interlocutory, is through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. This
procedural defect, therefore, bars the Court from ruling on the propriety of such
admission. Urgent Motion cannot be a substitute for the remedy of a special civil action
for certiorari. Consequently, the amended complaint admitted by the RTC stands.

Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends

It is settled that courts do not entertain a moot question. An issue becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on
the issue would be of no practical use or value. This Court, therefore, abstains from
expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

Petition is DENIED for being moot and academic.

DAVID LU
v. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM,
KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No. 157381 & G.R. No. 170889

FACTS: The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for “Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution” filed on August 14, 2000 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym,
Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC.

The RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling the issuance of the shares of stock
subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than par value, and ordering the
dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC.

In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate court’s
resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the
receivership order which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the Court,
by Decision of August 26, 2008 resolved that the issue was mooted by the amendment
of the complaint and by the trial court’s decision on the merits.

The Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position


on the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case for David Lu, et al.’s failure to pay the correct docket fees, hence, all
interlocutory matters and incidents subject of the present petitions must consequently
be denied.

ISSUE:

Have the resolutions become final and immutable?

HELD:
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions.
Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained
doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be
considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final.

That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional error
cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of
“occasional error” but also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz.,
that doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s Special Third
Division August 4, 2009 Resolution.

GRANTED

43
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. HON. EMMANUEL C.
CARPIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Davao City, COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD,
HATAB ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB ABDULLAH,
ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al., represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
MR. MANUEL L. TE, Respondents GR No. 195450, February 1, 2017
Statement of the Case:

 On August 21, 2001, Abad et al., filed a complaint before the RTC for delivery of
certificate of title, damages, and attorney’s fees against DBP and Guarantee
Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME). They prayed among others the
issuance of writ of seizure while the case is pending. They claimed that the
certificate of title was unlawfully detained by the respondent. They claimed that it
was only delivered for safekeeping pursuant to loan agreement they entered with
DBP and that DBP turned over the certificate of title to GFSME because of its call
on GFSME’s guarantee on their loan.
 On August 24, 2001, the RTC issued the writ of seizure accompanied by
Plaintiffs Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal Property issued by Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC).
 On September 5, 2001, DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and
to Quash Writ of Seizure on the ground of improper venue, among others.
Abad, et al. filed their Opposition and later, their Supplemental Opposition to
which they attached the Delivery Receipt showing that the court sheriff took
possession of 228 certificates of title from GFSME.
 On September 25, 2001, the RTC granted the DBP’s omnibus motion and
dismissed the case for improper venue.
 On December 20, 2001, DBP and GFSME filed their Joint Motion to Order
Plaintiffs to Return Titles to Defendants DBP and GFSME. After Abad, et al. filed
their opposition.
 On January 27, 2003, the RTC issued an order directing Abad, et al. to return the
228 certificates of title. Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court praying, among others, for the nullification and reversal of the
January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC.
 On June 9, 2003, the court dismissed the petition.
 On September 18, 2003, DBP filed its Motion for Writ of Execution of the January
27, 2003 Order before the RTC.
 On December 16, 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of Execution.
The Sheriffs Return of Service however, indicated that Abad, et al. failed to
deliver the certificates of title.
 On February 3, 2004, Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of title by
Abad, et al., DBP filed its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety Bond,
praying for the release of the bond issued by CBIC to answer for the damages it
sustained as a result of the failure to return the 228 certificates of title.
 On May 17, 2004, the RTC denied the subject motion explaining that the
resolution of the motion was no longer part of its residual power. It pointed out
that although there was indeed an order to return the 228 certificates of title to
DBP, it was not made as a result of a trial of the case, but as a consequence of
the order of dismissal based on improper venue. Thus, DBP filed a motion for
reconsideration.
 On July 9, 2004, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus, DBP filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA.
 On July 9, 2008 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus. It noted that DBP did not move for reconsideration
of the September 25, 2001 Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC decision as
final and executory. It added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
provided that the claim for damages against the bond must be filed before trial or
before appeal was perfected or before the judgment became executory.

Issue: Whether appeal may be taken if dismissal of the case was due to improper
venue and that damages may be claimed from such action.

Decision:

The petition lacks merit.

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants;
to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow
the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the
original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or
despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for review under
Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition

In the case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to
improper venue and respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as the
same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1 (h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action
without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal
has even been filed.

Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue.
Such dismissal is one without prejudice and does not bar the refiling of the same action;
hence, it is not appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached,
the residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper venue, and
such order of dismissal could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the perfection of
an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC did not acquire
residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may rule on DBP's
application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.

#44

AURORA N. DE PEDRO vs. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION


G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
Statement of the Case:

 On July, 1998, Romasan Development Corporation filed a complaint before the


RTC Of Antipolo,City against Aurora De Pedro for nullification of free patent and
original certificate of title. The complainant allaged that it was the owner and
possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo city covered by TCT No. 236044. It also
prayed for the payment of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.
 On February 22, 1999, there was an officer’s return which note that there was a
failure to serve the sommon personally to Aurora De Pedro because according to
the messenger of Post Office of Pasig there was no person in the said given
address.
 Thus, respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by
publication.
 On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion.
 On April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998, the summons and complaint were
published in People’s Balita.
 On July 15, 1999, respondent moved to declare all the defendants default in its
complaints, including De Pedro for failure to file their answer which the RTC
granted on August 19, 1999.
 On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity
the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint,
including the free patent issued to De Pedro. The defendants were also ordered
to pay to the plaintiff the amount of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, ₱3,000.00 as
appearance fee and also ₱50,000.00 as moral damages with costs against said
private defendants.
 On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the RTC a motion
for New Trial. Alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000
decision on March 16, 2000. She also argued that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of
summons because it was not personally served to him citing the officer’s return
and the reason therein that there was no person in the given address. De Pedro
also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving
the same property, when respondent filed the complaints against her and several
others.
 On September 30, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an order denying De
Pedro’s motion for new trial. The Regional Trial Court ruled that summons was
validly served upon De Pedro through publication, in accordance with the Rules
of Court. And that the motion for new trial was filed beyond the 15-day period
within which the motion may be filed. Therefore, the Regional Trial Court decision
had become final and executor.
 De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that
the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her
motion for new trial.
 On March 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial.
 De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals
resolution dated August 24, 2006.
 On October 11, 2006, De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the January 7, 2000 judgment of the Regional Trial Court 43 on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been dispossessed
of her property without due process.
 On July 7, 2010, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying De
Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that since
petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised the case
before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a
petition for annulment of judgment.51
 On December 3, 2010, De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
 On January 13, 2011, De Pedro filed before the Supreme Court a Rule 45
petition, seeking the reversal of the July 7, 2010 Court of Appeals decision and
the December 3, 2010 Court of Appeals resolution.

Issue: Whether there was a valid personal service of summon to the defendant.

Decision:

Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative.


A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.
Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is
sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the
court to proceed with the case with authority and competence.

Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of


summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to
serve summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served
by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent
cannot be served within reasonable time. Substituted service is effected "(a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is


allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his
or her whereabouts are "unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. It may
only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after
diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.

In Domagas v. Jensen: The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the


service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation
was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.

In the case, the return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the
summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the
post office messenger stated that there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service
address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner’s
whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return that personal
service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service could no
longer be made within reasonable time.

The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the
summons personally upon petitioner is a deviation from the court’s previous rulings that
personal service is the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his
or her return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in the
case was defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be allowed
based on such defective return.

#45

SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS


REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and
ARWENIA R. ODONES, G.R. NO. 186979, AUGUST 11, 2010

Statement of the Case:

 On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia


Odones, filed a complaint before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac for Annulment of
Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes
and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes. They alleged that
they are the owners of a 940-square meter parcel of land by virtue of an
Extrajudicial of Estate and Sale but they did not cause the transfer of title to their
name and when they decided to do so, the certificate of title was cancelled and
was replaced by a new certificate of title in the name of the petitioners by virtue
of deed of absolute sale executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband
Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972. Respondents sought the cancellation of
these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of DonataLardizabal and
Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because
they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively.
 In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming ambiguity in
respondents claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal.
Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court denied the same and ordered
petitioners to file their answer to the complaint.
 In their answer, petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute
grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a
cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void, since
the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it
contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the
title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-
joinder of the other heirs of DonataLardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
respondents claim is barred by laches.
 In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and
insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They
maintained their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity
of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents anchor their
purported title.
 Petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission on certain matters
arising from the case.
 Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting
petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses, arguing that respondents failure to respond or object to the
Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section 2
of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
 Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to
be admitted were not material and relevant to the issue of the case as required
by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized that the only
attendant issue was whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon which
petitioners base their TCTs is valid.
 November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held that items on the
Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners
Answer, to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would
be redundant for respondents to make another denial. The other items in the
Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan attached to respondents
Reply. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in an
Order dated January 5, 2007.
 Petitioners elevated the incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the
impugned resolution and order.
 On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative
defenses raised by petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in
a full-blown hearing.

ISSUE: Whether there was an implied admission on matters contained on the request
for admission.
Decision:

As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners
Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer
which respondents already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise
sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to
compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied, a
redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and
thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is to
expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed
on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the


allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set
forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is
pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.

In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners


Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe
the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
There being no implied admission attributable to respondent’s failure to respond, the
argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
46.- 48. Q: Gloria was awarded a residential lot through the Dagat-Dagatn project of
Imelda Marcos. Gloria constructed a two-storey house on the property. Thereafter
Gloria leased the house to Bote. Gloria and Bote entered into an agreement in which
Bote executed a promissory note, an undertaking to pay Gloria Php 850,000 as
purchase price of the property but Bote failed to pay. Gloria then filed a complaint
against Bote for sum of money and Recovery of Possession of Real property but it was
dismissed by the RTC on the ground that Gloria failed to show that she has a rightful
claim over the property. Gloria appealed to the CA. In the CA, Gloria interposed for the
first time that she is a builder in good faith thus she is entitled to the possession of the
house. CA rendered a decision in favor of Gloria. Is the CA correct?

A: NO. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he
stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his
theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter
anew either in the same forum or on appeal.

The "theory of the case" is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as:


A comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement of principle and facts,
conceived and constructed for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree of a
court in favor of a litigant; the particular line of reasoning of either party to a suit,
the purpose being to bring together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence
and to correlate them in a way that produces in the decision maker’s mind a
definite result or conclusion favored by the advocate.

The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the
first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the
issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the
same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.

As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed. However, when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as
in this case.

The instant case does not fall under this exception. In order to refute the contention
Gloria that she is builder in good faith, it is necessary that Bote present evidence that
they acted in bad faith (BOTE vs VELOSO G.R. No. 194270 .)

Q: Norat, Adoracion, Arsenia, Antonio and Elena are the heirs of Spouses Talao. The
spouses Talao died intestate, leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana Manila. The five Talao
children divided the property among themselves through an extrajudicial settlement.
Arsenia subsequently waived her share over the property. Meanwhile, Norat filed a
complaint for partition against his siblings. All of the parties except Arsenia claimed their
respective shares in the property. The parties entered into a compromise agreement
wherein they agreed that the property will be sold and the proceeds of the sale as well
as the rentals will be divided among them. The compromise agreement was approved
by the RTC. However, Norat again moved the physical partition of the property. This
was opposed by Nestor, the representative of Adoracion on the ground that judgment
based on the compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had
the effect of res judicata. Is the contention of Nestor tenable?
A: YES. A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has
the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside
because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments
bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if
the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers
to "bar by prior judgment," which means that actions on the same claim or cause
of action cannot be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity.
The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment." This means that facts
already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim or
cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39,
Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
....
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Norat cannot file another action for partition
after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for
partition involving the same parties and property.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it
or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.
This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:
1. "The correction of clerical errors;
2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
3. void judgments; and
4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable."
Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether
judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute
a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.
It is because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement
between the parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code
provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary
contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law; lack of consent by a party; and existence
of fraud or duress. (GADRINAB VS SALAMANCA G.R. No. 194560)
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs COSLAP
G.R. No. 135945. March 7, 2001

 April 11, 1983- a property found in Dominican Hills Baguio City was donated to the Republic of
the Philippines by UCPB.

 October 18, 1988- the Presidential Management Staff PMS received an application from
petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. (UNITED) a community
housing association composed of non-real property owning residents of Baguio City, to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property.

 On February 2, 1990- PMS Secretary Elfren Cruz referred the application to the HOME
INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC)

 May 9, 1990- a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and
UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills
property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED

 June 12, 1991- HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED

 1993- DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION


(ASSOCIATION) entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed
houses thereon. UNITED was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.

 ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 3316-R, in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. ASSOCIATION was able to obtain a temporary
restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.

 While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the
Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES), filed Civil Case No. 3382-R
before Branch 61 of the same court. The complaint prayed for damages, injunction and annulment
of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC.

 Upon motion of UNITED, the trial court in an Order dated May 27, 1996 dismissed Civil Case
No. 3382-R.8 The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

 Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and
the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City.

 September 29, 1998 - Association filed a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-253, in the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against United.

Ruling: It is evident from the foregoing facts that private respondents, in filing multiple petitions,
have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset the orderly
administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain
the writ of injunction they so desperately desired. The willful attempt by private respondents to
obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same from the
original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process.

In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994
provides:

Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or
complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.

Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in addition to those in
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the
filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other
than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and shall be subject to the sanctions provided
hereunder.

1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following
facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof;
and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading
and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention,
petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.

