EN BANC complied with, it is held that the proposed importations are EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS; CASE AT BAR.

— The American
[G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.] illegal. theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO 4. ID.; IMPORTATIONS "MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is
G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, ITSELF." — The provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any admit, but, also, insist that the contracts in question are not
Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, "government agency", apply likewise to importations "made treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of by the Government itself," because each and every officer and treaties to which the United States is a signatory require the
Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR employee of our Government, are government agencies advice and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of
MARIÑO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents. and/or agents. the legislative department. No such justification can be given
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner. 5. ID.; PROTECTION OF LOCAL PLANTERS OF RICE AND as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
CORN TO FOSTER SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN LOCAL PRODUCTION. legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for
— The protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
respondents.
that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of
SYLLABUS
production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is the United States.
1. PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; SUFFICIENCY OF
vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. 10. COURTS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO INVALIDATE
PETITIONER'S INTEREST AS RICE PLANTER AND TAXPAYER TO
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; AN TREATIES. — The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
SEEK RESTRAINT OF ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL RICE IMPORTATION.
EXECUTIVE OFFICER CANNOT DISREGARD THE LAW EVEN IF HE settled the question of whether an international agreement
— The status of petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of
BELIEVES THAT COMPLIANCE WILL NOT BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by
substantial proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the
— Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive officer providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme
Government the rice; it now seeks to buy abroad and, as a
believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity effected
the people he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected — reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error,
with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives said
we still live under a rule of law. as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant petition seeking
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which
to restrain the allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds
AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION WHICH IS the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
to import rice from abroad.
PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. — or executive order or regulation is in question." In other
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF
Although the President may, under the American words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS APPLICABLE TO
constitutional system, enter into executive not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also
CASE AT BAR. — The principle requiring the previous
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: (1)
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2)
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. 1. RICE IMPORTATION; INJUNCTION GRANTED
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or 8. ID.; ID.; MAIN FUNCTION OF EXECUTIVE IS TO DESPITE ILLEGALITY OF IMPORTATION WHERE
ENFORCE LAWS ENACTED BY CONGRESS, NOT TO DEFEAT ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED WITH FOREIGN
(3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose
SAME. — Under the Constitution, the main function of the GOVERNMENTS; REASONS. — Respondents, despite their lack
acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former of compliance with the Rice Importation Law, should not be
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers enjoined from carrying out the importation of the rice which
of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may according to the record has been authorized to be imported
urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the on a government to government level; it appearing that
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the samethrough an arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the
3. RICE IMPORTATION LAWS; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very only thing lacking being its implementation. Had the writ been
WHERE CONDITIONS FOR IMPORTATION NOT COMPLIED
act prohibited by said laws. issued, our government would have been placed in a
WITH. — Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic
9. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; THEORY THAT IN A predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation of
CONFLICT BETWEEN TREATY AND STATUTE, THE LATEST IN have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to its greet
rice, and in the case at bar such conditions have not been
POINT OF TIME SHALL PREVAIL, NOT APPLICABLE TO embarrassment and loss of face.
 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; CIVIL
AUTHORITY SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY. — The injunction
embodied in the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1)
that the civil authority shall always be supreme, can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to insure the
security and preservation of the State, and, to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action
must always be taken within the framework of the civil
authority.
Barrera, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREMACY OF CIVIL
AUTHORITY; THEORY THAT THE MILITARY MAY DISREGARD
RICE IMPORTATION LAWS IS DANGEROUS. — The theory that
rice can he legally imported by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the
prohibitory provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a
dangerous trend. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the
existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or
classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effort to
equate the army with the Government itself.
2. ID.; EXECUTIVE POWERS; NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL; FUNCTION TO DELIBERATE ON EXISTENCE OF
EMERGENCY. — It is not for the Department of National
Defense to unilaterally determine the existence of a threat of
emergency, but for the National Security Council to do so.
Otherwise, any change in the political climate of any region of
the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to
conjure up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to
override our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly
institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of
precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the interest
of the security of the state.
3. ID.; ID.; THEORY OF "THE END JUSTIFIES THE
MEANS" REJECTED. — Adoption as a government policy of the
theory of "the end justifies the means" brushing aside
constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we
end up with the end of freedom.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an original action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963,
respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed
of the other respondents herein 1 for the implementation of
said proposed importation. Thereupon, or on September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter,
and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of
rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in
making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice,
the aforementioned respondents "are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act
No. 3452 — which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency"; that petitioner has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the
preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency
of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from
becoming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary
injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondents, their
agents or representatives from implementing the decision of
the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign
rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their
answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at
which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a
memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said
incident may require some pronouncements that would be
more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits soon thereafter. The
parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although
counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of Petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as
a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We
find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency", Republic Act
No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the
Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers
and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their
products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return
for their labor and capital investment. . . ." Pursuant to this
provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of
substantial proportion, 2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover,
since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected
with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice
producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a
taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and
interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining
what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs
prayed for because he "has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court". We have
already held, however, that the principle requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one" 3 , or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, 4 or where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter 5 , unless actually
disapproved by him, 6 or where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at
bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the
general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's
cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation
in question is not governed by Republic Act Nos.
2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as
commander-in-chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the
exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2
of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in cases of necessity, the
President "or his subordinates may take such preventive
measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of
peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces,
"the President . . . is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge
of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any special
authority."
Regardless of whether Republic Act No.
3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein — on which our view need not be expressed
— we are unanimously of the opinion — assuming that
said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts
are applicable to the proposed importation in question
because the language of said laws is such as to include within
the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the
Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be
unlawful for any person, association, corporation
or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in
the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds that
"the President of the Philippines may authorize the
importation of these commodities through any government
agency that he may designate", if the conditions prescribed in
Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No.
3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration
or any government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions
of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do
not apply to importations "made by the Government itself",
because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is
devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents
herein, and each and every officer and employee of our
Government, are government agencies and/or agents. The
applicability of said laws even to importations by the
Government, as such, becomes more apparent when we
consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act
No. 2207 is to be authorized by "the
President of the Philippines", and,
hence, by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and
Corn Administration and any other
government agency from importing
rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 3452 adds " that the
importation of rice and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes", thus indicating
that only "private parties" may import
rice under its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding
P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not
more than five (5) years for those who
shall violate any provision of Republic
Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant
thereto, Section 15 of said Act
provides that "if the offender is
a public official and/or employee", he
shall be subject to the additional
penalty specified therein. A public
official is an officer of the Government
itself, as distinguished from officers or
employees of instrumentalities of the
Government. Hence, the duly
authorized acts of the former are
those of the Government, unlike those
of a government instrumentality
which may have a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that
of the Government, as such. The
provisions of Republic Act No.
2207 are, in this respect, even more
explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a
similar additional penalty for any
"officer or employee of the
Government" who "violates, abets or
tolerates the violation of any
provision" of said Act. Hence, the
intent to apply the same to
transactions made by the very
government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts
are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth
Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for
the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
"The Purchase and Equipment Division
of the Government of the Philippines and other
officers and employees of the municipal and
provincial governments and the Government of
the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards,
commissions, bureaus, departments, offices,
agencies, branches, and bodies of any
description, including government-owned
companies, authorized to requisition,
purchase, or contract or make disbursements
for articles, materials, and supplies for public
use, public buildings, or public works, shall give
preference to materials . . . produced . . . in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to
domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified." (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchase by the
Government, including those made by and/or for the armed
forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar
violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by
invoking reasons of national security — predicated upon the
"worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent
tension created by the Malaysia problem" — and the alleged
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National
Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact
that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a
manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the
local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that
is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency.
Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such
emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would,
instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to
discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of
rice.
Besides, the stocking of rice and corn for purposes of
national security and/or national emergency is within the
purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration
"to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities
as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks
held as a national reserve . . . be deposited by the
Administration throughout the country under proper dispersal
plans . . . and maybe released only upon the occurrence of
calamities or emergencies . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-
executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said
legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives
are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions
under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said
Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4
and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly,
Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources
necessary for our national defense may be secured by the
Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national
mobilization" 9 , which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore,
in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall
be produced in such manner as Congress may by other Laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are
concerned, Republic Act Nos. 2207 and3452,
and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense,
but in vain. An examination of the work cited 10 shows that
Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war
time" 11 or when he has placed the country or a part thereof
under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition obtains in the
case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory,
if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under
martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that
effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under
martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed
importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it
should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to
the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is
said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the
argument might have some value. But the respondents, as
officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and
again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian
population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It
has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It
implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance
with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at
liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected — we still
live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or
consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly admit — Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for
the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it
must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in
the compliancewith said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set
their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt
means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those
laws permit importation — but under certain conditions,
which have not been, and should be complied with.
IV. The Contracts With Vietnam and Burma. —
It is lastly contended that the Government of the
Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the
purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and
another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts
constitute valid executive agreements under international law;
that such agreements became binding and effective upon
signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that
in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned
contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a
treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the
conflict must be resolved — under the American jurisprudence
— in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that
petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive
relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the
Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the aforementioned
contracts have already been consummated, the Government
of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice
involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor
of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this
pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said
contracts as alleged executive agreements has been
sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements.
But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful,
as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under
the American constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements withoutprevious legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event
of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case
at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be
justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United
States is signatory require the advice and consent of its
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department.
No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in
our constitutional set up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say
that the Constitution of the Philippineshas clearly settled it in
the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII
thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question". In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,
when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned
contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case
academic. Republic Act No. 2207enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but
from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in
said Act. Upon the other, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2)
main features, namely; (a) it requires the Government to
purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters,
growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of
rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to
private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation — which has not been consummated as
yet — is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the
proposed importation would not compel our Government to
default in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because,
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
with without importing the commodity into the Philippines,
the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying
with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on
the question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation. However, the majority favors the negative view,
for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is
not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and
that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed
for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon and Makalintal, JJ ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ ., concur separately.
Paredes and Regala, JJ ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J ., concurring:
Under Republic Act 2207, which took effect on May
15, 1959, it is unlawful for any person, association, corporation
or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in
the Philippines. The exception is if there is an existing or
imminent shortage of such commodity of such gravity as to
constitute national emergency in which case an importation
may be authorized by the President when so certified by the
National Economic Council.
However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was
enacted providing that the importation of rice and corn
can only be made by private parties thereby prohibiting from
doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not expressly
repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or modifies those
parts thereof that are inconsistent with its provisions. The
question that now arises is: Has the enactment of Republic Act
3452 the effect of prohibiting completely the government
from importing rice and corn into the Philippines?
My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not
in any manner provide for the importation of rice and corn in
case of national emergency, the provision of the former law on
the matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent with any
provision embodied in Republic Act 3452. The Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, may
therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as
provided in Republic Act 2207 if there is a declared national
emergency.
The next question that arises is: Can the government
authorize the importation of rice and corn regardless
of Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military
precautionary measure for military stock-pile?
Respondents answer this question in the affirmative.
They advance the argument that it is the President's duty to
see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are geared to
the defense of the country as well as to the fulfillment of our
international commitments in Southeast Asia in the event the
peace and security of the area are in danger. The stock piling
of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense
preparation in view of the limited local supply and the
probable disruption of trade and commerce with outside
countries in the event of armed hostilities, and this military
precautionary measure is necessary because of the unsettled
conditions in the Southeast Asia bordering on actual threats of
armed conflicts as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the
Military Department of our Government. This advocacy, they
contend, finds support in the national defense policy
embodied in Section 2 of our National Defense
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:
"(a) The preservation of the State is
the obligation of every citizen. The security of
the Philippines and the freedom,
independence and perpetual neutrality of the
Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the
employment of all citizens, without distinction
of sex or age, and all resources.
"(b) The employment of the nation's
citizens and resources for national defense
shall be effected by a national mobilization.
"(c) The national mobilization shall
include the execution of all national defense
shall be effected by a national mobilization.
"(d) The civil authority shall always be
supreme. The President of the Philippines as
the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces,
shall be responsible that mobilization measures
are prepared at all times." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the
security of the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the core
of the preservation of our State which is the basic duty of
every citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the
President employ all the resources at his command. But over
and above, all that power and duty, fundamental as they may
seem, there is the injunction that the civil authority shall
always be supreme. This injunction can only mean that while
all precautions should be taken to insure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the employment of
all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be
taken within the framework of the civil authority. Military
authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil
authority, the only exception being when the law clearly
ordains otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act
3452, contains any exception in favor of military action
concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception must be
strictly construed.
 A distinction is made between the government and
government agency in an attempt to take the former out of
the operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Revised Administrative Code refers to that entity through
which the functions of government are exercised, including the
various arms through which political authority is made
effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form
of local government, whereas a government instrumentality
refers to corporations owned or controlled by the government
to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people.
A government agency, therefore, must necessarily refer to the
government itself of the Republic, as distinguished from any
government instrumentality which has a personality distinct
and separate from it (Section 2).
The important point to determine, however, is
whether we should enjoin respondents from carrying out the
importation of the rice which according to the record has been
authorized to be imported on government to government
level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has
already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its
implementation. This is evident from the manifestation
submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it appears that the
contract for the purchase of 47,000 tons of rice from Vietnam
had been signed on October 5, 1963, and for the purchase of
20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized
representatives of both our government and the governments
of Vietnam and Burma, respectively. If it is true that our
government has already made a formal commitment with the
selling countries there arise the question as to whether the Act
can still be impeded at this stage of the negotiations. Though
on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is gratifying to
note that the majority has expressed itself against it. This is a
plausible attitude for, had the writ been issued, our
government would have been placed in a predicament where,
as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of
face. This was avoided by the judicial statesmanship evinced
by the Court.
BARRERA, J ., concurring:
Because of possible complications that might be
aggravated by misrepresentation of the true nature and scope
of the case before this Court, it is well to restate as clearly as
possible, the real and only issue presented by the respondents
representing the government.
From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in
behalf of respondents, we quote:
"The importation of the rice in
question by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is for military stockpiling authorized
by the President pursuant to his inherent
power as commander-in-chief and as a military
precautionary measure in view of the
worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it
may be added, the recent tension created by
the Malaysia problem." (Answer, p. 2:
emphasis supplied.)
During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez,
appearing in behalf of the respondents, likewise reiterated
that the imported rice was for military stockpiling, and while
he admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn
Administration, he emphasized again and again that the rice
was not intended for the RCA for distribution to the people, as
there was no shortage of rice for that purpose, but it was only
exchanged for palay because this could be better preserved.
From the memorandum filed thereafter by the
Solicitor General, again the claim was made:
"We respectfully reiterate the
arguments in our answer dated October 4,
1963 that the importation of rice sought to be
enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the
authority vested in the President of the
Philippines as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, as a measure of military
preparedness demanded by a real and actual
threat of emergency in the South East Asian
countries. (p. 1:emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
"It (the stressing of the unsettled
conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely our
intention to show the necessity for the
stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is
the very reason for the importation. (p. 3
emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
"As it is, the importation in question is
being made by the Republic of the Philippines
for its own use: and the rice is not supposed to
be poured into the open market as to affect the
price to be paid by the public. (p. 4, Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
What we do contend is that the law,
for want of express and clear provision to the
effect, does not include on its prohibition
importation by the Government of rice for its
own use not for the consuming public,
regardless of whether there is or there is no
emergency." (p. 5, emphasis supplied.)
From the above, it not only appears but is evident
that the respondents were not concerned with the present rice
situation confronting the consuming public, but were solely
and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the future use
of the army. The issue, therefore, in which the Government
was interested is not whether rice is imported to give the
people a bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80
per ganta — for, to quote again their contention: "the rice is
not supposed to be poured into the open market to affect the
price to be paid by the public", as it is "not for the consuming
public, regardless of whether there is or there is no
emergency", — but whether rice can legally be imported by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future
use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority opinion ably sets forth
the reasons why this Court can not accept the contention of
the respondents that this importation is beyond and outside
the operation of these statutes. I can only emphasize that I see
in the theory advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous
trend — that because the policies enunciated in the cited laws
are for the protection of the producers and the consumers, the
army is removed from their application. To adopt this theory is
to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic
groups or classes; the producers, the consumers, and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is
the effort to equate the army with the Government itself.
Then again, the importation of this rice for military
stockpiling is sought to be justified by the alleged threat of
emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the existence
of this supposed threat was unilaterally determined by the
Department of National Defense alone. We recall that there
exists a body called the National Security Council in which are
represented the Executive as well as the Legislative
department. In it sit not only members of the party in power
but of the opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the
highest consultative body which deliberates precisely in times
of emergency threatening to affect the security of the state.
The democratic composition of this council is to guarantee
that its deliberations would be non-partisan and only the best
interests of the nation will be considered. Being a deliberative
body, it insures against precipitate action. This is as it should
be. Otherwise, in these days of ever present cold war, any
change or development in the political climate in any region of
the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to
conjure up a crisis or emergency and thereupon attempt to
override our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly
institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of
precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the interest
of the security of the state. One need not be too imaginative
to perceive a hint of this in the present case.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion
unanimously reached, is fully aware of the difficult and
delicate task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be
exploited by some for their own purposes, by claiming and
making it appear that the Court is unmindful of the plight of
our people during these days of hardship; that it preferred to
give substance to the "niceties of the law" than heed the
needs of the people. Our answer is that the Court was left no
alternative. It had, in compliance with its duty, to decide the
case upon the facts presented to it. The respondents,
representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and
insisted that there is no rice shortage; that the imported rice is
not for the consuming public and is not supposed to be placed
in the open market to affect the price to be paid by the public;
that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a
measure of mobilization in the face of what the Department of
National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened armed
conflict in Southeast Asia. Confronted with these facts upon
which the Government has built and rested its case, we have
searched in vain for legal authority or cogent reasons to justify
this importation made admittedly contrary to the provisions
of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because
respondents never as much as pretended that the importation ||| (Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, [October 22, 1963],
fulfills the conditions specified in these laws, but limited 118 PHIL 1065-1089)
themselves to the contention, which is their sole defense, that
this importation does not fall within the scope of said laws. In
our view, however, the laws are clear. The laws are
comprehensive and their application does not admit of any
exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance therewith is not
difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if at
all, is not urgently immediate.
In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that
the Supreme Court has a duty to perform under
the Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in
an appropriate proceeding, "all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order or regulation is in question". We can not elude
this duty. To do so would be culpable dereliction on our part.
While we sympathize with the public that might be adversely
affected as a result of this decision, yet our sympathy does not
authorize us to sanction an act contrary to applicable laws. The
fault lies with those who stubbornly contended and
represented before this Court that there is no rice shortage,
that the imported rice not intended for the consuming public,
but for stockpiling of the army. And, if as now claimed before
the public, contrary to the Government's stand in this case,
that there is need for imported rice to stave off hunger, our
legislature has provided for such a situation. As already stated,
the laws are adequate. The importation of rice under the
conditions set forth in the laws may be authorized not only
where there is an existing shortage, but also when the
shortage is imminent. In other words, lawful remedy to solve
the situation is available, if only those who have the duty to
execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for
the importation of rice, why adopt some dubious means which
necessitates resort to doubtful exercise of the power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not
comply with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed to be a
regime under the rule of law. Adoption as a government policy
of the theory of "the end justifies the means" brushing aside
constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we
end up with the end of freedom.
