(Bruce R. Reichenbach) The Cosmological Argument (B-Ok - CC)

THE
COSMOLOOICAL
ARGUMENT
A Reassessment
6
THE
COSMOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
A Reassessment
By
BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Ph.D.

Chairman, Department of Philosophy
Augsburg College
Minneapolis, Minnesota
CHARLES C THOMAS • P U B L I S H E R
Springfield • Illinois • U.S.A.
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1-10
To Sharon
A good wife who can find?
She is far more precious than jewels.
The heart of her husband trusts in her,
And he will have no lack of gain.
She does him good, and not harm,
All the days of her life.
—Proverbs 31
/
PREFACE
w ITHIN THE PAST decade or so there has been a gradual awak-
ening of interest in philosophical theology in general and in
the theistic arguments in particular. One of the first indications
of this was the response which the publication of Flew and
Maclntyre's collection, New Essays in Philosophical Theology,
evoked. A major result of this volume was to bring to the at-
tention of the philosophical world questions which had long
been passed off as meaningless. It pointed to the fact that we
can once again critically and cautiously investigate an area of
philosophy which for half a century or more was deemed barren.
It is true that the majority of articles contained therein were
largely negative in the judgment which they passed on a variety
of issues, including the truth and validity of the theistic argu-
ments. And considering the philosophical background out of
which this volume came, this is not surprising. But the lasting
value and importance of this volume are not so much the con-
clusions arrived at, but rather the indication of a new direction
in philosophical theology which it manifests; the endeavor to
do philosophical theology is again made respectable.
In the developments which have succeeded the publication
of this volume, it was the ontological argument which initially
stimulated the greatest interest and debate. The criticisms which
Kant raised had long been accepted by the overwhelming ma-
jority of philosophers as ultimately telling against Anselm's argu-
ment. But Norman Malcolm's reformulation (or discovery of a
second argument in Anselm) ignited a flurry of response, a
reaction which continues to the present. Interest was again
sparked in one of the oldest theses of natural theology. More
recently, interest has also been generated in the cosmological
argument. Has the argument been properly understood? Are
the traditional criticisms really damaging to the argument? Can
the argument be reformulated in order to overcome certain
weaknesses which have been discerned? These are some of the
vii
viii The Cosmological Argument
questions which have been raised in recent books and philosophi-
cal journals. Here again, what is important, to me at least, is not
so much the conclusions which these writers come to (though
they in no wise can be passed over lightly), as their willingness
to take another hard look at the cosmological argument, some-
thing which would have been generally considered unthinkable
not so long ago. Theirs is an unmistakable signal that it is time
to think through the multifarious and difficult issues which sur-
round the cosmological argument.
It is this challenge to analyze the positions which the cos-
mological argument propounds and presupposes which we have
undertaken to meet. The time has arrived for a reassessment
of both the truth and validity of what is to me the most inter-
esting and exciting of the theistic arguments. Such a reassessment,
such an investigation, is precisely the task of this book. It will
be the reevaluation of both the argument itself and the criticisms
which have been raised against it, both historically and in con-
temporary philosophy, which will occupy our attention through-
out.
Our program will be to establish in the beginning, what
initially appears to be a plausible cosmological argument, while
leaving to succeeding chapters the task of defending this against
its critics. In the first chapter we will endeavor to set forth argu-
ments which fully support the various steps to be found in our
cosmological argument. Accordingly, the complete development
of what we believe to be a true and valid cosmological argument
will be given here. Out of this presentation will arise the fact
of the argument's basic reliance on the principles of causation
and sufficient reason. The second, third, and fourth chapters will
be devoted to a detailed defense of the truth and necessity of
both principles. The final chapters will consider the various
criticisms which have been or are now raised against the argu-
ment. We will devote our attention to dealing with each in de-
tail. Consequently, if we can establish a plausible cosmological
argument, and if we can defend this initial argument against
the criticisms which usually have been thought to invalidate it,
then we have given new life to an argument which traditionally
has had an important place in philosophical theology.
Preface IX
The era is past when all metaphysical statements or argu-

ments can simply be dismissed as silly or senseless, since they
do not meet a preestablished criterion of verifiability. Meta-
physical utterances can be meaningful when placed in an ap-
propriate context. In this, hopefully, we have shown the way.
We have presented a context in which we can begin to dis-
course; we are pointing to a being whose very existence provides
the core of such a context.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A HOUGH THERE BE one author of a book, the ideas contained

in that writing have many fathers. Grateful acknowledgment
must be made to Professor Henry Veatch of Northwestern Uni-
versity, who made many concrete suggestions and timely criti-
cisms of the original manuscript. Many of the ideas were ham-
mered out in long discussions with Professor Kenneth Strike of
the University of Wisconsin. His probing analyses and ques-
tions helped forge clearer arguments. Finally, I am grateful to
the editors of The Monist for their kind permission to incor-
porate into Chapter 6 my article entitled "Divine Necessity and
the Cosmological Argument."*
B. R. R.
•Reprinted from The Monist (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1970), LaSalle, Illinois, with per-
mission of the publisher.
xi
CONTENTS
Page
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xi
Chapter
1. A COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 3
The Cosmological Argument as an Argument Form 4
The Argument 5
Conclusion 19
Notes 20
2. CAUSATION 23
Causation as Constant Conjunction 25
Causation as a Covering Law 33
Causation as Production 39
The Cause as the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 47
Notes 49
3. T H E PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION AND SUFFICIENT REASON . . . . 51

Relationship Between the Two Principles 53
Hume's Critique of the Causal Principle 56
The Necessity of the Causal Principle 60
The Necessity of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 67
Conclusion 70
Notes 72
4. CAN PROPOSITIONS BE INFORMATIVE AND NECESSARY

SIMULTANEOUSLY? 73
Logical Necessity 74
The Synthetic A Priori 85
Real Necessity 87
Notes 91
xiii
xiv The Cosmological Argument
5. CAUSATION AND T H E TOTALITY OF C O N T I N G E N T B E I N G S 94

Russell's Objection is Irrelevant to O u r Cosmological
Argument 95
T h e Totality of Contingent Beings Must Itself Be
Contingent 97
T h e Fallacy of Composition 99
A Framework for "Causation" As Applied to the Totality . . . . 103
Conclusion 105
6. T H E PROBLEM OF N E C E S S I T Y IN T H E C O N C L U S I O N 107
T w o Occurrences of "Necessary" 109

Logical Necessity 112
Conditional Necessity 114
"Necessary" As Predicated of Beings 117
Conclusion 120
Notes 121
7. I s T H E COSMOLOGICAL A R G U M E N T D E P E N D E N T U P O N
T H E ONTOLOGICAL A R G U M E N T ? 123
Kant's Analysis of the Argument 124
Conclusion 135
Notes 135
8. T H E NECESSARY BEING AND G O D 137
T h e Material Universe and the Necessary Being 138

Identification is Extrinsic to the Argument 140
Some Programmatic Suggestions 141
Argument and Belief 144
Notes 146
Index 149
THE
COSMOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
A Reassessment
Chapter 1
A COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT is an ancient and venerable

piece of human reasoning. Some have traced its beginnings to
Plato; most assuredly it is found in The Philosopher, Aristotle.
The locus classicus of the argument, however, is to be found in
the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas. Throughout the next
five or six centuries there were many proponents—including
Scotus, Ockham, Leibniz, and Clarke—and opponents, the most
famous being Hume and Kant. Indeed, the philosophical tandem
of Hume and Kant seemed to have successfully disposed of
what at one time appeared to be canonic truth. Thus, in the
period of time following Kant, it was widely accepted in philo-
sophical circles that the theistic arguments were dead issues,
interesting but philosophically useless relics of the past.
But times and ideas change, and through this change re-
appear the issues considered of old. Old ideas have a way of
becoming relevant again: a new framework, a new dress, new
light on the problem, a haunting feeling that truth might be
hidden there. Whatever the reason, modern philosophy has taken
a new interest in this venerable argument.
This renewed interest in the traditional theistic arguments
makes it imperative that first of all we begin to collate many
of the recent philosophical contributions which have a definite
bearing on the theistic arguments, and in particular, on the
cosmological argument. Appearing in recent books and philo-
sophical journals have been analyses of problems which im-
pinge on the question of the truth and validity of the cosmo-
logical argument. These analyses in many instances have pro-
vided, if not definitive solutions to traditional problems, at least
hints which might be fruitfully developed in the direction of
a solution to the problems which have consistently plagued
3
4 The Cosmological Argument
the cosmological argument. It is imperative, therefore, that we
assemble this new data into a coherent whole and show its
application to the argument. Secondly, I believe that it is time
that the cosmological argument be analyzed in fresh and con-
temporary terms and that precise arguments be given for the
various steps involved in the argument. Too often the admittedly
skeletal arguments given by St. Thomas Aquinas appear as the
primary representative of the proposed argument. Too seldom
have positive contemporary developments and alterations of
the basic argument appeared in those selections of writings
which purport to give both sides of the issues surrounding
the theistic arguments. What results is a presentation of a
theistic argument which appears inherently weak and horrify-
ingly outmoded, a relic of the thirteenth century.
Thus, it is incumbent upon us to prepare, by an in-depth
study of the cosmological argument, a viable alternative to the
usual fare. This analysis must involve not a mere sketch of some
general pattern or argument form, not a brief recollection and
restatement of some past sketches, but a rigorous development,
as best we can, of a detailed and specific cosmological argu-
ment. To make the strongest possible case we must develop an
argument which, at least initially, appears to be true and valid.
New and old ideas must be brought together; they must be
molded into a coherent, defensible argument. As such we will
attempt to approach the cosmological argument in our own
way. Hopefully, by starting out afresh, though in no way losing
sight of our historical heritage of past cosmological arguments,
we can thoughtfully and positively develop a revised and philo-
sophically important verison of the argument.
THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AS AN

ARGUMENT FORM
The cosmological argument, taken in its larger context, is
not so much a particular argument as an argument type. That
is, the cosmological argument is most properly viewed as a
general pattern of argumentation with several different possible
substitutions for the first factual premise or step. That this is
the case historically can be observed in the formulations of St.
A Cosmological Argument 5
Thomas Aquinas. His first three Ways, which are usually desig-
nated as cosmological arguments, though they argue from dif-
ferent premises (from motion, from causation, and from con-
tingency), invoke the same general argument form.1 In each
case what is argued is different, though the general form they
follow and the point they endeavor to establish is the same.
What I want to do in this chapter is to evoke what I believe is
this general argument form, while at the same time defending
a particular instance of the form as true and valid. Obviously,
validation of a particular instance of the pattern will not vali-
date the pattern itself. But my intention is not to validate this
general pattern; rather, it is to make plausible one particular in-
stance of the cosmological argument. Accordingly, my concern
with the general pattern will be only incidental, namely, as it
provides a framework within which a cogent and convincing
argument can be presented.
The cosmological argument, as I see it, can be analyzed
into six distinct but logically related steps. This analysis of the
argument into distinguishable steps or stages presents two ad-
vantages. First, it makes clear the transitions present in the argu-
ment and what arguments are necessary in order to support
them. And secondly, it clarifies the stage of the argument against
which any particular objection may be raised, thus enabling
us to isolate the factor or factors involved in the objection. The
value of this will be to eliminate irrelevant issues, to enable us
to clearly focus on the core of any proposed difficulty. Let us,
then, in terms of this general pattern, develop a particular cos-
mological argument, an argument which will hopefully appear
both true and valid.
THE ARGUMENT
The cosmological argument commences with an appeal to
the world of fact. Its first premise or step is the following ex-
istential assertion:
(Sx) A contingent being exists.
That is, there exists in the real world a being which, if it exists,
could conceivably not have existed.
At first it might seem strange to apply the word "contin-
gent" to beings. We are accustomed to predicating "contingent"
solely of propositions; it strains no credibility to say that a
proposition is contingent, that its opposite is logically possi-
ble. But what can we possibly mean when we say that a
being is contingent? Is it not impossible to apply such modal
terms as "contingent" and "necessary" to beings or things? Do
not these terms become meaningless when so applied?
To answer this objection, we must first determine what the
word "contingent" means. To be contingent is to be such that
it could have been other than it is. Of what, then, can we predi-
cate this adjective? For one, we can predicate it of propositions.
A proposition p is contingent if both p and not-p are possible,
either logically (in that neither p nor not-p contradict the sub-
ject) or conditionally (in that neither p nor not-p contradicts
a certain set of given conditions). For example, "the grass is
short" is a logically contingent propostion, for it is logically
possible for grass to be long as well as short. Again, "roses are
red" is a logically contingent proposition, for it is possible for
roses to be of a color other than red. Thus, "contingent" can be
meaningfully predicated of propositions.
One can also predicate "contingent" of events; an event is
contingent if it either may or may not happen. The event
"raining on Tuesday" is contingent, for on any given Tuesday it
may either rain or not rain. Or again, "meeting Mark in the
lounge" is a contingent event, for at any time I may either
meet or fail to meet Mark there. Thus, the word "contingent"
can be meaningfully predicated of events.
It can likewise be meaningfully predicated of beings. For
a being to be contingent means that it is a being which, at any
time T, either may or may not exist. Though it now exists, its
nonexistence was as possible as its existence; there was no neces-
city, logical or real, that it must now exist. It could have merely
ceased to exist in the preceding moment. Likewise, there is no
necessity that it must exist at the next moment; its nonexistence
at the next moment is as conceivable as is existence, for at any
time it could pass out of existence. Thus, for a being to be a
contingent being means that, if this being exists, it could just as
well not have existed.
Several points should be made clear here. First, we are not
saying that the nonexistence of an object which now exists is
in the future as likely or as probable as its existence. Contin-
gency is not a doctrine about the probability or improbability
of the instantiation of a particular thing. Rather, it is merely the
claim that the existence of an object in the past does not necessi-
tate its existence in the future.
Secondly, this is not to say that that which now is really
might not be, that we cannot be sure it exists. It is not a prin-
ciple of Cartesian doubt. Contingency as applied to existence
is not a statement about some certainty or uncertainty that we
have with respect to knowing whether an object exists; it is not
reporting an epistemological state of affairs. Rather, it is telling
us something about the ontology of the existent or future ex-
istent; it is informing us about the being itself, namely, that
there is no logical or real necessity that it exist now or in the
future; its nonexistence is as conceivable as its existence.
Thus, in light of the above, it seems quite evident that
"contingent," as applied to beings, is quite meaningful. Those
who, in spite of this, still tenaciously argue that this word can
only be applied to propositions and not to beings are being
nothing less than pedantic, especially in light of the fact that
throughout the history of philosophy "contingent" has been con-
sistently applied to beings as well as to propositions.
But granted that the word "contingent" can be meaningfully
applied to beings as well as to propositions, are there such be-
ings in existence? That there are contingent beings seems quite
obvious. My existence, for one, is contingent; my being is such
that at no time does it necessitate its own existence. Even the
fact that I existed in the past provides no guarantee that I must
exist now. I could, at this moment, just as well not have existed
as existed. And the same holds true with respect to the future:
at the next moment I could just as well not exist as exist. I am
not guaranteed any future existence; my instantaneous death at
the next moment is one of the possibilities open to me. Thus,
I at least am contingent. And, since there is such a being, S1; as
a true datum of experience, grounds the argument in the world
of facts.
The obvious result of this factual grounding is to dis-
tinguish this argument from any a priori argument such as, for
example, the ontological argument. According to the latter, the
fact that we are capable of forming in our intellect the
concept of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived
is sufficient to allow, indeed forces us to affirm, the existence in
reality of such a being, a being which possesses certain char-
acteristics, among which are necessary existence and a great-
ness and perfection surpassing that of any empirically known
being—in short, an ens realissimum. Thus, any a priori argument
appeals solely to the conceptual world, and from this basis
argues to the existence of a particular kind of being which in-
habits the real world.
In contrast, the cosmological argument seeks to distinguish
itself from such a priori reasoning by taking as its initial pre-
mise the fact that something exists. It commences not with an
a priori concept, but with an existential statement about the
world. Thus, the argument is not a priori, but a posteriori; it
argues from the nature of the perceived world, from the world
of real existence, to the world of real existence. This initial, fac-
tual, existential premise, then, makes invalid, at least initially,
any criticism that the cosmological argument has argued from
concept to reality.
The cosmological argument continues by arguing that this
being, as a contingent being, must be caused either by itself
or by another. But since to cause itself results in an impossibility,
we have the following:
(S 2 ) This contingent being depends on something else
for its existence.
This proposition involves two contentions. First, the argu-
ment claims that to be a contingent being implies that one is
caused. Every contingent being must have a cause of its ex-
istence, a cause which is either itself or another being. And
secondly, the argument claims that this being cannot be the
cause of its own existence. What reasons do we have for think-
ing that these two propositions are true?
Taking the latter first, since it is perhaps the least con-
troversial, we might argue that if a contingent being is caused,
it must be caused either by itself or by another; there is no
third alternative. But obviously it could not cause itself to exist,
for in order to bring itself into existence, it must already be
such that it can perform this act of creating itself. Consequently,
it would precede itself in existence, if not temporally, at least
logically. But this is impossible. Something cannot precede itself
in existence; something cannot logically be before it is. What
is nothing or nonexistent causes nothing. Thus, since something
cannot cause itself to exist, it must be caused by something
other than itself. The existent which is contingent is therefore
dependent on something outside itself for its existence.
But this only sets in greater relief the first issue, namely,
need a contingent being be caused at all? Granted that if it is
caused, it must be caused by something other than itself, yet
must every contingent being have a cause of its existence? Cannot
a contingent being exist uncaused? Since in the third chapter
we will be dealing in great detail with the argument which can
be used to support the principle that every contingent being
has a cause, it will suffice here to merely anticipate our later
argument. Our argument in that chapter will attempt to show
that for a being to be contingent in and of itself entails that it
must be caused. To be such that one either could or could not
exist means that one's existence is not intrinsically a part of one's
own nature. That is, to be a contingent being implies that one's
act of existence is not essential, but accidental, to one's nature.
If it were essential to its nature, it would be such that, if it
exists, it could not not-exist. Moreover, that which is accidental
is dependent upon something. If it were not dependent but in-
dependent, it would no longer be an accident, but a substance.
Thus, all contingent beings are dependent upon something for
their act of existence, for their instantiation. They are therefore
caused by that on which they depend, for to be dependent
upon something is to be caused by it. Thus for a being to be
contingent implies that it is caused; the fact of its being caused
is derived from the very fact of its contingency. Thus, any con-
tingent being, by the very nature of its being contingent, must
be caused, and indeed caused by another being.
To summarize, the cosmological argument contends that
there exists a contingent being, and that this being, as contin-
gent, not only must be caused, but must be caused by something
other than itself.
Since we have in S2 an existing being which is dependent
on some being outside itself to supply the reason for its ex-
istence, we must now search for that which will enable us to
account for the existence of this being, which will supply the
sufficient reason for this being. It is in this regard that step
three poses the following dichotomy:
(5 3 ) That which causes (provides the sufficient reason
for) the existence of any contingent being must be
either (3) another contingent being, or (4) a non-
contingent (necessary) being.
If what we have said above about contingent beings is correct,
these two possibihties are exhaustive; there is no tertium quid
between the appeal to another contingent being and/or the ap-
peal to a non-contingent being.
However, if we appeal to the former, we really have an
infinite series of contingent beings, for each contingent be-
ing to which we appeal must itself require a sufficient reason
for its existence (from Sx and S2) and so on to infinity. Thus
what results is an alternative between an appeal to an in-
finite series of contingent beings and an appeal to a non-con-
tingent or necessary being, in order to explain the existence
of any contingent being. Step three can therefore be reformu-
lated thus:
(5 4 ) That which causes (provides the sufficient reason
for) the existence of any contingent being must
be either (5) an infinite series of contingent be-
ings, or (4) a non-contingent (necessary) being.
The question which now arises is which of these will pro-
vide the sufficient reason for the existence of any contingent
being. Will an infinite series suffice to account for the being of
S1} or must we appeal to the activity of a necessary being?
The argument of the fifth step contends that a series of
contingent beings or explanations, even if it be infinite, will
never yield a sufficient reason for the existence of any contin-
gent being.2 Thus, we have:
(SB) An infinite series of contingent beings is incapable
of providing a sufficient reason for the existence
of any being.
Since S5 is by no means intuitively obvious, what argu-
ments can be given in support of its claim? How can we show
that S5 is true? Before we can present our argument, we must
first of all clarify exactly what we mean here by an infinite
series. Only after we clearly understand the nature of the
series (5) in S4 can we show it is incapable of yielding a suffi-
cient reason for the being in Si.
What do we mean in S4 and S5 by "an infinite series"? Ac-
cording to Aristotle, the infinite has two kinds of existence. The
infinite either exists actually (in the sense that it now "fully
is"3) or potentially.4 Which kind of infinite are we here con-
cerned with? Is the infinite causal series actual or potential?
Obviously the infinite series of contingent beings in S4 is
not potentially infinite. This can be seen from the fact that in
the series the contingent being which is the cause of another
contingent being is not temporally prior to it. Rather, the cause
and effect are simultaneous. And so it is with every cause and
effect in the series. As such, the entire series under considera-
tion is ordered apart from any consideration of time.
How is this? First, with respect to each individual cause
and effect, as we will argue in detail in the next chapter, causa-
tion does not involve the often deemed essential characteristic
of temporal priority. Indeed, the cause cannot be temporally
prior to the effect at the moment of actual causation, for if there
were a temporal lapse between the causing by the cause and
the effecting of the effect, the cause could never move the effect.
This is, of course, not to say that the cause might not have been
in existence or even in motion prior to the effect; indeed, such
might or might not have been the case. However, it is to say
that the cause, when it was performing the causal activity, could
not have been temporally prior to the effect.
Let us suppose that the cause and effect were to occur at
temporally disparate times. Then at the time at which the
cause would be performing its causal activity, viz. at time Tu
there would be yet no effect for it to cause, for the latter would
have to commence only after the actual act of causation, viz.
at Tt. And when the effect was being effected, viz. at time T2,
there could be no cause there to cause or move it, for the latter
would have to act at Tt. How, then, could the object which we
designate the cause ever move the object we designate the
effect? It obviously could not, for when the one acts, the other
would not exist and hence could not be acted upon; and even
before the one is effected, the other has ceased its causal ac-
tivity. Hence, if temporal priority were a necessary condition
of causation, causation could never occur. But causation does
occur. Therefore the cause and effect must be simultaneous.
The effect must occur at the same time as when the cause is
doing the causing; there can be no temporal lag between the
cause and effect in the span of time when causation is actually
occurring.
Take, for example, the situation in which the wind blows
a leaf, causing it to flutter. The wind can be blowing all day,
but until the leaf moves upon receiving one of its gusts, the
wind is not a cause with respect to that leaf. Or take the ex-
ample of a water skier. The tow boat can be moving away from
the dock, pulling out the line. But until the skier is actually
pulled off the dock and onto the lake the boat is not the cause
with respect to the skier. But when the gust of wind does move
the leaf and the outboard flings the skier into the water, then
causation has occurred. But note that at that precise moment,
the cause and effect are occurring simultaneously; there exists
no temporal gap between them. As long as a time gap separates
the wind and leaf or the boat and skier, no causation occurs
(with respect to the effect in question). These examples clearly
illustrate, I think, the contention that unless there be temporal
simultaneity between cause and effect, there will be no causal
efficacy.
Moreover, not only is this the case with each individual
cause -and effect, but all the causes in the series under con-
sideration in S4 are likewise simultaneous with each other, such
that the entire series may be considered apart from any con-
siderations of time.5 The causes in the series are transitively
related to each other. That is, each cause is the cause of sue-
ceeding effect only insofar as it itself is being caused. Each cause,
as itself contingent, is causally dependent upon another immedi-
ate cause for its causal efficacy. If it were not so dependent, it
in and of itself would be capable of providing the necessary and
sufficient conditions, the sufficient reason, for both itself and its
effect. But as such, it would no longer be a contingent being,
but a necessary being—a being not needing any explanation for
its existence, an uncaused cause. But the series is a series of
contingent beings. Hence, each cause in the series is transitively
related to the other causes, in that it is dependent for its im-
mediate causal efficacy upon the immediate causal activity of
the other members in the series. And since each cause is transi-
tively related to the other causes, since each cause is the "bearer"
of the causal action from the (logically) prior to causes to the
subsequent effect, the entire series must take on the nontemporal
character of the relation between each individual cause and
effect. The entire infinite series, then, is a series in which each
and every cause is simultaneous with each and every effect. The
series must be considered, then, as being ordered apart from
any consideration of time.
Perhaps an example or two might serve to clarify our con-
tention at this point. The arms move the hands, which in turn
move the baseball bat, which in turn strikes the pitched ball.
Here each of the intermediate causes—the hands and the bat—is
a transitive cause; it conveys the causal activity or efficacy from
the arms to the ball. Hence, the bat can strike the ball only
insofar as it is moved by the arms via the hands; the hands and
bat are incapable in and of themselves to hit the ball; they are
moved by and simultaneous with the moving of the arms. Thus,
here we have an example of a finite, transitively related causal
series. Another example can be taken from cooking. The gas
feeds the flame, which heats the pan, which in turn causes the
water to boil. Here again we have a finite, transitively related
series. The flame, heat, and pan are instrumental causes, de-
pendent for their causal efficacy upon the continued flowing
of the gas. They convey the energy of the gas to the water, mak-
ing it boil. Moreover, in this latter case as in the first, simul-
taneity is involved. All elements, working together and at one
time, are necessary to cause the water to boil; if the flame is lit
before or after the gas has flowed, no heat will be generated.
These two examples illustrate the kind of series which is tran-
sitively related.
The objection might be raised, however, that this causal
series is unreal. Since causation does occur in time and does
manifest duration, this series cannot account for duration. Hence,
this type of series, a transitively related series, really has no
bearing on reality. Indeed, there could be no such series as the
argument supposes, for causation does occupy time. The causal
process is durational, but a transitively ordered series cannot
account for duration.
In order to reply to this, we must first distinguish between
two types of causal sequences or series. The one type of series,
about which we have been speaking, involves causes related in
such a fashion that each cause is the cause of the succeeding
effect only insofar as it itself is being caused. Each cause de-
pends upon a prior cause precisely for its own act of causing.
Or in other words, each contingent being is merely a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for the effect to occur. As such,
each cause is transitively related to the other causes in the series.
In an analysis of this type of series, the temporal factor is not
an important concern, for each cause is simultaneous with each
and every other cause. However, this is not to say that causal
duration is precluded. Indeed, the actual causal activity might
be temporally extended over a long period of time; the causal
efficacy need not be such that it lasts only an instant. What we
are contending, however, is that no matter what the extent
of its temporal duration, each and every cause in the entire
series is simultaneous with each and every other cause. Thus,
when we say it is ordered apart from any consideration of time,
we do not mean that the series cannot occupy time. We only
mean that temporal duration is not a relevant factor in an
analysis of the series, since each cause in the entire series occurs
(for x length of time) simultaneously.
In the other type of series, the causes are related in such
a way that preceding causes are responsible for their particular
simultaneous effects, but are not directly involved (as necessary
conditions) in producing later effects. That is, they need not be
present in order for the effect which they originally caused to
itself cause something else. For example, my father need not
be present for me to have a son. As such, the causes are related
to each other intransitively; they are not the "bearers" of the
action from one cause to another. In this type of series, the
causal process is durational; it takes place over a span of time.
However, in each particular causal action, the causes involved
act simultaneously, such that within this intransitively ordered
sequence a transitively ordered sequence still exists.
Thus we have two kinds of sequences of causes, one ordered
transitively, the other intransitively.6 Of these two, the first is
clearly primary, for though the intransitive series at the same
time necessarily involves the transitive sequence, the reverse
does not follow. The reason that this is so is due to the nature
of what it is to be a cause. Since the cause is the totality of con-
ditions necessary and sufficient to produce an effect, and since all
these conditions must be present simultaneously or else the effect
will not occur, every causal sequence will necessarily involve a
transitive sequence, for this is the very nature of causation. Thus,
one could conclude that the transitive series is the primary
usage of "causal series," whereas the intransitive series is a de-
rivative usage.
To return to the objection, both causal series have a bearing
on reality. That the transitively ordered series is real stems
from the very nature of causation. In order for any effect to
occur, the totality of conditions necessary and sufficient to pro-
duce that effect must be present. Moreover, unless all those
conditions are present at the same time, the effect will not occur.
Hence, any analysis of what it is to be a cause will presuppose
this type of causal series.
The intransitively ordered series is likewise a real causal
series, as the objection admits. What is important to note is that
this type of series (ordered intransitively) depends ultimately
upon the first type of series (ordered transitively). For unless
sufficient conditions are present to produce each particular ef-
fect in the intransitively ordered series, there will exist no such
series.
Thus, both causal series are real. However, when one is
considering what conditions must be present for an effect to
occur, as is the case in the cosmological argument, only one
type of series is relevant, namely, a transitively ordered series of
necessary conditions. The question in this case is a logical one
concerning required conditions.
Let us now return to the question whether the infinite
series under consideration is potentially or actually infinite. For
a series to be potentially infinite, it must be such that it exists
through a period of time. A potentially infinite series involves a
sequential actualization. But as we have seen, the infinite series
(5) in S4 does not involve sequential actualization. Thus, the
infinite which we are concerned with must be an actual in-
finite, not a potential infinite; the series of contingent beings
must be ordered transitively in order to provide a sufficient
reason for the existence of the contingent being or effect.
With this clarification of the nature of the infinite series (5)
in S4 in mind, we must now inquire whether an actually infinite
series of contingent causes can yield a sufficient reason for the
existence of any contingent being. That it cannot can be seen
from the following. Suppose we have an infinite series, such
that a is caused by b, which in turn and at the same time is
caused by c, which in turn is caused by d, and so on to infinity.
This series is actually infinite, and each cause is in a transitive
causal relation to another cause. Following Brown, and sub-
stituting "cause" for "move" in his account, we now ask,
What [causes] a? Well, it has already been stated that b [causes] c;
so it may be suggested that "b [causes] a" is the desired explanation
of a's motion, the desired value of "x [causes] a." But this would be
an inadequate account of the matter. For b is itself being [caused]
by c, which — owing to the transitivity of "x [causes] y" — thus
yields the implication that a is [caused] by c, with b serving merely
as an instrument or intermediate. But in turn d [causes] c; and so on
indefinitely. Now, so long as this series continues, we have not
found the real [cause] of a; that is to say, we have not found the
explaining value of the function "x [causes] a." The regress is thus
a vicious one, in that the required explanation of a's motion is de-
ferred so long as the series continues.7
And since the series continues indefinitely, the explanation of
a is deferred indefinitely. Consequently, this type of series can

never yield any sufficient reason for the existence of a. No matter
to what extent one regresses in this causal series, one will
never have sufficient causes to account for this particular being;
the explanation is continually being deferred. Thus, an infinite
series of contingent beings will never yield a sufficient reason
for the existence of any contingent being.
To produce an effect, there must be a cause, i.e. there must
be present the totality of conditions necessary and sufficient to
bring about that effect. But in an infinite series, such a totality is
not present; the causal explantion is continually being deferred
because, due to the nature of the infinite series of conditioned
conditions, there must always be at least one more necessary
condition. But if there is always at least one more necessary con-
dition required, then all the conditions are not present; it is
not sufficient to produce the effect. Hence, an infinite series of
necessary conditions, where at least one more necessary con-
dition is always required to produce the effect, will never yield
a sufficient reason for the existence of any contingent being.
In such a series, the explanation must be continually deferred.
The objection might be raised, however, that this impossi-
bility of garnering a sufficient reason from an infinite series is in
fact due to our failure to consider the entire infinite series as
an explanatory unit. The inability is due to our preoccupation
with the notion that we must successively synthesize the in-
finite, i.e. that we must pass each causal element in review.
But it is not essential to the existence of a collection, or even to
knowledge and reasoning concerning it, that we should be able to
pass its terms in review one by one. This may be seen in the case
of finite collections; we can speak of "mankind" or "the human
race," though many of the individuals of this collection are not per-
sonally known to us. . . . And exactly the same happens in the
case of infinite collections: they may be known by their characteris-
tics although their terms cannot be enumerated. In this sense, an
unending series may nevertheless form the whole of it. 8
Consequently, when we consider the entire infinite series as a

