ARTICLE 48.

COMPLEX CRIMES

1. COMPOUND

A.

G.R. No. L-38755 January 22, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE PINCALIN, RODOLFO BELTRAN, EDUARDO EMPLEO and ALEJANDRO
JANDOMON, accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

This is another convict-against-convict murder case involving prisoners in the national penitentiary. As shown
in People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497, at around eight-forty-five in the morning of
Good Friday, April 9, 1971, certain Visayan prisoners, members of the Oxo gang, were killed by their fellow-
prisoners from Luzon, members of the Sigue- Sigue Sputnik (SSS) gang.

To avenge those killings, the herein accused, Jose Pincalin, Rodolfo Beltran, Eduardo Empleo and Alejandro
Jandomon, all Visayans (except Beltran) and members of the Oxo and Happy-Go-Lucky gangs, conspired at
about ten o'clock in the morning of that same Good Friday to kill some of their fellow- prisoners in dormitory
6-A of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa Rizal, who were members of the Sputnik gang.

They agreed that Pincalin would kill Leonardo Francisco that Beltran and Empleo would kill Victorino Abril,
and that Jandomon would kill Florentino Tilosa. The accused armed themselves with improvised bladed
weapons known among prisoners as matalas.

About an hour later, the accused proceeded to implement the objective of the conspiracy. While Abril was
seated on his bed watching someone who was making a basket Beltran and Empleo approached him frontally
and stabbed him Abril fell on the floor. While in that position, Empleo stabbed him six times while Beltran
stabbed him five times.

The second victim, Tilosa was standing near the door of the dormitory when Jandomon stabbed him on the
right side of his body. As Tilosa resisted, Jandomon stabbed him repeatedly until he collapsed on the floor.

The third victim, Francisco, was standing near a wall facing the prison hospital and, as he heard Abril asking
why he was assaulted when he had not done anything wrong, Francisco was stabbed by Pincalin in the
abdomen near the waist. Fransisco avoided further assaults from Pincalin by climbing a window.

Afterwards, Pincalin, Empleo, Beltran and Jandonion surrendered with their weapons to a prison inspector
named Manalac and a prison guard named Pantua. On that same day they executed separate extrajudicial
confessions in Tagalog which were sworn to before the Assistant Director of Prisons.
The autopsy disclosed that Tilosa, 37, a native of Mulanay, Quezon, suffered six gaping stab wounds in the
chest and abdomen two of which penetrated his right lung and liver, and two stab wounds in the left forearm, or
eight stab wounds in all.

Abril, 34, a native of Barrio Veronica, San Pablo City, sustained five gaping stab wounds in the chest, one of
which penetrated his left lung, a gaping incised wound in the right leg, and abrasions in the chest and wounds
in the back and arms, or fourteen stab wounds in all.

Francisco, 48, a native of Cavite City sustained a serious stab wound in the lumbar region of the abdomen
which was sutured Later, a surgical operation was performed on Fransisco.

About seventeen months after that killing, or on September 5, 1972, a special prosecutor filed an information
against the four accused, charging them with murder and frustrated murder, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation and alleging that they perpetrated the offenses while serving sentences in the national
penitentiary. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty.

The main evidence against the accused consisted of their ex- extra-judicial confessions. Francisco A. Cometa,
Jr., the prison guard investigator who took the confessions and made a written report of the incident dated May
6, 1971, testified on the voluntariness of the confessions and confirmed his report that the four accused were
responsible for the two killings and the wounding of Francisco and that gang rivalry motivated the assaults.

Cometa Identified the four accused in the course of his testimony. Cometa also Identified the affidavits of
Francisco and Lamberto Mapalad, a convict and alleged eyewitness who implicated the accused in the assaults.
However, Francisco and Mapalad did not testify. Hence, their affidavits are hearsay.

At the trial, the four accused repudiated their confessions Jandomon, 37, a native of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental, denied that he and his co-accused assaulted the three victims herein. He admitted that he was a
member of the Happy-Go-Lucky gang. He allegedly signed his confession because he was confined in a room
without breakfast and lunch up to ten-thirty in the evening of April 9, 1971. He signed because he was hungry.
Cometa allegedly said that if he did not sign the confession he would not be allowed to go home.

Jandomon said that he could not read his confession because he does not know how to read. He was not
formally investigated. He does not remember whether he appeared before the Assistant Director of Prisons to
swear to his confession. He admitted that he was not mauled by the investigator We were not mauled by
Cometa", 12 tsn March 20, 1974).

Accused Beltran, 29, a native of Pasay City, a tubercular who finished Grade five, testified that he did not know
how Abril and Tilosa were killed. He denied that he entered into a conspiracy with Pincalin, Jandomon and
Empleo to assault the victims. He said that he was investigated by Cometa. He admitted that he signed his
confession because he trusted Cometa who assured him that he could go home (umuwi) after signing it. At
about nine o' clock in the morning of April 9, 1971, he was taken to the investigation room by Cometa and
made to face the wall. He declared that Cometa did not maltreat nor intimidate him.

Accused Empleo, 32, a native of Bacolod City, who finished Grade one, declared that he did not know who
killed Abril and Tilosa. He was not interrogated by Cometa. He could not have read qqqs confession because he
does not know how to read. He signed it because he was hungry and dizzy. He did not kill Abril and Tilosa. He
admitted that he was not maltreated nor intimidated by Cometa. He was a member of the Happy-Go- Lucky
gang. He said that the enmity between Tagalogs and Visayans was a common phenomenon in Muntinlupa.
Pincalin, 27, a native of Samar, who finished Grade two, testified that he had no participation in the assaults
committed on April 9, 1971. He denied having executed any confession However, he admitted his signature and
thumbmark in his confession. He said that he was not interrogated by Cometa He admitted that he was not
maltreated by Cometa. He said that he did not belong to any gang in 1971 but in 1974 he was a member of the
Batang Samahan ng Way-Leyte. He said that Beltran was his "boy" (bata).

All the four accused admitted on the witness stand that they were serving sentences for different crimes when
the assaults in question were perpetrated.

By way of rebuttal, Cometa testified that the four accused were given their lunch at four twenty-five in the
afternoon of April 9, 1971. He took the confessions in the following manner:

Before I proceeded to the investigation proper, I interviewed them (the four accused) one by one verbally. After
that, I went to the brigade and looked for an eyewitness but I was not able to find an eyewitness that day.

I talked to them and asked them whether the other (their) confessions were true or not and they insisted that
they were confessing to the truth. So that was the time I proceeded to the investigation proper. (22 tsn March
26, 1974).

The trial court convicted the four accused of murder, which it regarded as a complex crime qualified by
treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation and quasi-recidivism. Applying article 160 of the Revised
Penal Code, it sentenced each of them to one death penalty and ordered them to pay solidarily to the heirs of
the two deceased victims, Abril and Tilosa, an indemnity of twenty thousand pesos.

The trial court also convicted the four accused of frustrated murder and sentenced each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum to
twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay solidarily an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos.

The accused did not appeal from that decision. The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of the
death penalty.

Accused Beltran died in prison of tuberculosis on May 7, 1977. Hence, his criminal liability was extinguished.
Resolution of November 17, 1977.)

Counsel de oficio, who was designated to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the guilt
of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He observed that the investigation conducted by
Cometa was haphazard and in adequate. The case hinges on the probative value of the confessions of the
accused.

After taking into account the testimony of the investigator on the voluntariness of the confessions, the fact that,
admittedly the accused signed their confessions without any maltreatment or intimidation and that there is no
reason why the investigator would falsely impute to them the commission of two murders and one frustrated
murder by fabricating their confessions, we have reached the conclusion that the confession should be regarded
as conclusive proof of their guilt.

The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty,
considering the inhuman congestion in the national penitentiary, as described by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in
People vs. De los Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 702, 712.
We find that the four accused are guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder
aggravated by quasi-recidivism. This case is governed by the rule that when for the attainment of a single
purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one
offense, a complex one (People vs. Penas 66 Phil. 682).

In other words, where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense.
Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense. (People vs.
Abella, L-32205, August 31, 1979.)

Therefore, the four accused should each be sentenced to death, as was done by the trial court. However,
following the precedent established in the De los Santos and Abella cases as well as in the Garcia case, which
involved four murders and double attempted murder committed on the same day when the double murder and
frustrated murder in this case were committed, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

In the De los Santos case, which like this case arose due to the virulent and continuing feud between members
of the Sigue-Sigue and Oxo gangs, there was a riot in the morning of Sunday, February 16, 1958, in the
national penitentiary. Five prisoners were killed. On the following day, a similar riot occurred Four prisoners
were killed. For the killing of the nine prisoners, the fourteen accused (originally 46 were charged in two
separate cases), only one reclusion perpetua was imposed.

It should be noted that the killings in this case were the fourth incident which transpired on Good Friday, April
9,. 1971. Thus at past eight o'clock in the morning of that day, four prisoners were killed (Garcia case). Then
at ten-fiveon that same morning, one prisoner was killed. At ten-twenty-five, two prisoners were killed and
at eleven-twenty-five, the two killings involved in this case were perpetrated (96 SCRA 505).

In other cases where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a
different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr.
Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. The accused, Pincalin, Empleo and Jandomon, are each
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily to each set of heirs of the victims, Abril and Tilosa, an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to Francisco an indemnity of six thousand pesos. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
B. People v. Toling

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-
appellee.

Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and
ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3)
Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F.
Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-
966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about
eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers
tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose.
Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn
Jan. 14, 1966).

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964.
Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give
him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for
sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-
five pesos for his expenses.

On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and
took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to
Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip
to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter
which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment
agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working
in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's
establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty
pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.

Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they
ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station
that same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.

After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.

The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one
row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite
seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-
passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near
the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was
near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty
passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping
with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in
line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the
window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman,
her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.

Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers
bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was
around eight o'clock in the evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors
(Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on
his seat.

For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite
him. She was not able to get up anymore.1

Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but
before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was
supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins,
who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2

Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort
who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He
was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing
inside the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon
reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of around
nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between
the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man
that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down
his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.

Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little
finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast.
He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel
saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when
he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.

Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.

Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he
received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and,
while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with
his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan
(Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach and
on the aisle.

Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When
Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the
head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's
buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows
administered to him.

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the
train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their
names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS).

Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad
tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals
for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the
official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G
to I-2, J-1 and J-2).

Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab
wounds, namely:

(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.

(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.

(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.

(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.

(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and

(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9,
C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)

Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving
train to avoid being killed. They were:

(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.

(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and

(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5,
C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).

Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida
Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio
supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).

Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she
was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of
the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of
charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one
month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with
her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos
cash in a paper bag which was lost.

The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone
headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary
investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal,
Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were
taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.

Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the
station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed
somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons
were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".

He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49
tsn Sept. 3, 1965).

Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from
Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He
said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed with
knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that
everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).

According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back
with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave
them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.

On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court
of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed
against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated
murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the
running train to avoid being stabbed).

At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial,
Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers
appealed.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues
that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability
was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.

According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1
and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8,
1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he
took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same
pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing
them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the four men
harbored evil intentions towards them.

When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach,
the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other
two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was already
running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed
a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if
he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money
provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.

When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo
(eight inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with
it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of
Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose
consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest
and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him.
His money was gone.

Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded
his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose
stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.

However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was
already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by
Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when
a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.

The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who
treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following
injuries on Antonio Toling:

Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the
forehead) and

Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating
thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).

and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left,
penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the
armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the
hospital on January 17th.

The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which
resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:

What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the
accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering privations,
even to the extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio
the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to
receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in Manila.

It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite
some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons
who easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of
them, immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).

To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their
unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke
the limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.

We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins,
whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at,
was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that
their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes
about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion or
suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might
victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers.
Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.

A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because
the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand
CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take
the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they might be
mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5,
1965).

In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn
statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical
certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the
knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses
and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed
with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared
that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he
boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors
was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to
commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio (not
Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that
Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former
had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That
fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).

The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract
from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the
twins that they stabbed several passengers.

Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's
decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does
not particularize on the supposed contradictions.

The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is
that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide.
Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.

It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not
corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the
train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea
and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was
nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the
acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception and
recollection are not the same.

Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her
testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the
seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy
reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.

On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted
the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins,
from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of
Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.

Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante
delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No.
9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because
everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and
confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins
consummated all the killings.

On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9,
which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without
being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the
blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.

Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly
killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny
that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave
task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who
reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the record
conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.

To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because
they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-
2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the
necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions,
contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to
M-2 and S to S-2).

The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they
met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs
should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the accused committed
homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended". The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act"
(Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).