2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly
willful and deliberate forum shopping by any other party and his counsel through the filing of
multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for
the summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of
a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof,
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the
counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the party.

A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private
respondents propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel. Hence, one can
deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an
assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents litany of omissions range
from failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and
then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a
certification against forum shopping. Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION
informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was
pending, that another action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court.
Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES
ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case. The aforesaid plaintiff, however, does not hesitate to admit
that it filed the second case in representation of private respondent, as one of its affiliates. In the same
manner, the certification against forum shopping accompanying the complaint in Civil Case No. 3382-R
does not mention the pendency of Civil Case No. 3316-R. In fact, the opposite assurance was given, that
there was no action pending before any other tribunal. Another transgression is that both branches of the
trial court do not appear to have been notified of the filing of the subject COSLAP Case No. 98-253.

49.Cahayag v CCC
Petitioner Dulos Realty was the registered owner of certain residential lots. On 20
December 1980, Dulos Realty obtained a loan from respondent CCC in the amount of
F300,000. To secure the loan, the realty executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the
subject properties in favor of respondent. The mortgage was duly annotated on the
certificates of title on 3 February 1981. On 29 March 1981, Dulos Realty entered into a
Contract to Sell with petitioner Cahayag over the lot covered by TCT No. S-39775. On
12 August 1981, Dulos Realty entered into another Contract to Sell, this time with
petitioner Rivera over the lot covered by TCT No. S-28335. Dulos Realty defaulted in
the payment of the mortgage loan, prompting respondent CCC to initiate extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale was held with CCC as the highest bidder.
And affidavit of virtue of consolidation was annotated on the corresponding titles, and
the name of DUlos Realty were all cancelled and new TCT’s in the name of CCC were
issued. After the consolidation, Dulos Realty entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale and
sold to respondent Qua the same properties. The sale was duly annotated and new
corresponding titles were issued in the name of Qua. Petitioners filed a complaint
against respondents for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale and other documents. The
complaint alleged the petitioners were owners of the properties in question by virtue of
Contract of Sale individually executed in their favor. Respondents failed to file an
answer within the reglementary period. Subsequently they were declared in default. The
RTC ruled that the foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject lots, as well as the
housing units was not valid. The CA accordingly reversed and set aside the RTC
decision, dismissed the case for lack of merit, and ordered petitioners to surrender
possession of the properties to Qua.

ISSUE: Whether or not contract of sale entered into by Dulos Realty with Baldoza is
valid.
Ruling:
Under the law on sales, one cannot give what one does not have. Dulos
Realty was no longer the owner of the real property at the time of the sale. The
court rules out ownership as a requiredment for the perfection of a contract of
sale. For all that is required is a meeting of the minds upn the object of the
contract and the price. Article 1434 of the CC provides that in case the seller does
not own the subject matter of the contract at the time of the sale, but the latter
acquires title to the thing sold, ownership shall pass to the buyer.
There was a calid sale, and there was no valid transfer to the title to Baldoza,
since Dulos Realty was no longer the owner at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale.

50.GO V. LOOYUKO
Facts:
Go filed a criminal case for estafa against Looyuko, alleging that the latter
misappropriated the stock certificates belonging to him by causing the transfer of the
aforementioned stock certificates to Looyuko’s name after receiving the same in trust
from Go. Suring the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on behalf of Go,
wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of the prosecution.
However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of the aforementioned
witnesses. This prompted Go to file a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess in
jurisdiction by not allowing the prosecution’s witnesses to testify for their case.
Issue: Did the trial court gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing the prosecution’s
witnesses to testify?
RULING:
Yes. The matter of deciding who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not
for the defendant or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the
prosecutor. It cannot be overemphasized that the trial court must accord full
opportunity for the prosecution, more so in criminal cases, to adduce evidence to
prove its case and to properly ventilate the issues absent patent showing of
dilatory or delaying tactics. The reason is obvious: it is tasked to produce and
adduce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Sans such evidence, a dismissal of
the criminal case on a demurrer to the evidence is proper. In the case at bar, there
was no showing that the presentation of the three (3) witnesses previously
approved by the trial court would be dilatory and manifestly for delay.
First, the testimonies of of the witnesses would bolster and tend to prove whatever fact
the prosecution is trying to establish. Second, the superfluity of a testimony vis-a-vis
what has already been proven can be determined with certainty only after it has been
adduced.

51. KATON V. PALANCA


FACTS:

Petitioner Katon contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island, located in
Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and
certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However,
Palawan authorities then favorably endorsed the request of Respondent Palanca,
together with some others, which resulted in the issuance of homestead patent in
Palanca’s favor in 1977 among others. In 1999, filed a petition which seeks to nullify the
homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the Palanca et al.
as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Palanca et al. filed their
Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed Katon’s Complaint as well as
his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was
dismissed motu proprio pursuant to the appellate court’s residual prerogative. The CA
ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questions
this dismissal. He submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the
Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative
refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still
validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not
possessed by an appellate court.

ISSUE:

Was the Court of Appeals correct in applying residual prerogative in dismissing a case
motu proprio based on prescription?

RULING: YES.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived,
except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence
on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss
the claim or action. xxx On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial
courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage
is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval
of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been
based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and
under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

52. ESTRELLA MEJIA-ESPINOZA AND NORMA MEJIA DELLOSA vs. NENA A.


CARIÑO

G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza (Espinoza) was the plaintiff in an action for


ejectment against respondent Nena A. Cariño (Nena) before the Municipal Trial Court of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan (MTC).

On August 25, 1998, the MTC rendered a joint decision in favor of Espinoza. It ordered
Nena and Alberto to vacate the respective properties and to pay rents from time of
default, litigation expenses, and attorney's' fees.

Nena and Alberto separately appealed the joint decision to the Regional Trial Cout of
Dagupan City which reversed the decision and dismissed the case against Nena for
lack of cause of action.

Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before the MTC, which Nena
opposed. When Sheriff Hortaleza proceeded to the property subject of the ejectment
suit, he found out that Nena had voluntarily vacated the place and turned over the
padlock to one Gertrudes Taberna, Nena's caretaker. Thus, Sheriff Hortaleza was able
to peacefully turn over the propetiy to co-petitioner Norma Mejia Dellosa (Dellosa),
Espinoza's attorney-in-fact.

On September 19, 2005, Nena filed a complaint captioned as "Annulment of Court's


Processes with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction and/or Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC of Dagupan City, which
was raffled to Branch 41 (RTC Branch 41).

Nena argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration of the
order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of execution because she was not
furnished a copy of the order. She claimed that Espinoza, through Dellosa, illegally
caused the demolition, without a special court order, of a one-story building which Nena
allegedly constructed on the land subject of the ejectment suit. Furthermore, she
questioned the levy on her commercial lot for being premature, as well as the
computation of the judgment debt. Espinoza emphasized that the writ of execution was
properly served and received by Nena on March 16, 2005, and that Nena had already
removed all her personal belongings from the premises weeks before the service of the
writ.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of execution was irregularly issued.

RULING: NO.

Nena sought to annul the writ of execution because she did not receive a copy of
the MTC order granting the issuance of the writ of execution. Yet, she received a copy
of the writ without any protest and voluntarily vacated the premises and turned over
possession to Espinoza's representative. These actions evince Nena's recognition of
and acquiescence to, the writ of execution; she is therefore estopped from questioning
its validity. "when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction
being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the
obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a
judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is
estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.”

Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution
of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative
tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ
of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of
its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.

53. JULIE S. SUMBILLA vs. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner obtained a cash loan from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial
payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Checks. The six
checks have a uniform face value of P6,667.00 each. Upon maturity, the six checks
were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for payment, however, all the checks
were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face
value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.The MeTC found
petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For each
count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of P6,667.00, the MeTC
meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to P80,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total
amount of P40,002.00.

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration
before the MeTC.

The Motion was denied being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Denied! Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules in Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City. Dismissed! The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner met the same fate of
dismissal.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy under the
circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. After she
received a copy of the June 28, 2011Resolution of the CA denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009,
which is already final and executory, may still be modified.

2. Whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which


proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt

RULING: YES.
1. Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section
1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on
the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court, if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a
longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted
on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed
under Section 1 of BP 22.

Hence, the penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case


Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to
double the face value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.

2. The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.

It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice
is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.

A final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

54.BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, FLORENTINO B. TRINIDAD, BONIFACIO MANGANIP


and EDGAR S. SALLIDAO vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN
A.M. No. P-98-1264. July 28, 1999
FACTS:
On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative
Region, Tabuk, Kalinga, tasked with the enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San
Miguel Corporation van with Plate No. PJC-321 loaded with narra flitches wrapped in
nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles and cartons. Confronted by the
forestry employees, Villamor Martinez, driver of the van, could not produce any legal
permit authorizing him to transport the narra lumber. Hence, after issuing seizure
receipts, the vehicle and its load of narra flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry
employees.
On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was filed
before the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation of Sec. 78 of
P.D. 705 as amended, and implemented by DENR Administrative Order 59. On 24 July
1996, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle
and its load was issued by the DENR Regional Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial
authority to administratively order the confiscation and forfeiture of lumber possessed
without permit including its conveyance.
Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its agent
Aimardo V. Interior, filed a case for recovery of personal property and damages with
application for writ of replevin with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, against herein complainants. The trial court issued a warrant of seizure of
personal property directing its sheriff to take hold of the van and its contents.
On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff Jacinto
Contapay of RTC-Br. 1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and agents of the Philippine National Police,
went to the office of the DENR in Tabuk, Kalinga, to enforce the warrant issued by the
trial court but the forestry employees and officials refused to release the van on the
ground that it had already been forfeited in favor of the government and was now
in custodia legis. Despite this explanation, on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
accompanied this time by Sheriff John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Tabuk, Kalinga, and twenty (20) other persons, took the van without permission of the
employees and officials of the DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse of the five-day
period prescribed by law for filing an opposition to the writ, the vehicle was delivered to
Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.

ISSUE:
Whether sheriff Magumun committed a grave misconduct in implementing a
warrant of seizure.
RULING: YES.
The OCA observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very literal interpretation
of Sec. 4, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court as amended. The OCA noted that while Rule
60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed by the defendant in
the replevin that the personal property to be seized has been forfeited in favor of the
government and is already in custodia legis, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have
insisted on seizing the property subject of the warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should have been for respondent to inform his judge of the situation by way of partial
Sheriffs Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. For
such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun be
penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at the very least.
We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject
of the warrant of seizure had already been confiscated by another government agency
and forfeited in favor of the government. However, the novelty of his predicament did
not call for him to use his discretion and justify his insistence on taking the property
subject of the warrant without waiting for instructions from his judge. A sheriffs
prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled
to the possession of the attached property, much less does he have any discretion to
decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate. However, the prompt implementation of a warrant
of seizure is called for only in instances where there is no question regarding the right of
the plaintiff to the property.
Where the plaintiff has shown by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of the property; that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant;
that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, then the executing
officer has no other recourse but to execute the warrant or writ expeditiously.
In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property
had been impounded due to violation of forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had
already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was advised that the proper remedy
for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of
the DENR. The prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the
warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead, Deputy
Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue
haste as evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of
seizure on the DENR officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A warrant
could be returned within a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60)
days after its receipt by the executing officer. Within this time frame, Deputy Sheriff
Magumun should have conferred with his judge and thereafter execute the warrant
judiciously and with more certainty.

True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs
promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the
nature of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with propriety and
decorum and act above suspicion.[16] There must be no room for anyone to
conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired
with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate
execution. The sheriff is the front line representative of the judiciary and by his
act he may build or destroy the institution.
WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found guilty of grave
misconduct and, as recommended, is fined P5,000.00 for arbitrarily implementing
the warrant of seizure of personal property and for ignorance of the proper
procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the personal property to be
recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government for
violation of forestry laws. Respondent is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act will merit a more severe sanction.
55. ONGCO vs. DALISAY
G.R. No. 190810
(July 18, 2012)

FACTS:
Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (DALISAY) applied for registration of a parcel of land
before the MTC. No oppositor aside from the Republic came. Neither was there any
written opposition filed in court; thus, an Order of General Default was issue against
the whole world except the Republic. The court found Dalisay to have clearly shown a
registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of registration be
issued by the LRA. Lorenza C. Ongco (Ongco) never intervened in the proceedings in
the trial court. The Republic filed an appeal and while the case was pending appeal,
Ongco filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" with an attached Answer-in-Intervention
seeking the dismissal of Dalisay's application on the ground that the property was not
free from any adverse claim. Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in
actual possession of the subject land in an earlier case filed before when she applied
for a free patent on the land. Dalisay contended that Ongco did not have a legal
interest over the property and the intervention would unduly delay the registration
proceeding. Dalisay pointed out that intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, but not at any other time. The CA denied the
Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Motion for Leave to Intervene" would be granted to Ongco?

HELD:
Ongco may not be allowed to intervene because she has not shown any legal
interest of such nature that she “will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of
the judgment.” On the contrary, her interest is indirect and contingent. She has not been
granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits being only in the
process of applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate. In Firestone Ceramics v.
CA⁠, the Court held that the petitioner who anchored his motion to intervene on his legal
interest arising from his pending application for a free patent over a portion of the
subject land merely had a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation. His
collateral interest could not have justified intervention.

In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight, the Court explained intervention in this


wise:

“Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute
authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal
interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a
direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or
sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote,
conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence
of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of
the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering “whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.”

56. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. 90478
(November 21, 1991)
FACTS:
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint
which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive
Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with
summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"Motion to Strike out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of
Other Portions."

The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the
opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file
interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the PCGG responded by
filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988,
the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a
Resolution.

Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On


July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted
the motion for production and inspection of documents respectively.

PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution and filed an


opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and
opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan denied the reconsideration and
reiterated by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the
plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by PCGG and reiterating by implication the permission to serve
the amended interrogatories on PCGG?

HELD:
The SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan was correct on both instances.
Accordingly, the present proceeding involves two of the modes of discovery provided in
the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties and production and inspection of document
and things.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a


device, along with the pre-trial hearing, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those
issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before civil trails and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or
interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness
to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant,
whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are
privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible
information of all relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon
said trial.

In line with the principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-


discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as a) depositions (whether by
oral examination or written interrogatories), (b) interrogatories to parties, and (c)
requests for admissions, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally,
without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of
court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the
complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but
after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the
action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery,
the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed
facts are not clear.

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a)


production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or
(b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due course.

57.SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs. METROBANK


G. R. No. 185145
February 05, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for
nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
With the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify
as the petitioners’ initial witnesses.

Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing,
the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set
a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that
pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who
are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that
petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to
be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the defective notice
was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to
notice. They further argued that Metrobank Officers, who were subject of the
subpoena are not party-defendant and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they
are individuals, separate and distinct from Metrobank.

In an opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted that since


a corporation may act only through its officers and employees, they are to be
considered as adverse parties in a case against the corporation itself.

The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration prompting them to file a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA asserting this time that their Motion for issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it does not seek relief, but aims for
the issuance of a mere process. They added that Rule 21 of the Rules requires prior
notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions. Finally, petitioners
claimed that the Rules (particularly section 10, Rule 132) do not prohibit a party from
presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
The CA affirmed the assailed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an adverse party can be required to take the witness stand (Sec
6 of Rule 25) without complying with the notice and hearing requirements under Sec. 4
and 5 or Rule 15?

HELD:
No. On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a
timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus
cured by the filing of the Opposition.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the
witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which
provides –

Sec. 6.: Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may
not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to
give a deposition pending appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness
stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s
possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is tantamount to
building their whole case from evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and
evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank. If petitioners cannot prove their claim
using their own evidence, then the adverse party may not be pressured to hang itself
from its own defense.

58. Romeo Teston vs DBP, GR 144374


Facts: There were two cases filed:
1. Conrado Colarina, attorney-in-fact of Romeo Teston, filed a complaint against
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
and Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR Secretary) for the
determination and payment of just compensation of two parcels of agricultural
land.
In his complaint, Romeo Teston alleged that he is the owner of the said two
parcels of agricultural land which he purchased from DBP by way of Deed of
Conditional Sale. It was later found out that Teston defaulted in the payment of his
amortizations so DBP rescinded the contract of conditional sale and transferred the
two parcels of land to the government. Also, it was subsequently found out that
Teston had also voluntarily offered the two parcels of land for inclusion in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the Voluntary Offer to Sell.
2. Colarina filed his own personal complaint against the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), LBP and the DAR Secretary for the determination and
payment of just compensation of fifteen parcels of agricultural land.

Colarina said that the fifteen parcels of agricultural land, situated Dimasalong
were mortgaged by the Associated Agricultural Activities, Inc. (AAA) to the GSIS as
security for the payment of its loan. When AAA failed to pay the loan, GSIS
foreclosed the mortgage on the lands, at public auction and GSIS was the highest
bidder. Colarina bought the lots from AAA and voluntarily offered to sell it to the DAR
under R.A. No. 6657. He informed GSIS of his offer to sell the properties to the DAR.
Subsequently, GSIS executed a Deed of Transfer in favor of the DAR. Despite
repeated demands, the LBP and the DAR refused to determine and pay the just
compensation for the lots.

Both cases were raffled to RTC, Masbate, Branch 48. 1st case: in separate Answers,
DBP, LBP and the DAR Secretary commonly averred that petitioner has no cause of
action since he was never the owner of the properties because DBP rescinded the
Deed of Conditional Sale for nonpayment of the purchase price. 2nd Case: in separate
Answers, GSIS, LBP and DAR Secretary contend that Colarina has no cause of action
since he is not the owner of the lands he voluntarily offered for CARP coverage. He only
bought from AAA the right to redeem the property and he failed to exercise such right
within the one-year period allowed by the law.

Without any order of the RTC expressly consolidating the two cases, a notice of
hearing of both cases was sent to the parties by the clerk of the RTC and terminated the
pre-trial in both cases. The RTC Dismissed both cases and the CA affirmed it.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in moto proprio consolidating both cases without an
order for consolidation?

Ruling: Yes the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in setting the joint trial of the two cases.
Consolidation should be denied when prejudice would result to any of the parties
or would cause complications, delay, cut off, or restrict the rights of a party. In the
present case, although both cases which were raffled to the same branch of RTC
Masbate (Branch 48), involve the prayer for determination and payment of just
compensation, Romeo Teston and Colarina are represented by the same counsel and
respondents LBP and DAR Secretary are common defendants, these are not sufficient
justifications for joint trial and joint order dismissing both cases. It cannot be denied that
there is no real identity of parties, facts or rights asserted was instituted by Colarina in
his own name principally against GSIS and concerns fifteen parcels of agricultural land
in Masbate, while the other case was instituted by petitioner represented by Colarina
principally against DBP and concerns two parcels of agricultural land in Masbate.
Furthermore, a perusal of the complaints plainly shows that Colarina claims ownership
as redemptioner while petitioner claims ownership as buyer. Clearly, the causes of
action in the two cases arose from different events or transactions, involve
different issues, and ultimately will depend on different evidence. A court may
order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from
the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has
jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give
one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
parties. The obvious purpose of the rule allowing consolidation is to avoid
multiplicity of suits to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to
clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and its action
in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion.

It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by,


both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory
of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The
judgment must be secudum allegata et probata. Due process considerations justify
this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity
to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

59. CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs PHILBANKING CORPORATION,


G.R. No. 150731

Facts: Casent Realty Developmet Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare
Realty which were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan from Philbanking
wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed. When Rare Realty failed to pay its debt,
the bank demanded payment based on the promissory notes issued by Casent Realty
Corp to Rare Realty.

On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its obligation by executing
a Dacion en pago. Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of payment against
Casent based on the promissory notes. Casent Realty, in its answer, raised that a
Dacion en pago was already executed which extinguished its obligation. Philbanking
failed to file a reply. Casent Realty points out that the defense of Dacion and
Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the Answer, should have been
specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of
the Rules of Court. Its failure to reply constituted an admission on the part of the bank.

Issue: Whether or not failure to file a Reply constitute a judicial admission of the
genuineness and due execution of documents.

Held: Yes. Failure to file a reply constitute admission of the genuineness and due
execution of documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the
appellate court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.-----An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
On appeal to the CA, respondent claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all
the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to
Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or
allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the
answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file
such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
The Court agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or
defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is
more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to
file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable
document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise,
the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be
considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof,
the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be
considered an admitted fact.

60. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT Of APPEALS and
ALFONSO ROXAS CHUA
If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Once determined to
be final, the order may be the subject of an appeal.

Metrobank brought an action for a sum of money against Pacific Multi Commercial
Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. but the respondents failed to file their answer
and were, for that reason, declared in default.

The trial court rendered judgment for Metrobank ordering respondents jointly and
severally liable to pay.

The deputy sheriff garnished the shares of stock of private respondent Alfonso Roxas
Chua, Jr. in the Club Filipino and were sold at public auction and Metrobank was the
highest bidder. Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. filed with CA a motion to hold in abeyance the
delivery to Metrobank of the certificate of ownership and to declare the sale to
Metrobank as null and void on the ground that the certificate of ownership was the
conjugal property of respondent Roxas Chua, Jr. and his wife Kiang Ming Chu. CA
denied the motion. Accordingly, he filed a notice of appeal from the order of the court.

Metrobank moved to strike out or expunge from the record the notice of appeal of
Roxas Chua, Jr. on the ground that he, having been declared in default, had no
standing to file the notice. However, the court denied it also.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts Orders
allowing private respondents appeal.

Ruling: No.

Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders shall
be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered for one party or the other.

A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof,
a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not
supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.

A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38.

The above provision, particularly its third paragraph, clearly states that one
who has been declared in default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the
default. Hence, the mere fact that the trial court has not lifted its default order
does not bar herein respondent from filing an appeal.
If at all, petitioner ought to have challenged the default status of private respondent
when he filed his Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of
Sale. However, the denial of that Motion being final in character as we shall now show,
he is allowed by the Rules to appeal therefrom.
Paragraph 1 of the above-quoted Rule provides that decisions and final orders are
appealable. Because the RTC Orders were final, not merely interlocutory, the CA did
not err in allowing respondents appeal.
It has been held that an interlocutory order does not terminate or finally
dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It refers to something
between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or
matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. Conversely, a final
order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The
test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.

61. NEYPES vs. CA G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 appeal, BP 129, Rule 41,
Rules of Court
OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo.

The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August
3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late.This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only
on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period
for appeal.

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND IN RULING AND


AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY
22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

RULING:

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners
should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal
is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be
(48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from.

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to
file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the
running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to afresh period of
15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the
15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal.

We consistently applied this rule in similar cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The rule is also founded on
deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of
occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law.

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time
during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been
pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule
37.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system
and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion
advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal
and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require


litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There,
we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of
fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we
have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with,
our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
cause.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration).
62. JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his
attorneys-in-fact and acting in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY
BARTOLOME, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES, Respondents.

FACTS: On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint8 for judicial foreclosure of a
house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City.

The Spouses Morales alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana
Bartolome loaned ₱500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed to pay within
two months with interest of five percent (5%) per month. To secure their loan, the
Spouses Bartolome mortgaged9 the Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales.

The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their loan. After
demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned amount.

In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against Juliet Vitug
Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.

The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself as Lita
Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses
Bartolome.10

Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the
Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.

In their answer,11 defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate
mortgage covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s
signatures on the instrument. They added that the complaint was already barred since it
had been dismissed in another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
failure to comply with an order of the trial court. Defendants assailed the authenticity of
the deed of real estate mortgage covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the
Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They added that the complaint was
already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an order of the trial court. The trial court
ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales ₱500,000.00 plus 7% interest per
month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry of
judgment. Defendants received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29, 2010.
Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. According
to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma as
defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not
supported by the evidence or contrary to law. Thus, in its order14 dated May 25, 2010,
the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the request for
a handwriting expert.

Defendants received a copy of the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010.

On August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order15 dated August 13,
2010, the trial court denied due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. According to the trial court, defendants, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F.
Tugonon, received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June
24, 2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court.
Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the
trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010,
which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.
On September 24, 2010,defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, 16 blaming
their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary
period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age.

In its order18 dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from
judgment. The trial court held that the petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from
the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

On July 13, 2011, Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome filed the
petition for certiorari19 with the Court of Appeals. In its resolution20 dated July 27, 2011,
the appellate court denied outright the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals found
that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition
for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution21 dated November 10, 2011. Petitioners filed the petition 22 for review on
certiorari with this court. They argue that they need not file a motion for reconsideration
of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment because the questions they
raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of law. They cite Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 as authority.

Petitioners add that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal. They
personally received a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011. They argue that the
period to file on appeal must be counted from August 11, 2011, not on the day their
"ailing counsel"24 received a copy of the decision.

A comment25 was filed on the petition for review on certiorari by respondents Spouses
Morales. They argue that the trial court did not err in declaring pro forma petitioners’
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision.

Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition for
certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their petition for relief from judgment.

ISSUE:

I. Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence; and

RULING:

1. This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief
from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner
learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of
judgment or final order is the six-month period.

The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should
be strictly complied with.26 A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the
reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief
from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final
judgments.27

A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from
knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a
fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
Strict compliance with these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief
from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be
allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or
proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order at last to put an end to
litigation. In Turqueza v. Hernando, this Court stressed once more that:

. . . the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental


considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The law gives an exception or ‘last chance’ of a timely petition for relief from
judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6
months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38, supra, but such grave period
must be taken as ‘absolutely fixed, in extendible, never interruptedand cannot be
subjected to any condition or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself
devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed
to give the aggrieved party another and last chance’ and failure to avail of such
last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal .

It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision, and the 6-
month period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We
have also time and again held that because relief from a final and executory judgment is
really more of an exception than a rule due to its equitable character and nature, strict
compliance with these periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must always be
observed.

2. Failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is not excusable negligence. Petitioners failed to prove that their
former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or
excusable negligence.
63. Davao Light v. Court of Appeals
Facts
The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against
Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court
issued an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May
1989. On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of
attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a
motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of
Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

Issue
Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

Held
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an
appreciable period of time between the commencement of the action (takes place
upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons to the
defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or
the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the
provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
allows the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit.
In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held
that notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of
the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties before
the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining
it. In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment is matched by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the
posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.
The second means of defeating a preliminary attachement, however, may not be
availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though
validly issued, is not binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his
person is first acquired

64. THOMAS YANG vs.THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ

(G.R. No. 73317 August 31, 1989)

FACTS:

On 4 January 1985, respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an


action in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City against petitioner Thomas
Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. In
their complaint, the Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and possession
of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period from 1982 to 1984.
The trucks were, however, registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was
the Treasurer in the Morante spouses' business of buying and selling corn. The Morante
spouses further alleged that they were deprived of possession of the vehicles in the
morning of 3 January 1985, when petitioner Yang had the vehicles taken from where
they were parked in front of the Coca-Cola Plant in General Santos City, to the
warehouse of Manuel Yaphockun and there they were thereafter held. Despite repeated
demands, the complaint alleged, petitioner Yang refused to release the trucks to
respondent spouses.

