IN RE: MANZANO

A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC

05 October 1988

FACTS: Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos Norte was appointed
as a member of Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner
requested the Court to allow him to accept the appointment and to consider his membership in the
committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He also added that his membership in the said
Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge. Upon examination of EO 856
reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

“3.3 RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ANY APPREHENDING OFFICER, JAIL WARDEN, FINAL
OR JUDGE WHO MAY BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES IN THE DISCHARGE OF
HIS DUTIES AND REFER THE SAME TO PROPER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION;
3.5 RECOMMEND REVISION OF ANY LAW OR REGULATION WHICH IS BELIEVED
PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.”

ISSUE: WON the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee discharges
an administrative functions and will be in violation of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Considering that membership of Judge
Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice involves the exercise of administrative functions,
hence, it will be in violation of the Constitution. Petition is denied.
 ANGARA vs., ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L-45081
15 July 1936

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that
was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral
Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE: WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

RULING: NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll
the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The Electoral
Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial
in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon
the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Hence, the grant of power to the
Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES vs., POEA
G.R. NO. 76633
18 October 1988

FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The
widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on
Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses
for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers?

RULING: No. SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the
memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to
promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise
of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. It is true that
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The
reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too
many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by
“filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
 CASIBANG vs., AQUINO
G.R. NO. L-38025
20 August 1979

FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, Dante Casibang
who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3)
rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and
other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the
election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided
by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable
controversy. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two
months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same
was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on
January 17, 1973. The petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had
rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground
that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. The trial court dismissed the case because the issue has already been considered
political question.

ISSUE: WON the trial Court is correct in dismissing the case?

RULING: No. The trial court is not correct because it retains jurisdiction over the case. The SC ruled
that the case still remains a justiciable question because the new constitution did not categorically
divest the courts of its jurisdiction on pending election protest cases. While under the New
Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective
provincial and city officials, such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.

The SC held that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy.
No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent
President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the
respondent Judge decides the election protest. Thus, it is apparent at once that such power
committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by
whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever
will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever
change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government
code.
 TAÑADA vs., CUENCO
G.R. NO. L-10520
28 February 1957

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent senators
Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal, alleging that
the Committee on Rules for the Senate, and the Senate itself, in nominating then choosing the
respondents, respectively, had acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution. Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to
nominate two (2) more Senators.

ISSUE: WON the respondents are correct in arguing the the Court has no jurisdiction?

RULING: No. the SC said that it cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents. According
to the SC, this case is not an action against the Senate and it does not seek to compel the latter,
either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said
House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.

The SC also held that, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, it does not detract from
the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial
power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of
Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of
said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper
actions.

The Court is also called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias – a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate – on behalf of
its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen upon nomination of the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not
clothed with full discretionary authority in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon
the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. Whether an election of public officers has been
in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a
particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights. The court
does not only have jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue
raised by the parties herein.
 SANIDAD vs., COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-44684
12 October 1976

FACTS: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after,
the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
“barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD
No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued
PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition
to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which
will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September
27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot
take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: WON Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution?

RULING: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.
This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition. After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like
all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
 DAZA vs., SINGSON
G.R. NO. 86344
21 December 1989

FACTS: Cong. Daza, a member of the Liberal Party, was one of the representatives chosen to
represent the said party in the Commission of Appointments. When the party Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, it resulted to the swelling of its members to 159 and
thereby reducing the members of the LP to only 17. Because of this, the House of Representatives
revise its operation in the COA withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis Singson. Cong. Daza challenges
his removal alleging that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not
based on a permanent political realignment because LDP is not a duly registered political party and
has not yet attained political stability. Cong. Singson, on the other hand, contends that the question
raised was political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.

ISSUE: WON the issue raised is political in nature, thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Court?

RULING: The issue at bar does not involve the discretionary act of the HR that may not be reviewed
because it is political in nature. The issue involved here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act
of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the COA. Consequently, the issued presented is
justiciable rather than political, for it involves the manner of filling the COA as prescribed in the
Constitution (legality) and not the discretion of the HR in the choice of its representatives (wisdom).
Moreover, even if the question is political in nature, it would still come in the powers of the Sc to
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 8, Section 1 of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch on instrumentality of the government.
 GARCIA vs., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 101273
03 July 1992

FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be
taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides “All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” He contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: No. the EOs are constitutional. The SC said that under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course,
within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted
instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates
. . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized
the President to issue the said EOs.
 ARANETA vs., DINGLASAN
G.R. NO. L-2044
26 August 1949

FACTS: Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge
hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding
with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which
he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis. Three other cases were consolidated
with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192
which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him. L-3054 is filed
by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO
225. L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the
national elections. They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF
TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the
Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

RULING: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex
proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders
Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of
Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act,
the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.”
Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if
war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs,
otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
 Rodriguez vs., Gella
G.R. NO. L-6266
02 February 1953

FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then
National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were pursuant
to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared
inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

RULING: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating
from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of
the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war
contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must
be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote.
In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary
contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot
be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created
under the Act is coupled with interest.
 PEOPLE vs., VERA
G.R. NO. 45685
22 December 1937

FACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for
probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.

The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of
Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng
under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province,
and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer – hence, a
Manila court cannot grant probation. Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter
alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal
protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether
or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence,
that makes it violative of the equal protection clause. Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law
is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not
to apply the probation law – however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by
the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power to
grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the
issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation
law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces). For his part, one of the issues
raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of the
Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in
the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE: 1. WON the State question its own laws? 2. WON Act 4221 constitutional?

RULING: 1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using
an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken
on this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given
the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to
install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power. There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided
for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard
test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in
their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power. Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of
Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.
 US vs., ANG TANG HO
G.R. NO. L-17122
27 February 1922

FACTS: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act,
under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August
1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO
fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

RULING: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to
the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one
cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the
law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take
the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
 YNOT vs., IAC
G.R. NO. L-74457
20 March 1987

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.

ISSUE: WON the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to
the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
 TABLARIN vs., GUTIERREZ
G.R. NO. L-78164
31 July 1987

FACTS: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either
did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges
who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.

After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional?

RULING: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical
Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical
Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The
petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52 series 1985.

One of the provisions is Article 14, Section 1 which states “The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional
school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.” Also, the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police
Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote important interest and needs -- in other words, the public order --
of the general community. An important component of that public order is health and physical safety
and wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish
to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained
as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical
schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

 PELAEZ vs., AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. NO. L-23825
24 December 1965

FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress
has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: WON Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68
of the RAC?

RULING: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a)
be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is
present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation
of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).