reason for something's existence—since it is possible to con-
sider the infinite as a totality—will not the total infinite series
itself yield a sufficient reason for any existent? Is not the suffi-
cient reason to be found in the infinite series of contingent beings
taken all together, as a unit?
That this will not do can be seen from the fact that " 'An
infinite regress of [causes causes] a is not a possible value of
the function 'x [causes] a,' for the variable in the latter ranges
over individuals, not classes (and a forteriori not over series,
finite or infinite)."9 That is, "the notion of infinity . . . is pri-
marily a property of classes, and only derivatively applicable to
series."10 But when we are asking for the cause of a, we are
not asking for the class which causes a. Classes are not causes;
only individuals are causes. Thus, we can in no way appeal to
an infinite series, taken as a unit, in order to provide a sufficient
reason for any being.
Consequently, an actually infinite series of contingent be-
ings can never yield a sufficient reason for the existence of any
being. But a sufficient reason is required for the existence of a
contingent being; that which is contingent is dependent on
something else for the explanation of its existence. But if an
infinite series of contingent beings is incapable of yielding this,
we must appeal to the only remaining alternative, namely that
there exists a non-contingent (necessary) being which provides
the sufficient reason for any contingent being. That this is the
only other alternative has been shown above (S 4 ) in that there
is no tertium quid between an infinite series of contingent be-
ings and a being which is non-contingent. Contingent and non-
contingent exhaust all the possibilities. The fifth step has shown
that the former alternative will never yield a sufficient reason
for the existence of any being. Therefore, the only remaining
alternative is to appeal to the causal explanation of a necessary
being.
The sixth step is thus the affirmation of the only remain-
ing half of the dichotomy presented in step four:
(S 6 ) Therefore, a necessary being exists.
This conclusion contains two parts. On the one hand, this being
is a necessary being. Since "necessary" here is the opposite of
"contingent," the essential characteristics of this necessary be-
ing must be the opposite of those of a contingent being. Ac-
cordingly, whereas a contingent being is incapable of ex-
plaining its own existence, is dependent on something outside
itself, and is caused, this necessary being is self-explanatory,
independent, uncaused, and, as we can see from the cosmological
argument itself, it must be the cause of everything else.
On the other hand, the conclusion of this argument is that
such a being necessarily exists in reality. This necessary being
must really exist if we are to account for, to explain, the ex-
istence of contingent beings. Its existence is required by the
very existence of those beings which depend on it for their
existence. Without the existence of the necessary being, no con-
tingent beings would exist. Thus, since there are contingent
beings to be found in this world, there must necessarily be a
non-contingent being, a being such that it explains, it accounts
for, their existence.
Thus, the sixth step provides the conclusion to the argu-
ment: a necessary being necessarily exists. As here presented,
then, we have a true and valid cosmological argument which
argues from the existence of some contingent being to the fact
that a necessary being must exist in order to provide a sufficient
reason for the existence of contingent beings.
CONCLUSION
We may summarize the detailed argument as follows:
(Si) A contingent being exists.
a. This contingent being is caused either (1) by it-
self, or (2) by another.
b. If it were caused by itself, it would have to pre-
cede itself in existence, which is impossible.
(5 2 ) Therefore, this contingent being (2) is caused by an-
other, i.e. depends on something else for its existence.
(5 3 ) That which causes (provides the sufficient reason for)
the existence of any contingent being must be either
(3) another contingent being, or (4) a non-contin-
gent (necessary) being.
c. If 3, then this contingent cause must itself be
caused by another, and so on to infinity.
(5 4 ) Therefore, that which causes (provides the sufficient
reason for) the existence of any contingent being
must be either (5) an infinite series of contingent
beings, or (4) a necessary being.
(5 5 ) An infinite series of contingent beings (5) is incapable
of yielding a sufficient reason for the existence of any
being.
(S e ) Therefore, a necessary being (4) exists.
We have here what appears, at least initially, to be a true

and valid cosmological argument From what appear to be true
premises we have argued to a valid conclusion. Our task in
the remaining chapters must be to defend the premises and
steps of this argument against their various critics, both his-
torical and contemporary, so that we may see whether our
initial judgment as to the truth of this argument can be sustained.
NOTES
1. Although even a cursory reading of the first two of Thomas's Five
Ways reveals this underlying structure, it might be objected that the third
argument (the argument from contingency) does not manifest such a pat-
tern. However, I believe that a closer analysis will reveal that the pattern
is still there. This argument seems to contain two parts. The first part
attempts to prove that there exist necessary beings. Whereas the existence
of motion and causation seem to Thomas to be obvious facts unnecessary
of proof, the existence of necessary beings does seem to require such proof,
and it is this which he undertakes to develop in the first part of the argu-
ment. The second part of the argument is the cosmological argument
per se. It is here that he attempts to show that if necessary beings do exist
(as he concludes from the first part), then there must be a being which
has its necessity from itself — an uncaused necessary being. The second
part of the argument follows precisely the same pattern as the arguments
enunciated in the first two Ways.
2. In the history of the cosmological argument there seem to have
been two different lines of argumentation, the point of divergence occur-
ring here at S5. On the one hand, St. Thomas Aquinas contends that an
infinite series of moved movers cannot fully or adequately account for the
moving or causing of any one moved object. It is impossible to proceed
to infinity in the series of moved movers, for to do so implies the absurdity
that (1) an infinite number of bodies are moved in a finite time, and (2)
there would be no motion, for where there is no first mover, there is no
subsequent mover (Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Ch. 13, Pars. 11-15; Summa
Theologica, I, Q. 2, Art. 3). Hence, alternative 5 in S4 is rejected because
it cannot provide the cause or sufficient reason for any moved thing.
The other line of argumentation is represented by Duns Scotus.
Scotus argues that an infinite series of causes ordered per se is impossible,
for this whole series of infinite effects would itself be dependent upon
some prior cause. The cause of this series cannot be part of the series, for
if it were it would be the cause of itself. If it exists apart from the series
of all caused beings, it must itself be uncaused, which is precisely what
the arguer is trying to prove (Opus Oxioniese, I, Dist. II, Q. 1). Hence,
alternative 5 in S4 is rejected as an alternative because ultimately even this
infinite series of causes related per se must itself have a cause. The differ-
ence between these two forms of the argument is significant, as we shall
point out in Chapter 5.
3. Richard McKeon (Ed.), Physics, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New
York, Random House, 1941), 206a 14.
4. It is important to note that Aristotle has two different uses of "poten-
tial existence." He writes, "But the phrase 'potential existence' is ambiguous.
When we speak of the potential existence of a statue we mean that there
will be an actual statue. It is not so with the [potential which characterizes
the] infinite. There will not be an actual infinite" (Ibid., 206a 18-20). That
is to say, there is the type of potentiality which implies that the existent
can at some instant of time actually and fully exist. In this sense, the
potential existent will be completely actual at some particular time (all
of it will be actualized at one time). The other type of potentiality will
never be completely actualized at one time; it is potentially actual through
a period of time. It can never become actual all at once, but must be
actualized only through successive stages.
It is in this latter sense that we are asking whether the infinite be
potential. In this sense, the potential infinite will never exist all at once,
but only through sequential actualization.
5. Frederick Copleston, "Commentary on the Five Ways." In John
Hick (Ed.), The Existence of God (New York, Macmfflan, 1964), p. 87f.
It is important to note that this type of causal series has been the series
present in the cosmological argument ever since its formulation by St.
Thomas. Thomas himself distinguished between a causal series which was
ordered per se and one which was ordered per accidens. He writes, "In
efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se. Thus, there
cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain
effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand,
and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
accidentally as regards efficient causes. . . . [For example,] it is accidental
to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. . . . Hence it
is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity" (Sumrna
Theologica, I, Q. 46, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 7).
The difference between these two orderings of the causal series is
clearly brought out by Duns Scotus. "Per se or essentially ordered causes
differ from accidentally ordered causes. . . . In essentially ordered causes,
the second depends upon the first precisely in its act of causation. In
accidentally ordered causes this is not the case, although the second may
depend upon the first for its existence, or in some other way. Thus, a son
depends upon his father for existence but is not dependent upon him in
exercising his own causality [that is, in himself begetting a son], since he
can act just as well whether his father be living or dead . . . The [other]
difference is that all per se and essentially ordered causes are simultaneously
required to cause the effect, for otherwise some causality essential to the
effect would be wanting" (Duns Scotus, Opus Oxioniese, I, Dist. II, Q. 1).
Thus traditionally, the type of causal series which is integral to the
cosmological argument was recognized to be one in which each and every
cause is simultaneous with every other cause in the series, and in which
each cause is dependent upon the prior cause for its causal efficacy. A
per se ordering of causes involves no temporal sequence. The other type
of causal series, i.e. one which is ordered per accidens, involves a temporal
series: x causes y, which at a later time causes z. In this type of series,
it has been deemed quite possible to proceed to infinity without contra-
diction. But this series is in no way involved in the cosmological argument;
the argument is not trying to prove the existence of a first cause in time.
6. See Paterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression." Philosophical
Review, LXXV, No. 4 (October, 1966), pp. 517-519.
7. Ibid., p. 522.
8. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 197.
9. Brown, op. cit., p. 523; substituting "cause" for "move."
10. Russell, op. cit., p. 170.
Chapter 2
CAUSATION
w HAT CONSTITUTES an adequate explanation for the existence
of contingent beings? To what can we appeal? How far, in
terms of the order of causes, need one progress? The cosmo-
logical argument contends that an adequate explanation must
include the sum total of all the conditions individually neces-
sary and jointly sufficient for that event to occur. But is this an
appropriate analysis of the requirements for adequate explana-
tion? Is this the kind of explanation that is relevant to an analysis
of the events in our world?
William Alston, in dealing with the cosmological argument,
poses the issue this way:
Thus the crucial issue on which the cosmological argument hinges
is an issue concerning the requirements for an adequate explanation.
He who resists the argument will say something like this: So long
as we explain a mother's overprotecting her daughter by pointing
out her repressed hostility to the daughter and explain that in terms
of her unconscious sense that her daughter is a threat to her, and so
on, it is true that at each stage what we bring in to do the explaining
stands in need of explanation of exactly the same sort, and that unless
we can get back to something that is logically necessary we Can never
exhaust the task. But that is just one of the things we have to learn
to face in life, and it is unreasonable to demand that things be tidier
than this. From this standpoint Aquinas is making an unreasonable
metaphysical demand on the universe by insisting that it must be
such that a final completion of this process is possible in principle.
A Thomist will reply that this insistence is just part of the general
assumption of the rationality of the universe which everyone makes
whether or not he realizes it. But to this it will be replied that there
are various grades and modes of rationality and that we can hold the
universe to be rational in some ways, for example, ordered causally,
without making such extreme demands as this. It would seem that
at this point we have come up against one of those rock-bottom
philosophical oppositions about which nothing further can be said. 1
23
24 Tne Cosmological Argument
It seems that the core of the disagreement between pro-
ponents and critics of the cosmological argument at this junc-
ture clearly lies in the nature of explanation. When one ex-
plains the occurrence of an event, what sort of explanation is
adequate or sufficient? Is it quite sufficient to present the event
which preceded the event to be explained? Will a listing of rele-
vant conditions be sufficient to account for the event in ques-
tion? Or must explanation be in terms of the totality of conditions
necessary and sufficient to explain the effect? What is the nature
of explantion?
On the surface, it would seem that Alston is correct in
his claim that we have before us a rock-bottom issue about
which little more can be said. We have reached a methodological
impasse, with the result that the cosmological argument will
be valid only to those who choose to adopt a particular meth-
odology, invalid to those who adopt another method, and
nothing much more can be done than to compare methods.
But is the issue of the nature of explanation involved here
so rock-bottom that nothing further can be relevant? One must
be careful, I think, about putting the issue as Alston did, for it
is not simply a question of what features we must give in order
to explain the event. It is not a question about how complete
our own enumeration of necessary conditions for any particular
event must be. It is not simply an epistemological issue, as
Alston seems to claim. The problem is grounded in an ontological
issue about the nature of explanation, or more accurately, about
causation. In explaining the existence of any contingent being,
one is asking for the cause of it. What brought it into existence?
What caused it to be? Hence, the question really is, What is
it to be a cause? And this question certainly is open to philo-
sophical analysis and scrutiny. In other words, since the issue
is not merely methodological, but about the nature of what it
is to be a cause, we are not at a philosophical impasse; the door
is open to further investigation.
This same point can be seen in another way. In answer
to the question posed by Alston, "What will explain a mother's
overprotecting her daughter," both the critic and the propo-
nent of the cosmological argument will give the same reply,
Causation 25
"The cause." But this answer does not terminate dialogue and
debate, with each banking on a view of explanation about which
nothing further can be said. Rather, it opens up the possibility
for further analysis, for we can now inquire what each means
by the term "cause," and evaluate the adequacy of their analyses.
Thus, the real question is, What is it to be a cause? It is
the answer to this which will determine what does or does not
constitute an adequate explanation. To proposed answers to this
question let us now turn our attention.
CAUSATION AS CONSTANT CONJUNCTION

One of the most influential answers to the question, What
is causation? was given by the eighteenth century philosopher
David Hume. Hume contends that causation must be analyzed
in terms of a psychological propensity which arises on the oc-
casion of the awareness of a constant conjunction between ob-
jects. How, in detail, does he present this analysis of causation?
Hume states that to understand the idea of causation, we
must search out the impressions from which this common idea
comes, for all ideas must ultimately come from impressions.
In other words, what we know of the causal relation can (and
must) be stated in terms of that which is perceptible to us.
What, then, Hume asks, are the original impressions which lead
us to form the idea of cause and effect?
"The idea, then, of causation must be derived from some
relation among objects."2 Indeed, Hume discovered that there
are three relations which are ultimately responsible for pro-
ducing our notion of causation. The first is the spatial relation
of contiguity. The cause and effect must be in physical con-
tact for causation to occur. If one observes causation-at-a-dis-
tance, i.e. one object causing another which is at some distance
from it (as with a magnet or moon and tides), the causation
is due to intermediate bodies which are contiguous among them-
selves. The second is the temporal relation of priority; the cause
must be temporally precedent to the effect. But these alone
are merely two of the conditions necessary for causation; they
are not jointly sufficient to give us the experience of causation.
Two objects can be contiguous and temporally prior to each
other without our ever experiencing causation. The third con-
dition is the presence of a necessary connection. But what,
Hume asks, is a necessary connection? We know what spatial
and temporal relations are, but what is a relation of necessity?
And secondly, why is this condition so essential or as he puts it,
"of much greater importance than any of the other two above-
mentioned"? 3
To answer the latter first, we must understand the view
of causation against which Hume was reacting. Traditionally,
the causal relation was viewed as one of production; the effi-
cient cause produced some kind of change or alteration in the
effect. In order for the cause to produce changes in the effect,
it had to possess a certain power or efficacy. The effect resulted
from the power which the cause possessed, viz. the power to
change the character, location, or mode of existence of the object
affected. Thus, the carpenter had the power or causal efficacy to
change the shape, size, or even the hue of the wood. Indeed,
the resulting woodwork was the consequence of his power of
production. Thus, essential to the traditional notion of causation
was the notion of production, power, or better, causal efficacy.
Now for Hume, the term "necessary connection" is synony-
mous with "causal efficacy" or "causal power." For example,
Hume writes, "I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy,
agency, power, force, energy, necessary connexion, and produc-
tive quality, are all nearly synonymous."* And a little later in
this discussion he indicates that the terms "necessity" and
"power" are interchangeable. 5 In other words, in Hume's ter-
minology to speak about a necessary connection is to refer to
the element of causal efficacy or power found in the traditional
view of causation. Moreover, since causal efficacy or power was
deemed to be the essence of the causal relationship—for it was
this which accounted for the unique element of productivity
manifested in causation—then necessary connection should like-
wise appear as, if not the essence of causation (taking into ac-
count Hume's rejection of essentialism), at least the most im-
portant element in or sufficient condition of causation. And since
this is the case, this accounts for the great importance which
Hume places on this relation of necessary connection.
Causation 27
Let us then turn to the first question, What is a necessary
connection? To answer this, Hume inquires concerning the
source of the idea of necessary connection; from what impres-
sion does it come? Obviously this idea of necessity never comes
from the impressions of sensation; sensation is only capable of
presenting us with the first two relationships; it never presents
us with the idea of necessity. Therefore, the idea of necessity
cannot be an impression of sensation, but must be an impression
of reflection. It is "an internal impression of the mind," which
comes from the repetition of a conjunction between events. Per-
ceived constant conjunction produces in us a feeling of deter-
mination or the propensity to pass from one object as the
cause to another as the effect. "Necessity is the effect of this
observation [of constant conjunction], and is nothing but an
internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our
thought from one object to another."6
Thus causation, contrary to the traditional opinion, does
not involve causal efficacy or causal power located in the object
itself; it does not involve any real transfer of causal energy. We
can have no idea of causal efficacy per se. If we could, we
would be able to "produce some instance where the efficacy is
plainly discoverable to the mind."7 But it seems quite obvious
that there is no impression with which we can correlate this
notion of production or efficacy. "We can never have any impres-
sion, that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have
any idea of power."8 Thus, the notion of power must be analyzed
in terms of the propensity to pass from the idea of one object to
the idea of another, occasioned by our experience of two ob-
jects constantly conjoined in this relation of continguity and
temporal priority.
Therefore, causation as an objective relation between ob-
jects A and B occurs when (1) A and B are spatially contiguous,
(2) A is temporally prior to B, and (3) any object like A is con-
tiguous and prior to some object like B. Causation as an idea
occurs when conditions 1, 2, and 3 give rise to or produce con-
dition 4, a "new impression in the mind," a feeling of deter-
mination of the mind, a propensity, to pass from the idea of A to
the idea of B.
Of the conditions for causation which Hume lays out, two,
I believe, merit closer attention. Let us first consider the neces-
sary condition of temporal priority, and then turn our attention
to the condition which Hume deems essential and ultimately
constitutive of the objective causal relationship, constant con-
junction.
Critique of the Condition of Temporal Priority

As we noted above, Hume contends that temporal priority
is a necessary condition for causation. Unless the cause be
temporally prior to the effect, unless the one succeed the other
in time, there can be no temporal progression in causation. All
objects would have to be coexistent, for there would be no suc-
cession of causes, which is contrary to experience. Hence, cause
and effect are not connected but merely conjoined; the one
succeeds the other.
But is temporal priority a necessary condition for causation?
To be such, there must be no case of causation where the cause
is not temporally prior to the effect (with respect to its causal
activity). But there are clearly such cases. Take, for example,
the case of the water skier presented in the first chapter. The
towboat moves through the water, pulling out the slack in the
towline. The towline snaps taut, and the skier is pulled off the
dock onto the lake. But though the boat was moving prior to
the insertion of the skier into the water, not until the skier is
actually pulled off the dock and onto the water is the boat the
cause with respect to the skier. And this motion of the boat,
responsible for the insertion of the skier into the water, is simul-
taneous with the motion of the skier. The boat is a cause with
respect to the skier only at that time when, simultaneous with
its own motion, it pulls the skier off the dock.
Or take the case of the moving of this writing pen by my
fingers (my hand causes the pen to move). Now it is not the
case that the pen moves after I move my fingers. Rather, the
pen "responds" immediately to the corresponding movement of
my fingers: the pen moves simultaneously with the moving of
my hand. There is no time lapse between my hand's movement
and that of the pen.
Causation 29
Or again, consider a leaf that is being fluttered by the wind.
Here it would be quite erroneous to say that the wind currents im- ,
pinge upon the leaf, and then, at some time later, the leaf flutters
in response. There is no gap in time at all. One might want to
say that the leaf, however light, does offer some resistance to the
wind, and that the wind must overcome this slight resistance before
fluttering occurs. But then we need only add that the wind is no
cause of the leaf's motion until that resistance is overcome. Cause
and effect are again, then, simultaneous.9
Here we have cases which are instances of causation. Yet
in each, the cause is simultaneous with the effect. Indeed, in
each case, though the cause might be in motion prior to the
effect, at such a time it is not yet a cause. It becomes a cause
only when it begins to move the object affected by its action. ">
In other words, temporal priority is not a necessary condition,
for there are instances commonly accepted as instances of
causation which do not involve this condition.
Moreover, I think one could even go beyond the claim
that temporal priority is not a necessary condition, to ask
whether it is ever a condition of causation. If the cause is tem-
porally prior to the effect, can there ever be anything such as
causation?
Let us suppose for a moment that temporal priority is in-
volved. What is the causal situation with respect to two billiard
balls, where the one causes the other to move by striking it?
On the one hand, we have the cue ball A in motion (causing)
at time Tt. And on the other hand, we have the two-ball B in
motion (being caused) at time Tt, where T2 succeeds Tt. Now
according to our observation, A strikes B, causing it to roll
across the table; it is this action of one ball striking another
that we want to designate as causation. Now what did A strike
(cause) at Tt? Obviously, it could not have struck (caused) B,
for B is caused at 1\, which is later than Tt. Moreover, what
struck (caused) B at Te? Obviously it could not have been A,
for A caused at Tt.
This is certainly an odd state of affairs! We saw (or thought
we saw) A strike B, and cause it to roll into the side pocket.
But according to this Humean analysis, A cannot strike (cause)
B, nor can B be struck (be caused) by A, for A causes and
30 The Cosmologicat Argument
B is caused at two different times. What went amiss? Was it
our observation, or was it the analysis of causation in terms of
temporal priority?
By carrying this example a bit farther, I think we can show
that it is the analysis, not the observation, for if temporal prior-
ity is involved, A cannot cause anything to move. If A cannot
strike B because of time difference, maybe there is some object
C between A and B which A causes, and which in turn causes
B. But here again, if cause A is temporally prior to the effect
C, A must cause at time T, and C must be caused at T*u where
T precedes TV,. If this is the case, then A cannot cause or strike
C, for C was struck at a time later than the time of A's action.
Indeed, we are forced to conclude that any object which we
substitute for y, where A causes y, cannot really be caused by A
at all; it is always caused at a time later than the time when A
causes. As such, nothing can ever move anything else.
But surely this is contrary to experience; we do see one
object moving another. It seems, then, that we must reject
temporal priority as being a condition at all for causation. The
necessary condition must be simultaneity. A causes B at the
same time as B is caused by A. In order to act, they must both
be present and interacting at the same time. Where they are
not simultaneous, where the one is temporally prior to the other
with respect to its causal activity, causation cannot occur, for
what acts at T certainly can have no relation to the causal action
at TV,. It is therefore simultaneity, not temporal priority, which
is a necessary condition of causation.
The objection has been raised by Hume and others that
if all causes are contemporaneous with their effects, there can
be no such thing as a causal sequence or causal chain. If every-
thing happened simultaneously, if all causes and effects operated
at the same time, every cause causally connected with a certain
cause would be contemporaneous with the first cause, making
temporal succession impossible. Richard Taylor puts the objec-
tion this way:
If some event A, for example, causes B, which in turn causes C,
which in turn causes D, then in case every cause is simultaneous with
its effect, it follows that when A occurs, then the others, and indeed
Causation 31
every event in the universe that is in any way causally connected
with A, must occur at the same time. This, however, is false. There
are causal chains, and sometimes temporally separated events are
casually related in one way or anodier. When a stone is dropped
into the middle of a pond, for instance, this has at least some causal
connection with ripples that appear at the shore some moments
later.10
Taylor and Hume are right, of course, in recognizing that

there are causal chains which occupy time. But one can ac-
count for these chains in a view of causation which involves
temporal simultaneity, in particular, by invoking the notion of
intervening causes. As we noted in Chapter 1, there are two
types of causal chains, one which is ordered transitively and
another which is ordered intransitively. With respect to the
former, though each cause can be active for a period of time
such that the entire causal chain can be of a particular dura-
tion in time, each cause is simultaneous with the first cause.
Consequently, one can conceive of this type of causal chain
as ordered apart from consideration of time.
However, with respect to the second type of causal order-
ing, each cause not only occupies time, but each cause need
not be simultaneous with every other cause. When one ob-
serves such a causal chain, one observes, for example, cause A
acting for a duration of time, affecting other things such as B,
which in turn acts for a period of time, causing C, and so on.
Though each cause is simultaneous with its own effect, the
causal activity of each of these intransitively ordered causes can
continue for various lengths of time, with the result that the
entire causal sequence or chain occupies time. But when B
causes C (where B is intransitively related to A and C), A
need not be present. Hence, C need not be simultanous with A,
and a causal chain spread over a period of time results.
Perhaps an example will be of help in explaining this.
One can consider a genealogical lineage to be such a causal
chain. For example, Abraham is the cause of Isaac, and Isaac of
Jacob. Abraham is the simultaneous cause of Isaac's concep-
tion, and Isaac of Jacob's. But it was not necessary for Abra-
ham to still exist when Jacob was conceived; Jacob's concep-
tion was not simultaneous with that of Isaac. Abraham, then,
caused Isaac, and Isaac caused Jacob; each was a member of
an intransitively ordered causal chain in which each cause was
simultaneous with its own individual effect, and where the
intransitively ordered causal chain was extended in time.
In other words, one need not invoke the mistaken notion
of temporal priority in order to account for temporal succession
in causation. One can maintain that causes are contemporaneous
with their effects, and still hold that, since they are active for a
duration of time, and since they are followed by numerous other
causes, the entire intransitively ordered causal chain can oc-
cupy any given length of time.
With respect to Hume's first condition, then, it seems that
not only is it not a necessary condition (in that one can present
instances of causation where the condition of temporal priority
is absent), but it is not a condition of causation at all. For if
it were, causation would in principle be impossible.
Critique of the Condition of Constant Conjunction

Let us proceed to the other condition, i.e. constant con-
junction, which Hume feels is the sufficient condition for causa-
tion. Can we analyze causation in terms of constant conjunction?
We can show that constant conjunction is not a necessary
condition by presenting instances of causation where events
needed to occur only once for us to conclude that causation
had occurred. For example, only one atomic bomb needed to
be dropped for America to conclude that such would cause great
destruction and death to the populus of a great city. Even if
no other bombs had been dropped on Japan, there would have
been no doubt concerning the fact that atomic bombs cause
radiation bums of great intensity on human beings. One could,
of course, object that since other bombs were dropped with
the same fiery results, constant conjunction is involved. But
though this statement shows that the same cause will bring
forth the same results, this does not mitigate our point that
prior to the dropping of any other atomic bombs, or had no other
bombs ever been dropped, one still would conclude that atomic
bombs cause radiation bums. One can establish such a causal
Causation 33
conclusion simply on the basis of one tragic event. Likewise,
from a single scientific experiment conducted under method-
ologically rigorous conditions one can conclude that one thing
is the cause of another. One needs only one experiment under
controlled conditions to show, for example, that methyl mer-
cury is hazardous to human health, that it can cause severe
brain damage. Thus, causation can occur, and one can con-
clude such, without a constant conjunction between objects.
One can likewise show that constant conjunction is not a
sufficient condition by presenting instances where two objects
or events are constantly conjoined, but where one would not
say that the one is the cause of the other. For example, day
follows night, and night follows day, but day is not the cause
of night, nor night the cause of day. Again, the building of a
nest by a bird is regularly followed by the laying of her eggs,
but no one suggests that nest building causes egg laying. Finally,
the ringing of the class bell is regularly followed by the noise
of moving chairs in the classroom. But the bell cannot be con-
sidered to be the cause of the sound of scraping chairs. One
could multiply examples to show that there are objects or
events which, though constantly conjoined, are not causally re-
lated.
In sum, constant conjunction, like temporal priority, is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for causation.
Hence, we must turn to other accounts to discover a proper
analysis of the causal relation.
CAUSATION AS A COVERING LAW