To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied for a
writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560,000.00 executed by respondent
Milagros Morante and Atty. Bayani Calonzo (counsel for respondent spouses)

On 10 January 1985, defendant Manuel Yaphockun filed a motion seeking


repossession of the cargo trucks, and posted a replevin counter-bond of P560,000.00
executed by himself and one Narciso Mirabueno. The respondent judge promptly
required the respondent spouses to comment on the counter-bond proffered.

ISSUE:
WON the replevin bond was defective

RULING

No. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and
the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not
be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a
writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the
possession thereof." The fact that the other respondent, Ricardo Morante, did not
act as surety on the same bond as his wife did, does not affect the validity or the
sufficiency of that bond. The failure of the replevin bond to state expressly that it
was "conditioned for the return of the property to the defendant, if the return
thereof be adjudged," is not fatal to the validity of the replevin bond. A defendant
in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied by
filing a redelivery bond within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
60, which provide:

Sec. 5. Return of property. — If the defendant objects to the


sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon,
he cannot require the return of the property as in this section
provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the
delivery of the property to the plaintiff, require the return thereof by
filing with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the
plaintiff, in double the value of the property stated in the plaintiff's
affidavit, for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if such
delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as
may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a copy of
such bond on the plaintiff or his attorney;

Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days


after the taking of the property by the officer, the defendant does not
object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon, or require the return of the property as provided in the last
preceding section; or if the defendant so objects and the plaintiffs
first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and
his bond is objected to and found insufficient and does not forthwith
file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the
plaintiff. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the plaintiff,
the officer must return it to the defendant.

65. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA V. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS

(G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009)


FACTS:
On February 24, 2003, respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a
complaint against petitioner and several John Does before Branch 02 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock
crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. In his complaint and affidavit, Vargas claims
ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and imported the same directly
from Hyun Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South Korea, in December 1993. The equipment
was allegedly entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in
late 2002, as caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas.
According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husbands
death despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The
complaint was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the
necessary bond amounting to P2,400,000.00.

Summons dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner through her
personal secretary on April 28, 2003 at her residence in Paraaque City. Interestingly,
however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo,
the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon on April 29,
2003, contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.

ISSUE:
WON RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counter bond on the
ground that it was filed out of time.
RULING:
Yes.

Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name
from the object of its process. It originated in common law as a remedy against
the wrongful exercise of the right of distress for rent and, according to some
authorities, could only be maintained in such a case. But by the weight of
authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of wrongful
distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper
remedy for any unlawful taking. Replevied, used in its technical sense, means
delivered to the owner, while the words to replevy means to recover possession
by an action of replevin.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of
Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior
to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party
(petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and
the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the
adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the courts
order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse
party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the
constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse
party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the
adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf,
the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the
statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the
writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these
circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of
the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

66. BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL PHILIPPINES, INC.) V.


CLARK TRADING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 175284, September 19, 2012)
FACTS:

BP Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), filed a Complaintfor "injunction with prayer for


preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages" in the RTC
against respondent Clark Trading Corporation, owner of Parkson Duty Free, which, in
turn, is a duty free retailer operating inside the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ).
Parkson Duty Free sells, among others, imported duty-free Castrol products not
sourced from petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1994 it had entered into a Marketing and Technical
Assistance Licensing Agreement and a Marketing and Distribution Agreement
(agreements) with Castrol Limited, U.K., a corporation organized under the laws of
England, and the owner and manufacturer of Castrol products. Essentially, under the
terms of the agreements, Castrol Limited, U.K. granted petitioner the title "exclusive
wholesaler importer and exclusive distributor" of Castrol products in the territory of the
Philippines. Under the July 22, 1998 Variation "territory" was further clarified to include
duty-free areas.

Petitioner claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing Castrol Productsnot


sourced from petitioner in the Philippines, violated petitioner’s exclusive rights under the
agreements. Despite a cease and desist letter dated September 14, 1998 sent by
petitioner, respondent continued to distribute and sell Castrol products in its duty-free
shop. Petitioner, citing Yu v. Court of Appealsas basis for its claim, contended that the
unauthorized distribution and sale of Castrol products by respondent "will cause grave
and irreparable damage to its goodwill and reputation."

ISSUE:
whether petitioner is entitled to injunction against third-persons on the basis of its
marketing and distribution agreements
RULING:
No. There is no evidence that any party was duped and that [respondent], who is not a
privy to the marketing and distribution agreement between [petitioner] and Castrol
Limited of England, employed any sinister scheme or ploy at all. We do not find any
showing of a scenario whereby [respondent] induced any party to renege or violate its
undertaking under said agreement, thereby entitling [petitioner] to injunctive relief and
damages. Thus, [petitioner’s] insistence that [respondent’s] obligation to [petitioner]
does not arise from contract, but from law, which protects parties to a contract from the
wrongful interference of strangers, does not have any factual or legal basis.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.

The writ of injunction would issue:

Upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely:

(1) the existence of a right to be protected; and

(2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction
is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s
right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction.

SUSAN LIM-LUA V. DANILO Y. LUA.

(G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013)

FACTS:

On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, In her prayer for support pendente
lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in
several companies and businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order dated March 31,
2004 granting support pendente lite, as follows:

From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(₱250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (₱135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her
eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already
extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling
from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

ISSUE:

Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from
the total support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.

RULING:

The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support
of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions
from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and
not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the CA).

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and


petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the
following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may
be guided by the following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between


the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for
such period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on
their standard of living during the marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the
spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances
make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the
time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the
spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse’s
future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the
comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the
marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care,
education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health
of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;
(9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into account
that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and
equitable.

(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the spouse.

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported


from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered
to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the
child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise


consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and
non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health
of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living
the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the
parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.

67. G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,


vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua.

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought
the amount of ₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, the Judge granted support pendente lite, the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand Pesos which would be sufficient to take care of the needs
of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (₱135,000.00)
Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff. The amounts
already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should
be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the
instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(₱250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such
date until the hearing of the support pendente lite.

Danilo Lua filed a motion for reconsideration. As to the ₱250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the ₱1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for
not having considered the needs of the respondent.

The trial court stated that the Order had become final and executory since
respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for
violation of the three-day notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the
period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of the court for disregarding the order granting support pendente
lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA.

CA nullified and set aside the lower court’s order and instead a new one is entered
ordering herein petitioner:

a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00


beginning the month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first five
(5) days thereof;

b) to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱115,000.00 a month multiplied


by the number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less
than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her
and their two (2) children monthly support; and

c) to pay the costs.

In Compliance, respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of


₱162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA
decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to
March 2005) ordered by the CA -- ₱2,185,000.00 -- plus ₱460,000.00 (April, May, June
and July 2005), totaling ₱2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner in the sum of ₱2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).

In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution,


petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be
chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA. The trial court
issued an Order granting petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it
rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B.
Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order denying
both motions since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules,
this denial has attained finality; a writ of execution was issued in favor of plaintiff as
against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.

Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite,
petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages. Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases
were consolidated.

But CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:


a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-
GR No. 01154;

b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No.
01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25
November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Ph₱2,482,348.16 plus


946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of


Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was
deferred by him subject to the deductions aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.

The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the
two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases
involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only
of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of
deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not
contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he
just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the
different interpretation by the trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation
of spouses to support their children.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:

Issue: Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children

Ruling: As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at
any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a
court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two
children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is
clear that the monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing,
salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioner’s
testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.

Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the
final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for
the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his
children. Respondent explained that the deductions were made consistent with the fallo
of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite
in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two
children’s monthly support.

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already
incurred by the respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be
properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children.
Said court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of
support for their children.

We reverse in part the decision of the CA.

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and


petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the
following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders24

Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may
be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for
such period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on
their standard of living during the marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the
spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances
make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the
time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the
spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse’s
future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the
comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the
marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care,
education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health
of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;
(9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into account
that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and
equitable.

(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the spouse.

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported


from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered
to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the
child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise


consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and
non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health
of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living
the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the
parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed
by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.

On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we


find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.

In Martin, Jr. v. Martin, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is
required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother,
cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice
to her.

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to
pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law,
claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v.
Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable
nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother,
when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are
justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.

While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial
assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school
expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff,
for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is
incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the
plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x
x x29

On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly
support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the
sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that
any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover
those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.1avvphi1

In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that
aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2)
children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely:
clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an
amount of more than One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) for each of them and
considering that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the total amount
of ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2)
children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him
through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but
fair and just that the monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private
respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of ₱115,000.00 which would be
sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the amount
of One Hundred ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is
demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support of
₱115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court
may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the
proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal. The petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-
G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005
and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued
in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the


support pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of


Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was
deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment

68. G.R. No. L-6666 May 12, 1954

GORGONIO PANDES, petitioner,


vs.
HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, JOSE AZCONA, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental,
and UY TIONG OH, respondents.

Facts: Uy Tiong Oh instituted in the Court of First Instance against Gorgonio Pandes,
for the recovery of a sum of money. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued, on
motion of Uy Tiong Oh, "against the properties of the defendant not exempt from
execution" . Then, the provincial sheriff issued a "Notice of Garnishment" (Annex C)
upon "whatever right, interest and participation the defendant Gorgonio Pandes has or
might have in " a certain "partnership between Uy Tiong Oh and Ester Pandes, the wife
of the defendant, in connection with the Eden Theater of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental." Thereafter, Gorgonio Pandes filed an "Answer to Notice of Garnishment of
the Provincial Sheriff" praying that said garnishment "be stayed" upon the ground that
said right, interest and participation "is involved in Civil Case No. 2371" of the same
court, entitled "Uy King Poe vs. Ester Pandes and Gorgonio Pandes."

A decision was, subsequently, rendered in favor of Uy Tiong Oh in case No. 2562. Said
decision having become final, the court ordered, on motion of Uy Tiong Oh, the
issuance of the corresponding writ of execution and directed the provincial sheriff to sell,
at public auction, "whatever rights, interest and participation the defendant may have on
the property levied upon . . . the proceeds thereof to be applied in satisfaction of the
judgment rendered" as above stated. After issuing the corresponding notice of auction
sale, the provincial sheriff sold to Uy Tiong Oh for P500.00, such right, interest and
participation as Gorgonio Pandes has or might have in the partnership aforementioned.

Gorgonio Pandes had moved for the reconsideration on the ground that the partnership
in question was under receivership and, being as such under custodia legis, said
partnership and its assets are not subject to garnishment. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge so he filed a petition for certiorari.

It appears Uy Tiong Oh and Ester Pandes, assisted by her husband, Gorgonio Pandes
executed a contract of partnership. It is stated therein that Uy King Poe (alias Uy Tiong
Oh) owns two (2) cinema projectors described therein, with all their accessories; that
Mrs. Pandes owns one (1) generator and one (1) motor, with their corresponding
accessories, all installed at the Eden Theater, situated at San Carlos, Negros
Occidental; and that both parties have agreed to form a partnership for the operation of
a cinema house at said Theater, subject to the condition that Uy would contribute said
projectors and Mrs. Pandes, the generator and the motor above referred to; that the
rentals of the building would be charged against the partnership; that the net profits,
after deducting all expenses, would be divided equally between the partners; that Mrs.
Pandes would be the managing partner and Uy Tiong Oh, the treasurer; that the
employment and dismissal of employees would be determined by both; and that the
partnership would exist for five (5) years, subject to renewal.

It further appears Uy King Poe (alias Uy Tiong Oh) commenced the aforementioned
civil case No. 2371 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the
dissolution and liquidation of said partnership and the recovery of the sum of P18,000,
upon the ground that Mrs. Pandes had misappropriated said sum allegedly belonging to
the partnership.

Upon the same grounds and the additional ground that Mrs. Pandes would continue
defrauding the partnership and had threatened to damage and destroy his projectors,
Uy King Poe moved for the appointment of a receiver, "to take care of the
properties contributed" by the partners and, also, of the administration of the
Cinema House" during the pendency of the case. The court appointed one Felisberto
A. Broce, "as receiver . . . with authority to take possession and take charge of the
Cinema House denominated and popularly known as Eden Theater, situated at San
Carlos, Negros Occidental, Philippines.”

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judge had exceeded his authority when he issued the order
directing the provincial sheriff "to sell at public auction whatever rights, interest and
participation the defendants may have on the property levied upon . . . the proceeds
thereof to be applied in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in this case."

Ruling:

No. Petitioner maintains that "said partnership being in the hands of a receiver, the
same or the properties thereof cannot be reached by execution."

This pretense is untenable for the exemption from attachment, garnishment or sale
under execution of properties under receivership is not absolute. Such properties
may not be levied upon "except by leave of the Court appointing the receiver".
This is a mere consequence of the theory that "a receivership operates to protect the
receiver against interference, without the consent of the court appointing him, with his
custody and possession of the property subject to the receivership. Hence, it has been
held . . . that real estate in the custody of a receiver can be levied upon and sold under
execution, provided only that the actual possession of the receiver is not interfered with"
The reason is that "only a receiver's possession of property subject to receivership . . .
is entitled to protection . . . against interference".