The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state
of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited
in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).

Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay,
79 Phil. 371).

The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already
named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of
the said victims.

The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple
frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal
and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence.
Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.

The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.

The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they
cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other".

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a)
cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th
Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de
las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica
y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs.
Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105
Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was
convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs.
Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of
fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired
successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272,
involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs.
Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-
103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil.
975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61
Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the
product of a single criminal impulse or intent).

As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for
murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised
Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.

A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8)
separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion
perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the
attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven
victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.
Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the
service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.
c. People v. Tabaco

[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases
identically read:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.

Contrary to Law."[1]

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex
crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt.
Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge Siriban,
Jr., caused his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo;
which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will."[2]
 All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres
Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at
Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and
order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th
PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes
claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs
and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey,
Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2)
Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed,
arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey;
(5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey,
Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3)
victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north
western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late
Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC
Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three
(3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were
seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the
distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly
without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several
successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the
western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside
the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing
from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused
Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him 'what is that happened again Mario.'
Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the
Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming
from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit
arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco 'Mario relax ka lang' 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding
their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession
of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge
Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on
his legs due to adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2)
Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face
and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints."[3]

Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as
follows:

"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario
Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon
Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at about
12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and
found out that there were several persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some
short and some long, and were seen in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother
to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if
they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the
same from them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government,
assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the
lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost seat of
the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been
officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be
known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the air and directed
to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was
answered by burst of gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he
forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he
(accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw
him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was
nothing to said persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the
gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That
because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of
Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to the police
authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito
Raquepo."[4]

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as
charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it
found that:

"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree on what
actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to
the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario
Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or others,
since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.
 In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where there are directly
conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for some
facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of
a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence.
(Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734;
Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of
People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario
Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt.
Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the
shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC
Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative
witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution
witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his
seat at the lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late
Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive
automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one
Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then
ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-
lighted at that time.

Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing
from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative
and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling 'what is that happened again Mario,' while the latter told him
'Mario relax ka lang keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun assisted
by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to
his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the
accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo."[5]

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily
loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's
magazine was already empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session, stenographer
L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun, M-14, and this
magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?
A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990
session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' &
'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).

ATTY. ARIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session,
Stenographer L. Tamayo).

Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was
really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as
testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder before
Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p. 187, record).

The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin,
Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the incident with ring
of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of
the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case
No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-
284).

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat.
Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately
after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the
accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their corroborative
testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even
as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs.
Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his
innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused.
(Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of
things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would
deny the proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no
adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be held
responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's
brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule that they have
regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not inspire
confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not shot the
four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or
row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much
lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot afore-said victims, as maybe
gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late
Mayor Arreola.

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from his seat and
directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of
cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could have
been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with
the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog,
were on the left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple;
Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head above the
hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base through and through.
Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative
position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of
entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward
and the bullet ricocheted.

It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were all
cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have rebounded
or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body
of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at the
place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper
bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor
Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness
Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris
of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming
and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds inflicted upon him during the
grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being no
competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as
the accused was clearly and positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the
shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo
Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo."[6]

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the
Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito
Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been
prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the
accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period,
with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is
further ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by
way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in
case of successful collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.

2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day Prision Mayor as
MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien
herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection; both without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC Company,
Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer
of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of
this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent preventive
imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art.
 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126
SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED."[7] (Underscoring ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal
on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the deaths of
Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury
sustained by Benito Raquepo.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when
the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with
respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, [8] unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.[9] The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman,[10] thus:

"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to
detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing
court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal.
The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an
informed and reasoned verdict."[11]

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial
court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the
assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they
positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his
companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you know?
A: M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Three (3) shots, sir.
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
A: Successive, sir.
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?
A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun shot, will you please
describe the stands (position) of the accused?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port) arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned, what did you see?
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A: Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you mentioned?
A: They have similarity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your companions?
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you facing?
A: We were facing south the arena.
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: From what direction?
A: Infront of us, sir.
Q: Where was he, was he in your front?
A: He was in the first row of seats.
Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?
A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Who was that?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A: Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession or automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?
A: An army man, sir.
Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say that these gun shots you
heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir."[12]
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is it not?
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at the gate of the
cockpit, is that correct?
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did you notice if he
had a gun with him?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir."[13]
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were they arranged?
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q: How many rows?
A: Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: And how about you?
A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where you stayed?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there was untoward
incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: M-14, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: What did you do also?
A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to him?
A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir."[14]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first time prior to the
shooting incident?
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused
sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q: How far?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the cockpit?
A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?
A: We were on the northwest.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?
A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola on the northwest
when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on
4th row, is that what you mean?
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together with the late
Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco considering that you
were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct examination you immediately
sought cover?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead already?
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?
A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was also hit.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir."[15]
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?
A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide myself, sir."[16]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off and that's the time I
took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside."[17]
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the abovenamed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As
between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of
accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare
denial and explanation.[18]
 Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-
appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption
was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when
they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and
his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-Mayor Arreola, testified that
the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the Ex-
Mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of
entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the
lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This
contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the
slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-
Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them.[20]
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-
mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same
level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a
point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound
was inflicted.[21]
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge
Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman
Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987
while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena,
he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside
the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused
"Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta
who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when
the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge
Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the
testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was
at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena.
Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about
one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and
Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-
appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told
accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun
position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of
the gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge
Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused-
appellant.
 Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as
lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo,
and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not
tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from
port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt.
Raquepo.[22]
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-
fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun,
which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal
intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the single
sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog,
Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only
one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).'

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed;
first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and
second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex
proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which should
have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted under one
information, involving four (4) murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered
victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave
felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of Oscar Tahulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively,
were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty
--- is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing have
been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of
defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum
degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is
hereby reduced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson
Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that
the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the
accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more
serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17
years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario
Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2' magazine of M-14 and Exh.
'L' Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful
weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even
more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness
Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the lower and upper
bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we
have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')."[23]

We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all
four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows
that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun
fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)"[24] does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs.
Pama[25] (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas,[26] and People vs. Pineda.[27]

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which
killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of
complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave
felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing
the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully
loaded M-14 sub-machine gun.[28] He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its
magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty.
Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in
People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling
laid down in People vs. Desierto[29]. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-
machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:

"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the
five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other
persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said
article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet
the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted
upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself
criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every singe act that produced the
same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each
person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of
homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated
homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that
would connect one of them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson
sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger
with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.[30]
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda.[31] True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition
of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the
said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the
perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized
the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes."[32] Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."[33] (emphasis supplied)
The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes
several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no
showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is
thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo[34] we held that:

"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate
murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."

Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas[35] is misplaced. The doctrine
enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the
accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex
crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every
death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the
judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four
sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 2. Complex Crime Proper

a. Enrile v. Salazar

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA
TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more
takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that
took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate,
even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now
brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe,
State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6,
1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case
and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's
co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that
the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the
information in Hernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for
the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor
General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised
Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause
of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not
apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator
Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without
prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and
stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted
against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in
said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by
the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute
"common" crimes of grave or less grave character;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course,
whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains
good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not
too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit
to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify
or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect
that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title
3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law
are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and
that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common
crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that
the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient
to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by
the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied
in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and
(2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme
penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted
out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing
him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were
punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del
Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo
de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o
mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el
limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez
Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the
imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed
the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said
limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be,
in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act,
the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much
less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-
off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his
rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez,
the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime
of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of
P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to
a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in
the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation
conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the
evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour
and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely
because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply
with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to
have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to
be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-
existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not
excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have
been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present
petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or
omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against
him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there
instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or
competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to
our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to
disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing
established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to
petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice
sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in
any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right
to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to
the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to
wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already
gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too
strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that
should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by
the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues
properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as
co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI
Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without
bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every
effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to
raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken
in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any
given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
b. People v. Garcia

G.R. No. 141125 February 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 6, dated October 28, 1999, convicting accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia y Caragay of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and three counts of Rape, and sentencing him to death. 1

The victim, Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of B.S.
Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. On July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30 p.m. to
go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, she saw
a white van approaching so she stopped to let it pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The
rear door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door
closed and the van sped away. Something was sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and
feel dizzy. She shouted, then she felt a fist blow on her stomach and she fell unconscious. 2

When Cleopatra came to, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying flat
on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. One of them, who had Bombay features,
was also totally naked while the other three were clad in briefs and smoking cigarettes. The Bombay-
looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm. Another man with
long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a
lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but accused-appellant held her right arm. While accused-
appellant was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have
sexual intercourse with her. She tried to kick him and close her legs, but two men were holding her
feet. The two men boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.3

After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra, accused-
appellant took his turn and went on top of her. One of the men sat on her right leg and pinned it
down, while another held her left leg. Cleopatra tried to punch accused-appellant with her right hand,
but the Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Accused-appellant then had sexual intercourse with
her while holding her left arm. 4
 The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The
Bombay-looking man was still holding her right arm, while the man on top of her held her left arm.
She tried to close her legs but someone hit her right thigh, which forced her to keep her legs apart.
The third man with pimples succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. 5

The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless and was
too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw the Bombay-
looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and heard the men
laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private parts
were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but accused-appellant hit her on the abdomen. 6

One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatra’s face which made her vision blurred.
She heard somebody say that it was 1:30.7 After that, she blacked out. When she regained
consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong. It was
still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and was unable to move. A
taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi, she boarded it just to get
home. The taxi brought her to her house.8

Her aunt, Rufina Angog, saw Cleopatra alight the taxi crying. She also noticed that
Cleopatra’s clothes were inverted and she smelled bad. She woke up Cleopatra’s brothers and
cousins.9 They asked her what happened. Cleopatra just kept crying and was unable to talk. After
some time, when she was able to regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by
four men. 10

The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police Station.
After giving her statement to the police, she was brought to the Crime Laboratory of the Baguio City
Police, where she was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor.

In his Medico-Legal Report, Dr. Villaseñor wrote the following findings:

FINDINGS:

General and Extra-genital:

Fairly nourished, fairly developed coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with
light brown areola and nipples from which no secretion could be pressed out. Abdomen is soft and
flabby.

The following are the injuries noted:

1. Second degree burns, mental region, measuring 1.3.1cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.

2. Second degree burns, left supra-mammary region, measuring 1 x 1cm, 8cm from the
anterior midline.

3. Second degree burns, left supra-mammary region, measuring 0.6x0.6 cm, 8.5cm from the
anterior midline.

4. Second degree burns, left hypothenar region, measuring 1x0.5cm, 7cm from the posterior
midline.
 5. Second degree burns, left middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 2x1cm, 13cm from the
anterior midline.

6. Second degree burns, middle 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 1x 1cm, 10cm from the
anterior midline.

7. Contusion, left mammary region, measuring 3x1cm, 5cm from the anterior midline.

8. Contusion, right mammary region, measuring 1x1cm, 9cm from the anterior midline.

9. Contusion, middle 3rd of the right arm, measuring 5x3cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.

10. Contusion, middle 3rd of the right thigh, measuing 6x4cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.

11. Hematoma, left zygomatic region, measuring 4x4cm 7cm from the anterior midline.

There is tenderness on the mammary region, both thighs and at the abdominal region.

Genital:

There is abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full convex, gaping, with the
congested abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed a
congested hymen with shallow fresh lacerations at 7, 8 and 9 o’clock and deep fresh laceration at 6
o’clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the
examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is congested with moderate amount of whitish secretion.

CONCLUSION:

Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.

Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will resolve in 14-15
days.

RE MARKS:

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram (-) diplococci and POSITIVE for
spermatozoa. 11

The panties that Cleopatra was wearing was also submitted to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. Dr. Villaseñor found cigarette burns and seminal stains, 12 as well as stains of blood on
the panties. 13 The Medico-Legal Report states:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Specimen "A" - One (1) white printed panty with cigarette burns and with suspected seminal
stains.

xxx xxx xxx

 FINDINGS:

Biochemical examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen

gave POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of seminal stains.

CONCLUSION:

Specimen "A" revealed the presence of seminal stains. 14

On July 17, 1998, Cleopatra went back to the police station and gave a description of the four
rapists to the cartographer. 15 She likewise executed another sworn statement to the police. 16

Meanwhile, accused-appellant was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with
another rape charge against him filed by a certain Gilda Mangyo.