More recent analyses of the causal relation have attempted
to improve on Hume's view in certain significant ways. First,
they have attempted to divorce themselves from introducing
into causality any psychological components, as was Hume's
propensity. They have tried to locate the necessity involved in
other than the psychological realm. This, of course, is con-
sistent with the general separation of psychology from philoso-
phy since Hume's day. Secondly, they have attempted to sup-
plement the theory of constant conjunction in order to eliminate
the "inadequacies of a constant conjunction theory along Hume's
lines."11 As a result, causation is usually developed in terms of a
causal or covering law. For example, Bertrand Russell writes
that it would be preferable to eliminate the words "cause" and
"effect" altogether, and to simply talk about causal laws.
The word "cause," in the scientific account of the world, belongs
only to the early stages, in which small preliminary approximate
generalizations are being ascertained with a view to subsequent
larger and more invariable laws. . . . But in a sufficiently advanced
science, the word "cause" will not occur in any statement of invar-
iable laws.12
Or as Stephen Toulmin puts it, "The question of causality be-
comes the question whether all physical phenomena are com-
pletely mappable." 13 As a proponent exemplary of this type
of position in modern philosophy, I want to analyze briefly the
notion of causation proffered by R. B. Braithwaite, to see
whether a supplementation of Hume's basic thesis along the
lines of a covering law can provide an adequate analysis of
causation.
Braithwaite analyzes causation in terms of a general (scien-
tific) law which applies to the event. "The statement that some
particular event is the effect of a set of circumstances involves
the assertion of a general law; to ask for the cause of an event
is always to ask for a general law which applies to the particular
event."14 Now since in asking for the cause, we are asking for
a general, scientific law, we must discover what constitutes a
scientific law. According to Braithwaite, a scientific law is a
generalization which "asserts the constant conjunction of prop-
erties."15 It "includes a generalization, i.e. a proposition asserting
a universal connection between properties. It always includes
a proposition stating that every event or thing of a certain sort
either has a certain property or stands in a certain relation to
other events, or things, having certain properties."16 Thus, the
scientific law which expresses a causal relation is simply a
statement of a constant conjunction between events. And the
statement of such a conjunction must be an inductive generaliza-
ion. Since we can experience only a few of the constant con-
junctions, we must generalize from these to form a law stating
that these two events are always conjoined. Thus, in accepting
Causation 35
the view that causation can be analyzed in no other terms than

constant conjunction, he accepts Hume's conclusion that there
is nothing else involved (e.g. no causal efficacy or real neces-
sity) other than constant conjunction between the events.
However, for Braithwaite, the scientific law does not stand
merely as an inductive generalization established by a simple
enumeration of the events. Rather, the generalization stands
within an entire hypothetical-deductive system as a deductive
conclusion from higher (inductive) hypotheses or laws. A gen-
eralization must be explained, not as an isolated instance of
induction by simple enumeration,
. . . but in reference to the place which it occupies within a scientific
system . . . . The combination of the constant conjunction view that
scientific laws are only generalizations with a doctrine of the func-
tion of such generalizations within scientific systems puts the con-
stant conjunction view in a new light. 17
Thus, the confirmation of any causal law does not simply de-
pend upon the presentation of evidence which shows that two
events are constantly conjoined, for in the very nature of this
case, such evidence can be no more than partial. However, if the
law can be deduced from other laws supported by evidence, so
that together they find their place in a total hypothetical-deduc-
tive system, the law thus based has behind it the total weight
of both the evidence and the deductive system. That is to say,
the scientific laws which explain causation are not simply
generalizations based on constant conjunction, but are also de-
ductions from higher-level scientific hypotheses. It is the fact
that the law finds its place within the total system which ac-
counts for our expressions of causation in apodictic terms.18
In this view, therefore,
. . . when a person asks for a cause of a particular event, what he is
requesting is the specification of a preceding or simultaneous event
which, in conjunction with certain unspecified cause factors of the
nature of permanent conditions, is nomically 19 sufficient to determine
the occurrence of the event to be explained in accordance with a
causal law. 20
That is to say, causation can be analyzed first into those events
which precede or are simultaneous with the explicandum-event.
These events constitute the sufficient condition for the ex-
plicandum-event. Secondly, there are those conditions in the
nature of the explicandum-event which make possible such an
event (for example, the glass in the window has a certain
fragility). Finally, the constant conjunction of these events must
be according to, or deducible from, a particular causal law.
It is this aspect which gives our causal statements their apodictic
certainty. Thus, when events fulfilling the first two conditions
are constantly conjoined so that we can form a generalization
concerning their relationship, and when this general statement
can be placed within a deductive system, then we can ascribe
causation to these events.
Causation is therefore not a productive relation between
things, but designates the set of rules whereby, when events are
constantly conjoined and this generalization can be subsumed
under a causal law,21 we can apply the term "causation." And
for Braithwaite, it is the fact that this generalization can be
placed into a scientific system, in which it can be deduced from
higher laws, that avoids the difficulties of basing causation mere-
ly on constant conjunction.
Critique
Can one properly conclude that this contemporary attempt
to rescue a constant conjunction theory of causation by intro-
ducing the notion of a covering law is successful? To answer
this, let us first evaluate the particular analysis given by Braith-
waite; then let us turn to a more general evaluation of the notion
of a covering law.
Braithwaite appeals to higher order causal laws in order
to solve two difficulties which exist in an analysis of causation
simply in terms of constant conjunction. First, as we have
argued above, constant conjunction is in and of itself neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for causation. One can
have instances of causation where this condition is absent; one
can have events where this condition is present but causation
fails to occur. Accordingly, constant conjunction does not con-
stitute a proper explicans of causation. Braithwaite's response
to this criticism is that constant conjunction must be supple-
Causation 37
mented by an appeal to higher order causal laws. It is never
constant conjunction alone, but constant conjunction in accord-
ance with a causal law, which provides us with a proper analysis
of the causal event.
Secondly, why is it the case that a particular event occurs
only after another particular event? Why, for example, does
the throwing of a ball through a window always result in the
glass breaking, and never in the glass singing? Since any two
events can in theory be constantly conjoined, why it is that
only certain events are followed by certain other events? Since,
as Hume argued, constant conjunction means events conjoined,
not connected, there is nothing within the relation of constant
conjunction which can account for why one event must be con-
joined with another particular event, rather than with an en-
tirely different event. Constant conjunction can account for the
prediction as to what event will probably occur after another
(i.e. that one event is conjoined to another particular event), and
this because it has always been thus in the past. But it cannot
say why this particular event must always be associated with this
particular cause.
Again, to solve this Braithwaite appeals to his causal laws.
For him, we can know why one particular event must follow
another because of the nature of causal laws. A law states a
necessary relationship between events. Hence, in any particular
case we can know that x must follow upon y because there is a
causal generalization which asserts that events of class X must
follow those of class Y. And because these causal generalizations
can be deduced from higher causal laws, which in turn express
the way the world must be, these generalizations express why
particular events are causally related in the world.
In both cases, then, he answers the objection raised against
a constant conjunction theory by appealing to the fact that this
causal generalization finds its place in a hypothetical-deductive
system, in that it can be deduced from higher (causal) laws.
But surely this answer begs the question. We cannot hope to
explain causation by introducing the notion of causality in the
explicans. To say that to ask for the cause is to ask for the
generalization which must be according to and deducible from
higher causal or nomic laws or hypotheses, is certainly circular,
for here we are explaining causal generalizations in terms of
higher causal generalizations. It is this circularity which makes
his position suspect.
Moreover, how do we account for these higher causal laws?
For Braithwaite, these higher laws are themselves inductive
generalizations deduced from still higher laws or generalizations.
And these in turn can be deduced from still higher generaliza-
tions, and so on until we reach the highest level of generaliza-
tions. But these highest ones are themselves inductive general-
izations based on constant conjunction; they cannot be deduced
from anything higher because they are the highest. Thus, the
problems raised against the lowest level of generalizations again
arise in relation to the highest causal generalizations which are
formed on the basis of constant conjunction. All that Braithwaite
has succeeded in doing is to push the problems back to an-
other level. But at the highest level the same problems arise,
and here there are no higher inductive hypotheses from which
to deduce these generalizations. Thus, not only has he begged
the question by introducing at the higher levels the notion of
causation, a notion which he was attempting to account for
on the lower levels, but he has not succeeded in solving the
original problems raised against the lowest levels of inductive
generalizations, for he has merely pushed these problems up
to the highest level, where they can be reintroduced against
the inductive generalizations established there. Thus, this analy-
sis still leaves unsolved some of the basic problems encountered
by a theory based upon constant conjunction.
Putting aside for a moment the specific difficulties which
Braithwaite encounters in his analysis, what can be said in
general about analyzing causation in terms of a covering law?
A covering law states that whenever events of such and such a
kind occur, events of such and such a kind will follow. A law
thus delineates specific conditions which must be met, and
informs us what specific consequences follow upon these con-
ditions. As such, it distinguishes relevant conditions from ir-
relevant ones.
But is not this to say that (1) certain conditions are
Causation 39
necessary for a certain event to occur, (2) that the totality of
these conditions, as the sufficient condition, is the cause of the
effect, and (3) that there must be some objective necessary
connection between the cause and the effect? The first certainly
must be the case, for it is the purpose of a law to state those,
and only those, conditions under which a specific event (as the
effect) will occur. The second likewise seems to be the case,
for in laying out the conditions sufficient for the event, the
law is designating the cause of that effect. And finally, the third
also seems to follow. A general statement cannot be considered
a law if it is merely true in a contingent sense, i.e. if it merely
states a de facto connection between certain properties as
causal conditions and a certain effect. A law states a necessary,
not a contingent relationship, between objects; it must state
not only what has happened, but what must happen under
those specific conditions. But to state what must happen is to
make that statement represent a necessary connection between
the cause and the effect. It is to say that there is something in
the cause which is not present in other conditions which are
deemed extraneous, something which makes the effect occur.
Instead of dispensing with necessary connection by invoking
covering laws, this analysis requires it. Instead of explaining
it in terms of deducibility within a deductive system, it pre-
supposes it.
Thus, covering laws do not function as an explanation of
causation. The necessity which is inherent in the law derives
from the necessary connection between the cause and the effect.
Indeed, the possibility of formulating the causal law depends
on the existence of such a necessary connection. Hence, a
covering law does not explain causation; it formalizes the causal
relation but is not an analysis of causality. The question of the
nature of causation and of the necessary connection between
cause and effect still remains.
CAUSATION AS PRODUCTION
There remains one analysis of causality upon which we
have not touched. Philosophers prior to Hume viewed causation
as an act of production; the cause was that which produced
changes in another object. For example, Aristotle writes, "[Cause
can be interpreted as] the primary source of the change or
coming to rest, . . . as generally what makes of what is made
and what causes change of what is changed."22 Or later John
Locke writes, "That which produces any simple or complex
idea we denote by the general name, cause, and that which is
produced, effect."23 The (efficient) cause, then, is that object
which by means of its activity produces changes in another
object, designated the effect.
Implied in this analysis is the contention that there is
something in the cause which makes it capable of such activity.
That by which the cause produces these changes in the state,
location, or character of the effect is its causal power or causal
efficacy; the cause has within it the power to bring about those
changes observed in the effect. It is this efficacy which gives
causation its dynamic character. Thus, causation involves a
transfer of energy or power from one object to another.
These notions might appear at first sight "unscientific," but
such need not be the case. This notion of causal efficacy or
power can, I think, be adequately translated into contemporary
scientific terms. For example, in some cases the power can be
seen as the kinetic energy of the object (cause) in motion,
while the transference of this corresponds with the mechanical
work done, to the expenditure of this kinetic energy in the
production of the effect.24 In order for there to be causation,
this energy must be expended in a certain way. If the object j
(cause) is merely expending kinetic energy, but producing no i
changes in another object, action can be observed, but certainly
not causation. Causation therefore involves the expenditure of
energy in the production of change in another object.
Hume's Critique and Reply

As we noted above, it is this view of causation which David
Hume was at pains to criticize. First of all, Hume argues, to
analyze causation in terms of production is not to provide a
philosophical analysis or explication of causation at all, for pro-
duction is merely a synonym for causation. To say that causation
Causation 41
is production gets us nowhere in terms of understanding what
causation really is. Hume puts the objection this way:
Should any one leave this instance, and pretend to define a cause by
saying it is something productive of another, 'tis evident he would
say nothing. For what does he mean by production? Can he give
any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation?
If he can; I desire it may be produced. If he cannot; he here runs in
a circle, and gives a synonymous term instead of a definition.25
Hence, to understand causation, we must give an analysis in
terms other than production, i.e. in terms of constant conjunc-
tion.
Hume, of course, is correct in his contention that produc-
tion is not a definiens of causation; clearly it is only a synonym.
However, neither does constant conjunction or covering law
provide an adequate analysis of the causal relation. It seems
from this that rather than attempt to explain causation in terms
of any other category, we should maintain that causation is itself
a basic concept, one which cannot be explicated in terms of
anything else. As Richard Taylor puts it,
What this means is that causation is a philosophical category, that
while the concept of causation can perhaps be used to shed light
upon other problems or used in the analysis of other relationships,
no other concepts can be used to analyze it.26
Any attempt to define it must ultimately borrow from it.
However, to say that causation is production is not to say
"nothing at all." Rather, it is to imply, first of all, that causality
involves more than mere contiguity and temporal succession,
more than a constant conjunction between events. To say that
cause A produced effect B is to say that A made B happen by
virtue of its power to do so. Thus, the claim that causation is
production implies that there is an efficacy present within the
relationship; the cause makes the effect occur. In other words,
to see causation as production is to exclude any analysis of
causation which attempts to eliminate causal efficacy. Secondly,
as we shall argue in the next section, it also implies that a set
of conditions is involved in that act of production, conditions
which are both necessary and sufficient for that event to occur.
In these senses, then, it says a great deal.
Thus Hume's criticism, though true, is not telling against
our contention that causation should be understood in terms of
production, since we never claimed that there was a defmien-
dum-defmiens relation between the two. On the other hand,
the fact that production is an appropriate synonym for causa-
tion, that causation is production, reveals something about the
nature of the causal relation, i.e. that causal efficacy and causal
conditions are involved.
The mention of causal efficacy introduces Hume's most
important criticism of the view that causation is production.
If causal efficacy is central to causality, he argues, we should
be able to show from what impression we derive such an idea.
But we can never have any impression of causal efficacy or
power. Through what sense would it come? It is not an object
of sight or touch; it is not a sound or taste or smell. Hence, since
there is no impression to which we can trace an idea of pro-
duction or power, we can have no idea of causal efficacy or
power. Hume sums up his argument as follows:
All ideas are derived from, and represent impressions. We never

have any impression, that contains any power or efficacy. We never
therefore have any idea of power.27
And since we cannot have any idea of power or causal efficacy,

but we can entertain an idea of causality, causality cannot con-
sist of efficacy or power. Thus, since to analyze causation in
terms of production is to claim that one can experience causal
efficacy, and since causal efficacy cannot in principle be ex-
perienced, this constitutes an inadequate analysis of causation.
But is Hume correct in his contention that causal efficacy
cannot be experienced? I would like to contend that he is
wrong on two counts. First of all, his contention that causal
efficacy cannot in principle be experienced is based upon a
false presupposition about the nature of our perceptual ex-
perience. Hume, taking the analytical posture that he does,
assumes that the phenomenal world must be a replica of the
world of stimuli. In any particular instance of perception, we
can perceive nothing more than we can sense; nothing can be
perceived unless there is something in the sphere of sensory
Causation 43
stimulation corresponding to it. Thus with respect to an analysis
of causation, Hume, consistent with his presuppositions, con-
tends that since there is no sensation with which we can cor-
relate this essential aspect of productivity, and since the per-
ception of causal efficacy is dependent upon such, we cannot
perceive this aspect of causation (if indeed it is even there).
But clearly this presupposition about the nature of per-
ceptual experience can no longer be reasonably maintained. The
discovery and analysis of the Gestalt phenomena have laid to
rest this analysis of the perceptual experience, for it has been
shown that there is more in the phenomenal world than in the
world of stimulus or sense data. We cannot account for such
phenomena as grouping, figure-ground, closure, proximity, and
gestalt-forming on grounds of stimuli alone. For example, when
we, in our perceptual experience, prior to any act of inference,
complete incomplete or merely suggested patterns, we are going
beyond the stimulational data. We find in these patterns ele-
ments which cannot be correlated with any stimulational data.
Yet this lack of correlation in no way prevents the perception
of these pattern elements. For example, take a figure composed
of disconnected lines (see Fig. A). When asked what we see,
we reply that we see the figure of a star. We do not perceive
A
/V
/ \
I \
•> <
I ' ^ \ .
. . * "A '
Figure A
merely disconnected lines; rather we perceive the total gestalt

as the closed figure of a star. It is the figure itself which is the
immediate object of perception, and not the disconnected phys-
ical elements. But this closed figure of a star cannot be com-
pletely correlated with any particular set of sensory stimuli or
sense data, for the figure is "composed" of both physical fines
and missing segments between these lines. We perceive these
missing segments as "being there," yet they are not there in
the sense of a physical presence of which we could have sense
data. Yet their physical absence in no way prevents us from
observing the completed pattern of a star. In other words, our
immediate perceptual experience is not an exact rephca of the
data of sense. As Albert Michotte writes,
It is a well-known fact that these combinations [of stimuli] often do
not show any observable resemblance to the phenomena involved;
and in particular the properties of structural organization, such as
integration, segregation, "belonging to," "dependence on," etc., are
clearly strangers to the world of stimuli, which, as far as the visual
sphere is concerned, is nothing more than a collection of light rays
operating independently of one another. In short, the role of stimuli
is to supply an impulse which determines the response of the receiv-
ing organism, which then reacts in accordance with the endogenous
laws of its own functioning in constructing the phenomenal world.28
Hence, the presupposition which lies behind Hume's con-

tention that we can never have any idea of causal efficacy or
power is untenable; the phenomenal world is not a rephca of
the world of sensory stimuli. The fact that there is no corres-
ponding sense data or correlative stimulus for causal efficacy
does not entail that this cannot be a part of our perceptual ex-
perience.
But what about Hume's denial that we can experience
causal efficacy? Even apart from the above presupposition,
cannot such be maintained? The answer, I believe, must be
in the negative. Take, for example, the case of Johnny hitting
a ball through the window. What is it that we see when we
observe this event? Do we first perceive the ball striking the
window and then the window shattering? Do we merely see
the events of the ball moving through the air and the pane of
glass breaking conjoined? I think not. We actually see the
ball going through the window; we actually perceive the ball
shatter the glass. Or take the case of a saw cutting an oak log.
Causation 45
We do not first see the saw moving, and then the log being cut.
Rather, we actually see the oak log being cut by the saw. It
is not the conjunction of two events, but the dynamic connec-
tion of two objects that we see. We perceive the action of the
one object causing the other to break or split; we actually
perceive the causal production involved. It is true that we do
not sense the causal efficacy, in the sense that we could correlate
some individual sense impression with the efficacy—unless we
are involved other than in the capacity of an observer. How-
ever, as we noted above, this lack constitutes no objection to
the possibiltiy of perceiving the causal action as a gestalt or
nexus, as a unified pattern of active production.
This same fact is carried over into the language used to
report observations of such events. We say that we saw the ball
break the window; we observed the saw cut the oak log; we
watched the snowplow move the snowdrift; we perceived the
derrick lift the metal beam; we watched the fire melt the choco-
late bar. The productive action of one object on another con-
stitutes the proper object of observation verbs like see, perceive,
watch. In other words, our language records that we experience
or see causal efficacy or production.
This analysis of common sense and ordinary language has
been strikingly confirmed by a French philosopher-psychologist,
Albert Michotte, in a series of carefully conducted experiments.
Michotte arranged two kinds of experiments with respect to
mechanical causation. The one, called the "Launching Effect,"
consisted of an object29 A striking another object B; A stopped
at that point while B began to move off in the same direction.
The other, designated the "Entraining Effect," consisted of an
object A not only striking another object B, but continuing on
together with it. Almost without exception, the subjects who
underwent these experiments, when queried as to what they
perceived, answered that they perceived the one object acting
on the other. They did not see merely two objects in constant
conjunction. Rather, they had an impression of real causality;
they claimed to actually perceive causality. They had what
Michotte calls a causal impression, i.e. the impression of A mak-
ing B go, of producing B's movement.
For example, concluding his summary of the experiments
with the "Launching Effect," Michotte writes,
From the experiments described so far there is sufficient evidence to
show clearly that the Launching Effect (in the case of launching-by-
striking) must be considered as a perceptual Form (Gestalt). It is
characterized by a specific internal structure, and occurs when there
are certain definite conditions of stimulation and reception. Like all
perceptual Forms it disappears as a result of appropriate modification
in the stimulus-conditions, or as a result of changes in the observer's
attitude which lead to the substitution of a different Form. . . . It
is therefore quite out of the question to regard the causal aspect of
the Launching Effect as due to an "act of interpretation" on our part,
or to suppose that, under the influence of past experience or in some
other way, we ourselves invest certain basic impressions of movement
with a "meaning." On the contrary there is actual perception of
causality, in the same sense that there is perception of shapes,
movements, and so on.30
Thus, the phenomenal perception of causation is in terms of a

causal impression.
For Michotte, a causal impression is an immediate datum
of perceptual experience; it is something directly lived.31 It is
a Gestalt Form immediately given in perception; it is not in-
ferred from it. Moreover, it is an actual perception of causality.
The causal impression consists of the awareness of one object
"acting on another object, producing in it certain changes, and
modifying it in one way or another."32 Thus, "the perception of
causality is quite literally the perception of an act of production,
or, to be more exact still, an act of production immediately per-
ceived."33
It is significant to note that in Michotte's studies, one of
his conclusions was that the unique aspect of the causal impres-
sion was the fact that it conveyed, from within its own self, the
character of productivity or efficacy.34 The notion of production,
power, or efficacy was essential to the causal impression.
In short, Hume's armchair contention that we cannot have
a causal impression, consisting of productivity, is at odds with
the facts of common experience, and with those of the rigidly
controlled experimental situation. We can have a perception of
causation, where causation is viewed as production. Indeed, the
Causation 47
psychological fact that we possess a causal impression serves to
strengthen—though not prove, since the issue is conceptual, not
psychological—the position that causation must be viewed as
production.
THE CAUSE AS THE NECESSARY

AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
If causation is to be viewed in terms of production, several
things follow. First of all, when one thing is observed to pro-
duce a particular thing, certain conditions are deemed to be
essential or necessary, others accidental or extraneous. In light-
ing a match, the presence of oxygen, a head of such and such
a composition, dryness of the match head, friction, and so forth,
are all deemed essential. Other contemporaneous conditions such
as the color of the match, the time of day or day of week, and
the style of my clothes are all extraneous conditions. In other
words, in order for a certain event to occur, among the totality
of possible conditions certain conditions must exist; there must
be a set of necessary conditions. Secondly, unless all the neces-
sary conditions are present, that particular effect will not occur.
If even one necessary condition is not present, the effect in
question will not occur. In other words, they must not only be
necessary conditions; they must likewise be sufficient to pro-
duce the effect. Thus, we can analyze causality in terms of pro-
duction, where the cause of an effect is the set of conditions
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the production
of the effect.
With this analysis of causation in hand, a reply can be
made to William Alston's objection, quoted at the outset of
the chapter. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to demand
that there be a totality of conditions necessary and sufficient to
produce an effect; this is not to make an impossible demand
upon the universe. Indeed, the universe demands such to be
the case if a particular effect is to occur. Neither is the issue
so rock-bottom that we have two opposing viewpoints "about
which nothing further can be said." Rather, a proper analysis
of causation entails that the cause consist of this totality of con-
ditions; analyses in terms of constant conjunction and covering
laws are insufficient to fully account for causation. What is it
to be a cause? We have shown, I trust, that the answer must
be, "the totality of conditions individually necessary and jointly
sufficient to produce the effect in question."
If this be the case, then we have an answer to the ques-
tion about the nature of explanation. What is it to explain an
event or effect? Is it sufficient to merely give the preceding
event? Clearly not. Is it adequate to merely state the relevant
conditions required to produce the effect? Again, the answer
must be in the negative. Adequate philosophical explanation,
it seems, must be in terms of the totality of conditions necessary
and sufficient to produce the effect in question. No other analysis
of explanation is philosophically adequate. Thus, the cosmological
argument, as a philosophical argument, is justified in appealing
to this notion of explanation.
* « *
Before we conclude this chapter, two final points should

be made. First of all, it is not necessary to know all the con-
ditions involved in the production of an effect for the effect to
occur. We must be careful to distinguish between the epis-
temological question of how we know the conditions, and the
ontological question concerning the nature of causation in terms
of these conditions. That in most cases we do not know all (or
even many) of these conditions entails nothing about the ex-
istence or necessity of there being such conditions. Our con-
tention in this chapter, and indeed elsewhere in this book, is
not that we know all the conditions; rather, it is simply that a
proper analysis of the nature of causation requires us to con-
clude that such must be there, that there must be conditions
sufficient to produce such an effect.
Finally, what of our common use of "cause"? When we
speak about the cause of an effect, we usually deem it sufficient
to list one or two, or, at most, several conditions. These con-
ditions, then, we call the cause. For example, why did the
bridge collapse? Because the cable snapped. Why did the
match light? Because it was dry. We designate the broken cable
and the dry matchhead as the cause of the effect; we do not
Causation 49
appeal to an indeterminate number of conditions to explain
such. Why, then, force ourselves philosophically to speak about
such?
The answer, I believe, is to be found in the distinction be-
tween two senses of "cause." The first sense is the abbreviated
sense of unsophisticated, common usage, where we designate
those relevant, immediate, and observable conditions as the
cause. This sense enables us to quickly identify the major par-
ticipants in the event But one should not take this common
usage as an analysis of what is meant by the term "cause."
"Cause" in this second sense is the philosophical notion of
cause, i.e. where a full explication of what it means to be a
cause is asked for, and where we have given our answer in
terms of the totality of necessary conditions involved. Both
senses are clearly legitimate in their appropriate spheres. Our
concern, in this book, is with the second sense; this is the sense
involved in the cosmological argument, for the argument is truly
a philosophical argument.
NOTES
1. William P. Alston, Religions Belief and Philosophical Thought
(New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 20.
2. David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford, The Clarendon
Press, 1888), p. 75.
3. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Ibid., p. 157.
5. Ibid., p. 166.
6. Ibid., p. 165.
7. Ibid., p. 157.
8. Ibid., p. 161.
9. Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 36.
10. Ibid., p. 38.
11. Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (New York,
Harper and Row, 1953), p. 10.
12. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, (New
York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1929), p. 239.
13. Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (New York, Harper
and Brothers, 1960), p. 123.
14. Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 2.
50 The Cosmalogical Argument
15. Ibid., p. 293.
16. Ibid., p. 9.
17. Ibid., p. 11.
18. Ibid., p. 10.
19. "Nomic" for him means "a necessary connection because it is a
law." A nomic generalization, which can be deduced from higher laws,
is to be distinguished from mere generalization by simple enumeration
{Ibid., p. 293).
20. Ibid., p. 320.
21. For Braithwaite, causal laws are a subclass of the laws of nature;
they are natural laws which involve temporal conditions (Ibid., pp. 308-
309). Laws of nature are to be distinguished from mere generalizations by
simple enumeration in that the hypothesis expressing them "occurs in an
established scientific deductive system as a higher-level hypothesis con-
taining theoretical concepts or that it occurs in an established scientific
deductive system as a deduction from higher-level hypotheses which are
supported by empirical evidence for the hypothesis itself" (Ibid., pp. 301-
302). Therefore causal laws are inductive generalizations from instances
of constant conjunction, which find their place in the hypothetical-deductive
system, in that (1) they can be deduced from higher laws; (2) they are
indirectly supported by evidence for other laws; and (3) they involve a
temporal relation, in terms of priority, between events.
22. Richard McKeon (Ed.), Physics, The Basic Works of Aristotle
(New York, Random House, 1941), Bk. 2, Ch. 3, 194b*..
23. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II,
Ch. 26, sec. 1.
24. Albert Michotte, The Perception of Causality, trans, by T. R. and
Elaine Miles (London, Methuen and Co., 1963), p. 227.
25. Hume, op. cit., p. 77.
v
26. Taylor, op. cit., p. 39.
27. Hume, op. cit., p. 161.
28. Michotte, op. cit., p. 225.
29. I am using "object" here in a phenomenal sense. Since Michotte,
in his experiments, used illusions produced by mechanical arrangements, it
was not the case that there were really any objects as such involved.
However, the experiments were set up so as to give the appearance of one
object acting on another.
30. Michotte, op. cit., p. 87.
31. Ibid., p . 15, note 20.
32. Ibid., p. 15.
33. Ibid., p. 223.
34. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
Chapter 3
THE PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION

AND SUFFICIENT REASON
A N THE PRECEDING chapter we attempted to show that a proper
analysis of "cause" was in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions. To ask for the cause of something is to ask for the
necessary and sufficient conditions required for one object to
produce a change in another. But the cosmological argument
does more than contend simply for a particular analysis of
"cause"; it also contends for the necessity of the causal relation.
That is, given the existence of any contingent being, that being
must be caused, either by itself or by another being. It cannot
be uncaused. Accordingly, the argument presupposes the prin-
ciple of causation: every contingent being must have a cause.
But is the causal principle a necessarily true principle? That
is, is it necessary that every contingent being have a cause? That
it is not necessarily true was the contention of the father of
much of today's empiricism, David Hume. He argued that not
every event or contingent being necessarily has a cause, for
since we can conceive of an effect separable and distinct
from a productive cause without any contradiction, and since
what is conceivable is possible in reality, they can possibly exist
separately in reality. If this is the case, then that the principle
of causation is necessary is demonstrably false. But if this
principle is false, then there is no necessity that a contingent
being have a cause, and consequently no necessity that there
exist a necessary being. If the contingent being can be un-
caused, then it is unnecessary to search for its necessary cause
in anything; it can be sufficient in and of itself. Thus, to deny
the principle of causation is to effectively destroy the cosmo-
logical argument: it is to say that contingent beings need not
be caused, and that there is no necessity that one search for
such a cause as a necessary being.
51
The cosmological argument also involves a second prin-

ciple, namely the principle of sufficient reason: for every event
or being there must be a sufficient reason, i.e. a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions. This principle claims that the world
is orderly and reasonable, that a sufficient reason can in prin-
ciple1 be presented for every event or being. As Langdon Gilkey
puts it,
The procession of the proof requires . . . that the universe as a
whole is known with certainty to exhibit rational coherence. Co-
herence in this sense means that, when our minds require explana-
tions, it can likewise be assumed that reality as well requires an
explanatory cause; and correspondingly, when our minds are satisfied,
then we assume that this satisfaction in us is a sign reflecting the
real coherence of objective things. 2
The cosmological argument, in claiming that only a necessary

being, and not an infinite series of contingent beings, can fully
account for the existence of a contingent being, is invoking this
principle of sufficient reason.
But to some philosophers the universe is not orderly, not
given to sufficient reasons or full accounts. Rather, it is absurd.
Gilkey continues, quoting Camus,
"Thought, to be sure, may require that there be explanations, that
the universe be coherent to our thought and responsive to our search
for intelligibility. But in fact the universe is not at all thus intelligible
—it is absurd in the precise sense that what our spirits require of it
is exactly what it fails to manifest. The order that thought requires
is merely a human cry flung out at a dark, unfeeling, irrational mys-
tery which neither knows nor heeds such requirements." If one says
that, then the movement from the apparent unintelligibility of things
without God to the positing of God "to save the coherence" has no
ground or legitimacy. 3
Modern thought, at least in some quarters, affirms the absurdity

and irrationality of the universe, an affirmation which, if true,
would destroy the validity of the cosmological argument in that
it denies that there need be a sufficient reason for the existence
of contingent beings.
Thus, we have two principles, both of which are essential
to the validity of the cosmological argument, but which likewise
The Principles Of Causation And Sufficient Reason 53
come under critical scrutiny. In dealing with these two prin-
ciples in this chapter, we have three goals. First, we shall show
how these two principles are related to each other. Secondly,
we shall evaluate Hume's critique of the causal principle, to
discover whether or not his objection against the necessity of
that principle can be sustained. And finally, we shall attempt
to present cogent arguments in defense of these two important
principles. Ultimately, we hope to show that to ask for a suffi-
cient reason is to ask, not for something unreasonable, but for
that which is warranted by the very nature of reality.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPLES

It will facilitate further consideration of these two essential
principles if we first of all clarify in what way they are related
to one another. Even a cursory analysis will reveal that they
are clearly related. If one defines "cause" as we have done, as
the totality of necessary and sufficient conditions required for
one object to produce changes in another, the cause becomes
the sufficient reason for the effect. That is, when one observes
that a contingent being has a cause, he is claiming that this
being has for its existence sufficient conditions of a particular
kind, namely, conditions which are causes. And since these con-
ditions can likewise suffice or function as reasons for the ex-
istence of that being or occurrence of that event, causes are
reasons.
For example, one might say that the causes of a match
lighting are oxygen, friction on the matchhead, sulphur, and so
forth. These conditions are sufficient to bring about the effect
of fire. But these conditions likewise function as answers to
the request, "Give the reasons why the match lit." As such,
these conditions function both as reasons and as causes; or stated
differently, causes are likewise reasons for the existence of a
being or the occurrence of an event.
Are the two principles then identical? An affirmative
answer would imply two things. First, it would mean that both
principles have the same sphere of reference; secondly, it would
imply that there is no difference between reasons and causes.
Both of these, I think, would be wrongheaded.
With respect to the first, the two principles do not have
entirely the same sphere of reference. The principle of causation
applies only to beings which are capable of being caused. We
cannot apply this principle to beings which by their very nature
cannot be caused, as for example, non-contingent beings. To
extend the principle to cover such would invalidate the prin-
ciple from the outset. For a being to be contingent means that
if it exists, it could just as well not have existed as existed. "Con-
tingent," with respect to existents, means "could conceivably not
have been." As we shall argue below, from this definition one
can demonstrate that to be contingent is to be caused; that which
is contingent is by nature caused. Hence, if we applied the causal
principles to all beings, both contingent and non-contingent,
the resulting principle would be that "all beings, including those
by nature capable of being caused as well as those by nature
incapable of being caused, must have a cause," which is plainly
false. The principle can only apply meaningfully to things which
are capable of being caused. Hence, the principle is properly
formulated: "All contingent beings must have a cause."
This, of course, should not be construed as circular reason-
ing, for first of all we have not defined "contingent" as "caused."
The fact that contingent beings can be (and are) caused is
derived from an analysis of what it is to be contingent; it is not
part of the definition of "contingent." Secondly, such a state-
ment about the sphere of reference of the principle, viz. noting
that it applies only to beings capable of being caused, does not
guarantee the truth of the principle. It does not make it true
by definition. The reference of the principle is to things capable
of being caused; the statement concerning reference makes no
claim as to the truth of the principle. Whether or not all beings
capable of being caused are in fact caused still has to be deter-
mined. Determination of the reference of the principle does not
determine its truth.
Though the principle of causation applies only to a limited
class of beings, the principle of sufficient reason is so broad as
to be meaningfully applied to all beings, contingent and non-
contingent. All beings and events, according to this principle,
must have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their
existence. Contingent beings have their reason for existence
outside themselves; non-contingent beings contain within them-
selves the reason for their existence. According to the principle,
all beings must have a sufficient reason for their existence.
From this, one can see that the two principles are not iden-
tical. Rather, the causal principle is a limited application of the
principle of sufficient reason; it is applicable only to a limited
sphere of things, namely to things capable of being caused.
With respect to the second, there seems to be a difference
between reasons and causes. To ask for the cause is to ask for
the objective conditions which were individually necessary and
jointly sufficient to produce a particular effect. The cause is
the set of objective conditions on account of which something
happened, which efficiently brought it into being.
Reasons, on the other hand, can include not only conditions
capable of producing an effect, i.e. conditions which are clearly
the causes of the event, as for example in "The reason the tire
went flat was because the nail punctured the inner tube," but
also something which cannot be generally construed to be a
cause, as for example in "He went to the store for a candy bar."
The candy bar provides the reason, the purpose, for his trek;
but surely the candy bar is not the efficient cause of such. The
candy bar did not produce his journey. Thus, the reason given
in this example can hardly be construed as the efficient cause
of his going to the store. At best it records his purpose; in
traditional terminology, it provides the final cause. But if we
restrict the notion of cause to efficient cause, which is the only
usage involved in the cosmological argument, there seems to
be no good reason to designate such a purpose or reason as a
cause. Hence, there seems to be a difference between reasons
and causes, for whereas all causes are reasons (in that all
causes give sufficient reasons for the existence of a being or
the occurrence of an event), not all reasons are causes. Reasons
can include such things as purposes, and ends to be achieved,
as well as efficient causes. Accordingly, it can again be seen
that the principle of causation is but a limited application of
the principle of sufficient reason.
In conclusion, then, the two principles are not identical.
Rather, the one is a special case of the other. The principle of
causation applies only to contingent beings, whereas the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason applies to all beings, contingent and
non-contingent. Granted this, let us now turn to an evaluation
of these principles, to see whether they can be maintained as
valid interpretations of the workings of reality.
HUME'S CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE

It is Hume's contention that the causal principle has been
generally presupposed but is in reality neither an intuitive nor
a demonstrably certain principle. And since, for Hume, neces-
sary truths can only be obtained by intuition or demonstration,
the principle is not necessarily true.4 Hume argues this as
follows:
Now that the latter proposition [that any thing can ever begin to
exist without some production principle] is utterly incapable of dem-
onstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves, by considering, that as all
distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of
cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to con-
ceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the
next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or produc-
tive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from
that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagina-
tion; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so
far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity.5
We might formalize Hume's argument in the following

manner:
1. Whatever is distinguishable can be conceived to be sepa-
rate from each other.
2. The cause and effect are distinguishable.
3. Therefore, the cause and effect can be conceived to be
separate from each other.
4. Whatever is conceivable is possible in reality.
5. Therefore, the cause and effect can be separate from
each other in reality.
If premise 5 is true, then the causal principle is not only in-
demonstrable, but certainly not necessary; eveiy effect need not
have a cause.
"Distinguishable" and "Separable"
Is Hume's argument valid? In the argument, premise 2
appears to be evidently true, while 3 follows logically from
1 and 2, and 5 from 3 and 4. This leaves premises 1 and 4 which
we might question. Granting 4, if 1 cannot be established as
true, then all that can be concluded from the argument is that
the cause and effect can be distinguished in reality (from 2 and
4) which we would not want to deny, but which also would
not prove Hume's thesis against the causal principle. Let us
therefore direct our attention to premise I.
What does Hume mean in premise 1 by "distinguishable"
and "separable"? With respect to the former, he obviously does
not mean "conceptually distinguishable." This can be seen from
his disclaimer that, for example, the body and form, or color
and form, of an object are distinguishable.
'Tis certain that the mind would never have dreamed of distinguish-
ing a figure from the body figured, as being in reality neither dis-
tinguishable, nor different, nor separable. . . . Thus when a globe of
white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white
color disposed in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and
distinguish the color from the form.6
But why are not the color and form distinguishable, whereas
the cause and effect are? Hume's reason, I submit, is that we
cannot have an impression of the color alone—it must also in-
clude the form—whereas we can have one impression of the
cause and another of the effect. Thus, for Hume, the criterion
for deciding whether two things are distinguishable or not is
whether we can have two separate impressions of them. If we
can have separate impressions, then they are distinguishable.
Distinguishability, therefore, is determined in terms of the epis-
temological conditions required for knowing.
On the other hand, what does Hume mean by "separable"?
He obviously does not use it in the sense of being conceptually
abstracted, as for example when we abstract (separate) in our
mind a person's Roman nose from his face, or the flame from
the roaring fire. That is, the separation he has in mind is not
designative of an intellectual operation or state which has no
real bearing on the nature of reality or on the dependence or
independence of things. If he meant this, his argument would
merely conclude that we could possibly abstract the cause from
the cause-effect nexus, but that this abstraction would make no
comment upon, would have no bearing on, the essential or real
relationship of cause to effect. And quite obviously this kind
of separation would say nothing about the causal principle,
which concerns itself with this very relation.
Rather, he means "separable" in a real or ontological sense.
By saying that one thing is separable from another, he means
to imply that one thing is such that it is or can be entirely in-
dependent of the other things. Separability is meant to comment
upon the essential relation which one thing bears or might bear
to another. Thus, when he denies that figure can be separable
from a body, he means that they are essentially connected such
that you cannot have one without the other.7 Accordingly, re-
turning to Hume's argument and to premise 1, whenever we
have two separate impressions, the objects (and their ideas) can
exist independently of each other—they can be separate
Hume's Confusion of Conditions

Can Hume's claim, that whenever we can form two dis-
tinct impressions of things, these things can therefore be con-
ceived as separate, be maintained? Let us look at the example
of a plate which is of uniform thickness throughout and which
is concave on one side and correspondingly convex on the other.
Now, are concavity and convexity separable in an object of
equal thickness throughout? Obviously, we can have two sepa-
rate impressions of the two sides of the plate. When we look at
one side of the plate we can have an impression of concavity,
while when we look at the other side we can have an impression
of convexity. These are separate impressions, coming at different
times, neither of which includes the other. But can we really
separate the convexity from the concavity? Or asked another
way, Is the concave side really independent of the convex side?
Let us suppose that we can slice off a layer of uniform thick-
ness from the plate. What have we now but two plates, each
of which is both concave and convex. Indeed, no matter how
many times we perform this feat, if we maintain uniform thick-
ness, we can never separate the concave from the convex in
reality. It seems, then, that though concavity and convexity are
distinguishable in that we can entertain two separate impres-
sions with regard to the two different sides of the plate, in the
real world the concavity is inseparable from the convexity in
an item of uniform thickness. We can never have one without
having the other. It seems, then, that the conclusion of Hume's
argument can be shown, at least empirically, to be false; as shown
by this example, it is not true that whatever is distinguishable
is likewise separable.
But what, in particular, is Hume's error? The answer, I
believe, is that Hume seems to have confused two different
conditions in premise 1. On the one hand, with respect to "dis-
tinguishability," we have those conditions which are necessary
so that we may know the object. These requirements (e.g. the
impressions of sensation) constitute what we will call the epis-
temological conditions. It is in respect to these conditions that
Hume claims that we can know the effect without having any
knowledge or impression of the cause, or that we cannot know
the color without knowing the form. Thus, distinguishability
is defined in terms of epistemological conditions. However, to
state what conditions are necessary so that we may know an
object is quite different from stating what is necessary for that
object to exist. These latter conditions (which we will call the
ontological conditions) are present and operate independently
of any epistemological considerations. These are the conditions
involved in separability. Hume, when he claims that whatever
is distinguishable is separable, or that one thing can be con-
ceived to be separate from another because we can have two
different impressions, identifies the ontological conditions with
the epistemological ones. But the fact that we can have an im-
pression of something independent of all else is not to say that
this is the way it is in reality, i.e. that the referent of the im-
pression can possibly be independent of all else. Hume's as-
sumption that the epistemological conditions are the ontological
conditions constitutes a confusion of two very different con-
ditions.
The difference between these two conditions can be brought
out by using the example of a moving car. On one hand, we
need know nothing other than the moving car in order to know
this car; all that is required is the sense impression of a mov-
ing auto. But that is not to say that this car can move inde-
pendently of any cause. Indeed, we would want to say that one
of the necessary conditions for the auto to move would be that
there be gasoline present in the fuel line. Now whereas gasoline
is a condition for the car to move (i.e. an ontological condition),
it certainly is not a condition of our knowledge of the moving
vehicle (i.e. it is not an epistemological condition). This simple
example shows that we have two very different conditions here
and that they should not be confused or equated.
But it is this confusion which Hume seems to make, and
which therefore invalidates his proof that the causal principle
is neither demonstrable nor necessary. The assumption that the
ontological conditions are the same as the epistemological con-
ditions lies at the core of his claim that premise 1 is true. For
in 1 he decides the ontological situation in terms of the episte-
mological (distinguishability). But my contention is that pre-
mise 1 is not true, that not everything which is distinguishable
can be conceived to be separate. Indeed, it could be true only
upon the confusion of these two different conditions.
Thus, Hume has not shown that the causal principle is
neither demonstrable nor necessary, for his argument seems to
rest on a confusion of two very different conditions. Rather,
all that Hume's argument can show is that the cause and effect
can be distinguished in reality, a claim which, though true, is in
no way detrimental to the causal principle. Therefore, the fact
that we can know the cause and effect separately does not mean
that the effect could ever be separate in reality from the cause,
that we can have an effect without there being a cause. Thus,
the causal principle does not appear to be in any danger, at least
from Hume.
THE NECESSITY OF THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE

To refute a purported disproof of a doctrine does not at the
same time constitute a proof of that doctrine. A positive de-
fense is still called for. Two very different kinds of arguments
can be given in order to establish the necessity of the causal
principle; to these let us now turn our attention.
On one hand, we can regard the causal principle not so
much as a principle but as a conclusion arrived at by a rigorous
demonstration. That is, the causal principle can be arrived at
by deduction from true premises; it is demonstrably true. The
demonstration proceeds as follows.
The causal principle, as we noted above, does not apply
to all beings, but only to contingent beings; all contingent be-
ings have a cause. What is it to be a contingent being? A being
is contingent if it could conceivably not be. That is, a contingent
being is one which, if it exists, could just as well not have ex-
isted as existed. There was no logical or real necessity that it
exist.
Accordingly, beings which are contingent do not have their
existence intrinsic to their nature. Existence does not belong to
them as an essential feature of their nature, but rather as acci-
dental to their essence. Only if their nature were such that, if
they existed, they could not be nonexistent, would their existence
be essential to their nature. But this is to be a necessary, not a
contingent, being. Hence, premise one: All contingent beings
have their existence accidental to their essence.
Proceeding further, what does it mean for the existence of
a being to be accidental to its nature? It is part of the nature
of an accident that it is dependent; if an accident were not de-
pendent, but independent, it would no longer be an accident,
but a substance, something capable of existing in and of itself.
Thus, that which is accidental is dependent upon something; it
is either caused by the principle of its own nature, or else by
something other than itself. Since to be the efficient cause of
itself is absurd, it must be dependent on something other than
itself. Thus, that which has its existence as accidental to it
must be dependent on something else for its existence. Thus,
premise two: That which has its existence accidental to its es-
sence derives its existence from something.
The conclusion of the syllogism plainly follows: All con-
tingent beings derive their existence from something, that is,
all contingent beings are caused. That the causal principle is
necessary, then, can be demonstrated through the conceptual
analysis of the relation of existence to essence in contingent
beings in premise one, through the analysis of what it is to be
accidental to something in premise two, and finally through the
syllogism resulting from these premises.8 As such, we have here
a demonstration that the causal principle is a true and neces-
sary principle.
One might object to the above demonstration by posing
the following dilemma. Either premise two, in using "de-
pendent," is itself a causal proposition or not. If it is a causal
proposition, the question of the necessary truth of the principle
of causation is itself begged by the very proof. We have used a
causal proposition to show that contingency implies being
caused. But this causal proposition itself presupposes that every
contingent being (a being which has its existence accidental to
its essence) has a cause. Hence we cannot use this argument to
prove in turn the causal principle. On the other hand, if it is
not a causal proposition, then the notion of dependency in-
volved is not a causal notion. That is, the notion of dependency
involved in the substance/accident relation is a relation of in-
herence. For example, the accident red depends on, or inheres
in, the substance paint. But paint does not cause the accident
red. However, if the notion of dependency is not a causal notion
but one of inherence, then either the conclusion to the syllogism
is not a causal proposition, or we have equivocated on the no-
tion of dependency, which likewise invalidates the conclusion.
In premise two we have made dependence a relation of in-
herence while in the conclusion it is a relation of causation.
Either way, the critic will contend, the syllogism is not as sound
as it might first appear.
Clearly, the second horn of the dilemma must be denied;
the notion of dependency in premise two must be a causal
notion. Joseph Owens, in dealing with this, points out that there
are two kinds of accidental relations.9 The one, which he calls
a predicamental accident, is an accident which inheres in a
substance. Red, square, laughing are predicamental accidents.
This type of accident is subsequent to the substance or essence.
That is, these qualities or properties arise from and are subse-
quent to the nature of an object.
The other sense of "accident" is that in which the accident
is prior to its nature. Priority here means dependence on some-
thing other than its own essence, that is, the accident arises not
from its own nature but from something other than it. As such,
it is contemporaneous with its essence, and not inherent in it.
Applying this distinction to premise two, we can see that
the existence referred to as accidental must be accidental in the
second sense. Existence does not arise from the being itself; the
being is not the efficient cause of itself. If such were the case,
the absurdity would result that something not in existence
brought itself into existence; hence, it is dependent on some-
thing other than itself for its existence. Its existence is (logically)
prior to itself or its essence. Consequently, the relation of de-
pendence in the case of existence is not that of inherence (acci-
dent in sense one), but dependence on something else as the
cause of it (accident in sense two). Thus in premise two, "de-
pendence" is not being used in the sense of inherence, but in
the sense of being caused.
Does this then mean that we have begged the question in
premise two? Does the second premise, as a causal proposition,
presuppose the causal principle? The answer, I think, is no. To
say that an analysis of what it is to be an accident involves
essentially the fact that it is dependent upon something is not
to involve the causal principle. It does involve the notion of
causation or dependency, but it does not presuppose the prin-
ciple that all contingent beings have a cause. Indeed, the whole
conception of contingency is absent from premise two. One can
find it there only if one defines "accident" in terms of contin-
gency, which we have not done. The causal principle enters in
only when the two premises are brought together in the con-
clusion.
The appearance of begging the question is due, I think,
to the type of thing that a syllogism is. To know the two pre-
mises is, in effect, to know the concluding statement. But if we
know the conclusion already, do we need a demonstration at
all? Why demonstrate that which we already know? The answer
is that in a sense we do know the conclusion, and in a sense we
do not. We know it if we have already performed the mental
function of syllogistic reasoning. That is, if we have mentally
compared the two premises, seen the middle term, and accord-
ingly conjoined the subject of one with the predicate of the
other, we already know the concluding statement. But this is
already to have performed the syllogistic reasoning in question.
We did not know prior to such mental reasoning that the sub-
ject and predicate were compatible so as to form a true state-
ment, unless the conclusion was already a part of our experi-
ence. In other words, the charge that syllogistic reasoning is
uninformative, or that one of the premises begs the question—as
here with respect to the demonstration of the causal princi-
ple—stems, I think, from a failure to recognize that when this
seems to be the case, it is because we have already performed
the required mental syllogism. Such, I think, is the source of
the objection here with respect to the demonstration of the
causal principle. Taking this into consideration, one can avoid
the critic's posed dilemma and hold that the causal principle
can be demonstrated.
One can also defend the causal principle on grounds en-
tirely different from that just presented, namely on the grounds
that it is a basic principle of the universe. It is not a principle
for which one can give a demonstration; it is too basic a prin-
ciple for that. Rather, it is known by human reason to be in-
tuitively true.
The evidence for this contention that it is a fundamental
principle can be found in the procedures of human reasoning
itself. The natural procedure of the intellect is to search for
the causes of the effects or events with which the intellect is
presented. Given the effect, it asks "What is the cause?" The in-
tellect will not rest contented with the mere fact that some-
thing happened. It has a drive to pass on to discover the causes
of that being or event. The plane crashed. But why? we find
ourselves asking. The baby died. Again, why? Built within us
is the dissatisfaction with mere facts; there is the continual urg-
ing to uncover the causes of those facts. This dissatisfaction is
evidence that this principle is a foundational principle of human
reason.
But even more than this, our entire intellectual approach
to the world is based on the contention that for any being or
event, there must be a cause. One can observe this principle
as a working procedure in almost any discipline, whether it be
the sciences or humanities. The continual search for causes is
at the heart of their procedural method; they presuppose,
without questioning it, that their witnessed events must have
causes. Frederick Copleston puts the point in terms of the
operations of the scientist:
I cannot see how science could be conducted on any other assump-
tion than that of order and intelligibility in nature. The physicist
presupposes, at least tacitly, that there is some sense in investigating
nature and looking for the causes of events, just as the detective pre-
supposes that there is some sense in looking for the cause of a mur-
der. The metaphysician assumes that there is sense in looking for
the reason or cause of the phenomena, and . . . I consider that the
metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist.10
The causal principle, then, can be viewed as an intuitively
known truth about reality, necessitated by our rational attempt
to understand the world. Without such a basic assumption, scien-
tific and metaphysical analysis of reality would be impossible.
As such, the principle is a necessary truth about the world; it
records how the world must necessarily be if we are to rationally
comprehend it.
The objection has been raised by no less a person than
Bertrand Russell that this is not the case, for often we cannot
discover the causes of a being or event. There are some things
for which we just do not have an explanation. Hence, we can
conceive of events or beings without any cause.
But this objection is beside the point. It is not a question
of being able to discover a cause for every effect. As of yet, the
scientist has not discovered the cause of cancer. But this is not
to say that cancer has no cause. The necessity of the causal
principle is not dependent upon our ability to discover each
and every condition necessary for the bringing about of a cer-
tain effect. Rather, it is evidenced by the fact that, if we do
not know those conditions, we make a relentless search to un-
cover and disclose those causes.
A much more serious objection to this line of reasoning has
been raised that though such a principle might indeed hold
for the rational sphere of human endeavors, this in no way
entails that such a principle adequately reflects the actual opera-
tions of the universe. It is one thing to assert that the question
"why?" is essential to intellectual endeavors, and that it is as
such an appropriate question to ask concerning things which are
capable of being caused. But by what right can we extend this
principle of the mind to reality? Are we not restricted to saying
that this principle is operative solely in the sphere of human
reason?
Two replies might be made to this line of reasoning. On
one hand, defenders of this principle can point to the prag-
matic success which the application of this principle in the
sciences has had. The principle does indeed work; the search
for causes has been the backbone of scientific research. If the
principle did not apply to reality, could any endeavor, like
science, which rests on this principle yet at the same time claims
to be empirical, be successful?
On the other hand, the objection appears to attempt to
drive a wedge between thought and reality, between the prin-
ciples according to which human reason interprets its world and
the principles according to which the world operates. But must
we not operate on the assumption that the mind can know
reality, that principles evolved by the mind correspond with
reality? I believe that Aristotle's contention that the categories
of the mind reflect, indeed are derived from, reality is the core
assumption of any attempt to understand our world, whether it
be science, philosophy, or whatever. Without such a belief,
human intellectual endeavors become nothing more than a
charade, a ghostly dance in the ethereal realm.
This should not be taken to be an assertion of naive realism.
We are not claiming that reality is always precisely the way
we perceive it to be. Neither are we contending for a particular
analysis of the epistemological situation, except to exclude those
analyses based on an open or tacit denial of this contention.
The point here is simply that unless there be a basic corres-
pondence between the concepts evolved by human reason and
the principles according to which extra-mental reality operates,
the former, insofar as they are put forth as informative or de-
scriptive of reality, are ultimately useless, if not meaningless.
If mental constructs purport to inform us about reality, but in
point of fact never can or never do, what function can they
serve? Certainly not the function for which they are intended.
They might constitute interesting intellectual gymnastics or be
viewed as wonderfully imaginative creations of the human mind,
but this does not enable us to better understand our world. In
other words, any claim of the intellect to comprehend and in-
terpret reality must operate on the basis that the principles or
categories or concepts which it evolves must correspond with
reality.
In conclusion, then, there appear to be two very different
kinds of arguments in support of the contention that the causal
principle is necessarily true. The one attempts to demonstrate
such; the other regards the causal principle as a necessary pre-
supposition of an orderly attempt to understand our world.
The former, of course, is the stronger of the two positions. The
claim that it is a presupposition of a rational approach to the
world weakens the principle insofar as basic presuppositions
are harder to defend and more open to question than are demon-
strative proofs. If a principle is basic, a defense will often do
nothing more than assume that principle. Yet, should the above
demonstration be in error—though at this point I do not believe
it is—the defender of the principle of causation can fall back
upon the claim that the principle is a presupposition of reason.
The conclusion of both arguments is the same: the causal prin-
ciple is a necessary principle. It is necessary either as the con-
clusion of a deductive argument, or it is necessary as a basic
principle of the intellect and the world. But either way, all
contingent beings must have a cause.
THE NECESSITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

SUFFICIENT REASON
When we come to the principle of sufficient reason, the
same arguments given in support of the causal principle can be
found to be applicable to a defense of it. How is this possible?
First of all, it is possible to distinguish two varieties of
the principle of sufficient reason. The first form, which is the
strong form of the principle, is the form which we presented
in the first section, namely, that there is a sufficient reason for
all beings and events. However, we may also note a weaker
form of this same principle, namely, a form which states that
there is a sufficient reason for all contingent beings. This weaker
form leaves open the question whether or not there is a sufficient
reason for non-contingent beings as well; it simply states that
there must be a sufficient reason for all contingent beings.
The question now arises as to which form is necessary to
maintain the cosmological argument. The answer, I believe, is
that it is the weaker form, and not the stronger. In the cosmo-
logical argument we are not concerned with whether or not
we can give a sufficient reason for a non-contingent being. In-
deed, at the outset of the argument there are grave doubts that
such a being exists. Rather, the argument attempts to provide
the sufficient reason for all contingent beings. Thus, our prin-
ciple need only be formulated in the weaker sense; in order to
maintain the cosmological argument we need only a principle
of sufficient reason which states that there must be sufficient
reason for all contingent beings.
But this weaker form of the principle of sufficient reason
is the same as the principle of causation, namely, that for every
contingent being there must be a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. As such, it can be shown to be necessary with the
same deductive argument as was used above to demonstrate
necessity of the principle of causation, which is as follows:
1. All contingent beings have their existence accidental to
their essence.
2. That which has its existence accidental to it is dependent
on something for its existence.
3. To be dependent is to be caused, i.e. to have a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for it.
4. Therefore, all contingent beings have a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for themselves.
Thus the weaker form of the principle of sufficient reason,
the form necessary to the validity of the cosmological argu-
ment, can be defended on the same demonstrative grounds as
were used to defend the principle of causation.
One can also defend the weaker form of the principle
of sufficient reason in a way similar to that developed above
with respect to the causal principle, namely on the grounds
that it is a basic and intuitive principle of human reasoning.
Like the principle of noncontradiction, the principle of suffi-
cient reason is a basic principle of the universe. One cannot hope
to prove the truth of the principle without at the same time
assuming it to be true. Likewise, one cannot develop arguments
(sufficient reasons) against the principle, one cannot criticize
a given proof of the principle as being insufficient or inade-
quate, without at the same time assuming as true the very
principle held in question. It is a presupposition which we are
forced to make when we attempt to approach the world ration-
ally. In writing about the theistic arguments and this principle,
Richard Taylor notes that it is a datum which must be accepted;
it is a presupposition of reason itself. He writes,
The principle of sufficient reason can be illustrated in various ways,
as we have done, and if one thinks about it, he is apt to find that he
presupposes it in his thinking about reality, but it cannot be proved.
It does not appear to be itself a necessary truth, and at the same time
it would be most odd to say it is contingent. If one were to try
proving it, he would sooner or later have to appeal to considerations
that are less plausible than the principle itself. Indeed, it is hard to
see how one could even make an argument for it, without already
assuming it. For this reason it might properly be called a presupposi-
tion of reason itself. One can deny that it is true, without embarrass-
ment or fear of refutation, but one is apt to find that what he is
. denying is not really what the principle asserts. We shall then, treat
it here as datum — not something that is provably true, but as some-
thing which all men, whether they ever reflect upon it or not, seem
more or less to presuppose.11
In other words, the principle of sufficient reason is a basic, in-

demonstrable, necessary principle of human reasoning.
Therefore, as with the causal principle, there appear to be
two very different kinds of arguments to support the contention
that the principle of sufficient reason is necessary. The one
attempts to demonstrate such by means of a deductive argu-
ment; the other regards the principle as a necessary presupposi-
tion, an indemonstrable principle, of human reason. And as
with the causal principle, the former provides the stronger
position for the defense of the principle. Yet should the demon-
stration be found faulty by future analysis, the defender of the
principle can fall back upon the claim that the principle is a
basic presupposition of human reason, for the conclusion of
both arguments is the same: the principle of sufficient reason
is a necessary principle.
CONCLUSION
What then can be said to Camus' objection, quoted at the
beginning of this chapter, that though thought may require the
principle of sufficient reason, the universe does not respond in
any intelligible fashion, but rather absurdly? This profound at-
tempt to separate thought and reality must be viewed with
great suspicion. On one hand, its result is to take the intellect
out of nature. The human reason becomes an isolated element,
antithetical to, indeed at enmity with, nature. For the existential-
ist, nature is true being, mind is non-being. Absurdity, frus-
tration, angst, all are a result of the impetuous desire of the
mind to become what it can never be, i.e. being-itself. But
can the human being be so abstracted from, so cut off from,
nature? Whether one accepts the creationist or evolutionary
metaphysic, both make the same claim: man is intrinsically a
part of nature. Thus, to denaturalize the intellect is to de-
naturalize man, for part of the essence of man, his differentia,
is his ability to conceptualize. And to remove man from his
world is to preclude the possibility of his finding satisfaction.
It is to force the existentialist's absurdity on to man. Hence, far
from describing the human situation, by separating the intellect
from nature they have thrust a strong intellectual predicament
on man. Only by putting man back into his proper place in
nature can this imposed predicament be resolved.
On the other hand, Camus' position proffers two sets of
categories. There are those categories according to which the
mind operates, and there are others according to which nature
functions. These two sets are disparate. For example, Camus
contends that the mind operates according to the principle
of sufficient reason and that nature does not. But with this
radical disjunction of principles, how can he claim to know
what the principles of nature are, especially that they are differ-
ent from those of human reason? On what basis can he make
the claim that they are not the same as the principles of the
intellect? Such a pretension is impossible, for the implication
of his position must be that we cannot know those principles
of nature. Otherwise, reasoning man would have already adopt-
ed these principles as the principles of his own reasoning. If
he knows the principles of reality, man will surely attempt to
encompass them in his own thought. Camus' position, at best,
leads to subjectivism; what we know are the principles of the
intellect through which the world is filtered. Or as Kant puts
it, the phenomena we know; the noumena we postulate about.
But is this an adequate basis on which to do philosophy, science,
or anything else? Must we not operate on the assumption that
the mind can know reality? And must we not likewise assume
that the principles of reality can become the principles of the
human intellect, that the principles evolved throughout the his-
tory of the human mind correspond with reality? Such an as-
sumption, I believe, is at the heart of every serious endeavor to
come to grips with our world.
Finally, the above arguments for the necessity of the prin-
ciples of causation and sufficient reason must be taken seriously.
If one can present a cogent defense of these principles, as we
have attempted to do, the burden of disproof rests on those
who refuse to accept them. One can, of course, even in the face
of demonstrations, embrace absurdity. But then one cannot
rationally defend such a position; one cannot simultaneously
deny and accept the dictates of reason. Absurdity must then be
accepted as an item of intuition or faith. But the cosmological
argument appeals to man as a rational being, noting that it is
on this level that philosophical man operates. On this level one
must face these demonstrations as genuine attempts to rationally
defend the principles of order and intelligibility in the universe.
Our conclusion in this chapter must be that these principles are
necessarily true.
w

NOTES
1. It is important to emphasize the fact that this is the case in
principle, though in fact we may not be able to perform such a task.
But what results from our finitude, our epistemological condition, does
not determine the ontological situation with respect to what is required
for something to be a cause. Pragmatically we operate with a finite set
of conditions; but as we argued in Chapter 1, a complete set is necessary
to bring about the effect.
2. Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-
Language (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 221.
3. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
4. David Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indiana-
polis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 40.
5. David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford, The Clarendon
Press, 1888), p. 79.
6. Ibid., p. 25.
7. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
8. See Joseph Owens, "The Causal Proposition — Principle or Con-
cIusionF' Modern Schoolman, XXXII (1955), pp. 159-171, 257-270, 323-
339, for a more detailed presentation of this argument.
9. Ibid., p. 335f.
10. Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the
Existence of God." In John Hick (Ed.), The Existence of God (New York,
Macmillan, 1964), p. 177.
11. Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-
Hall, 1963), pp. 86-87.
Chapter 4
CAN PROPOSITIONS BE INFORMATIVE