Then, again, the interference enjoined is that resulting from orders or processes
of a court "other" than that which appointed the receiver (45 Am. Jur. 136), the
rule being predicated upon the need of preventing "unseemly conflicts between
courts whose jurisdiction embraces the same subjects and persons" (45 Am. Jur.
137). Thus, in Cu Unjieng e Hijos vs. Mabalacat Sugar Co. (58 Phil., 439, 441), this
Court said:

The fact that the mortgaged properties are in the hands of receiver appointed by
the court which tried the foreclosure suit does not prevent the same court from
ordering the sale of the aforesaid mortgaged properties, inasmuch as although
the said properties are in custodia legis by virtue of the judicial receivership,
there cannot be any conflict of jurisdiction therein because the court that ordered
the sale thereof is the same which ordered that they be placed under
receivership.
For this reason, respondents maintain that petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought,
the garnishment and the sale under execution complained of, having been ordered, not
only by the same court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which had jurisdiction
over the receivership, but, also, by the same judge, respondent Jose Teodoro, Sr., who
appointed the receiver.

Petition was dismissed.

69. G.R. No. 166462 October 24, 2012

P.L. UY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,


vs.
ALS MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ANTONIO S.
LITONJUA, Respondents.

Facts: PLU, as vendor, and ALS, as vendee, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage covering a parcel of land with a price of PhP 8,166,705 payable in
installments.

Notably, the parties stipulated in paragraph 4.a of their Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage on the eviction of informal settlers, as follows:

4. a. It is understood that the PLU shall have the property clear of any existing
occupants/squatters, the removal of which shall be for the sole expenses &
responsibilities of PLU & that the ALS is authorized to withhold payment of the
1st 24% installment unless the above-undertaking is done and completed to the
satisfaction of the VENDEE

The succeeding paragraph 4 provided that in the event the informal settlers do
not leave the property, PLU would reimburse ALS the amounts it paid including
damages.

Eventually, TCT No. 26048 was issued in the name of ALS. The parties executed a
Partial Release of Mortgage attesting to the payment by ALS of the first installment
indicated in the underlying deed.

ALS, however, failed to pay the 2nd payment despite demands so PLU filed a complaint
against ALS for Foreclosure of Mortgage and Annulment of Documents. PLU alleged
having had entered into an oral agreement with ALS whereby the latter "agreed to take
over the task of ejecting the squatters/occupants from the property covered by TCT No.
26048 issued in its name," adding that, through the efforts of ALS, the property was
already 90% clear of informal settlers. Notably, PLU’s prayed that, in the event
defendant refuses or fails to pay all the above-mentioned amounts after the decision of
this Hon. Court has become final and executory, the corresponding order is issued for
the sale, in the corresponding Foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property described in
the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, to satisfy the judgment rendered by this Hon. Court,
plus costs of suit.

The condition, as to their eviction, had not yet been complied with so the RTC found the
obligation of ALS to pay the balance of the purchase price has not yet fallen due and
demandable; thus, it dismissed the case for being premature.

It dismissed the instant action for foreclosure of mortgage, as the same is premature.
Likewise the counterclaim was dismissed, for lack of sufficient merit

Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in a Decision
dated August 30, 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12663 entitled PLU Realty Corporation v.
ALS (or ASL) Management and Development Corporation.

ALS appealed the case to this Court primarily questioning the finding of the RTC that it
had assumed the responsibility of ejecting the informal settlers on the property. On
February 7, 1990, in G.R. No. 91656, entitled ALS Management and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals and PLU Realty, the Court issued a Resolution
affirming the rulings of the CA and the Makati RTC. The resolution became final and
executory.

Sometime thereafter, PLU again filed a Complaint dated November 12, 1990 against
ALS for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Rule 68, before Pasig RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 60221 and entitled P. L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ASL
Management and Development Corporation and Antonio S. Litonjua.

In the complaint, PLU claimed that ALS had not yet completed the agreed 1st payment
obligation despite numerous demands.

In defense, ALS claims that the installment payments for the balance of the purchase
price of the property are not yet due and demandable, as the removal of the informal
settlers, a condition precedent for such payments to be demandable, is still to be
completed. By way of counterclaim, ALS alleged that because there were still informal
settlers on the property, PLU should be directed to reimburse ALS the payments that it
already made, the cost of improvements introduced by ALS on the property and for
other damages.

The RTC dismissed the case for being premature.

Just like the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 47438, the Pasig RTC found that the
payment of the installments has not yet become due and demandable as the
suspensive condition, the ejection of the informal settlers on the property, has not yet
occurred. Furthermore, the trial court, citing Art. 1167 of the Civil Code, ruled that the
foreclosure of the mortgage is not the proper remedy, and that PLU should have caused
the ejectment of the informal settlers.
From such Decision, PLU appealed to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision
affirming that of the Pasig RTC. PLU moved for a reconsideration of the CA Decision
but was denied in the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition

Issue: W/N the judgment by the Makati RTC constitutes res judicata and bars the action
filed in the Pasig RTC.

The instant petition must be dismissed.

Ruling:

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Under Rule 9, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court may motu proprio dismiss a case
when any of the four (4) grounds referred to therein is present. These are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d)
prescription of action.

Correlatively, Secs. 47(b) and (c) of Rule 39 provides for the two (2) concepts of res
judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment, respectively. The
provisions state:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been missed in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest,
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The Court, in Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association,
Inc., distinguished the two (2) concepts in this wise:
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.

In the same Social Security Commission case, the Court enumerated the elements of
res judicata, to wit:

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by
prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be
shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies. (Emphasis supplied.)

All the elements of res judicata, as a "bar by prior judgment," are present in the instant
case. The previous complaint for foreclosure of mortgage was dismissed by the trial
court for being premature in Civil Case No. 47438. The dismissal action, when
eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 91656, was affirmed and the affirmatory
resolution of the Court becoming final and executory on February 7, 1990. Further, the
element of indentity of parties is considered existing even though Litonjua was only
impleaded in Civil Case No. 60221 and not in Civil Case No. 47438. Absolute identity of
parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity is sufficient. The
Court articulated this principle was raised in Cruz v. Court of Appeals38 in this wise:

The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of
including an additional party to the first and second action. Only substantial
identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or
elimination of some parties does not alter the situation.

There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest


between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter
was not impleaded in the first case.

Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, thereby satisfying


the requisite of substantial identity of parties.

Plainly, the two (2) cases involve the very same parties, the same property and the
same cause of action arising from the violation of the terms of one and the same deed
of absolute sale with mortgage. In fact, PLU prayed substantially the same relief in both
complaints. There is no reason not to apply this principle to the instant controversy.

Clearly, the instant complaint must be dismissed.

Petition was DENIED.

70. G.R. No. 142401 August 20, 2001

ANDREW TAN, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WU SEN WOEI, respondents.

The Facts

"Plaintiff-appellant [respondent herein], a Taiwanese national, and defendant-


appellee [petitioner herein], a Filipino, first met in Taiwan sometime in August
1987 through Kua Bei Tiu, defendant's sister-in-law. Defendant proposed that
plaintiff invest money in the hatchery business he had started, and plaintiff parted
with the amount of $80,000.00 or its equivalent of P1,650,700.00. Repaid only
[in] the amount of $10,000.00, plaintiff-appellant lodged a complaint before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to recover the balance of $70,000.00.
Before the NBI, defendant Andrew Tan and his sister Helen Go signed a Joint
Affidavit of Undertaking.
"Defendant claims that he was coerced into signing the above Undertaking. He
then assailed the validity of said Undertaking in Civil Case No. D-9864 entitled
'Andrew Tan, plaintiff vs. Wu Sen Woei, represented by Raul Estrella. The RTC
found Tan's and Go's consent to the Undertaking as vitiated and rendered
judgment declaring the Undertaking as a nullity. The decision was appealed to
this Court. This Court, reversed and set aside the appealed judgment, and
dismissed Andrew Tan's complaint

"In the meantime, based on the Undertaking, herein plaintiff-appellant Wu Sen


Woei was further able to collect $25,000.00, Weaving a balance of $45,000.00
(Complaint, par. 8, Record, p. 3) Hence he filed the instant suit docketed as Civil
Case No. 91-55981 to collect the said balance of $45,000.00 plus interest and
attorney's fees, alleging in his Complaint that defendant had defrauded him by
not actually investing the money into the hatchery business." 7

The CA had ruled therein that the said Affidavit was an admission against
interest, a clear acknowledgment by Tan of his obligation to Wu Sen Woei. Thus,
the appellate court deemed it pointless to determine whether there was, instead,
a consummated partnership between the two parties.

Issues

"I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious error of
judgment in applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.

Ruling

The petition is not meritorious. Clearly, the present case is closely related to the civil
action for annulment of document filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan against respondent on April 3, 1991. In that action, the RTC-
Dagupan declared null and void the Affidavit of Undertaking executed by Tan in favor of
Wu Sen Woei. Upon appeal,10however, the Court of Appeals11 reversed the RTC
judgment and upheld the validity of the Affidavit.12 That CA Decision became final and
executory.

Indeed, the CA's earlier Decision concerning the validity of Andrew Tan's Affidavit of
Undertaking has become conclusive on the parties, pursuant to Section 47 (c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.14 The parties are bound by the matters adjudged and those
that are actually and necessarily included therein. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment, which is also known as "preclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel"
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

The concept clearly applies to the present case, because petitioner again seeks refuge
in the alleged nullity of the same Affidavit of Undertaking which, as earlier mentioned,
was already ruled upon with finality. In other words, the question on the validity of the
Affidavit has been settled. The same question, therefore, cannot be raised again even in
a different proceeding involving the same parties.

Although the action instituted in this case (collection of a sum of money) is technically
different from that action instituted by Andrew Tan before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan (for annulment of document), "the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still
applies because under this principle, the identity of causes of action is not required but
merely identity of issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action."15

Moreover, petitioner's assertion that the Affidavit of Undertaking had been executed
under duress is contradicted by the events that took place following its execution.
Petitioner did not immediately question its validity. In fact, of the $70,000 that he
undertook to pay Wu Sen Woei, the former has been able to make payments in the
amount of $25,000, pursuant to the terms of the Affidavit.

71. [G.R. No. 164857. April 11, 2005]

FLEXO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COLUMBUS FOODS,


INCORPORATED and PACIFIC MEAT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, respondents.

Facts:
On February 6, 2002, Flexo Manufacturing Corporation (Flexo) filed a
complaint[4] against Columbus Foods Incorporated (Columbus) and Pacific Meat
Company Incorporated (Pacific) for sum of money with preliminary attachment. Flexo
alleged that on August 27, 1999 and September 28, 1999, it executed Contract Nos.
6150 and 6288 with Columbus for the manufacture of 48 million and 6 million foil
pouches, respectively.
Flexo made partial deliveries which were paid by Pacific. Subsequently, Flexo
demanded the payment of manufactured but undelivered foil pouches amounting to
P2,957,270.00 but both respondents denied any liability. Thus, the complaint where
Flexo sought for the payment of the foil pouches valued at P2,957,270.00 with 24%
interest per annum from April 2000 until fully paid, as well as 25% of the obligation as
attorneys fees and cost of suit.
In their answer with counterclaim,[5] respondents claimed that Flexo had no cause of
action against them. They alleged that the two contracts executed by them were general
agreements subject to specific instructions and confirmation to be relayed periodically to
Flexo. On March 31, 2000, they informed Flexo to deliver all outstanding orders by April
14, 2000. Since the latter was unable to deliver the outstanding orders on time,
respondents argued that they had been relieved from the obligation.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Columbus Foods, Inc. and
Pacific Meat Co., Inc.,
On December 27, 2002, Columbus and Pacific appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On the same day, Flexo filed a motion for execution pending appeal[8] which the trial
court granted considering the deteriorating condition of the pouches and the insolvency
of Columbus as valid grounds for execution.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari[9] with the Court of Appeals
which granted the petition and set aside the order of the RTC of Caloocan City.
The Court of Appeals held that no good reasons or superior circumstances
demanding urgency justified the grant of the motion for execution pending appeal. [10] It
noted that when the complaint was filed, the foil pouches which had a shelf life of six
months, had already deteriorated. In effect, the foil pouches had become unfit and there
is no more right to be protected by the execution pending appeal. [11] Furthermore,
Columbus alleged insolvency was not duly established. Notwithstanding, it observed
that Flexo could still collect from Pacific as the latter was a solidary debtor.
Flexo filed the instant petition[12] after denial of its motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
whether good reasons exist to justify the grant of execution pending appeal.
Ruling:
Flexo maintains that the deteriorating condition of the foil pouches, the insolvent
state of Columbus, and the posting of bond were good reasons to warrant execution
pending appeal. It avers that the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the foil pouches
had already become unfit at the time the complaint was filed and thus, there was no
right to be protected by the execution pending appeal. It insists that the evidence on
record proves that Columbus is insolvent. Lastly, the five million pesos (P5,000,000.00)
bond it posted was sufficient to answer for the money garnished on execution pending
appeal from Pacific.
The petition lacks merit.
As a general rule, the execution of a judgment should not be had until and unless
the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of appeal has lapsed
without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has
been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in
which event, execution shall issue as a matter of right. Execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is, therefore, the
exception.[13]
Execution pending appeal requires the observance of the following requisites: (a)
there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason
for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special
order.[14]
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
rule, the existence of good reasons is essential.[15] Good reasons has been held to
consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment
becomes illusory. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment.[16] The rules do not specify the good reasons to justify
execution pending appeal, thus, it is the discretion of the court to determine what may
be considered as such.
In the instant case, the first demand letter for the undelivered goods was sent on
June 6, 2000. Therefore, it can be assumed that the foil pouches have been processed
prior to this date. Since the lifetime of the product is one year after which they start to
deteriorate,[17] the foil pouches had deteriorated when Flexo filed the complaint on
February 6, 2002. When the trial court promulgated its decision on December 11, 2002,
two and a half years had already elapsed. As such, the foil pouches were over and
beyond its shelf life and unfit to be utilized.