The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers Gilbert
Bulalit and Archibald Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects depicted in the
cartographic sketch bore a striking resemblance to accused-appellant, who was in their custody. 17 On
July 26, 1998, Cleopatra was summoned to the police station to identify accused-appellant. She was
brought to the upper floor of the police building and asked to look below on the basketball court of
the city jail and see if any of the inmates looked familiar to her. 18 Cleopatra recognized accused-
appellant among those watching the basketball game. 19

PO1 Bulalit brought accused-appellant to the office upstairs. When Cleopatra saw accused-
appellant face to face, she started to tremble and cry. Then she tried to attack him but she was
restrained by the police officers. 20 On the same day, Cleopatra gave a supplemental statement to the
police, confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.21

Inquest proceedings followed in due course. 22 On July 27, 1998, formal charges for forcible
abduction with rape were brought against accused-appellant and three John Does, under an
information which alleged:

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means
of force and intimidation abduct CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON, 19 years old, by dragging her
inside a van and taking her to Tam-awan Village, Baguio City, against her will and with lewd design,
and once inside a house, had carnal knowledge of her, also by means of force and intimidation and
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 23

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15805-R of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 6. Accused-appellant was arraigned, wherein he entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial ensued as against him, while the other three unidentified accused remained at large.

Accused-appellant testified that he spent the whole day of July 14, 1998 at the boarding house
where his brother-in-law lived, located at No. 36 Torres Bugallon Street, Aurora Hills, Baguio City.
His brother-in-law asked him to go there to take care of his nephew. That evening, while he was in
the said house watching television, some of his friends came over to visit him. They brought a bottle
of gin and began to have a drinking session. Accused-appellant did not join them because his
stomach was upset. Accused-appellant’s brother-in-law arrived a little before midnight, after which
his guests left. 24 When asked about the charges of rape against him, he denied the same. 25

Catherine Faith Madella was among those who visited accused-appellant in the evening of
July 14, 1998. She came to know him through her friend, Joy Tabinas, who was a tenant at the said
boarding house. Madella testified that she went to the boarding house on July 14, 1998 at 9:00 p.m.
At 12:00 midnight, she went to the bedroom of Joy Tabinas and slept there. 26 Her testimony was
corroborated by her boyfriend, Ronaldo T. Valdez, who also testified for the defense.27

Joy Tabinas likewise testified that on July 14, 1998, she was at the boarding
house.1âwphi1 She watched television with accused-appellant from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m. 28

On October 28, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of one
count of forcible abduction with rape and three counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the
judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court Finds the Accused Jeffrey Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and likewise of the three (3) crimes of rape in
conspiracy with three (3) others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown as charged in the
Information and hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of the 4 offenses
aforementioned; to indemnify the offended party, Cleopatra Changlapon, the sum of One Hundred
Forty Six Thousand, One Hundred Twenty Five Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P 146,125.75) as
actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay one fourth (1/4) of the costs.

The police authorities are directed to exert all efforts to identify and arrest the three other
accused whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown.

Meantime, pending their arrests, the case is Archived in respect to the three (3) other accused
whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown to be revived upon their arrest.

SO ORDERED. 29

In his Brief, accused-appellant raises the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT

JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE AND FOR THREE (3) COUNTS
OF RAPE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY WITH THREE (3) OTHERS WHOSE
IDENTITIES AND WHEREABOUTS ARE STILL UNKNOWN.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION

TO THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY GARCIA Y
CARAGAY IS ONLY A LOOK-ALIKE OF THE REAL CULPRIT.
 III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEOPATRA

CHANGLAPON HAD POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY AS ONE OF
THOSE WHO ABDUCTED AND RAPED HER. 30

Accused-appellant assails his conviction based on complainant’s identification. According to

him, the identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded. Based on our
own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither influenced nor induced
by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts
convincingly show that complainant was left to freely study the faces of the thirty or more inmates
on the basketball court below to see whether she recognized any of them. 31There was no suggestion
from the police to point to the new detainee, who had just been arrested on another rape charge.

Owing to the gravity of the crime and penalty involved, we have meticulously studied the
testimony of complainant Cleopatra Changlapon and find it to be clear, straightforward and
categorical. The details of her narration are consistent on all material points. Her actions throughout
her ordeal correspond to normal human behavior. We take particular note of her natural and
spontaneous reaction of crying and attacking her molester when brought before her face to face. The
records also eloquently exhibit that she repeatedly cried throughout her testimony. All of these
actuations bear the ring of truth and deserve full faith and credit.

More importantly, complainant’s narration of the events is well substantiated by the physical
evidence. The second degree burns found on her face, chest and thighs prove that she was indeed
burned with lighted cigarettes whenever she attempted to fight her assailants. The medico-legal
officer confirmed that they were consistent with cigarette burns. 32 Furthermore, the contusions found
on her body were said to be caused by a blunt instrument like a closed fist. 33 This confirms her
testimony that she was repeatedly hit to stop her from struggling. The medico-legal officer placed the
time of infliction of the external physical injuries on complainant within the last twenty-four
hours. 34The findings on her genitals --- namely the gaping labia majora, the congested and abraded
labia minora, and the lacerations --- all suggest the entry of a foreign object, such as a fully erect
male organ. 35 Finally, the presence of spermatozoa further confirms that complainant recently had
sexual intercourse. 36

In the face of complainant’s positive and categorical declarations that accused-appellant was
one of her rapists, accused-appellant’s alibi must fail.

It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 37

Furthermore, in order that the defense of alibi may prosper, accused-appellant must establish
not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. 38 In the case
at bar, the place of commission of the rapes --- somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong --- and
the boarding house where accused-appellant alleged he was in the evening of July 14, 1998, are both
situated within Baguio City. The distance between Tam-awan and Aurora Hills, especially at dawn,
can be traversed in just a matter of minutes.
 Indeed, as pointed out by the trial court, accused-appellant’s witnesses failed to account for
his whereabouts after 12:00 midnight. At the time of the rape, complainant distinctly heard one of her
molesters state the time as 1:30. Since it was still dark when complainant was dropped off on the side
of the road, it can safely be assumed that the crimes were committed at dawn.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The
crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge
with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented. 39

In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible
abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was
likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and
mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and
intimidation and against her will.

Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover, the
prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded in
forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. 40

Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He
should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three co-accused,
considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate,
one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped one another in
consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other three held her
arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from
warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well. 41

However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the
subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction
with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction.
Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape and three separate acts of rape. 42

The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by
more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape. 43

As regards the other three acts of rape, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength
and motor vehicle. However, these were not alleged in the information. Under the amended
provisions of Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven at the trial.
Being favorable to accused-appellant, this rule should be applied retroactively in this case. 44Hence,
there being no aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated, and with no mitigating
circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be applied, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Anent the matter of damages, the trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages.1âwphi1 This was justified by complainant’s emotional and physical suffering, as
narrated in her testimony. 45 Notably, the prosecution successfully proved that complainant lost her
virginity during the rape. 46 As she narrated, virginity is a highly regarded virtue among the people of
Kalinga. 47

However, the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to the complainant.1âwphi1 We have
ruled that if rape is committed or qualified by any of the circumstances which authorize the
imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity shall be not less than P75,000.00. 48 For the other
three counts of simple rape, where the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant is
liable for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count. 49

We also find that the actual damages awarded by the trial court was well substantiated.
Complainant presented the required receipts for her medications, transportation and other
expenses. 50 Complainant testified that as a member of the Kalinga tribe, she had to undergo
the korong and songa rituals, wherein they had to butcher several chickens, pigs, and carabaos,
thereby incurring total expenses of P90,000.00. 51 These rituals were intended for complainant’s
safety and to call on the tribe’s spirits so that no more violence or misfortune may befall her. 52 The
grand total of all these actual expenses, including those for medicines and transportation, as duly
proved by the receipts and computations presented in evidence, is P 146,125.75, 53 the amount
awarded by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15805-R, convicting accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia y
Caragay of one count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and three counts of Rape, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death for
the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three
counts of rape. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Cleopatra Changlapon the
amounts of P146,125.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Costs against accused-appellant.
d. People v. Alfeche

G.R. No. 124213 August 17, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANTE ALFECHE y TAMPARONG, alias WILLY, and JOHN DOE, accused, DANTE
ALFECHE y TAMPARONG, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Condemned to suffer the death penalty in each of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City, Branch 12, in its Joint Decision 1 of 22 August 1995 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4615-0 and
4616-0, accused-appellant Dante Alfeche y Tamparong (hereafter DANTE) seeks the reversal of his
conviction as we review the judgment now on automatic appeal to us pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659.2

The two cases were commenced by complaints signed by complainant Analiza Duroja (hereafter
ANALIZA). The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of September 1994, at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning, in Brgy.
Can-adieng, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused DANTE ALFECHE y Tamparong, Alias WILLY and JOHN DOE, in conspiracy with one
another, treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, by means of violence and intimidation,
with the use of a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant herein ANALIZA A. DUROJA, a 17 year old lass, against her will.

In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

The complaint in Criminal Case No. 4816-03 is similarly worded except as to the date and time the
crime was committed, that is, "on or about the 11th of September 1994, at around 10:30 in the
evening." Only DANTE was apprehended. His co-accused Willy and John Doe have remained at
large.

DANTE waived preliminary investigation. 4 Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of

innocence. 5 Since the two cases involved the same parties and common evidence, the trial court
ordered their consolidation and joint trial. 6

The witnesses for the prosecution were ANALIZA, Sergio Dy, Francisca Duroja, Dr. Merly Tan, Dr.
Regino Mercado, Dr. Rosemarie Cam, and Luz Lucero. The defense relied on the testimonies of
DANTE, PS/Insp. Roel Acidre, Teresita Acain, Josephine Ollave, and Petty Orocay.

ANALIZA started working as a domestic helper for Sergio Dy and his family in Barangay Can-
adieng in Ormoc City, Leyte, on 9 March 1994. On 11 September 1994, at about 10:30 p.m., the Dy
spouses were at Ipil, Leyte, attending a meeting of the Couples for Christ. Their two grown-up
children were not at home either. Only ANALIZA and her one-year-old ward were left in the Dy
residence. In accordance with her employer's instructions, she locked only the kitchen door and
placed a chair to the front door but kept it unlocked, as the Dys did not bring a key to the door.
ANALIZA was watching television in the sala when she heard a sound from the front door, then
somebody, whom she recognized as a certain Willy suddenly held her hand, gagged her mouth, and
pointed a knife at her. Willy had two companions, but she recognized only one of the two, namely,
DANTE. While she was thus gagged and held at the point of a knife, DANTE approached her and
boxed her on her side, as a result of which she lost consciousness. 7

Upon regaining consciousness some thirty minutes later, ANALIZA found her short pants removed
and her private part bleeding, which was unusual because she was not menstruating before she was
attacked. She immediately washed her private part and took a bath. 8

Her employers arrived at 12:30 a.m. the following day, but ANALIZA did not report the incident to
them. Neither did she inform the authorities or her mother, who lived some houses away, because she
was ashamed and also afraid of DANTE's threat that he would kill her mother if she told anyone
about the incident.9

ANALIZA had not engaged in sexual intercourse prior to this assault. 10

Again, on 18 September 1994, at about 11:00 a.m., ANALIZA was alone with her ward in the Dy
residence. She was sautéing pork when suddenly, the three accused again intruded into the house
through the back door. Willy held her hand and gagged her mouth, while John Doe first turned off the
stove and then laid her on the floor and pointed a knife at her. Thereupon, DANTE knelt on her legs,
undressed her, inserted his private part into hers, and made a "push and pull motion." Some five
minutes later, DANTE stood up and immediately put on his pants. ANALIZA saw a whitish
substance on her organ, which came from DANTE. The latter then placed her left hand on a table and
drove a nail into it. DANTE and his companions forthwith left. The incident affected her work;
nevertheless, she was able to finish preparing lunch for her employers, who arrived at noon. 11

ANALIZA reported to the police that her hand was injured, and sought medical attention therefor.
She related nothing about the rape for fear that Dante would make good his threat to kill her mother.
It was only after she took poison several times that her mother came to know of the rapes. She tried
to kill herself because she was then pregnant and ashamed of what had happened to her. She gave
birth to a boy on 27 May 1995. 12

Dr. Regino Mercado, City Health Officer of Ormoc City, examined ANALIZA on 18 September 1994
and found a "[p]unctured wound over the base of left 4th posterior finger." He then issued a medical
certificate. 13 According to him, the injury could have been caused by a sharp instrument, possibly a
nail; and his interview of ANALIZA confirmed his theory. ANALIZA did not inform him who caused
the injury. He further observed that ANALIZA seemed frightened and depressed, which he attributed
to her recent ordeal. On cross-examination, Dr. Mercado stated that ANALIZA did not tell him that
she was raped. Neither did she complain of pain in her vagina, nor did she request an examination of
her private part.14