AND NECESSARY SIMULTANEOUSLY?
N THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS we have developed a particular
analysis of the causal principle. On one hand, we have contend-
ed that this principle informs us about the real world; to say
that every contingent being has a cause is to say that there
is a real cause discoverable for each and every contingent being
or event in the objective world. Causation is a real, productive
relation between objects; one object acts upon and produces
changes in another. On the other hand, we have argued that
the causal principle is necessary; every contingent being must
have a cause. As such, we have contended for a principle that
is both informative and necessarv; it informs us about a neces-
sary relationship in the real world.
But what kind of proposition would this principle be? Would
it be analytic, synthetic, or what? Indeed, is it even possible to
formulate a proposition which is both informative and necessary
simultaneously? Is it not the case that the proposition which is
necessary cannot be otherwise, whereas that which is informa-
tive about the world could be otherwise? How, then, can these
two seemingly contradictory characteristics be reconciled in any
one proposition?
That there can be no proposition which is both necessary
and informative about the world is the contention of many
contemporary philosophers. For example, A. J. Ayer writes, "If
empiricism is correct, no proposition which has factual content
can be necessary or certain."1 J. J. C. Smart writes more recently,
"No informative proposition can be logically necessary."2 A prop-
osition can be either necessary or else a truth about the world,
but not both. And this applies to the above-developed causal
principle.
73
The issue here is not that we have not shown what we
claimed to show, namely, that the causal principle is both in-
formative and necessary, but rather that such conditions, when
found in a proposition, appear to be contradictory. And since
there appears to be a contradiction in our results, there must
be an error in our analysis. Thus, the issue here concerns
whether and how a proposition can be informative and necessary
at the same time. The attempt to discover an answer to this
problem will be the subject of concern in this chapter.
LOGICAL NECESSITY
What do contemporary philosophers mean when they state
that a proposition is necessary? What are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a proposition to be necessary? On one
hand, the necessary condition is that the opposite of the propo-
sition must imply a contradiction. If the negation of the proposi-
tion does not imply a contradiction, that is to say, if the opposite
is perfectly possible or conceivable, then the proposition is not
necessary but contingent. On the other hand, the sufficient con-
dition for a proposition to be necessary is that it be necessary
solely by virtue of the meanings of the terms which compose it
and not by virtue of any state of affairs in the world. The con-
tradiction which characterizes its opposite must be produced
solely from a consideration of the logical principles and the
definitions of the terms involved. Thus, for many philosophers
a necessary proposition is a logically necessary proposition, one
whose truth and necessity is determined solely on the basis of
an analysis of the meanings of constituent terms and the stipu-
lated logical rules for transformation of linguistic expressions.
Accordingly, we shall designate this particular analysis of neces-
sity as logical necessity. '"-y.;'.-'-
To illustrate this view, we might take A. J. Ayer's analysis
of necessity as generally typical of this position. Ayer follows
in the Kantian tradition by making necessity an essential char-
acteristic of a priori propositions. If a proposition is (logically)
necessary, it is a priori. What, then, is an a priori proposition?
For Ayer, an a priori proposition is one which concerns only
the "relations of ideas,"3 as opposed to matters of fact. That is,
Can Propositions Be Informative And Necessary Simultaneously? 75
the truth of an a priori proposition is determined simply by an
analysis of the meanings of the terms involved. It is true ex vi
terminorum. Thus, a logically necessary proposition, such as an
a priori proposition, is a proposition the contradiction of whose
opposite is derived from the analysis of the meanings of the
terms involved.
From this it becomes immediately evident that logical
necessity involves analyticity. For Ayer, an analytic proposition
is one whose "validity depends solely on the definitions of the
symbols it contains."4 The truth of an analytic proposition is
decided on the basis of the meanings of the constituent terms;
it is this which sets it apart from a synthetic proposition, whose
"validity is determined by the facts of experience." Consequent-
ly, the sufficient condition (that they are true ex vi terminorum)
for a proposition to be analytic is the same as the sufficient
condition for a proposition to be logically necessary. Thus, we
can say that a logically necessary proposition must be expressed
in the form of an analytic proposition.
Indeed, for Ayer a priori (necessary) propositions are
"necessary and certain only because they are analytic."5 To be
necessary is to be such that one's opposite implies a contradic-
tion. Accordingly the opposite of a necessary proposition must
be of the form A is non-A. If its opposite is of this form, then a
necessary proposition must be of the form A is A. That is, a
necessary proposition must be a tautology.6 But for Ayer, propo-
sitions which are tautologies are analytic. He writes, "I use the
word 'tautology' in such a way that a proposition can be said
to be a tautology if it is analytic."7 Therefore, all a priori (neces-
sary ) propositions must be analytic.
Moreover, for Ayer, neither analytic nor a priori proposi-
tions, since they are tautologies, are informative8 about matters
of fact. They neither refer to matters of fact nor can be "con-
firmed or refuted by any facts of experience." They are devoid
of any factual content and consequently say nothing whatsoever
about the world. Thus, on the view of logical necessity, being
necessary and being informative about the world are two incom-
patible properties of propositions.
But though they are uninformative, though they simply
express tautologies, "we are not suggesting that they are sense-
less. . . . For although they give us no information about any
empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way
in which we use certain symbols. . . . They call attention to
linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be con-
scious."9 Though they add nothing to our knowledge of the
world, they do reveal how our conventionally established lan-
guage operates.
Thus, finally, logical necessity involves a conventionalist
view of language. It is a characteristic of logical necessity that
it "merely reflects our use of words, the arbitrary conventions
of language."10 Whether necessary propositions are true or
false does not depend on reality, but rather on the conventions
of our language, on our conventionally established symbolism.
Analytic propositions "simply record our determination to use
words in a certain way. We cannot deny them without infringing
the conventions which are presupposed by our very denial."11
The truth of an analytic proposition is determined simply through
an analysis of the meanings of the terms involved. But these
terms are defined, not with reference to the nature of the refer-
ent, but simply on the basis of the conventions of linguistic usage.
They are nominal definitions which express our decision as to
how we should use a word. C. I. Lewis, stating a position which
he later refutes, puts the issue with regard to analytic truth in
this way:
It may thus suggest itself that the ultimate ground of all analytic
truth is to be found in definitive statements, together with rules of
the transformation and derivation of linguistic expressions, such rules
being themselves resultant from equivalences of definitions and con-
ventions of synthetic usage. And to this it may be added that defini-
tions also are merely conventions of the use of language; determined
by decisions made at will concerning the equivalence of expressions.
Thus it may appear that analytic truth in general expresses nothing
beyond what is determined or determinable by conventions of linguis-
tic usage But if any conception of this general sort be enter-
tained, then analytic truth becomes viewed, commensurately, as rela-
tive to the content and structure of a system of language, erected ac-
cording to rules of usage and of manipulation having, in the last
analysis, no further basis than decisions made as we choose according
to our purposes. 12
Necessary truths are therefore determined to be true on the
basis of Knguistic habit; they are in no way explicative of any
necessity in the world.
If they were explicative, then the doctrine of logical neces-
sity would not stand, for we would have propositions which on
one hand were informative, and on the other were necessary,
for the proposition would not be true simply on the basis of the
meanings of the terms involved, but since these terms were
explicative of reality they would be true because of the way
^ reality was structured. But on the view of logical necessity, a
proposition cannot be both necessary and informative at the
same time; only those statements which are true in virtue of
their concepts alone can be necessary. Consequently, logical
necessity involves a conventionalist view of language; it is pre-
dicated of statements, the meanings of whose terms are con-
ventionally established without reference to the nature of things.
In conclusion, then, logical necessity is expressed by analytic
a priori propositions, the meanings of whose constituent terms
are established on the basis of a conventionalist view of lan-
guage; necessity is a function of linguistic conventions about the
meanings of words and the stipulated syntactical rules for their
significant combination in sentences. Such propositions are neces-
sary but uninformative, i.e. devoid of factual content about the
world.
A Reduction of Categories
Ayer's theory of necessity is not without its difficulties.
First of all, Ayer's way of solving the problem whether a propo-
sition can be necessary and informative is much too easy. What
he seems to have done is to define "analytic" and "a priori" in
the same way, and from this to conclude that it is impossible
(by definition) that there be any necessary proposition which
is not analytic, i.e. which would be synthetic and a priori. To
be a priori is to be necessary, i.e. to be such that one's opposite
entails a self-contradiction determinable from an analysis of
the meanings of the terms involved. To be analytic is to be true
solely in virtue of the meanings of the symbols involved—hence
the equivalence, and the corresponding impossibility of a non-
analytic necessary truth. But solving the issue of the synthetic
a priori in this fashion makes it true but quite trivial to say that
all necessary propositions must be analytic; it is at best an empty
victory.
Moreover, by defining both terms in this way, he has re-
duced the category of analytic to the category of a priori, such
that there is no difference between them. Both must then func-
ion as categories in the same way. But why then maintain two
category names? Why not just eliminate one or the other? To
utilize both is redundant. But certainly Kant, when he intro-
duced this categorization, and succeeding philosophers, when
they adopted such, have meant something different by these
two categories. Ayer's confusion of the two can be cleared up
if we remember that the one refers to the structure of proposi-
tions, while the other refers to the mode of verification of
propositions. The analytic/synthetic distinction categorizes the
form or structure of propositions. A proposition is analytic if
and only if its negation leads to the form of an unobvious
tautology, i.e. A is not-A, while the negation of a synthetic propo-
sition does not lead to the form of A is not-A. The a priori/a pos-
teriori distinction, on the other hand, characterizes the mode of
verification of propositions. "To characterize a proposition as
'a priori' is to say nothing whatever about its formal structure,
or the structure of its negation, or consequences derivable there-
from. It is, rather, to remark the mode whereby the truth of the
proposition is discovered. A proposition is a priori if its truth is
established without recourse to any possible experience."13 As
such, one could discuss what kind of form or structure the
proposition had (e.g. if it was of the form of an obvious or
unobvious tautology) without having to decide how we would
discover the truth of such.
The consequence of this is that a proposition can be in-
formative (synthetic) and necessary (a priori) at the same
time. One can learn how a proposition is structured without
directly entailing anything about its mode of justification. To
establish that a proposition is synthetic is simply to establish
that it is of the form or structure such that its opposite is not
self-contradictory, is not of the form A is not-A. But this is quite
another thing from establishing its mode of justification, i.e. dis-
covering on what basis it is true. To be justified a priori is
possible. In other words, to be necessary (a priori) a proposition
need not be analytic. To be informative and necessary simultane-
ously is not a contradiction. Ayer's analysis, which endeavors to
show this, is guilty of reducing to one category two very different
categories.
This, of course, is not to say that there actually are any
propositions which are synthetic and a priori. Indeed, phi-
losophers like Norwood Russell Hanson, who argue as we have
just done, note that as far as they are concerned no such prop-
ositions have been brought forth, and it is unlikely that any
genuine candidates will be forthcoming in the future. In other
words, they agree with Ayer that all necessary propositions are
analytic, though they disagree with his contention that they
must be analytic. This is to say, however, that a synthetic (in-
formative) a priori (necessary) proposition is a possibility, and
not a contradiction of terms.
Some contemporary philosophers, then, have held that prop-
ositions can be both informative and necessary, in that synthetic
a priori propositions are possible. Whether this is a viable option
for those who maintain the causal principle we shall have to
evaluate in a later section.
Confusing Use and Mention

The above explanation of the system of categories presup-
posed by those who maintain that a contradiction is involved
in the contention that a proposition can be informative and
necessary points up even deeper difficulties than the ones just
raised. Indeed, it introduces questions which strike at the very
heart of their system of classification of propositions, and in par-
ticular, their view of analyticity. First of all, this system prevents
any statement which is necessary from telling us anything about
the world, about what things essentially are. In this theory all
statements about what something essentially is are expressed
by necessary propositions. But all logically necessary proposi-
tions, as expressed in analytic form, are tautologies. Their truth
is established without reference to the real world; they are true
in virtue of the principles of logic and the meanings of their
terms. Accordingly, they have no real factual import; they are
not informative about the real world. To say, for example, that
man is necessarily a rational animal is to say nothing at all
about the way men actually are, about real men and real rational
animals, but simply to record our conventional usage of the word
"man." It tells us only about our determination to use words
in a certain way, not about the referent of these words. But this
leads to the curious consequence that statements such as "man
is a rational animal," which purport to inform us about the way
things really and essentially are, actually tell us nothing about the
real state of affairs. Necessary statements, which claim to be
about what something is by nature, are really devoid of factual
content. Thus, we have the paradoxical state of affairs that
that statement which claims to tell us about the world actually
cannot do so; it can only tell us about our concepts. And worse
than this, it is not informative at all, but tautologous. This
position, therefore, prevents a certain class of statements from
fulfilling what they claim to be doing, i.e. from informing us as
to the essential nature of the world.
How, then, do we characterize statements which purport
not only to tell us about the world but also to explain to us
what something in the world really and essentially is and why
it is what it is? How do we speak about what man really is?
We want to say that man is something (a rational animal, for
example), but we do not want this merely to characterize the
way in which we use or have conventionally defined "man."
Neither do we want to say that "man is a rational animal" is a
trivial tautology. We want to say something about what man
essentially is in reality, about what man is apart from and prior
to any establishment of language, about the essences prior to
and independent of their linguistic expression.14 And more than
this, we want to speak concerning both reality and the necessity
to be found in it, or better, the necessity in virtue of it. But
the impossibility of both of these is precluded if logical neces-
sity is the only kind of necessity and if statements which are
characterized by such are analytic. The result of this view is that
we cannot say anything about what something essentially or
necessarily (due to the nature of the world) is. The reduction

of real to logical necessity severely restricts us; it forecloses any
attempt to say what is what. This analysis, therefore, seems to
arbitrarily limit our speech about reality, and indeed, to lead
to the paradox that statements which purport to inform us
about the world actually can not do so.
Secondly, we might ask, "What are necessary propositions
about?" For the logical empiricist they are not about matters of
fact. They are devoid of factual content; they are not about any
actual thing. But if this is the case, are not analytic or necessary
propositions meaningless? For a statement to be meaningful,
"some possible sense-experience should be relevant to the deter-
mination of its truth or falsehood."15 Ayer, however, denies that
this lack of factual content implies that they are senseless or
meaningless.
When we say that analytic propositions are devoid of factual content,
and consequently that they say nothing, we are not suggesting that
they are senseless in the way that metaphysical utterances are sense-
less. For, although they give us no information about any empirical
situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we
use certain symbols. . . . An analytic proposition . . . records our
determination [to use words in a certain way]. In other words, I
am simply calling attention to the implications of certain linguistic
usage. . . . And I am thereby indicating the convention which governs
our usage of words. 16
Ayer's statement here seems to imply that analytic (necessary)

propositions, since they are not meaningless and not about things
in the world, are about our usage of words, about our linguistic
/ habits. John Wisdom writes, "This is part of the explanation of
the necessity of necessary statements. For such statements con-
nect abstract things and are therefore purely verbal in a way in
which 'He asserted Africa is hot' is not, that is, they are purely
about the use of expressions they connect."17
However, this position seems to commit the fallacy of con-
fusing use with mention. We may argue for this as follows.
As we have noted, the claim is made that since the truth of
necessary propositions can be determined simply on the basis
of the meanings of the constituent terms and logical principles,
such a statement must be informative, not about the facts in the
world, but only about its own words or terms and how we use
them. That is, they argue from the fact that in an analytic state-
ment we can decide its truth or falsity simply on the basis of
the concepts contained therein, to the claim that this statement
itself informs us only about these words or concepts and not
about the real objects which they are concepts of. But, as
Henry Veatch points out in a most relevant article,18 the mere
fact that I am making a particular statement by using certain
words does not imply that this statement is about these words
or concepts. To make such a claim confuses the logical charac-
teristics of the proposition with the states of affairs in the real
world which this proposition is about. In other words, such an
argument confuses the use of the word with its mention. It is
one thing to give an analysis of the logical and linguistic fea-
tures of the proposition; we can clarify how the various words
are related; we can show that we can derive the predicate
concept by unpacking the subject concept. But this is a far cry
from claiming that it is therefore these features, which compose
the proposition, which the proposition is about. Rather, the
proposition is about real objects in the real world. Thus, again
using our example of "man," to say that the proposition "man
is a rational animal" is simply about how we use the term "man,"
is to commit this fallacy of confusing use with mention. For in
regard to this proposition, we are not concerned with the word
"man" and how it is used, but rather with what real men are
in the real world, i.e. with real men and real rational animals.
If we were to concern ourselves with the terms involved in the
proposition, we should express the proposition differently, viz.
" 'Man' means the same as 'rational animal.'" The fact that we
use words to express the necessary proposition does not mean
that the proposition is about these words.
We can, of course, discourse about the words or terms
which compose the proposition. But if we desire to do so, we
must put the word with which we are concerned in quotes.
However, when the word is found without quotes, we are no
longer speaking about the word or concept, but about the
object to which the word refers. When it states a proposition
(in analytic form) which purports to be about the world, the
above theory then claims this statement is about the habitual
use of words. But such a proposition, when the words are not in
quotes, is not about the words or concepts and their relation-
ship to each other, but rather about the objects in the real world
and their relationships. We must distinguish speech about the
words and concepts from that about the objects which they are
concepts of; failure to do this results in the fallacy of confusing
use with mention, and it is this fallacy which is committed by
the proponents of logical necessity.
Arthur Pap 19 has raised a somewhat similar objection against
the logical empiricist's analysis of necessity. According to the
theory detailed above, necessary truths function apart from em-
pirical evidence. Indeed, to introduce empirical evidence for a
statement is to make that statement empirical, i.e. contingent.
But the linguistic theory of necessary propositions is open to
the "charge of reducing necessary propositions to empirical
propositions about language," for in claiming that necessary
propositions are about linguistic usage, one is saying that evi-
dence for linguistic usage is relevant to the truth or falsehood
of the necessary statement. If the linguistic habit of humans
is not to use "man" in the sense of "rational animal," the prop-
osition is false, and vice versa. But propositions derived from
or supported by empirical propositions must themselves be em-
pirical. In other words, those who maintain this theory of neces-
sary propositions seem to be guilty of reducing necessary prop-
ositions to empirical ones. They are empirically informative about
linguistic habits.
These objections have been countered by the contention
that necessary propositions are not descriptive propositions at
all, but rather prescriptive.20 They do not describe our usage of
words. Malcolm argues that though it is a fact about words
which makes the statement correct, yet the statement is not
about this fact.21 Their necessity is based upon, their truth is
justified by, the way people use words, but they do not describe
how people use statements. Rather, they are used as rules of
inference or calculation. They are "rules of grammar or com-
mands to use words in a certain way. . . . Thus it is that when
a man says, 'My wife said that she would either be at home
or at Mrs. Brown's. She isn't at home so we'll be able to find her
at Mrs. Brown's,' he is using a necessary statement as a rule of
inference, is using it to make a deduction, and not to describe
how people use statements of the form 'Either p or q and
~ p.'" 2 2 Thus, since necessary propositions are not about any-
thing, but rather are rules of inference, the fallacy of confusing
use with mention is not committed.
But are all necessary propositions rules of inference?
Granted that some can be used as rules of inference (for ex-
ample, "water is either wet or not-wet"), but is it the case that
all are thus? It seems odd, indeed, to say that propositions such
as "hydrogen is an element," "man is a rational animal," "unsup-
ported rocks necessarily fall," and "every contingent being has a
cause" are merely rules of inference, that their sole purpose is
to function as universal premises in deductive arguments. As
we argued above, sometimes it is the purpose of necessary propo-
sitions to tell us what something really and necessarily is, or to
present the essential structure of the world. We want to know,
for example, what hydrogen really is. In such cases, the necessary
proposition is not an inference ticket for other items of knowl-
edge about hydrogen, but rather provides the vehicle for en-
abling us to know what hydrogen really and essentially is;
similarly with the causal principle. This may sometimes func-
tion as an inference ticket in order to gain further knowledge.
But this usage does not rule out the possibility of its being used
to discover whether it really is the case that real objects or events
require or need real causes. To sustain Malcolm's thesis, every
usage of a necessary proposition must be as an inference ticket.
But these examples seem to indicate that such is not the case,
that we have necessary propositions which seek to be informa-
tive just in themselves. And in respect to these, it .still remains
a meaningful question to ask what these propositions are about,
a question which logical empiricism cannot answer without con-
fusing use and mention.
Thus, it seems that logical necessity is only one usage of
"necessary," and a very restricted one at that. It is a necessity
which applies solely to propositions about concepts or word
usage. In this area it is sufficient. But when we want to speak
about what things are and about the essential structure of the
world, then we must appeal to another kind of necessity.
THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI

As we noted previously, some contemporary philosophers
have held that propositions can be informative and necessary
in that synthetic a priori propositions are possible, though few
would hold that there are any convincing examples of such.
Despite such pessimism, perhaps this is the kind of necessity
needed to make the causal principle plausible, and which at
the same time will free metaphysical statements from the Mal-
colmian drudgery of acting merely as rules of inference or
calculation, that will free them to be informative about the facts
of the world, in the way in which these statements claim.
Unfortunately, this analysis likewise presents problems
for the causal principle. In particular, if one adopts the position
that the synthetic a priori is possible, what is it to be a necessary
truth? What does one mean by "necessary"? Obviously, one can
no longer mean that a proposition is necessary in the sense that
its opposite implies a self-contradiction. If it is synthetic in
form, its negation is not of the form A is not-A. What, then, is
it to be necessary?
The answer to this question, as traditionally given by Kant,
is that nonanalytic a priori metaphysical propositions are neces-
sary in virtue of the fact that they refer to the very conditions for
the possibility of experiencing objects. The mind can know ob-
jects of experience only through the pure concepts or categories
of understanding; these categories are a priori in the mind as
the formal ground for experience. Their necessity rests upon the
fact that, without them, experience of objects is impossible.
"[A priori concepts] must be recognized as a priori conditions
of the possibility of experience. . . . Concepts which yield the
objective ground of the possibility of experience are for this
very reason necessary."23 Therefore, the necessity of synthetic
a priori propositions derives from the fact that they refer to
categories which themselves are necessary for the possibility of
experience.
Applying this to the causal principle, such a principle must
be necessary, for causation is one of the pure concepts or cate-
gories of the understanding. As such, the causal principle can
be necessary without having to be analytic. Likewise it is in-
formative, for it is synthetic. Hence it is necessary and informa-
tive simultaneously.
However, "informative" in this case does not mean in-
formative about the real world, but only about our experience
of this world. It "can never admit of real but always only of
empirical employment, and it can apply only to objects of the
senses under the universal conditions of a possible experience,
never to things in general without regard to the mode in which
we are able to intuit them."24 Thus, for example, if the causal
principle were synthetic a priori, it would apply only to the phe-
nomena, to the perception of the thing, and not to the thing-in-
itself (the noumena). As such it is not informative in the way
we want, for it informs us not about the real world, but simply
about the conditions required for our experience of such. It is
no longer a real but a transcendental principle.
Moreover, if this analysis of the causal principle were
adopted, it would lead to the transformation of the cosmological
argument from the real to the transcendental realm. The argu-
ment purports to prove that there really exists a cause which
accounts for or explains the existence of all beings. This cause
is a being which exists apart from any conditions which might
be required for us to know the world. That is to say, it exists
in reality independent of all epistemic considerations. But if
we say that the causal principle refers simply to a condition of
our understanding, and consequently is a transcendental prin-
ciple of our knowledge of the world, then the cosmological ar-
gument argues not for the existence of a being in the real
world, not for a real cause, but rather for the existence of a
regulative principle. If causality is an epistemological prere-
quisite, the causal explanation for a being has to do with episte-
mological, not ontological, concerns. Thus, in this view, a valid
cosmological argument would only lead to a Kantian regulative
principle, not to a real cause existing in the real world.
Indeed, even though Kant rejects the cosmological argu-
ment as being invalid, this type of ultimate cause is what he
opts for on other grounds. The Ideal of Pure Reason, or God,25
is merely a concept, one which "prescribes that we are to phil-
osophise about nature as if there were a necessary first ground
for all that belongs to existence—solely, however, for the pur-
pose of bringing systematic unity into our knowledge."26 When
we change this regulative principle into a constitutive one, then
we have introduced transcendental subreption. Thus, if we
follow the path of Kant, the most that the cosmological argu-
ment could hope to prove would be the necessity of there being
a regulative principle in order to properly unify all our experi-
ence.
But the cosmological argument argues for a real being, not
a regulative principle. And the causal principle which the cos-
mological argument wants to uphold is one which is informative
in that it tells us about the real world, not merely about our
experience of such. We must, therefore, show on what other
grounds it can be a principle which is both necessary and still
informative about the real world.
REAL NECESSITY
What do we mean when we say that a proposition is really
(as opposed to logically) necessary? On one hand, like logical
necessity, the necessary condition for a proposition to be really
or naturally necessary is that its opposite imply a contradiction.
Unless the opposite implies a contradiction, the proposition is
contingent, not necessary. But the difference between the two
theories lies in their sufficient condition. The sufficient condition
for a proposition to be logically necessary, as noted above, is
that it be necessary solely in virtue of the principles of logic
and the meanings of its terms, without any reference to the
real world. But the sufficient condition for a proposition to be
really or naturally necessary is that it be necessary in virtue of
the very nature or structure of the world. Statements which ex-
press the way things are in the world are necessary because
of the nature of the world, and not in virtue of a priori concepts.
Their necessity is therefore derived, or arises, from the essen-
tial structure of the world; they are necessary propositions
because of the way the world essentially is. Or put another way,
we might say that a necessary truth reflects the necessary, essen-
tial structure of the world.
Now whereas logical necessity involves a conventionalist
view of language, real necessity involves what we might term
an essentialist view of language. That is to say, the meanings of
our words are not established simply on the basis of conven-
tional usage, but rather on the basis of what we believe the
nature of that object to be. We say that % means y because we
have discovered that y seems to be essentially what x is in the
' real world. For example, we define "man" as a "rational animal,"
not because we happen to use the word "man" to mean the
same as "rational animal," but rather because from our experi-
ence with men we have discovered that rationality and ani-
mality appear to be essential characteristics of them. Quite apart
from our conceiving it, prior to our thinking about it, man is
just the sort of being which is a rational animal. All the men
with whom we are acquainted seem to exhibit these character-
istics, not accidently, but as an essential part of their makeup. 27
Thus our concept of what man is, is derived from and applicable
to the real world, for our definition of "man" has been formed
on the basis of our analysis of what he essentially is in the
world. The meaning is therefore the conceptual form of the
—essence. Or as Quine puts it when he critically refers to essen-
tialism, "Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced
from the object of reference and wedded to the word."28
> Moreover, the statement "man is a rational animal" is
necessary because of the way things are in the world, because
man is essentially and necessarily a rational animal. To deny
that man is such would be to contradict what man in fact truly
is. Necessary truths therefore reflect a real necessity, a necessity
which is operative prior to and independent of linguistic formu-
lation.
Statements, then, which are really necessary are both in-
formative and necessary. They are informative in that they tell
us about the world, and about the essential structure of beings
in the world and of the world itself. And they are necessary in
that a denial of them would lead to contradiction; it would be
saying that a thing was not what it was or that the structure of
the world was not what it was.
Someone, however, might raise the following objection. It
is an obvious fact that we can be mistaken about states of affairs
in the world. Hence, informative propositions are such that
what they assert could conceivably be different; the distant
tower might be round, not square, though we have stated that
it was square. Now if that which is informative can possibly be
other than it is, how then can it be necessary, for to be necessary
means that it cannot be other than it is? It seems that we are
affirming two contradictory claims about the proposition at the
same time, namely, that it both can and cannot assert that the
state of affairs might be other than what they were claimed to be.
The solution to this difficulty can best be brought out by
an illustration from the history of philosophy. Let us take, as
an example, the definition of an atom as put forth by the early
Atomists. "Atom" was defined as "an indivisible unit of matter."
The proposition "an atom is an indivisible unit of matter" was
accordingly a necessary proposition (in that to deny it led to
a contradiction) and an informative one (in that it informed
one what an atom really and essentially was). For the Atomists,
it would have been inconceivable to deny that an atom was an
indivisible unit of matter; such would have been self-contra-
dictory. Yet, on the other hand, they were certainly talking
about real atoms and not simply about the concept of atom.
When Lucretius claimed that all things were composed of
atoms, he was not saying that entities were structured out of
concepts; such would be absurd. Concepts of atoms do not go
together to make up entities—real atoms do. Similarly, when he
attempted to define what an atom essentially was, he was not
speaking about the concept of such, but about real atoms. Thus,
here we have a case of an informative and necessary proposition.
Today, however, modern science has discovered that what
was once considered to be indivisible was not indivisible; the
atom is composed of still smaller particles. Thus today scien-
tists define the atom, not as indivisible, but as "the smallest com-
ponent of an element having all the properties of the element."
And here again, we have a necessary and informative proposi-
tion, but one which differs significantly from the ancient defini-
tion of an atom.
What is the point here? It is simply that what were once
conceived to be necessary propositions or necessary truths about
the world might conceivably not be true at all. That is to say,
such propositions are subject to correction. We may be mistaken
as to what we conceive the essence of any given thing to be.
In other words, the point is simply this: If P is what S is really and

in fact, then "S is P" will be necessary truth, precisely in the sense
that its opposite will be inconceivable and self-contradictory. And
yet it does not work the other way around: If "S is P" strikes us as
being a necessary truth and one the opposite of which seems incon-
ceivable, that does not necessarily mean that P is what S is really. 29
This, of course, does not mean that the statement defining

a concept is not necessary at any given time. Indeed, if we
conceive the essence of S to be such and such, then any state-
ment which would deny this would imply a contradiction. That
is, once anything is conceived to have such and such a nature,
the proposition affirming this must be necessary. But that such
a proposition is necessary is no guarantee of the infallibility of
our conception of such. We might have misconceived what the
nature of the being was. But this is simply a recognition of our
fallible knowledge.
Thus, while we hold that real entities are essentially or
necessarily such and such, any statement about what they es-
sentially are must be a necessary proposition, but this necessity
in no way guarantees a veridical knowledge of that reality nor
that that is the way these real entities are. If reality corresponds
to what we deem it to be, then our propositions concerning it
must be necessary. But the fact that we have certain necessary
propositions about the way reality is in no way assures us that
£ reality is such. The necessity expressed in our propositions is
dependent upon our view of what reality is, and since we can
be mistaken concerning the latter, we must then hold that that
which is deemed to be necessary could possibly be other than
it is. Thus, there is no conflict between a proposition being both
informative and necessary, for something which is now deemed
necessary could be other than it now is if we are mistaken about

it, though according to present doctrine it is necessary.
In conclusion, real or natural necessity deals with proposi-
tions which claim to be informative at the same time as they
are necessary. They are necessary in virtue of the nature of
things, not in virtue of the nature of our language system. Their
opposites would be contradictory because they would be deny-
ing that things are just what they are. Moreover, the plausa-
bility of this concept results from the fact that it allows us to
speak about the real world as it essentially is and that its analysis
in no way prevents us from stating what something essentially
and necessarily is; instead it encourages us to discourse about
the nature of the world. Indeed, we might say that this kind
of necessity is required by our discourse about the nature of
things and the structure of the world.
Application to the Causal Principle

We have, then, the answer to our question, How can the
causal principle be both informative and necessary simultane-
ously? The reply to such a query should, by now, be quite ob-
vious. There is a contradiction between these two characteristics
only if the logical analysis presupposed is one in which the prin-
ciple is true simply in virtue of its concepts. But such an analysis,
among other things, is guilty of confusing the use (that which
the proposition is about) with the mention (the logical instru-
ment). On the contrary, we want to contend that the causal
principle is not logically necessary, but really necessary; it is
necessary because the world is so structured that contingent
beings require a cause. As such, we can say that the causal
principle is both informative and really necessary without fear
of invoking a contradiction, for such are characteristics of neces-
sary truths which intend real necessity.
NOTES
1. A. J. Aver, Language, Truth and Logic (New York, Dover Pub-
lications, 1946), p. 22.
2. J. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God." In Antony Flew and
Alasdair Maclntyre (Eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New
York, Macmillan, 1955), p. 38.
3. Ayer, op. cit., p. 31.
4. Ibid., p. 78.
5. J M . , p. 31.
6. Ibid., pp. 16, 114.
7. Zfotd., p . 16.
8. Ibid., p. 79. By "informative" we mean "devoid of factual con-
tent about the world." A proposition can be uninformative in this sense,
while still being informative in the sense that it informs us about our use
of words.
9. Ayer, op. cit., pp. 78, 80.
10. J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" In New
Essays in Philosophical Theology (see note 2 ) , p. 54.
11. Ayer, op. cit., p. 84. See also pp. 31, 79.
12. Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation
(LaSalle, 111., Open Court, 1946), p. 96.
13. Norwood Russell Hanson, "The Very Idea of a Synthetic-Apriori,"
Mind, LXXI, no. 284 (October, 1962), p. 521.
14. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 72, 105.
15. Ayer, op. cit., p. 31.
16. Ibid., p. 79.
17. John Wisdom, "Metaphysics and Verification." Mind, XLVII,
no. 188 (October, 1938), p. 463n.
18. Henry B. Veatch, "St. Thomas and the Question, 'How Are Syn-
thetic Judgments A Priori Possible?'" The Modern Schoolman, XLII, no. 3
(March, 1965), pp. 256-257.
19. Arthur Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth (New Haven, Conn.,
Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 164-168.
20. Ayer, "Introduction to the Second Edition." In Language, Truth
and Logic, p. 16.
Norman Malcolm, "Are Necessary Propositions Really Verbal?" Mind,
XLIX, no. 194 (April, 1940), pp. 199-202.
Ayer ("Truth by Convention." Analysis, IV, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 19-20)
claims that since necessary truths are prescriptive, they are not propositions
at all. But Malcolm argues that in order to be a proposition, a statement
does not have to be descriptive. That is, it is perfectly possible to have
non-descriptive propositions (Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 202-203).
21. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 199.
22. Ibid., pp. 199, 202.
23. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans, by Norman Kemp
Smith (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965), A94.
24. Ibid., A246, with the substitution of "realen" for "transcendentalem"
made by Kant in the Nachtrage.
25. Ibid., A580.
26. Ibid., A616.
27. The epistemological question how we discover that this is the
essential feature of man is not the issue here. I am merely attempting to
state the basis on which real necessity is grounded, so that we may under-
stand what real necessity is.
28. Willard VanOrman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (New
York, Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 22, 155.
29. Henry B. Veatch, "On Trying to Say and to Know What's What."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIV, No. 1 (September,
1963), p. 91.
Chapter 5
CAUSATION AND THE TOTALITY