While this Court in several cases has held that insolvency of the judgment debtor or
imminent danger thereof is a good reason for discretionary execution, otherwise to
await a final and executory judgment may not only diminish but may nullify all chances
for recovery on execution from said judgment debtor, We are constrained to rule
otherwise in this particular case. In the aforecited cases, there was either only one
defeated party or judgment debtor who was, however, insolvent or there were several
such parties but all were insolvent, hence the aforesaid rationale for discretionary
execution was present. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that, assuming MMIC is
insolvent, its co-defendant PNB is not. It cannot, therefore, be plausibly assumed that
the judgment might become illusory; if MMIC cannot satisfy the judgment, PNB will
answer for it. It will be observed that, under the dispositive portion of the judgment
hereinbefore quoted, the liability of PNB is either subsidiary or solidary.

Thus, when there are two or more defendants and one is not insolvent, the
insolvency of a co-defendant is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal if
their liability under the judgment is either subsidiary or solidary. In this case, Pacific was
adjudged to be solidarily liable with Columbus. Therefore, the latter is not the only party
that may be answerable to Flexo. Its insolvency does not amount to a good reason to
grant exectution pending appeal.

72. G.R. No. 131237 July 31, 2000

ROSENDO T. UY, MEDRING SIOCO, BOBBY BERNARD S. UY and LUISA T.


UY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, as Judge of Branch 101, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City; BENITO PALOMADO, PIO BERMEJO and SANTOS
NGALIO, respondents.

Facts:

On December 19, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43,
rendered a Decision1 in favor of petitioners in four consolidated ejectment cases.

Three of the cases involving private respondents were appealed and raffled to Branch
101 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Courts, presided by respondent Judge. On July
15, 1997, respondent Judge rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the
court a quo.2 A week thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal, to which private respondent filed their Opposition.

Meanwhile, on August 6, 1997, private respondents filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals assailing the Decision of respondent Judge in the ejectment cases.

On August 12, 1997, respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal.3A Motion for Reconsideration was filed on August 22, 1997,
to which an Opposition was filed by private respondents.

On October 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.4

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus for the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, which according to petitioners is the mandatory duty of respondent Judge.

As basis for denying petitioners’ Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, respondent
Judge cited private respondents’ compliance with the requirements to stay immediate
execution of judgment, namely: (1) perfection of appeal; (2) filing of a supersedeas
bond; and (3) periodic deposit of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.

Petitioners contend that Rule 70, Section 10, which enumerated the above-mentioned
requirements, has already been expressly repealed by Rule 70, Section 21 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the execution of appealed ejectment
decisions with the Regional Trial Courts cannot now be stayed.

Issue:

Whether or not decisions of Regional Trial Courts in appealed ejectment cases pending
appeal with the Court of Appeals are immediately executory and cannot be stayed.

Ruling:
"In her answer, Judge Paas contended that Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure allows the stay of execution of judgment if the defendant files sufficient
supersedeas bond and deposits to the appellate court from time to time the amount of
rent due under the contract. Since Thadanis deposited sufficient supersedeas bond and
are up to date in depositing the monthly rental of P17,000.00 including 20% rental
increase, Judge Paas stayed execution of the judgment. She cited the case of Heirs of
J.B.L. Reyes vs. Metro Manila Builders, Inc., where the Court of Appeals granted a
temporary restraining order restraining the court of origin from enforcing the execution
until final disposition of the case.

Northcastle on the other hand argued that the word "shall" in Section 21, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure means that it is the ministerial duty of the court to
immediately execute the decision. Such interpretation, according to complainants, is
consistent with the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.

A careful perusal of the two provisions reveals the applicability of Section 19 only to
ejectment cases pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court, and Section 21 to those
decided by the Regional Trial Court.1âwphi1

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

‘Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.- If judgment is


rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract,
he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by
the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court,
with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action
is appealed.’

‘All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or
authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final
disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in
the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order
the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until
the final disposition thereof on the merits.’
‘After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the Court by
the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it
appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or
building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession
may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of
the appeal.’

On the other hand, Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

‘Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court –


The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.’

We agree with the complainants.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court in an ejectment case is immediately executory
without prejudice to a petition for review with the Court of Appeals." (emphasized in the
original)

From the foregoing, it is clear that it is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be
stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided inRule 70, Section 19 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has
rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without
prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or
Supreme Court.

Erasing any doubt on the matter is the more recent case of Teresa T. Gonzales La’O &
Co., Inc. vs. Sheriff Hatab,6where it was categorically held that –

"Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court where the defendant, after
perfecting his appeal, could prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by taking
an appeal and making a periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the
appeal and thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the
meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that the
judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be
immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a
higher court."

Private respondents’ argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them of
their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We must stress that
what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. It is
not conclusive on the right of possession of the land 7 and shall not have any effect on
the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it must be remembered that
ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible.8

73. RUFA A. RUBIO vs. LOURDES ALABATA


GR No. 203947

Statement of the case:


1. Before October 31, 1995---The institution of a complaint for annulment of declaration
of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43 of Dumaguete City.
2. October 31, 1995—The said RTC-43 decided the following: (1) annulled the
"Declaration of Heirship and Sale;" (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire
subject property to petitioners; (3) dismissed respondent’s counterclaim; and (4)
ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit.
3. After the RTC rendered its decision, the respondent elevated the case to the CA.
However, she later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC-43 Decision
to lapse into finality.
4. June 20, 1997—The CA resolution granting respondent’s motion to withdraw became
final and executory.
5. August 20, 1997—The Entry of Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA Book of
Entries of Judgments. Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed.
6. November, 2007—More than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC-43 decision
was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said
decision had become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the
Entry of Judgment.
7. December 5, 2007—Petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival
of judgment which was raffled to RTC-42.
8. On February 28, 2008—After respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses,
RTC-42 granted her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners’ case for revival of
judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription.
9. April 4, 2008—RTC-42 denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
10. November 16, 2011— CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the dismissal
by the RTC-42 of the case for revival of judgment.
11. September 26, 2012— the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
WHETHER the court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription
and dismissing the case based on the said ground in spite of the fact that petitioners will
suffer manifest injustice and deprivation of the property

Ruling:
Yes. The court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and
dismissing the case. [P]rocedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not
be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the
September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for
appropriate action”

74. DOUGLAS F. ANAMA vs. CA and PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK


G.R. No. 187021

Statement of the case:


1. Sometime in 1973—Douglas F. Anama, petitioner, and Philippine Savings Bank
(PSB), respondent, entered into a Contract to Buy, on installment basis, the real
property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the
latter’s name.
2. Subsequent to the contract—Anama defaulted in paying his obligations. PSB
rescinded the contract, and the title to the property remained with it. Subsequently, PSB
sold the property to the spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co (Co Spouses). After
paying the purchase price in full, they registered the property in their names under TCT
No. 14239.
3. After the sale and issuance of the title—Anama filed with the CA a complaint for
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and
specific performance with damages against PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.
4. August 21, 1991—CA dismissed Anama’s complaint and upheld the validity of the
sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Anama then appealed the case to the SC.
6. January 29, 2004—SC denied Anama’s petition sustaining the validity of the sale
between PSB and the Co Spouses.
7. July 12, 2004—SC decision became final and executory.
8. November 25, 2005---CA granted the Co Spouses’ motion for execution.
9. After November 25, 2005 order---Anama moved for the reconsideration of CA’s order
arguing that the Co Spouses’ motion for execution is fatally defective. He averred that
the spouses motion was pro forma because it lacked the required affidavit of service
and has a defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap of paper. CA, however,
denied Anama’s motion for reconsideration.
10. March 31, 2008—The CA dismissed the petition for reason that the issue on the
validity of the deed of sale between Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and the Spouses Co
had long been laid to rest considering that the SC Decision on January 29, 2004
became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of
right on the part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ
of execution enforcing a final and executory decision.
11. Not satisfied with the CA’s unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition
praying for the reversal thereof: The respondents failed to substantially comply with the
rule on notice and hearing when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution with the RTC.

Issue:
WHETHER the respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and
hearing when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC.

Ruling:
No, respondents did not violate the Rules of the Court.

The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements
is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule,
however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex
parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered
by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

In this case, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution
of the Spouses Co. The records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly
served upon, and received by, petitioner’s counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena
Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a “signed stamped received a mark” appearing
on said pleading. The said law office, as a matter of fact, did not present any written
denial of its valid receipt on behalf of its client, neither is there proof that the Quasha
Ancheta Pena Nolasco Offices has formally withdrawn its appearance as petitioner’s
counsel-of-record. Thus, there was compliance with the rules.

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is
proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not
prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority.

Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to
study and answer the arguments in the motion.
75. BPI v. CARLITO LEE
G.R. No. 190144

Statement of the case:


1. April 26, 1988— Carlito Lee filed a complaint for sum of money with damages and
application for the issuance of a writ of attachment against Trendline and Buelva before
the RTC seeking to recover his total investment in the amount of P5.8 million.
2. May 4, 1988—The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment whereby the Check-
O-Matic Savings Accounts of Trendline with Citytrust Banking Corporation, Ayala
Branch, in the total amount of P700,962.10 were garnished.
3. August 8,1989—the RTC rendered a decision finding defendants jointly and severally
liable to Lee for the full amount of his investment plus legal interest, attorney’s fees and
costs of suit. The defendants appealed the RTC decision to the CA (CA-G.R. CV No.
23166).
4. April 13, 1994—Citytrust filed before the RTC an Urgent Motion and Manifestation
seeking a ruling on defendants' request to release the amount of P591,748.99 out of the
garnished amount for the purpose of paying Trendline’s tax obligations.
5. October 4, 1996— Citytrust and BPI merged, with the latter as the surviving
corporation.
6. December 22, 1998—CA denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 23166 and affirmed
in toto the decision of the RTC, which had become final and executory on January 24,
1999.
7. July 29, 1999— Lee filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC which was granted.
8. December 16, 2002—Lee filed a Motion for Execution and/or Enforcement of
Garnishment before the RTC seeking to enforce against BPI the garnishment of
Trendline’s deposit in the amount of P700,962.10 and other deposits it may have had
with Citytrust.
9. Lee’s Motion for Execution and/or Enforcement of Garnishment and Motion for
Reconsideration were denied.
10. February 11, 2009—After Lee elevated the case to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, the CA decided in favor of Lee.
11. The CA refused to give credence to BPI’s defense that it can no longer locate
Trendline’s bank records with the defunct Citytrust, as its existence was supported by
evidence and by the latter's admission. Neither did it consider BPI a stranger to the
case, holding it to have become a party-in-interest upon the approval by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the parties’ Articles of Merger.
12. October 29, 2009—BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA.

Issue:
WHETHER the CA erred in ruling that petitioner BPI became party-in-interest in the
case filed by Lee upon the approval by the SEC of its merger with Citytrust Banking
Corporation.
Ruling:
No. Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in court must be impleaded as private respondents. Upon
the merger of Citytrust and BPI, with the latter as the surviving corporation, and with all
the liabilities and obligations of Citytrust transferred to BPI as if it had incurred the
same, BPI undoubtedly became a party interested in sustaining the proceedings, as it
stands to be prejudiced by the outcome of the case.

It is a settled rule that upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a
“virtual party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby acquires
jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and processes.

Citytrust, therefore, upon service of the notice of garnishment and its acknowledgment
that it was in possession of defendants' deposit accounts in its letter-reply dated June
28, 1988, became a “virtual party” to or a “forced intervenor” in the civil case. As such, it
became bound by the orders and processes issued by the trial court despite not having
been properly impleaded therein. Consequently, by virtue of its merger with BPI on
October 4, 1996, BPI, as the surviving corporation, effectively became the garnishee,
thus the “virtual party” to the civil case.

76.- AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), Represented by


Josephine b. Omictin vs Loreto g. Nicolas and Olimpio Cruz
Statement of the Case
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Tagum City, Davao del Norte.The DARAB declared the land granted to
petitioner, Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (ARBA),exempt from the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program(CARP).It ordered,inter alia, the
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) given to ARBA and
reinstated the titles under the names of respondents.
This case started when the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a notice of
Coverage to PhilBanking, the registered owner of a two parcels of land located in
Barangay Mintal, Davao City.PhilBanking immediately filed its protest after DAR
declared that subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of CARL. Despite protest,
DAR caused the cancellation of the titles of the subject parcels of land and distributed
said land to the farmer-beneficiaries.PhilBanking then, executed a deed of assignment
in favor of respondents. As assignees and succesors-in-interest, respondents continued
Philbankings protest over DARs takeover of their lands. However, respondents filed
their complaint before the local DARAB in Tagum City, Davao del Norte with a prayer
for the cancellation of the CLOA and reinstatement of titles previously registered under
the name of Philbanking.
The DARAB (Tagum) rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Petitioner appealed
then to the DARAB Central Office. Acting on the appeal, the DARAB,overturned the
decision of its local office.
Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration but was subsequently denied by the DARAB.
Dissatisfied with the Central DARAB ruling, respondents elevated the matter to the
CA.In their appeal, respondents essentially contended that the DARAB (Central Office )
erred in ruling that the subject parcels of lands were within RA 6657.
CA granted the appeal applying the ruling on Department of Justice Opinion no. 44 ad
this ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc v. Department of Agrarian Reform.