Sergio Dy, ANALIZA's employer, declared that he was not at his home on 11 September 1994
between 8:00 and 11:00 p.m., as he was at a prayer meeting of the Couples for Christ in Ipil, Leyte.
He instructed ANALIZA to close the door and windows of the house while he was away; and that if
she felt sleepy while he was still away, she should place a chair at the door to shut it so that he could
get inside the house without waking her. He arrived home at around 11:00 p.m. ANALIZA did not
complain of any unusual incident. On 18 September 1994 between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m., Sergio was
attending to his business at the corner of Hermosilla and Real Streets in Ormoc City. He had lunch at
home at around noon, but again ANALIZA did not inform him of any unusual incident while he was
away. On cross-examination, Sergio added that it was only sometime in March 1995 that ANALIZA
told him that a person nailed her hand and that she was pregnant, but she never informed him that she
was raped. 15

According to Francisca Duroja, her daughter ANALIZA was a "tomboy" and had, therefore, no
boyfriend. She first learned that ANALIZA was pregnant when the latter attempted suicide by
drinking poison sometime in March 1995 at the office of Engineer Lucero. She brought her daughter,
who was already in a serious condition, to the Ormoc District Hospital. At the hospital ANALIZA
explained that she attempted suicide because she became pregnant after she was raped; and she
identified her assailants as DANTE, Willy, and an unknown person. Francisca and her daughter then
went to the police to complain about the incident. After the rape charges were filed in court, a certain
Joe Burgos came to her house and offered, allegedly on behalf of DANTE, to settle the cases
amicably, but she rejected the offer. 16

Dr. Merly Tan, a medical officer of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Ormoc
District Hospital, testified that ANALIZA was previously "handled" by the medical department when
she attempted suicide. Later, or on 31 March 1995, she examined ANALIZA in connection with the
rape incident. Her findings were summarized as follows:

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

Abdomen — globularly enlarge[d] as to 8-9

months ACG

INTERNAL EXAMINATION — admits two fingers with ease.

Hymen — with 2, 4, 7, 11 o'clock laceration (old healed) 17

According to Dr. Tan, the hymenal lacerations could have been caused by sexual intercourse. Her
examination of ANALIZA's uterus disclosed that the fetus was about 8 to 9 months old; however,
since ANALIZA said that she was raped in September 1994, or about six months prior to the
examination, Dr. Tan doubted her findings and requested an ultrasound test, 18 the result of which was
not shown to her. 19

Dr. Rosemarie, Cam, who was responsible for ANALIZA's pre-natal care, declared that ANALIZA's
child was born on 27 May 1995 and could have been conceived on 11 September 1994 or 18
September 1994. She could not be certain as to the period of conception because she was unaware of
ANALIZA's menstrual cycle. On cross-examination, she opined that it was also possible that the
child was conceived earlier than 11 September 1994. 20

DANTE had another story to tell.

He is a native of Zamboanga, grew up in Davao City, and came to be in Ormoc City because of his
business of selling dried fish. He arrived in Ormoc City during the first week of January 1993 and
stayed in the house of Mylene Ablen in Barangay Can-adieng, which was separated by a chapel from
ANALIZA's house. ANALIZA, who was also known as Ethel in that Barangay, used to go to Ablen's
house to play computer games. Soon they became sweethearts. During the last week of January 1993,
he took her to the Shalom Lodging House where he gave her P200, and they had sexual congress.
They repeated their tryst in February 1993. They stopped seeing each other when he got involved
with Naomi Marilao, whom he considered his common-law wife. He later lived with Teresa Acain,
whom he met because Teresa's mother retailed dried fish. He maintained a relationship with these
three women only. 21

It was on 24 August 1994 that he eloped with Teresa Acain. Accompanied by a certain Babie, they
went to the house of Josephine Ollave at Barangay Patag, Ormoc City, where they stayed until the
end of September 1994. At around 10:30 p.m. of 11 September 1994, he was at Josephine's house
with Teresa and the other occupants thereof. Throughout his stay at Josephine's house, he never went
to Ormoc City proper. 22

However, on 16 September 1994, at around 6:00 p.m., he met with ANALIZA at the Boy Scout
Canteen. He then asked her to check-in with him at the Rajah Lodging House because he had a
reserved room there. She acquiesced, but once there he noticed that her "tummy was already hard and
that turned [him] off." He asked her whether it was true that three persons had trespassed her house
and raped her. She confirmed the story, added that her hand had been pierced with a nail, and even
showed him the location of her wound. But she did not divulge the identity of her assailants, much
less accuse him of perpetrating the offense. She then asked for money, and he gave her P40. He first
learned of the charge against him on 29 March 1995 when he was arrested. 23 DANTE denied
knowing any Willy or John Doe.

On cross-examination, DANTE disclosed that while in transit at Cebu City, he met Mylene Ablen and
her husband, who told him that there was a good business in Ormoc City. He was then traveling with
card gamblers, being himself a hustler. In Ormoc City, Mylene told him that ANALIZA could be
"easily gotten" if she was given money; hence, he surmised that ANALIZA was no longer a virgin.
He then courted ANALIZA, and soon they became sweethearts. While he admitted having asked Joe
Burgos for help, he denied having asked the latter to seek an amicable settlement of the case. 24

Teresita Acain, DANTE's alleged lover since June 1994 and who claimed to be married to him,
testified that she was supposed to go to Tacloban City on 24 August 1994. Instead, she eloped with
DANTE. Accompanied by Petty Orocay, they went to the residence of Josephine Ollave in Barangay
Patag, Ormoc City, where they stayed until 27 September 1994. On 11 September 1994, at around
10:00 p.m., she and DANTE were just about to go to sleep at Josephine's house. She could recall no
instance when he left the room where they were staying. On 18 September 1994, at about 11:00 a.m.,
she and DANTE were cleaning Josephine's house and tending to the pigs. 25

Josephine Ollave recalled that on 24 August 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., her sister Petty, together with
DANTE and a certain Teresa, came to her house in Barangay Patag. She remembered the date
because it was her son's birthday. Betty asked her to allow the couple to stay over because they had
just eloped. Josephine acceded to the request. On 11 September 1994, at about 10:00 p.m., she was at
home with her husband, DANTE, and Teresa. On 18 September 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., she, her
husband, DANTE, and Teresa were tending to the hogs; after which DANTE went inside the house.
DANTE and Teresa left her house during the last week of September 1994. On cross-examination she
informed the court that her house was only a 30- to 40-minute ride away from Ormoc City by
motorcab. 26

Police Inspector Roel Acidre, Commanding Officer of the Mobile Force Company of Ormoc City
Police Command based in Camp Downes, Ormoc City, testified that on 18 September 1994, at
around 8:00 p.m., Francisca Duroja and her daughter ANALIZA came to report that the latter's hand
was pierced with a nail by DANTE. Acidre told the two to go to any hospital for medical treatment
and bring the result for appropriate legal action, but they never returned to the police station. 27
Betty Orocay testified that at around 4:00 p.m. of 16 February 1995 she saw DANTE enter the Boy
Scout Canteen in Ormoc City while she was eating at the said establishment. She asked DANTE to
join her for snacks, and the latter obliged. Later ANALIZA arrived, and DANTE approached her.
Betty heard DANTE invite ANALIZA to a lodging house. Betty left the canteen and proceeded to
Zenaida's Inn where she was to meet her boyfriend. At past 7:00 p.m. she saw DANTE proceed to the
Rajah Lodging House. Afterwards, while Betty was having dinner with her boyfriend at the Inn, she
saw ANALIZA go to that same lodging house. 28

Perceiving an attempt by the defense to destroy ANALIZA's credibility by portraying her as a

prostitute and a woman of loose morals, the prosecution sought to prove ANALIZA's good moral
character by presenting Luz Lucero as rebuttal witness. The 61-year-old Luz worked as a secretary to
her husband and as a councilwoman in her barangay. She has known ANALIZA since the latter was a
little girl, as ANALIZA lived only two houses away from their house. ANALIZA worked at the
Lucero residence, washing clothes. About once a week, she would join the Luceros for a stroll at the
plaza and for picnics. Later, she worked at the Dy residence; but after completing her chores for the
Dys, ANALIZA would still play with the Lucero children at the latter's house. Luz never saw this girl
in the company of male friends despite her tomboyish behavior. ANALIZA could not be a prostitute;
for if she were, Luz would not have allowed her children to befriend the former. 29

The trial court found the defense witnesses and the tale they spun not credible enough. It could not
believe that DANTE, a fish vendor without "extraordinary looks," could hook a 17-year-old virgin
while he was still a stranger in her place; or that the same woman would jump to bed with him on the
first opportunity to do so. On the other hand, it found ANALIZA to be a more credible witness,
especially that she told her story in between sobs. Moreover, her positive testimony prevailed over
DANTE's alibi. It found sufficient reason for her delay in reporting her experience, and recognized
that after drawing courage she went on to endure a public trial. It opined that even if DANTE and
ANALIZA were sweethearts from January to February 1993, he could still have raped her on 11 and
18 September 1994. And although she was unconscious during the alleged rape on 11 September
1994, it believed that the circumstances, when collectively considered, were sufficient to establish the
crime of rape.

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime (in the case of the first rape)
and dwelling against DANTE. It also recognized that the offense was committed by three persons and
with the use of a knife. It then imposed the Supreme penalty of death; thus:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in criminal case No. 4615 finding the accused DANTE
ALFECHE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, this court imposes upon the
same DANTE ALFECHE the penalty of DEATH. Decision is also hereby rendered in criminal case
no. 4616 finding the accused DANTE ALFECHE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and nighttime with no mitigating
circumstance to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said DANTE ALFECHE the
penalty of DEATH. Further, the said Dante Alfeche is directed to indemnify ANALIZA DUROJA the
sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS in criminal case no. 4615 and the further sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS in criminal case no. 4616 as compensation for moral damages, and to pay the
cost.
Since the penalty imposed was death, this case was brought to us for automatic review and
judgment. 30

In his Appellant's Brief, DANTE contends that the trial court gravely erred (a) in convicting him for
two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty in each; and (b) in holding him
liable to pay the complainant P60,000 as civil indemnity.

DANTE maintains that the alleged rape on 11 September 1994 was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt because ANALIZA was unconscious at the time and could not therefore testify as to the
pertinent circumstances. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that
there were sufficient established circumstances to constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other
hypothesis than that DANTE was guilty of the crime charged, and that these circumstances were
sufficient to convict him. These circumstances were as follows:

(a) While Analiza was watching television at her employer's house on September 11, 1994 at around
10:30 in the evening, three (3) persons entered the house; (b) One of the men whom she knew as
Willy suddenly held her hand, gagged her mouth and pointed a knife at her; (c) Another man whom
she recognized as appellant approached her and boxed her at her side; (d) Because of appellant's
punch, Analiza lost consciousness; she regained consciousness about thirty (30) minutes later; and (e)
When she woke up, Analiza felt something unusual; she noticed that her shorts had been removed
and her vagina was bleeding. (Citations omitted).

We agree with DANTE that the first alleged rape was not sufficiently proved. Since rape is not
normally committed in the presence of witnesses, 31 the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered
to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony. 32 Said testimony must be clear
and positive to prove that the acts which constitute the elements of rape were committed. 33 Although
ANALIZA was unconscious when the first rape was allegedly committed, she could have described
circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events that would indicate that the offense was
actually perpetrated by the accused. 34 In this case, ANALIZA's unconsciousness broke the chain of
events from which we could have inferred the occurrence of the offense. ANALIZA's testimony says
as much:

PROS. FULACHE

Q Why do you say that you do not know what was the cause of the bleeding in your sexual organ?

COURT

Q Before you became unconscious, were you bleeding already?

A Not yet, Your Honor.

COURT

Continue.

PROS. FULACHE

So that you did not know what happened when you were unconscious?
COURT

Of course.

WITNESS

A I did not know anything, Sir. 35

As regards the second rape, DANTE again argues that the offense was never proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The uncorroborated testimony of ANALIZA cannot be a basis for
conviction. 36 Moreover, her testimony was contrary to human experience because the activities of the
rapists, from their turning off the stove in the kitchen to the forced sexual intercourse, presumably
coupled with resistance from her, "could not have been accomplished in nine (9) minutes, even with
military precision." Another source of doubt was her activity when the accused entered the kitchen.
She testified that she had not yet prepared lunch; but, on cross-examination, she said that she was
sautéing vegetables, which she later changed to pork. DANTE maintains that the discrepancies are
material because ANALIZA took pains to specify the acts of the accused in relation to what she was
doing at the time; hence, her testimony as to what she was doing must be as consistent as her
insistence on the alleged acts of the accused.