For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the
Court.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 202242. April 16, 2013.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.,respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J p:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents), duly opposed 2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to
determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote
each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject
decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself
so that only one (1) member of Congress will
sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents' motion for
reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos.
111, 3 112, 4 113, 5 and 114, 6 the Court set the subject motion for
oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On August 3, 2012, the Court
discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the
meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed
that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the
August 3, 2012 Resolution 8 reads: SDTIaE
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed
to submit their respective MEMORANDA within
ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders,
the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
the Court's July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads:
"This disposition is immediately executory." 9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed
their respective memoranda. 10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the
Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the
Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the
executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their
progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution 11 and the 1935 Constitution 12 vested the power to
appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during
these times that the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in
the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the
legislative body. 13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution, 14 with the fusion of the
executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of
judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another
body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive,
subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the
Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities, 15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it
wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution in this wise: EcDSHT
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated
one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-
officio members. 16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that
Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a
representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by
rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as
the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote. 17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. 18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court
reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following
grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2]
that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment
when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was
a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would
not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from
political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in
declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution
should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct. ASaTHc
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in
amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents,
still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of
merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the
first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final
resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them
jointly. ISCHET
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by
which the fundamental powers of government are established,
limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed
among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise
for the benefit of the body politic. 19 The Framers reposed their
wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate
expression of the principles and the framework upon which
government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say.
The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed
in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate
intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience
and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its
text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch
tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain
oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in
the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to
describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through
the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat
in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can
be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several
provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to
bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides
that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority
of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately." 20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the
nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately." 21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of
Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding
adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and
voted upon by its two Houses. CaSHAc
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8,
Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a
bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough.
Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a
conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were
not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its
primary function — to legislate. JBC was created to support the
executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was
merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be
discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering
that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the
functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether the
two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative 23 or its non-
legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation, 24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war, 25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-
President, 26 and impeachment, 27 the dichotomy of each House
must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay
between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its
nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the
other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks
and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between
the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the
creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by
adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives
from the major branches of government — the Chief Justice as ex-
officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the
Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and
a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the
Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it
was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it
as a major branch of government. DCSTAH
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted
his well-considered position 28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there
should be only one representative of Congress
in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution . . . .
The aforesaid provision
is clear and unambiguous and does not need
any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to
mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that
"construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two
representatives in the Council, with one vote
each, is to negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the
proposition that the Council should adopt the
rule of single representation of Congress in the
JBC in order to respect and give the right
meaning to the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice
and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion, 29 which reads: EScAID
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts
and citations above: the creation of
the JBC is intended to curtail the
influence of politics in Congress in the
appointment of judges, and the
understanding is that seven (7)
personswill compose the JBC. As such,
the interpretation of two votes for
Congress runs counter to the
intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress
more influence in the appointment of
judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number
of JBC members to eight, which could
lead to voting deadlock by reason of
even-numbered membership, and a
clear violation of 7 enumerated
 members in the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper, 30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes
VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above
constitutional provision, the JBC is composed
of seven (7) representatives coming from
different sectors. From the enumeration it is
patent that each category of members
pertained to a single individual only. Thus,
while we do not lose sight of the bicameral
nature of our legislative department, it is
beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only ". . . a
representative." Thus, two (2) representatives
from Congress would increase the number of
JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond
what the Constitution has contemplated.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating. 31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional
Commission reveals that the composition of
the JBC reflects the Commission's desire "to
have in the Council a representation for the
major elements of the community." . . . The ex-
officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches
of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article
VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-
officio member as representing one co-equal
branch of government. . . . Thus, the JBC was
designed to have seven voting members with
the three ex-officio members having equal say
in the choice of judicial nominees. SEHaTC
xxx xxx xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers
under Article VI and constituent powers under
Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches
of government, is constitutionally treated as
another co-equal branch in the matter of its
representative in the JBC. On the other hand,
the exercise of legislative and constituent
powers requires the Senate and the House of
Representatives to coordinate and act as
distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress' role
under our constitutional scheme. While the
latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the
separateness of the two Houses of Congress
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy
need be made when Congress interacts with
the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature
of the three governmental branches to assign
the same weight to considerations that any of
its representatives may have regarding
aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House
of Representatives act as such for one branch
and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise
of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality
among the three branches support this
conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the
House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus,
misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity. aSDHCT
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative
of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement
effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this
unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized.
After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be
legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or
tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the
Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one
member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume
that this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in
effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the
regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of
checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment
of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent
process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents' contention that the current irregular composition of
the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned
for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation
of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious
cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel
or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement
of the Constitutionit is void from the very beginning and cannot be
the source of any power or authority. EaHcDS
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule,
an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is
not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of
fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products,
Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation: 32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception
to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of
 unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it. 33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable
in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the
Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino
people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake
in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power
to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law
something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the
same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would
otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the
Constitution through a judicial pronouncement. IEDaAc
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission.
According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held
as intentionally omitted." 34"The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration." 35 Pursuant to this,
"the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted
from inadvertence or because the case in question was not
foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it
thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been
called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member
by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court
tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted
by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed
to become judicial exuberance. 38 In cases like this, no amount of
practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform
either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional
representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a
subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted.
True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and
tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of
situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents
is hereby DENIED. SIaHTD
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which
reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., took no part as I am chairperson of JBC.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to participation in JBC.
Brion, J., took no part.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Abad.
Abad, J., see my dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
ABAD, J., dissenting:
On July 17, 2012, the Court rendered a Decision 1 granting the
petition for declaration of unconstitutionality, prohibition, and
injunction filed by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, and declaring that
the current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) is unconstitutional. The Court also enjoined the JBC to
reconstitute itself so that only one member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. AICEDc
On July 24, 2012, respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. moved for
reconsideration. 2 The Court then conducted and heard the parties
in oral arguments on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the current practice of the
JBC to perform its functions with eight
members, two of whom are members
of Congress, runs counter to the letter
and spirit of Section 8 (1), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
A. Whether or not the JBC should be
composed of seven members
only.
B. Whether or not Congress is entitled
to more than one seat in the
JBC.
C. Assuming Congress is entitled to
more than one seat, whether
or not each representative of
Congress should be entitled
to exercise one whole vote.
I maintain my dissent to the majority opinion now being
reconsidered.
To reiterate, the vital question that needs to be resolved is:
whether or not the Senate and the House of Representatives are
entitled to one representative each in the JBC, both with the right
to cast one full vote in its deliberations.
At the core of the present controversy is Section 8 (1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis
supplied) TcCDIS
In interpreting Section 8 (1) above, the majority opinion reiterated
that in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of the Congress," the Filipino people through the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended Congress to just have
one representative in the JBC. The majority opinion added that
there could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of
the provision since the other provisions of the 1987
Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift to a
bicameral legislative body.
The mere fact, however, that adjustments were made in some
provisions should not mislead the Court into concluding that all
provisions have been amended to recognize the bicameral nature
of Congress. As I have previously noted in my dissenting opinion,
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the Constitutional Commission
himself, admitted that the committee charged with making
adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the JBC,
failed to consider the impact of the changed character of the
Legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the Congress" in
the membership of the JBC. 3
Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the
Senate or the House of Representatives should sit at any time in
the JBC, is to ignore the fact that they are still separate and distinct
from each other although they are both involved in law-making.
Both legislators are elected differently, maintain separate
administrative organizations, and deliberate on laws
independently. In fact, neither the Senate nor the House of
Representatives can by itself claim to represent the Congress.
Again, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to
limit the term "Congress" to just either of the two Houses can be
seen from the words that they used in crafting Section 8 (1). While
the provision provides for just "a representative of the Congress," it
also provides that such representation is "ex officio" or "by virtue
of one's office, or position." 4
Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is
automatically the Senate representative to the JBC. In the same
way, under the House of Representatives rules, the Chairperson of
its Justice Committee is the House representative to the JBC.
Consequently, there are actually two persons in Congress who hold
separate offices or positions with the attached function of sitting in
the JBC. If the Court adheres to a literal translation of Section 8 (1),
no representative from Congress will qualify as "ex officio"
member of the JBC. This would deny Congress the representation
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended it to
have. aEHAIS
Having said that the Senate and the House of Representatives
should have one representative each in the JBC, it is logical to
conclude that each should also have the right to cast one full vote
in its deliberations. To split the vote between the two legislators
would be an absurdity since it would diminish their standing and
make them second class members of the JBC, something that the
Constitution clearly does not contemplate. Indeed, the JBC
abandoned the half-a-vote practice on January 12, 2000 and
recognized the right of both legislators to cast one full vote each.
Only by recognizing this right can the true spirit and reason of
Section 8 (1) be attained.
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the motion for
reconsideration.
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives must be
represented in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is the
Constitution's mandate read as a whole and in the light of the
ordinary and contemporary understanding of our people of the
structure of our government. Any other interpretation diminishes
Congress and negates the effectivity of its representation in the
Judicial and Bar Council.
It is a Constitution we are interpreting. More than privileging a
textual preposition, our duty is to ensure that the constitutional
project ratified by our people is given full effect. DHATcE
At issue in this case is the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution which provides the following:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. (Emphasis provided)
Mainly deploying verba legis as its interpretative modality, the
main opinion chooses to focus on the article "a." As correctly
pointed out in the original dissent of Justice Robert Abad, the
entire phrase includes the words "representative of Congress" and
"ex officio Members." In the context of the constitutional plan
involving a bicameral Congress, these words create ambiguity.
A Bicameral Congress
Our Constitution creates a Congress consisting of two chambers.
Thus, in Article VI, Section 1, the Constitution provides the
following:
The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives . . . . (Emphasis provided)
Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines". 1 Members of the House of Representatives, on the
other hand, are elected by legislative districts 2 or through the
party list system. 3 The term of a Senator 4 is different from that of
a Member of the House of Representatives. 5 Therefore, the
Senate and the House of Representatives while component parts
of the Congress are not the same in terms of their representation.
The very rationale of a bicameral system is to have the Senators
represent a national constituency. Representatives of the House of
Representatives, on the other hand, are dominantly from
legislative districts except for one fifth which are from the party list
system. THaDAE
Each chamber is organized separately. 6 The Senate and the House
each promulgates their own rules of procedure. 7 Each chamber
maintains separate Journals. 8 They each have separate Records of
their proceedings. 9 The Senate and the House of Representatives
discipline their own respective members. 10
To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress
of the Philippines, but there is a Senate President and a Speaker of
the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate
and a journal for the House of Representatives. There is no record
of proceedings for the entire Congress of the Philippines, but there
is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of
proceedings for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the
Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that
promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it
is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its
members.
No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he
or she reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of
Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather,
he or she reports to the House of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Congress does not exist separate from the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate
must get directions from the Senate. By constitutional design, he or
she cannot get instructions from the House of Representatives. If a
Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate,
then he or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions
given to him or her by the Senate if the House of Representatives'
instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution vests disciplinary
power only on the Senate for any Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of
Representatives.
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of
Representatives. No Member of the House of Representatives may
carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of
the House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as
a whole.
The difference between the Senate and the House of
Representative was a subject of discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. In the July 21, 1986 Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Jose F. S. Bengzon presented the
following argument during the discussion on bicameralism, on the
distinction between Congressmen and Senators, and the role of the
Filipino people in making these officials accountable: cDHAaT
I grant the proposition that the Members of
the House of Representatives are closer to
the people that they represent. I grant the
proposition that the Members of the House
of Representatives campaign on a one-to-
one basis with the people in the barrios and
their constituencies. I also grant the
proposition that the candidates for Senator
do not have as much time to mingle around
with their constituencies in their respective
home bases as the candidates for the House.
I also grant the proposition that the
candidates for the Senate go around the
country in their efforts to win the votes of all
the members of the electorate at a lesser
time than that given to the candidates for
the House of Representatives. But then the
lesson of the last 14 years has made us
mature in our political thinking and has given
us political will and self-determination. We
really cannot disassociate the fact that the
Congressman, the Member of the House of
Representatives, no matter how national he
would like to think, is very much strongly
drawn into the problems of his local
constituents in his own district.
Due to the maturity of the Filipinos for the
last 14 years and because of the emergence
of people power, I believe that this so-called
people power can be used to monitor not
only the Members of the House of
Representatives but also the Members of the
Senate. As I said we may have probably
adopted the American formula in the
beginning but over these years, I think we
have developed that kind of a system and
adopted it to our own needs. So at this point
in time, with people power working, it is not
only the Members of the House who can be
subjected to people power but also the
Members of the Senate because they can
also be picketed and criticized through
written articles and talk shows. And even the
people not only from their constituencies in
their respective regions and districts but
from the whole country can exercise people
power against the Members of the Senate
because they are supposed to represent the
entire country. So while the Members of
Congress become unconsciously parochial in
their desire to help their constituencies, the
Members of the Senate are there to take a
look at all of these parochial proposals and
coordinate them with the national problems.
They may be detached in that sense but they
are not detached from the people because
they themselves know and realize that they
owe their position not only to the people
from their respective provinces but also to
the people from the whole country. So, I say
that people power now will be able to
monitor the activities of the Members of the
House of Representatives and that very same
people power can be also used to monitor
the activities of the Members of the
Senate. 11 ASTcaE
Commissioner Bengzon provided an illustration of the fundamental
distinction between the House of Representatives and the Senate,
particularly regarding their respective constituencies and
electorate. These differences, however, only illustrate that the
work of the Senate and the House of Representatives taken
together results in a Congress functioning as one branch of
government. Article VI, Section 1, as approved by the Commission,
spoke of one Congress whose powers are vested in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of
Congress" should participate in the Judicial and Bar Council, it
cannot mean a Senator carrying out the instructions of the House
or a Member of the House of Representative carrying out
instructions from the Senate. It is not the kind of a single Congress
contemplated by our Constitution. The opinion therefore that a
Senator or a Member of the House of Representative may
represent the Congress as a whole is contrary to the intent of the
Constitution. It is unworkable.
One mechanism used in the past to work out the consequence of
the majority's opinion is to allow a Senator and a Member of the
House of Representative to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council but to
each allow them only half a vote.
Within the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chief Justice is entitled to
one vote. The Secretary of Justice is also entitled to one whole vote
and so are the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the private sector,
legal academia, and retired justices. Each of these sectors are given
equal importance and rewarded with one whole vote. However, in
this view, the Senate is only worth fifty percent of the wisdom of
these sectors. Likewise, the wisdom of the House of
Representatives is only worth fifty percent of these
institutions. DAHSaT
This is constitutionally abominable. It is inconceivable that our
people, in ratifying the Constitution granting awesome powers to
Congress, intended to diminish its component parts. After all, they
are institutions composed of people who have submitted
themselves to the electorate. In creating shortlists of possible
candidates to the judiciary, we can safely suppose that their input
is not less than the input of the professor of law or the member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or the member from the
private sector.
The other solution done in the past was to alternate the seat
between a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and
the House of Representatives would mean not giving a seat to the
Congress at all. Again, when a Senator is seated, he or she
represents the Senate and not Congress as a whole. When a
Member of the House of Representative is seated, he or she can
only represent Congress as a whole. Thus, alternating the seat not
only diminishes congressional representation; it negates it. CScaDH
Constitutional Interpretation
The argument that swayed the majority in this case's original
decision was that if those who crafted our Constitution intended
that there be two representatives from Congress, it would not have
used the preposition "a" in Article VIII, Section 8 (1). However,
beyond the number of representatives, the Constitution intends
that in the Judicial and Bar Council, there will be representation
from Congress and that it will be "ex officio", i.e., by virtue of their
positions or offices. We note that the provision did not provide for
a number of members to the Judicial and Bar Council. This is unlike
the provisions creating many other bodies in the Constitution. 12
In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only
from the preposition "a" and from there provide a meaning that
ensures a difficult and unworkable result — one which undermines
the concept of a bicameral congress implied in all the other 114
other places in the Constitution that uses the word "Congress".
Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is
within the expectations of the people who ratified the
Constitution by also seeing and reading the words "representative
of Congress" and "ex officio."
This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet
regarding the authoritativeness of the text of the Constitution. It
does not detract from the text. It follows the canonical
requirement of verba legis. But in doing so, we encounter an
ambiguity.
In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 13 we said:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Thus these
are cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum. DHTECc
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt,
the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of
its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful
provision must be examined in light of the
history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances surrounding the framing
of the Constitution. In following this
guideline, courts should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished in
adopting a doubtful constitutional provision,
and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied. Consequently, the intent of the
framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-
indulgent men, should be given effect.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat — the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize
them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis provided)
And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 13 we said:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has
been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented
or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitutionwas framed.
The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,
in order to construe the whole as to make
the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. CSTEHI
The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable
result or one which undermines the intended structure of
government provided in the Constitution. Text is authoritative, but
it is not exhaustive of the entire universe of meaning.
There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to
the meaning of "representative of Congress" and "ex officio." There
is no compelling reason why there should only be one
representative of a bicameral Congress.
Proposed Reasons for Only One Representative of Congress
The first reason to support the need for only one representative of
Congress is the belief that there needs to be an odd number in the
Judicial and Bar Council.
This is true only if the decision of the constitutional organ in
question is a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no. It is in this sense
that a tie-breaker will be necessary.
However, the Judicial and Bar Council is not that sort of a
constitutional organ. Its duty is to provide the President with a
shortlist of candidates to every judicial position. We take judicial
notice that for vacancies, each member of the Judicial and Bar
Council is asked to list at least three (3) names. All these votes are
tallied and those who garner a specific plurality are thus put on the
list and transmitted to the President. There had been no occasion
when the Judicial and Bar Council ever needed to break a tie. The
Judicial and Bar Council's functions proceed regardless of whether
they have seven or eight members.
The second reason that the main opinion accepted as persuasive
was the opinion that Congress does not discharge its function to
check and balance the power of both the Judiciary and the
Executive in the Judicial and Bar Council. From this premise, it then
proceeds to argue that the Representative of Congress, who is ex
officio, does not need to consult with Congress as a whole.
This is very perplexing and difficult to accept.
By virtue of the fundamental premise of separation of powers, the
appointing power in the judiciary should be done by the Supreme
Court. However, for judicial positions, this is vested in the
Executive. Furthermore, because of the importance of these
appointments, the President's discretion is limited to a shortlist
submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council which is under the
supervision of the Supreme Court but composed of several
components.
The Judicial and Bar Council represents the constituents affected
by judicial appointments and by extension, judicial decisions. It
provides for those who have some function vis a vis the law that
should be applied and interpreted by our courts. Hence,
represented are practicing lawyers (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines), prosecutors (Secretary of the Department of Justice),
legal academia (professor of law), and judges or justices (retired
justice and the Chief Justice). Also represented in some way are
those that will be affected by the interpretation directly (private
sector representative). ETDAaC
Congress is represented for many reasons.
One, it crafts statutes and to that extent may want to ensure that
those who are appointed to the judiciary are familiar with these
statutes and will have the competence, integrity, and
independence to read its meaning.
