G.R. No.
L-63915 December 29, 1986 that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask
the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.
This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted
that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it
is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is
the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not
true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely
to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that
six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for
the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus
on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to
the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a
wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
obviously has not yet been published. 2 of the Civil Code.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of SO ORDERED.
a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at
least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.
This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic,
with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain
the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts
of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void
two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment
since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for
not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-
day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this
Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said
rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30,
1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY
the instant petition for lack of merit.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor
Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No.
265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay
a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign
exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money
orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt
of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal
is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in
the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and
effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act
2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official
Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not
require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices
therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents
required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of
the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was
Bureau of Printing. issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951,
that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not
that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the
provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the possession thereof.
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-
Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised
Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, in the court below and which is within the issues made by the
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If
should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first there was no such circular to be violated and consequently
be published and the people officially and specifically informed of appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any
said contents and its penalties. offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction.
This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar or not raised in the court below.
provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely,
that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and
that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette.
Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word
"laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with
the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil
en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido
entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el
mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria
perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o
del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176006 March 26, 2010
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, represented by ALFREDO A. DY,
Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The National Power Corporation (NPC)1 questions the decision
dated June 30, 2006 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC
Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional. The dispositive portion of the
decision provides:
WHEREFORE then, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring item[s] 3 and 3.1 of NAPOCOR Circular No. 99-
75, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that
directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in
the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for
being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free
trade and commerce.
The claim for attorney’s fees is denied for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2
NPC also assails the RTC resolution dated November 20, 2006
denying its motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.3
In this petition, NPC poses the sole issue for our review:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED
ITEMS 3 AND 3.1 OF NAPOCOR CIRCULAR NO. 99-75 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIAL DUE
PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS FOR RESTRAINING COMPETITIVE FREE
TRADE AND COMMERCE.4
NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in
the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or
ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in
NPC installations and to generate additional income for NPC." Items
3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or
corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum,
or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be
based locally or overseas.6
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of
bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACSR7 cables. Respondent
Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper,
aluminum, steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials,
submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was
informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003 that its application for pre-
qualification had been denied.8 Petitioner asked for reconsideration
but NPC denied it.9
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC
Circular No. 99-75, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.10 Pinatubo
argued that the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and ran
counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding.11
The RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of
the circular unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that it was violative of
substantive due process because, while it created rights in favor of
third parties, the circular had not been published. It also
pronounced that the circular violated the equal protection clause
since it favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap
vis-à-vis dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR cables
from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the circular denied traders the
right to exercise their business and restrained free competition
inasmuch as it allowed only a certain sector to participate in the
bidding.12
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the
circular since it was not of general application. It was addressed only
to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal
committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved
in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC also contends that there was a
substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders of
aluminum scrap materials specially viewed in the light of RA 7832.13
According to NPC, by limiting the prospective bidders to
manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs.
There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise
maintains that traders were not prohibited from participating in the
pre-qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer.14
The questions that need to be resolved in this case are:
(1) whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published; and
(2) whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -
(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and
(b) restrained free trade and competition.
Tañada v. Tuvera15 stressed the need for publication in order for
statutes and administrative rules and regulations to have binding
force and effect, viz.:
x x x all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative power or,
at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.16
Tañada, however, qualified that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.17
(emphasis ours)
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published
since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport
to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive
issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the
proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders.
Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the
different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding
and award of scrap ACSRS.18 It also provided for the deposit of a
proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the
award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs.19 All
these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in
the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect
the rights of the public in general or of any other person not
involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual
rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
Pinatubo’s argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75
deprived it of its "right to bid" or that these conferred such right in
favor of a third person is erroneous. Bidding, in its comprehensive
sense, means making an offer or an invitation to prospective
contractors whereby the government manifests its intention to
invite proposals for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment for official business or public use, or for public works or
repair.20 Bidding rules may specify other conditions or require that
the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or
qualifications.21 Since a bid partakes of the nature of an offer to
contract with the government,22 the government agency involved
may or may not accept it. Moreover, being the owner of the
property subject of the bid, the government has the power to
determine who shall be its recipient, as well as under what terms it
may be awarded. In this sense, participation in the bidding process
is a privilege inasmuch as it can only be exercised under existing
criteria imposed by the government itself. As such, prospective
bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Thus, it has been
stated that under the traditional form of property ownership,
recipients of privileges or largesse from the government cannot be
said to have property rights because they possess no traditionally
recognized proprietary interest therein.23
Also, as the discretion to accept or reject bids and award contracts is
of such wide latitude, courts will not interfere, unless it is apparent
that such discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or used as a shield to a
fraudulent award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy decision
that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison,
evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the
concerned government agencies, not by the courts. Courts will not
interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within
those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the realm of policy
decision-making.24
Limiting qualified bidders in this case to partnerships or
corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products made purely or partly of aluminum was
an exercise of discretion by the NPC. Unless the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily or used as a subterfuge for fraud, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
This brings to the fore the next question: whether items 3 and 3.1 of
NPC Circular No. 99-75 violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances."25 The guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification.26 The equal protection clause, therefore, does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary.271avvphi1
Items 3 and 3.1 met the standards of a valid classification. Indeed, as
juxtaposed by the RTC, the purpose of NPC Circular No. 99-75 was to
dispose of the ACSR wires.28 As stated by Pinatubo, it was also
meant to earn income for the government.29 Nevertheless, the
disposal and revenue-generating objective of the circular was not an
end in itself and could not bar NPC from imposing conditions for the
proper disposition and ultimately, the legitimate use of the scrap
ACSR wires. In giving preference to direct manufacturers and
producers, it was the intent of NPC to support RA 7832, which
penalizes the theft of ACSR in excess of 100 MCM.30 The difference
in treatment between direct manufacturers and producers, on one
hand, and traders, on the other, was rationalized by NPC as follows:
x x x NAPOCOR can now easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSR
wires and verify whether or not a person’s possession of such
materials is legal or not; and consequently, prosecute under R.A.
7832, those whose possession, control or custody of such material is
unexplained. This is based upon the reasonable presumption that if
the buyer were a manufacturer or processor, the scrap ACSRs end
with him as the latter uses it to make finished products; but if the
buyer were a trader, there is greater probability that the purchased
materials may pass from one trader to another. Should traders
without tie-up to manufacturers or processors of aluminum be
allowed to participate in the bidding, the ACSRs bidded out to them
will likely co-mingle with those already proliferating in the illegal
market. Thus, great difficulty shall be encountered by NAPOCOR
and/or those authorities tasked to implement R.A. 7832 in
determining whether or not the ACSRs found in the possession,
control and custody of a person suspected of theft [of] electric
power transmission lines and materials are the fruit of the offense
defined in Section 3 of R.A. 7832.31
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection
clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended
to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of
government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832.
Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct
manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to
negate the rationale behind the distinction.
Finally, items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not restrain
free trade or competition.
Pinatubo contends that the condition imposed by NPC under items
3 and 3.1 violated the principle of competitiveness advanced by RA
9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) which states:
SEC. 3. Governing Principles on Government Procurement. – All
procurement of the national government, its departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, government
financial institutions and local government units, shall, in all cases, prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the authority
be governed by these principles: of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it.

xxx WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 dated June 30,
(b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable 2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006 are REVERSED and
private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. MC-03-2179 for the annulment of NPC
participate in public bidding. (emphasis ours) Circular No. 99-75 is hereby DISMISSED.

The foregoing provision imposed the precondition that the SO ORDERED.

contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It should be
emphasized that the bidding process was not a "free-for-all" where
any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could take part.
Section 5(e) of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a "method of
procurement which is open to participation by any interested party
and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-
bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt
and opening of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and
award of contract x x x." The law categorically mandates that
prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier
stated, bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the
bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or
qualifications.32 Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for
the sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify
any applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-
qualification.33 Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a bidding
process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant;
otherwise, it defeats the principle that only "responsible" and
"qualified" bidders can bid and be awarded government
contracts.34 Our free enterprise system is not based on a market of
pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-devour-the-
hindmost rule.35

Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted
to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the
issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition.36 While
the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare.37 In the present case,
the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper
the government’s effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of
trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil sought to be
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND SECURITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres
to the Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not
to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to
assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective
and untrammeled communication and exchange of information
between the President and his/her advisers in the process of
shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise
of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence
is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations.
It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and
more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its
power of review and arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated
dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of government. In
this task, this Court should neither curb the legitimate powers of any
of the co-equal and coordinate branches of government nor allow
any of them to overstep the boundaries set for it by our
Constitution. The competing interests in the case at bar are the
claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and
the respondent Senate Committees’ assertion of their power to
conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular facts and
circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and
emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides and viewed in the light
of settled constitutional and legal doctrines, plainly lead to the
conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be upheld.
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated
March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"), granting the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,1
Trade and Commerce,2 and National Defense and Security
(collectively the "respondent Committees").3
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent
Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a
project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege."
To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or
not she directed him to approve it.6
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers
to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once
more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and
requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the
ground of executive privilege.7 The letter of Executive Secretary
Ermita pertinently stated:
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall
under conversations and correspondence between the President
and public officials which are considered executive privilege
(Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R.
133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of
conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her
executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a
President to the confidentiality of her conversations and
correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the
President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will
hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her
conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Given the confidential nature in which these information were
conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to
invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in
Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the
subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has
answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing
questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that
his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be
dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking
executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent
Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain
why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in
petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it
was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to
appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He
just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he
"needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance
notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the
Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 &
144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on
the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
above Order.8 He insisted that he had not shown "any contemptible
conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his
willingness to testify on new matters, but respondent Committees
did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He
also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed with
this Court on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should
restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated
January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and directed his
arrest and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with
Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1,
2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties
were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the
Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on
two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions were covered by executive privilege; and second,
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered
the subject communications as falling under the presidential
communications privilege because (a) they related to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they
were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c)
respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of
executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain
the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt
as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of
the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the
contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion
for reconsideration, anchored on the following grounds:
I DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO
DOUBT THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT
COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE
POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS.
II
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE CAN BE
NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE
INSTANT CASE IS PRIVILEGED.
III
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO
FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS
ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE
DECISION IS APPLIED, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS
OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.
C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A
COMPELLING NEED TO JUSTIFY THE DISCLOSURE OF THE
INFORMATION SOUGHT.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT
CASE WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.
E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
INFORMATION, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH THE CLAIM OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
IV
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, RESPONDENTS
ASSAILED CONTEMPT ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS
LAID DOWN IN SENATE V. ERMITA.
C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INTERNAL RULES.
D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT
ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE DULY PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED
DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERED THE OSG’S
INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING RESPONDENTS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.
E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT
ARBITRARY OR PRECIPITATE.
In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with
exaggerating and distorting the Decision of this Court. He avers that
there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from
investigating the NBN Project or asking him additional questions.
According to petitioner, the Court merely applied the rule on
executive privilege to the facts of the case. He further submits the
following contentions: first, the assailed Decision did not reverse the
presumption against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v.
Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed to overcome the
presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they
could legislate even without the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions, and they admitted that they could dispense
with petitioner’s testimony if certain NEDA documents would be
given to them; third, the requirement of specificity applies only to
the privilege for State, military and diplomatic secrets, not to the
necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential
communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry into the
President’s thought processes or exploratory exchanges; fifth,
petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the
Court has the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh,
the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the present
Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the
requirement for a witness to be furnished advance copy of
questions comports with due process and the constitutional
mandate that the rights of witnesses be respected; and ninth,
neither petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the matter of
executive privilege, only the Court.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1)
there is no categorical pronouncement from the Court that the
assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to
their oversight function; hence, there is no reason for them "to
make much" of the distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article
VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a
presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v.
Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
executive privilege, because all the elements of the presidential
communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad
testificandum issued by respondent Committees to petitioner is
fatally defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5) the failure
of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void;
and (6) respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt
order.
Incidentally, respondent Committees’ objection to the Resolution
dated March 18, 2008 (granting the Office of the Solicitor General’s
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Memorandum) only after the promulgation of the Decision in this
case is foreclosed by its untimeliness.
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions
of the opposing parties are as follows:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
I Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005.
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration
that presidential communications are presumptively privileged
reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that
"inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court
erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the
presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is
mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the
truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12
affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even
Senate v. Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent
Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated
the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized,
among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court
articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the
public,16" that there is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters";17 and that "the
right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which
the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."18
Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision
reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal
interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held
that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but
the decision must be considered in its entirety.19
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the
circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void
The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive
privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear
principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may
be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in
Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by the
executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely
by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that
when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the
said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure,
there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive
privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that
the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling
in this wise:
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the
head of office determines that a certain information is privileged,
such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority
and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These
provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege
by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already
discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where
exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must,
as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court
finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the
President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by
the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the
instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere
silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this
score.
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to
invoke executive privilege granted by the President to executive
officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific
matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines
and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case
markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this
present case hews closely to the ruling in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit:
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has
been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.
Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has
been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts,
and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x
x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was
recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the
term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis
for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality
of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to
those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communication," which was recognized
early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage in Senate v.
Ermita adverted to in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent
Committees, referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive
authorization" of an executive official, to mean that the
"presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the
ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and make the same engage in self-
contradiction.
Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of
the relationship between the Executive Department and the
Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied
authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive
privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as follows:
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly
within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates
that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in
the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure
by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the
contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by
settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate
v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications."23
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are not covered by executive privilege
because the elements of the presidential communications privilege
are not present.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a
foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to
give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity
does not make such power less executive. "Quintessential" is
defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the
concentrated essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-
delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to
another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the
obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature
of the power.
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each
branch of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by
analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the
President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative
in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI,
Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that the
approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not
render the power to pass law executive in nature. This is because
the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive
power to enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign
loans does not become less executive in nature because of
conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the
exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of
the President.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely
to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but,
in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the
application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason
that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to communications between those who
are ‘operationally proximate’ to the President but who may have
"no direct communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was
laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of
the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and,
therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to
White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only
to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
presidential decision-making, thus:
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed
to accomplish the purposes of the privilege, could pose a significant
risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch a privilege
that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the
President. In order to limit this risk, the presidential
communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is
consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President’s
decision-making process is adequately protected. Not every person
who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no
matter how remote and removed from the President, can qualify for
the privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff
outside the White House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the
privilege should apply only to communications authored or solicited
and received by those members of an immediate White House
advisor’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for
investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President
on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only
communications at that level are close enough to the President to
be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of
his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity"
to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he
President’s confidentiality interests" is implicated). (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large
swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by
respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of
the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official
family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved
is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the
organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department
of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity test
used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In
determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but
also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational
structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the
privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the
operational proximity test is unfounded.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based
on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’
and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency,
accountability and disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in
upholding the President’s invocation, through the Executive
Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent
Committees’ specific and demonstrated need and the President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest,
the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution on government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information, specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article
II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI,
Section 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35
21,36 and 22.37
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege
is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as
the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Given the confidential nature in which this information were
conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require
the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project
involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was
actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the
Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the
agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are
matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There
is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China. We reiterate the importance of secrecy in matters
involving foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 38 thus:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a
conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been proposed or
contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a
pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent
reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which
the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and
to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation
with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing
Congress access to all papers relating to a negotiation with a foreign
power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens
Action Party, et al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39 upheld the
privileged character of diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the
Court stated:
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the
right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same
privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom
(PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for
the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the state of the
then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of
the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on to
state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and
expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action.
Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential
nature. Although much has been said about "open" and "secret"
diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State
Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice.
In the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without
many, many private talks and discussion, man to man; many
tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries
come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of
their differences with other countries and with other delegates;
they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances
and would not do under other circumstances… If these reports…
should become public… who would ever trust American Delegations
in another conference? (United States Department of State, Press
Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
xxxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with
foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is
claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As
expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid
system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking
Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in
starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared
that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived at." He quickly
abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method
of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started,
pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one
of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are
exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a widespread
propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been
drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity
for discussion before it is approved. (The New American
Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of
the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries,viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude;
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his
great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives,
"The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals,
6th Cong., col. 613… (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the
original)
Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings
with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of
approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not
only official, documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the
pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.
Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee
unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to
unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency
and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge
constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked
legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making
process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a
member of her Cabinet.
With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of
constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to
information and public accountability and transparency, the Court
finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent
Committees’ case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right
of the people to information and the constitutional policies on
public accountability and transparency. These are the twin
postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are
denied access to information. And the policies on public
accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public concern is
denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with
respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the
public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate
the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed
Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call
petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed
his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the
scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that
elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that
petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why
these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information
is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply,
the right to information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent
Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By
their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to
the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions
of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the right
to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it
was stated that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated
the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national
security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3)
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National
security matters include state secrets regarding military and
diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to
protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict
confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of
legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the
reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction
between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the
right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to
Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and
petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information
on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed
by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right
to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's
right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not
enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project.
All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered
by executive privilege.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote
an unusually lengthy discussion on the purported legislative nature
of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry.
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass
upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiry into the NBN
Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However,
this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the
course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by
the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which
their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test
laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is
that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a
showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information
covered by executive privilege.
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority." In the Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the
information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the
discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider
the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and
corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is
subject to balancing against other interests and it is necessary to
resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve
the essential functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed
between presidential privilege and the legitimate claims of the
judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled
that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to
the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege
would stand in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said Court
further ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the
Honorable Chief Justice Puno's dissenting opinion, as follows:
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our
historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more
profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of
criminal justice) is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.'
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct., at 633. We have
elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or
speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the
function of courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense.
xxx xxx xxx
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly
has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly
confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be
confronted with the witness against him' and 'to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the
courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is
essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege
of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of
the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is
demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic
function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for
confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in
nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of
justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may
be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in
confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of
a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have
some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only
on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence
in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for
facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with
the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative
functions. This leads us to consider once again just how critical is the
subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees’
functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent
Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of
competence of the President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting
legislation.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon41 expounded on the nature of a legislative inquiry in aid of
legislation in this wise:
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to
depend, therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials
are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a
clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the
responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is
undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend
more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions
and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting
information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility
of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did
or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v.
Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of
certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise
evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original
form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative
process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed,
whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's
argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its
legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by
subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be
equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific
need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of
"pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant
case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative
Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the
Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which
states:
A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it
bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential
communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S.
v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al., v.
Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all
recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of
Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v.
Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of
Presidential communications.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the
burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the
presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions
subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there
is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to
the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters
relating to these bills could not be determined without the said
information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed
out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate
Concurring Opinion:
…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president
and/or her executive officials have committed wrongdoings that
need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial
legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily
bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation.
They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting
such legislation.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically
needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant
legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the
counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the
Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner
answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information
being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the
lawmaking function of the Senate. For instance, question Number 1
whether the President followed up the NBN project. According to
the other counsel this question has already been asked, is that
correct?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your
Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function
of the Senate?
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe it is critical, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Why?
ATTY. AGABIN
For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam
Santiago, she would like to indorse a Bill to include Executive
Agreements had been used as a device to the circumventing the
Procurement Law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
But the question is just following it up.
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we
look at this problem in its factual setting as counsel for petitioner
has observed, there are intimations of a bribery scandal involving
high government officials.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize
this ZTE, is that critical to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
Will it result to the failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill without this
question?
ATTY. AGABIN
I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed
amendment to the Procurement Law, Your Honor, because the
petitioner had already testified that he was offered a P200 Million
bribe, so if he was offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that
other government officials who had something to do with the
approval of the contract would be offered the same amount of
bribes.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, that is speculative.
ATTY. AGABIN
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your
Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
How about the third question, whether the President said to go
ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged
bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
And the question is may they craft a Bill a remedial law without
forcing petitioner Neri to answer this question?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And
sound legislation requires that a proposed Bill should have some
basis in fact.42
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint
the specific need for the information sought or how the withholding
of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their
legislative purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due
to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully
discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of
presidential communication stands. The implication of the said
presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the burden of proof
as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the President’s
performance of her function. Needless to state this is assumed, by
virtue of the presumption.
Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to
"speculate" regarding the questions covered by the privilege, this
does not evince a compelling need for the information sought.
Indeed, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon43 held that while fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments
normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed
legislative actions and their political acceptability than on a precise
reconstruction of past events. It added that, normally, Congress
legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees’ self-
defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3)
questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished members of
the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed
that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise
of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the
purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing
graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.44
And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in
asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even
contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and
not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and
corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress,
respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set
by the Constitution.
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle
to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to
delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.46 (Emphasis
supplied)
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry
by respondent Committee is not really ‘in aid of legislation’ because
it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5
of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of
the Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to
trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.48 While it
may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of
high government officials, including the President, in a given
government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to
perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to
determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution
has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the
Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or
prosecute.
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry
in aid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in respondent
Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for
persons responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are,
they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial
bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a
crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each
official, the determination of who should be haled to court for
prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding
of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of
criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a
law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing
that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence
and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.49 In this
regard, the pronouncement in Barenblatt v. United States50 is
instructive, thus:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since
Congress may only investigate into the areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches
of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary,
it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to
the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo
and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under
our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to
investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is
the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to
preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly
are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine
criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the
Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and
ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons,
parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.

Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a
possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the
constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or
branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information
in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed
compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information
validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the
Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without
the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the
petition.
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege on the ground that there is
no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or
illegal activity, despite the absence of an administrative or judicial
determination to that effect. Significantly, however, in Nixon v.
Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the presumption
favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential
conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on
the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance
of which the material was sought, and the degree to which the
material was necessary to its fulfillment.
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon does not apply to the case
at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding
has been initiated at present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is
true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however,
complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed
against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of
the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and
judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated
by the Constitution and our laws to determine whether or not the
allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who
should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the
exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual
findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides
that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings
which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or
repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to
name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from
the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings
by a competent court or body.
IV
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (1) there
is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate
the requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the
contempt order in accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did
not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their
issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or precipitate.
We reaffirm our earlier ruling.
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully
discussed in the preceding pages, we see no reason to discuss it
once again.
Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that
the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations or subpoenas to
contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for
the inquiry" along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry
and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not
provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of
compliance with these requirements.
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently,
claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or
has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times.53
Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the
ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set
forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not
unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be
confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving
commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54
Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process.
They should be adequately informed what matters are to be
covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the
pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these
requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the
part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power
of inquiry. The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the
study conducted by William P. Marshall,55 to wit:
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current
system allows committees to continually investigate the Executive
without constraint. One process solution addressing this concern is
to require each investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At
present, the charters of some congressional committees are so
broad that virtually any matter involving the Executive can be
construed to fall within their province. Accordingly, investigations
can proceed without articulation of specific need or purpose. A
requirement for a more precise charge in order to begin an inquiry
should immediately work to limit the initial scope of the
investigation and should also serve to contain the investigation once
it is instituted. Additionally, to the extent clear statements of rules
cause legislatures to pause and seriously consider the constitutional
implications of proposed courses of action in other areas, they
would serve that goal in the context of congressional investigations
as well.
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a
standing committee to simply articulate its reasons to investigate
pro forma does no more than imposes minimal drafting burdens.
Rather, the system must be designed in a manner that imposes
actual burdens on the committee to articulate its need for
investigation and allows for meaningful debate about the merits of
proceeding with the investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of
questions is a reasonable demand that should have been granted by
respondent Committees.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13,
2007 made no specific reference to any pending Senate bill. It did
not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were,
the subpoena merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows
relative to the subject matter under inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that
their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that
this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look
into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to
possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this
regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is
enlightening, thus:
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The
Constitution empowers each House to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."
In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial
review is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of
the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees.
Section 18 of the Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobey any order of
the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer
proper questions by the Committee or any of its members."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to
the validity of the contempt order because during the deliberation
of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators
were present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority
requirement needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of
seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National
Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade and
Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three
(3) members were present.57 These facts prompted us to quote in
the Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano
and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of
lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the
contempt order.
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing
before this Court, Senator Francis Pangilinan stated that any defect
in the committee voting had been cured because two-thirds of the
Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session.58
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led
to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being
submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent
Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter
presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the
contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a
faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said
date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the
contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008
deliberation when the matter was taken up.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Emphasis supplied)
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of
the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed,
the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there
be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough
to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he
can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a
proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the
concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such
proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have
the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power.
It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their
benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the
highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to
respondent Committees’ fourth argument. Respondent Committees
argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the
same was published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that
the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish
the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees
fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of
its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be
taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated
upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will
typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and
of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in
its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected
in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the
President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should
be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote
of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval. (emphasis supplied)
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account
the new composition of the Senate after an election and the
possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of
each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their
term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until
they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation."59 The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the
next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall
be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main
rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that
not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective.
Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the
contempt order is not precipitate or arbitrary. Taking into account
the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.
As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness,
and contrary to the assertion of respondent Committees, petitioner
did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him.
He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent
hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was that he
be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him
to adequately prepare as a resource person. He did not attend the
November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with his testimony
on the ground of executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an
executive official under the direct control and supervision of the
Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was
merely directed by his superior? Besides, save for the three (3)
questions, he was very cooperative during the September 26, 2007
hearing.
On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their
haste and impatience. Instead of ruling on Executive Secretary
Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as
unsatisfactory and ordered the arrest of petitioner. They could have
informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to decide
whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he
is not just an ordinary witness; he is a high- ranking official in a co-
equal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The
same haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt
order, despite the absence of the majority of the members of the
respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging the pendency of his
petition for certiorari before this Court.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the
Executive and the Legislature are political branches of government.
In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches
inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy
and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the
proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our
democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally
mandated checks and balances among the different branches of
government.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that
their determination on the validity of executive privilege should be
binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion that
their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into
by this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle of respect
between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a
courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive
(on the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of
judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent
Committees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks
to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome power of
investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to
grave abuse.
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-
intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the highest
echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or
accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and
granted instead to the other branches of government.

There is no question that any story of government malfeasance

deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees
contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of
transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a
"search for truth" by the general public, the religious community
and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation
that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the
best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches
of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of
generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in
arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the
people deserve a more exacting "search for truth" than the process
here in question, if that is its objective.

WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration

dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S.
CAYETANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE
PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator
Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis
N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano
(petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of
the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the
complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
(Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double
insertion of ₱200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the
2008 General Appropriations Act.
The Antecedents
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson)
delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2
In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the
congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act,
particularly the ₱200 million appropriated for the construction of
the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon
Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way
(ROW), and another ₱200 million appropriated for the extension of
C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was
formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the
second appropriation covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon
Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson
inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double
entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional
insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the
narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then
the Senate President.
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution
706,3 the full text of which reads:
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly
"advocated" (sic) the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia
Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Parañaque City to the South
Luzon Expressway;
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of
₱200 million for the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act;
WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile
confirmed that the double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension
Project was made by the Senate President;
WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate
President, from the time he was member of the House of
Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the
realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his
properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City and Barangays
Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Piñas would be financially
benefited by the construction of the new road;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate
President, through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his
properties as roads right of way to the government, the same
properties affected by the projects he proposed;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate
President caused the sale of his landholdings to government as a
grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area,
the government, and the Filipino people;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate
President, in the overpriced sale of another property, used his
power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit
made from the overprice by the Villar owned corporations;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation
of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the
people in order to serve his personal interests thereby sacrificing
the people’s welfare;
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President
has betrayed the trust of the people, and by doing so has shamed
the Philippine Senate;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to
reclaim the people’s trust and confidence and show that the illegal
conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go
unpunished;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO
DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION
PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO
NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY
THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS
REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO
THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A
BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL4
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on
Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was
composed of the following members:
Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson
Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal

Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member
Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile)
was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was
reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and
Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and
Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008,
Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation
with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the
body that there would be no member from the Minority in the
Ethics Committee.6 On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated
his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the
Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of
the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics
Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if
the Minority’s decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official
Gazette on 23 March 2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10
where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him
on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009,
Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech11 where he
stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court.
However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not
act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that
the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the
Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was
approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
abstentions.12
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings
on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009,
with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected
to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners
questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009,
petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics
Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were
adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the
need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with
the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the
Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a
directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the
preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent
declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the
adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May
2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following
grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative
of Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the
investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against
Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and
of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the
Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due
process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own
provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or
implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant
petition should be archived until such time that the said
indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the
opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to
prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature.
Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or
prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for
disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a
political question which exclusively pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly
published and adopted[,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules
to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
The Issues
The issues for the Court’s resolution are the following:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against
Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator
Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is required for their effectivity.
The Ruling of this Court
Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as
follows:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an
action before it may properly go forward.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest
in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest
of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice
between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his
presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and
those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the
subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid
multiple litigation.15
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the
petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an
interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution
706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure
on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be
resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature
of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that
this case could not be resolved without her participation.1awphi1
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply
calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are
ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than
by courts of justice."16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers
that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate
and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between
the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The
Court has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within
the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an
administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.19
As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the
Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government
by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people."20 Thus, it has been held that "the power of
judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this
Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the
performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers
set by the principle of separation of powers."21 The Court,
therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by
the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of
powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator
Villar to the Senate Committee of the Whole violates his
constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the
Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the
purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator
Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and
removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the
Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.
We do not agree with petitioners.
Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate
Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of
Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics
Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called
the Senate’s attention to the alleged irregularities committed by
Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008,
when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to
name their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator
Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from
the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator
Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their
representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel
informed him that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate
any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel
promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s
decision on the matter is final but the records did not show that a
caucus was convened.
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where
he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the
floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the
accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on
Senator Villar’s case that Senator Lacson moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate
acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved
with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating
to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and
reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges."22 However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to
name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation.
In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’
alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the
Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the
Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the
Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary
remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a
majority of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
by the Senate Committee of the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of
Senator Villar’s right to due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case,
the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that
does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same
manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right
to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of
proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of
this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due
process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which,
under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually
unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at
liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit,
subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication.23
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own
rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when
required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the
Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own
rules.
Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is
not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely
adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been
published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent
alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the
Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,24 the Court declared void unpublished rules of
procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights
of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution which mandates:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for
reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall
be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main
rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that
not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al.,27 the Court further clarified:
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a
categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure.
Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of
publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s
directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of
Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a
forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the
Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the allowance of
either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges33 which
issuances.28 states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall
constitute a quorum, contrary to respondent’s allegation in its
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the
the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that Whole shall constitute a quorum.34
affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole,
their publication before the rules can take effect. a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do
business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of
Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of
involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must
are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the
Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.29 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the
complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of
the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly
mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the
Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole,
and the publication requirement which they adopted should be
considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense
with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the
Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official
Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take
effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must
follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.

Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the

Senate Committee of the Whole30 is an exact reproduction of
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges31 which states that the Ethics Committee shall be
composed of seven members, contrary to the fact that the Senate
Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In
addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole32 is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.)
Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008
Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one
be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315
with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by
the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits
ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police
Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and
Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch
Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other
policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on
Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated
National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City,
where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his
team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed
him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found
a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5)
pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning.
Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp
Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm
was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol),
and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him
out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of
the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for
his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum
Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon
City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of
the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision
but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to
four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision.
Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied
with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring
this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and
deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it
instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now
recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the
evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by
the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from
the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority
to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his
superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-
Appeal, together with the OSG’s position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23

The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a
general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion
of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or
excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s
motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus
Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the
case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner
would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for
a crime which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in
Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set
aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then
finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13,
2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First
Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and
resolve respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the
motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the
merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for
the re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law
earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense.
The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to
board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting
officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of
the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened
a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of
the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that
we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as
a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a
law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers,
or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental
right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are
the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are
allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident
to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests
are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is
not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin,
Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person
of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40
The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso
was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside
the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of
Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject
firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according
to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area
within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him,
for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former.
But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or
the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should
not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In
the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which
cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control.
Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered
as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
"plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not
just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in
evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which
the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price
to pay for the loss of liberty.53

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional

right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.54

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If

people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless.
This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of
the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental
law way above the articles on governmental power.55

Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot

stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All
told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally
ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might
probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the

other issues raised by Valeroso.

One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the
government.58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008

Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104528 January 18, 1996
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE
C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA,
FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO
SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON,
NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA,
ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented
by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior
purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them
to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the
defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D.
957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree",
is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same
having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the
question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the
Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the
Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary,
Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President."
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots
from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and
Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it
executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the
lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of
this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their
obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in
question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later
consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled
that PNB - without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina
Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the
"remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase
agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina Village,
Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again
for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision
developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the
President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB.
Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may
be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ." However, in order to hasten
the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for
decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception
to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
Petitioner bank raised the following issues:
1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957
because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the
subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and
2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between
private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence,
the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to
accept private respondents' remaining amortizations and issue the
corresponding titles after payment thereof.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is
obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even
those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed
prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the
preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable
purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieve:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the
requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them
with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and, obligations to provide and
maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water
systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements,
thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens
and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent
sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers
for value;1 (Emphasis supplied).
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming
subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the
gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is
obvious that the law - as an instrument of social justice - must favors
the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities,
and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due
diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection
or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition,
utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It
could not have been unaware that the property had been built on
by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents
obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land
developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was
precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957
was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a
protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers."
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory
Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of
consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2 ), says:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have
effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The
intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule
of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a
legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to
start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt
that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in
the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.3
Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a
strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have
toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their
homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his
comment, argues:
Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited
mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to
impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into
a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the
State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the
fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if
P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent
practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can
nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957
cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The
legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole
which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers
(private respondents).4
Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which
themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity
of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 2l and 23 thereof,
which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact
upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to
P.D. 957's enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer or shall
construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures
and other forms of development, including water supply and
lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision or condominiun plans, brochures, prospectus, printed
matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year
from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed
by the Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or
condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this
Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the
subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with
his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two
years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in
accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations
under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation
punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment
made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for, the lot
or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor, of the owner
or developer when the buyer, after, due notice to the owner or
developer, desist from further payment due to the failure of the
owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. Such buyer may, at this option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests
but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate. (emphasis supplied)
As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment
clause, we find the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz
enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:
Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its
execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by
a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power,
it will prevail over the contract.
Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and,
always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement
deals with a matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it
has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its
susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal
order.5
This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6 :
The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law
would violate the impairment clause. The argument does not
impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact,
there are many who now believe it, is an anachronism in the
present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the
integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that
was when such agreements did not affect the community in general.
They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference
with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that
could properly struck down.
But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the
public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private
agreements, which have, as a result been removed from the
protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come
within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of
the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as
the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to
require the interference of the State, then must the police power be
asserted, and prevail, over the clause.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et
al.7 penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R.
Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the
factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the
antecedent facts of the case at bench:
Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if
only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their
own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a
lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It
has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living
individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles
delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such
as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant
case, after almost completing the payments for the property and
after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the
stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would
now appear to be owner.
xxx xxx xxx
We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot
barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as
security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby
relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching
implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The
BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a
subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not
enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there
may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed their
installment payments? (id., pp. 7 & 9).
By the foregoing citation, this Court, thus adopts by reference the
foregoing as part of this Decision.
The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although
constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was
struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of
subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the
mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the property. The Court of
Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring
the real estate mortgage as null and void.
As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view
of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a
"total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made to
take the developer's place.
We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law
obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining
unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents.
Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made
by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the
Authority, Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that
the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
development of the condominium or subdivision project and hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE
effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No
The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be costs.
determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before
the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his
installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall
apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness
secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to
enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after
full payment thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the
law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment
payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner),
which is required to apply such payments to reduce the
corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is
without prejudice to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the
subdivision developer.
Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to
focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but
also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice
and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution;
firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum
but within the context of existing social, economic and political
conditions, law being merely a brick in the up- building of the social
edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all
intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state
policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration
are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular
suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country
strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to
achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being for the majority
of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank
in the country, which has in recent years made record earnings and
acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and
subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world, should be
equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private
respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their
very homes purchased through their hard work and with their
meager savings.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168129 April 24, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse the Decision1 dated February 18, 2005 and
Resolution dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth
Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76449.
The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are:
The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., herein respondent, is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines. Pursuant to its Articles of Incorporation,2 its primary
purpose is "To establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid
group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance
organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in
the health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and
financial responsibilities of the organization."1^vvphi1.net
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 273, amending the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1158) by imposing Value-Added
Tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and services. This E.O. took effect on
January 1, 1988.
Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, or on December 10, 1987,
respondent wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
petitioner, inquiring whether the services it provides to the
participants in its health care program are exempt from the
payment of the VAT.
On June 8, 1988, petitioner CIR, through the VAT Review Committee
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), issued VAT Ruling No. 231-
88 stating that respondent, as a provider of medical services, is
exempt from the VAT coverage. This Ruling was subsequently
confirmed by Regional Director Osmundo G. Umali of Revenue
Region No. 8 in a letter dated April 22, 1994.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716
(Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law) took effect, amending further the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Then on January 1, 1998,
R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1997) became
effective. This new Tax Code substantially adopted and reproduced
the provisions of E.O. No. 273 on VAT and R.A. No. 7716 on E-VAT.
In the interim, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a
Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its payment of the
VAT and documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years 1996 and
1997.
On October 20, 1999, respondent filed a protest with the BIR.
On January 27, 2000, petitioner CIR sent respondent a letter
demanding payment of "deficiency VAT" in the amount of
₱100,505,030.26 and DST in the amount of ₱124,196,610.92, or a
total of ₱224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Attached
to the demand letter were four (4) assessment notices.
On February 23, 2000, respondent filed another protest questioning
the assessment notices.
Petitioner CIR did not take any action on respondent's protests.
Hence, on September 21, 2000, respondent filed with the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review, docketed as CTA Case No.
6166.
On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for
Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED TO
PAY the deficiency VAT amounting to ₱22,054,831.75 inclusive of
25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1997 until fully
paid for the 1996 VAT deficiency and ₱31,094,163.87 inclusive of
25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1998 until paid
for the 1997 VAT deficiency.1awphi1.nét Accordingly, VAT Ruling
No. 231-88 is declared void and without force and effect. The 1996
and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby
CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent is ORDERED to DESIST from
collecting the said DST deficiency tax.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the above
judgment concerning its liability to pay the deficiency VAT.
In its Resolution3 dated March 23, 2003, the CTA granted
respondent's motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, the VAT assessment
issued by herein respondent against petitioner for the taxable years
1996 and 1997 is hereby WITHDRAWN and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
The CTA held:
Moreover, this court adheres to its conclusion that petitioner is a
service contractor subject to VAT since it does not actually render
medical service but merely acts as a conduit between the members
and petitioner's accredited and recognized hospitals and clinics.
However, after a careful review of the facts of the case as well as
the Law and jurisprudence applicable, this court resolves to grant
petitioner's "Motion for Partial Reconsideration." We are in accord
with the view of petitioner that it is entitled to the benefit of non-
retroactivity of rulings guaranteed under Section 246 of the Tax
Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its part. Section 246
of the Tax Code provides:
Sec. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. - Any revocation,
modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations
promulgated in accordance with the preceding Sections or any of
the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not
be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or
reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, x x x.
Clearly, undue prejudice will be caused to petitioner if the
revocation of VAT Ruling No. 231-88 will be retroactively applied to
its case. VAT Ruling No. 231-88 issued by no less than the
respondent itself has confirmed petitioner's entitlement to VAT
exemption under Section 103 of the Tax Code. In saying so,
respondent has actually broadened the scope of "medical services"
to include the case of the petitioner. This VAT ruling was even
confirmed subsequently by Regional Director Ormundo G. Umali in
his letter dated April 22, 1994 (Exhibit M). Exhibit P, which served as
basis for the issuance of the said VAT ruling in favor of the petitioner
sufficiently described the business of petitioner and there is no way
BIR could be misled by the said representation as to the real nature
of petitioner's business. Such being the case, this court is convinced
that petitioner's reliance on the said ruling is premised on good
faith. The facts of the case do not show that petitioner deliberately
committed mistakes or omitted material facts when it obtained the
said ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Thus, in the
absence of such proof, this court upholds the application of Section
246 of the Tax Code. Consequently, the pronouncement made by
the BIR in VAT Ruling No. 231-88 as to the VAT exemption of
petitioner should be upheld.
Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76449.
In its Decision dated February 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the CTA Resolution.
Petitioner CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied
by the appellate court in its Resolution4 dated May 9, 2005.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising these two
issues: (1) whether respondent's services are subject to VAT; and (2)
whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from
payment of VAT has retroactive application.
On the first issue, respondent is contesting petitioner's assessment
of its VAT liabilities for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Section 1025 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended by E.O. No. 273 (VAT Law) and R.A. No. 7716 (E-VAT Law),
provides:
SEC. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. - (a) Rate and base of tax. - There shall be levied,
assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of
gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services,
including the use or lease of properties.
The phrase "sale or exchange of service" means the performance of
all kinds of services in the Philippines for a fee, remuneration or
consideration, including those performed or rendered by
construction and service contractors x x x.
Section 1036 of the same Code specifies the exempt transactions
from the provision of Section 102, thus:
SEC. 103. Exempt Transactions. - The following shall be exempt from
the value-added tax:
xxx
(l) Medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services except those
rendered by professionals
xxx
The import of the above provision is plain. It requires no
interpretation. It contemplates the exemption from VAT of
taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital,
and veterinary services. In Commissioner of International Revenue
v. Seagate Technology (Philippines),7 we defined an exempt
transaction as one involving goods or services which, by their
nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the
VAT, under the Tax Code, without regard to the tax status of the
party in the transaction. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.,8 we reiterated this
definition.
In its letter to the BIR requesting confirmation of its VAT-exempt
status, respondent described its services as follows:
Under the prepaid group practice health care delivery system
adopted by Health Care, individuals enrolled in Health Care's health
care program are entitled to preventive, diagnostic, and corrective
medical services to be dispensed by Health Care's duly licensed
physicians, specialists, and other professional technical staff
participating in said group practice health care delivery system
established and operated by Health Care. Such medical services will
be dispensed in a hospital or clinic owned, operated, or accredited
by Health Care. To be entitled to receive such medical services from
Health Care, an individual must enroll in Health Care's health care
program and pay an annual fee. Enrollment in Health Care's health
care program is on a year-to-year basis and enrollees are issued
identification cards.
From the foregoing, the CTA made the following conclusions:
a) Respondent "is not actually rendering medical service but merely
acting as a conduit between the members and their accredited and
recognized hospitals and clinics."
b) It merely "provides and arranges for the provision of pre-need
health care services to its members for a fixed prepaid fee for a
specified period of time."
c) It then "contracts the services of physicians, medical and dental
practitioners, clinics and hospitals to perform such services to its
enrolled members;" and
d) Respondent "also enters into contract with clinics, hospitals,
medical professionals and then negotiates with them regarding
payment schemes, financing and other procedures in the delivery of
health services."
We note that these factual findings of the CTA were neither
modified nor reversed by the Court of Appeals. It is a doctrine that
findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular
expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final,
binding, and conclusive upon this Court, more so where these do
not conflict with the findings of the Court of Appeals.9 Perforce, as
respondent does not actually provide medical and/or hospital
services, as provided under Section 103 on exempt transactions, but
merely arranges for the same, its services are not VAT-exempt.
Relative to the second issue, Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as
amended, provides that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no
retroactive application if to apply them would prejudice the
taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer
deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in
any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling
is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
We must now determine whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting
respondent from paying its VAT liabilities has retroactive
application.
In its Resolution dated March 23, 2003, the CTA found that there is
no showing that respondent "deliberately committed mistakes or
omitted material facts" when it obtained VAT Ruling No. 231-88
from the BIR. The CTA held that respondent's letter which served as
the basis for the VAT ruling "sufficiently described" its business and
"there is no way the BIR could be misled by the said representation
as to the real nature" of said business.
In sustaining the CTA, the Court of Appeals found that "the failure of
respondent to refer to itself as a health maintenance organization is
not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to make false
representations." As "the term health maintenance organization did
not as yet have any particular significance for tax purposes,"
respondent's failure "to include a term that has yet to acquire its
present definition and significance cannot be equated with bad
faith."
We agree with both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that
respondent acted in good faith. In Civil Service Commission v.
Maala,10 we described good faith as "that state of mind denoting
honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
transaction unconscientious."
According to the Court of Appeals, respondent's failure to describe
itself as a "health maintenance organization," which is subject to
VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. We note that the term "health
maintenance organization" was first recorded in the Philippine
statute books only upon the passage of "The National Health
Insurance Act of 1995" (Republic Act No. 7875). Section 4 (o) (3)
thereof defines a health maintenance organization as "an entity that
provides, offers, or arranges for coverage of designated health
services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium."
Under this law, a health maintenance organization is one of the
classes of a "health care provider."
It is thus apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in
respondent's favor, the term "health maintenance organization"
was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation purposes.
Respondent, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT
exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT
Ruling No. 231-88.
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals,11 this Court
held that under Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is precluded from adopting a
position contrary to one previously taken where injustice would
result to the taxpayer. Hence, where an assessment for deficiency
withholding income taxes was made, three years after a new BIR
Circular reversed a previous one upon which the taxpayer had relied
upon, such an assessment was prejudicial to the taxpayer. To rule
otherwise, opined the Court, would be contrary to the tenets of
good faith, equity, and fair play.
This Court has consistently reaffirmed its ruling in ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp. in the later cases of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Borroughs, Ltd.,12 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Mega Gen. Mdsg. Corp.13 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Telefunken Semiconductor (Phils.) Inc.,14 and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.15 The rule is that the BIR
rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would
result to the prejudice of the taxpayer, as in this case.
More recently, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Benguet
Corporation,16 wherein the taxpayer was entitled to tax refunds or
credits based on the BIR's own issuances but later was suddenly
saddled with deficiency taxes due to its subsequent ruling changing
the category of the taxpayer's transactions for the purpose of paying
its VAT, this Court ruled that applying such ruling retroactively
would be prejudicial to the taxpayer.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76449. No costs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction
worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the
tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig,
Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by
the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of
the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while
victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo
[were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board
a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by
2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires
attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block,
when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing
the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under
construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the
[p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of
the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the
chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the
following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE
REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE
OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF
RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS
PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS
NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is
hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held
that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to
the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify
as what he merely learned from others either because he was told
or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general
rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as
oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies,
suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie
underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best
brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The
hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among
which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the
work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for
admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in
question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court
of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer
who signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This
Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the
officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which
were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the
report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based
on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the
offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be
considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be
admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It
has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact
that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply,
but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
petitioners on his Report and made himself available for cross-
examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved
that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was
effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section
44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with
the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official
record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and
makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying
reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness,
as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily
needed; the occasions in which the officials would be summoned
from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in
which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no
exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in
court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having
business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these
reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such
documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and
fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each
case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez
was not presented to testify on his report. In that case the
applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of
Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned
third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the
sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official
information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they
were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein
but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of
PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s
testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove
that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the
latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an
ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that
the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to
the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain
was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s
testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was the
loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such
portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the
application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine
is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or management used proper
care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e.,
that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches
over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the
matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the
defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and
direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement
that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to
the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation
of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in
the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th
floor of a building to the basement while he was working with
appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the
situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant
or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position
to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources
that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or
inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the
doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed
or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or
prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from
arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play
only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman
Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence
of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company
enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its
workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof
of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to
prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails
the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and
inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the
hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse
party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known
fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant
himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said
statement as proof of its due care any more than private
respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application
of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously
availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is,
therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer
damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-
one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed
recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be
the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a
cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the
deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the
Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought
relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies,
majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs.
Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault
of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus
Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case
to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having
availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its
motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that
the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up
the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report
was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the
benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as
it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies
was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda.
De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a
claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the
Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by
workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under
the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint
for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation
report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal
complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there
was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint,
the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at
all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in
Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged
negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of
the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her
sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her
personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her
knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s
employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of
said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s
office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators
which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no
complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit:
"Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by
complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also
possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before
the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following
statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified
pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting
evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to
summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence
cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death
benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her
complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after
receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the
victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the
respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in
nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are
more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about
appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the
benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case
fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only
elementary school for her educational attainment; that she did not
know what damages could be recovered from the death of her
husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more
from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private
respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her application
and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or
mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the
trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been
ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private
respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees.
On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in
the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding
that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s
employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show
that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January
2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew
of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to
claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in
the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts
as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies
is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests
on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single
wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a
waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The
claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived
the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be
generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person
against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all
material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which
to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver
is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the
record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s
contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner
to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the
contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as
petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense
is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when
petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts
that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a choice
of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a
mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for
nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation
and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the
courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that
ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that
her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990
she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days
after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the
application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is
more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial
court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already
made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the SO ORDERED.

remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.
On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,

ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil
Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s
ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to

mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the
language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The
rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is
neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages.

The records do not indicate the total amount private respondent
ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing
the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97
and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total
amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum
of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is
greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private
respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial
court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this
adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from
plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing
defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As
established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the
respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the
parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year
1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant
University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff
enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year
1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the
mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal
counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last
semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to
pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano
having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted
the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and
enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law
of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying
law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to
him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants
were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by
plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the
first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year
in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After
graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take
the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he
needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the
P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he
could not take the bar examination without those transcripts,
plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University,
I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject
of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges
and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show
that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving
students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students
who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they
could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not
be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right
of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves
the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that
plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue
on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87;
that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of
records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to
said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented
to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in
1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the
Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract
with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim
for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to
the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the
ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual
provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff
to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and
simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle."
Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had
been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor
published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower
court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or
not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos
University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching
effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination
of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it
essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed,
out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether
or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano
University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy.
In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180,
19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of
the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution,
the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government
officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to
lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your
communication, but courts consider the practices of government
officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of
the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the
principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the
law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to
be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs.
Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano
University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and
the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No.
38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with
Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the
Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to
sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte
de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find
that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done,
contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine
the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are
awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in
school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university
scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is
not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But
what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs;
those generally accepted principles of morality which have received
some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of
awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is
not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does
not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the
leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our
educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students
in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first
lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as
well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify
the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity)
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying
his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of
P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to
April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S.
Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 6991 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness
incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the service of
the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby
to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the
payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if
any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the
performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head
may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement
dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the
comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of
the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding
petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on
Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a
4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September
1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 19912 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that
"the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code,
including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement
transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992,
however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699
of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-
enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of
1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th
Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner
"elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987
repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was
brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended,
and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary
Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed
with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by
respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under
the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there
was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would
decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated
to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the
legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the
applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in
deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-
related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the
Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to
allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account
of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the
Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not
by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers
may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or
laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.3 A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals.4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature
to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the
scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is
found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed.5 Rather, it is an example of a general
repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws.6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect.7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention
to repeal must be clear and manifest;8 otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the
two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is,
that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not
cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations,
claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the
two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable
conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision
on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has
not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the
COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same
section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the
particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in
force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored this
argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by
a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules
of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code —
the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is
necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.13
We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of
a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was
intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect
system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to
repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of
the former statute.14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence
the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act
that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.15
Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later
act be the substitute to the prior act.16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this
opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as
the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this
particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA
relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of
Sison vs. Pangramuyen17 that in the absence of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted
with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not
hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative
decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the
decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.18 It has been
held that Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice
are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored.20 The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows:
"Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless
the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand
and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.22

Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject

section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second
sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor
Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the

petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for
plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the
judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We
reverse the judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder
stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental
Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and sworn to by him, with
the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera
with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30.
On August 13, 1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding
Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years
and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of
the case for illegal possession of firearm and another case, likewise
filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same
occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a
patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of
the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting
Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm,
sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering
the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16,
1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the
Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on December 11,
1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as
secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People
vs. Macarandang,1 was exempt from the requirements relating to
the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court
a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa2 which
held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the
rule that should be applied to the case at bar that enunciated in
Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears
the date "December 11, 1961" includes a grant of authority to Licera
to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance with
the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated
December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm ... for
use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the
rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang,3 the appointment
of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to
firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect.4
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the
time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle
without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and,
hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by
the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or
interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area,
more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of
Licera's appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a
grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the
time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance
with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is
hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916
CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.
Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.
ARAULLO, J.:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit
of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging
to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said
persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the
cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout,
the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the
peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be
declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the
bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the
appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to
render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and comply
with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the
stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both
sums of wager being held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner,
Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both instances against
the defendant.
cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing
cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know
where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of
no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the
defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the
law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that
the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter
that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and
his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not
reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such
an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case
might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil
Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof,
the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore
mentioned, are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall
remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard
to costs. So ordered.

The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the

complaint and moved to dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff.
On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance rendered
judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs.
The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order
dictated by the same court on November 8th of the same year, on
the plaintiff's motion, ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay and,
if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the same
province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner,
the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come
before us on appeal by means of the proper bill of exceptions.

The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the
judgment appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C.
MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T.
DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L.
DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A.
REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO
BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the
City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar
for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-
46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by
the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided
by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A.
Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with
Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the
accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective
cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted
below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a
common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all
other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation
1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of
6-½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall
length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection
therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of
the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with
the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI
Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI

No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated
April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed
and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of
about 8½ inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or
implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection
therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the
name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the
crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First
Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO
REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses
PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the
President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at
Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly
weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is
no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a
livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred
with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the
offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the
carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected
with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried
under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of
abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and
recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of
this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information
in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon
a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that
more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that
could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose,
and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is
back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are
inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the
heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire
of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-
66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the
charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing
premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons
outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable
by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection
or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that
also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly
weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of
the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made
unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof,
regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon
because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while
on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen
knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the
same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's
home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe
penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree.
Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him
to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his
cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9
were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the
prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by
some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a
tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the
act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable
by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is
one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder.
(pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar
expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him,
thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence
and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a
state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of
wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness
and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of
the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives
in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms,
explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same
would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion
becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable,
which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the
provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the
Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during
martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons
is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their
farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity
would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19,
rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given
before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the
Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at
the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases
where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered
their immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed
by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are
charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7
DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order
No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated
September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief
of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the
desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct,
it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended
by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents
in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to
said persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm
is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or
chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any
other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated
under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to
life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may
direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall
be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the
board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or
private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of
said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand
grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not
limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire
bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical,
chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible
units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or
bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion,
or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which
may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive
effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a
person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed,
pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger,"
"bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such
articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a
livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any
person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2
and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided
for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal
of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of
dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that
the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy.1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is
immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the
carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the
crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in
general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized
pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged
in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be
sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by
the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific
statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In
fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the
statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly
weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly
weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by
a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes
with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone
who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would
disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or
other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is
necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there
exists a substantial difference between the statute and city
ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty
imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute
and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D.
9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal
by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater
force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting
fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential
decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for
an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become
an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by
respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are
daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are
charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with
a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the
offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon,
etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and
second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public
disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that
motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or
some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one
and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any
of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective
of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of
"statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task
to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the
measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this
Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee,
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or
reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated
September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as
well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly
mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid
public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute
usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of
an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the
explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits
the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself
inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the
reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115,
rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects
which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16
N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not
of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal
rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an
apparently general provision may have a limited application if read
together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be
within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause,
the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief
of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the
desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those
related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms
and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or
bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our
duly constituted government and against our people, and having
committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and
rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons,
destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which
activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger
public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of
anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and
destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the
forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's
Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated
forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and
depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid
lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they
will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they
have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly
seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our
present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital
Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon
with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D.
9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved
and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking
Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to
its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis
supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to
inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence
to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and
injurious consequences.9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the
President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or
an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship
on another, and so on.10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the
following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon
a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that
more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that
could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose,
and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his
example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a
lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to
return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30
meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman.
The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places
him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could
the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such
absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state
and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be
"the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is
to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not
to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this
manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor
should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so
by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the
rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as
an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v.
Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be
alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a
sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is
determined solely by the facts alleged therein.13 Where the facts
are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the
quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when
the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is
charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information
that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar
Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an
order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the
facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section
1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the
People could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If
the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another
information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such
order is not made or if having been made another information is not
filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further
time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if
in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on
some other charge.
was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to
quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this
rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information
is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been
extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was
granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be
filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and
unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of
oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their
government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We
AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made
in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right
of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new
one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may
warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police
authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the
oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection
and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case
so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the
purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is
warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in
the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of
the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have
filed an amended Information to include the second element of the
offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We
have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed
but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Information.16
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A.
Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975,
written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated
the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so
that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those
whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities,
may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under
P.D. No. 9.17