The OSG states that the inconsistencies relied upon by DANTE refer to collateral and minor matters,
which do not detract from ANALIZA's positive testimony. Even the most candid witnesses have been
known to make inconsistent statements; but these do not necessarily impair their credibility and,
instead, may even be a badge of truthfulness. What is significant is that ANALIZA categorically
stated that the accused entered her employer's house and sexually assaulted her.

We believe that the aforementioned details — the accused's length of stay and the dish ANALIZA
was preparing — are insignificant. Since it was not shown that ANALIZA looked at a watch before
and after the accused's assault, she could not be expected to give an accurate appraisal of the
accused's length of stay. Furthermore, a misestimation of time is too immaterial to discredit the
testimony of a witness, especially where time is not an essential element or has no substantial bearing
on the fact of the commission of the offense. 37 Likewise, since several months passed before
ANALIZA told her story to the trial court, she could not be expected to remember what dish she was
preparing at the time unless the same had a significant connection with the events that transpired on
that date.

As the OSG emphasizes, the victim should not be presumed to have total recall of the
incident. 38 Indeed, this Court cannot, in rape cases, expect the poor victim to give an accurate
account of the traumatic and dreadful experience that she had undergone. 39 Neither inconsistencies
on trivial matters nor innocent lapses affect the credibility of a witness. 40 On the contrary, they may
be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on material points in the
testimony. 41 Put in another way, minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 42 At any rate, the
circumstances mentioned by DANTE, do not touch upon the area of inquiry, that is, the acts allegedly
perpetrated by the accused which constituted the offense.

DANTE also asserts that the element of force or intimidation indispensable in rape was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. ANALIZA testified that one of the accused, who was never identified,
pointed a knife at her while DANTE was raping her. This testimony was inconsistent,
uncorroborated, and incredible. Furthermore, ANALIZA gave no information on where or how she
was threatened with the knife, or what the unidentified accused was doing with the knife while
DANTE was raping her. She also failed to prove any struggle against her attackers, which would
preclude a finding that force or intimidation was employed. 43

The OSG claims that force and intimidation attended the commission of the second rape, consisting
in (1) Willy's holding ANALIZA's hand, gagging her mouth, and keeping her immobile on the floor;
(2) John Doe's pointing a knife at her; and (3) DANTE's kneeling on her legs, further immobilizing
her.

We reiterate that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in
accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary
is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. 44 We have also held that intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim, and must be
viewed according to her perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
offense. 45 ANALIZA elaborated on how she was held down by the three assailants. Regardless of
how she was threatened with a knife, ANALIZA made it clear that she could not resist the accused's
attack.

DANTE next disputes the application of the principle that "no woman in her right senses would
concoct a tale so repugnant to her virtue and undergo the rigors of a public trial concerning her very
honor," because "this is no guaranty that all self-inflicted indignities are for the sake of truth." 46 He
theorizes that the said principle is applicable when the victim is between 12 and 16 years old and
"clad in the armor of innocence." A kindred test of the complainant's credibility is her conduct after
the alleged sexual assault. Such conduct must be consistent with human behavior; otherwise, the
complainant's uncorroborated testimony is deemed incredible. 47 DANTE maintains that ANALIZA's
behavior after the rape rendered her allegations incredible.

The OSG contends that there is no standard human response to a crime; hence, ANALIZA's opting to
finish her chores after she was raped should not discredit her testimony. ANALIZA also gave a
plausible explanation for her failure to report the rape, that is, she was ashamed and afraid.

We disagree with DANTE's view that the complainant's age is the basis for the application of the
aforequoted principle. He even concedes that the precept has been employed in cases involving 17-
and 18-year-old victims, as well as married women, where the circumstances so
warrant. 48 Therefore, it is the totality of the circumstances, and not the victim's age alone, which
determines whether the principle should be applied.

Anent the victim's conduct following the alleged rape, there is no standard form of behavior in this
regard. In one case, after having been raped, the victim accepted a P20 bill from the rapist and then
went home. 49 In another case, some twelve hours after the rape, the victim accompanied her sister to
attend a wake; and there she played card games and jumped with joy whenever she won. 50 In a few
other cases, the victims merely kept silent about their harrowing experience despite opportunities to
divulge the same. 51 In these examples the oldest of the victims was 16 years old, but we will not
jump into the sweeping conclusion that the victim's age is the controlling factor in upholding her
credibility. It is more correct to state that the victim's discernment of the consequences of the rape, in
relation to her reaction to the offense, influences our assessment of the victim's trustworthiness. Thus,
in a case where the alleged victim was an adult, the absence of any manifestation of her outrage
demonstrated the dubiousness of the charge 52 because the victim in such a case could be deemed to
have sufficient recognition of the impact on her of the offense.
ANALIZA was only 17 years old when she was sexually assaulted. Her educational attainment is
Grade VI. 53 She lived most of her life as a servant of one household or another. 54 It was not shown
that she was a woman of above average intelligence.

We must not discredit her story of rape merely because after the rape she did other things which
could not be expected from one who had just been raped. In the first incident, ANALIZA simply
washed her bloodied private part after she regained consciousness; and in the second incident, she
finished her cooking. We have said before that the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and that people react differently. In such a given situation, some
may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly
welcome the intrusion. 55

As to ANALIZA's failure to immediately report her ordeal, the same was due mainly to her feeling of
shame. We keep in mind the fact that ANALIZA grew up in the province under a code of behavior
characterized by shyness and chastity. We also take judicial notice of the Filipina's inbred modesty
and antipathy in airing publicly things which affect her honor. 56 Indeed, there are many victims of
rape who would rather keep to themselves forever than make public a painful and humiliating
secret. 57

Appreciating the foregoing circumstances together, we cannot expect ANALIZA to act in accordance
with the norms of behavior demanded of mature women. 58

A review of her testimony convinces us with moral certainty that DANTE raped her on 18 September
1994. Further strengthening our conclusion is the fact that the trial judge gave full faith and credit to
her testimony. It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the
trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity
to observe the witnesses on the witness stand and determine whether they are telling the truth or
not. 59 As we stated in People v. De Guzman: 60

[T]he trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading
of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that
will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone
of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not
show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only
the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed
and reasoned verdict. 61

Furthermore, no ulterior motive was shown by DANTE why ANALIZA would concoct a story of
rape and openly accuse him thereof. It is settled that where there is no evidence that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 62

Against ANALIZA's story, DANTE has his alibi and tangential attack on the moral character of
ANALIZA whom he pictured to us to be a prostitute.

His alibi must fail not only because he was positively identified by ANALIZA as the one who raped
her on 18 September 1994, but also because he was unable to prove the requisites of the defense of
alibi. For alibi to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed. 63 Per his own evidence, DANTE was
just in another barangay (Patag) in Ormoc City on 18 September 1994. He did not dare show how far
is that to Barangay Can-adieng where the rape took place.

As to the suggestion that ANALIZA was a prostitute, that alone, even if it be conceded, cannot
absolve him of his liability for rape. First, prostitutes can be victims of rape. 64 Second, it was not
shown that ANALIZA remained a prostitute up to 18 September 1994. Our own meticulous review of
the evidence convinces us that ANALIZA was not a prostitute; and the testimony of DANTE on this
is simply incredible in itself, let alone the fact that we do not find him to be a credible person. For
evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also
be credible in itself. 65 To us, DANTE is a confessed scoundrel portraying himself to be a veritable
Casanova whose story is gravid with implausibilities.

The only issue left is the penalty which may be imposed on DANTE for the rape on 18 September
1994. The trial court imposed the death penalty pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, in view of the finding that the crime was committed by three persons and
with the use of a knife, and was attended with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

It must be first observed that the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos.

4615-0 and 4616-0 charge DANTE and his co-accused with rape "in violation of Article 335, Revised
Penal Code, instead of "Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended R.A. No. 7659." Before Article
335 was amended by R.A. No. 7659 the penalty for rape when committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons was reclusion perpetua to death. Its third paragraph read:

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

This paragraph was not touched by R.A. No. 7659. Nevertheless, from the ratification on 2 February
1987 of the Constitution until the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on 31 December 1993 66 the
imposition of the death penalty was constitutionally prohibited pursuant to Section 14(2), Article III
of the former. 67

The complaints in the cases below do not use the language of the law, viz., "with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons." In lieu of "deadly weapon," the complaints use "knife"; and,
there is no specific allegation that the crime was committed by "two or more persons," but only an
allegation of conspiracy among the three accused. These allegations are, however, sufficient for
purposes of the above-quoted third paragraph of Article 335.

A "deadly weapon" is any weapon or instrument made and designed for offensive or defensive
purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury; or one which, from the manner used,
is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. 68 In our jurisdiction, it has been held
that a knife 69 is a deadly weapon.

Also, since the complaints charge three persons with the crime of rape, namely, DANTE, alias Willy,
and John Doe, who allegedly acted in conspiracy, it is too plain and obvious that "two or more
persons" are alleged to have committed the crime. The evidence proved that, indeed, the three acted
in concert to commit the crime of rape on 18 September 1994 charged in Criminal Case No. 4615-0.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is timely to remind prosecutors to exercise due care in the
preparation of complaints or informations to the end that circumstances which by specific provisions
of law change the nature of the crime or upgrade the penalty therefor must be specifically alleged
using the language of the law. 70

Parenthetically, we also note that the complaints allege treachery as an aggravating circumstance.
Under Article 14 of the Penal Code treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. At the time
ANALIZA was raped, rape was a crime against chastity, although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997
(R.A. No. 8353), approved on 30 September 1997, rape is already a crime against persons.

By way of conclusion, we do not hesitate to rule that in Criminal Case No. 4615-0, the crime was
committed with the use of a deadly weapon and by two or more persons under the third paragraph of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The generic aggravating circumstance of
dwelling 71 justified the imposition of the greater penalty of death. 72 Dwelling was clearly established
during the cross-examination of ANALIZA's mother by the defense. Thus:

Q Is it not a fact that Analiza was staying in the house of her employer Mr. and Mrs. Dy, the whole
year of 1994?

A Yes, sir.

Q And being employed as domestic helper, Analiza would stay in the house of Mr. and Mrs. Dy day
and night?

A Yes, sir.

Q And only very seldom that Analiza goes to your house?

A Yes, sir. 73

Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the
law accords to human abode. The dwelling need not be owned by the victim. 74 Thus, in People v.
Basa, 75 dwelling was appreciated, although the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the
house of another. As aptly stated in People v. Balansi: 76 "[O]ne does not lose his right of privacy
where he is offended in the house of another because as [an] invited guest [or a housemaid as in the
instant case], he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life
it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to
respect even for that short moment."

Premises considered, his conviction in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 and the penalty imposed, death,
must stand. Four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority of the Court that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed in the
case at bar.

Lastly, we note that the trial court awarded moral damages only without the civil indemnity provided
for in Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to that Article and the latest case
law, 77 ANALIZA should be awarded P75,000 as indemnity. As to moral damages, a conviction for
rape may properly carry with it an award therefor. 78 Here we find the award justified because
ANALIZA was compelled to attempt suicide out of shame of what had happened to her and of the
resulting pregnancy. Given this extreme consequence of DANTE's offense, we raise the award of
moral damages from P30,000 to P50,000. In addition, ANALIZA is entitled to an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 in view of the presence of one aggravating
circumstance. 79 Furthermore, since ANALIZA begot a child by reason of the rape, DANTE must
acknowledge and support the offspring pursuant to Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 201 of the Family Code. 80

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the judgment in Criminal Case No. 4676-
0 and ACQUITTING accused-appellant DANTE ALFECHE y Tamparong on ground of reasonable
doubt. However, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 convicting said accused-appellant of the
crime of rape committed on 18 September 1994 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that (1) an indemnity is hereby imposed in the amount of
P75,000; (2) the award of moral damages is increased from P30,000 to P50,000; and (3) exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 is also awarded in favor of the victim ANALIZA DUROJA.