Two, the power of judicial review vests our courts with the ability
to nullify their acts. Congress, therefore, has an interest in the
judicial philosophy of those considered for appointment into our
judiciary.
Three, Congress is a political organ. As such, it is familiar with the
biases of our political leaders including that of the President. Thus,
it will have greater sensitivity to the necessity for political
accommodations if there be any. Keeping in mind the
independence required of our judges and justices, the Members of
Congress may be able to appreciate the kind of balance that will be
necessary — the same balance that the President might be able to
likewise appreciate — when putting a person in the shortlist of
judicial candidates. Not only do they appreciate this balance, they
embody it. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
(unlike any of the other members of the Judicial and Bar Council),
periodically submit themselves to the electorate.
It is for these reasons that the Congressional representatives in the
Judicial and Bar Council may be instructed by their respective
chambers to consider some principles and directions. Through
resolutions or actions by the Congressional Committees they
represent, the JBC Congressional representatives' choices may be
constrained. Therefore, they do not sit there just to represent
themselves. Again, they are "representatives of Congress" "ex
officio".
The third reason to support only one representative of Congress is
the belief that there is the "unmistakable tenor" in the provision in
question that one co-equal branch should be represented only by
one Representative. 14 It may be true that the Secretary of Justice
is the political alter ego of the President or the Executive. However,
Congress as a whole does not have a political alter ego. In other
words, while the Executive may be represented by a single
individual, Congress cannot be represented by an individual.
Congress, as stated earlier, operates through the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Unlike the Executive, the Legislative
branch cannot be represented by only one individual.
A Note on the Work of the Constitutional Commission
Time and again, we have clarified the interpretative value to Us of
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thus in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we emphasized: AIcECS
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution,resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention 'are
of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give Us no
light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers' understanding
thereof. 15 (Emphasis provided)
Also worth Our recall is the celebrated comment of Charles P.
Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis: 16
The intention of the framers of the
Constitution, even assuming we could
discover what it was, when it is not
adequately expressed in the Constitution,
that is to say, what they meant when they
did not say it, surely that has no binding
force upon us. If we look behind or beyond
what they set down in the document, prying
into what else they wrote and what they
said, anything we may find is only advisory.
They may sit in at our councils. There is no
reason why we should eavesdrop on
theirs. 17 (Emphasis provided)
In addition to the interpretative value of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission, we should always be careful when we
quote from their records without understanding their context.
The Committees of the Constitutional Commission were all tasked
to finish their reports not later than July 7, 1986. 18 The Second
and Third Readings were scheduled to finish not later than August
15, 1986. 19 The members of the Sponsorship and Style Committee
were tasked to finish their work of formulating and polishing the
style of the final draft of the new Constitution scheduled for
submission to the entire membership of the Commission not later
than August 25, 1986. 20 cETCID
The Rules of the Constitutional Commission also provided for a
process of approving resolutions and amendments.
Constitutional proposals were embodied in resolutions signed by
the author. 21 If they emanated from a committee, the resolution
was signed by its chairman. 22Resolutions were filed with the
Secretary-General. 23 The First Reading took place when the titles
of the resolutions were read and referred to the appropriate
committee. 24
The Committees then submitted a Report on each
resolution. 25 The Steering Committee took charge of including the
committee report in the Calendar for Second Reading. 26 The
Second Reading took place on the day set for the consideration of
a resolution. 27 The provisions were read in full with the
amendments proposed by the committee, if there were any. 28
A motion to close debate took place after three speeches for and
two against, or if only one speech has been raised and none against
it. 29 The President of the Constitutional Commission had the
prerogative to allow debates among those who had indicated that
they intended to be heard on certain matters. 30 After the close of
the debate, the Constitutional Commission proceeded to consider
the Committee amendments. 31
After a resolution was approved on Second Reading, it was
included in the Calendar for Third Reading. 32 Neither further
debate nor amendment shall be made on the resolution on its
Third Reading. 33 All constitutional proposals approved by the
Commission after Third Reading were referred to the Committees
on Sponsorship and Style for collation, organization, and
consolidation into a complete and final draft of the
Constitution. 34 The final draft was submitted to the Commission
for the sole purpose of determining whether it reflects faithfully
and accurately the proposals as approved on Second
Reading. 35 HTacDS
With respect to the provision which is now Article VIII, Section 8
(1), the timetable was as follows:
On July 10, 1986, the Committee on the Judiciary presented its
Report to the Commission. 36 Deliberations then took place on the
same day; on July 11, 1986; and on July 14, 1986. It was on July 10
that Commissioner Rodrigo raised points regarding the Judicial and
Bar Council. 37 The discussion spoke of the Judicial and Bar Council
having seven members.
Numerous mentions of the Judicial and Bar Council being
comprised of seven members were also made by Commissioners
on July 14, 1986. On the same day, the amended article was
approved by unanimous voting. 38
On July 19, 1986, the vote on Third Reading on the Article on the
Judiciary took place. 39 The vote was 43 and none against. 40
Committee Report No. 22 proposing an article on a National
Assembly was reported out by July 21, 1986. 41 It provided for a
unicameral assembly. Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., made the
presentation and stated that they had a very difficult decision to
make regarding bicameralism and unicameralism. 42 The debate
occupied the Commission for the whole day.
Then, a vote on the structure of Congress took place. 43 Forty four
(44) commissioners cast their votes during the roll call. 44 The vote
was 23 to 22. 45
On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened for
purposes of introducing amendments to the proposed Sections 3,
7, 10, 11, 13, and 14. 46
On October 9, 1986, the entire Article on the Legislature was
approved on Third Reading. 47 IECcaA
By October 10, 1986, changes in style on the Article on the
Legislature were introduced. 48
On October 15, 1986, Commissioner Guingona presented the
1986 Constitution to the President of the Constitutional
Commission, Cecilia Muñoz-Palma. 49
It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission either through
the Style and Sponsorship Committee or the Committees on the
Legislature and the Judiciary was not able to amend the provision
concerning the Judicial and Bar Council after the Commission had
decided to propose a bicameral Congress. We can take judicial
notice of the chronology of events during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. The chronology should be taken as
much as the substance of discussions exchanged between the
Commissioners.
The quotations from the Commissioners mentioned in the main
opinion and in the proposed resolution of the present Motion for
Reconsideration should thus be appreciated in its proper context.
The interpellation involving Commissioners Rodrigo and
Concepcion took place on July 10, 1986 and on July 14,
1986. 50 These discussions were about Committee Report No. 18
on the Judiciary. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and of
judges of lower courts. At present it is the President who
appoints them. If there is a Commission on Appointments,
then it is the President with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. In this proposal, we would
like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed
of seven members, called the Judicial and Bar Council. And
while the President will still appoint the members of the
judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this
Council. AECacT
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the
President appoints four of them who are the regular
members.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. CONCEPCION:
The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate
partisan politics. 51
xxx xxx xxx
It must also be noted that during the same day and in the
same discussion, both Commissioners Rodrigo and
Concepcion later on referred to a 'National Assembly' and
not a 'Congress,' as can be seen here:
MR. RODRIGO:
Another point. Under our present Constitution, the
National Assembly may enact rules of court, is that right?
On page 4, the proviso on lines 17 to 19 of the Article on
the Judiciary provides:
The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION:
Yes. caTIDE
MR. RODRIGO:
So, two things are required of the National Assembly
before it can repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, etc. — it must have the
advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION:
That is correct. 52
On July 14, 1986, the Commission proceeded with the Period
of Amendments. This was when the exchange noted in the
main opinion took place. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO:
If my amendment is approved, then the
provision will be exactly the same as
the provision in the 1935 Constitution,
Article VIII, Section 5.
xxx xxx xxx
If we do not remove the proposed amendment
on the creation of the Judicial and Bar
Council, this will be a diminution of
the appointing power of the highest
magistrate of the land, of the
President of the Philippines elected by
all the Filipino people. The appointing
power will be limited by a group of
seven people who are not elected by
the people but only appointed.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created,
there will be no uniformity in our
 constitutional provisions on
appointments. The members of the
Judiciary will be segregated from the
rest of the government. Even a
municipal judge cannot be appointed
by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of
three names by this committee of
seven people, commissioners of the
Commission on Elections, the COA and
Commission on Civil Service . . . even
ambassadors, generals of the Army
will not come under this restriction.
Why are we going to segregate the
Judiciary from the rest of our
government in the appointment of the
high-ranking officials? AaIDCS
Another reason is that this Council will be
ineffective. It will just besmirch the
honor of our President without being
effective at all because this Council
will be under the influence of the
President. Four out of seven are
appointees of the President, and they
can be reappointed when their term
ends. Therefore, they would kowtow
to the President. A fifth member is the
Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the
President. Another member
represents the legislature. In all
probability, the controlling party in
the legislature belongs to the
President and, therefore, this
representative from the National
Assembly is also under the influence
of the President. And may I say, Mr.
Presiding Officer, that even the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is an
appointee of the President. So, it is
futile; he will be influenced anyway by
the President. 53
It must again be noted that during this day and
period of amendments after the
quoted passage in the Decision, the
Commission later on made use of the
term 'National Assembly' and not
'Congress' again:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Presiding Officer and members of the
Committee, I propose to delete the
last sentence on Section 16, lines 28
to 30 which reads: "The Chief Justice
shall address the National Assembly at
the opening of each regular session."
May I explain that I have gone over the
operations of other deliberative
assemblies in some parts of the world,
and I noticed that it is only the Chief
Executive or head of state who
addresses the National Assembly at its
opening. When we say "opening," we
are referring to the first convening of
any national assembly. Hence, when
the Chief Executive or head of state
addresses the National Assembly on
that occasion, no other speaker is
allowed to address the body. TSacID
So I move for the deletion of this last
sentence. 54
Based on the chronology of events, the discussions cited by the
main ponencia took place when the commissioners were still
contemplating a unicameral legislature in the course of this
discussion. Necessarily, only one Representative would be needed
to fully effect the participation of a unicameral legislature.
Therefore, any mention of the composition of the JBC having seven
members in the records of the Constitutional Commission,
particularly during the dates cited, was obviously within the
context that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a
bicameral legislature.
The composition of the Congress as a bilateral legislature became
final only after the JBC discussions as a seven-member Council
indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission took
place. This puts into the proper context the recognition by
Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986, which runs as
follows:
Last week, we voted for a bicameral
legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of
what the thinking of this group is, that all the
provisions that were being drafted up to that
time assumed a unicameral government. 55
The repeated mentions of the JBC having seven members as
indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission do not
justify the points raised by petitioner. This is a situation where the
records of the Constitutional Commission do not serve even as
persuasive means to ascertain intent at least in so far as the
intended numbers for the Judicial and Bar Council. Certainly they
are not relevant even to advise us on how Congress is to be
represented in that constitutional organ. aIEDAC
We should never forget that when we interpret the Constitution,
we do so with full appreciation of every part of the text within an
entire document understood by the people as they ratified it and
with all its contemporary consequences. As an eminent author in
constitutional theory has observed while going through the various
interpretative modes presented in jurisprudence: ". . . all of the
methodologies that will be discussed, properly understood, figure
in constitutional analysis as opportunities: as starting points,
constituent parts of complex arguments, or concluding
evocations." 56
Discerning that there should be a Senator and a Member of the
House of Representatives that sit in the Judicial and Bar Council so
that Congress can be fully represented ex officio is not judicial
activism. It is in keeping with the constitutional project of a
bicameral Congress that is effective whenever and wherever it is
represented. It is in tune with how our people understand
Congress as described in the fundamental law. It is consistent with
our duty to read the authoritative text of the Constitution so that
ordinary people who seek to understand this most basic law
through Our decisions would understand that beyond a single
isolated text — even beyond a preposition in Article VIII, Section 8
(1), our primordial values and principles are framed, congealed and
will be given full effect.
In a sense, we do not just read words in a legal document; we give
meaning to a Constitution.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration
and deny the Petition for lack of merit.
||| (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242
(Resolution), [April 16, 2013], 709 PHIL 478-523)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.]
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C.
IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of the Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 204934. April 8, 2014.]
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION
PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche,
Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante,
Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S.
Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho,
Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel
Fernando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C.
Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya
Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor
& Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C.
Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho,
Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho &
Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws,
Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R.
Laws,petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN,
Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA
Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios Ignacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President
Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE
OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato
Marcos, respondents.
[G.R. No. 204957. April 8, 2014.]
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS,
INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education;
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of the Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 204988. April 8, 2014.]
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC.,
represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION, INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA,
CPA, LOVENIA P. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and
MARLON I. YAP,petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL
A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205003. April 8, 2014.]
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN,
JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205043. April 8, 2014.]
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC
XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DOH SECRETARY
ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H.
LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205138. April 8, 2014.]
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC.
(PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo, and in his
own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio
O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito
M. Diokno and Baldomero
Falcone, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department
of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-
General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205478. April 8, 2014.]
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H.
KING M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D.,
collectively known as Doctors for Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos for Life, petitioners, vs. HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary;
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Education; and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205491. April 8, 2014.]
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA
FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, fox
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of
Filipino posterity, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
[G.R. No. 205720. April 8, 2014.]
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc.,
represented by Lorna Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 206355. April 8, 2014.]
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC.,
ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLA ACEDERA, ATTY.
BERTENI CATALUÑA
CAUSING, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207111. April 8, 2014.]
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG,
ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH
MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of the Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207172. April 8, 2014.]
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC.,
SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO
AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, petitioners, vs. HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207563. April 8, 2014.]
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN
M. KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to
the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem
that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society.
The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of
the Filipino people and the development of the country as a
whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and
policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the
executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and
bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of
Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that
merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it
is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called
into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn
duty to interpret legislation vis-à-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together — the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution. AECDHS
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years
than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates 2 to sticker campaigns, 3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy 4 — the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of
the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on
the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention,
to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by
spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in
their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and
on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Learning Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Imbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition, 6 filed by the Alliance for
the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president,
Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7and several others 8 in their
personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, 9 filed by the Task Force for
Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by
Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc., 12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);
(5) Petition, 14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his
capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by
Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by
the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians, Inc., 18 and several
others 19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX); AHcaDC
(8) Petition, 20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and
several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by
spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F.
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf
of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in
his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by
Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. 24 and several
others, 25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on
behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, 26 filed by Millennium
Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Cataluña
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members
of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by
John Walter B. Juat and several others, 29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat);
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by
Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31 in
their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition 32 filed by Almarim Centi
Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention, 33 filed by Atty. Samson
S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention, 34 filed by Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong (BUHAY), an accredited political
party. acHETI
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following
GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation
of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and
the right to protection against
 hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives
which are hazardous to one's health,
as it causes cancer and other health
problems. 36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that
the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for
the procurement of contraceptives.
For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed
to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional
mandate ensuring religious
freedom. 37 CHATEa
It is also contended that the RH Law
threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to
refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although
it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions. 38
In this connection, Section 5.23 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides
that skilled health professionals who
are public officers such as, but not
limited to, Provincial, City, or
Municipal Health Officers, medical
officers, medical specialists, rural
health physicians, hospital staff
nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement
these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing
for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs. 41
While the petitioners recognize that the
guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise
of religion and the right to free
speech. 42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro
bono services for indigent women,
under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of
punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority
of patients are covered by PhilHealth,
a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the
lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public
would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners' services. 44 ESIcaC
• The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law. It is claimed
that the RH Law discriminates against
the poor as it makes them the primary
target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among
the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the
poor. 45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in
violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine
for "any violation," it
is vague because it does not define
the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law. 46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section
7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them
(the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer." 47 It
ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion
and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free
speech. To compel a person to explain
a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right
to expound only his own preferred
way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious
groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service
or procedure. 48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of
privacy of one's family protected by
the Constitution. It is contended that
the RH Law providing for mandatory
 reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional
right to raise their children in
accordance with their
beliefs. 49 cCSDTI
It is claimed that, by giving absolute
authority to the person who will
undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses
and impedes the right of spouses to
mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also
claimed that the parents of a child
who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to
determine whether their child should
use contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional
principle of non-delegation of
Legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one
bill rule provision under Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53
• The RH Law violates the principle
of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao(ARMM).
It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon
the powers devolved to LGUs and the
ARMM under the Local Government
Code and R.A. No. 9054. 54 HcDATC
Various parties also sought and were granted Leave
to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of
the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents, 55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman, 56former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberta G.
Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH), 58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty.
Joan de Venecia 60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4,
2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the
substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there
is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are
not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] same petitioners
lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary
conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and
the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6,
13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On
July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court. 63 IaESCH
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on
some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law)
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country
has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966,
the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive
drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner." 65 aTEHIC
In addition, R.A. No. 5921, 66 approved on June 21,
1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices."
Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or
chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or
preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to
the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to
mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes." The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective
means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit
family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further
reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
79, 68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health
care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous
of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from
being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to
the commitments made in the International Conference on
Population and Development. 70 Thus, on August 14, 2009,
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for
Women," which, among others, mandated the State to provide
for comprehensive health services and programs for women,
including family planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the
population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached
over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010. 72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the
measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the
RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range
of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive
health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information
on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain
acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. ScCIaA
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners — Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH
Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the
status quo ante — the situation prior to the passage of the RH
Law — must be maintained." 73 It explains:
. . . . The instant Petition does not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. As
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution
of contraceptives are prohibited unless
dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable
and repugnant under the RH Law is the role
that the State and its agencies — the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries
down to the barangay officials in the remotest
areas of the country — is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program
to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers'
money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program
by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family
planning methods, devices and supplies. 74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and
contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues: IHCSTE
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is
unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right
to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and
Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the
FDA
10] Autonomy of Local
Governments/ARMM SETaHC
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law
and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial
hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative
and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises
made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the
RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's
ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the
petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature. 79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating
measure. 80 TADCSE
In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the
wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is
a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere. 81Thus, the 1987 Constitution
provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. 84The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary
recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature
of their functions and of their respect for the other branches
of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or
the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86 CITaSA
It has also long been observed, however, that in times
of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this,
the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and
specific point — to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they
were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus,
while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the
scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation
that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of
social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the
Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has
no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied] AEDCHc
As far back as Tañada v. Angara, 91 the Court has
unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC, 93 Magallona v. Ermita, 94and countless others.
In Tañada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once
a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case),
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention
— of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that
the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence
is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96 IcDHaT
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject
petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim
that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete
and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that
any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its
operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of
the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect an the individual challenging it. For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of. 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in
question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act
performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the
fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does
not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not
necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual
case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is
so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must,
at least, be heard on the matter NOW. STaAcC
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression,
as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit
with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution. DICcTa
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that
the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The
rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing. 115 STaIHc
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." 116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v.
Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit
may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH
Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119 ACIDTE
Granting arguendo that the present action
cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to binder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all.