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a
complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier,
or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No.
3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire
into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and
prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and
letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual
guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ,
plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in
this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong
de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of
Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant
used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant,
and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in
the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-
hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's
delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of
passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her
head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence
to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at
the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had
sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran,
and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the
team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of
the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered;
that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it
out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip
and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached
to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which
the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of
negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with
interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th
day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except
that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code
pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of
their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damages should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished
a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under
the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence
of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the
judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly
be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a
question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of
negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same.
That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the
law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally
speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903;
16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2
March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13
April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March,
1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses
several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in
the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in
which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never
run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading
the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident
was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the
defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by
their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs.
Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs.
Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs.
Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.)
lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170),
Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the
house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the
street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another
to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of
the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of
his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised
by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances.
It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in
itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse
unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse;
whether he was under the observation and control of some person
all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be
determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it
was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is
not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him
unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public
highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the
wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in
finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was
upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the
alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that
way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as
requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver
goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel
at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left
the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the
house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for
three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start,
is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his
part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the
respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence.
Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal
or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no
liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs.
Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs.
Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.
Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs.
Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance
of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have
been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result
from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted
in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes
successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate
against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a
prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the
circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It
is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's
case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the
injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and
Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court
said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the
case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in
smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's
agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the
case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a
wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her
officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage
was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be
so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves,
not only the fact of the runway and the accident resulting
therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway
occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the
defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the
horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed
as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the
universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind
of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in
which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at
the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not
been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the
sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people?
We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN,
petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO
SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan
City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition
they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died
intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor
the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-
Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho
and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of
Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee;
and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent,
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy
Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the
probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-
27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the
legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31;
Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat
with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed
Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that
of the probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze
Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy
Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had
not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's
Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on
December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English
translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts
Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded
from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook
Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA
decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration,
which was however denied by respondent court. They thus
interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah,
Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of
the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the
motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of
judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1)
and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on
June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a
resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and
decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign
the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE
(sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE
AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH
ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in
accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven.
To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and
documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19,
1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder
brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she
and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and
invitations were sent out; that the said agreement was complied
with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died;
that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze
Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years
old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she
and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before
he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice
during the time of her marriage was a written document [is
exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is
that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known
to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be;
that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be
their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day;
that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring
some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then
one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in
her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931;
that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch
(sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents
of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the
document would be signed by the parties but there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the
wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the
bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties
themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be
placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the
bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with
a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the
bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat
(according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons
present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old
ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the
house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest
brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to
the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married
for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she
doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the
possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years
and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten
by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they
lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in
March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to
the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she
went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips
by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp.
50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee
who stated that he was among the many people who attended the
wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is
issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the
parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-
16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified
before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to
Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to
her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan
City on October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found:
"Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao
Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of
marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on
January 12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found:
"Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of
spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by
the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that
"according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a
Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were
married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of
China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish
the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or
custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue
Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno,
Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires
that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v.
Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a
higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish
a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686,
700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61
Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure
to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling
they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as
judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is
the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
[Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer
v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging
the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to
prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the
contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage
to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony,
which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors
on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was
the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with
Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p.
160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has
indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the
aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that
the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng
marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84)
years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil.
633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that
the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the
testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence
to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar
as said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed
was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent
evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage,
it should be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo
Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.]
Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no
solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article
56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated
[CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her
marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status
of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners'
filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the
following are entered: "Children if any: give number of children—
Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she
had five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely,
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12,
1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for
presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze
Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat
expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy
Kiat told her he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of
whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted
son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee
with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded
the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged
natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at
the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269,
Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased
because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its
extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the
full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's
acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with
whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of
marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance
on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as
his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law
husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which they have
likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May
30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on
January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14,
1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares between, and
distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall
transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy
Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed
children an amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly
out of the rental of the two doors of the same building now
occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of
the real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the
name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be
transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court
of record by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See
Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy
Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the
parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic
Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding,
the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation
of adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations,
legal separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and
title seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-
23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No.
L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and
jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See
Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-
47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer
necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall
be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August
10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of
conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance
and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v.
Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more
importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court
finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO
in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District
No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August
1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue
district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that
the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused
the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while
business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not
liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly
corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from
real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8
Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.10
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was
filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum
alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under
protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face
of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced
on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed
by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last
included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent
filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence,
it filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact
that a particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to
April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of
730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither
interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus,
this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22 Section
229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive
period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on
the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the
claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within
730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review
in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in
Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from
the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-
year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when
the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365
days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that
a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year.26 Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a 5th
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap
year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is calendar month
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of 6th
to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
(emphasis supplied) Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, calendar month
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of derogat priori.
time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, 7th
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned calendar month
month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April
illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows: October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from
January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, Year 1 8th
2008.30
1st calendar month
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that
the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled
with the previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 9th
the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
2nd calendar month
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998 10th
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be 3rd calendar month
abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all
laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1 calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998 11th
have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The
test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the 4th calendar month
subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or
reasonably reconciled.33 calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month No costs.

calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999 SO ORDERED.

March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999 20th

Year 2
13th calendar month

calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999 21st

14th calendar month

calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999 22nd

15th calendar month

calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999 23rd

16th calendar month

calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999 24th

17th calendar month

calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the
day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed
18th within the reglementary period.

calendar month Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED
to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously
September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999 proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V.
19th Parcero.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983
and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
"no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition
are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse
of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a
certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2
Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and
we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the
Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street,
San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm
of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated
by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated
by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-
P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an
unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
2 further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of
the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5
However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints
were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided
by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch
XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As
a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until
after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion
was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former
was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment.
13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid
order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as
parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule
in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution
for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued
by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of
a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that
after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution
was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of
the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in
this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil
case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our
law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully
relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old
Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared
null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration
of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio
is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after
said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the
criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same
rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta,
hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A
cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse
therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a
factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of
the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to
quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987
is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with
others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is
free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if
one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of the National law
doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife
is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is
no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct
view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of
the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the
foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents
of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce
as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial
to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the
new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce
should be considered void both with respect to the American
husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot
apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar
as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2
and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo
T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed
on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which
they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family
Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of
the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and
legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his
position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers
on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.
28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions
as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14,
1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that
the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage.
As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40
we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez
are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that
a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between
a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55
where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that
where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the
ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the
Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60
the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating
that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67
In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however,
the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo
as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss
contrary is proven. 77 and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the trial court for further proceedings.
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article
148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of SO ORDERED.
the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union
of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s
defense. x x x 81
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To
live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due.
These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law
and order in society. We reaffirm them in this petition for review on
certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan
Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle
the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco
against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the
three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the
motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s
business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was
visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold
on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching
Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle
was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan
assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September
1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments
and told petitioner corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that
the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching,
accompanied by policemen,5 went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to
recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo
Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent.
While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner
Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises,
the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence while
petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take
photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner
Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the
motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor
bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed
the complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitching’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the
RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to
hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of
the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that
respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and
malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the
respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10 finding that
petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he
called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner
and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners’ acts were found to be contrary to
Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held
petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages,
P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorney’s fees plus
costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision with modification, reducing the award of moral and
exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.13
Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole
(allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the filing of a
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in
favor of respondent.
Petitioners’ suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for
damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking
the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive
manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice
and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to
respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners
were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings.
This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to
respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners’ concern, we also find that the
trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the
complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners
themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."15
Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the
RTC, as adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the
City Prosecutor’s Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching
knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no
probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had
no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in
question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill
collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Veraño[,] that
Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for
the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of
[respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo
Veraño in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of
Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [‘]taken[’],
not [‘]unlawfully taken[’] or ‘stolen.’ Yet, despite the double
hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the
[complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as ‘the
suspect’ of the stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of
‘qualified theft and fencing activity’ before the City [Prosecutor’s]
Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily
signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is
that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse
[respondent] or the latter’s men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much
less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the
authorities. That Atty. Uypitching’s act in charging [respondent] with
qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also
shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga16 [during
one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint?
You have already recovered the motorcycle…"[:] "Aron motagam
ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of
motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual
matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly
mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right
thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such
possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure.18
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law,
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment should indemnify him.22
with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000
illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
mouthed a slanderous statement. CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto
Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners’ improper behavior.
acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations. SO ORDERED.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.19 It
seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or
duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another.20 The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive
or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.21
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at
petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of
the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial
and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act
of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered
to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but
terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954
as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am
leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of
court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00
as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders,
judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It
added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief
and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court.
Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for
two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de
Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable
element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by
the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and
his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in
its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to
appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his
petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in
the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an
affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this
stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was
in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment
sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of
Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now
Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to
said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was
declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs.
Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason
given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as
reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts
not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh.
E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant,
who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating:
"Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never
heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As

stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages

awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of
actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is
that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21
of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that
the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article
2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted
in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of
this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to
be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the

lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages
brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil
Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more
popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at
around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his
friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager,
Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for
him for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up
with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was
the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first
had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat
with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the
buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but,
to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as
Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue
at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes
tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who
was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus
adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was
still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a
common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million
Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary
damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave
the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by
the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive
Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions
included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and
extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some
hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21
At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter
ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain
waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not
invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group
of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her
that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested
Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes
conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28
Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms.
Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes
by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there
were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr.
Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to
wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms.
Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang
ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She
then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and
making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33
1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the
lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she
never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr.
Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the
celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse,
she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed
and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes
already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col.
Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did
not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41
giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was
discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a
guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk
of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not
invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the
law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some
right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel
and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took
responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court
as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that
he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the
hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to
morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate
the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a
consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises
from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but
contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the
exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally
cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in
approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr.
Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she
should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should
have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been
done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and
together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close
friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to
approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not
have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated
upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which
calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates
this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were
attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of
the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko,
Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr.
Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as
the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and
passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim
contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A
GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING,
AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION,"
"WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT
AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY
BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN
ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE
APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he
was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or
to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the
case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21
of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly
in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively
in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party
where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence
of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent
power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is
that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this
general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court
ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave
the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate
court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish
his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other
guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr.
Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the
lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-
invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese
national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his
face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was
aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s
instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get
rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not
to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in
the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss.
To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would
certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions
of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove
that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could
not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that
and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close.
Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while
you were at the buffet table? How close was she when she
approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and
she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba
ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they
nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need
for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is
that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who
alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness
to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito
Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts
and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following:
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith
or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is
violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a
violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was
perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the
act complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not
shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two
people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the
statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very
strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by
her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to
leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the
appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms.
Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct
especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April
told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith. SO ORDERED.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because
of the latter’s lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited
somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration,
but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp.
33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to
avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should
be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs

counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on
hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident
in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a
radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee
of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74
During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that
he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other
hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and
economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny
as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim

and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated
09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the
16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is
the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach
of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community;
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted
and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to
live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay
her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the
personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint
and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced
her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told
her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay
captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00
as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court
issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the
parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen
and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year
medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up
to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced
the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the
Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the
private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the
sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions
that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private
respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she
allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended
our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because,
inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come
to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the
foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time
and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed
marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as
his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as
he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members
of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and
sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good
and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and
sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon.
When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in
the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole
day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent
by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince
him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although
the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant
had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already
looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited
many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent
Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256.
In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in
ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16
October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant
who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a
girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not
used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact,
we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would
not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in
public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on
March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal
of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to
her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant
where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished
his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine,
he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that
woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country
girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on
26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not
Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because
he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any
good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is
a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife
as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed
arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The
mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her
Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply
thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they
subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the
petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses
and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the
appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or
values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over
again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court.
There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453
[1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate
and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any
of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it
so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise
to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of
De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the
girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as
culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened
the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of
the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier
adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted
at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery
was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon
a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
(43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for
one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman
of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case
is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L.
Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach
of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse
was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30,
1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge,
there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer,
33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar
sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished
without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority
or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given
herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can
be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness
(sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of
fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen
years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition
to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise
to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot
recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN,
p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in
need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in
dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that
may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the
petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then,
from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and
an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of
love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to
fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy
a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in
pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in
a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition
of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not
apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is
not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private
respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval
to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision,