Accused-appellant is further ordered to acknowledge and support the offspring born of the rape. The
amount of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by the trial court.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of the case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED

e. Bantulanon v. People

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting
Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its

Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits
from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans
were discovered.4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against
Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then
and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted
a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted
a loan, never received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and
convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160,
Philippine Currency.5

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province
of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same,
and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by
then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of
P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing
that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan,
received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance
of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release
to herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert
to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute
the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by
then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo
had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00,
thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and
was never granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused
did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo
by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo
received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never
received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI
said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and
thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province
of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI
by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis
Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with,
and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a
deposit and was never granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth,
said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name
of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that
the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis
Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to
defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of
P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount
of P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as
witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash
vouchers9 testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing
varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No.
30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No.
237A11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No.
276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was
released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan
because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was
a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982.
She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their
respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of
the amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared
that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He
corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its
Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and
Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of
Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is
Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in
Arroyo's name was settled.22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile
witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her
the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the
financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the
Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No.
237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because the
Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the
names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them;24 that the three were
members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of
directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries
in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans
and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;25 that she signed the loan
application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that
she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;26 that
contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative
provided they are children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for
another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan
but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court.27 She also
declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not
have by-laws yet.29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had
been registered since 1967.30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months
of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the
PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints until
fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.31

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayormaximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to
indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty
(P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was
allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion
and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as
Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element
prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions
because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.34

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled
rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the
technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given
in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is
and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged,
then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which
those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph
2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion,
and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts
appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan
and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected
in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name
of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from
the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she
did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in
the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these
persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo.
Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose
signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover,
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that
Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.

The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of
guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan
transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only
grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not
members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal
prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected
from Batulanon.39

The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not
commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law.42Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined
as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of
other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth. 43

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden
completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime
to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it
appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days
during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn
ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the
falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article
pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the
accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment
of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded
in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be
within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal
Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer
the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify
PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting
the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the
understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994
until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the
interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not
falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification
are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when

no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of
the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name
of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A,
petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does
not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful
about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the
proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false
statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud
which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also
guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash
voucher of Dennis.50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not
necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation.
The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds
of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of
the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to
deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month.
When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the
accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in
his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB
sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained
that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element
of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion
of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is
obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the
intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds
before the defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements
of estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by
him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible
financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the
purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of
such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of
the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility,
might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to
him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks
were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the
funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the
appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might
as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain
them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases
of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities
have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short
periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law
to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as
in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no
distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the
present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The
appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well
settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the
misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her
misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the
records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other
productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision
is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount
defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts
of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28,
1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from
finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
3. Continued Crime

a. People v. De Leon

G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.

Modesto Reyes for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente
Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or intimidation against
persons nor force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard,
one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage
and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.

Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft of
Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and
was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one
day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs
in both cases. The accused appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon
being arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried
jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the
theft of the two roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into consideration the circumstance
that the accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to the penalty of three
years, six moths and one day presidio correccional and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375,
declaring the costs in case No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to indemnify, as the roosters
were returned to their respective owners. The accused appealed to this court and his counsel alleges
that the trial court erred: (a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was proven by his own
admission; (b) in not giving him the benefit of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead of
acquitting the accused, with the costs de oficio.

We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support the contention of the appellant. We
are of the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused in the present case is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The case falls under the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code,
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244, in connection with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same
Code. The penalty provided in the law is that ofpresidio correcional in its full extent, and there
having been present the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the penalty must be imposed upon
the accused in its maximum degree, or four years, two moths and one day presidio correcional. The
accused being an habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an additional penalty must be imposed
upon him consisting of half the penalty provided or the crime committed, or 2 years and 1
month presidio correcional. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No.
24753 1).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a question in his brief which we believe it
is necessary for us to resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only important to our jurisprudence,
but also to the due prosecution of violators of the law. The Attorney-General urges that the penalty
for two crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each of the stolen roosters. The question,
then, to determine is whether or not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same
occasion and in the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat and the other
to Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.

It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code contains three paragraphs enumerating the
acts which constitute the crime of theft. The first defines theft in general; the second declares a
particular act to be theft which is not included in the description in the first paragraph, and the third
also considers theft a series of acts with similar characteristics to the general type, with the
exceptions therein noted.

Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft: 1awph!l.net

1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of violence or intimidation against any
person or the use of force upon anything, shall take anything which is the personal property of
another without the latter's consent.

2. Any person who, having found anything which has been lost, shall with knowledge of its
ownership appropriate the same with of gain.

3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove or make use of the things damaged,
subject to the exceptions established by paragraphs one two, and three of article five hundred and
ninety-two paragraph one of article five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and
six hundred and three.

As may be seen, the act taking another's property without violence or intimidation against persons,
not force upon things, with intent to gain and without the consent of its owner, is what constitutes the
crime of theft, as described in the first paragraph of article 517.

The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and what is punished is the alarm caused in
the community by the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual rights guaranteed by
the law, as well as the damage that said act may occasion to the members of the community. Under
sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate
crimes.

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894, said:
The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two calves on one night, belonging to four
owners, which livestock was found in various adjacent and open meadows, constitutes only one
crime of theft, because the fact that the persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused
were several, said accused knowing that the meadows in which this livestock was found were open
and adjacent, it being easy to pass from one to the other, does not authorize the legal conception that
the said accused committed four thefts on said night, but only one as found by the lower court, which
did not commit an error of law by holding that the acts were committed on a single occasion.

It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime
being consummated provided that being stolen belongs to another and the same is taken with intent
to gain. (Decision of the supreme Court of Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for
the existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a specific manner who the owner is of the
thing stolen, because the law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal liability, but only the
restitution or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes the crime of theft is the taking of
another's property with intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after the unlawful act
of taking another's property is proven, it is evident that all the elements mentioned in the first
paragraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the
intention to take a thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the
commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does
not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Balaba (37 Phil., 260), according to which, where the accused made no objection to the information
on the ground that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as
to the commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and the trial court also properly entered
judgment of conviction of each and all of these offenses which were established by the introduction
of competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have imposed the prescribed penalties for
each and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in accordance with the provisions of
article 87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present case as two
separate complaints have been filed herein against the accused, but the trial court convicted the
accused in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the said complaints as constituting but one
crime.

In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in Spanish decisions in regard to the question
which is here debated:

In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the taking of articles belonging to two
different owners at the same time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that if two or
more articles belonging to different are stolen at the same time and place, the theft of the property of
each owner is a separate crime and may be prosecuted as such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14,560; 5 Cranch C. C., 412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.],
498.) In other jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State,
either as one offense or as several distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass., 507;
Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St., 688;
State vs.Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if several articles, stored in the same
place, are taken by a single larcenous act, the mere fact that some of them belonged to one person
and some to another does not dissolve the act into separate crimes. (Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala.,
12; 45 So., 212; Am. St., 17; D. C.-Chanock vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Holies vs. U. S.,
10 D. C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71
South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III., 284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-Furnace vs. State, 153
Ind.-93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335; Iowa-State vs. Sampson, 157 Iowa, 257; 138
North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.], 967; State vs. Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80 North West,
227; State vs. Larson, 85 Iowa, 659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-
State vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich.,
573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs. Quintini, 51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44
So., 802; 124 Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90 Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37
Mo., 373; Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75
Pac., 87; N. H.-State vs. Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac., 679;
Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St.,
339, 13 Am. Rep., 253; State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23 Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-
State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101; Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa.
Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95 North West, 289; Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex.,
76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson vs. State, 9 Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep., 732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex.
A., Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23 Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs.Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl. Rep.,
794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54 Am. St., 878; State vs.Newton, 42 Vt., 537;
Va.-Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533; 112
Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189;
Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K., 765; 61
Eng. C. L., 765.)

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, modified and the accused
Vicente de Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three months presidio
mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.
b. Santiago v. Garchitorena

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the
Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp.
2-35 and pp. 36-94).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass
her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on
January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).

On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.

No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of
particulars).

At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to

admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11,
1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days
from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set
for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of
the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22,
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-
departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of
the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who
would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft
charges against her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and
returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the
peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The
Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of
perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads
as follows:

(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to
travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people
transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with
having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the
Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena

that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation
of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same,
thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).

It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for.
The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge
against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had
Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan
sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character
of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).

Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991
and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of
the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the
attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of
the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal
presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In
other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is
not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by
petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.

Re: Delito continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted
that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore
proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor
in her petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and
same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following
cases:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same
time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same
period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil.
437 [1926] ).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's
benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same
motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the
same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).

On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December
1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The
said acts were committed on two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said
offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the
result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66
Phil. 354 [1938] ).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn
over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the
employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up
claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless
the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown
by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct
offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting
a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
— that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the
accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the
approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the
prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but
because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal
Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371
to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as
to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
c. Gamboa v. CA

G.R. No. L-41054 November 28, 1975

JOSE L. GAMBOA and UNITS OPTICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN LU HAYCO, respondents.

Assistant City Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles for petitioner Jose L. Gamboa.

Koh Law Offices for petitioner Units Optical Supply Company.

Arturo M. Tolentino and Montesa, Manikan and Associates for private respondent.

MARTIN, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-03877, promulgated on July 17, 1975, which We treat as special civil action (SC
Resolution of September 2, 1975), involving the proper appreciation of the rule on plurality of
crimes, otherwise known as "concursus delictuorum", and the theory of "continuous crime".

The private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of petitioner company in its
optical supply business at Sta. Cruz, Manila. On January 5, 1973, one hundred twenty-four (124)
complaints of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code were filed against him by
the petitioner company with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After the procedural preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against private
respondent before the City Court of Manila. Except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the
75 informations commonly charge that "... the said accused, being then an employee of the Units
Optical Supply Company ..., and having collected and received from customers of the said company
the sum of ... in payment for goods purchased from it, under the express obligation on the part of the
said accused to immediately account for and deliver the said collection so made by him to the Units
Optical Supply Company or the owners thereof ..., far from complying with his said aforesaid
obligation and despite repeated demands made upon him ... did then and there ... misappropriate,
misapply and convert the said sum to his own personal use and benefit by depositing the said amount
in his own name and personal account with the Associated Banking Corporation under Account No.
171 (or with the Equitable Banking Corporation under Account No. 707), and thereafter withdrawing
the same ... ."

A civil action for accounting (docketed as Civil Case No. 89373 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila) was likewise filed by Lu Chiong Sun, the owner of the Units Optical Supply Company,
complaining that during his hospital confinement from September 27, 1972 to October 30, 1972,
private respondent initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company. And
to paint a shade of validity to this exercise of powers, private respondent, thru fraud, deceit and
machinations duped Lu Chiong Sun into affixing his signature and thumbprint on a general power of
attorney in his (private respondent's) favor. With the use of this deed, private respondent closed the
accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the Equitable Banking Corporation and, thereafter, opened accounts
in his own name with the same bank and with the Associated Banking Corporation.

While the criminal suits in particular were pending trial on the merits before the twelve branches of
the City Court of Manila,1 private respondent commenced on May 15, 1974 a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XV) against the
petitioners herein and the City Court Judges of Manila, claiming that the filing, prosecution and trial
of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases against him is not only oppressive, whimsical and capricious,
but also without or in excess of jurisdiction of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court Judges
of Manila. Private respondent asserts that all the indictments narrated in the seventy-five (75)
informations were mere components of only one crime, since the same were only impelled by a
single criminal resolution or intent. On October 31, 1974, the lower court dismissed the petition on
the ground that the series of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof involved in the criminal
cases were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of private respondent.

As a consequence, private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July
17, 1975, the Appellate Court reversed the order of the lower court and granted the petition for
prohibition. It directed the respondent City Fiscal "to cause the dismissal of the seventy-five (75)
criminal cases filed against petitioner-appellant, to consolidate in one information all the charges
contained in the seventy-five (75) informations and to file the same with the proper court." The
raison d'etre of the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that:

Where the accused, with intent to defraud his employer, caused the latter to sign a document by
means of deceit and false representation, which document turned out to be a general power of
attorney, and with the use of said document he closed the accounts of his employer in two banks and
at the same time opened in his name new accounts in the same banks, and then made collections
from the customers of his employer, depositing them in the bank accounts in his name, the series of
deposits made by him which he later withdrew for his own use and benefit, constitutes but one crime
of estafa, there being only one criminal resolution and the different acts performed being aimed at
accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer."

We thus readily recognize that the singular question in this present action is whether or not the basic
accusations contained in the seventy-five (75) informations against private respondent constitute but
a single crime of estafa.