OF CONTINGENT BEINGS
A N HIS FAMOUS DEBATE with Frederick Copleston on the ques-
tion of the validity of the theistic arguments, Bertrand Russell
contends that it is meaningless to ask, as the cosmological argu-
ment does, for any explanation of the universe. The universe
is without explanation, for the notion of causation is in-
applicable to the totality. As such, the cosmological argument
has no validity, for one of its premises is meaningless. How, in
detail, does Russell develop his criticism?
The concept of cause, Russell contends, is one which we
derive from our experience with, our observation of, par-
ticular things. We see billard balls causing each other to move,
people causing doors to close, and the wind whipping leaves
through the air; from these instances where particular things
move other particular things we form our notion of causation.
And since our notion of causation is derived from the perception
of such instances, it is inappropriate to apply the notion "cause"
to anything other than such instances of particulars causing par-
ticulars. We have no reason to apply the notion of causation to
areas extending beyond our experience.
When he applies this to the cosmological argument, Russell
wants to contend that since "the whole concept of cause is one
we derive from our observation of particular things, [there is]
no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause
whatsoever. . . . The concept of cause is not applicable to the
total."1 The cosmological argument, Russell notes, involves a
request for the sufficient reason for the totality of contingent
beings. But when it asks for such, its request is meaningless, for
we cannot meaningfully apply the concept of causation to the
totality. As such, we can never ask for the reason for the ex-
94
Causation And The Totality Of Contingent Beings 95
istence of the universe. And if we cannot do this, then we can
never arrive at the existence of a necessary being which is sup-
posed to explain the existence of such. We can proceed no farther
than to ask for the causes of particular effects; to ask for more
is to lapse into meaningless queries. The totality, therefore, is
totally without explanation; to ask for an explanation in terms
of finding a cause for it is meaningless.
Thus for Russell, the question, Is there a sufficient reason
for the totality of beings? is crucial to the cosmological argu-
ment. But such a query is meaningless. Thus the entire edifice
of the argument supposedly collapses around our feet.
RUSSELL'S OBJECTION IS IRRELEVANT TO OUR

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Russell seems to feel that the validity of the cosmological
argument hinges on the attempt to find a cause for the totality
of contingent beings, an effort which for him is doomed from
the start to meaninglessness. But is Russell correct in this con-
tention? Does the cosmological argument contend that there
must be a cause for the totality of contingent beings?
The answer one gives to this depends, I believe, upon
which of the two types of arguments for rejecting an infinite
series of contingent beings2 that one is considering. As we noted
in Chapter 1, though there seems to be one general argument
form for the cosmological argument, there are some differences
in the development of this form. One can find such a difference
in the arguments given for rejecting the alternative in S4 of an
infinite series of contingent beings. On one hand, the argument
given by St. Thomas Aquinas was that an infinite series of con-
tingent beings was in and of itself incapable of explaining the
existence or motion of a contingent or moved being. It is im-
possible to proceed to infinity in the series of moved movers,
for to do so implies that there would be no first mover, and
hence no subsequent movers and ultimately no motion whatso-
ever. Thus we must reject, St. Thomas argues, the alternative
of an infinite series of moved movers, for this cannot account
for the moving of any given moved object.
On the other hand, the argument given by Duns Scotus
was that an infinite series of contingent beings was itself in need
of a cause, for since this series exists and whatever exists has
a cause, this series likewise must have a cause. The alternative
of an infinite series of causes must therefore be rejected as being
the cause of the caused being because ultimately even this in-
finite series of causes related per se must have a cause.
Thus two different kinds of arguments have been tradi-
tionally given for rejecting an infinite series of contingent be-
ings: one, like the one we developed in the first chapter, argues
that this alternative can never yield a sufficient reason; the
other contends that this entire series needs a cause. Now given
these two different arguments, to which of these does Russell's
criticism apply? to one or to both?
That Russell's criticism applies to the type of argumentation
given by Scotus can be seen from two things. First, this seems
clear from the fact that Russell's argument is developed directly
in reply to Frederick Copleston, who argues as follows:
So if you add up contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent
beings, not a necessary being. An infinite series of contingent beings
will be, to my way of thinking, as unable to cause itself as one con-
tingent being. . . . Why stop [finding a cause for] one particular ob-
ject? Why shouldn't one raise the question of the cause of the exis-
tence of all particular objects? . . . I can't see how you can rule out
the legitimacy of asking the question how the total, or anything at
all comes to be there.3
Note that in his argument Copleston is asking not merely for

the cause of any contingent being but for the cause of the
infinite series of contingent beings. Thus, that to which Rus-
sell is replying is the same line of argumentation which Duns
Scotus developed.
Secondly, the type of argument developed by both Scotus
and Copleston contains, as a part of the argument, the con-
tention that even the infinite series of contingent beings needs
a cause. But this is precisely Russell's point: it is meaningless
to press the question of causation to the totality. Thus it can
be seen that Russell's contention is applicable to the Scotus/
Copleston type of argument (though, as we shall show below,
not valid against it).
But granted that Russell's argument does apply to the
type of analysis given to statement 5 in S4 by Scotus and Cople-
ston, does it apply to the type of analysis given by Thomas
and ourselves? That his criticism does not apply to the argu-
ment which we have developed can be seen from the following.
First, that for which our cosmological argument is attempt-
ing to account is not an infinite series of contingent beings nor
any totality of contingent beings. The quest for an explanation
of a totality does not find a place in the argument itself. That
this is the case can be readily seen in that the proposition "An
existent totality itself needs a sufficient reason (cause) for
its existence" finds no correlate in the argument which we pro-
posed in Chapter 1. In our presentation all that we were con-
cerned to explain was the existence of any individual contingent
being. Moreover, the infinite series of contingent beings, which
we considered as one alternative for accounting for the ex-
istence of any contingent being, was not considered in our
argument as a totality which must be caused. There was no
attempt in our argument to discover a cause for this totality
of contingent beings. Our only contention was that no con-
tingent being nor any number of contingent beings, even if
they amounted to an infinity of contingent beings, could pro-
vide a sufficient reason for the existence of this particular con-
tingent being. It was not that the totality needed a cause, but
that it by itself could not provide the cause or sufficient reason
which led us to reject it as an alternative in S5. Thus, Russell's
criticism, as he states it, is irrelevant to the particular cosmo-
logical argument which we advanced, for a perfectly valid cos-
mological argument can be formulated without ever introducing
the question about the cause of the totality of contingent beings.
THE TOTALITY OF CONTINGENT BEINGS

MUST ITSELF BE CONTINGENT
Russell's counter to this, I believe, would be something
like the following. It must be granted that the cosmological
argument, as formulated in Chapter 1, does not seek for a
cause of the totality of contingent beings and that the infinite
series of contingent beings is not rejected as a possible ex-
planation of the existence of any contingent being because it
itself must be caused. However, cannot this uncaused totality
of contingent beings be used to help us escape the dilemma
posed in S4? In S4 we noted that in order to account for die
existence of any contingent being we must appeal to either an
infinite series of contingent beings or to a necessary being. Now
granted that the first will not yield the desired result and that
we want to avoid the latter at all cost, can we not escape be-
tween the horns of the dilemma by stating that the sufficient
reason for any being is provided by a totality of contingent
beings which is itself neither caused nor uncaused? Is it not
at this point that we can introduce the notion of a totality
which provides, on the one hand, the explanation for every-
thing else, and to which, on the other hand, the notion of
causality is inapplicable (as shown in Russell's argument
above)? Here we have avoided the difficulties of an infinite
regress, for we do have a final term in the series which can
be considered the cause of the contingent being, viz. the to-
tality; yet we have made no appeal to a necessary being, for it
is quite meaningless to ask for the cause of this totality, since
we can never experience such. Thus, it is now in regard to the
dichotomy posed in S4 that the difficulty with the cosmological
argument arises; by the introduction of an explaining totality
to which the predicate "caused" does not apply, we have escaped
between the horns of this dilemma, and have consequently
avoided the conclusion that a necessary being must exist.
Now in regard to this criticism of our argument, it is ob-
viously the case that we cannot use the same objection to it
that we used against Russell's first presentation, for here Rus-
sell's objection can be shown to be relevant to one of the
steps in our argument. The argument which he here proposes
is raised against our fourth step, for he contends that he can
escape the dilemma posed there. Thus in this case Russell's
criticism, if it can be sustained, is telling against our particular
version of the cosmological argument.
Moreover, we must also grant that there is no way in which
we can experience the totality, and consequently, there is no
direct way (by perceptual means) of knowing that the totality
is caused. Russell again appears to be on firm ground.
But granted that we cannot experience the totality, and
hence cannot on this basis apply the notion of causation to
it, cannot we establish on other grounds that this totality must
itself be caused? The answer, I believe, is that we can. We can
infer that the world is contingent, hence caused, from the fact
that since the totality is in reality nothing more than the sum
of all the contingent beings, and since the parts are all con-
tingent, the totality, as the sum total of its parts, must like-
wise be contingent. And if it is contingent, it is caused (as
argued in the third chapter). Therefore, it is certainly mean-
ingful to ask for that which caused the totality.
Russell counters this argument with an example. He states,
"I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man
who exists has a mother, and it seems to me that your argu-
ment is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but
obviously the human race hasn't a mother—that's a different
logical sphere."4 We cannot logically infer from the fact that
all the individual parts of a totality have a certain character-
istic that the totality likewise possesses the same characteristic,
gency of all the parts we have argued to the contingency of
To do this is to commit the Fallacy of Composition. Yet this is
precisely the move of the above argument: from the contin-
gency of all the parts we have argued to the contingency of
the whole. Consequently, any argument which seeks to estab-
lish the contingency of the totality from the contingency of its
parts is guilty of committing the Fallacy of Composition.
THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION

Our argument for the contingency of the totality is based
on the argument from part to whole, and Russell contends that
such reasoning is fallacious, for it commits the Fallacy of Com-
position. But is every argument from part to whole fallacious?
We can present numerous examples where such arguments are
valid and not fallacious. For example, all the parts of this book
are extended; therefore this book is extended. Or again, all the
parts of this desk are made of wood; therefore this desk is made
of wood. In both cases, the whole must have a certain char-
acteristic because all the parts do; the conclusion does logically
follow from the premises. We appear, then, to have examples
which tell against the application of this fallacy to all argu-
ments from part to whole. It would seem strange indeed to call
these arguments fallacious, when it is in fact the case that
the whole must have this property because the parts do. Let us,
then, examine the Fallacy of Composition more closely.
What is the crux of the Fallacy of Composition? This
fallacy is committed whenever the universal premise which
expresses the argument from part to whole-
Premise 1: (x) (y) [(xRy • Px) 3 Py]
where R stands for "relation of parts to whole" and P
stands for "some property"
—cannot be shown to be necessarily true. That is, any individ-
ual argument from part to whole 5 commits the Fallacy of
Composition when it argues from the universal premise 1, which
cannot be established to be necessarily true.
Now it must first be admitted that, if we are restricted to
deciding the truth of premise 1 on the basis of logical form
alone (as Russell seems to think), then all arguments from part
to whole are fallacious. That is to say, premise 1 cannot be
shown by formal logic to be necessarily true. A truth-table
analysis of 1 will not show that its denial is self-contradictory.
However, it does seem odd to restrict the manner of dis-
covering the truth involved in 1 to formal logical manipulation
alone, and accordingly to apply the term "fallacy" to all cases
where the necessary truth of the universal premise cannot be
established simply by means of formal logic. For, as shown
by our examples, there seem to be arguments which, though
employing 1, are not fallacious. Are there not other ways of
establishing the necessary truth of this premise than by formal
logic? Cannot we establish its necessary truth through an analysis
of the nature of the properties involved?
The point here is that, since there seem to be obvious cases
where the inference from part to whole is not fallacious, it
seems questionable to apply the term "fallacy" to all cases
where the necessary truth of 1, though it cannot be established
by formal logic, can be established on other grounds. The appli-
cation of "fallacy" to an argument must be made in a wider
context than simply in that of formal logical validity. We must
also take into consideration the essential nature or character of
the properties involved. And if we do this, then the Fallacy of
Composition applies to every case in which premise 1 is not
necessarily true, where the decision whether it is necessarily
true or false rests on something more than simply formal logic.
In this formulation we have not changed the nature of the
Fallacy of Composition, but have merely altered our concept
of logical validity to include arguments whose validity can be
discerned by means of formal logic plus an analysis of the
nature of the properties involved in the argument.
Thus in any particular case, in order to decide whether the
argument from part to whole has committed the Fallacy of
Composition, we must decide whether premise 1 is necessarily
true. And whether this premise is necessarily true in any par-
ticular part/whole argument must be determined by an analysis
of the characteristic or property involved in that case.6 In cer-
tain cases, the characteristic involved is such that the whole
must have a certain character if all the parts have it. Or put
another way, it is impossible for all the parts to be of a par-
ticular character if the whole is not. Thus in our example
above, if the parts of the desk are made of wood, it is simply
contradictory to say that the desk is not made of wood. Sim-
ilarly, in our example of extended objects, the object simply
must be extended if its parts are extended. The extension of
the whole is dependent on the extension of the parts. In such
instances, the parts themselves cause1 the whole to have this
characteristic.8 As such, the whole must have this property if
the parts do: it is really necessary that the desk be wooden if
its parts are wooden. Thus, by an analysis of the characteristic
under consideration we can see that in some cases if all the
parts of y are P, y must be P. And we can see that in these cases
this is really necessary, for to deny it involves a contradiction.
We may conclude, then, that not every argument which
infers that the whole has a certain property because the parts
do, commits the Fallacy of Composition. It is impossible to
universalize this fallacy to apply to all cases of part/whole in-
ference, for there are some arguments of this type which do not
commit this fallacy. Rather, the validity or invalidity of this,
inference depends upon what property we substitute for P in
premise 1. In some cases the property is such that premise 1
is necessarily true, for to deny it involves a contradiction,
whereas with respect to other properties such is not the case.
We must consider the property involved in each individual
case, in order to determine where it is applicable, and where
it is not. In those cases where premise 1 is necessarily true, the
fallacy does not apply.
Application to the Cosmological Argument

If this is the case, then, in the argument under considera-
tion, we must analyze the property involved, viz. contingency.
We want to contend that the very nature of contingency makes -
it such that premise 1 must be necessarily true. The argument
may be put as follows: The totality of contingent beings is
nothing more than the sum total of individual contingent be-
ings; it is nothing over and above these beings. Each indi-
vidual being, then, if it exists could conceivably not be. But
what would occur if all these beings ceased to exist at the next
moment, something which is a distinct possibility since each is
contingent? Obviously, if such were the case, the totality itself
would cease to exist. For if the totality is the sum total of all its
parts, and if there were no parts, then it would be impossible for
the totality to exist. But if this is the case, it is perfectly conceiv-
able that the totality could not exist. And if the totality could
conceivably not exist, then it too must be contingent. Therefore,
if all the parts of something are contingent, the totality likewise
must be contingent; it could conceivably not exist.
Here, then, we have a statement of the form of premise 1,
namely, the fact that the parts are contingent necessarily im-
plies that the whole be contingent. By an analysis of contin-
gency we can see that this must be the case. Thus, when we
argue that since the parts of the totality of contingent beings
are contingent, therefore the totality must be contingent, we
are making a necessarily true statement. To deny that the to-
tality is contingent, even though all its parts are contingent, is
simply contradictory. Accordingly, when we argue that the to-
tality must be contingent because its parts are, we have not
committed the Fallacy of Composition, for in our argument
premise 1 is necessarily true. Thus it seems that though we
cannot directly know that the totality is caused, by this argu-
ment we can show that it must be contingent and therefore
caused. And if the totality must be caused, then we can appeal
to no such thing as an explaining totality to which causation
does not apply. Russell has not provided us with a viable escape
between the horns of the dilemma posed in step four.
A FRAMEWORK FOR "CAUSATION"

AS APPLIED TO THE TOTALITY
Russell would have at least one more move. It must be
granted that the totality can be shown to be contingent by
such an argument as that given above and that, consequendy,
we cannot appeal to such a thing as an uncaused totality of
contingent beings to escape the dilemma posed in S4. However,
previously we have shown that that which is contingent must
be caused. Hence, this totality of contingent beings must be
caused. But, to reformulate his original objection, causation as
known to us always describes an event in which a particular
being is caused by another particular being in the world. When
we ask for the cause of something, that cause is sought for
within the structure or context of the totality of contingent be-
ings. But what would it mean to ask for a cause which lies
outside of this totality? Since causation as known by us always
occurs within the context of the totality, is not then mean-
ingless to ask for a cause outside of this totality? If this is the
only frame of reference we have for causation, what could we
possibly mean when we ask for the cause of the totality? Such
a question would seem to be meaningless, for there is no appro-
priate frame of reference in which to put the question. Thus the
cosmological argument necessarily implies a proposition which
is without any meaning.
One thing is immediately evident from this reformulation
of Russell's original objection against the cosmological argu-
ment. As formulated here against our argument, his objection
has great similarity to the original formulation against the argu-
ment of Copleston. His criticism here is that since causation
can only be meaningful within a framework of totality, the
necessary implication—from the contingency of the totality—that
it is caused is meaningless. His criticism of Copleston was similiar,
namely, that it was meaningless to ask for the cause of the
totahty. Thus, we have a parallel between our own argument
and that of Copleston, such that a reply to Russell here would
likewise suffice against his original criticism of Copleston.
Now can Russell's argument here be sustained? Is there
no framework in which we can speak about the causation of
the totality of contingent beings? That there is a framework
both for the statement that the totahty of contingent beings is
contingent and for the statement that the totality is caused, can,
I think, be shown as follows.
First, what land of framework is necessary in order to
ask whether the totality is or is not contingent? That the totality
is contingent means that the totality, if it exists, could possibly
not exist. Now in order to discover whether or not the totality
need exist, we need no other frame of reference beyond the
totality itself. When we ask whether we can conceive of this
totality as nonexistent, we are not introducing anything which
lies outside of this totahty. We are not (at least at this junc-
ture) asking for an external cause of this contingent totality;
we are not appealing to any external forces or beings. Neither
are we affirming the existence of anything other than this to-
tahty of contingent beings. We are merely saying that it is
possible that this totality could not be, for the elimination of
all contingent beings would result in the elimination of the
totahty of contingent beings.
Thus the frame of reference for any statement about the
contingency of the totality is the totality itself. In the strict
sense of "contingent," where "contingent" simply means "could
conceivably not be," when we ask whether the totality is con-
tingent we need no other frame of reference beyond the totality
itself in order to frame the question.
Secondly, one can likewise show that there is a meaningful
frame of reference in which one can speak about the totality
being caused. In order to make it meaningful to speak of the
totality of contingent beings being caused we need merely to
extend our notion of totality to include necessary as well as
contingent beings. That is to say, given the above argument
to show that the totality of contingent beings is caused, in
order to discover in what framework we can discuss this causa-
tion we need merely to include the necessary being established
by the cosmological argument in a totality along with the
contingent beings of our experience. As such, the question of
causation still takes place within a totality, as Russell claims.
But the totality in which the question of the causation of the
totality of contingent beings takes place is not the restricted total-
ity of beings of one kind, viz. contingent, but a larger totality. As
such, by expanding the idea of a totality, the question of causa-
tion of one part of that totality again becomes meaningful; it
is asked in a meaningful framework of reference.
But how, it may be objected, can these two (contingent
beings and a necessary being) be included together in a totality?
Are they not too very different? I think not, for upon examining
them more closely, there are two important ways in which they
are similar and which would allow them to be grouped together.
First, both groups include real beings. There really are con-
tingent beings, and, as the cosmological argument shows, there
really is a necessary being. Hence, such a totality would be the
totality of all existing things. Secondly, both are capable of
yielding reasons for the existence of other beings, though ob-
viously with differing degrees of sufficiency. Thus, both can
be causes. And if both are causes, cannot they both be included
in a totality of beings which are causes? Thus, although they
differ in that the one contains contingent and the other non-
contingent beings, it is perfectly possible to extend the notion
of a totality to include all necessary as well as all contingent
beings. And as such, we have here a frame of reference in
which we can meaningfully ask whether the world (as the to-
tality of contingent beings) can be caused, namely, in that of
a totality of beings which are real and are causes.
CONCLUSION
It appears that none of Russell's arguments will support his
claim that we cannot proceed beyond the totality in order to
explain the existence of a contingent being. We have argued,
first, that to make the quest for the cause of the totality a
central part of the cosmological argument is not applicable to
our argument; no such contention can be found in the argu-
ment. Secondly, the appeal to an explanatory totality to which
causation does not apply can be countered by an argument
from the character of the parts of this totality to the character
of the whole. This argument shows that the totality must itself
be contingent and therefore cannot fill the role Russell assigns
to it, namely, of being a cause to which itself the notion of
causal explanation is inapplicable. Finally, we have contended,
contrary to Russell, that there is a meaningful frame of refer-
ence in which we can ask for the cause of the totality, namely,
a framework in which the notion of totality is extended beyond
its restricted usage with reference only to contingent beings.
Hopefully, then, the cosmological argument has met the chal-
lenge of Bertrand Russell.
NOTES
1. Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the Exis-
tence of God." In John Hick (Ed.), The Existence of God (New York,
2. Note 2, Ch. 1.
3. Copleston and Russell, op. tit., pp. 174-175.
4. Ibid., p. 175.
5. The argument form involved here would be modus ponens.
Premise 1: (x) (y) [(xRy • Px) D Py]
Premise 2: (3x) (3y) [(xRy • Px)]
Premise 3: .". (3y) (Py)
6. William L. Rowe, "The Fallacy of Composition." Mind, LXXI,
No. 281 (January, 1962), p. 89.
7. The causation involved is obviously not efficient causation. Prob-
ably the closest we could come to categorizing the cause would be to call
it a material cause.
8. Why this is so with respect to certain properties and not with others
is difficult to say. But the recognition that the part/whole inference works
with certain properties like colors and extension, but not for others like
small or round, is not contingent upon our presentation of a principle which
will enable us to decide automatically in every instance whether premise 1
is necessarily true.
Chapter 6
THE PROBLEM OF NECESSITY

IN THE CONCLUSION
JL HAT THE CONCLUSION of the cosmological argument involves

the notion of necessity is hardly disputable. What is disputed,
however, is the kind of necessity which is thought to be in-
volved therein. For many contemporary philosophers, the neces-
sity involved is of one and only one kind, namely, logical
necessity. That is, the conclusion of the cosmological argument,
"God exists," is a logically necessary proposition. J. J. C. Smart's
analysis of this existence claim is a case in point.
The first stage of the argument purports to argue to the existence of
a necessary being. And by "a necessary being" the cosmological argu-
ment means "a logically necessary being," i.e. "a being whose non-
existence is inconceivable in the sort of way that a triangle's having
four sides is inconceivable." . . . Now since "necessary" is a word
which applies primarily to propositions, we shall have to interpret
"God is a necessary being" as "The proposition 'God exists' is logically
necessary." 1
C. B. Martin arrives at the same conclusion.

The difficulty with [the concluding statement of Thomas's third Way]
is not only that it follows from untrue and muddled premises, but
that it suggests that God's existence is logically necessary. That is,
it suggests that it does not make sense to say that it is possible that
God should not exist.2
Finally, Paul Edwards writes, with respect to the cosmo-

logical argument from contingency,
We can, then, properly explain the contingent beings around us only
by tracing them back ultimately to some necessary being, to some-
thing which exists necessarily, which has "the reason for its existence
within itself." The existence of contingent beings, in other words,
107
implies the existence of a necessary being . . . To say that there
is a necessary being is to say that it would be self-contradictory to
deny its existence.3
Moreover, upon concluding that it is logical necessity which
is involved in the conclusion of the argument, it is then
fashionable to quickly dispense with the question of the validity
of the cosmological argument on the grounds that it leads to a
logically impossible conclusion. For example, from the phras-
ing of the conclusion of the cosmological argument in terms of
logical necessity, Smart contends that the cosmological argu-
ment must therefore be invalid because this proposition is self-
contradictory. No existential proposition can be logically neces-
sary. " 'A logically necessary being' is a self-contradictory ex-
pression like 'round square.' "4 J. N. Findlay goes even farther,
arguing not simply that the cosmological argument is invalid
because the conclusion is self-contradictory, but presenting what
amounts to a disproof of God's existence on the same assump-
tion that since "necessary," when applied to the divine being,
is logical necessity, the existence of a necessary being is self-
contradictory and hence impossible.5
Thus, the claim is made that whether the cosmological
argument concludes that a necessary being exists or that a divine
being necessarily exists, in either case the necessity involved
is of one particular kind, namely, logical necessity. Consequent-
ly, no matter which way one formulates the conclusion of the
cosmological argument, it may be properly translated into "The
proposition 'God exists' is logically necessary," and this latter
proposition is evidently self-contradictory.
But are Smart and others correct when they claim, first
all, that the proposition "a necessary being exists" is equivalent
to the proposition "a being necessarily exists"?6 Is the word
"necessary" being used in precisely the same sense in both in-
stances? Secondly, are they correct when they claim that both
propositions are translatable into "the proposition 'God exists'
is logically necessary"? That is, can they justify their claim that
there is indeed only one kind of necessity, namely, logical
necessity? And finally, when the cosmological argument argues
to the existence of a necessary being, is it claiming that its
The Problem Of Necessity In The Conclusion 109
conclusion is a logically necessary proposition, as Smart and
others seem to think?
In this chapter we want to attempt to unravel the con-
fusion which surrounds the use of the word "necessary" as it
is used with reference to divine existence, and in particular, as
it manifests itself in the conclusion of the cosmological argu-
ment. Hopefully we can show that the majority of contem-
porary criticisms of the cosmological argument (i.e. those criti-
cisms which, like Smart's, attack the conclusion of the argument
as being self-contradictory) are not really so telling against the
argument as their proponents would have us think. Rather
these criticisms arise from the contemporary muddle which sur-
rounds the use of "necessary" in the cosmological argument. The
muddle, we will argue, has arisen because of the modern ten-
dency to group all uses of "necessary" under one category, viz.
logical necessity. Our contention will be that such a move is a
mistake and that a proper analysis of the different uses of "neces-
sary" involved in the conclusion of our argument will go a long
way toward making the conclusion of the argument, and the
theistic claims in general, both understandable and meaningful.
TWO OCCURRENCES OF "NECESSARY"

In the argument which we developed in Chapter 1, our
conclusion was as follows:
(S 6 ) Therefore, a necessary being exists.
What is immediately apparent from this conclusion is that it
employs two uses of "necessary." That this is the case can be
brought out by translating the conclusion of the argument
"Therefore, a necessary being exists," into "The proposition 'a
necessary being exists' is necessary." What, then, can be said
about the two uses of "necessary" here? Are they different, or
is this merely an instance of emphatic reiteration?
The first use of "necessary" is as an adjective which modi-
fies "being." As a modifier or predicate of things or beings,
"necessary" here signifies a certain characteristic of beings. What
this characteristic is can be understood when it is compared
with its opposite "contingent" (see S 3 ). A contingent being is
one which, if it exists, could just as well not exist. There is no
compulsion, logical or otherwise, that it exist. As such, it is
intrinsically dependent on something else for its existence.
Something else must cause and sustain its existence. On the
other hand, to be a necessary being means that this being, if
it exists, cannot not exist. It can neither be caused to be nor be
caused not to be. Thus, if it exists, it is totally independent of
all other beings; its existence can in no way be caused or tem-
porally limited. Thus, "necessary" in this first sense (which we
will designate NEC 1) is a qualifier of beings; by saying that
a being is a necessary being, we are saying that if it exists, a
certain mode of being must characterize it, i.e. it is independent
of all other beings, uncaused and eternal.
The second use of "necessary" here is not as a modifier of
things or beings, but rather of propositions. To say that a
proposition is necessary is to say that to deny that proposition
would involve a contradiction, either with the proposition itself
or with some set of conditions. Accordingly, we can categorize
this second use of "necessary" (NEC 2) as the necessity which
applies to propositions. Consequently, we have two uses of
"necessary" here: the first as applicable to beings and the second
as applicable to propositions.
That these two occurrences of "necessary" are indeed
different seems to be quite evident. On the one hand, we have
those predicates which apply to objects and which signify
characteristics of those objects; on the other hand, we have
those predicates which apply to statements about those objects
and which signify characteristics of those statements or proposi-
tions. Such is the case respectively with NEC 1 and NEC 2.
Moreover, it is obvious that those predicates which apply to
objects have quite different meanings when they apply to state-
ments about those objects. For example, that an expression is
ill-formed says nothing whatsoever about the character of the
objects to which this expression refers. To say that the objects
have an indeterminate shape because the expression about them
is ill-formed is nothing less than to confuse the properties of
objects with the properties of propositions about them. Similar-
ly, failure to comply with the distinction between NEC 1 and
NEC 2 results in the same confusion. It is a confusion of levels,
confusion of the higher level of statements about objects with
the level of objects themselves.
The fact that we have here two different uses of "necessary"
yields one very important result, a result which, if clearly under-
stood, does much to alleviate the confusion surrounding the
conclusion of the cosmological argument. With respect to NEC
1, whether this being exists or not is open to question. The fact
that we speak about a necessary being does not imply that such
a being exists. Indeed, speaking about a necessary being is sim-
ilar to speaking about any other being, real or imaginary; the
mention of the name does not imply that there is an ontological
referent for that name. As talk about unicorns does not mean
that such exist, so speech about necessary beings does not
mean that such exist. Again, to say that something is a necessary
being is merely to say that, if it exists, it cannot not exist.
In fact, there is no contradiction involved in the denial
that such a being does exist. That is, "A being which is such that
if it exists, it cannot not exist, does not exist" is not self-contra-
dictory. And it is not self-contradictory because in the conditional
clause, which contains the definition of NEC 1, there is no claim
of existence made. One can deny the hypothesis or condition
without pain of self-contradiction. One can hold that the con-
ditional clause is either true or false. If it is true, certain con-
sequences follow; but if it is false, these consequences are no
longer in effect. Thus, with respect to NEC 1, the existence of
the divine being remains an open question. However—and this
is the force of NEC 1—if this being does exist, if its existence
can be established in some manner, then this being must be
of such and such a character, viz. it cannot not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to NEC 2, whether this
being exists or not is not open to question. If its existence is
necessary, then it is contradictory (either to itself or to some-
thing else) to say that it does not exist. That is, the denial of
a necessary proposition must result in contradiction.
We may conclude, then, that the concluding statement of
the cosmological argument involves two different uses of the
word "necessary." On one hand, by noting that the divine be-
ing is a necessary being, it is claiming that it is a being which,
if it exists, cannot not exist. It claims that this being, as an ex-
istent, is independent of all other beings, is uncaused, and can-
not cease to exist. On the other hand, by claiming that the
proposition itself is necessary (that a being necessarily exists)
it is claiming that a denial of this being's existence involves a
contradiction. Part of the confusion which surrounds discus-
sions of the cosmological argument has arisen from the re-
peated failure to maintain a distinction between these two uses
of "necessary"—between "necessary" as it is predicated of beings
(as in "a necessary being exists") and "necessary" as it is predi-
cated of propositions about these beings (as in "a being neces-
sarily exists"). Understanding and utilizing this proper distinc-
tion goes a long way toward truly understanding the claim of
the cosmological argument.
The question which now arises is, Is the necessity which
the conclusion of the cosmological argument invokes logical
necessity? Is the existence of this being logically necessary? Since
logical necessity is a theory about propositions, this question
must be answered by a close look at NEC 2. We will return to
the issues raised by NEC 1 in a later section.
LOGICAL NECESSITY
That the necessity involved in the conclusion of the cos-
mological argument is logical necessity seems to be the general
view of contemporary philosophy. A prime example of such
from J. J. C. Smart's article has already been given:
The [cosmological] argument purports to argue to the existence of a
necessary being. And by "a necessary being" the cosmological argu-
ment means "a logically necessary being," i.e. "a being whose non-
existence is inconceivable in the sort of way that a triangle's having
four sides is inconceivable." 7
Therefore, that a logically necessary being exists is the con-
clusion of the cosmological argument.
The same assumption underlies Terence Penelhum's analy-
sis of the argument.
It is important to see that what refutes it [the Ontological Proof] is
not a discovery about the structure of things, which might in a given
case be different, but a logical discovery about the concept of exis-
tence, which sets it apart from other concepts; that no tautology can
be existential is a consequence of this. Another consequence is the
refutation of our Existential Argument. For the distinctive char-
acteristic of the concept of existence precludes our saying that there
can be a being whose existence follows from his essence. . . . If all
necessary propositions are tautologies, this explains why we cannot
deny them. 8
Finally, J. N. Findlay, though not in direct reference to

the cosmological argument, but dealing with precisely the same
issue in respect to the theistic arguments in general, writes as
follows:
The true object of religious reverence must not be one, merely, to
which no actual independent realities stand opposed: it must be one
to which such opposition is totally inconceivable. . . . Not only
must the existence of other things be unthinkable without him, but
his own non-existence must be wholly unthinkable in any circum-
stances. There must, in short, be no conceivable alternative to an
existence properly termed "divine." 8
First of all, what is meant by "logical necessity?" Accord-

ing to contemporary usage, for propositions to be logically neces-
sary, they must be such that (1) their opposite must imply a
contradiction, and (2) they must be "guaranteed solely by the
rules for the use of the symbols they contain."10 That is, for a
proposition to be logically necessary, it must be necessarily true
solely in virtue of the meanings of the terms which compose it.
The contradiction which characterizes its opposite must be pro-
duced by a manipulation of the meanings of the terms involved
in the proposition; the truth and necessity of the proposition
are determinable independently of any consideration of the
states of affairs in the v/orld. But if the opposite of a logically
necessary proposition is determined to be contradictory in this
fashion, then it must be seZf-contradictory. That is, if the con-
tradiction is determined solely through an analysis of the mean-
ings of the terms involved, then it can contradict nothing else
but itself. Thus a logically necessary proposition is one, the
self-contradiction of whose opposite one must discern solely
through an analysis of the meanings of the terms involved.11
Returning to the point in question, we must query, Why
is the conclusion of the cosmological argument thought to be
logically necessary? The answer, it seems, is that for Smart and
others there is no way a proposition can be necessary other
than by being logically necessary. Smart in particular seems to
believe that logical necessity is the only kind of necessity appli-
cable to propositions. Thus, any proposition which is necessary
must be logically necessary.
Consequently, we are presented with two questions. First,
must a proposition, to be necessary, be logically necessary? And
secondly, is this the kind of necessity invoked by the conclusion
of the cosmological argument? Obviously, if logical necessity
is the only kind of necessity, then the answer to the second
question is already determined. Therefore, since the first ques-
tion is primary, let us attempt to discover an answer to it first.
CONDITIONAL NECESSITY
Must a proposition, to be necessary, be logically necessary?
Must the opposite of every proposition which claims to be
necessary be seZ/-contradictory? Must all necessary propositions
be necessary simply in virtue of the meanings of the terms
contained within the proposition? I think not. There are proposi-
tions which derive their necessity, not from an analysis of the
meanings of the terms contained within the proposition, but
rather from being the conclusion of a valid argument. The
proposition follows necessarily from its premises.
That such concluding statements are not logically necessary
can be seen from the fact that they lack the two characteristics
which are essential for a proposition to be logically necessary.
On one hand, they are not self-contradictory. The denial of the
conclusion of an argument does not lead to self-contradiction.
Indeed, the opposite of such is perfectly conceivable; the con-
clusion, taken simply by itself, is nothing more than a contingent
statement. What it does contradict is a certain set of conditions
or premises. For example, in the standard argument, "All men
are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal," the
denial of the concluding statement is not self-contradictory. If
we denied that Socrates is mortal, we would not be contradicting
ourselves, but rather contradicting a set of given premises or
conditions. Thus, on this count a concluding statement of an
argument is not logically necessary.
On the other hand, the conclusion of an argument makes
no claim to be necessary simply on the basis of an analysis of
the meanings of the terms involved in the concluding proposi-
tion. If such were the case, then no argument would be neces-
sary to support such a conclusion; the conclusion would be
self-evident. But such an argument is essential to establish the
type of proposition which we are considering. For example, it is
not self-evident that Socrates is mortal; we must appeal to
other relevant facts to support this. Thus, on neither count can
the conclusion of an argument be considered to be logically
necessary.
However, this is not to say that the conclusion is not
necessary. Indeed, it is necessary; its opposite does imply a
contradiction. But the contradiction which is implied is not self-
contradiction, but rather a contradiction of a certain set of
conditions or premises. The conclusion is necessary, but it is
necessary because it is the conclusion of a valid argument: the
conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. Thus, though
it is not logically necessary, the conclusion is still necessary;
it is necessitated by a certain set of conditions.
Consequently, we have an answer to our first question. A
proposition does not have to be logically necessary in order to
be necessary. It can be necessary in that to deny it involves
a contradiction with respect to a certain set of conditions or
premises. Thus, we have at least two kinds of necessity which
can characterize propositions: a proposition can be logically
necessary, or it can be conditionally necessary, i.e. necessary with
respect to certain conditions or premises.
The Conclusion of the Cosmological Argument