the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective
damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the
complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if
true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried
on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a
married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable
for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that
defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad
faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision
dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the
ground that the issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents,
brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the
La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation.
Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant
was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in
their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who
regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not
only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to
teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other
the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each
other but also the extent to which they had carried their
relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of
Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita.
The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant
who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and
sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On
April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left,
her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled
piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small
slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this
month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning
at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities
and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her
whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code
which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based
on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love
affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of
the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair
was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great
damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her
parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their
complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove
that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's
affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this
point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of
the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the
human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita
simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on
their part, but also against their better judgment and in full
consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially
so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love
with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how
to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the
latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a
collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family,
the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where
Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their
illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who
is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love
affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused
her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS,
respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a
dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to
the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for
which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered
the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias
made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that
he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one
week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned
to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him
and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered
to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination
by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the
anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a
laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of
participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private
investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10,
1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report
however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a
memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the
filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police
Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a
second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous
finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in
the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent
transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests
conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the
anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator,
was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the
City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently
five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of
which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document
while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled
with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however,
remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four
of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the
Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh.
"F") from petitioners that his employment has been terminated
effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed
the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting
on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor
arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order
with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal
with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered
into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry,
without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during
the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX,
through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias
appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of
Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable
for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages
in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of
petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the
inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of
the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of
the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society,
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not
violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their
legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however,
leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the
Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No.
L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may
be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the
Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and
factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo
v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250,
December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July
31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R.
No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No.
50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it
was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence
of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence
and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the
number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and
to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But
regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards
the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An
employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such
as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a
leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment
accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one
week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted
by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this
company." Considering that the first report made by the police
investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A]
the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court
has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal
is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc.,
G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18
SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several
other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias
after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of
January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints
against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias'
protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against
Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as
well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook"
and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See
Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a
letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias
had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because
of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as
a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period
of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners
must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have
a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind
of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was."
[Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the
accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or
warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor
or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the
possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.].
These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a
seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after
almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal
complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case
against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be
"penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking
justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was
their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that
persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs
and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103
Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not
be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R.
No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V.
Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the
Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be
used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function
of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia
CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld
the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages
and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with
persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent,
all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a
person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA
602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA,
G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by
the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent
evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison
v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that
petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against
Tobias, observing that:
x x x pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of
Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which were for
estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets
thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the
cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted
to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate
General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad
plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was
frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.
x x x against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the
findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the
Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or
involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite
the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants
compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police
investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report
will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered,"
defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's
Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal
Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were
dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia,
commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste
in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be no
mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to
plaintiff.
x x x
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court
finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the
petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were
filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove
their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed
against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred
cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions
committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good
faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the
first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against
Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was
made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In
fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were
filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the
fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed
cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal
complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the
following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages;
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The
trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by
Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him
the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty
of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive
manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the
investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as
the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the
malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of
the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias
was reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper,
invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that
"[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private
respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his
having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and
legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners
herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However,
the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089,
December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision
of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code."
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral
damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners.
Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled
that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages,
with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed
is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta
case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the
award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or

loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount
to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207,
September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29
Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-
18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work,
the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a
legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but
was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed
by petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is
the issue in the instant petition for review premised on the
following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984
up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-
1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice
Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year
law student (Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by
Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May
30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-
N").1âwphi1.nêt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College
of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students
should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of
Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1
to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the
candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April
1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that
occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the
candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of
the names of the candidates there appeared however the following
annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these
candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in
the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz
Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the program of which he
went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic)
mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter
handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical
of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion
(Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by
neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the
forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during
the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a
leave of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to
September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review
class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned
of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to
take the bar examination.2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that
he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing
mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed
the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the
lower court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter
to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of
suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower
court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-
appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for
moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE
elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to
respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter
arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor
concerned the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning
institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors
hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under
the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the
student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's
agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result of
his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students
from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes
judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions
wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their
grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform
and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they
would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless
is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational
institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the
students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree
during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony,
the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also
most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the
removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have
acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of
the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school
that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules,
regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the
prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control,
much less influence, over the way an educational institution should
run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers
and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders.
Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises
general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with
respect to the submission of reports involving the students'
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had
any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or
injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation
of an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and
the supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it
that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or
position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by
the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the
rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act
of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein
is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that
others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no
internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they
act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that
those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act
in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable
reliance under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent
to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of
their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the
former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the
conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would
make the erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that
time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to
inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out
its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply
with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission
of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from
its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the
following disquisition of the respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-
appellee University had been informed during the deliberation that
the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing
grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant
of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did
they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the
knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again
included plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of
candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation
and which became the basis for the commencement rites program.
Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was
allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation
in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the
situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean
Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader
could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-
appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-
appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its
own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to
respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.13 The
modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere
fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for
injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith
make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in
the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to

respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock,
trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate
and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he
has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically
those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given
these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have
suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar
exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has
satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before
preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the
subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and
submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must
meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs
of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177,
denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife
and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto
and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as
a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age
(scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house
of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage,
indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend,
Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned
out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of
their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor,
Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his
return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married
and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought
some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall,
which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the
elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente
went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the
college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following
morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack
of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the
officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor
met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to
his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still
solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her
previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition,
and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a
"jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for
her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case
was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at
the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a
passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that
she intended to return after two years. The application was
approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950,
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff
in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for
the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce,
"final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor
(Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him,
has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar
by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended
on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto
and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed
the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the
exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and
the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay
the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought
by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez,
and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to
each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above
the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to
the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is
nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil
law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the
parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is
irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of
Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a
formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said
marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of
the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that
the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at
bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only
after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently
suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the
marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom
she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and
assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by
a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October
1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not
even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage
of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code
only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108),
and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect
to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens
could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside
the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's
divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through
her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge
of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the
basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage
after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines
and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were
rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute
divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo
before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil
Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act
2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest.
Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated
in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The
claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel
Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,
begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid
divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on
the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court
committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where
the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on
the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in
Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands
are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr.
Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated
the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony
of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied
by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-
Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters
he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them"
and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders"
and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was
admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the
record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as
good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected
event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of
their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it
was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did
not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her
resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections.
Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while
she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not
wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in
her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper
motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her
subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and
being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and
ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the
liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will
justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of
the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held
that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has
more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with
racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and
pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice
take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a or unworthy motives on their part.
million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in
secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived follows;
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay
appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion and attorneys' fees;
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees. (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we
opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded Neither party to recover costs.
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that
said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and

decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386),
is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation

with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a
decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce

decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.
Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.
Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty
Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J.
Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of
Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the
issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was
the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio
family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS.
ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by
BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a
cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the
needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place
free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans
took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and
determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house ... for
P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving
community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision
planned for wholesome family living.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated
January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of
the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital,
noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty
the following letter of protest:
Dear Sirs:
This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15,
1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly
depicted my house at the above-mentioned address and implying
that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any
permission or authority on my part for the use of my house for such
publicity.
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and
much more the apparent distortions therein are I believe not only
transgression to my private property but also damaging to my
prestige in the medical profession I have had invited in several
occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and
friends to my house and after reading your December 15
advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting
doubts as to my professional and personal integrity. Such sly
remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how
much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife
portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," etc.,
have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine
Medical Association and their final advice is pending upon my
submission of supporting ownership papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your
corporation unless you could satisfactorily explain this matter within
a week upon receipt of this letter.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis
Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the
advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his
apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.
On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis
Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D).
In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed that there
was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification
would be published in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a
new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But
it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation
of the error.
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis
Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969
the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is'
which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a
rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times
issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968
and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another
Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was
mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the
Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real
house in the background, as was intended all along.
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have
immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as
a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of
sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was
violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000
as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding
Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and Justices Sixto A.
Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed
an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court
ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This
contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this
Court.

St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law
and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the
rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article
26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief".

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles

2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral
damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily
explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm
fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the

Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused

by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily
exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J.
DATUIN, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January
31, 2007 and its Resolution3 dated September 12, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63602, entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo
SG. Villanueva, et al."
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint4 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law) by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of
the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of
petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner
Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances
bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was
unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 236544, 236545, and 236546, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
The MeTC issued a warrant5 for her arrest, and it was served upon
her by the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30 a.m.
in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their two (2)
daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the
PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and
mug shots, and was detained. She was released in the afternoon of
the same day when her husband posted a bond for her temporary
liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion6 for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she
could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even
have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were
drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National
Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was
patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on
the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted.
In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of
Desistance7 dated August 18, 1998, stating, among others, that
Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks
subject of prosecution.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss8 dated November 12, 1998 with respect to Criminal Case
Nos. 236544-46. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases dismissed.9
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint10 for damages
against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. The complaint, in part, reads —
4. That on or about December 15, 1995, defendant Emma J. Datuin
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an "Affidavit of
Complaint" wherein, among others, she alleged under oath that as
an Officer In-charge of the Accounts Receivables Department of
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she was duly authorized and empowered
by said company to file cases against debtors, customers and
dealers of the company;
xxxx
5. That while acting under authority of her employer namely the
defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., defendant EMMA J. DATUIN
falsely stated in the "Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex "A"), among
others, that plaintiff Zenaida R. Gregorio issued and delivered to
their office the following checks, to wit:
a. PNB Check No. C-347108 dated November 30, 1992 in the
amount of ₱9,564.00;
b. PNB Check No. C-347109 dated November 30, 1992 in the
amount of ₱19,194.48; and
c. PNB Check No. C-347104 dated December 2, 1992 in the amount
of ₱10,000.00
and that the above-mentioned PNB Checks bounced when
deposited upon maturity;
6. That as a result of the filing of the "Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex
"A") wherein defendant Emma J. Datuin falsely charged the plaintiff
with offenses of Estafa and/or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on three (3)
counts, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a
Resolution dated April 1, 1996 finding the existence of a probable
cause against the plaintiff for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on
three counts;
xxxx
7. That in the "MEMO OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION" attached
hereto as Annex "C," signed by defendant Emma J. Datuin she
falsely indicated the address of plaintiff to be at No. 76 Peñaranda
Street, Legaspi City when the truth of the matter is that the latter’s
correct address is at Barangay Rizal, Oas, Albay;
8. That as a consequence of the aforegoing false and misleading
indication of address, plaintiff was therefore not duly notified of the
charges filed against her by defendant Emma J. Datuin; and more,
she was not able to controvert them before the investigating
prosecutor, finally resulting in the filing in court of three (3)
informations accusing her of violating B.P. 22;
xxxx
9. That as pernicious result of the unwarranted and baseless
accusation by the defendants which culminated in the filing of three
(3) informations in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3
indicting the plaintiff on three counts of the offense of violating B.P.
22, the said court issued a Warrant of Arrest on July 22, 1996
ordering the arrest of the plaintiff;
xxxx
10. That taking extra effort to expedite the apprehension of plaintiff,
defendants’ retained private prosecutor managed to obtain the
Warrant for the Arrest of said plaintiff from the Court as evidenced
by the copy of the letter of lawyer Alquin B. Manguerra of Chua and
Associates Law Office (Annex "H") so much so that in the morning of
October 17, 1997, while plaintiff was visiting her husband Jose
Gregorio and their two daughters at their city residence at 78 K-2
Street, Kamuning, Quezon City, and without the slightest
premonition that she was wanted by the law, armed operatives of
the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of DILG
suddenly swooped down on their residence, arrested the plaintiff
and brought her to the PARAC DILG Office in Quezon City where she
was fingerprinted and detained like an ordinary criminal;
xxxx
11. That feeling distraught, helpless and hungry (not having eaten
for a whole day) the plaintiff languished in her place of confinement
until the late afternoon of October 17, 1997 when her husband was
able to post a bond for her temporary liberty and secure an order of
release (Annex "J") from the court. It was providential that a city
judge was available in the late afternoon of October 17, 1997 which
was a Friday, otherwise plaintiff would have remained in
confinement for the entire weekend;
12. That because of her desire to prove and establish her innocence
of the unjustified charges lodged against her by the defendants, the
plaintiff was thus compelled to retain the services of counsel
resulting in the filing of a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Reinvestigation (Annex "K") which was granted by the court; the
filing of a Request for Reinvestigation with the prosecutor’s office
(Annex "L"); and the submission of a Counter-Affidavit to the
investigating prosecutor. All of these culminated in the filing by the
investigating prosecutor of a Motion to Dismiss (Annex "M") the
three criminal cases as a consequence of which the Court issued an
Order dated June 1, 1999 (Annex "N") dismissing Criminal Cases No.
236544, No. 236545 and No. 236546, copy of which was received by
plaintiff only on July 7, 2000;
13. That previous to the filing of the above-mentioned Motion to
Dismiss by the prosecutor and having been faced with the truth and
righteousness of plaintiff’s avowal of innocence which was
irrefutable, defendants had no recourse but to concede and
recognize the verity that they had wrongly accused an innocent
person, in itself a brazen travesty of justice, so much so that
defendant Emma J. Datuin had to execute an Affidavit of Desistance
(Annex "O") admitting that plaintiff is not a signatory to the three
bouncing checks in question, rationalizing, albeit lamely, that the
filing of the cases against the plaintiff was by virtue of an honest
mistake or inadvertence on her (Datuin’s) part;
14. Be that as it may, incalculable damage has been inflicted on the
plaintiff on account of the defendants’ wanton, callous and reckless
disregard of the fundamental legal precept that "every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" (Art. 26, Civil Code of the Philippines);
15. That the plaintiff, being completely innocent of the charges
against her as adverted to in the preceding paragraphs, was socially
humiliated, embarrassed, suffered physical discomfort, mental
anguish, fright, and serious anxiety as a proximate result of her
unjustified indictment, arrest and detention at the PARAC
headquarters – all of these ordeals having been exacerbated by the
fact that plaintiff is a woman who comes from a respected family in
Oas, Albay, being the wife of an executive of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, the mother of two college students
studying in Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a businesswoman by
occupation, and an incumbent Municipal Councilor (Kagawad) of
Oas, Albay, at the time of her arrest and detention; and that she
previously held the following positions:
(a). President, Philippine Pharmaceutical Association (Albay
Chapter);
(b). Chairman of the Board, Albay Pharmaceutical Marketing
Cooperative (ALPHAMAC);
(c). Charter Secretary, Kiwanis Club of Oas;
(d). Chairman, Polangui Ladies Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Polangui,
Albay;
(e). Vicarial Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate International,
District IX;
(f). Chapter President and Municipal Coordinator, Albay Women
Volunteers Association, Inc., Legaspi City;
(g). Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate International Virgo
Clemens Circle, Oas, Albay;
(h). Secretary, Girl Scout of the Philippines District Association; and
(i). Director, Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO),
not to mention the undue aspersion cast upon her social,
professional and business reputation because of defendants’
tortious act of accusing her of Estafa and/or issuing bouncing checks
– even without a scintilla of evidence;
16. That to compound the aforegoing travails and sufferings of the
plaintiff she had to devote and spend much of her time, money and
efforts trying to clear her tarnished name and reputation, including
traveling to and from Manila to confer with her lawyer, attend the
hearings at the prosecutor’s office and at the Metropolitan Trial
Court;
17. By and large, defendants’ fault or, at the very least, their
reckless imprudence or negligence, in filing the three (3) criminal
cases against the plaintiff unequivocally caused damage to the latter
and because of defendants’ baseless and unjustified accusations,
plaintiff was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to
represent her at the Metropolitan Trial Court and at the Office of
the City Prosecutor at Manila in order to establish her innocence
and cause the dismissal of the three (3) criminal cases filed against
her, reason for which she spent ₱20,000.00; and in order to institute
this instant action for the redress of her grievances, plaintiff have to
pay the sum of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and incur litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱35,000.00;
18. That by reason of all the aforegoing and pursuant to the
provision of law that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done," (Article 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines), the
plaintiff is entitled to and hereby claims the following items of
damages:
a. ₱3,000,000.00 as moral damages
b. ₱50,000.00 as actual damages
c. ₱50,000.00 as nominal damages
d. ₱70,000.00 as attorney’s fees
e. ₱35,000.00 as litigation expenses
19. That defendants herein are jointly and solidarily liable for the
payment of the above items of damages being co-tortfeasors.
Moreover, defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC. is vicariously liable
as the employer of defendant Emma J. Datuin who patently acted
within the scope of her assigned tasks (Vide: Art. 2180, Civil Code of
the Philippines).11
Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss12 on the ground that
the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious
prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
Gregorio opposed13 the Motion. Sansio and Datuin filed their
Reply14 to the Opposition. Gregorio, in turn, filed her Rejoinder.15
On October 10, 2000, the RTC issued an Order16 denying the
Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion for
Reconsideration17 of the October 10, 2000 Order, but the RTC
denied the same in its Order18 dated January 5, 2001.
Sansio and Datuin went to the CA via a petition19 for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying
their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the
civil case for damages instituted by Gregorio, directing Sansio and
Datuin, jointly and solidarily, to pay Gregorio ₱200,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱10,000.00 as nominal damages; ₱35,000.00 as litigation
expenses; ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of the suit. The
RTC expressly stated in its Decision that the complaint was one for
damages based on quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution.
Aggrieved by the March 20, 2003 Decision, Sansio and Datuin
appealed to the CA, and the same is now pending resolution.
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision on the certiorari
case granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the damage
suit of Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said Decision
but the same was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated
September 12, 2007.
Hence, this petition.
The core issue to be resolved, as culled from the factual
circumstances of this case, is whether the complaint, a civil suit filed
by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the complaint for
damages filed by Gregorio before the RTC was for malicious
prosecution, but it failed to allege the elements thereof, such that it
was aptly dismissed on appeal by the CA on the ground of lack of
cause of action. In their comment, citing Albenson Enterprise
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,20 they posit that Article 26 of the
Civil Code, cited by Gregorio as one of the bases for her complaint,
and Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the same Code, mentioned by the RTC
as bases for sustaining the complaint, are the very same provisions
upon which malicious prosecution is grounded. And in order to
further buttress their position that Gregorio’s complaint was indeed
one for malicious prosecution, they even pointed out the fact that
Gregorio prayed for moral damages, which may be awarded only in
case of malicious prosecution or, if the case is for quasi-delict, only if
physical injury results therefrom.
We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages
readily shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for
filing against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that
respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true
identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded
checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that
respondents never gave her the opportunity to controvert the
charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the
criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting
her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad
in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles
26,21 2176,22 and 218023 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite
alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined
by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.24 Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its
entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious
prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties.25
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach,
though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse;
(5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.26
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments
thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s
rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of
mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the
person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently
funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to
ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given
proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76
Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as
stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested
by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78
K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest
and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear
her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held
several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in
the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at
the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between
Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting
Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability,
as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee
Datuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted

a cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was
correct when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s
complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover
damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or
bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio,
knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to
vex and humiliate her.27 As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not
allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for
moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on
quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she
was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted
against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper,
given the factual antecedents of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January

31, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February
1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information
which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging
that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC
of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime
of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and
Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted
petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be
dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in
Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already
final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it
was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are
not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and
arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that
there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili
and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness,
non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As
such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No.
128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said
decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24,
2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on
certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED
JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST
PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS
BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT,
AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE
TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS
BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT
IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY
TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME
"CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL
AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON
DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration
of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may
still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction
for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the
first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the
aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further
held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is
clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of
the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4
The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-
L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which
second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of
the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which,
as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall
before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to
by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented
(1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes
on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would
plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to
the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his
brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to
note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office
and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are
dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind,
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner
has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24
Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy
step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same
shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the
crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to annul the Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed
against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the
RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in
San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which
alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first
marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13
arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that
the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which
appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has
not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It
found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of
her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we
held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second
marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the
RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in
1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the
Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her
first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition
for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair
her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity
of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set
aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information.
Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had
contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the
Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state
of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the
principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was
declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first
marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated
January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that
the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said
marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us
raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid
defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second
marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private
complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings
filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had
done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the offended party
(private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her
husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among
others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in
all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that
we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is
aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the
OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required
the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in
some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has
ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the
petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect,
such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or
not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy
as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion
to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April
2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case,
her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from
the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to
speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question
now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the
moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime
of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the
first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during
the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing
of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was
rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not
marriage. enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.34 adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
prosecuted for bigamy.35 subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would
effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void
marriage. WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
We are not persuaded. January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into court for further proceedings.
before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of SO ORDERED.
the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."
The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B.
ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N.
SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN,
ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance
brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to
deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is
properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the
ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination
is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges
based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF
Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain)
as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots
situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total
area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of
₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three
separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under
the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel
Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a
total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed
of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties
paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San
Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20
TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale
because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver
at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as
receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on
August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas)
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-
delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39,
both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6
praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel
Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’
claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not
have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his
having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the
SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were
irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should
have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under
receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all
claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the
receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and
extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of
the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under
custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings,
necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed
in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to
suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas,8 citing the pendency of
BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition,
BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September
12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27,
2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a
motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to
the intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution,10
dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be
filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had
appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the
issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior
resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there
appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not
being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel
Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000,
holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held
liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No.
957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s
actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF
Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to
deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas
to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied
the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City
Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for
violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land
Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific
performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and
rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in
question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF
Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72,
the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices
under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union
Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29,
1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules
on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question
with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF
Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge
criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In
other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD
957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on
the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for
reconsideration.13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to
the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008),
contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave
abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors
and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or
not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial
question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’
petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the
rule on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal
actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs.
Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an
administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the
resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the
suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative
proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme
Court relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court
similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed
petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should
the demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal
as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil
action involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial
question which must be resolved prior to an administrative
proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that
in the interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case
pending determination of another case closely interrelated or
interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse
of discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question
to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity
of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF
Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal
culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes,
Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of
land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the
HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of
private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an
absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no
obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and
contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against
private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which
they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein
public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a
public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under
no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October
2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on
January 18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the
following for consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT
SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION
25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO
PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY
SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD
DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY
2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES,
INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO
DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES
CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT
IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE
THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB
CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT
CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE
TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO
PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
HLURB’S RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE
EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action
for specific performance and damages that San Miguel Properties
instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January
25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’
behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical
antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the
complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding that
although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one
case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to
suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of the
administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to
the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in
suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed
the HLURB Board’s ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance
under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 – "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the
authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD
1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases "involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in
the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties
under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever
appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for
some forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming – the issue on the
authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it
peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues
thereon having been joined and the respective position papers and
the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it
behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the
right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation
of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha
Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the
finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed
to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or
not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the
question of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction
with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether
or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC
resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty.
Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20
decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San
Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and
ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further
proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within
the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB
has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual
and statutory obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s
competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB
should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be
remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take
under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the
proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable
cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case
brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to
suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’
posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the
HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a
criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission
that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no
civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the
action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the
charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action
was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be
suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the
facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance
case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint
for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the
question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature
of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the
exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was
made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with
what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either
case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific
performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded,
Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal
obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil
Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution
applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of
the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the
injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one,
contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the
rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with
payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that
regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of
the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly"
the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of
alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers
and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No.
957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration
and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the
procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or
non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance
in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the
remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether
or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San
Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs
because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF
Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by
the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section
25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby
negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need
not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is
enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of
the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented
a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested
its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of
the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case
pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no
consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the
HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these
agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently
invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has
observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into
play on matters demanding the special competence of
administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time
within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its
determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
some administrative board or commission because it involves
technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be
obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes
within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine
does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its
suspension until after the matters within the competence of the
administrative body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts
cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question
within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the
controversy having been so placed within the special competence of
the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within
the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the
resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or
dismissal of the action is proper.33
given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would
produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not
validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the
criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves
initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal
action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial
question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised
by the party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question
makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the

character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF
Homes’ directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the
TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable.34 The mere
fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away
with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result
by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application
of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be