It is provided in Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, that "(w)hen
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period." The intention of the Code in installing this particular provision is
to regulate the two cases of concurrence or plurality of crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are
called "real plurality" and "ideal plurality".2 There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos"
when the actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind. "Ideal plurality" or
"concurso ideal" occurs when a single act gives rise to various infractions of law. This is illustrated
by the very article under consideration: (a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense (described as "delito complejo" or complex proper).
"Real plurality" or "concurso real", on the other hand, arises when the accused performs an act or
different acts with distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which are juridically
independent. Unlike "ideal plurality", this "real plurality" is not governed by Article 48.3
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito
continuado" or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor,
there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a
delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such
concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado". In order that it may exist, there should
be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed
upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim."4

It is not difficult to resolve whether a given set of facts constitutes a single act which produces two or
more grave or less grave offenses or a complex crime under the definition of Article 48. So long as
the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a
single offense to be punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime, imposed in
its maximum period.5, The test is not whether one of the two offenses is an essential element of the
other.6 In People v. Pineda ,7 the court even expressed that "to apply the first half of Article 48, ...
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
Prior jurisprudence holds that where the defendant took the thirteen cows at the same time and in
the sameplace where he found them grazing, he performed but one act of theft.8 Or, the act of taking
the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion,
constitutes a single crime of theft. There is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of
different purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of
only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes. 9

In the case before Us, the daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the deposits
made by the customers of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972,
excluding Saturdays and Sundays, which We assume ex hypothesi, cannot be considered as
proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48. The abstractions were not
made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates. Each day of conversion
constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own. All the
conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each
conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying deposits
thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous
crime". In the above formulation of Cuello Calon, We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain day
as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal
Code. As earlier pointed out, an individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private respondent cannot be held to
have entertained continously the same criminal intent in making the first abstraction on October 2,
1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days and months until December 30, 1972, for
the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer
on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to
misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each business day but
not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there
could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted and/or
diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be said that the City Fiscal
had acted properly when he filed only one information for every single day of abstraction and bank
deposit made by private respondent. 10 The similarity of pattern resorted to by private respondent in
making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to divisible crimes.

Apropos is the case of People v. Cid, 11 where the Court ruled that the malversations as well as the
falsifications in the months of May, June, July and August 1936 imputed to the accused "were not the
result of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or
misappropriations had of the funds entrusted to his care, and of as many falsifications also committed
to conceal each of said case. There is nothing of record to justify the inference that the intention of
the appellant when he committed the malversation in May, 1936 was the sameintention which
impelled him to commit the other malversations in June, July, and August." The ruling holds true
when the acts of misappropriation were committed on two different occasions, the first in January,
1955 to December, 1955, and the second in January, 1956 to July, 1956. It cannot be pretended that
when the accused disposed of the palay deposit in January, 1955 to December, 1955, he already had
the criminal intent of disposing what was to be deposited in January, 1956 to July, 1956. 12 There is
no synonymy between the present case and that of People, v. Sabbun, 13 where the Court held that the
illegal collections made on different dates, i.e., December, 1949; January 1950 to February 1956;
March 1956 to September 1957 constitutes a "continuing offense", because the said collections were
"all part of the fees agreed upon in compensation for the service" to be rendered by the accused
Sabbun in filing the claim of the spouses Dacquioag for U.S. Veterans benefit and collecting the
pensions received by the widow from time to time. "The periodical collections form part of a single
criminal offense of collecting a fee which is more than the prescribed amount fixed by the law" and
"were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered." As We have said,
the various acts of defalcation perpetrated by private respondent in the present case from October 2,
1972 to December 30, 1972 are susceptible of division with separate criminal intents.

The respondent Court of Appeals harps upon the act of private respondent in allegedly inducing, with
intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun "to sign a document by means of deceit and false representation,
which document turned out to be a general power of attorney" and with the use of which, he closed
the accounts of the latter in two banks, at the same time opening in his name new accounts in the
same banks, for its conclusion that the acts complained of against private respondent constitute one
continuous crime of estafa. It is striking to note, however, that the accusatory pleadings against
private respondent are founded on Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code, which defines
and penalizes estafa by conversion or misappropriation. In this form of estafa, fraud is not an
essential element. 14 According to Groizard "impudence, barefacedness covetousness, and disloyalty
employed in taking advantage of an opportunity take here the place formerly occupied by
deceit." 15 "Fraudulent intent" in committing the conversion or diversion is "very evidently not a
necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the
conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient.
The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust
funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. We may say in passing that the view here
expressed is further strengthened by the fact that of the nine paragraphs of Article 535, the paragraph
here under discussion is the only one in which the words "fraud", or "defraud" do not occur." 16 In
other words, the alleged act of private respondent in causing, with intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun
to affix his signature and thumbprint on the general power of attorney is immaterial and ineffective
insofar as the charges of conversions are concerned. If at all, the said document may serve only the
purpose of closing the accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the banks and nothing more. Definitely, there
is no necessity for it before private respondent could commit the acts of defalcation. As a matter of
fact, private respondent resorted to this document only on October 17, 1972, or 15 days after he had
already commenced the abstraction on October 2, 1972. 17
The characterization or description of estafa as a continuing offense cannot be validly seized upon by
private respondent as basis for its inference that the acts of abstraction in question constitute but a
single continuing crime of estafa. The sole import of this characterization is that the necessary
elements of estafa may separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself
is consummated. The moment, however, that the elements of the crime have completely concurred or
transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been consummated. The term
"continuing" here must be understood in the sense similar to that of "transitory" and is only intended
as a factor in determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. 18 This is so, because "a person charged with
a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is part committed.
In transitory or continuing offense in which some acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province
has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case
will exclude the other." 19

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, subject matter of this proceeding, is hereby
reversed and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 7, 1975,
enjoining the enforcement or implementation of the said judgment is hereby made permanent. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
d. People v. Penas

G.R. Nos. L-46353-46355 December 5, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RESURRECCION B. PEÑAS, defendant-appellant.

Aniceto B. Fabia for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Abad Santos and J. G. Bautista for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

The appellant was convicted on three separate charges for estafa with falsification of public
documents by the Court of First Instance of Cebu and sentenced in each case to an indeterminate
penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional to ten years and one day
of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P100, to indemnify the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines in the sum of P200 and to pay the costs, He appealed from these decisions of conviction
and attributes to the lower court the following errors:

1. In not declaring that he was placed in double jeopardy.

2. In not declaring that the acts alleged in each of three cases constitute only one offense.

3. In not acquitting him in each case. The informations in the three cases read as follows:

(G.R. No. 46353)

That on or about January 4, 1937, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had in his possession
and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse of his official
position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6990, by making it appear that said money order
was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also imitated and
forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peñafiel, thus causing false facts to
appear on said money order No. 6990, such as the intervention of persons who in fact did not
intervene nor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
Resurreccion B. Peñas did not deposit in the post office of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, the sum of $100 or
its equivalent of P200, nor did the postmaster, Sulpicio Peñafiel, intervene or have any knowledge of
the issuance of said money order; that after falsifying money order No. 6990, the accused went to the
post office of Cebu and, with intent of gain, presented the money order and collected the amount of
P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.

Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.lawphil.net

(G.R. No. 46354)

That on or about January 4, 1937, in the city of Cebu, Philippines, the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had in his possession
and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse of his official
position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6991, by making it appear that said money order
was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also imitated and
forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peñafiel, thus causing false facts to
appear on said money order No. 6991, such as the intervention of persons who in fact did not
intervene nor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
Resurreccion B. Peñas did not deposit in the post office of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, the sum of $100 or
its equivalent of P200, nor did the postmaster, Sulpicio Peñafiel, intervene or have any knowledge of
the issuance of said money order; that after falsifying money order No. 6991, the accused went to the
post office of Cebu and, with intent of gain, presented the money order and collected the amount of
P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.

Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

(G.R. No. 46355)

That on or about January 4, 1937, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had in his possession
and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse of his official
position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6992, by making it appear that said money order
was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused Resurreccion B.
Peñas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also imitated and
forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peñafiel, thus causing false facts to
appear on said money order No. 6992, such as the intervention of persons who in fact did not
intervenor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
Resurreccion B. Peñas did not deposit in the post office of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, the sum of $100 or
its equivalent of P200, nor did the postmaster, Sulpicio Peñafiel, intervene or have any knowledge of
the issuance of said money order that after falsifying money order No. 6992, the accused went to the
post office of Cebu, and, with intent of gain, presented the money order an collected the amount of
P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.

Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

(1) Previous to his prosecution in the herein three cases the appellant was charged with and found
guilty of infidelity in the custody of documents for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six months and one day to four years and two months of prision correccional and to pay a
fine of P500, plus costs. The facts constituting the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents,
like those alleged in the information in the case wherein the appellant was convicted of said crime,
are entirely distinct from those constituting the complex crime of estafa with falsification of public
documents with which he was charged in the said three cases. There is no point of similarity between
the two offenses except that in both crimes the perpetrator is a public officer and that the document
concealed, removed or destroyed in the case of infidelity in the custody of documents and that
falsified in the case of falsification are public or official documents. The conviction or acquittal in a
case of infidelity in the custody of documents is no bar to the prosecution for the crime of
falsification of the same documents. This is so because, one who conceals or destroys an official or
public document in order to be punishable under the provisions of article 226 of the Revised Penal
Code, which prohibits and penalizes infidelity in the custody of documents, need not falsify these
documents in any of the ways provided in article 171 of the said Code. It is enough that he should
remove, conceal or destroy said documents. In order that a public officer may be punished for the
crime of falsification of a public documents, it is not necessary that he should remove, conceal or
destroy the falsified document. The doctrines of double jeopardy and previous conviction do not
apply to cases wherein the following requisites are not present: that the defendant or defendants in
both the former and later cases are the same; that the acts complained of in the two cases are likewise
the same, and that the offenses are also the same or identical. (Secs. 24 and 26 of General Orders,
No. 58; U. S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil., 527; U.S. vs. Bayona Vitog, 37 Phil., 42; U. S. vs. Ching Po. 23
Phil., 578; U. S. vs. Lim Tigdien and Esteves, 30 Phil., 222.)

(2) On the dates alleged in the three informations, the appellant was assistant postmaster in the
municipality of Barotac Viejo, for which reason he was aware that no money order could be brought
or issued for a sum greater than $100, as expressly provided in section 1968 of the Administrative
Code. In accordance, therefore, with said provision of the law, in order to issue a money order for
P600, it was necessary to make three separate money orders.

As shown by Exhibits A, B and C, which are the falsified money orders subject of the three
informations, the appellant falsified the same on a single date: November 24, 1936, and he collected
them also on a single date, January 4, 1937 — from which it is inferred that the three acts of
falsification and the said three acts of appropriation of the sum of P200 in each case proceed from a
single purpose of the appellant, namely, to appropriate for himself the sum of P600. If he had to
resort to this means falsifying three money orders, it was because he was aware that he could not do
otherwise, in view of the legal provision, which he was supposed to know, limiting the issuance of
money orders to sums not greater than P100 or P200. When, for the attainment of a single purpose
which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense. Under this view, the appellant committed only the complex crime of estafa with falsification
of three postal money orders which are, without doubt, official and public documents, the
falsification being the means he employed to appropriate, as he did for himself the sum of P600, to
the prejudice of the Government.

Considering that the law prescribes a more severe penalty for the crime of falsification (art. 171,
Revised Penal Code) than for estafa (art. 315, case 3, Revised Penal Code), we should impose on the
appellant, in conformity with the provisions of article 48 of the said Code, the maximum of prision
mayor, this being the penalty prescribed for the crime of falsification of public documents when
committed by public officers.

Wherefore, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed on the
appellant in the said three cases is that of eight years and one day to ten years and one day of prision
mayor (People vs. Pao, 58 Phil., 545; People vs. Gayrama, 60 Phil., 796; People vs. Haloot, 37 Off.
Gaz., 2901), to indemnify the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in the sum of
P600, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs.

(3) Having arrived at this conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to discuss the third error assigned
by the appellant to the lower court. In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgments are unnecessary
as expressed in this decision. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

e. People v. Madrigal-Gonzales

G.R. Nos. L-16688-90 April 30, 1963

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, (formerly Pacita M. Warns), ET AL., accused-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Bausa, Ampil and Suarez and G.W. Gonzales for accused-appellees.

PAREDES, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by the State against the decision of Branch XVIII of the CFI of Manila,
dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 & 36904, all entitled "The People of the Philippines
vs. Pacita Madrigal Gonzales, et al.", for falsification of official and public documents. When the
appeal was in the stage of preparation and submission of briefs, the Solicitor General presented with
this Court a pleading captioned "MANIFESTATION AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
WITHDRAW APPEAL", instead of an appeal brief for the State, as appellant. The above
manifestation was opposed by the City Fiscal of Manila, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., who appeared
in this Court, as amicus curiae.