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused
deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues
of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at
issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action. aSTAIH
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial
restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution
are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of
either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because
they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of
the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution, 122 prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates
the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its
true intent — to act as a population control measure. 123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that
the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, 124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated
as they are inseparable. 125 THCSAE
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive
health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier,
the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to
information on the full range of modern family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to
provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion
of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information
and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health
care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners'
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the
entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. 127 As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and
management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women." 128 TcDHSI
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero,
it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one
subject" rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the
 nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as
not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State
recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood. cEDaTS
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act." 129 Considering the close
intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under
its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of
the assailed legislation.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates
the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion. 130 HcDSaT
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4 (a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
andprior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum
which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows
only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as
they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life. 131 As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a
fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State
sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is
an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH
Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the
FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer
the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients,
there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it
shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out
that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply
the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law
does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health
care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be
made accessible to the public. 134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due
consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the
medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when
a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive. 135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life
begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that
do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human
being enjoys the right to life. 137 Even if not formally
established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon
a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends
any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than
ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. cDHAaT
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act
to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion of male vasectomy
and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved
from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various
measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from
R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this
paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle
of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As
will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from
the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford
protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins *
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the
position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of
the Court could express their own views on this matter. CASIEa
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that
life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus
should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which
reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the
unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it
is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when
life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of
the Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum — from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
The raison d' être for the rule is essentially
two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to
prevail. TCEaDI
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a
viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the
male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival
and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a
legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S.
Montaño, 147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, 148 Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was
referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed
light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a
sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx xxx xxx
 Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship
speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. . . . . 150
xxx xxx xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization
and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained: aTHCSE
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a
biological manner. The first question that
needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the
fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon
fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the
continuous process of cell division. All these
processes are vital signs of life. Therefore,
there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics
gives an equally categorical "yes." At the
moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23
chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of
46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46
is found only — and I repeat, only in human
cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered
affirmatively, we must conclude that if the
fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then,
as night follows day, it must be human life. Its
nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the
moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life
begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: . . . the phrase from the moment
of "conception" was described by us here
before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of
some people; we want to use the simpler
phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is
given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word
"unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing
a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception." EHTADa
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that
particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would
leave it to Congress to define when life begins.
So, Congress can define life to begin from six
months after fertilization; and that would really
be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined
by science that life begins from the moment of
conception. There can be no doubt about it. So
we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like
to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during
the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of
conception," does this mean when the egg
meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to
Congress the right to determine whether
certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that
some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel
towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that
they stop the opportunity for the fertilized
ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so
called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is
established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under
this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not
think it is up to Congress to state whether or
not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the
provision as it is now proposed, they are
already considered abortifacient. 154 ESDcIA
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent
that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that
is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether
a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence. 155 From the discussions above,
contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should
be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
 Mr. Gascon: . . . . As I mentioned in my speech Before the union of the eggs, egg and the Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also
on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that sperm, there is no life yet. reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of
I would like not only to protect the life of the Justice Bersamin: male and female gametes or germ cells during a process
unborn, but also the lives of the millions of There is no life. known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence
people in the world by fighting for a nuclear- Atty. Noche: of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
free world. I would just like to be assured of So, there is no life to be protected. (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends
the legal and pragmatic implications of the with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
Justice Bersamin:
term "protection of the life of the unborn from sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
To be protected.
the moment of conception." I raised some of form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a
Atty. Noche:
these implications this afternoon when I large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a
interjected in the interpellation of Under Section 12, yes. human being." 162
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask Justice Bersamin: The authors of Human Embryology &
that question again for a categorical So you have no objection to condoms? Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
answer. CHIScD Atty. Noche: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term Not under Section 12, Article II. EaCDAT landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new,
"the life of the unborn from the moment of Justice Bersamin: genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed. . . . The
conception" we are also actually saying "no," Even if there is already information that combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which condoms sometimes have porosity? results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
are already being encouraged at this point in Atty. Noche: number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
time. Is that the sense of the committee or Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
does it disagree with me? findings to that effect, Your Honor, In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I am discussing here Section 12, Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
because contraceptives would be preventive. Article II, Your Honor, yes. Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein
There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped. Justice Bersamin: concluded that:
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I Alright. CONCLUSION
was speaking more about some contraceptives, Atty. Noche: The PMA throws its full weight in supporting
such as the intra-uterine device which actually And it's not, I have to admit it's not an the RH Bill at the same time that PMA
stops the egg which has already been fertilized abortifacient, Your Honor. 158 maintains its strong position that fertilization is
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say sacred because it is at this stage that
Medical Meaning
"from the moment of conception," what really conception, and thus human life, begins.
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will Human lives are sacred from the moment of
medical foundation. Mosby's Medical, Nursing, and Allied
have to be unconstitutionalized. conception, and that destroying those new
Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after lives is never licit, no matter what the
pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
the fertilization. purported good outcome would be. In terms of
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159 It describes
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding biology and human embryology, a human
fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form
Officer. 156 being begins immediately at fertilization and
a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by after that, there is no point along the
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological &
the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during continuous line of human embryogenesis
Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the
the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, where only a "potential" human being can be
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person)
vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the
abortifacients. 157 ESCTIA conclusion cannot escape this objective
egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new
Atty. Noche: scientific fact.
individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue. TDCaSE
 The scientific evidence supports the conclusion
that a zygote is a human organism and that the
life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of
conception." This conclusion is objective,
consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos. 164 DTAcIa
Conclusion: The Moment
of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to
the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. 165 According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is
only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object — it is a
living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. 168Implantation has been conceptualized only
for convenience by those who had population control in mind.
To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the
RH Law but also to the Constitution. CSTEHI
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would
unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine
wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-
based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution
proscribes — abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of
the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers
was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention . . . is to make sure that there
would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed
by the Supreme Court. 169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line
with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage,
when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is
replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
Thus: HEDCAS
1]. . . .
Section 4. Definition of Terms. — For the
purpose of this Act, the following terms shall
be defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the
access to a full range of methods, facilities,
services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life
and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) Proscription
of abortion and
management
of abortion complications;
cTACIa
xxx xxx xxx.
2]. . . .
Section 4.. . . .
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the
rights of individuals and couples, to decide
freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of
their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have
the information and means to do so; and to
attain the highest standard of sexual health
and reproductive health: Provided,
however, That reproductive health rights do
not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3]. . . .
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. — Except for
prevailing laws against abortion, any law,
presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise
known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4
(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. — . . .
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device
that induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
 be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA. SEHTAC
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that
protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
By using the word "or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug
or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb; or aTADcH
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's
womb,
upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners,
the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits
any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law
does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent — all the
way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb.
After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from
the moment the fertilized ovum implants — there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation. DTAHEC
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as
it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a or device that induces
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is abortion or the destruction of
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of a fetus inside the mother's
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH womb or the prevention of
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which the fertilized ovum to reach
kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized and be implanted in the
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is mother's womb upon
an abortifacient. determination of the
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law FDA. ECcaDT
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso Section 3.01 (a) of the IRR, however, redefines
under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply "abortifacient" as:
included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification Section 3.01.For purposes of these Rules, the
from the FDA that said product and supply is made available terms shall be defined as follows:
on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or
empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot device that primarily induces
fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortion or the destruction of
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every a fetus inside the mother's
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be womb or the prevention of
used. 171 the fertilized ovum to reach
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access and be implanted in the
only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, mother's womb upon
however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as determination of the Food
worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that and Drug Administration
"any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
must have a certification from the FDA that said product and Again in Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR,
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be "contraceptive," is redefined, viz.:
used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal,
the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section effective and scientifically proven modern
that provides: family planning method, device, or health
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices product, whether natural or artificial, that
shall not purchase or acquire by any means prevents pregnancy but does
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
abortifacients that will be used for such prevent a fertilized ovum from being
purpose and their other forms or equivalent. implanted in the mother's womb in doses of
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR its approved indication as determined by the
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
"abortifacient" as follows: that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — For the inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
purpose of this Act, the following terms shall ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172
be defined as follows: This cannot be done.
 In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and
Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with
the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of
the RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily,"
in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and should, therefore,
be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the
RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. aEcHCD
For the same reason, this definition of
"contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives
which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the
certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act
as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its
declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is
that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL
will not only be those contraceptives that do not have
the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary
action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy
prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws
should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is
sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the
word "primarily" in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.01
(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives
that have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle
of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of
life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the
right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the
risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared
to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is
decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk
of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk
of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk
of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4
(p) 178 and (w) 179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that
the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180 CaSHAc
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article
II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if
it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities
refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health
of women. 181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional
right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for
the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz.:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and
maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special
agency for disabled persons for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-
reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: CTIEac
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers
from trade malpractices and from substandard
or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions. 182 In Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 183 it was stated:
. . . Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that —
 . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would
be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Emphases
supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the
petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI prays that
the status quo — under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the
sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited
when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed
by a physician — be maintained. 185 ETCcSa
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law
in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good
law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus,
the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman
that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that
are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained
by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary
users of contraceptives, the same cannot be
dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to
Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and
Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education
in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the
provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or
distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:
"(a)" Contraceptive drug" is any
medicine, drug, chemical, or portion
which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of
the female ovum: and
"(b)" Contraceptive device" is any
instrument, device, material, or agent
introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or
corporation, violating the provisions
of this Act shall be punished with a
fine of not more than five hundred
pesos or an imprisonment of not less
than six months or more than one
year or both in the discretion of the
Court. HATICc
"This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general
manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine,
pharmaceuticals, drugs and
devices. — No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or
resold, or otherwise be made
available to the consuming public
except through a prescription
drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly
established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act."
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as
provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners
that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether
harmful or not, is completely unwarranted
and baseless. 186[Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in
connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides: CacEID
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of
Family Planning Supplies. — The DOH shall
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole
country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan
and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget
allotments shall be based on, among others,
the current levels and projections of the
following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age
and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of
method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
 Provided, That LGUs may implement its own
procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions
of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive
drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health
must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are
assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs
and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single
contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to
the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines
available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the
constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself. SICaDA
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that
Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and
intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering
the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3-Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy
and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious
education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their
beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the
willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that
"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the
reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life." 188 CacEID
The petitioners question the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure
of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of
religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their
religious beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH
Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional
guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the
patient seeking reproductive health services to another
medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he
refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious
objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly
limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a) (3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information — no escape is
afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (1) and
(2), i.e., against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working
in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public
officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to
in Section 23 (b); and c) teachers in public schools referred to
in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognized. 191 aTEHIC
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical
practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to
refer the matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service
providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against
their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality.
Sections 9, 14 and 17 of the law are too secular that they tend
to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services
to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those
upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes
on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to
become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious
sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's
belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by
the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public. 193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show
compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that
endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of
the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights,
sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands
of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not
being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom. 194 ISCHET
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the
RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law
even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by
providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only
prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his
religion against his free will. 199 AHacIS
The respondents add that by asserting that only
natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious
freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking
the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods
and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201 CAETcH
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents
insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced
compromise between the interests of the religious objector,
on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to
refer — and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health
care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section
7 and 23 (a) (3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to
freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing
on the rights of others. 202 Whatever burden is placed on the
petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact. 203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under
Section 15, the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to
have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that
those who object to any information received on account of
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept information given to them. They are completely free
to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State. 204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute
the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing
various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families. HEcTAI
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History
has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all — the religious
people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring
the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this
Constitution. TSEcAD
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty
God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that
the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so
far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional
religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a
strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the
affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of
separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article
II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State
shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State
is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the
other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country. cADTSH
 Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic
sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the
need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx xxx xxx.
No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of
any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. ASaTHc
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious
freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the
State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with
the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith. 208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits
legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.
ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been
said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common
good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose
is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose
and effect to advance the state's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L
ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses
were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal — to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs
and practices. In simplest terms, the free
exercise clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot
or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices. 210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's
religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom
is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211 SacTCA
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and
limitless bounded only by one's imagination
and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between
the freedom of belief and the exercise of said
belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to
the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare." 213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise
clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the
Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated
"that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same case,
it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that
with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose
of accommodation is to remove a burden on,
or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion." 216 "What is sought
under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially
neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether
by the legislature or the courts." 217 EcSaHA
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper. 218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the
notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws
burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several
tests to determine these limits. Beginning with
the first case on the Free Exercise
Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test
but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test
continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then
pronounced that the test of permissibility of
religious freedom is whether it violates the
established institutions of society and law.
The Victoriano case mentioned
the "immediate and grave danger" test as well
as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise
provided the law is the least restrictive means
to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also
used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling
state interest" test. After Victoriano,
German went back to
the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed
the "grave and immediate danger"test and
overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent
case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear
and present danger" test in the maiden case
of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all
the cases which employed the "clear and
present danger" or "grave and immediate
danger" test involved, in one form or another,
religious speech as this test is often used in
cases on freedom of expression. On the other
hand, the Gerona and German cases set the
rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority
cited by German has been overruled
by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the
only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the
use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of
the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as
in American Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia
ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has
easily discernible or immediate effects.
The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from
having been overruled, is not congruent with
the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar
to Victoriano, the present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole
gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others
delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not
any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as
this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights —
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is
sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise
Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The
entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty,
thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society
and establish a government." As held
in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially
the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious
liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at
the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the
test used in Sherbert which involved
conduct, i.e., refusal to work an Saturdays. In
the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the
state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of
the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modern reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma
or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with
"faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church . . . are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in
this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom. CcAITa
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes
and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2. The State recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family which in turn is the foundation of
the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall
defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of
Policy] THDIaC
3. The State shall promote and provide
information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards
such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide
funding support to promote modern natural
methods of family planning, especially the
Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the
needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1)
enable individuals and couples to have the
number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and
affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(f)]
5. The State shall respect individuals'
preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs,
taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment
organizations (NGOs), women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will
address the priority needs of women, the poor,
and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will
and ability of a parent to respond to the needs
and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between
parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological
preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. (Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives
is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected. cHESAD
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's. 221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to
promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the
same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7,
23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate
that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice,
the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in
the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny. CHEDAc
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-
of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him
into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean
conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law
promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modern reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against
his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is
the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an
opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance
of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do
directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is
necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being
an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in
turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that
should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual
to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is
not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of
choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct
or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and
moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest
of the State, on the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If
he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief
and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner
House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan
and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health
Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious
objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of
1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support
staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions. 226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation'
were defined according to whether the person was taking part
'directly' or 'indirectly' this would actually mean more
complexity and uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral,
the applicable principle was the same — they could not be
forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering
that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer
under Section 7 and Section 23 (a) (3), the Court deems that it
must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23 (a) (1) and (a) (2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred
status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties
provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a
law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when
what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to
stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs,
is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the
Court cannot allow. HTSAEa
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR
reads:
 Provided, That skilled health professional such IRR-Implementing Rules and
as provincial, city or municipal health officers, Regulations of the RH Bill?
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising Congressman Lagman:
midwives, among others, who by virtue of Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to
their office are specifically charged with the admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH thoroughly dissected the nuances of
Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as the provisions.
conscientious objectors. Justice Mendoza:
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal I will read to you one provision. It's Section
protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law.
be equally protective of the religious belief of public health But in the IRR it says: ". . . skilled
officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should health professionals such as
not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The provincial, city or municipal health
protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should officers, chief of hospitals, head
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction nurses, supervising midwives, among
whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, others, who by virtue of their office
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the are specifically charged with the duty
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken to implement the provisions of the
off even if one acquires employment in the government. RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies considered as conscientious
a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The objectors." Do you agree with this?
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular Congressman Lagman:
or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral I will have to go over again the provisions, Your
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid Honor.
views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
Justice Mendoza:
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of
In other words, public health officers in
religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
contrast to the private practitioners
petition, and freedom of association. 229
who can be conscientious objectors,
The discriminatory provision is void not only because
skilled health professionals cannot be
no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
considered conscientious objectors.
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Do you agree with this? Is this not
Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
against the constitutional right to the
conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
religious belief?
prevail. ISHaCD
Congressman Lagman:
Justice Mendoza:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the
I'll go to another point. The RH law . . . in your
IRR and the law, the law must
Comment-in-Intervention on page 52,
prevail. 230
you mentioned RH Law is replete with
Compelling State Interest
provisions in upholding the freedom
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on
of religion and respecting religious
whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions,
convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this
were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest
with qualifications. Now, you have
to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services
read, I presumed you have read the
to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the
obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to
achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents'
submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent
in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that
would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's
right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained
the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following: EHITaS
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious
objector to refer. . .
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
. . . which you are discussing awhile ago with
Justice Abad. What is the compelling
State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector
which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, . . .
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose
this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe
that the standard is a compelling
State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech
matter or a pure free exercise matter.
This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors
and their patients. 231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state
interest which would limit the free exercise clause of
the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is R.A. No. 4729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The transmitted diseases, HIV,
constitutionally unacceptable. 232 Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, and AIDS;
Freedom of religion means more than just the otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply (6) Prevention and management of
freedom to believe. It also means the freedom cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and reproductive tract cancers
to act or not to act according to what one programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on like breast and cervical
believes. And this freedom is violated when comprehensive health services and programs for women, in cancers, and other
one is compelled to act against one's belief or fact, reads: gynecological conditions and
is prevented from acting according to one's Section 17. Women's Right to Health. — (a) disorders;
belief. 233 HDIATS Comprehensive Health Services. — The State (7) Prevention of abortion and
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, management of pregnancy-
danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health related complications;
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans services and programs covering all stages of a (8) In cases of violence against
the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children woman's life cycle and which addresses the women and children, women
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not major causes of women's mortality and and children victims and
the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for survivors shall be provided
method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to comprehensive health services, due respect with comprehensive health
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed shall be accorded to women's religious services that include
upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and convictions, the rights of the spouses to found psychosocial, therapeutic,
occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on a family in accordance with their religious medical, and legal
reproductive health matters. convictions, and the demands of responsible interventions and assistance
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists parenthood, and the right of women to towards healing, recovery,
to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's protection from hazardous drugs, devices, and empowerment;
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate interventions, and substances. DcaCSE (9) Prevention and management of
"the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which Access to the following services shall be infertility and sexual
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to ensured: dysfunction pursuant to
religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented (1) Maternal care to include pre- and ethical norms and medical
any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes post-natal services to address standards;
to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive pregnancy and infant health (10) Care of the elderly women
means. 234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring and nutrition; beyond their child-bearing
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral (2) Promotion of breastfeeding; years; and
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested (3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, (11) Management, treatment, and
as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents and effective methods of intervention of mental health
to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the family planning; problems of women and girls.
State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the (4) Family and State collaboration in In addition, healthy lifestyle
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may youth sexuality education activities are encouraged and
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform and health services without promoted through programs
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness prejudice to the primary right and projects as strategies in
and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to and duty of parents to the prevention of
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of educate their children; diseases. ICaDHT
the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms. (5) Prevention and management of (b) Comprehensive Health Information and
At any rate, there are other secular steps already reproductive tract infections, Education. — The State shall provide women in
taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is including sexually all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, and accurate information and education on all
 the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs,
with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth and the
development of moral
character and the right of
children to be brought up in
an atmosphere of morality
and rectitude for the
enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's
sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective
family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay
eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of
unintended pregnancies, lives changed, . . . ." 235 He,
however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World
Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time.
Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such
number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state
interest. aSTAcH
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in
the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange
for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly
recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to
render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made
in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of
the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother
in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that
we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of
religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother
and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting
death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. — May we please
remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the
House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the
life of either the mother of the child is never
justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child
and the life of the mother, the doctor
is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no
direct harm is intended to the other. If the
above principles are observed, the loss of the
child's life or the mother's life is not
intentional and, therefore, unavoidable.
Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a
mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the
medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have
been more than justified considering the life he would be able
to save. EScAHT
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section
15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is
not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses
to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate
the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly
noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept the information given to them, are completely free
to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23
(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions
strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In
fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family
in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood; DcTaEH
The right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation
 and other conditions prejudicial to
their development;
The right of the family to a family
living wage and income; and
The right of families or family
associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect
them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to
control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It
likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether
public or private, who shall: . . .
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe
reproductive health procedures on any person
of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or
authorization of the following persons in the
following instances: CTEaDc
(i) Spousal consent in case of
married persons:
provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision
of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health
procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their
very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art.
XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the
"right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses.
In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them" is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter
animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for
the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not
just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect
their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision
whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively
to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they
chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not
shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-de Castro, Section
19 (c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta
for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including
the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3 (v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23
(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family
by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure. 242 TaCDcE
The right to chart their own destiny together falls
within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, 243 where the
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the
right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection." 244 Morfe adopted the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights — older than our political parties,
older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on
the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of
the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas in Griswold wrote that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple,
the courts will decide. aEHASI
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental
consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. — . . . .
No person shall be denied information and
access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will
not be allowed access to modern methods of
family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. HIaAED
There can be no other interpretation of this provision
except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excludedfrom the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is
already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent
needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own
parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and
father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To
say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront
to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the
constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government." 247 In this regard, Commissioner
Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the
adjective "primary" to modify the right of
parents. It imports the assertion that the right
of parents is superior to that of the
State. 248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of
parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or
the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be
dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition
that the State affords couples entering into the special
contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation
of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest,
take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under
the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23 (a) (2)
(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves,
on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to
take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the
State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person
to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited
to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor
child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. SAHITC
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require
the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the
life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for
lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should
be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23
(a) (2) (ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting
the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective
surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed
above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii), the parents should not
be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority.
To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5-Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation
to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age- and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education
under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom. According to the petitioners,
these provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students. 250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led
to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society;
and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251 ScCEIA
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the
validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the
youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act
as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of
the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role
in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14 provides
not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health
education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and
other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4 (t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical
and emotional changes among adolescents — the Court finds
that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of
the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could
very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs
of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes
apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3 (1) of the Constitution is without
merit. 254 aDSHCc
While the Court notes the possibility that educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates
their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should
an actual case be filed before it.
6-Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a) (1) mentions a
"private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health
care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the
assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious
groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern
family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
health informationunder Section 23 (a) (1), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23 (a) (2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the
withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information,
but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade. AHCTEa
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the
definition of "private health care service provider," reference
must be made to Section 4 (n) of the RH Law which defines a
"public health service provider," viz.:
(n) Public health care service provider refers
to: (1) public health care institution, which is
duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of
facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease,
injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of
health care services; or (4) barangay health
worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO
and who voluntarily renders primarily health
care services in the community after having
been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health (DOH). ACIDTE
Further, the use of the term "private health care
institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health
care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for
the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the
right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive
health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modern family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures.
The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention
that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby
quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts
are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether
public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information
or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/or intentionally
provide incorrect information
regarding programs and
services on reproductive
health including the right to
informed choice and access
to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective
family planning
methods; STaCcA
 From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here
denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to
coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional. 258 Used together in relation to Section 23 (a) (1),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health
and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance
with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care
service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the
need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.
7-Equal Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates
the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the
guiding principles 259 and definition of terms 260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional. ScTIAH
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the
Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this
government was founded is that of the equality
of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality on
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all
official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken. DHCSTa
It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements
of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to
the class. "The classification will be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification
are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law
to him." IECAaD
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in
the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes
the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3 (l) explains,
the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth
rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number
of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the
petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise
them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide
priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact
that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public
educational institutions does not amount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the
other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is
constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-
government health care service providers to render forty-eight
(48) hours of pro bonoreproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro
bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion
as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken. EIcSTD
It should first be mentioned that the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the
very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades,
even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of
involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest. EAICTS
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors
are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs
and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bono or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or
not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs
List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation.
The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to
render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products." In this connection, Section 4
of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act,
there is hereby created an office to be called
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said
Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following
functions, powers and duties: TcaAID
"(a) To administer the effective
implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the
collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health
products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as
basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill
of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers,
drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by
the FDA;
"xxx xxx xxx
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all
applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders,
distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,
retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users
of health products to report to the FDA any
incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the
death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person; TDEASC
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu
propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for
thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty
(60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban,
recall, and/or withdrawal of any health
product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or
patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is
a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
xxx xxx xxx.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions,
powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency
to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with
the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of
the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public
be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained
in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows: cDEICH
The reason is the increasing complexity of the
task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10-Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers
devolved to local government units (LGUs)under Section 17 of
the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of
basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. —
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to
be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such
other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein. HcSCED
(b) Such basic services and facilities include,
but are not limited to, . . . .
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs
to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already
been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services. 268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or
partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those
cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as
the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows
that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or
the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of
its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the
LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services. There
is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as
making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments. EHSTDA
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the
ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or
the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to
justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may
be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the
ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in
the relationship between the national and the regional
governments. 274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot
be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest. 275
11-Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law
violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does
not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or
invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it.
To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions
on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right
has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a
basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it
was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279 aCHcIE
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does
not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion
in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information
and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods,
devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of
Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to
impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modern
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be,
the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in
the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial
issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution
of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of
the very few. cACTaI
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial
for the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number
of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on
their economy. These young workers represent a significant
human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling.
For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up
by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed
down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be
the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like
the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious
objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is
non-interference in the wisdom of a law. SDHITE
. . . . But this Court cannot go beyond what the
legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say
what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the
law should be or what is the correct rule in a
given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
 adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every
unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the
legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as
always, with apt judicial caution and cold
neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to
the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law
is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive
measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No.
6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women
(R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and
"non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: SCEDAI
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
||| (Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
2] Section 23 (a) (1) and the corresponding provision
204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491,
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses
PHIL 1-99)
to disseminate information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
3] Section 23 (a) (2) (i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4] Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23 (a) (3) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs; SDAaTC
6] Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8] Section 3.01 (a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125346. November 11, 2014.]
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE
FACTORY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 136328-29. November 11, 2014.]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 144942. November 11, 2014.]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner, vs. LA SUERTE CIGAR &
CIGARETTE FACTORY, respondent.
[G.R. No. 148605. November 11, 2014.]
STERLING TOBACCO
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
[G.R. No. 158197. November 11, 2014.]
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE
FACTORY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
[G.R. No. 165499. November 11, 2014.]
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE
FACTORY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco
imported and locally purchased by cigarette manufacturers for use
as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC), before it
was amended on December 19, 2012 through Republic Act No.
10351 1 (Sin Tax Law), stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to an excise
tax of P0.75 for each kilogram thereof. 2 The 1997 NIRC further
provides that stemmed leaf tobacco — "leaf tobacco which has had
the stem or midrib removed" 3 — "may be sold in bulk as raw
material by one manufacturer directly to another without payment
of the tax, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the rules
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Finance." 4
This is a consolidation of six petitions for review of several
decisions of the Court of Appeals, involving three cigarette
manufacturers and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. G.R.
No. 125346 is an appeal 5 from the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) that reversed 6 the Court of Tax Appeals' decision 7 and
held petitioner La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory (La Suerte)
liable for deficiency specific tax on its purchase of imported and
locally produced stemmed leaf tobacco and sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco to Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (AATC)
during the period from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989. G.R. Nos.
136328-29 is an appeal 8 by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Commissioner) from the decision 9 of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals' rulings 10 that Fortune Tobacco
Corporation (Fortune) was not obliged to pay the excise tax on its
importations of stemmed leaf tobacco for the periods from January
1, 1986 to June 30, 1989 and July 1, 1989 to November 30, 1990.
In G.R. No. 148605, Sterling Tobacco Corporation (Sterling)
appeals 11 the decision 12 of the Court of Appeals that reversed
the Court of Tax Appeals' decision 13 and held it liable to pay
deficiency excise taxes on its importation and local purchases of
stemmed leaf tobacco from November 1986 to June 24, 1989. G.R.
No. 144942 is an appeal 14 from the Court of Appeals'
decision 15 that affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals' decision 16 and
ordered the refund of specific taxes paid by La Suerte on its
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in April 1995. In G.R. No.
158197, La Suerte sought to appeal 17 the decision 18 of the Court
of Appeals holding it liable for deficiency specific tax on its local
and imported purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco and those it sold
for the period from June 21, 1989 to November 20, 1990. Finally,
in G.R. No. 165499, La Suerte again sought to appeal
by certiorari 19 the decision 20 of the Court of Appeals reversing
the Court of Tax Appeals and holding it liable for deficiency specific
tax on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in March 1995.
Factual background
Overview of cigarette manufacturing
The primary component of cigarettes is tobacco, a processed
product derived from the leaves of the plants in the
genus Nicotiana. 21 Most cigarettes contain a mixture or blend of
several types of tobacco from a variety of sources.
The tobacco types grown in the Philippines are: Virginia (or 'flue-
cured'), 22 which accounts for 59.35% of tobacco
production, Burley (or 'bright air-cured'), 23which makes up
22.21%, and the Native (or 'dark air-cured), 24 which makes up the
remaining 18.44%. 25 "[T]he 'native' type is normally categorized
into three: cigar filler type, wrapper type and chewing type, or . . .
'Batek' tobacco." 26 Virginia and Burley, considered as the
aromatic type, are intended for cigarette manufacturing.
Growing and harvesting
"Tobacco seeds undergo a process of germination, which takes
about 7 to 10 days, depending on the tobacco varieties. . . . The
tobacco seedlings are then sown in cold frames or hotbeds to
prevent attacks from insects, and then transplanted into the
fields" 27 after 45 to 65 days. 28 CAHTIS
Harvesting begins 55 to 60 days after transplanting. 29 A farmer
carries out either priming (leaf by leaf) or stalk harvesting (by the
whole plant). 30
Curing
"After harvest, tobacco is stored for curing, which allows for the
slow oxidation and degradation of carotenoids. This allows for the
leaves to take on properties that are usually attributed to the
'smoothness' of the smoke." 31
"Curing methods vary with the type of tobacco grown. The tobacco
barn design varies accordingly." 32 There are two main ways of
curing tobacco in the Philippine setting:
1) Air-curing (for Burley and Native tobacco) "is
carried out by hanging the tobacco in
well-ventilated barns, where the
tobacco is allowed to dry over a
period of 4 to 8 weeks. Air-cured
tobacco is generally low in sugar
content, which gives the tobacco
smoke a light, smooth, semi-sweet
flavor. These tobacco leaves usually
have a high nicotine
content[;]" 33 and
2) Flue-curing (for Virginia tobacco) process
"starts by the sticking of tobacco
leaves, which are then hung from tier-
poles in curing barns. The procedure
will generally take about a week. Flue-
cured tobacco generally produces
cigarette tobacco, which usually has a
high content of sugar, with medium to
high levels of nicotine." 34
Once cured, the leaves are sorted into grades based on size, color,
and quality, and packed in standard bales. 35 The bales are then
moved to accredited trading centers where they are purchased by
leaf buyers such as wholesale tobacco dealers and exporters or
cigarette manufacturing companies. 36
Redrying and aging
After purchase, leaf tobacco is re-dried and then added with
moisture to make the tobacco pliable enough to remove its large
stems. 37 The leaves are stripped or de-stemmed, either by hand
or machine, cleaned and compressed into boxes or porous wooden
vats called hogsheads, and aged. 38 Thereafter, the leaves are
either exported or used for the manufacture of cigarettes, cigars,
and other tobacco products.
Primary processing 39
In the cigarette factory, the tobacco leaves undergo a conditioning
process where "high temperatures and humidity restore moisture
to suitable levels for cutting and blending tobacco and completing
the cigarette-making process." 40
"[T]obaccos are precisely cut and blended according to . . .
formulas, or recipes, to produce tobaccos for various brands of
cigarettes. These brand recipes include ingredients and flavors that
are added to the tobacco to give each brand its unique
characteristics." 41
Cigarette making and packing 42
"The blended tobacco — often referred to as "filler" or "cut-filler"
— . . . is delivered by a pneumatic feed system to cigarette making
machines . . . within the factory." 43 The machine disperses the
shredded tobacco over a continuous roll of cigarette paper and
cuts the paper to the desired length. The completed cigarettes are
subsequently packed, sealed, and placed in cartons.
Cigarette manufacturers
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory (La Suerte), 44 Fortune Tobacco
Corporation (Fortune), 45 and Sterling Tobacco Corporation
(Sterling) 46 are domestic corporations engaged in the production
and manufacture of cigars and cigarettes. These companies import
leaf tobacco from foreign sources and purchase locally produced
leaf tobacco to be used in the manufacture of cigars and
cigarettes. 47
The transactions of these cigarette manufacturers pertinent to
these consolidated cases are the following:
1. La Suerte's local purchases, importations,
and sale of stemmed leaf tobacco
from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989
(G.R. No. 125346), and from June
1989 to November 1990 (G.R. No.
158197), and importations in March
1995 (G.R. No. 165499) and April 1995
(G.R. No. 144942);
2. Fortune's importation of tobacco strips from
January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989, and
from July 1, 1989 to November 30,
1990 (G.R. Nos. 136328-29); and
3. Sterling's importations and local purchases
of stemmed leaf tobacco from
November 1986 to June 24, 1989 (G.R.
No. 148605).
History of applicable tax provisions
The first tax code came into existence in 1939 with the enactment
of Commonwealth Act No. 466 48 (1939 Code). Section 136 of the
1939 Code imposed specific (excise) taxes on manufactured
products of tobacco, but excluded cigars and cigarettes, which
were subject to tax under a different section. 49 Section 136
provided thus:
SECTION 136. Specific Tax on Products of
Tobacco. — On manufactured products of
tobacco, except cigars, cigarettes, and tobacco
specially prepared for chewing so as to be
unsuitable for consumption in any other
manner, but including all other tobacco twisted
by hand or reduced into a condition to be
consumed in any manner other than by the
ordinary mode of drying and curing; and on all
tobacco prepared or partially prepared for sale
or consumption, even if prepared without the
use of any machine or instrument and without
being pressed or sweetened; and on all fine-cut
shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings,
and sweepings of tobacco, there shall be
collected on each kilogram, sixty
centavos. cAECST
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so
as to be unsuitable for use in any other
manner, on each kilogram, forty-eight
centavos. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 132 of the 1939 Code, however, by way of exception,
provided that "stemmed leaf tobacco . . . may be sold in bulk as
raw material by one manufacturer directly to another, under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations of the
Department of Finance, without the prepayment of the tax."
Section 132 stated:
SECTION 132. Removal of Tobacco Products
Without Pre-payment of Tax. — Products of
tobacco entirely unfit for chewing or smoking
may be removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the
Department of Finance; and stemmed leaf
tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut
chewing tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings,
clippings and sweepings of tobacco may be
sold in bulk as raw material by one
manufacturer directly to another, under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Department of Finance,
without the prepayment of the tax.
"Stemmed leaf tobacco," as herein used means
leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib
removed. The term does not include broken
leaf tobacco. (Emphasis supplied)
On September 29, 1954, upon the recommendation of then Acting
Collector of Internal Revenue J. Antonio Araneta, the Department
of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. V-39 (RR No. V-
39), or "The Tobacco Products Regulations," relative to "the
enforcement of the provisions of Title IV of the [1939 Tax Code] in
so far as they affect the manufacture or importation of, and the
collection and payment of the specific tax on, manufactured
tobacco or products of tobacco." 50 Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39,
which lays the rules for tax exemption on tobacco products, states:
SECTION 20. Exemption from tax of tobacco
products intended for agricultural or industrial
purposes. — (a) Sale of stemmed leaf tobacco,
etc., by one factory to another. — Subject to
the limitations herein established, products of
tobacco entirely unfit for chewing or smoking
may be removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use; and stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-
cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing
tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and
sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as
raw materials by one manufacturer directly to
 another without the prepayment of specific
tax.
Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the
refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps,
cuttings, clippings, and sweeping of leaf
tobacco or partially manufactured tobacco or
other refuse of tobacco may be transferred
from one factory to another under an official L-
7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact
weight of the tobacco at the time of its
removal, and entry shall be made in the L-7
register in the place provided on the page of
removals. Corresponding debit entry will be
made in the L-7 register book of the factory
receiving the tobacco under heading "Refuse,
etc., received from other factory," showing the
date of receipt, assessment and invoice
numbers, name and address of the consignor,
form in which received, and the weight of the
tobacco. This paragraph should not, however,
be construed to permit the transfer of
materials unsuitable for the manufacture of
tobacco products from one factory to another.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sections 10 and 11 of RR No. V-39 enumerate and describe the
record books to be kept and used by manufacturers of tobacco
products, viz.:
SECTION 10. (a) Register, auxiliary, and
stamps requisition books for
manufacturers. — The Collector of Internal
Revenue shall from time to time supply
provincial revenue agents or the Chief of the
Tobacco Tax Section with the necessary
number of manufacturers official register
books and official auxiliary register books as
may be required in each locality by
manufacturers of tobacco products. Whenever
any manufacturer shall have qualified himself
as such by executing a proper bond, registering
his factory, and paying the privilege tax and
shall have complied with all the requirements
of engaging in such business contained in
the National Internal Revenue Code and in
these regulations, the internal revenue agent
within whose district the factory is located shall
deliver to said manufacturer the necessary
official register books and auxiliary register
books. These books consist of the following:
B.I.R. No. 31.09 — Official Register Book, A-3
for manufacturers of chewing and smoking
tobacco.
B.I.R. No. 31.10 — Manufactured tobacco
(Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.18 — Official Register Book, A-4,
for manufacturers of cigar.
B.I.R. No. 31.19 — (Transcript sheet of the
above).
B.I.R. No. 31.27 — Official Register Book, A-5,
for Manufacturers of cigarettes.
B.I.R. No. 31.28 — (Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.01 — Official Register Book, L-7,
record of raw materials for manufacturers of
any class of tobacco products.
B.I.R. No. 31.02 — (Transcript sheet of
above)[.]
B.I.R. No. 31.46 — Auxiliary Register Book, L-7-
1/2, bale book, for manufacturers of any class
of tobacco products.
B.I.R. No. 31.47 — (Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.12 — Stamp requisition book, for
manufacturers of manufactured
tobacco. DcCEHI
B.I.R. No. 31.21 — Stamp requisition book, for
manufacturers of cigars.