Uses Conditional Necessity
The question still remains as to which kind of necessity
the cosmological argument invokes. Granted that there is an-
other kind of necessity than logical necessity, is this other kind
of necessity the necessity involved in the cosmological argu-
ment? It seems that we must answer this in the affirmative.
This can be seen, first of all, from the fact that the concluding
statement of the argument does not claim that its necessity can
be determined simply on the basis of an analysis of the mean-
ings of the terms involved in itself. Indeed, if such were the
case, then no argument would be needed to establish this con-
clusion; the concluding statement would be self-evident, apart
from the appeal to any such argument like the cosmological.
Rather, it claims to be necessary only insofar as it is the con-
clusion of a valid cosmological argument. Secondly, the con-
clusion makes no claim to be such that its opposite implies a
self-contradiction. Indeed, it claims just the opposite. If the
conclusion is taken by itself, the proposition is contingent; to
deny that a necessary being exists, as we have argued above,
is not self-contradictory. Rather, what is contradicted by its
opposite is a set of conditions or premises, viz. the premises of
the cosmological argument. Thus, the necessity which belongs
to it does so because it is the conclusion of a valid argument; it
follows necessarily from its premises.
Thus, the necessity involved in the cosmological argument
is not logical necessity, but what we have called conditional
necessity. The conclusion is necessitated by the premises or
conditions. Or put another way, the existence of a necessary
being is necessitated by the existence of contingent beings; if
there are contingent beings, then a necessary being is required
in order to explain their existence.
The Conclusion Is Not Self-contradictory

This conclusion has one very important consequence. It
has been a standard criticism of the cosmological argument that
the proposition "God exists," if it is necessary, is self-contra-
dictory. "The demand that the existence of God should be
logically necessary is thus a self-contradictory one."12 The argu-
ment which forms the core of this criticism is simply this. A
logically necessary proposition is one whose opposite is self-
contradictory. Hence, it could not conceivably be other than it
is. However, the opposite of an informative or existential proposi-
tion is conceivable; that which we can conceive to exist we can
likewise, without contradiction, conceive to be nonexistent. Con-
sequently, we are affirming two diametrically opposed elements
of the proposition simultaneously; we are saying that the op-
posite of the proposition is both impossible and possible at the
same time. Consequently, "God necessarily exists" is self-con-
tradictory. As such, the cosmological argument is suspect, for it
concludes to a self-contradictory proposition.
However, this criticism is predicated upon the supposition
that it is logical necessity which is involved in the conclusion of
the argument. But such, as we have argued, is not the case.
The conclusion is conditionally, not logically, necessary. And
once we properly distinguish the type of necessity involved, it
is clear that no such contradiction, as Smart and Findlay have
visualized, is present. As a logically contingent, conditionally
necessary proposition, the opposite of the conclusion of the cos-
mological argument does not lead to self-contradiction. The
opposite of the proposition, far from being impossible, is per-
fectly possible; "a necessary being does not exist" is not self-
contradictory. The proposition is necessary, but only in the sense
that it follows necessarily from certain premises. In other words,
since there exist contingent beings, there must exist a necessary
being. Consequently, Smart's claim that the conclusion is self-
contradictory is void, for there is no claim made that the opposite
of the conclusion is inconceivable, only that it contradicts a cer-
tain given set of premises, e.g. that there exist contingent beings.
"NECESSARY" AS PREDICATED OF BEINGS

There remain two more issues which must be dealt with
when we consider the necessity which belongs to the divine
being. Thus far, in explicating the type of necessity involved in
the cosmological argument, we have contended that with re-
spect to NEC 2 this is conditional, not logical, necessity. But
what of NEC 1? Can we properly predicate "necessary" of be-
ings? Is not "necessary" a vacuous term when applied to be-
ings? And perhaps a bit more difficult, what of the necessity
involved here?
In recent years it has been claimed that "necessary" can
only be predicated of propositions and not of beings. " 'Neces-
sary' is a predicate of propositions, not of things." 13 That is,
when "necessary" is applied to beings, it is a completely vacuous
term. But as Penelhum notes, "It is pedantic of philosophers to
insist that these words ["necessary" and "contingent"] only apply
to propositions and not to things."14 Moreover, as I hope now
to show, not only is such a claim pedantic, but it is false. "Neces-
sary," far from being a vacuous term, can be given a definite
meaning when applied to beings.
What, then, does it mean for something to be a necessary
being? What does it mean for a being to be such that, if it
exists, it cannot not exist? First of all, it means that on one hand,
this being can never come or be brought into existence. If it
does not now exist, it never will exist, for it can in no way come
into existence. If it does now exist, it has always been in ex-
istence; there has been no time prior to which it did not exist.
On the other hand, it means that this being can never cease to
exist. If it does not now exist, it never has existed, for otherwise
it would have had to pass out of existence at some prior time.
If it does now exist, then it can never be annihilated; it will
never pass out of existence. In short, to be a necessary being
means that if it does not exist now it never has been and never
will be; but if it does exist now, it always has been and ever
will be: it is eternal.
Secondly, this being, as an existing necessary being, must
be self-sufficient and self-sustaining. It must be capable of
eternally maintaining its own existence. Thus, it provides the
sufficient reason for its own existence; the reason why a neces-
sary being exists cannot be sought in the causal activity of any
other being. And finally, this being must be independent of all
other beings. Neither its characteristics nor its existence can be
derived from any other being.
In summary, to be a necessary being means that one is an
eternally existing being, self-sufficient, and independent of all
other beings. In short, it is "virtually equivalent to aseity or
self-existence."15 Thus, far from being a vacuous term when
applied to beings, "necessary" has a very definite and important
meaning.
With reference to the second issue, it may be asked, as
16
Alvin Plantinga recently does, What is meant here by "can-
not" when we define the word "necessary," when applied to be-
ings, as meaning that if the being exists, it cannot not exist?
What type of impossibility is involved in this case? Obviously
we do not want to say that it is a logical impossibility. If it
were thus, we would have to say that we have a being with
the characteristic such that it is logically impossible that it not
exist. But if this were the case, then we would no longer need
the cosmological argument to prove this being's existence; we
could readily discover that it must exist merely from an analysis
of the subject term. That is, if the "cannot" involved here were
a logical impossibility, we would simply have the ontological
argument, couched in a clever but unnecessary disguise. But
such is completely contrary to the claim of the cosmological ar-
gument. As we have argued above, the very role of the argument
is to prove the existence of a being whose existence is not self-
evident. Thus, it would be contrary to the very nature of the cos-
mological argument to interpret the necessity in "necessary be-
ing" as being logical necessity.
Moreover, not only is it the case that we do not want to say
that it is logical necessity which is involved because such is
contrary to the tenor of the cosmological argument; it is also
the case that we cannot claim that it is logical necessity which
is involved. It should be remembered from our discussion above
of logical necessity that those propositions which are logically
necessary are determined to be such independently of the states
of affairs in the world. The self-contradiction of their opposites
is determined simply by an analysis of the meanings of the
terms involved in the statement. Since their opposites are to be
determined to be self-contradictory in this manner, they are at
heart tautologies. The opposite of a necessary proposition must
be of the form A is non-A. If its opposite is of this form, then
a necessary proposition must be of the form A is A. That is, a
logically necessary proposition must be a tautology. But if they
are tautologous, they are completely uninformative. They can-
not be "confirmed or refuted by any fact of experience."17 They
are devoid of any factual content, and consequently say
nothing whatsoever about the world.18 Thus, logically necessary
propositions are by nature uninformative about the world; they
are neither applicable to nor derived from i t Their role is to
"enlighten us by illustrating how we use certain symbols . . . to
call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise
not be conscious."19
But the necessity with which we are concerned here is a
necessity which does have to do with the real world. It is a
necessity predicated of beings, not of symbols. It is a necessity
projected into the real world, not a necessity resulting simply
from conventional definitions. Moreover, it is also informative
about these existents; it presents us with a determinate charac-
teristic of these beings. Hence, the necessity involved in NEC 1
cannot be logical necessity, for it is a necessity to be found in
the real world, not in virtue of our language about the world.
On the other hand, neither can it be what Plantinga desig-
nates as a causal impossibility. "A causally necessary being would
be one (presumably) whose existence was entailed by causal
laws, or the laws of nature (but not by just any statement)." 20
But by definition this being is uncaused; it neither causes itself
nor is caused by another. Hence causal impossibility must like-
wise be ruled out.
Rather, the impossibility or necessity involved in NEC 1 is
a natural or real impossibility or necessity. That is to say, the
necessity follows from the very nature of the existent. It is of
God's very essence that if he exists, he cannot not exist. It is
of God's very nature that he is not dependent on any other
being, that he cannot be brought into existence nor made to
cease to exist. These characteristics (which are those of NEC 1)
derive from the very nature, the very being, of the divine being.
Therefore, the necessity is more than the result of mere verbal
convention. God was a necessary being prior to and independent
of any human verbalization of such. Thus, the necessity involved
in NEC 1 is not logical or causal necessity, but real necessity.21
CONCLUSION
We have, then, the answer to the questions which we posed
at the outset of this chapter. First of all, the proposition "a neces-
sary being exists" is not equivalent to "a being necessarily
exists." The necessity predicated of beings is different from
that predicated of propositions; these two different uses
must not be confused. Secondly, we have contended that there
is more than one kind of necessity. We have isolated at least
three kinds of necessity: that predicated of beings, logical ne-
cessity predicated of propositions, and conditional necessity pre-
dicated of propositions. Finally, it is not the case that the
necessity which is involved in the cosmological argument is
logical necessity. In particular, the cosmological argument does
not contend for a being whose existence is logically necessary.
Rather, it contends for the logically contingent, conditionally
necessary existence of a necessary being, a being which, if it
exists, cannot not exist. It concludes to a conditionally neces-
sary proposition about a necessary being, a being which is in-
dependent of all other beings, which can neither be caused to
exist nor cease to exist. And as such, the argument avoids the
contemporary criticism that its conclusion is self-contradictory.
Such a criticism is based on the mistaken assumption that the
necessity involved in the conclusion of the argument is of only
one kind, and that is logical necessity.
NOTES
1. J. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God." In Antony Flew and
Alasdair Maeintyre (Eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New
York, Macmillan, 1955), p. 38.
2. C. B. Martin, Religious Belief (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University
Press, 1959), p. 151.
3. Paul Edwards, A Modern Introduction to Philosophy (New York,
4. Smart, op. cit., p. 39. See also Edwards, op. cit., "To talk about
anything 'existing necessarily' is . . . about as sensible as to talk about
round squares."
5. J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" In New
Essays in Philosophical Theology, (see note 1), p. 52.
6. They are obviously in good company. See Immanuel Kant, Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, A585, 587, 588, 606.
Also Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the
Existence of God." In John Hick (Ed.), The Existence of God (New York,
7. Smart, op. cit., p. 38.
8. Terence Penelhum, "Divine Necessity" Mind, LXIX, No. 274
(April, 1960), pp. 180-181.
9. Findlay, op. cit., p. 52.
10. Smart, op cit., p. 38. See Penelhum, op. cit., p. 185, "A proposi-
tion is necessary if its truth can be known without reference to anything
other than a clear understanding of what is said or implied in it."
11. See Findlay, op cit., p. 54.
Also A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York, Dover Pub-
lications, 1946), pp. 22, 31, 73f.
12. Smart, op cit., p. 39.
13. Ibid., p. 38; Copleston and Russell, op. cit., p . 169.
14. Penelhum, op. cit., p. 185.
15. John Hick, Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Pren-
tice-Hall, 1963), p. 23. It should be made clear that I am not claiming that
this has been the historical position with respect to the meaning of "neces-
sary" as applied to beings. As Patterson Brown has shown in "St. Thomas's
Doctrine of Necessary Being," The Philosophical Review, LXXIII (January,
1964), this is certainly not Thomas's meaning. What I am claiming is that
this is a consistent and adequate analysis of "necessary" as applicable
to beings.
16. Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell
University Press, 1967), p. 22.
17. Ayer, op cit., p. 16.
18. Ibid., p. 79.
19. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
20. Plantinga, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
21. One should be careful not to confuse the real necessity predicated
of beings with that predicated of propositions (in Ch. 4 ) . A being is a
necessary being if it is such that if it exists, it cannot not exist. A
proposition is really necessary if its opposite is contradictory because it
denies or contradicts the very nature or essential structure of the world.
Chapter 7
IS THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

DEPENDENT UPON THE
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT?
UNDOUBTEDLY ONE of the most persistent criticisms of the
cosmological argument has been the contention that it depends
upon the ontological argument for its validity. For example,
note the recent statement of H. J. Paton:
So far the concept of God as an absolutely necessary being is en-
tirely vague and indeterminate. Something is supposed in some sense
to exist, but we are told nothing more about it except what it is not.
If we are to mean anything definite, we must make the negative con-
cept of a non-contingent or necessary being into a positive one. How
is this to be done?
The first step is to say that a necessary being is its own ground,
its own condition, its own cause. . . . We are invited to take yet a
further step. A necessary being is one whose non-existence is in-
conceivable — that is, it is one whose essence is the ground of its
existence.
These words have a familiar ring. We have been edged back
gradually to the old ontological argument, which we are now asked
to take for granted.
To sum up — the cosmological argument cannot prove the exist-

ence of God without the aid of the ontological argument, and this
may be the underlying reason why the ontological argument had to
be invented.1
The contention of those who hold to this objection is that
the cosmological argument by itself cannot yield any positive
results. Without the ontological argument we have no means of
positively identifying the being whose existence it is supposedly
attempting to prove. What we are given is at best "vague and
indeterminate." In order to clarify and make determinate the
123
being proven to exist, in order to "make the negative concept
of a non-contingent or necessary being into a positive one," the
concept of a most real being (ens realissimum) is introduced.
"Unless we can show that we possess such a concept—whether
it be the concept of a perfect being, a supreme being, or a most
real being—the whole cosmological argument must fail to prove
the existence of an absolutely necessary being in any positive
sense."2 Thus, since the cosmological argument must ultimately
appeal to the ontological argument, it is ultimately dependent
upon the ontological argument for its validity.
But this yields a curious conclusion. Paton writes, "If the
ontological argument is valid, the cosmological argument is
superfluous. If the ontological argument is invalid, the cosmo-
logical argument must be invalid too."3 Thus, seemingly, advo-
cates of the cosmological argument are impaled on the horns
of a dilemma: either the cosmological argument is superfluous
in that all that is necessary to prove the existence of the neces-
sary being is the ontological argument, or it is invalid in that
the ontological argument on which it is based is invalid. In
light of our argument in the first chapter, this is surely an un-
happy dilemma.
But is the cosmological argument dependent on the onto-
logical argument? Granted that it has been thought to be de-
pendent, why has it been thought to be such? What reason can
be given for such a claim? Paton's analysis is merely a summa-
tion of the fuller argument to which contemporary critics ap-
peal, i.e. Kant's argument as presented in the Critique of Pure
Reason. Let us turn to this traditional formulation as the locus
chssicus of the purported proof of dependence. What is said
with respect to Kant will, I think, apply equally to such con-
temporary critics as Paton.
KANT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT

According to Kant, the cosmological argument can be di-
vided into two parts, namely, that part which appeals to ex-
perience, and that in which pure reason alone is operative.4
And for him, it is this analysis which reveals to us the (objec-
tionable) fact that the cosmological proof is either dependent
Is Cosmological Argument Dependent Upon Ontological Agrument? 125
upon or reducible to the ontological proof. Let us see how he

develops this.
According to Kant, the cosmological argument, in its first
part, concludes that an absolutely necessary being exists. The
argument proceeds as follows: "If anything exists, an absolutely
necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore
an absolutely necessary being exists."5 Or stated in another way,
If we admit something as existing, no matter what this something

may be, we must also admit that there is something that exists
necessarily. . . . That there must be something that exists with abso-
lute necessity, is regarded as having been established by the first
step of the argument. 6
Thus, the first step proceeds from the fact that a contingent
being exists to the necessity that there exist an absolutely neces-
sary something.
But this something which necessarily exists is indeterminate;
the first part of the argument only leads us to "the concept of
absolute necessity, but is unable to demonstrate this necessity
as belonging to any determinate thing."7 That is to say, the first
part of the argument only yields the fact that something neces-
sarily exists; it concludes with the existence of some necessary
being, but the argument does not inform us as to exactly what
or who this being is. "What properties this being may have,"8
how many such beings there are, who the being is—all this the
argument fails to tell us. Indeed, Kant contends that the argu-
ment leaves open the possibility that this being might even be
a limited being. He writes as follows:
[Even granting the argument] it by no means follows that the con-
cept of a limited being which does not have the highest reality is
for that reason incompatible with absolute necessity. For although
I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is involved in
the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not justified in con-
cluding that its existence must for this reason be conditioned. . . .
On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that any limited beings
whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be un-
conditionally necessary. . . . Thus the argument has failed to give
us the least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and
indeed, is utterly ineffective.9
All that the first part concludes is that an indeterminate
something necessarily exists. Thus, a second part is required to
complete the argument, a part which provides us with a con-
cept by which we can know or recognize this necessary being.
In this stage, pure reason chooses from its warehouse of con-
cepts that one which is most suitable to and most compatible
with the concept of necessary existence. And the concept which it
finds to be most compatible is the concept of an ens realissimum.
"Now there is only one possible concept which determines a
thing completely a priori, namely, the concept of the ens real-
issimum. The concept of the ens realissimum is therefore the
only concept through which a necessary being can be thought."10
Thus reason, by its own workings, through its own con-
cepts, supplies us with the concept by which we can know that
which necessarily exists. It is reason alone, in the second part,
that determines which concept is most compatible with it. It
can appeal to nothing else to determine the possessor of ab-
solutely necessary existence.
Kant then raises his objection to the introduction of the
use of pure reason, for, to him, this means that we have sur-
reptitiously introduced the ontological argument in the second
part. Kant writes as follows:
But it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of
the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute
necessity of existence, that is, that the latter can be inferred from
the former. Now this is the proposition maintained by the ontologi-
cal proof; it is here being assumed in the cosmological proof; and
indeed, is made the basis of the proof. . . - 11
Kant's objection is that the cosmological argument is based on
the ontological argument, such that the validity of the former
is entirely dependent on that of the latter. The cosmological
proof intrinsically relies on the ontological argument for its
cogency.
However, Kant does not stop at this point, but even goes
further to say that the cosmological argument reduces to, is
nothing more than, the ontological proof.
Appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses. . . . In reality
the only witness is that which speaks in the name of pure reason;
in the endeavor to pass as a second witness it merely changes its
dress and voice. . . . Thus, the so-called cosmological proof really
owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof from
mere concepts. The appeal to experience is quite superfluous.12
This really boils down to saying that the cosmological argu-
ment is nothing more than the ontological argument in a new
dress. Though it appeals to experience, when we analyze it, it
is really arguing from a priori concepts all along. All that is
necessary to the cosmological argument is presented in the
second part, which argues from pure reason alone.
Moreover, since, according to Kant, the ontological proof
is invalid, so also is the cosmological proof which is based on
it. Thus if, as Kant claims, the cosmological argument is based
on or reducible to the ontological, and if the latter is invalid,
then the cosmological argument must be rejected as invalid, for
it yields no proof for the existence of any necessary being.
In dealing with this criticism there are two possible de-
fenses. On one hand we might attempt to defend the validity
of the ontological argument, and in this way rescue the cosmo-
logical. Or else, we might try to show that the cosmological
proof is in no way dependent on the ontological. It is the latter
which will be attempted here.
But how can we show that the cosmological proof is inde-
pendent of the ontological? To do such, it seems that we must
answer two questions. First, in what way does the cosmological
argument supposedly depend on the ontological argument? I
hope to show that Kant's claim of dependence cannot be sus-
tained, for the conclusion of the cosmological argument cannot
be converted into the principle of the ontological argument, as
he thought it could. The second question might be put, Why is
the cosmological proof thought to depend on the ontological?
Our answer to this will hopefully reveal both the basic mis-
conception on the part of Kant as to the nature of the cosmo-
logical argument and also his misconception as to the nature
of the necessity involved in it. Let us now consider these ques-
tions in this order.
How Does the Cosmological Argument Depend

on the Ontological Argument?
Kant claims that the cosmological proof intrinsically de-
pends upon the ontological proof for its validity. We might
formalize Kant's argument as follows:
Part One: 1. If anything exists, an absolutely necessary be-
ing exists.
2. I exist.
3. .'. An absolutely necessary being exists.
Part Two: 4. Every absolutely necessary being is the most
real being.
5. Some most real beings are absolutely neces-
sary beings.
6. All most real beings are completely (in all re-
spects) the same.
7. .'. All most real beings are absolutely neces-
sary beings.
8. .'. All most real beings exist.
or 8'. All most real beings necessarily exist.13
But, argues Kant, the inference in 8' is precisely the in-
ference made by the ontological argument. The ontological
argument contends that from the mere concept of the most
real being we can derive the fact that this being exists in reality.
The concept, and the concept alone, of this being is sufficient
to lead us to its necessary existence. But is this not the claim,
he asks, of the cosmological argument in 8'? He writes as follows:
But since this proposition is determined from its a priori concepts
alone, the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry with it
the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely what the
ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological proof has
refused to admit, although the conclusions of the latter are indeed
covertly based on it.14
Thus, Part Two concludes to the principle of the onto-
logical proof, such that the cosmological proof is dependent for
its validity on the ontological, for it is claiming that from the
concept of a most real being, we can arrive at its necessary
existence.
But is Kant correct in his claim that 8' is the thesis of the
ontological argument? Is the truth of 8' determined solely on
the basis of concepts? I think not, and for two reasons. First
of all, 8' is a conclusion which follows logically from two prior
conclusions, 3 and 7. Moreover, conclusion 3 is an existential
statement, stating that the necessary being exists in reality.
Hence, it is false to say that 8' is determined from its concepts
alone; rather, it is a conclusion from two prior conclusions, one
of which is an existential statement. Kant, it seems, has forgot-
ten that the first part of the argument has already proven that
a necessary (and hence by 7 a most real) being exists. Thus,
the ontological argument is not involved at all in the second
part, for the truth of 8' depends not on the argument from con-
cept to reality, but on the fact that the existence of the neces-
sary being has already been established, something the onto-
logical argument purports to do by itself, without any help from
previous proofs.
That 8' is not an "argument from concepts" can, I think, be
shown in a second way. The argument as formulated by Kant
concludes that all most real beings necessarily exist. What is
meant here by "necessarily"? Kant obviously interprets "neces-
sarily" here in the sense of logically necessary, for he writes,
"Absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere con-
cepts."15 And if it is determined from mere concepts, it must be
determined on the basis of the meanings of its terms and the
principles of logic. Thus, Kant seems to be contending that the
proposition which asserts the necessary existence of the most
real being is logically necessary; the denial of such is self-con-
tradictory. Moreover, this is also the claim of the ontological
argument. The ontological argument, he notes, seeks to move
from the absolute necessity of the judgment (logical necessity)
to the absolute necessity of things.16
But is this really the claim being made in 8'? I think not.
To begin with, the necessity predicated of "exists" in 8' is the
same as that found in 3. Just as we translated 8 into 8', so 3 can
be translated into 3': an absolutely necessary being necessarily
exists. In both cases, the necessity which modifies "exists" de-
rives from the "therefore" which modifies the entire proposi-
tion. Hence, both uses of "necessarily" are the same, such that
what we discover about the nature of "necessarily exists" in 3'
will likewise apply to 8'. Now to what, in 3', is this necessary
existence owed? It is owed, is it not, to the condition of the
existence of the "I" in 1: If I exist, then (necessarily so) we
know that an absolutely necessary being exists. The necessity
follows upon prior conditions. In other words, the necessity pred-
icated here of "exists" is conditional necessity, not logical neces-
sity; if something like myself exists, then a necessary being must
(necessarily) exist. And since the necessity predicated of "exists"
in 8' is the same, 8' likewise uses conditional necessity when it
claims that the most real being necessarily exists. Thus the cos-
mological argument is not claiming that the denial of 8' or 3' is
self-contradictory; rather it is saying that the opposite of these
propositions contradicts certain conditions. But if this is the
case, 8' is not the principle of the ontological argument, for this
argument claims that the denial of its conclusion about the ex-
istence of the ens realissimum is self-contradictory. Thus, 8' is
not moving from the necessity of the judgment to the absolute
necessity of existence. Whereas such a move involves logical
necessity, the move here involves only conditional necessity.
Hence, 8' is not the principle of the ontological argument, but is
logically derived from 3 and 7.
In sum, Kant's contention that the cosmological proof ex-
pressed in the above form has appealed ultimately to the onto-
logical proof cannot be sustained. The proof is not claiming in
8' to argue from concept to reality, but 8' is clearly derived
from 7 and 3, of which the latter proposition is a conditionally
necessary, existential statement.
Why Does the Cosmological Argument Depend

on the Ontological Argument?
Turning to the second query posed above, why is it that
the cosmological argument depends, or is thought to depend,
upon the ontological argument? Or put another way, why does
Part One of Kant's argument (which is the cosmological as-
pect) need Part Two (which is supposedly the ontological
aspect)? Why is not Part One sufficient in and of itself to
establish the conclusion of the cosmological argument? Kant's
answer to this has already been given, namely, that the cos-
mological proof needs the ontological proof in order to deter-
mine what being possesses the mode of absolutely necessary