The pertinent antecedents of the instant proceedings are contained in the "Statement of the Case" in
the Manifestation and Petition to Withdraw presented by the Solicitor General, to which both the
amicus curiae, and the appellees concur, and which we reproduce hereunder:

"That on or about August 23, 1956, the herein accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was
charged with malversation of public funds, in the amount of P104,000.00 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, said case having been docketed as Criminal Case No. 36877 of said Court, under
an information alleging that said accused, while administrator of the Social Welfare Administration
(SWA), appropriated, took and misappropriated the said amount on five different occasions
comprised within the period from February, 1954 to September, 1955, in the City of Manila;

"That simultaneously on the same date, the same accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was
charged together with Angelita Centeno, Anita Paggabao, Lourdes Alburo, Remedios Serrano, Julia
Carpio, Calixto Hermosa and Crispula R. Pagaran alias 'Pula', with the crime of falsification of
public documents under 27 separate informations filed before the same Court of First Instance of
Manila. In said 27 separate informations, the eight accused were alleged to have conspired in the
commission of said offense in or about and during the period comprised between December, 1954
and September, 1955, by having allegedly caused it to appear: that cash aids were given when no
such aids were indeed distributed to the persons named and at the time and place and in such
amounts specified, or by making and/or causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or
merchandise were purchased by the accused Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales when in truth and in fact no
such relief supplies were purchased, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of fact in
said public and official documents (Annexes A-1 to A-27, pp. 4-161, rec. of L-16688-90). The
aforesaid separate informations for falsification were couched in the same form and language,
alleged the same period of time of the commission of the felonious acts, i.e., between December,
1954, and September, 1955, and invariably described only two different modes of commission of the
alleged falsifications, to wit:

"... by taking advantage of their official positions falsified and/or caused to be falsified the following
described public documents by making and/or causing it to appear that certain cash aids were
distributed and given personally by said PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M.
Warns) to the persons named, and at the time and place and in such amounts specified, in said public
documents when in truth and in fact no such cash aids were ever distributed or given personally by
said accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) to said persons named,
at the time and place and in such amounts specified, in the following described public documents,
and otherwise making untruthful statements or narration of fact in the said public and official
documents to the effect that social cases studies had been made when in truth and in fact no such
social case studies were ever made, ...."

"... by taking advantage of their official positions, falsified and/or caused to be falsified the following
described public documents by making and/or causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or
merchandise were purchased by said accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita
M. Warns),in such quantities and at such prices, from such business establishments or persons as
appear to be specified in the following described public documents, when in truth and in fact no such
relief supplies or merchandise were purchased by the accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES
(formerly Pacita M. Warns) in such quantities and at such prices, at such times and places and from
such business establishments or persons as are mentioned and specified in the said public documents,
and otherwise making untruthful statements or narration of facts in the said public and official
documents to the effect that such relief supplies as are appearing to have been purchased by the
accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) at such prices and from
such persons or business establishments, at such times and places, mentioned in the following
described public and official documents, were immediately distributed to calamity victims or
sufferers when in truth and in fact no such distributions of such relief supplies, valued and purchased
by said accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) at so such prices as
are mentioned and stated in said public and official documents, were ever made, ...."

That on the same date, August 23, 1956, and accompanying the filing of said 27 separate
informations for falsification and one single information for malversation, the prosecution filed ex
parte petition for the consolidation of all said 27 falsification cases and one malversation case before
only one branch or sala of the Court of First Instance of Manila; or ex parte petition being couched in
the tenor following:

"The plaintiff, thru the undersigned, respectfully moves ex parte that all the above entitled cases be
assigned to one sala or branch of the Court and a joint trial be held thereon — all the charges being
related to similar if not the same transactions and the evidence of the prosecution being in great part
the same for all said charges. As can be seen from the allegations of the informations, the
falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation. Having been committed to conceal rather
than to commit the malversation the offense is not a complex one and the separate charges had to be
made in several informations.

and accordingly granted by the trial court.

That after the Court of First Instance of Manila granted the ex-parte petition consolidating the said
cases before Branch II of the Manila Court, then presided by the Honorable Francisco E. Jose, the
prosecution suddenly reversed its stand and sought a reconsideration of said order of consolidation
and prayed instead for the distribution or farming out of said 27 falsification cases before all
branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as a consequence of which, and over the repeated
objections of the defense, said 27 cases for falsification were ordered distributed among the 18
different branches of said Court, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution, however, maintained the assignment of the lone case for malversation with Branch
II of the lower Court to which was assigned also three cases for falsification as above enumerated.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

That after protracted quibbling on various procedural and technical aspects of the distribution of said
27 falsification cases in the manner above described before the 18 branches of the lower court, the
herein accused-appellees filed on or about October 15, 1956, a motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos.
36878 and 36883 to 36884, inclusive, assigned to Branch XVIII of the lower court, on the ground of
double jeopardy, said motion having been filed also in each of the other 16 salas or branches of the
lower court before which the said cases were docketed, accused-appellees predicating the aforesaid
motion on the grounds: (a) that said 27 separate informations for falsification indeed constitute only
one indictable offense of falsification considering that the falsifications allegedly committed
separately as described under said separate informations were but the result or product of one single
criminal impulse or intent, and the same are therefore in the nature of a continuing offense which
should be alleged and prosecuted only under one information; and (b) that the accused Pacita
Madrigal Gonzales and her 7 co-accused had already been arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty
in Criminal Case No. 36885 before Branch XIII of said lower court and in Criminal Case No. 36882
assigned to Branch X of the same court, by reason on which all eight accused were already placed in
jeopardy respect to the 25 other falsification charges before the 16 other branches of said court;

That after hearing the arguments pro and con on the said motion to quash .... with the prosecution and
the defense filing memorandum and rebuttal memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy, Branch
XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the Honorable Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. to
which was assigned Criminal Case Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904, all for falsification, in an order
promulgated on January 19, 1960, granted the aforesaid motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, and held (a) that the 27 separate cases of falsification should indeed be tried and/or
prosecuted only under one information for the crime of falsification as a continuing offense resulting
from only one criminal intent or impulse, and (b) that according to the spirit rather than the letter of
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and the complementary provision on the matter
in our Rules of Court, the accused Pacita Madrigal Gonzales and her seven co-accused were placed
in jeopardy of trial for the same offense immediately after entering their pleas with Branch X of the
said court, and therefore, said plea could be pleaded as a bar to their further prosecution for the other
offenses of falsification pending before said Branch XVIII.

That dissatisfied with the foregoing dismissal, the prosecution has interposed the instant appeal on
purely questions of law on January 21, 1960.

That after the perfection of the instant appeal, however, and during the pendency hereof, Branch X of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the Honorable Higinio Macadaeg, dismissed the
information in Criminal Case No. 36882 against the said accused-appellees herein without their
consent; while Branch XIII of the same Court of First Instance, presided by the Hon. Bienvenido
Tan, after presentation by the prosecution of the available evidence against the same accused-
appellees herein in Criminal Case No. 36885 for falsification, dismissed the said case by finding all
said accused innocent, with costs de officio, in its decision promulgated on March 24, 1960. ...."

The Solicitor General is of the belief that the dismissals of the cases by the three branches of the
Manila CFI constituted double jeopardy and, therefore, they are a bar to the further prosecution of the
remaining 24 informations for falsification. Upon the other hand, the amicus curiae claims that the
appeal of the State is meritorious, there is no double jeopardy; and the Orders granting the motions to
quash (Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904) were erroneous.

It would seem that the dominant issue which needs determination in the instant cases, is "whether the
Orders of the three (3) different branches of the Manila CFI, namely: the Order of Dismissal issued
by Judge Ruperto Kapunan (Branch XVIII) dated January 19, 1960, in Criminal Cases Nos. 36894,
36899 and 36904; the Order of Judge Macadaeg, dated March 23, 1960 (Branch X) dismissing
Criminal Case No. 36882; and the decision of Judge Tan (Branch XIII) dated March 24, 1960, in
Criminal Case No. 36885, acquitting the accused, constitute a bar to the prosecution of the remaining
22 falsification charges, filed against the same accused-appellees, which were lodged and still
pending resolution with the other branches of said Court on the ground of double jeopardy." The
resolution of this legal issue revolves on the circumstances of whether or not the twenty-seven (27)
falsifications were the product of only one criminal intent. It is argued that since all the falsifications
were supposedly committed within a specific period (from December, 1954 to September, 1955), and
that the allegations in the different informations for falsification are the same, said acts were but the
product or result of a singular criminal intent; that no less than the prosecution in said cases had
admitted in a manifestation, that the charges are "related to similar if not the same transactions and
the evidence of the prosecution being in great part the same for all said charges"; and that the
falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation.

One reason advanced by the trial court and the Solicitor General in holding that the falsifications
constituted a continuing offense, proceeding from a single criminal intent is that, according to the
manifestation of the City Fiscal and Special Prosecutor, the motive for these falsifications, was to
conceal the malversation. The appellees seem to confuse motive with criminal intent. Motive is not
an element of a felony; it is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence. Criminal intent renders an
act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind of the accused, and it is he who can state his real motive in
committing a crime. Whatever the fiscal had manifested, as to the motive which had impelled the
accused to transgress the law, was but a speculation gathered in the process of investigation. The
existence of a motive, not having been alleged in the informations for falsification, in order to be
available to the accused in his defense of double jeopardy, or any ground for that matter, must have to
be proven, being, as heretofore stated, a prospectant circumstantial evidence. In other words, the
existence of the motive to conceal malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of fact which should
be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of double jeopardy. The Court cannot
assume that the purpose of committing the twenty-seven (27) falsifications was to conceal the
malversation. This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount they had
malversed on a certain period, they had purposedly perpetrated the corresponding falsification to
cover up such amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been completely
misappropriated. In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed that in the falsification of each
document, the criminal intent was separated and distinct.

In effect, it will be noted that although all the informations in the 27 falsification cases were
uniformly worded, the numbers of the vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts
thereof are different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at bar, Voucher No. 4,
dated September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No. 6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and
Voucher No. 13, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also show different
vouchers, dates and amounts. These undeniable facts, alleged in the informations, evidently show
that different acts of falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering distinct
amounts. Each information did not refer to all said acts of falsification. Neither is there merit in the
argument that said acts of falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all
prosecuted in only one information. This Court in a number of cases, dealing on the same subject,
held:

"The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to each
other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of one
individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series. The crime of
falsification of a private document was completed and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a
third person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct crime was
initiated and consummated when the second ticket was falsified. That both documents may have been
falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an embezzlement in no wise affects the case, as
under the definition of the crime of falsification of private documents set out in Article 304 of the
Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the moment when such a document is
actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a third person, it matters not to what
use the document may be put thereafter. ..." (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 148-149).

"The falsification of each of these six money orders committed separately by means of different acts
constitutes independent crimes of falsification (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the
appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different
crimes of malversation. In the record of payments then kept by the defendant, it appears that the
respective amounts of the money orders had been paid on different dates, proving that the
appropriation thereof was made on different occasions. Furthermore, no objection had been filed to
any of the informations presented in the trial court." (People v. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671)..

".... By reading the four informations inserted above, it clearly appears that the alleged acts of
falsification and malversation imputed to the accused-appellant were committed by him. .... It may
therefore be said that the malversations as well as the falsifications imputed to the accused in the
four cases under consideration were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or misappropriations had of the funds
entrusted his care, and of as many falsifications also committed to conceal each of said acts. ....
(People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354).

"The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the falsifications committed on April 30, 1931 and on
May 2 of the same year were not necessary means for the commission of the malversations on the
same dates, is correct. Each falsification and each malversation constitute independent offenses
which must be punished separately .... The acts being independent from each other and executed by
different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense." (Regis v. People, 67 Phil. 43).

Upon the basis of the above authorities, we need not proceed any further to determine whether the 27
falsifications perpetrated on separate vouchers, at different dates and in various amounts, constitute
27 separate and independent crimes, which were not continuous. It becomes, likewise, unnecessary
to inquire into the merits of the question of double jeopardy, because of the above opinion.
"In respect of the defense of former jeopardy, made to a prosecution for forgery, it must appear by the
plea that the offense charged in both cases was the same in law and in fact. The plea will be bad if the
offenses charged in the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly they
may be connected in fact. As to several acts of forgery, each generally constitutes a separate crime,
even though they are committed in the course of a continuous transaction, on the same date, or even
on the same piece of paper, unless each act constitutes merely a component part of an indivisible
instrument. ...." (23 Am. Jur., pp. 700-701).

Moreover, under the facts and circumstances appearing in the record, the grounds upon which the
appellees anchor their defense of double jeopardy in the motion to quash, are not clear and
indubitable. One cannot build up the defense of double jeopardy on mere hypothesis.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the lower court (Branch XVIII) dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 36894,
36899 and 36904 on the ground of double jeopardy is set aside and another entered remanding the
said case for further proceedings. The Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appeal, presented by the
Solicitor General should be, as it is hereby denied. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part

4. Special Complex Crime

Artilcles 266-B, 267, 294, 297,and 320