Doctrines:
1. Natalia Ruling:Once land has been classified as non- agricultural prior to the
effectivity of CARL, it becomes outside of its coverage .
2. Petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 vs. rule 65

Rule 45- a petition for review on certiorari is an ordinary appeal. It is a


continuation of the case from CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC, or other courts. The
petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and
discussed.

Rule 65-a petition for certiorari is an original action. It seeks to correct errors of
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was
issued by court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction,or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction. The purpose of the remedy of certiorari is to annul void
proceedings; prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority; and
provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.
Thus, errors in the appreciation of evidence may only be reviewed by appeal and
not by certiorari because they do not involve jurisdiction and may only be
corrected by ordinary appeal.
77. REPUBLIC VS BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS GR.No. 203039
Facts:
On February 12, 1998, the Department of Public works and highways filed with
the RTC, NCR, Las Pinas City, a case for expropriation against portions of the
BPI and of Bayani Villanueva situated in Pamplona, Las Pinas City. DPWH
needed 281 square meters of BPI’s lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
and 177 square meters from Villanueva’s lot covered by TCT No. T-64556 for the
construction of the Zapote Alabang Fly-over.

Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation.The


Trial court constituted a Board of commissioners to determine the just
compensation.In their report on September 29, 1998,the Board of commissioners
recommended the amount of PHP 40,000.00 per square meter.
The amount to be awarded to BPI and Villanueva shall be 11,240,000.00 and
7,080,000.00 respectively. The DPWH deposited Php. 632,250 as partial
payment to BPI and Php 2,655,000.00 to Villanueva.
Judgement then was rendered ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant BPI a sum
of 10,607,750.00 and a sum of 4,425,000.00 to Villanueva as just compensation
for their properties which were expropriated.
On December 15, 1998, the acting branch clerk of court issued a certification
that decision in this case has become final, executory and unappealable.
On December 16, 1998, BPI filed a motion for partial new trial to determine the
just compensation of its building, which was not included in decision on
November 25, 1998.
On January 6, 1999, the court granted partial new trial.
On September 10, 1999, the trial court held that just compensation for the
building was due and ordered petitioner to pay BPI.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,on the ground that the proceeding fixing the
just compensationof the building is null and void for not complying with the
mandatory procedure set forth in section 5 to 8 of rule 67 of rules of court.The
Trial court denied BPI’s motion for reconsideration.
On Sept. 19,2000, the trial court Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, the branch clerk of
court as the chairman of the board of commissioners, and gave petitioner 10
days to submit their respective nominees and their oath of office.BPI nominated
Roland Savellano and submitted his oath of office.
On October 13, 2000, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion objecting to the
propriety of paying just compensation for BPI’s building and praying that BPI’s
claim for additional just compensation be denied because they have not taken
the building.

On 07 May 2001, the trial court denied33 petitioner’s motion dated 09October 2000, and
ruled that the demolition of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential
damage suffered by BPI as a result of the expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered to
submit its nominee to the Board of Commissioners.

Petitioner nominated Romulo C. Gervacio (Gervacio), the Officer-In-Charge of the City


Assessor’s Office in Las Piñas City. The Board thus constituted, the trial court ordered
the Commissioners to submit their recommendation.

Commissioner for BPI Savellano recommended the amount of ₱2,633,000.00, which


was based on the appraisal conducted by an independent professional business and
property consultant. On the other hand, Commissioner for petitioner Gervacio
recommended the amount of ₱1,905,600.00, which was the market value indicated on
the tax declaration of said building. The Commissioner’s Report presented both the
recommendations of Savellano and Gervacio for the trial court’s consideration.

The trial court issued the order, adopting the recommendation of Gervacio.Petitioner to
the court of appeals but the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

ISSUES:
1.whether the trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had become final
and executory before BPI filed its motion for partial new trial; and
(2) whether the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building in the
amount fixed therefor is unfounded and without legal basis.
RULING:

We find the appeal unmeritorious.

On whether BPI’s motion for partial new


trial was filed out of time

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had already
become final and executory as of 11 December 1998, as stated in the
Certification42 issued by the acting branch clerk of court. On the other hand, BPI asserts
that its motion for partial new trial filed on 16 December 1998 was timely filed because it
received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 25 November 1998
Decision did not become final and executory for BPI on 11December 1998. It argues
that the appellate court erred in reckoning the 15-day reglementary period from a mere
admission of the date of receipt by BPI. Petitioner further argues that the Certification
issued by the acting branch clerk of the trial court enjoys a presumption of regularity and
that BPI had not been able to overcome the presumption. Both the trial and appellate
courts found that BPI’s motion for partial new trial was filed on time.

A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998
Decision had already become final, executory and unappealable as to petitioner:

x x x the Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL,
EXECUTORY and UNAPPEALABLE as of December 11, 1998 considering that the
Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice of Appeal or Motion for
Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on November 26, 1998.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Jansen Rodriguez for
whatever legal purpose it may serve.43 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record.

Section 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states that judgments, final orders or
resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. Section 13 of the
same Rule provides what consists proof of service:

Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service. x x x If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by
the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender x x x.

A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25
November 1998 was served upon BPI. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision, the period of 15 days within which to
file its motion for partial new trial did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPI’s
admission that it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998 is binding on it,
and was correctly considered by the Court of Appeals as the reckoning date to count
the 15-day period.

On whether the award of additional just


compensation and the amount fixed therefor
was unfounded and without legal basis

Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private
property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just
compensation. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional
mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated.46

The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The
general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion
actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property.

In this case, petitioner questions the appellate court’s Decision affirming the trial court’s
Order of 03 February 2003 granting additional just compensation for consequential
damages for BPI’s building. Petitioner contends that BPI’s building was "never taken" by
petitioner, and that to award consequential damages for the building was unfounded
and without legal basis. In support of its contention, petitioner relies on the letter
dated12 September 2000 of the DPWH to the Office of the Solicitor General50 stating
that the proposed sidewalk of 2.50 meters was reduced to 2.35meters, thus leaving
BPI’s building intact.

Petitioner’s argument is untenable.

No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.


Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining
property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. The rules on
expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages.
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:

x x x The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not
taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or public purpose of the property taken, the
operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held that:

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first as certain the market value
of the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting
therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should bed is
regarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case.

We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Lastly, as to the argument of plaintiff-appellant that the award of additional just


compensation for the building of defendant-appellee is erroneous and without legal
basis because the building was never taken by the government in the expropriation
proceeding conducted by the trial court nor was it affected by the construction of the
Zapote-Alabang Flyover, We find the ruling of Republic of the Philippines through the
DPWH vs. CA and Rosario R. Reyes appropriate to apply in this case, to wit:

Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may be awarded as the remaining


lot was not "actually taken" by the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the
lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of
the latter.

Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious.

No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the
remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private
respondent.53(Italicization in the original)

Petitioner would also have us review the bases of the courts below in awarding just
compensation for the building for consequential damages. The uniform findings of the
trial court and the appellate court are entitled to the greatest respect. They are binding
on the Court in the absence of a strong showing by petitioner that the courts below
erred in appreciating the established facts and in drawing inferences from such
facts.54 We find no cogent reason to deviate from this.

The Court would like to stress that there is a stark absence in the records of any proof
that DPWH communicated its amended plan to BPI or to the trial court. On the other
hand, the trial court found that BPI was not notified of the reduction and had relied only
on the DPWH letter dated 12 August 1997 saying that it was not possible to reduce the
width of the sidewalk. Petitioner had actively participated in the expropriation
proceedings of the portion of BPI’s lot according to the original plan, the decision for
which was promulgated on 25 November 1998. The trial court had also ruled that
additional just compensation for the building was in order in its Decision dated 10
September 1999, from which petitioner moved for reconsideration but only as to the
procedure in the determination of the amount. Further, the records show that by 07
September 1999, when Officer-In-Charge Agbayani conducted an ocular inspection, a
new building had already been constructed replacing the old one; whereas the
amended plan was communicated by DPWH to the OSG only in September 2000,when
the trial court was constituting anew the Board of Commissioners to determine the
amount of just compensation for the building. The findings of the lower courts are borne
by the records. Hence, there was proper basis for the determination of just
compensation for the building for consequential damages.

78. ISABELO ESPERIDA V. FRANCO K. JURADO GR NO. 172538

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the resolution on March 2,2006
denying the motion for extension of time to file answer filed by petitioners Isabel
Esperida, et. Al and the resolution on April 19, 2006 denying petitioners Omnibus
motion and second Motion for extension,of the CA.

On February 5,2001, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against


respondent Jurado before the labor arbiter. The labor arbiter’s decision favored
petitioners declaring that they have been illegally dismissed and awarding them their
corresponding backwages and separation pay on March 14,2002.

The respondent appealed to the NLRC but the latter issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal and affirming the decision of the labor arbiter.

Respondent sought recourse before the CA but CA rendered decision dismissing the
petition and affirming the resolution of NLRC. Respondent filed motion for
reconsideration but was denied again on September 27, 2005. However during the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration, respondent filed before the CA a petition to
declare petitioners in contempt of court against petitioners declaring the petitioners
guilty of indirect contempt of court on the basis of their alleged act of dishonesty, fraud,
and falsification of documents to mislead the CA to rule in their favor in CA. The CA
issued then a resolution ordering petitioners to file their answer within 15 days from
notice, showing cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of
court.

On February 8, 2006, counsel for petitioners filed his entry of appearance, together with
motion for extension of time, seeking that petitioners be granted 15 days from February
3, 2006, or up to February 18,2006 within which to submit their answer to petition.

On March 2, 2006, the CA issued one of the assailed resolutions denying the motion for
extension.

On March 20,2006, petitioners counsel also filed an omnibus Motion for reconsideration
of the March 2, 2006 resolution; and for admission of respondents answer, reasoning
that the late filing of the motion for extension was because counsel was tied up with the
preparations of equally important paer works and pleadings for the other cases which
he is also handling. Counsel explained that he failed to give instructions to his liaison
officer to mail the motion on the same day. Also, personal service was not possible due
to the considerable distance between the parties respective offices.

On April 19, 2006, the CA issued the other assailed resolution denying both the
Omnibus Motion and second motion for extension for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED


IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED


IN CONSIDERING THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WITHOUT
GIVING PETITIONERS THEIR INHERENT AND INALIENABLE RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW; and

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED


IN DENYING BOTH THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS ANSWER.[15]

RULINGS:

Petition Granted.

Petitioners argue that the reasoning advanced by its counsel in failing to submit
their Answer on time, and their failure to submit the Explanation why their answer was
not served personally, erases any legal defect or impediment for the admission of their
Answer by the CA. Petitioners maintain that the CA should have practiced liberality in
interpreting and applying the rules in the interest of justice, fair play and equity.

Petitioners contend that if their Answer would not be considered and appreciated
in the disposition of the case, they will be adjudged guilty of falsification and
misrepresentation without being afforded an opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy, in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On his part, respondent maintains that the CA did not err in denying petitioners
motions and that they were not denied due process of law. Moreover, respondent avers
that even if petitioners Answer was not admitted, it does not mean that they will
unceremoniously be adjudged in contempt of court. It only means that the contempt
proceedings will commence without petitioners Answer, in accordance with the Rules.

The petition is meritorious.

Sections 3[16] and 4,[17] Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the
procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First,
there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment
on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must
investigate the charge and consider respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will
respondent be punished accordingly.[18] The law requires that there be a charge in
writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard
by himself or counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted
an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This
is due process, which must be observed at all times.[19]

The case of Mutuc v. Court of Appeals[20] is instructive as to what due process


means in contempt proceedings. This Court stated:

There is no question that the essence of due process is a hearing


before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal x x x
but due process as a constitutional precept does not always, and in all
situations, require a trial-type proceeding x x x. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. x x x To
be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.[21]
In the case at bar, petitioners were indeed given ample opportunity to file their
Answer. In denying petitioners Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension, the
CA ratiocinated that the justifications advanced by petitioners do not warrant the grant
of liberality in the application of the Rules and their omissions are unpardonable and
should not be tolerated.[22]

It must be stressed, however, that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the


nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions
also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of
the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes
governing them are to be strictly construed.[23] Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the
answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.[24]

In the present recourse, petitioners plead for the liberal application of the Rules.
Admittedly, in their Omnibus Motion before the appellate court, petitioners counsel
acknowledged his shortcomings in complying with the resolution of the court and took
full responsibility for such oversight and omission. Petitioners counsel also reasoned
that the lack of personal service of the motion for extension was due to the considerable
distance between the parties respective offices and that the failure of filing the motion
for extension on time was due to the fact that counsels liaison officer failed to follow his
instructions. Indeed, counsels liaison officer attested such facts in his
Explanation/Affidavit,[25] which was attached to the Omnibus Motion. More importantly,
also attached to the Omnibus Motion was petitioners Answer to the petition to cite them
in contempt.
It is settled that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure.[26] Time and again, this Court has held that a strict
and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.[27] Considering the nature of contempt proceedings and the
fact that petitioners actually filed their Answer, albeit belatedly, the CA should have
been more liberal in the application of the Rules and admitted the Answer.
Moreover, this Court finds that the CA also erred in considering the case deemed
submitted for resolution sans the answer[28] of petitioners without setting and conducting
a hearing on a fixed date and time on which petitioners may personally, or through
counsel, answer the charges against them.