existence. He writes as follows:
The appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with
the credentials of pure reason and the other with those of exper-
ience. . . . What properties this being may have, the empirical
premise cannot tell us. 1 7
That is to say, the cosmological proof depends on the ontological
proof (Part Two) in order to identify this being. And it does
this by informing us as to what positive properties it has. The
why question is answered, then, by stating that the cosmological
argument depends on the ontological in order to supply the
positive properties which this being has, so that we may deter-
mine who this absolutely necessary being is.
But in this regard Kant seems to have confused the cos-
mological argument itself with the further determinations by
means of reason of the nature of the being to which we have
argued. The cosmological argument proposes only to tell us
that a necessary being exists; what this being is like, what
characteristics or properties it has, these require additional con-
sideration beyond the concern of the argument proper.18 That
is, it is one thing to prove that something exists; it is quite an-
other to describe or characterize this existent. These additional
determinations extend beyond the scope of the cosmological
argument and as such have no bearing on the validity of the
argument.
The point here is simply that it is one thing to contend
for the existence of something; it is quite another to state what
that something is like. For example, in the argument, "If anything
eats, it exists; man eats; therefore man exists;" we are attempting
to prove that man exists. But whether man is tall or short, bald
or bearded, young or old, Negro or Caucasian, these character-
istics are all irrelevant to the validity of this argument for man's
existence. They may be interesting features of man, but they
cannot be considered to be an essential part of this particular
argument.
The case is similar with the cosmological argument. Kant
puts the cosmological argument, "If anything exists, a necessary
being exists; I exist; therefore a necessary being exists." The
argument endeavors to establish that a necessary being exists.
But whether this necessary being be good or evil, omnipotent
or limited in power, infinite or finite, most real or not, may be
interesting but hardly relevant to the validity of the argument
itself. Thus, Kant's stated reason for why the second part of
the argument is necessary, i.e. that it is needed to tell us what
properties this being has, is based on a misconception as to the
nature of the cosmological argument. Kant has rightly noticed
that the first part of his stated cosmological argument proves
the existence of some necessary being, but this part is in no way
dependent for its validity on a second part.
It should be clear, of course, that we would not take ex-
ception to the a priori clarification and development of the
properties and characteristics of this being. Our objection is
not to Kant's second part as calling for the a priori elucidation
of the properties of this necessary being, but rather to the in-
clusion of this as essential to the cosmological argument and,
indeed, to making the validity of the argument depend on this
part. Further determination of the characteristics of this being
is extrinsic to the establishment of its existence, and not essen-
tial to it, as Kant thought.
However, Kant, I think, would reply that perhaps he ex-
pressed himself badly, that he is not attempting to state further
properties of this being, but simply attempting to discover
some one concept by which to identify the being whose existence
the first part has established, and that the first part does not
even supply this one determinate concept. Without such a de-
terminate concept, the conclusion of the cosmological argument
is merely the statement that something (I know not what) exists
necessarily. But this, since it fails to identify this being,
since it lacks any concept by which we might determine this
being, is simply useless information; it supplies us merely with
a "mode of existing" without informing us as to what being
possesses this mode of existence. But surely, Kant would con-
tinue, this is not the purpose of the cosmological argument! Its
purpose is to prove to us the existence of some particular being,
and to tell us who (or what) this particular being is—to identify
it. The conclusion of the argument is that some particular being
exists, not merely that there is some kind or mode of existence.
And if there exists a particular being, then the argument must
provide the concept by which we can identify it. Indeed, such
a determining or identifying concept must be integral to the
argument itself. But since the first part of the cosmological argu-
ment does not provide any such determining concept, we must
appeal to a second part, which happens to be convertible into
the principle of the ontological argument. Therefore, the cos-
mological argument, in order to achieve its goal, is intrinsically
dependent upon the ontological argument.
In order to deal with this objection, we must recall an
important distinction made in the last chapter. There we noted
that in the conclusion of the cosmological argument were two
different occurrences of "necessary." The one use of "necessary"
(NEC 1) was as a qualifier of beings: by saying that a being
is a necessary being, we are saying that if it exists, it cannot
not exist. The second was of "necessary" (NEC 2) was as a
modifier of propositions: to say that a proposition is necessary
is to say that to deny that proposition would involve a contra-
diction, either with the proposition itself or with some set of
conditions. Moreover, these two uses of "necessary" were seen
to be different, for to identify them would be to confuse predi-
cates which apply to beings with those which apply only to the
propositions made about such. Hence, these two uses should
be kept separate, and not be confused with each other.
But it is precisely such a confusion which lies at the
heart of Kant's contention that the first part needs the second
part. That Kant has made such a confusion of these two kinds
of necessity is borne out by the fact that, for Kant, the phrase
"absolutely necessary being" is equivalent to the phrase "neces-
sarily exists." Indeed, throughout this passage Kant uses these
phrases interchangeably. For example, Kant writes, "The con-
cept of the ens realissimum is therefore the only concept through
which a necessary being can be thought. In other words, a
supreme being necessarily exists."19 It is the identification of
these two phrases which makes him guilty of confusing char-
acteristics of beings with those of statements about such.
Moreover (and more important for our discussion), it is
this confusion which has prevented him from observing that the
cosmological argument does indeed identify this being in NEC 1.
The argument in its first part concludes that this existent is a
necessary being—a being which, if it exists, cannot not exist.
As such, the argument itself gives us a positive concept by which
we can identify this being as a particular being; it informs us that
this being possesses the essential characteristics which are the
opposite of those found in a contingent being.
In the last chapter we attempted to lay out what it meant
for a being to be a necessary being. First, we noted that, on
one hand, it meant that this being can never come or be brought
into existence. If it does not now exist, it never will exist; if it
does now exist, it always has been in existence. On the other
hand, it means that this being can never cease to exist. If it
does not now exist, it never has existed, for otherwise it would
have had to pass out of existence at some prior time. If it does
now exist, it can never be annihilated; it will never pass out of
existence. In short, it is eternal. Secondly, a necessary being
must be self-sufficient and self-sustaining; it provides the suffi-
cient reason for its own existence, as well as for that of other
beings. Hence, to be a necessary being is to be an eternally
existing being, self-sufficient, self-explanatory, and independent
of all other beings.
When we unpack the concept of necessity used here, we dis-
cover that the argument itself (in the first of Kant's two parts)
does indeed identify this being which necessarily exists. The con-
clusion is not that some indeterminate being necessarily exists,
or that we have merely a mode of existence called necessary
existence, but rather, that a necessary—a particular, deter-
minate—being necessarily exists. The first part itself identifies
this being; to say that this being is a necessary being is suffi-
cient to identify it. Therefore, the cosmological argument does
not need the ontological argument (Kant's second stage) to
provide the concept by which we determine who this being is.
Kant's claim to the contrary seems to rest on a failure to dis-
tinguish the necessity which is applicable to beings from that
which is applicable to propositions. In short, talk about or proofs
for the existence of the ens realissimum, ens perfectissimum, or
such like, are quite foreign to the cosmological argument.
Is Cosmological Argument Dependent Upon Ontological Agrumtint? 135
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to show that the traditional reasons
given by Kant to show that the cosmological proof is dependent
upon the ontological proof cannot be sustained. Those who con-
tend that the cosmological proof needs the ontological in
order to identify the being to which we have argued not only
fail to see that the characterization of this being lies outside
the realm of the proof per se, but due to a confusion of the
necessity which is characteristic of beings with that which
is applicable to statements and propositions, they also fail to
see that the cosmological argument does indeed, in and of
itself, provide a concept by which we can identify this being
which exists. Furthermore, the demonstration given by Kant
to show that the conclusion of the cosmological argument is
the principle of the ontological argument does not yield
the above result. It is not arguing from concept to necessary
existence in reality, but concludes to the realm of existence from
a prior premise which had already established such existence.
But the latter is not the ontological argument, for whereas this
argument claims to be able to prove the existence of a necessary
being without prior proof, the conclusion in 8' depends upon
such prior proof of existence. Hence, those who contend in this
fashion that the cosmological argument rests upon the ontological
argument seem badly mistaken.
NOTES
1. H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament (New York, Collier Books,
1955), pp. 202-203.
2. Ibid., p. 203.
3. Ibid., p. 203.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans, by Norman Kemp
Smith (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965), A584, 585, 606. It is ob-
viously the first part — the appeal to experience — which sets the cosmo-
logical argument apart from the ontological argument. Whereas the latter
appeals solely to pure reason, the former "really begins with experience,
and is not wholly a priori or ontological" (A605).
5. Ibid., A604.
6. Ibid., A584, 585, See Paton, op. cit., pp. 196-199.
7. Ibid., A607. See Paton, op. cit., p. 202.
8. Ibid., A606.
9. Ibid., A588.
10. Ibid., A605.
11. Ibid., A607. See Paton, op. cit., p. 203.
12. Ibid., A606-607.
13. Ibid., A608.
14. Ibid., A608.
15. Ibid., A607.
16. Ibid., A593, 594.
17. Ibid., A606. This likewise seems to be the objection raised by
Paton (see note 1), p. 202.
18. Aquinas himself recognized this distinction. The cosmological ar-
guments presented in Question Two of the Summa Theologica intend to
establish that, for example, a first cause exists, but it is the task of the further
reasoning of Question Three and following, which are outside the domain
of the cosmological argument, to establish what properties this being has,
what characterizes it.
19. Ibid., A606. See also A585, 587, 588, 607. Also see Paton, op.
cit., p. 199.
Chapter 8
THE NECESSARY BEING AND GOD

yJ NE OBJECTION to the traditional formulations of the cosmo-
logical argument has been that they include an illicit move
from "there exists an unmoved mover" or "there exists a first
cause" to "there exists a God." Copleston writes as follows:
It might seem to be rather cavalier behaviour on St. Thomas's part to
assume that the unmoved mover or the first cause or the necessary
being is what we call God. Obviously if anything exists at all, there
must be a necessary Being . . . but it is not so obvious that the neces-
sary being must be the personal Being whom we call God. [Indeed]
does a purely philosophical argument give us a personal Being at all?
Did St. Thomas's belief in God lead him perhaps to find more in the
conclusion of the argument than was actually there? Because he was
looking for arguments to prove the existence of the God in whom he
believed, was he not perhaps over-hasty in identifying the first
mover, the first cause and the necessary being with the God of
Christianity and religious experience, the personal Being to whom
man can pray?1
Or as H. J. Paton states:
It seems that the cosmological argument, even if it can prove the
existence of something, cannot prove without the aid of further prem-
ises that this "something" is God. . . . It is hardly necessary to remind
ourselves that even if the cosmological argument were valid, it would
not be a proof of the existence of God.2
And more recently, William Alston states:
At the end of each of his arguments Aquinas appends a phrase like
"and this everyone understands to be God," or "This all men speak
of as God." The reader might well wonder about the basis for this,
especially in the first three arguments. Why should we suppose that
a necessary being, which requires no cause outside itself, would have
the personal attributes contained in the notion of God? Why should
a first cause not be an impersonal force of some sort, or, if a personal
being, why should it not be evil rather than good?3
137
Traditionally, then, it seems that a determination of the

identity of this being was deemed a part of the cosmological
argument. But on what basis can one identify this being with
the divine? Must this necessary being be God? Cannot it be
the world or the material universe? Or, on the other side of
the ledger, need the argument make such an identification of
the necessary being in order to be valid? Is the criticism of
the move from "there exists a necessary being" to "there exists
a God" really an attack against the cosmological argument itself?
The answers to these questions will occupy our attention in
this final chapter.
THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE AND THE NECESSARY BEING

It has been the contention of some philosophers that one
need not make the move from the necessary being to God at
all. The identity of this being can be determined without having
to invoke the existence of a being (such as a personal deity)
which exists transcendent to sense experience. Rather, the neces-
sary being is the universe itself. Wallace Matson writes:
The world itself might be the necessary being after all: infinite in
power and maximal in goodness, but neither containing nor presup-
posing any personal intelligence. . . . The world might be conceived
of as having (nontemporally) actualized itself — more simply, as
having just always been here, so to speak, automatically. It is hard
to see why the argument should not lead to this conclusion just as
well as to the orthodox one. 4
The same point was made several centuries ago by David Hume:
"Why may not the material universe be the necessarily existing
being, according to this pretended explication of necessity?"5
Those who argue in this fashion are making two points.
First, they are claiming that as the cosmological argument
stands it cannot validly conclude that this necessary being is
God. In order to make such a move legitimately, the argument
must be further supplemented. Matson, for example, goes on
to suggest that the cosmological argument should be supple-
mented by the argument from design. With this general con-
tention I agree; in light of the premises of the argument, to
The Necessary Being And God 139
move from the necessary being to a personal deity requires
additional argumentation. We shall say more on this later.
Secondly, and more importantly, they are contending that
one need not conclude that the necessary being in S6 is divine
at all. Indeed, it is quite conceivable (or even evident) that
this necessary being can be identified with the world or material
universe. We need not conclude to a personal divinity, intro-
duced from a religious sphere external to the argument; the
world itself could be the necessary being, as that which "non-
temporally actualized itself."
But is the world or material universe a proper candidate
for the position of necessary being? I think not. The totaHty or
world or universe is nothing over and above the sum total of
its constituents. But all its constituents are contingent beings;
what exists in the universe could conceivably not exist. Now if
the components, as contingent, could conceivably not exist, then
the totality or world which they compose could likewise con-
ceivably not exist, for if all the constituents ceased to exist at
the same time (which is possible), the totaHty of which they
constitute the parts would likewise cease to exist. And if the
whole which now exists can conceivably not be, it is contingent.
Thus, contrary to what Matson claims, the world cannot be the
necessary being for which we argue, for if it were, it would
possess contradictory properties: it would be necessary because
it is the necessary being to which the cosmological proof argues,
and it would be contingent because it is the totality of con-
tingent beings.
Matson responds to this by noting that it is meaningless
to apply the notion of "cause" to the totality of contingent be-
ings. That which is contingent is caused; but causation can
only meaningfully take place within the context of a totaHty.
"The universe is the framework within which causal explana-
tions operate. . . . It is quite beyond their scope to link the uni-
verse to anything [beyond itself]. To ask for the cause of the
universe is to ask a question similar to 'When is time?' or 'Where
is space?'" 6 Consequently, to inquire about the cause of this
totaHty is to move outside the framework within which the
question of causation can be meaningfully asked. As such, the
contention that the totality is contingent and caused is meaning-
less.
Since we have attempted to answer this objection in detail
in Chapter 5, a summation of our contention there will suffice
at this point. Though it be granted that causation can take
place only within a totaHty, there is no reason to restrict the
notion of "totality" simply to the totality of contingent beings.
There are many kinds of totalities, some of which are relevant
to the problem before us. There can be, for example, a totality
of all existent beings or a totality of all things which are causes.
That is, the notion of "totaHty" can be satisfied in the inclusion
of all contingent and necessary beings in the whole, and it
is within this resulting totality of existents that we can mean-
ingfully inquire concerning the contingency or causation of
the totaHty of contingent beings. Thus, far from being meanr
ingless, the question of the contingency or causation of the
totaHty of contingent beings can be asked within a meaningful
framework. Just as we can ask for the cause of the totaHty of
tulips within the totaHty of the world, we can ask for the cause
of the totaHty of contingent beings within the totality of ex-
istents or totaHty of causes.
Thus, it seems that we cannot identify the world or ma-
terial universe with the necessary being, for the world itself is
contingent and requires an explanation or cause for its existence.
IDENTIFICATION IS EXTRINSIC TO THE ARGUMENT

What about the move from the necessary being to God?
Is not such a move Hkewise unjustified from the premises in
the argument? And does not such a move cast doubt upon the
vaHdity of the whole argument? To answer this, we must deter-
mine whether the move from a necessary being to God is essen-
tial at all to the validity of the cosmological argument. Is such a
move essential, such that the questioning of such an identifica-
tion throws in doubt the validity of the entire argument?
That such a move was part of the traditional formulation
by St. Thomas Aquinas has already been pointed out above.
But though he did identify this being as God, he recognized
that the argument to prove the existence of a necessary being
must be kept distinct from the analysis of its essence. He writes,
"When the existence of a thing has been ascertained, there re-
mains the further question of the manner of its existence, in
order that we may know its essence."7 The distinct purpose of
his cosmological arguments in Question Two was to show that
this being exists. The determination of who this necessary being
is and what it is like was the concern of the questions which
followed after St. Thomas' arguments to show that this being
exists. Thus, though he did perhaps commit himself too early in
his Five Ways to an identification of this heing with God, St.
Thomas himself seemed to recognize a distinction between the
argument which endeavors to prove the existence of some be-
ing, and the arguments which seek to determine who this being
is through a determination of the essence or further properties
of this being.
Likewise, nowhere in the argument we developed in Chap-
ter 1 did we make such an identification nor did we need to
do so. The argument is perfectly valid and quite complete with-
out it. Just as it is one thing to prove something's existence and
quite another to determine its properties (as we noted in Chap-
ter 7), so it is one thing to prove a necessary being exists and
another to identify this being with the being called God, or to
further research what other names, derived from other spheres
of experience like the religious sphere, are appropriate to it. Such
research commences subsequent to the argument for existence.
Thus, since the cosmological argument, as I see it, does not need
to further determine who this being is which we have proven
to exist, further identification (beyond the fact that it is a
necessary being) is extrinsic to the validity of the argument.
Consequently, though the traditional move from the necessary
being to God is without justification from the argument itself,
such should not be construed as a criticism of the argument per
se, for identification is not really part of it.
SOME PROGRAMMATIC SUGGESTIONS

Granted that the identification of this being is extrinsic to
the cosmological argument per se, still the question remains, Is
this necessary being God? Can this being be identified with a
personal deity? What is this being like which we have shown
to necessarily exist? Who is this necessary being?
Though such a question, as we have shown, is not an in-
trinsic part of the cosmological argument, some programmatic
suggestions toward the identification of such a being might still
be in order. Three steps are necessary in order to discover
whether the necessary being is to be identified with God. First
of all, the characteristics of this necessary being must be de-
termined. From what we have already said in other chapters
about this being, some of these characteristics can be noted. The
being which exists is a necessary being, a being which is such
that if it exists, it cannot not exist. That is, it can neither be
brought into existence nor pass out of existence. It is eternal.
Moreover, as a non-contingent being it partakes of those essen-
tial qualities which are the opposite of those of a contingent
being. That is, it is uncaused and independent of all else (a se).
And since it is not dependent on anything else, it cannot be
limited by another being. Hence, it must be a non-finite being.
Finally, from the cosmological argument itself we can see that
it must be the sufficient reason not only for the existence of all
contingent beings, but also for its own existence. As such, it
must be self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Accordingly, by means
of reason alone, we can discover some of the characteristics of
this necessary being: it is independent of all beings, not finite,
self-sufficient, self-sustaining, the uncaused cause of all contin-
gent beings, and eternal. Perhaps other characteristics can be
determined in this manner.
The second step of the programme will involve the deter-
mination of what God is hke. As with the necessary being, it
must be determined what properties and characteristics can be
meaningfully predicated of God. Some attributes have been
accorded prominence in traditional theology. According to the
Nicene Creed, God is one God, the "Maker of heaven and
earth." He is both the creator and sustainer of the universe;
by the Word of God all things came to be and continue to exist,
for in Him we "live and move and have our being." This act
of creation was a free act on His part; there was no necessity
that He create the world. Thus, the world is dependent on Him,
but He is independent of it. He is self-sufficient, needing no
other being in order to act, and self-sustaining, needing no other
being in order to exist. Likewise He is non-finite in His being,
for He cannot be limited by any other being.
Another important attribute is His eternality. God was be-
fore the foundation of the worlds; He is the great "I am," the
eternally present now. God never came into existence, nor will
He ever pass out of existence. Finally, He is personal and good;
He is the personal Deity which is the very source and stan-
dard for goodness in the world. Thus, God may be partially
characterized as independent of all things, self-sufficient and
self-sustaining, non-finite, the uncaused cause and sustainer of
the universe, personal and good. These attributes are by no
means exhaustive, but they do embody some of the more im-
portant concepts predicated of God. Further analysis of the
attributes of God will constitute the task of the second stage.
The third and final phase involves the method of correla-
tion. If the characteristics of the necessary being correlate with
those of the Deity, and if none of the Deity's characteristics
conflict with those of the necessary being, then the probability
that they are one and same being has been established. From
the above it is obvious that many of the characteristics do in-
deed correlate. Further analysis is necessary to discover other
correlations, and to see whether there are any conflicts. This
analysis or correlation constitutes the third phase of the pro-
gramme.
That the identification between the necessary being and
God is possible can be seen from the correlation of the attributes
of these two beings. Indeed, that there is such an identification
has been the conclusion of most philosophers who have engaged
in philosophical theology. Witness the general heading under
which the arguments fall: proofs for the existence of God.
However, we must remind ourselves that such a programme,
such an identification, extends beyond the boundaries of the
cosmological argument proper. This method of correlation is a
programme which commences after we have shown that a
necessary being necessarily exists if we are to adequately account
for the existence of a contingent being.
ARGUMENT AND BELIEF
One final question remains: What is the relationship of
the cosmological argument to religious belief? Must one who
sees the logic of the argument become a committed theist? The
answer I believe is twofold. First, if the cosmological argument,
as presented above, is a true and valid argument, and if the
above programmatic suggestions can be successfully carried out
such that the necessary being can be identified with God, then
certainly an important religious dogma has been rationally es-
tablished. That is, it has then been shown that there are good
reasons for believing in the existence of a divine being, that such
a belief is most rational and reasonable. Tc^ believe in God is
not to commit intellectual suicide.
Secondly, however, it is quite possible that someone could
see the validity of the argument and see the validity of identi-
fication of this being with God, and yet not believe in or commit
himself to this Deity. It is not to be expected that an argument
to prove the existence of a being should at the same time pro-
duce in the hearer a desire to trust himself to this being.
This is, of course, a statement about the relationship be-
tween reason and faith, between argument and commitment.
For most individuals it is one thing to rationally acknowledge
the truth of an argument or the truth of a statement, but it is
quite another to incorporate this rational conclusion as an in-
tegral part of their life style. This is not to say that such would
not be the ideal; most certainly it would. From an ideal stand-
point, the establishment of the rational probability or improb-
ability of something should result in an act of commitment or
rejection on the part of those who agree with the rational con-
clusion. Likewise, beliefs should be based upon reason and
fact, such that beliefs could be evaluated as rational or irrational.
It is to say, however, something about the psychology of belief,
i.e. that individuals by and large are not converted by rational
argument, but out of deep, existential realization of their plight.
To Kierkegaard and his twentieth century followers, this
must appear most paradoxical. On one hand, I am affirming
the Kierkegaardian position that faith is not an act of reason
but an act of commitment and that despair—the wanting to die
and inability to do so—leads or can lead to this faith. The leap
of faith, the act of personal commitment, the ultimate risk,
follows upon the recognition of the state of despair. To speak
of plights—dread, anxiety, despair, melancholy—and the result-
ing movement from this into the religious stage is welcome to
their ears. But to likewise affirm that this faith ideally should
be reasonable is the clashing of Hegelian cymbals, the treading
again of the muddy, wellworn path to "the system." They assert
that the truth on the human level is to be found in the inward-
ness and passion with which a doctrine is held. As passionate
believing and passionate grasping, the inwardness of the ulti-
mate choice and decision thrives not on rational synthesis, but
on absolute paradox; the greater the paradox, the greater the
inwardness called for. Faith is not believing the rational; it is
appropriating the irrational, the contradictory. Faith as rational
is impossible.
Beyond the suggestion that "rational faith" might provide
a more ultimate paradox for the Kierkegaardian to grasp hold
of, I want to affirm that faith and reason are not such strange
bedfellows as one might be led to believe. Indeed, they are
related as cultivator and harvester. Reason plows the furrows,
cutting the ground, separating what is to be separated, planting
seeds of ideas, putting back together what belongs as such. It
prepares the bed by breaking the clods of rational doubt. But
its work is in vain if the grain does not grow and is not reaped,
if it is not cut and bound and used. Without fruit, without ac-
tion, it is simply a mental charade; it is to plant the field without
concern for harvest. Reason should prepare the way for faith;
faith as commitment should either grow out of reason or be
based upon rational conclusions such that faith can be con-
ceived to be either rational or irrational.
Kierkegaard was correct when he saw that faith was a
matter of the heart, an act of commitment and inwardness rather
than an act of reason (of the rational faculty). But he failed to
see that faith, insofar as it is or is not based upon reason, can
be either a rational act or an irrational act. Commitment to the
improbable, absurd, or irrational is faith, it is true, but irrational
faith. It is as if the explorer would cast aside the compass and
chart with the assertion, "It is the movement, not the direction,
that counts." Faith becomes a meaningful act when good reasons
can be given for the action, when exploration is guided by
compass.
Kierkegaard was, of course, describing human existence,
seeing man as he acted and made decisions. Here Kierkegaard
is on solid ground. It must be granted that most humans make
decisions of commitment on grounds other than rational. The
politician sways the crowd not by reason, but by emotion. The
"sawdust trail" evangelist stirs his audience by passion or fear,
not by rational debate. The communications media rarely give
arguments in their advertisements or commercials; music, humor,
and beautiful, sexy women convey the message. But again, to
say that this is the way we normally do make decisions is not
to say that this is the way decisions ought to be made. Nor is it
to say that, ultimately, good reasons should not be given for the
decision or action. Reason might not psychologically precipitate
the action, but it should provide a basis for an analysis of that
commitment.
But is not this admission concerning the common human
decision-making process fatal to our argument? If Kierkegard
was correct in his analysis of the usual decision-making process,
is then our argument without value, despite all our talk about
"the ideal way" to make decisions? I think not. Granted that
it is highly unlikely that the above argument will convert the
atheist to theism or convince the agnostic to adopt religious be-
lief in God; yet perhaps it will answer or cast light on some of
the pressing questions of reason which surround the debate about
the reasonableness of a belief in God. With questions of reason
aside, the ground has been prepared for the planting of reasoned
belief.
NOTES
1. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Garden City, N. Y.,
Doubleday, 1962), Vol. 2, Ft. II, pp. 61-62.
2. H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament (New York, Collier Books,
1962), pp. 194, 203.
3. William P. Alston, Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought (New
York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 20.
4. Wallace I. Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell
University Press, 1965), pp. 75-76.
5. Charles W. Hendel, Jr. (Ed.), Dialogues Concerning Natural Reli-
gion, Hume Selections (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 355.
6. Matson, op. cit., p. 83.
7. Thomas Aqyinas, Summa Theologica, Vol. I, Q. 2, Art. 3.
•
INDEX
A D
Accident, 9, 61-63 Distinguishable, 56-60
Accidently related, 21-22, 88 Duns Scotus, 21-22, 95-97
Alston, William, 23-24, 47, 137
Analytic proposition, 73-83, 86 E
A priori Edwards, Paul, 107
analysis, 8, 126-128, 132 Ens realissimum, 8, 124, 126, 128-
concepts, 85, 87 130, 133-134
propositions, 74-79 Epistemological conditions, 59-60
Aquinas, S t Thomas, 3-5, 20-21, 95- Essentialism, 88
97, 136-137, 140-141 Eternal, 110, 118, 134, 142-143
Aristotle, 3, 11, 21, 40, 66 Existentialism, 70
Ayer, A. J., 73-81, 92
F
B Faith (and reason), 144-146
Fallacy of composition, 99-103
Braithwaite, Richard B., 34-38
Findlay, J. N., 108, 113, 117
Brown, Patterson, 16
Flew, Antony, vii
c G
Camus, Albert, 52, 70-71 Gilkey, Langdon, 52
Categories (Kantian), 85-86 God, 52, 87, 107-108, 116-117, 123,
Causal 137-146
efficacy, 26-27, 40-46
impression, 46-47 H
laws, see Covering law Hanson, Norwood Russell, 79
principle, 8-9, 51-71, 73-74, 79, Hume, David, 3, 25-46, 5 1 , 53, 56-60,
85-87, 91 138
Cause, 5, 8-67, 73, 94-106, 110, 120,
139-140, 142-143 I
Constant conjunction, 25, 27-28, 32-
38, 4 1 , 47 Impression, 25, 27, 42, 45-47, 57-60
Contingent, 5-7, 20, 63, 99, 102-107, Inductive generalization, 34-35, 38, 50
117 Infinite series, 10-11, 16-18, 20-21,
beings, 5-13, 16-20, 23-24, 51-56, 95-98
61-63, 67-68, 73, 94-99, 102-
110, 116-117, 139-140 K
Conventionalism, 76-77 Kant, Immanuel, 3, 71, 78, 85-87,
Copleston, Frederick, 65, 94-97, 104, 124-135
137 Kierkegaard, S0ren, 144-146
Covering law, 33-39, 47-48 Kinetic energy, 40
149
L sufficient reason, see Sufficient rea-

son, principle of
Lewis, C. I., 76
Locke, John, 40 Production (causation a s ) , 26, 39-48
Lucretius, 89
Q
M Quine, W. V., 88
Maclntyre, Alasdair, vii
Malcolm, Norman, vii, 83-84 R
Martin, C. B., 107
Reason (and faith), 144-146
Matson, Wallace, 138-139
Reasons (and causes), 53-55
Mention (and use), 81-84, 91
Russell, Bertrand, 34, 65, 94-99, 103-
Method of correlation, 143
106
Michotte, Albert, 44-46
S
N
Separable, 56-60
Necessary Simultaneity, 11-15, 28-32, 35
being, 18-20, 51, 95, 98, 105, 107- Smart, J. J. C , 73, 107-109, 112,
112, 116-135, 137-144 114, 117
conditions, 15, 17, 23, 25, 28-32, Sufficient
39, 4 1 , 47-49, 51, 53-55, conditions, 15, 17, 23-25, 32-33,
68, 74, 87 35-36, 39, 4 1 , 47-48, 51-55,
connection, 26-27 68, 74-75, 87
propositions, 73-91, 107-122, 129- reason, 10-11, 13, 16-20, 52-55,
130, 133, 135 68, 94-98, 105, 134, 142
truth, 56, 65, 100-103 principle of, 52-56, 67-71
Necessity Synthetic
conditional, 114-117, 121, 130 apriori, 77-79, 85-86
logical, 6 1 , 73-74, 87-88, 9 1 , 107- propositions, 73, 75, 77-79
109, 112-121, 129-130
real, 6 1 , 81, 87-91, 120-122 T
Nicene Creed, 142
Tautology, 75-76, 79-80, 113, 119
Taylor, Richard, 30-31, 41, 69
o Temporal priority, 11-12, 25, 27-32,
Ontological 35, 41
argument, vii, 8, 112, 119, 123-135 Toulmin, Stephen, 34
conditions, 59-60 Transitive series, 13-16, 31-32
Owens, Joseph, 62
u
P - '- ' Universe, 138-140
Pap, Arthur, 83
Paton, H. J., 123-124, 137 V
Penelhum, Terrence, 112, 118
Veatch, Henry, 82
Perception, 42-46, 94, 98
Plantinga, Alvin, 119-120
Principle of
w
causation, see Causal principle Wisdom, John, 81

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THE

BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Ph.D.

This book is protected by copyright. No

© 1972 by CHARLES C T H O M A S • PUBLISHER

With T H O M A S BOOKS careful attention is given to all details of

Printed in the United States of America

The era is past when all metaphysical statements or argu-

A HOUGH THERE BE one author of a book, the ideas contained

3. T H E PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION AND SUFFICIENT REASON . . . . 51

4. CAN PROPOSITIONS BE INFORMATIVE AND NECESSARY

5. CAUSATION AND T H E TOTALITY OF C O N T I N G E N T B E I N G S 94

T w o Occurrences of "Necessary" 109

8. T H E NECESSARY BEING AND G O D 137

T h e Material Universe and the Necessary Being 138

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT is an ancient and venerable

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AS AN

a is deferred indefinitely. Consequently, this type of series can

Consequently, when we consider the entire infinite series as a

We have here what appears, at least initially, to be a true

CAUSATION AS CONSTANT CONJUNCTION

Critique of the Condition of Temporal Priority

Taylor and Hume are right, of course, in recognizing that

Critique of the Condition of Constant Conjunction

CAUSATION AS A COVERING LAW

the view that causation can be analyzed in no other terms than

Hume's Critique and Reply

All ideas are derived from, and represent impressions. We never

And since we cannot have any idea of power or causal efficacy,

merely disconnected lines; rather we perceive the total gestalt

Hence, the presupposition which lies behind Hume's con-

Thus, the phenomenal perception of causation is in terms of a

THE CAUSE AS THE NECESSARY

Before we conclude this chapter, two final points should

THE PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION

The cosmological argument also involves a second prin-

The cosmological argument, in claiming that only a necessary

Modern thought, at least in some quarters, affirms the absurdity

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPLES

HUME'S CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE

We might formalize Hume's argument in the following

Hume's Confusion of Conditions

THE NECESSITY OF THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE

THE NECESSITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

In other words, the principle of sufficient reason is a basic, in-

72 The Cosmological Argument

CAN PROPOSITIONS BE INFORMATIVE

Confusing Use and Mention

necessarily (due to the nature of the world) is. The reduction

Ayer's statement here seems to imply that analytic (necessary)

THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI

In other words, the point is simply this: If P is what S is really and

This, of course, does not mean that the statement defining

necessary could be other than it now is if we are mistaken about

Application to the Causal Principle

CAUSATION AND THE TOTALITY

RUSSELL'S OBJECTION IS IRRELEVANT TO OUR

Note that in his argument Copleston is asking not merely for

THE TOTALITY OF CONTINGENT BEINGS

THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION

Application to the Cosmological Argument

A FRAMEWORK FOR "CAUSATION"

THE PROBLEM OF NECESSITY

JL HAT THE CONCLUSION of the cosmological argument involves