B.I.R. No. 31.30 — Stamp requisition book, for
manufacturers of cigarettes.
B.I.R. No. 31.05 — L-7 Official Invoice Book for,
use in connection with L-7 register book.
B.I.R. No. 31.05 — L-7-1/2 Official Invoice Book,
for use in connection with L-7-1/2 bale book.
(b) General nature of official register and
auxiliary register books. — The L-7 official
register book is the record of all raw materials
used in the manufacture of tobacco products of
all description in the factory. It is the primary
record of the internal operations of the factory.
It shows the raw materials used in the
manufacture and the articles actually
manufactured or produced. The Schedule A
register books are the record of the articles
actually manufactured or produced, and
transferred from the credit side of the official
register book, L-7. They show the amount of
taxes paid and the name of the person to
whom the finished products is consigned or
sold when leaving the factory. The bale book[,]
L-7-1/2, is an auxiliary to the L-7 official register
book.
All official register books and other official
records herein required of manufacturers shall
be kept in the factory premises, or in the
factory warehouse, in the case of bale books,
and open to inspection by any internal revenue
officer at all times of the day or night.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 11. Entries to be made in the official
register and auxiliary register books; monthly
transcripts. — (a) Official bale book (L-7-1/2).
All leaf tobacco received in any factory or
factory warehouse shall be debited, and any
removal of tobacco from the factory shall be
credited in the official bale book; except
cuttings, clippings, sweepings, and other
partially manufactured tobacco, which shall be
credited in the L-7 register book.
The Collector of Internal Revenue may in his
discretion waive the requirements of keeping
an official bale book by small factories.
(b) The Official Register Book (L-7). — One L-7
books shall suffice for each manufacturer of
tobacco products, regardless of the classes of
tobacco manufactured by him. All loose leaf
tobacco received in the factory proper and all
bales of leaf tobacco which are opened in the
factory for use in the manufacture of tobacco
products shall be entered in the L-7 official
register book under the heading "Received
from Dealers" at the net weights. In the
 column headed "Name["] and "Address" shall
be shown the words "Transferred from tobacco
factory warehouse". All leaf tobacco received
into a factory must be entered in the official
bale book pertaining to the factory and bales of
leaf tobacco shall not be taken up in the L-7
register book until said bales are transferred
for use and credited in the official bale book.
While leaf tobacco must be taken in the official
bale book, this is done for statistical purposes
only. As soon as it enters the factory for use in
manufacture it should be taken up in the L-7
register book and credited in the official bale
book.
All removals of waste of tobacco, whether
transferred to other factories, removed for
agricultural or industrial purposes, or
destroyed on the premises or elsewhere, shall
be entered in the official register book, L-7,
under the heading "Raw Materials Removed",
showing all information required therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of RR No. V-39 broadly defined "manufactured products
of tobacco" and "manufacturer of tobacco products" as follows:
Section 2. Definition of terms. — When used
in there [sic] regulations, the following terms
shall be given the interpretations indicated in
their respective definitions given below, except
where the context indicates otherwise:
(a) "Manufactured products of tobacco" shall
include cigars, cigarettes, smoking tobacco,
chewing, snuff, and all other forms of
manufactured and partially manufactured
tobacco, as defined in section 194 (M) 51 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
(b) "Manufacturer of tobacco products" shall
include all persons engaged in the manufacture
of any of the forms of tobacco mentioned in
the next preceding paragraph.
In 1967, the Secretary of Finance promulgated Revenue
Regulations No. 17-67 (RR No. 17-67), as amended, 52 or the
"Tobacco Revenue Regulations on Leaf, Scrap, Other Partially
Manufactured Tobacco and Other Tobacco Products; Grading,
Classification, Inspection, Shipments, Exportation, Importation and
the Manufacturers thereof under the provisions of Act No. 2613, as
amended." Section 2 (i) of RR No. 17-67 defined a "manufacturer of
tobacco" and included in the definition one who prepares partially
manufactured tobacco. Section 2 (m) defined "partially
manufactured tobacco" as including stemmed leaf tobacco. Thus,
Sections 2 (i) and (m) read:
(i) "Manufacturer of tobacco" — Includes every
person whose business it is to
manufacture tobacco o[r] snuff or
who employs others to manufacture
tobacco or snuff, whether such
manufacture be by cutting, pressing
(not baling), grinding, or rubbing
(grating) any raw or leaf tobacco, or
otherwise preparing raw or leaf
tobacco, or manufactured or partially
manufactured tobacco and snuff, or
putting up for consumption scraps,
refuse, or stems of tobacco resulting
from any process of handling tobacco
stems, scraps, clippings, or waste by
sifting, twisting, screening or by any
other process.
xxx xxx xxx
(m) "Partially manufactured tobacco" —
Includes: SCHIac
(1) "Stemmed leaf" — handstripped
tobacco, clean, good,
partially broken leaf only,
free from mold and dust.
(2) "Long-filler" — handstripped
tobacco of good, long pieces
of broken leaf usable as filler
for cigars without further
preparation, and free from
mold, dust stems and cigar
cuttings.
(3) "Short-filler" — handstripped or
machine-stripped tobacco,
clean, good, short pieces of
broken leaf, which will not
pass through a screen of two
inches (2") mesh.
(4) "Cigar-cuttings" — clean cuttings
or clippings from cigars,
unsized with any other form
of tobacco.
(5) "Machine-scrap tobacco" —
machine-threshed, clean,
good tobacco, not included in
any of the above terms,
usable in the manufacture of
tobacco products.
(6) "Stems" — midribs of leaf tobacco
removed from the whole leaf
or broken leaf either by hand
or machine.
(7) "Waste tobacco" — denatured
tobacco; powder or dust,
refuse, unfit for human
consumption; discarded
materials in the manufacture
of tobacco products, which
may include stems.
Section 3 of RR No. 17-67 classified entities that dealt with tobacco
according to the type of permit that the Bureau of Internal
Revenue issued to each entity. Under this classification, wholesale
leaf tobacco dealers were considered L-3 permittees. Those
(referring to wholesale leaf tobacco dealers) that reprocess
partially manufactured tobacco for export, for themselves, and/or
for other L-6 or L-7 permittees were considered L-6 permittees.
Manufacturers of tobacco products such as cigarette
manufacturers were considered L-7 permittees. Section 3 of RR No.
17-67 reads:
(a) L-3 — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealer.
(b) L-3F — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealer.
Issued only in favor of Farmer's
Cooperative Marketing Association
(FaCoMas) duly organized in
accordance with law. [This function
relative to tobacco trading was
transferred to the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) under
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 2265].
(c) L-3R — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers.
Issued only in favor of persons or
entities having fully equipped
Redrying Plants.
(d) L-3-1/4 — Buyers for wholesale leaf tobacco
dealers.
(e) L-4 — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers.
Issued only in favor of persons or
entities having flue-curing barns, who
may purchase or receive green
Virginia leaf tobacco from bona
fide tobacco planters only, or handle
green leaf of their own production,
which tobacco shall be sold or
transferred only to holders of L-3 and
L-3R permits after flue-curing the
tobacco.
(f) L-5 — Tobacco planters selling to consumers
part or the whole of their tobacco
production.
(g) L-6 — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers who,
exclusively for export, except as
otherwise provided for in these
regulations, perform the following
functions:
(1) Handstripped and/or thresh whole
leaf tobacco for themselves
or for other L-6 or L-7
permittees;
(2) Re-process partially manufactured
tobacco for themselves, or
for other L-6 or L-7
permittees;
(3) Sell their partially manufactured
tobacco to other L-6
permittees.
(h) L-7 — Manufacturers of tobacco products.
[L-7 1/2 designates an auxiliary
registered book (bale books), for
manufacturers of tobacco products.]
(i) B-14 — Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers
(Privilege tax receipt)
(j) B-14 (a) — Retail leaf tobacco dealers
(Privilege tax receipt)
La Suerte contends that on December 12, 1972, then Internal
Revenue Commissioner Misael P. Vera issued a ruling which
declared that:
. . . . The subsequent sale or transfer by the L-
6/L-3R permittee for export or to an L-7-1/2 for
use in the manufacture of cigars or cigarettes
may also be allowed without the prepayment
of the specific tax. 53
Almost 40 years from the enactment of the 1939 Tax
Code,Presidential Decree No. 1158-A, otherwise known as the
"National Internal Revenue Code of 1977," was promulgated on
June 3, 1977, to consolidate and integrate the various tax laws
which have so far amended or repealed the provisions found in the
1939 Tax Code.Section 132 was renumbered as Section 144, and
Section 136 as Section 148. Sections 144 and 148, read:
SEC. 144. Removal of tobacco products without
prepayment of tax. — Products of tobacco
entirely unfit for chewing or smoking may be
removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the
Department of Finance, and stemmed leaf
tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cuts
chewing tobacco, re-refuse, scraps, cuttings,
clippings, stems or midribs, and sweepings of
tobacco may be sold in bulk as raw material by
one manufacturer directly to another, under
such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Department of Finance,
without the prepayment of the tax. HcDaAI
"Stemmed leaf tobacco", as herein used means
leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib
removed. The term does not include broken
leaf tobacco.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 148. Specific tax on products of
tobacco. — On manufactured products of
tobacco, except cigars, cigarettes, and tobacco
specially prepared for chewing so as to be
unsuitable for consumption in any other
manner, but including all other tobacco twisted
by hand or reduced into a condition to be
consumed in any manner other than by the
ordinary mode of drying and curing; and on all
tobacco prepared or partially prepared for sale
or consumption, even if prepared without the
use of any machine or instrument and without
being pressed or sweetened; and on all fine-cut
shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings,
stems, and sweepings of tobacco, there shall
be collected on each kilogram, seventy-five
centavos: Provided, however, That fine-cut
shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings,
stems and sweepings of tobacco resulting from
the handling, or stripping of whole leaf tobacco
may be transferred, disposed of, or otherwise
sold, without prepayment of the specific tax
herein provided for under such conditions as
may be prescribed in the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance upon
recommendation of the Commissioner if the
same are to be exported or to be used in the
manufacture of other tobacco products on
which the specific tax will eventually be paid on
the finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so
as to be unsuitable for use in any other
manner, on each kilogram, sixty centavos.
Sections 144 and 148 were subsequently renumbered as Sections
120 and 125 respectively under Presidential Decree No.
1994, 54 which took effect on January 1, 1986 (1986 Tax Code);
then as Sections 137 and 141 under Executive Order No.
273; 55 and finally as Sections 140 and 144 under Republic Act No.
8424 or the "Tax Reform Act of 1997." However, the provisions
remained basically unchanged.
The business transactions of La Suerte, Fortune, and Sterling that
the Commissioner found to be taxable for specific tax took place
during the effectivity of the 1986 Tax Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 273. The pertinent provisions are Sections
137 and 141, thus:
SEC. 137. Removal of tobacco products without
prepayment of tax. — Products of tobacco
entirely unfit for chewing or smoking may be
removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of
Finance. Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut
shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco,
scraps, cuttings, clippings, stems or midribs,
and sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk
as raw material by one manufacturer directly
to another, without payment of the tax under
such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Ministry of Finance.
'Stemmed leaf tobacco,' as herein used, means
leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib
removed. The term does not include broken
leaf tobacco.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 141. Tobacco Products. — There shall be
collected a tax of seventy-five centavos on
each kilogram of the following products of
tobacco:
(a) tobacco twisted by hand or
reduced into a condition to be
consumed in any manner other than
the ordinary mode of drying and
curing;
(b) tobacco prepared or partially
prepared with or without the use of
any machine or instruments or
without being pressed or sweetened;
and
(c) fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps,
clippings, cuttings, stems and
sweepings of tobacco.
Fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings,
cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco
resulting from the handling or stripping of
whole leaf tobacco may be transferred,
disposed of, or otherwise sold, without
prepayment of the specific tax herein provided
for under such conditions as may be prescribed
in the regulations promulgated by the Ministry
of Finance upon recommendation of the
Commissioner, if the same are to be exported
or to be used in the manufacture of other
tobacco products on which the excise tax will
eventually be paid on the finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so
as to be unsuitable for use in any other
manner, on each kilogram, sixty centavos.
Parenthetically, the present provisions explicitly state the
following:
Stemmed leaf tobacco, tobacco prepared or
partially prepared with or without the use of
any machine or instrument or without being
pressed or sweetened, fine-cut shorts and
refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems,
midribs, and sweepings of tobacco resulting
from the handling or stripping of whole leaf
tobacco shall be transferred, disposed of, or
otherwise sold, without any prepayment of the
excise tax . . . if the same are to be exported or
to be used in the manufacture of cigars,
cigarettes, or other tobacco products on which
the excise tax will eventually be paid on the
finished product, under such conditions as may
be prescribed in the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner. 56
BIR assessments
G.R. No. 125346
Sometime in June, 1989, a team of examiners
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, led by
Crisanto G. Luna, Revenue Officer III of the
Field Operation Division of the Excise Tax
Service, conducted an examination of the
books of La Suerte by virtue of a letter of
authority issued by then Commissioner Jose U.
Ong. EcHIAC
On January 3, 1990, La Suerte received a letter
from then Commissioner Jose U. Ong
demanding the payment of P34,934,827.67 as
deficiency excise tax on La Suerte's entire
importation and local purchase of stemmed
leaf tobacco for the period covering January 1,
1986 to June 30, 1989.
On January 12, 1990, La Suerte . . . protest[ed]
the excise tax deficiency assessment . . .
stressing that the BIR assessment was based
solely on Section 141 (b) of the Tax
Code without, however, applying Section 137
thereof, the more specific provision, which
expressly allows the sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco as raw material by one manufacturer
directly to another without payment of the
excise tax. However, in a letter, dated August
31, 1990, Commissioner Jose U. Ong denied La
Suerte's protest, insisting that stemmed leaf
tobacco is subject to excise tax "unless there is
an express grant of exemption from [the]
payment of tax."
In a letter dated October 17, 1990,
Commissioner Ong reiterated his demand for
the payment of the alleged deficiency excise
taxes due from La Suerte, to wit:
"Please be informed that in an
investigation conducted by this Office,
it was ascertained that you incurred a
deficiency specific tax on your
importation and local purchase of
stemmed leaf tobacco covering the
period from January 1, 1986 to June
30, 1989 in the total amount of
P34,904,247.00 computed as follows:
STEMMED-LEAF TOBACCO
Imported 13,918,465 kls. x P0.75 P10,438,848.00
Local 32,620,532 kls. x 0.75 24,465,399.00
–––––––––––––
Total Amount Due (Basic Tax) P34,904,247.00
============
. . . ." (page 99, Rollo)
On December 6, 1990, La Suerte filed with the
Court of Tax Appeals a Petition for Review
seeking for the annulment of the assessments.
..
. . . On July 13, 1995, the Tax Court rendered
[its] Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads[:]
 "WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, the LANGUAGE IN SEC. 137 IS
assessment of alleged deficiency UNQUALIFIED, WHILE SEC. 20 (A)
specific tax in the amount of CONTAINS NO RESTRICTIVE
P34,904,247.00 issued by the LANGUAGE
Respondent is hereby CANCELLED for C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
lack of merit. IGNORED SEC. 43 OF RR NO. 17-67 AS
SO ORDERED." 57 WELL AS OPINIONS OF BIR OFFICIALS
The Commissioner appealed the Court of Tax Appeals' decision WHICH CONFIRMED THE EXEMPTION
before the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1995, the Court of OF STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO FROM
Appeals Sixth Division ruled against La Suerte and found that RR PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX
No. V-39 limits the tax exemption on transfers of stemmed leaf D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
tobacco to transfers between two L-7 permittees. 58 The Court of HELD THAT SEC. 43 OF RR NO. 17-67
Appeals ruled as follows: DID NOT REPEAL SECTIONS 35 AND 20
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the (A) OF RR NO. V-39, SINCE THEIR
Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED PROVISIONS ARE REPUGNANT TO
and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to pay EACH OTHER cAaDCE
the petitioner Commissioner of Internal E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
Revenue the amount of P34,904,247.00 as HELD THAT RR NO. V-39 IMPOSES
deficiency specific tax on its importations and SPECIFIC TAXES ON STEMMED LEAF
local purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco and TOBACCO, SINCE IT MAKES NO
its sale of stemmed leaf tobacco to Associated MENTION AT ALL OF TAXES ON
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation covering STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO
the period from January 1, 1986 to June 30, F. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
1989, plus 25% surcharge for late payment and HELD RR NO. V-39 APPLIED TO L-6
20% interest per annum from October 17, 1990 PERMITTEES OR MANUFACTURERS OF
until fully paid pursuant to sections 248 and STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO, SINCE L-6
249 of the Tax Code. CLASSIFICATION WAS NON-EXISTENT
SO ORDERED. 59 AT THE TIME
La Suerte filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
the Court of Appeals in its June 7, 1996 resolution. 60 INTERPRETED SECTION 20 (A) OF RR
On August 2, 1996, La Suerte filed the instant petition for NO. V-39 IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
review, 61 praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision RESULT IN ADMINISTRATIVE
and cancellation of the assessment by the Commissioner. La Suerte LEGISLATION, SINCE THE
raises the following grounds in support of its prayer: INTERPRETATION SANCTIONED THE
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESTRICTION OF AN UNQUALIFIED
CONSIDERED SECTION 20 (A) OF RR PROVISION OF LAW BY A MERE
NO. V-39, SINCE THE COMMISSIONER REGULATION
RAISED IT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE H. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
COURT OF APPEALS GAVE NO WEIGHT TO THE DECEMBER
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT 12, 1972 BIR RULING AND OPINIONS
HELD THAT SECTION 20 (A) OF RR NO. OF OTHER BIR OFFICIALS WHICH
V-39 RESTRICTS THE APPLICATION OF CONFIRMED THE EXEMPTION OF
SECTION 137 OF THE TAX CODE,SINCE
STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO FROM
PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
HELD [THAT] NON-APPLICATION OF
[THE] DECEMBER 12 RULING DID NOT
IMPINGE ON PRINCIPLE OF NON-
RETROACTIVITY OF RULINGS BECAUSE
THE ASSESSMENT DID NOT CITE THE
RULING, SINCE CITATION OF A RULING
IN AN ASSESSMENT [IS] NOT
NECESSARY FOR PRINCIPLE TO APPLY
J. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE OF BIR FOR OVER HALF A
CENTURY OF NOT SUBJECTING
STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO TO SPECIFIC
TAX
K. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT SUBJECTING STEMMED
LEAF TOBACCO TO SPECIFIC TAX IS
NOT PROHIBITED FORM OF DOUBLE
TAXATION, SINCE A TAX ON BOTH
STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO AND
CIGARETTES INTO WHICH IT IS
MANUFACTURED IS DOUBLE
TAXATION
L. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
HELD LA SUERTE LIABLE FOR SPECIFIC
TAX EVEN IF NO EFFORT WAS FIRST
MADE TO COLLECT THE TAX FROM
THE MANUFACTURER OF STEMMED
LEAF TOBACCO, SINCE TAX
CODE ALLOWS THIS ONLY IF SPECIAL
ALLOWANCE IS GRANTED, WHICH IS
NOT THE CASE
M. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
REENACTMENT OF THE 1939 CODE AS
THE 1977 CODE AND 1986 TAX CODES
ADOPTED THE INTERPRETATION IN
THE DECEMBER 1972 BIR RULING
N. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
APPLIED THE RULES OF
 CONSTRUCTION ON EXEMPTION
FROM TAXES, SINCE NO TAX
EXEMPTION WAS INVOLVED BUT
MERELY AN EXEMPTION FROM
PREPAYMENT OF TAX. 62
G.R. No. 136328-29
In the letter dated November 24, 1989, the Commissioner
demanded from Fortune the payment of deficiency excise tax in
the amount of P28,938,446.25 for its importation of tobacco strips
from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989. Fortune requested for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Commissioner on August
31, 1990. Undaunted, Fortune appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals through a petition for review, which was docketed as CTA
Case No. 4587. 63
In the decision dated November 23, 1994, the Court of Tax Appeals
ruled in favor of Fortune and set aside the Commissioner's
assessment of P28,938,446.25 as deficiency excise tax.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1991, Fortune received another letter
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, demanding payment of
P1,989,821.86 as deficiency specific tax on its importation of
stemmed leaf tobacco from July 1, 1989 to November 30,
1990. 64 Fortune filed its protest and requested the Commissioner
to cancel and withdraw the assessment. 65 On April 18, 1991, the
Commissioner denied with finality Fortune's request. 66 Fortune
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and the case was docketed
as CTA Case No. 4616. 67
In the decision dated October 6, 1994, the Court of Tax Appeals
ruled in favor of Fortune and set aside the Commissioner's
assessment of P1,989,821.26 as deficiency excise tax on stemmed
leaf tobacco.