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. [29] To be


sure, since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge,
conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. [30] A respondent in a
contempt charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil
actions, the Court does not issue summons on the respondent. While the respondent is
not required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must
set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent
must make his appearance to answer the charge. On the date and time of the hearing,
the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or
testimony as the respondent may make or offer. The mode of procedure and rules of
evidence therein are assimilated to criminal prosecutions. If he fails to appear on that
date after due notice without justifiable reason, the court may order his arrest, just like
the accused in a criminal case who fails to appear when so required. The court does not
declare the respondent in a contempt charge in default.[31]

Clearly, the contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of the
proceedings. The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court below has
set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their defenses. Verily, a
hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary
or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more
thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe
the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from
the complainants or the court itself.[32] In fine, the proper procedure must be observed
and petitioners must be afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.
79.City Government of Baguio vs Atty. Masweng
GR no. 188913
Statement of the case
Petitioner issued Demolition order no.33 series of 2005 and nos.25 and 28 series of
2004, ordering the demolition of illegal structures on the Busol Watershed Reservation.
On Oct.13,2006, a petition for injunction with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction was filed by Elvin Gumangan et al. docketed as case no. 31-CAR-06.
On Oct. 16 & 19,2006, respondent Masweng issued 2 separate TROs and granted the
application for injunction.
On Appeal, CA affirmed the injunctive writ issued by Masweng.
On the SC, docketed as GR no. 180206, the court reversed and set aside the ruling of
the CA and dismissed NCIP case no. 31-CAR-06. The court held that although NCIP
has the authority to issue TROs and writ of injunction, Elvin Gumangan et al were not
entitled to the relief granted. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, thus the
decision became final and executory.
Petitioner issued Demolition advices against Alexander Ampaguey Sr. et al that DO no.
33,series of 2005 and no.83 series of 1999 will be enforced in July 2009.
On July 23,2009 Magdalena Gumangan et al filed a petition for the identification and
recognition of their ancestral land and enforcement of their indigenous cultural
communities with prayer for issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction
docketed as case no. 29-CAR-09.
On July 27,2009, Alexander Ampaguey Sr. et al filed a petition for injunction with prayer
for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction as case no 31-CAR-09.
Respondent issued 2 separate 72 hours TRO and also issued writ of preliminary
injunction for both cases.
Hence, this petition asserting that the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were
issued in willful disregard, disobedience, defiance and resistance of the court’s decision
in GR no.180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s act of enjoining the execution of the demolition
orders is tantamount to allowing forum shopping since the implementation of the
demolition orders already been adjudicated and affirmed by this court.
In the Case at bar, the same legal issues are thus being litigated in GR no.
180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being
assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim 1.) that atty. Masweng is prohibited from
issuing TROs and writ of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure
preojects 2.) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA and 3) that private
respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents,
presented the same allegations in their petition for injunction, particularly the alleged
recognition made under Proclamation no.15 in favor of their ancestors. While res
judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar
and GR no. 180206 ( they assail different writs of injunction, albeit the same hearing
officer) we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition.
The Principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.
It is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues necessary for 2 reasons: economy
and stability. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised, however, such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should
not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. The court must exercise
the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint, with the end
in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
not for retaliation or vindication.

80.Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs Lee Won


Gr no L-23851 March 26, 1976

Statement of the Case


The wack wack and Golf and Country club inc. a non- stock,civic and athletic
corporation alleged, for its cause of action, that the defendant Lee Won claims
ownership of its membership certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil
case 26044 entitled “Lee Won vs Wack Wack Golf & Country club” and also by virtue of
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court.
That the defendant Bienvenido Tan, claims to be the lawful owner of its membership fee
certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201 serial no. 1199 issued to him
pursuant an assignment made in his favor by “Swan, Culbertson and Fritz” the original
owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201.
The corporation prayed that a.) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead
and litigate their conflicting claims and b.) judgment be rendered, after hearing,
declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201 and
ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201 serial no.
1478 issued in the name of Lee.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicate,failure
of the complainant to state a cause of action and bar by prescription. The trail Court
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the corporation contends that the court erred in dismissing the complaint,
instead of compelling the appellees to interplead and as there is not identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action between civil case no. 26044 of the CFI of
Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been dismissed on the
ground of res judicata.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants


to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before
filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable
time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
barred.
Action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be
so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable
to the latter.

81.Flores vs spouses Lindo


Gr no. 183984 April 13, 2011
Statement of the facts
On October 31, 1995 Edna Lindo, obtained a loan from Arturo Flores( petitioner)
amounting to 400,000 payable on December 1995. To secure the loan, Edna executed
a deed of Real estate mortgage covering a property in the name of Edna and her
husband Enrico Lindo.
Edna issued 3 checks as partial payments for loan. All checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for foreclosure of
Mortgage with damages against respondents.
The RTC branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority
of Enrico. Further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from
Edna as he could file a personal action against her.
On September 8, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with damages
against respondents, raffled to Branch 42 RTC. Respondent filed their answer with
affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum shopping invoking the
decision of the RTC Branch 33.
The RTC branch 42 issued an order denying the motion.
On the CA the court set aside the orders of the RTC branch 42. CA ruled that a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others.

The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself. If the
mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the
collection of the debt, and vice versa. The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to
file his separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit
and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural redress for
a single breach of contract at so much costs to the court and with so much vexation and
oppressiveness to the debtor.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The principle of unjust
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis
or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one
from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration.
The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan
from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause.

82. G.R. No. 182738 February 24, 2014


CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:


July 1, 2002- Respondent , a stockholder of Capitol Hills Golf, filed a petition for the
nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special
meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002.
August 12, 2002-Respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents
September 10, 2002-Motion was granted which directed the defendants to produce and
make available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the
defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and
Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21,
2002
Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Inspection and Production of the said documents
which was denied
Respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002 Order. The supposed inspection
on September 30, 2002 was not held
The January 22, 2003 inspection also did not push through after petitioners and their
co-defendants again moved for its deferment
Respondent set the inspection to August 1, 2003 but during the said date the Corporate
Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town and Roman purported to
have shown no willingness to comply with the directive
November 3, 2003-Respondent moved for the issuance of an order for immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order but the the court denied his motion.
November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial conference until the actual
conduct of the inspection of records/documents on December 12, 2006
Before said date, petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the inspection to
January 11, 2007, which the court granted
During the inspection, the only document produced was the Stock and Transfer Book of
the Corporation. The employees alleged that they could not find from the corporate
records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape
recordings taken during the stockholders’ meetings, and that they needed more time to
locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the
Corporation
This prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that an
order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the
Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799(Stated sa Impt.
Doctine/s)

The court granted Respondent’s motion with an addition of sanctions incase of failure to
comply with the order.
Petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them
sua sponte or without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende
v. Judge Sardido37 is not proper and calls for the exercise of Our power of supervision
over the lower courts.
Citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay they claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not
in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or that the contumacious act be
done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.

To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere
reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty
mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence
of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available
for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another
failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally
initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of
the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person
adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the
Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. These were not
done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007
Resolution final and executory

IMPORTANT DOCTRINE/S:

1. Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible


treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the
Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery
shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or
other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done,
the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to
the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the
phrase "among others."
2. A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court 39 or
commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice40 may be punished for indirect contempt

Two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court;
or (2) by a verified petition

1. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be
no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the
respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This
formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the
respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of
the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from
the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the discretion to order
the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be
docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely
because it is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.

2. Charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with


supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
joint hearing and decision

83. G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO


DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

October 30, 2007-Petitioner represented by his attorney-in-fact,Atty. Dugenia


(petitioner), filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against Respondent Ugay
before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union
Petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land
evidenced by an Original Certificate of Title and Tax Declarations as against
Respondent and that respondent refused to vacate the premises despite several
demands made by the Petitioner.
April 26, 2011-MTC ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to adduce
any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot and that
petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject property
RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC

SC- The Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject property by
juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth
Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18,
1987.

IMPORTANT DOCTRINE/S:

1. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that
they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived
of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that
the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property
The word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than
prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the
absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in
an ejectment case

2. Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership
shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only
an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance - to determine the issue
of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership

84. G.R. No. 164246 January 15, 2014


HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION, TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and
SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L. LOPEZ,Respondents

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:


Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin
Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the MTC of Alcala, Cagayan. The
defendants did not file their answer.
MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in favor of the Spouses Lopez
Petitioner appealed to the RTC
Sps. Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging
that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution.
The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pending appeal
RTC rendered its decision disposing the case finding that the petitioner had not
received the summons, and that the sheriff’s return did not show the steps taken by the
server to insure the petitioner’s receipt of the summons; that the non-service of the
summons on her resulted in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and that the
MTC’s decision was void ; and ordering the MTC of Alcala reopen the case and serve
the summons to Petitioner
The decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because it declared the judgment of the
MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC
thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct
further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the
nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed against her has rendered moot and
academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned
Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for
execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate
execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that
they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs
failure to comply with all of the three requisites for staying the immediate
execution(Stated sa Impt Doctrine/s)

IMPORTANT DOCTRINE/S:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession
of the property in question.
To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the
foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant
perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the
defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution
of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative."
Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely,
the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal
is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the
period for the perfection of the appeal.
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal
#85 FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORP VS ARTIRO LOO PO (2016)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

January 30, 2012: Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding that he pay the
amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased
premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the
demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises.

December 12, 2012: Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so.
Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.

March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of
Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment. In the attached
Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations against him and commented that there
was no supporting document that would show that Fairland owned the property; that
there was no lease contract between them; that there were no documents attached to
the complaint which would show that previous demands had been made and received
by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the amount of damages
being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership;
and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case.

March 21, 2013: The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s
failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence.

In its memorandum, Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil
action governed by summary procedure. In cases where a defendant failed to file his
answer, there was no need for a declaration of default. Fairland claimed that the Rules
stated that in such cases, judgment should be based on the “facts alleged in the
complaint,” and that there was no requirement that judgment must be based on facts
proved by preponderance of evidence. Considering that the presentation of evidence
was not required when a defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear in a
preliminary conference, the same should be applied when no answer had been filed.

July 18, 2013: Po filed his memorandum and countered that there was no merit in
Fairland’s insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no answer had been filed.

September 16, 2013: RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to
establish its case by preponderance of evidence.

Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration attaching its condominium certificate of title
over the subject property, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order, dated February 24,
2014. Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not
lie against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and the limited
pleadings it allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on
evidence. In order for an action for recovery of possession to prosper, it was
indispensable that he who brought the action should prove not only his ownership but
also the identity of the property claimed.

Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its assailed
Resolution, dated March 6, 2015. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of
possession.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.

86. G.R. No. 202597

SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL and EMMA SERVILLION PASCUAL, Petitioners


vs.
FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND
CORPORATION and ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA, Register of Deeds, Butuan
City, Respondents

Facts:
Sps. Pascual filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) to
nullify the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case by the Regional Trial Court in
Butuan City which ordered the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in
their TCT.

CA ordered to file their pre-trial briefs and a preliminary conference was scheduled.
However, the spouses filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-
Trial in Abeyance and during the preliminary conference, they did not appear.

CA dismissed the case stating:

Section 4 through 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 4. Appearance of parties. - It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to
appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid
cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized
in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admission of facts and of documents.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.- The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure
on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief - x x x

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-
trial.

The spouses averred that the court has to rule first on their motions before pre-trial
could be conducted

But considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before
the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action
with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import.

Contrary to the spouses’ contention, it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the
courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided
by Section 2 (g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of


dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.
The spouses may not arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended or dispensed
with, or that their motions be resolved first, as the same are discretionary upon the court
taking cognizance of the petition. Strict compliance with the Rules is indispensable for
the prevention of needless delays and the promotion of orderly and expeditious dispatch
of judicial business. Hence, petitioners' failure to comply with our directives merits
dismissal of their petition. We find support in the provision of Section 1 of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court, viz:

Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.

(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule 48, or to
comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable cause.

Aggrieved, the spouses filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether or not CA erred in declaring that "it is only at the pre-trial that the
rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
2. Whether non-resolution of a motion for summary judgment bars the holding of a
pre-trial

Ruling:

1. We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it is only at the
pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court." The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to
the pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 3 5 of the Rules of Court permits a party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking
declaratory relief to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any
part thereof in his favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions) "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served;" while Section 2 of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is
sought may file the motion for summary judgment (and its supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or any part thereof "at any
time." As such, the petitioners properly filed their motion for summary judgment
prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the requirement of
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).

The CA could have misconceived the text of Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of


dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has
earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers
the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no
such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper
party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary
motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the
Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge
cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the
case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the
motion.

2. Although motions for summary judgment


can be filed before the pre-trial, their
non-resolution prior to the pre-trial should
not prevent the holding of the pre-trial

Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first resolved
their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pretrial.1âwphi1 They could not
use the inaction on their motion to justify their nonappearance with their counsel at the
pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their
appearance at the pre-trial with their counsel was mandatory.

The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing that
Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective on
August 16, 2004.

The petitioners' argument was unwarranted.

Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 still affirmed the mandatory
character of the pre-trial, to wit:

A. Pre-Trial

6. Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be a cause for dismissal of
the action. A similar failure of the defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of
Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) - similarly
underscored the mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated under its
heading Pre-Trial in civil cases that, among others, the trial court could then
determine "the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing the case
based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial." As such,
they could have urged the trial court to resolve their pending Motion for Summary
Judgment during the pre-trial.

Court affirmed CA ruling.