G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal
laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding
the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has
all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified
that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter
from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and
Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
(Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes
on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage
ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of
the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all
the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution
to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal
laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of
the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in
this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social
institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
SO ORDERED.
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition
to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage,
namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have
been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the
present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article
36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985
at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining
her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo
did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of
our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying
it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family
Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the
Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003] explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of
action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows
BENGZON, respondents. that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of
action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of
forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent
The Case
Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no
longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision1[1] as well as the 7
August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court
Appeals affirmed the Order2[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused
second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of
to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a
Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred
Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.3[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial
1995. court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid
judgment if proven to be true.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471
(second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court). The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To
determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a
final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the
no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of
second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent
there is no final decision on the merits.
Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support
of the Motion.
Issues
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order
(first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court,
through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second
order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison
 I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING
OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.4[4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is
untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal
right of the plaintiff.5[5] A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.6[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.7[7] The
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached
to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five
children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto
Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria
born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present
time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing.
Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the
whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria
and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to
temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a
little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that
he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that
the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy,
the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium
located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor
through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation
in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and
taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with
Article 39 thereof.
xxx.8[8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.9[9] Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action
rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
which establish the material elements.10[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly11[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals12[12]
as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.13[13] Santos gave life to the
phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term
in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.14[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in
Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second
petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the
celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).15[15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration
of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.16[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need
not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences
are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new
Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and
control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition
complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent
Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner
Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege
the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done
at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show
that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board,
27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.18[18] Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment
over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of
non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal
without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.19[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion
of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original
pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to
the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state
the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification
contemplated herein have been filed.20[20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-
forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the same
grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have
stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to
the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself
constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the
complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.21[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,22[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether
the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in
Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more
in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first
petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471)
about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to
keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before
service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since
respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,23[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated
the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.24[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects.25[25] In
rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the
marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this
issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations
in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not
violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a
motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as
the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27,
1967. Out of their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia,
born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of
the latter's family; their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents,
Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with
contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started
a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later
on, his business became successful and he was able to embark upon another business
venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then
became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however,
because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her
husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband
causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business
was being given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected
their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences had become
irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property
relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have
been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage
failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as
a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol,
and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the
spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted
a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing
their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas
regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that
evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS
FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY
DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A",
hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL" (p. 7, ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. x x x4
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.5
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 367 of the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce
the same quoted portion, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,9 which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have
been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-
xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to
the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining
psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality
Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not
amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA
for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following
written evaluation regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where
the mother assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt
and developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-
average. Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to
give way, even minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional control could
not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially
with females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to
her basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable
feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her
mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further
rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for
which she is consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol
is suffering from some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a
result of marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate
Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope
with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient
psychological inner resources.10
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her
life, she could not function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always
been very much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological
reactions to any stresses, Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the
husband talking to some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present
some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of stresses
circulations, Sir.11
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a
feeling of rejection from the start of her development and this was carried on into her
adult life. When the husband started having some good relationship with his employees,
then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their employees
and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr.
Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -
Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in
such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was
already rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of
how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol
rendered her psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always
gets what she wanted in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and
during her growing up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of
her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager.
With this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development.
Besides, she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her
growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the
marriage is concerned, considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child,
Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those
feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of
jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction
with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr.
Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court
cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is
inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason
of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of
difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband, such
as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder
of respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated reactions to
normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her
dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition.
Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that
there is no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written
evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize
respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was
not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her
following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.15
(Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina
requires that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the
present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other
witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business.
In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that
their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their business.17 This is
confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a
considerable period of time.18 However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under
the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household
and provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this obligation
necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's
marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a
marriage null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her
husband's handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to start a fight
with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements
regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands
and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also
one's obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to
show that respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children
as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.20
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage.22 It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.23 In the instant case, the
Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive
behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of
incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well as their
attitudes, which developed after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological
disorder.1âwphi1 However, the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does
not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19,
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been
placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the
trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial
Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the
Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of
their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as

newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse
between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between
them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or
by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he
see hers.
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this
case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still
very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.

Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still
a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications
for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did
not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or
not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between
the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
SO ORDERED.
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their Hence, the instant petition.
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
 I testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent
has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since
it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon
a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability.
Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal
of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to
make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of
10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any
rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to
have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not
be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime
he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that
the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife
did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not
physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire
time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for
not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins,
111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it
is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated
by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to
put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation."
After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to
love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic
marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually
the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS).” 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge
of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without
the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June
20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage
License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN
THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of
their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void
ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions
of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same
married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent
Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said
“death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being
the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of
the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation
of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in
good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one- CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the
second wife, holding that: amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-
18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife SO ORDERED.
lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code,
entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has
an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to
the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by
her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership
of the first marriage.” 21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with
their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies
even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage
claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would
prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-
Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse
of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her,
he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage
is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present,
she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon
her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact;
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of
their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and
void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be
placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of
action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is,
therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by
a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under
the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled
in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited
cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that
may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the
marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration
and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and
mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the
case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the
lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant
case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage.
It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired
during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital
relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is
denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits,
the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the
partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the
alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of
an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to
recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that
SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by
private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes
of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private
respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases
where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
 Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving
the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the
Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's
share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that
"if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417,
there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for
that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and
Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration
as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of
no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the
Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which
drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40,
then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified
to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid,
does it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages,
with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if
they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea
in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not
the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving
one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that
there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the
point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in
the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner
submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure
to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
"solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it
finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the
phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of
petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support
of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage
an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas,
for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20
In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore,
the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration
by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to
be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state
in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of
SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to
"for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is
unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court
but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the
following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
 guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue
of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.