The Commissioner filed separate petitions before the Court of
Appeals, challenging the decisions rendered by the Court of Tax
Appeals in CTA Case Nos. 4587 and 4616. These petitions were
consolidated on November 28, 1996. 68
In the decision dated January 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals
Seventeenth Division dismissed the consolidated petitions filed by
the Commissioner and affirmed the assailed decisions of the Court
of Tax Appeals. It also denied the Commissioner's motion for
reconsideration. DTaAHS
Hence, the Commissioner filed the present petition 69 on January
8, 1999. The Commissioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) "in holding that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the
specific tax imposed under Section 141 of the Tax Code[;]" 70 (2)
"in not holding that under Section 137 of the Tax Code,stemmed
leaf tobacco is exempt from specific tax when sold in bulk as raw
material by one manufacturer directly to another under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations of the
Department of Finance[;]" 71 and (3) "in holding that there is
double taxation in the prohibited sense when specific tax is
imposed on stemmed leaf tobacco and again on the finished
product of which stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw material." 72
G.R. No. 144942
In April 1995, "[La Suerte] imported stemmed leaf tobacco from
various sellers abroad." 73 The Commissioner "assessed specific
taxes on the stemmed leaf tobacco in the amount of P175,909.50,
which [La Suerte] paid under protest." 74 "Consequently, [La
Suerte] filed a claim for refund with [the Commissioner], [who]
failed to act on the same." 75 Undeterred, La Suerte appealed to
the Court of Tax Appeals, which in its March 9, 1999 decision, ruled
in its favor.
The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals Third Division,
which on August 31, 2000, rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP. No.
51902, affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Commissioner then filed the instant petition for
review 76 asking this court to overturn the Court of Appeals'
decision. It avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Section 137 of the Tax Code applied "without any conditions as to
the domicile of the manufacturers and that [the Commissioner]
cannot indirectly restrict its application to local manufacturers." 77
The Third Division of this court initially denied 78 the petition due
to an insufficient or defective verification and because "the
petition was filed by revenue lawyers and not by the Solicitor
General." 79
The Commissioner filed a motion for clarification 80 seeking to
clarify whether the Bureau of Internal Revenue legal officers can
file petitions for review pursuant to Section 220 of the Tax
Code without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor
General.
The motion was referred to the En Banc 81 on August 7, 2001,
which issued the resolution on July 4, 2002, holding that "Section
220 of the Tax Reform Act must not be understood as overturning
the long established procedure before this Court in requiring the
Solicitor General to represent the interest of the Republic. This
Court continues to maintain that it is the Solicitor General who has
the primary responsibility to appear for the government in
appellate proceedings." 82 In the same resolution, this court also
declared the following:
The present controversy ruminate upon the
singular issue of whether or not Revenue
Regulation 1767 [sic] issued by petitioner, in
relation to Section 137 of the Internal Revenue
Code in the imposition of a tax on stemmed-
leaf tobacco, deviated from the tax code.This
question basically inquires then into whether or
not the revenue regulation has exceeded, on
constitutional grounds, the allowable limits of
legislative delegation.
Aware that the dismissal of the petition could
have lasting effect on government tax
revenues, the lifeblood of the state, the Court
heeds the plea of petitioner for a chance to
prosecute its case. 83 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
This court resolved to reinstate 84 and give due course 85 to the
Commissioner's petition.
G.R. No. 148605
"On January 12, 1990, [Sterling] received a pre-assessment notice
for alleged deficiency excise tax on its importation and local
purchase of stemmed-leaf tobacco for P5,187,432.00 covering the
period from November 1986 to January 1989." 86 Sterling filed its
protest letter 87 dated January 19, 1990. The Commissioner,
through its letters 88 dated August 31, 1990 and October 17, 1990,
denied the protest with finality.
Sterling filed before the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for
review 89 dated January 3, 1991, seeking the cancellation of the
deficiency assessment and praying that the Commissioner be
ordered to desist from collecting the assessed excise tax. On July
13, 1995, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered its decision ordering
the cancellation of the assessment for deficiency excise tax.
The Commissioner then appealed 90 to the Court of Appeals. On
March 7, 2001, the latter, through its Ninth Division, rendered a
decision reversing the Court of Tax Appeals' ruling, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A.
Case No. 4532 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent is ORDERED to pay
to the public petitioner the amount of
P5,187,432.00 as deficiency specific tax on its
 imported and locally purchased stemmed leaf from taxes, since no tax exemption was involved, but merely an SALES OF STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO
tobacco from November 1986 to June 24, exemption from prepayment of excise tax." 96 WERE EXEMPT FROM PRE-PAYMENT
1989, plus 25% surcharge on P5,187,432.00, G.R. No. 158197 OF SPECIFIC TAX.
and 20% interest per annum on the total On January 10, 1991, the Commissioner sent a pre-assessment II. EVEN IF SEC. 3 OF RR NO. 17-67 HAD BEEN
amount due from December 07, 1990 until full notice to La Suerte demanding payment of P11,757,275.25 as WAS [sic] INTENDED TO LIMIT
payment, pursuant to Sections 248-49 of deficiency specific tax on its local purchases and importations and MANUFACTURERS EXEMPT FROM
the Tax Code. on the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco during the period from PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX, THIS
SO ORDERED. 91 ICESTA September 14, 1989 to November 20, 1990. 97 On February 8, WOULD AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL
Sterling filed a motion for reconsideration, 92 which was denied by 1991, La Suerte received the formal assessment letter of the DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
the Court of Appeals in its June 19, 2001 resolution. Commissioner. 98 POWER. SIaHDA
Hence, on August 13, 2001, Sterling filed the instant petition for La Suerte filed its protest on March 8, 1991. 99 On May 14, 1991, III. RR NO. 17-67 WAS NEITHER ISSUED TO
review. 93 La Suerte received the Commissioner's decision "denying the AMEND RR NO. V-39 NOR TO AMEND
Sterling argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) protest with finality." 100 THE TAX CODE,BUT SOLELY TO
then Section 141 of the Tax Code subjects stemmed leaf tobacco to "On June 13, 1991, the Court of Tax Appeals promulgated a IMPLEMENT ACT NO. 2613, AS
excise tax; (2) Section 137 of the Tax Code did not exempt Decision finding for . . . La Suerte and disposing [as follows:]" 101 AMENDED, WHICH WAS ENACTED IN
stemmed leaf tobacco from prepayment of excise tax; (3) Section WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We find 1916 AND HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING
20 (A) of RR No. V-39 restricts the application of Section 137 of the petition for review meritorious and the TO DO WITH TAXES.
the Tax Code since its language was unqualified, while Section 20 same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent's IV. SECTION 2(H) OF RR NO. 17-67 EXCEEDED
(A) contained no restrictive language; (4) RR No. V-39 imposed decision dated April 29, 1991 is hereby set THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE
specific taxes on stemmed leaf tobacco since its language made no aside and the formal assessment for the DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
mention of taxes on stemmed leaf tobacco; (5) the reason behind deficiency specific tax in the sum of V. SECTION 3(M) OF RR NO. 17-67 AS
limiting exemptions only to transfers from one L-7 to another L-7 is P11,575,275.25 subject of the respondent's INTERPRETED BY COMMISSIONER
because sale has previously been subjected to specific tax; and (6) letter, dated January 30, 1991, is deemed EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE LIMITS ON
the exemption from specific tax did not apply to imported cancelled. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
stemmed leaf tobacco. 94 No pronouncement as to costs of suit. VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Sterling further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not SO ORDERED. 102 ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 20(A) OF
holding that (1) the Commissioner's interpretation of Section 141 The Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was RR NO. V-39 TO LA SUERTE'S IMPORTS
of the Tax Code and Section 20 (A) of RR No. V-39 amounts to an denied by the Court of Tax Appeals in its April 5, 1995 OF STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO, FOR
amendment of Sections 141 and 137 of the Tax Code by a mere resolution. 103 THE APPLICABLE PROVISION IS
administrative regulation; (2) a December 12, 1972 Bureau of The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 104 In its CHAPTER V OF RR NO. V-39.
Internal Revenue ruling and opinions of other Bureau of Internal decision dated July 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed the VII. THE COMMISSIONER'S PRESENT
Revenue officials confirmed the exemption of stemmed leaf decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. It cited Commissioner of INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS
tobacco from prepayment of specific tax; (3) the administrative Internal Revenue v. La Campaña Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc. 105 as 2(M)(1) AND 3(H) OF RR NO. 17-67,
practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for over half a century basis for its ruling. La Suerte filed a motion for reconsideration, but WAS NOT THE INTERPRETATION
of not subjecting stemmed leaf tobacco to excise tax proves that it was denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution 106 dated GIVEN TO THOSE SECTIONS BY ITS
no excise taxes were ever intended to be imposed; (4) imposition May 9, 2003. FRAMERS, AS SHOWN BY THE LONG
of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco would result in the La Suerte prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AFTER
prohibited form of double taxation; and (5) the re-enactment of and resolution in its petition for review, 107 wherein it raises the THE ISSUANCE OF RR NO. 17-67 AND
the relevant provisions in the 1977 and 1986 Tax Codes adopted THE BIR RULING DATED DECEMBER
following arguments:
the interpretation in the December 1972 Bureau of Internal 12, 1972, WHICH CONFIRMED THE
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
Revenue ruling. 95 Sterling also contends that the "Court of TAX-FREE TRANSFER OF STEMMED-
WHEN IT HELD THAT SECTION 20(A)
Appeals erred in applying the rules of construction on exemption LEAF TOBACCO. 108
OF REV. REGS. NO. V-39 LIMITED THE
CLASS OF MANUFACTURERS WHOSE G.R. No. 165499
 On various dates in March 1995, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . .
collected from La Suerte the aggregate amount
of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P325,410.00) for
specific taxes on La Suerte's bulk purchases of
stemmed-leaf tobacco from foreign tobacco
manufacturers. La Suerte paid the said amount
under protest.
xxx xxx xxx
On September 27, 1996 and October 2, 1996,
La Suerte instituted with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue . . . and with Revenue District
No. 52, a claim for refund of specific taxes said
to have been erroneously paid on its
importations of stemmed-leaf tobacco for the
period of November 1994 up to May 1995,
including the amount of Three Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P325,410.00). . . .
Inasmuch as its claim for refund was not acted
upon by petitioner and in order to toll the
running of the two-year reglementary period
within which to file a judicial claim for such
refund as provided under Section 229 of
the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, La Suerte filed on February 8, 1997 a
petition for review with the CTA. 109
On September 23, 1998, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered
judgment granting the petition for review and ordering the
Commissioner to refund the amount of P325,410.00 to La
Suerte. 110 The Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but this was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals on December 15,
1998. 111
On appeal, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division reversed 112 the
Court of Tax Appeals' ruling. It also denied 113 La Suerte's motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed, 114 reiterating
the same arguments already presented in the other cases.
This court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 136328-29
and 125346. 115 Thereafter, this court consolidated G.R. Nos.
165499, 144942, and 148605. 116 Finally, this court approved the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 125346, 136328-29, 144942, 148605,
158197, and 165499. 117
Issues
I. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to
excise (specific) tax under Section 141
of the 1986 Tax Code;
II. Whether Section 137 of the 1986 Tax
Code exempting from the payment of
specific tax the sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco by one manufacturer to
another is not subject to any
qualification and, therefore, exempts
an L-7 manufacturer from paying said
tax on its purchase of stemmed leaf
tobacco from other manufacturers
who are not classified as L-7
permittees;
III. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco imported by
La Suerte, Fortune, and Sterling is
exempt from specific tax under
Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code;
IV. Whether Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39, in
relation to RR No. 17-67, which limits
the exemption from payment of
specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco
to sales transactions between
manufacturers classified as L-7
permittees is a valid exercise by the
Department of Finance of its rule-
making power under Section
338 118 of the 1939 Tax Code; ITaCEc
V. Whether the possessor or owner of
stemmed leaf tobacco may be held
liable for the payment of specific tax if
such tobacco product is removed from
the place of production without
payment of said tax;
VI. Whether the August 31, 1990 ruling of then
Bureau of Internal Revenue
Commissioner Jose U. Ong denying La
Suerte's request for exemption from
specific tax on its local purchase and
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco
violates the principle on non-
retroactivity of administrative ruling
for allegedly contradicting the
previous position taken by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue that such a
transaction is not subject to specific
tax as expressed in the December 12,
1972 ruling of then Bureau of Internal
Revenue Commissioner Misael P.
Vera; and
VII. Whether the imposition of excise tax on
stemmed leaf tobacco under Section
141 of the 1986 Tax Code constitutes
double taxation.
Arguments of the cigarette manufacturers
The cigarette manufacturers claim that since Section 137 of
the 1986 Tax Code and Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39 do not
distinguish "as to the type of manufacturer that may sell stemmed-
leaf tobacco without the prepayment of specific tax[,] [t]he logical
conclusion is that any kind of tobacco manufacturer is entitled to
this treatment." 119 The authority of the Secretary of Finance to
prescribe the "conditions" refers only to procedural matters and
should not curtail or modify the substantive right granted by the
law. 120 The cigarette manufacturers add that the reference to an
L-7 invoice and L-7 register book in the second paragraph of
Section 20 (a) cannot limit the application of the tax exemption
provision only to transfers between L-7 permittees because (1) it
does not so provide; 121 and (2) under the terms of RR No. V-39, L-
7 referred to manufacturers of any class of tobacco products,
including manufacturers of stemmed leaf tobacco. 122
They further argue that, going by the theory of the Commissioner,
RR No. 17-67 would have unduly restricted the meaning of
"manufacturers" by limiting it to a few manufacturers such as
manufacturers of cigars and cigarettes. 123 Allegedly, RR No. 17-67
cannot change the original meaning of L-7 in Section 20 (A) of RR
No. V-39 without exceeding constitutional limits of delegated
legislative power. 124 La Suerte further points out that RR No. 17-
67 was not even issued for the purpose of implementing the Tax
Code but for the sole purpose of implementing Act No. 2613; and
Section 3 of RR No. 17-67 restricts the new designations only for
administrative purposes. 125
Moreover, the cigarette manufacturers contend "that Section 132
does not operate as a tax exemption" because "prepayment means
payment of obligation in advance or before it is
due." 126 Consequently, the rules of construction on tax
exemption do not apply. 127 According to them, "the absence of
tax prepayment for the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco impliedly
indicates the underlying policy of the law: that stemmed leaf
tobacco shall not be taxed twice, first, as stemmed leaf tobacco
and, second, as a component of the finished products of which it
forms an integral part." 128
Fortune, for its part, claims that stemmed leaf tobacco is not
subject to excise tax. It argues that stemmed leaf tobacco cannot
be considered prepared or partially prepared tobacco because it
does not fall within the definition of a "processed tobacco" under
Section 1-b of Republic Act No. 698, as amended. 129Furthermore,
it adds that Section 141 should be strictly construed against the
taxing power. 130 "There being no explicit reference to stemmed
leaf tobacco in Section 141, it cannot be claimed or construed to be
subject to specific tax." 131
According to Fortune, "a plain reading of Section 141 readily
reveals that the intention was to impose excise taxes on products
of tobacco that are not to be used as raw materials in the
manufacture of other tobacco products." 132 "Section 2 (m) (1)
unduly expanded the meaning of prepared or partially prepared
tobacco to include a raw material like stemmed leaf tobacco;
hence, ultra vires and invalid." 133
As regards the taxability of their importations, Sterling argues that
since locally manufactured stemmed leaf tobaccos are not subject
to specific tax, it follows that imported stemmed leaf tobaccos are
also not subject to specific tax. 134 On the other hand, La Suerte
claims that Section 20 (A) of RR No. V-39 does not apply to its
imports because the applicable provision is Section 128 (b) of
the 1986 Tax Code, which states that "imported articles shall be
subject to the same tax and the same rates and basis of excise
taxes applicable to locally manufactured articles," and Chapter V of
RR No. V-39 (Payment of specific taxes on imported cigars,
cigarettes, smoking and chewing tobacco). 135
Finally, La Suerte and Sterling 136 argues that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in ignoring Section 43 of RR No. 17-67, December 12,
1972 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling and other Bureau of
Internal Revenue opinions confirming the exemption of stemmed
leaf tobacco from prepayment of specific tax; 137 (2) in
disregarding the Bureau of Internal Revenue's practice for over half
a century of not subjecting stemmed leaf tobacco to specific
tax; 138 (3) in failing to consider that the re-enactment of the
1939 Tax Code as the 1977 and 1986 Tax Codes impliedly adopted
the interpretation in the December 12, 1972 ruling; and 4) in
holding that non-application of the December 12, 1972 ruling did
not impinge on the principle of non-retroactivity of
rulings. 139 Moreover, it argues that the Tax Code does not
authorize collection of specific tax from buyers without a prior
attempt to collect tax from manufacturers. 140
Respondent's arguments
Respondent counters that "under Section 141 (b), partially
prepared or manufactured tobacco is subject to specific
tax." 141 The definition of "partially manufactured tobacco" in
Section 2 (m) of RR No. 17-67 includes stemmed leaf tobacco;
hence, stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to specific
tax. 142 "Imported stemmed leaf tobacco is also subject to specific
tax under Section 141 (b) in relation to Section 128 of the 1977 Tax
Code." 143 Fortune's reliance on the definition of "processed
tobacco" in Section 1-b of Republic Act No. 698 144 as amended
by Republic Act No. 1194 is allegedly misplaced because the
definition therein of processed tobacco merely clarified the type of
tobacco product that may not be imported into the
country. 145 cACEaI
Respondent posits that "there is no double taxation in the
prohibited sense even if specific tax is also imposed on the finished
product of which stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw
material." 146 Congress clearly intended it "considering that
stemmed leaf tobacco, as partially prepared or manufactured
tobacco, is subjected to specific tax under Section 141 (b), while
cigars and cigarettes, of which stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw
material, are also subjected to specific tax under Section
142." 147 It adds that there is no constitutional prohibition against
double taxation. 148
"Foreign manufacturers of tobacco products not engaged in trade
or business in the Philippines cannot be classified as L-7, L-6, or L-
3R since they are beyond the pale of Philippine laws and
regulations." 149 "Since the transfer of stemmed leaf tobacco from
one factory to another must be under an official L-7 invoice and
entered in the L-7 registers of both transferor and transferee, it is
obvious that the factories contemplated are those located or
operating in the Philippines and operated only by L-7
permittees." 150 The transaction contemplated under Section 137
is sale and not importation because the law uses the word
"sold." 151The law uses "importation" or "imported" whenever the
transaction involves bringing in articles from foreign countries. 152
Respondent argues that "the issuance of RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67 is
a valid exercise by the Department of Finance of its rule-making
power" under Sections 132 and 338 of the 1939 Tax Code.153 It
explains that "the reason for the exemption from specific tax of the
sale of stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one L-7 directly to
another L-7 is that the stemmed leaf tobacco is supposed to have
been already subjected to specific tax when an L-7 purchased the
same from an L-6." 154 "Section 20 (A) of RR No. V-39 adheres to
the standards set forth in Section 245 because it provides the
conditions for a tax-free removal of stemmed leaf tobacco under
Section 137 without negating the imposition of specific tax under
Section 141 (b)." 155 "To construe Section 137 in the restrictive
manner suggested by La Suerte will practically defeat the revenue-
generating provision of Section 141 (b)." 156
It further argues that the August 31, 1990 ruling of then Bureau of
Internal Revenue Commissioner Jose U. Ong denying La Suerte's
request for exemption from specific tax on its local purchase and
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco does not violate the principle
on non-retroactivity of administrative ruling. It alleges that an
erroneous ruling, like the December 12, 1972 ruling, does not give
rise to a vested right that can be invoked by La Suerte. 157
Finally, respondent contends that under Section 127, if domestic
products are removed from the place of production without
payment of the excise taxes due thereon, it is not required that the
tax be collected first from the manufacturer or producer before the
possessor thereof shall be liable. 158
Court's ruling
Nature of excise tax
Excise tax is a tax on the production, sale, or consumption of a
specific commodity in a country. Section 110 of the 1986 Tax
Code explicitly provides that the "excise taxes on domestic
products shall be paid by the manufacturer or producer before
[the] removal [of those products] from the place of production." "It
does not matter to what use the article[s] subject to tax is put; the
excise taxes are still due, even though the articles are removed
merely for storage in some other place and are not actually sold or
consumed." 159 The excise tax based on weight, volume capacity
or any other physical unit of measurement is referred to as
"specific tax." If based on selling price or other specified value, it is
referred to as "ad valorem" tax.
Section 141 subjects partially
prepared tobacco, such as
stemmed leaf tobacco, to
excise tax
Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code provides:
 SEC. 141. Tobacco Products. — There shall be
collected a tax of seventy-five centavos on
each kilogram of the following products of
tobacco:
(a) tobacco twisted by hand or
reduced into a condition to be
consumed in any manner other than
the ordinary mode of drying and
curing;
(b) tobacco prepared or partially
prepared with or without the use of
any machine or instruments or
without being pressed or
sweetened; and
(c) fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps,
clippings, cuttings, stems and
sweepings of tobacco.
Fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings,
cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco
resulting from the handling or stripping of
whole leaf tobacco may be transferred,
disposed of, or otherwise sold, without
prepayment of the specific tax herein provided
for under such conditions as may be prescribed
in the regulations promulgated by the Ministry
of Finance upon recommendation of the
Commissioner, if the same are to be exported
or to be used in the manufacture of other
tobacco products on which the excise tax will
eventually be paid on the finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so
as to be unsuitable for use in any other
manner, on each kilogram, sixty centavos.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is evident that when tobacco is harvested and processed either
by hand or by machine, all its products become subject to specific
tax. Section 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of
manufactured tobacco — in contrast to raw tobacco leaves —
including tobacco refuse or all other tobacco which has been cut,
split, twisted, or pressed and is capable of being smoked without
further industrial processing.
Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section
141 (b). It is a partially prepared tobacco. The removal of the stem
or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting stemmed leaf
tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco. The following is
La Suerte's own illustration of how the stemmed leaf tobacco
comes about: In the process of removing the stems, the whole leaf
tobacco breaks into pieces; after the stems or midribs are
removed, the tobacco is threshed (cut by machine into fine narrow
strips) and then undergoes a process of redrying, 160 undoubtedly
showing that stemmed leaf tobacco is a partially prepared
tobacco.
Since the Tax Code contained no definition of "partially prepared
tobacco," then the term should be construed in its general,
ordinary, and comprehensive sense. 161
RR No. 17-67, as amended, supplements the law by delineating
what products of tobacco are "prepared or manufactured" and
"partially prepared or partially manufactured." Section 2 (m)
states:
(m) "Partially manufactured tobacco" —
Includes:
(1) "Stemmed leaf" — handstripped
tobacco, clean, good,
partially broken leaf only,
free from mold and dust.
(2) "Long-filler" — handstripped
tobacco of good, long pieces
of broken leaf usable as filler
for cigars without further
preparation, and free from
mold, dust stems and cigar
cuttings.
(3) "Short-filler" — handstripped or
machine-stripped tobacco,
clean, good, short pieces of
broken leaf, which will not
pass through a screen of two
inches (2") mesh.
(4) "Cigar-cuttings" — clean cuttings
or clippings from cigars,
unsized with any other form
of tobacco.
(5) "Machine-scrap tobacco" — Stemmed leaf tobacco
machine-threshed, clean,
good tobacco, not included in
any of the above terms,
usable in the manufacture of
tobacco products.
(6) "Stems" — midribs of leaf tobacco
removed from the whole leaf
or broken leaf either by hand
or machine.
(7) "Waste tobacco" — denatured
tobacco; powder or dust,
refuse, unfit for human
consumption; discarded
materials in the manufacture
of tobacco products, which
may include stems.
Insisting on the inapplicability of RR No. 17-67, La Suerte points to
the different definitions given to stemmed leaf tobacco by Section
2 (m) (1) of RR No. 17-67 and Section 137. It argues that while RR
No. 17-67 defines stemmed leaf tobacco as handstripped tobacco
of clean, good, partially broken leaf only, free from mold and dust,
Section 137 defines it as leaf tobacco which has had the stem or
midrib removed. The term does not include broken leaf
tobacco. We are not convinced. cdll
Different definitions of the term "stemmed leaf" are unavoidable,
especially considering that Section 2 (m) (1) is an implementing
regulation of Act No. 2613, which was enacted in 1916 for
purposes of improving the quality of Philippine tobacco products,
while Section 137 defines the tobacco product only for the purpose
of exempting it from the specific tax. Whichever definition is
adopted, there is no doubt that stemmed leaf tobacco is a partially
prepared tobacco.
The onus of proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to
the specific tax lies with the cigarette manufacturers. Taxation is
the rule, exemption is the exception. 162 Accordingly, statutes
granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. The cigarette manufacturers must justify their claim by a
clear and categorical provision in the law. Otherwise, they are
liable for the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco found in their
possession pursuant to Section 127 163 of the 1986 Tax Code, as
amended.
transferred in bulk between
cigarette manufacturers are
exempt from excise tax under
 Section 137 of the 1986 Tax
Code in conjunction with RR
No. V-39 and RR No. 17-67
In the instant case, an exemption on the taxability of stemmed leaf
tobacco is found in Section 137, which provides the following:
SEC. 137. Removal of tobacco products without
prepayment of tax. — Products of tobacco
entirely unfit for chewing or smoking may be
removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of
Finance. Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts,
the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps,
cuttings, clippings, stems or midribs, and
sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as
raw material by one manufacturer directly to
another, without payment of the tax under
such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Ministry of Finance.
'Stemmed leaf tobacco,' as herein used, means
leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib
removed. The term does not include broken
leaf tobacco. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 137 authorizes a tax exemption subject to the following: (1)
that the stemmed leaf tobacco is sold in bulk as raw material by
one manufacturer directly to another; and (2) that the sale or
transfer has complied with the conditions prescribed by the
Department of Finance.
That the title of Section 137 uses the term "without prepayment"
while the body itself uses "without payment" is of no moment.
Both terms simply mean that stemmed leaf tobacco may be
removed from the factory or place of production without prior
payment of the specific tax.
This court has held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La
Campaña Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., 164 reiterated in Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of
Appeals 165 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte
Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. 166 that the exemption from
specific tax of the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco is qualified by and
is subject to "such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Department of Finance." These conditions were
provided for in RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67. Thus, Section 137 must be
read and interpreted in accordance with these regulations.
Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39 provides the rules for tax exemption
on tobacco products:
SECTION 20. Exemption from tax of tobacco
products intended for agricultural or industrial
purposes. — (a) Sale of stemmed leaf tobacco,
etc., by one factory to another. — Subject to
the limitations herein established, products of
tobacco entirely unfit for chewing or smoking
may be removed free of tax for agricultural or
industrial use; and stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-
cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing
tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and
sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as
raw materials by one manufacturer directly to
another without the prepayment of the specific
tax.
Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the
refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps,
cuttings, clippings, and sweeping of leaf
tobacco or partially manufactured tobacco or
other refuse of tobacco may be transferred
from one factory to another under an official L-
7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact
weight of the tobacco at the time of its
removal, and entry shall be made in the L-7
register in the place provided on the page of
removals. Corresponding debit entry will be
made in the L-7 register book of the factory
receiving the tobacco under heading "Refuse,
etc., received from other factory," showing the
date of receipt, assessment and invoice
numbers, name and address of the consignor,
form in which received, and the net weight of
the tobacco. This paragraph should not,
however, be construed to permit the transfer
of materials unsuitable for the manufacture of
tobacco products from one factory to another.
(Emphasis supplied)
The conditions under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be
transferred from one factory to another without prepayment of
specific tax are as follows:
(a) The transfer shall be under an official L-7
invoice on which shall be entered the
exact weight of the tobacco at the
time of its removal; DaEcTC
(b) Entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the
place provided on the page for
removals; and
(c) Corresponding debit entry shall be made in
the L-7 register book of the factory
receiving the tobacco under the
heading, "Refuse, etc., received from
the other factory," showing the date
of receipt, assessment and invoice
numbers, name and address of the
consignor, form in which received,
and the weight of the tobacco.
Under Section 3 (h) of RR No. 17-67, entities that were issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue with an L-7 permit refer to
"manufacturers of tobacco products." Hence, the transferor and
transferee of the stemmed leaf tobacco must be an L-7 tobacco
manufacturer.
La Campaña explained that the reason behind the tax exemption
of stemmed leaf tobacco transferred between two L-7
manufacturers is that the same had already been previously taxed
when acquired by the L-7 manufacturer from dealers of tobacco,
thus:
[T]he exemption from specific tax of the sale of
stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one
L-7 directly to another L-7 is because such
stemmed leaf tobacco has been subjected to
specific tax when an L-7 manufacturer
purchased the same from wholesale leaf
tobacco dealers designated under Section 3,
Chapter I, Revenue Regulations No. 17-
67 (supra) as L-3, L-3F, L-3R, L-4, or L-6, the
latter being also a stripper of leaf tobacco.
These are the sources of stemmed leaf tobacco
to be used as raw materials by an L-7
manufacturer which does not produce
stemmed leaf tobacco. When an L-7
manufacturer sells the stemmed leaf tobacco
purchased from the foregoing suppliers to
another L-7 manufacturer as raw material, such
 sale is not subject to specific tax under Section
137 (now Section 140), as implemented by
Section 20(a) of Revenue Regulations No. V-
39. 167
There is no new product when stemmed leaf tobacco is transferred
between two L-7 permit holders. Thus, there can be no excise tax
that will attach. The regulation, therefore, is reasonable and does
not create a new statutory right.
RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67 did
not exceed the allowable
limits of legislative delegation
The cigarette manufacturers contend that the authority of the
Department of Finance to prescribe conditions is merely
procedural. Its rule-making power is only for the effective
enforcement of the law, which implicitly rules out substantive
modifications. The Secretary of Finance cannot, by mere
regulation, limit the classes of manufacturers that may be entitled
to the tax exemption. Otherwise, Section 137 (Section 132 in the
1939 Tax Code) would be invalid as an undue delegation of
legislative power without the required standards or parameters.
The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed
or revoked only by the legislature. 168 Moreover, this plenary
power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other
branch of government or private persons, unless its delegation is
authorized by the Constitution itself. 169 Hence, the discretion to
ascertain the following — (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b)
person or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and
exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax — may
not be delegated away by Congress.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and
manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law may be
delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the
Secretary of Finance in this case. 170
This court in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr. 171 explained the rationale
behind the permissible delegation of legislative powers to
specialized agencies like the Secretary of Finance:
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that
delegation of legislative power has become the
rule and its non-delegation the exception. The
reason is the increasing complexity of modern
life and many technical fields of governmental
functions as in matters pertaining to tax
exemptions. This is coupled by the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions. 172
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to
fill in the details or to make explicit what is general, which
otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the
law. 173 Such rules and regulations, when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, 174 "deserve to be given weight and
respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to
those who formulate them and their specific expertise in their
respective fields." 175 To be valid, a revenue regulation must be
within the scope of statutory authority or standard granted by the
legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the
object and purpose of the law; 176 (2) not contradict, but conform
to, the standards the law prescribes; 177 and (3) be issued for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our
tax laws. 178
Section 338 authorizes the Secretary of Finance to promulgate
all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the 1939 Tax Code. SICDAa
The specific authority of the Department of Finance to issue
regulations relating to the taxation of tobacco products is found in
Section 4 179 (Specific provisions to be contained in regulations);
Section 125 180 (Payment of specific tax on imported articles to
customs officers prior to release from the customhouse); Section
132 (Removal of tobacco products without prepayment of tax);
Section 149 181 (Extent of supervision over establishments
producing taxable output); Section 150 182 (Records to be kept by
manufacturers; Assessment based thereon); and Section
152 183 (Labels and form of packages) of the 1939 Tax Code.
RR No. V-39 was promulgated to enforce the provisions of Title IV
(Specific Taxes) of the 1939 Tax Code relating to the manufacture
and importation of, and payment of specific tax on, manufactured
tobacco or products of tobacco. By an explicit provision in Section
132, the lawmakers defer to the Department of Finance to provide
the details upon which the removal of stemmed leaf tobacco may
be exempt from the specific tax in view of its supposed expertise in
the tobacco trade. Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39 adhered to the
standards because it provided the conditions — the proper
documentation and recording of raw materials transferred from
one factory to another — for a tax-free removal of stemmed leaf
tobacco, without negating the imposition of specific tax under
Section 137. The "effective enforcement of the provisions of
[the Tax Code]" in Section 338 provides a sufficient standard for
the Secretary of Finance in determining the conditions for the tax-
free removal of stemmed leaf tobacco. Section 4 further provides a
limitation on the contents of revenue regulations to be issued by
the Secretary of Finance.
On the other hand, RR No. 17-67 was promulgated "[i]n
accordance with the provisions of Section 79 (B) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
2803." 184 Among the specific administrative powers conferred
upon a department head under the Administrative Code is that of
promulgating rules and regulations, not contrary to law, "necessary
to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of
his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper
execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of
said Department." 185 Under the 1939 Tax Code,the Secretary of
Finance is authorized to prescribe regulations affecting the
business of persons dealing in articles subject to specific tax,
including the mode in which the processes of production of
tobacco and tobacco products should be conducted and the
records to be kept by manufacturers. Clearly then, the provisions
of RR No. 17-67 classifying and regulating the business of persons
dealing in tobacco and tobacco products are within the rule-
making authority of the Secretary of Finance.
RR No. 17-67 did not create a
new classification
The contention of the cigarette manufacturers that RR No. 17-67
unduly restricted the meaning of manufacturers of tobacco
products by limiting it to a few manufacturers such as
manufacturers of cigars and cigarettes is misleading.
The definitions in RR No. 17-67 of "manufacturer of tobacco" and
"manufacturer of cigars and/or cigarettes" are in conformity with,
as in fact they are verbatim adoptions of, the definitions under Such construction is consistent with the rule that tax exemptions, and manufactured tobacco
Section 194 (m) and (n) of the 1939 Tax Code. deemed to be in derogation of the state's sovereign right of which shall be exported, as
The cigarette companies further argue that RR No. 17-67 unduly taxation, are strictly applied and may be granted only under clear well also as the manner in
restricted the meaning of L-7 in Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39 and unmistakable terms of the law and not merely upon a vague which standard tobacco, shall
because when RR No. V-39 was issued, there was no distinction at implication or inference. 188 be packed. Before
all between L-7, L-3, L-6 permittees, and L-7 referred to RR No. V-39 must be applied establishing the rules above
manufacturers of any class of tobacco products including stemmed and read together with RR specified, the Collector of
leaf tobacco. No. 17-67 Internal Revenue shall give
This argument is similarly misplaced. The cigarette manufacturers' argument is misplaced, stating that due notice of the proposed
A reading of the entire RR No. V-39 shows that the regulation RR No. 17-67 could not modify RR No. V-39 because it was rules or amendments to
pertains particularly to activities of manufacturers of smoking and promulgated to enforce Act No. 2613, as amended (entitled "An those interested and shall
chewing tobacco, cigars and cigarettes. 186 This was rightly so Act to Improve the Methods of Production and the Quality of give them an opportunity to
because the regulation was issued to enforce the tax law provisions Tobacco in the Philippines and to Develop the Export Trade present their objections to
in relation to the manufacture and importation of tobacco Therein"), which allegedly had nothing whatsoever to do with such rules or amendments.
products. Clearly apparent in Section 10 (a) is that when a the Tax Code or with the imposition of taxes. (c) To require, whenever it shall be
manufacturer of chewing and smoking tobacco, cigars, or "The Tobacco Inspection Service, instituted under Act No. 2613, deemed expedient the
cigarettes has been qualified to conduct his or her business as was made part of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of inspection of and affixture of
such, he or she is issued by the internal revenue agent the Customs administration for . . . internal revenue inspection labels to tobacco
corresponding register books and auxiliary register books purposes." 189 The Collector of Internal Revenue was charged to removed from the province
pertaining to his business as well as the official register book, L-7, enforce Act No. 2613, otherwise known as the Tobacco Inspection of its origin to another
to be used as record of the raw materials for his or her product. It Law, with a view to promoting the Philippine tobacco trade and province before such
is, therefore, logical to conclude that the L-7 invoice and L-7 thereby increase the revenues of the government. This can be removal, or to tobacco for
register book under Section 20 (a) refers to those invoice and inferred from a reading of the following provisions of Act No. 2613: domestic sale or factory
books used by manufacturers of chewing and smoking tobacco, SEC. 6. The Collector of Internal Revenue shall use. 190
cigars or cigarettes. have the power and it shall be his duty: SEC. 7. No leaf tobacco or
RR No. 17-67 clarified RR No. V-39 by explicitly designating the (a) To establish general and local rules manufactured tobacco shall be
manufacturers of tobacco products as L-7 permittees (Section 2), in respecting the classification, exported until it shall have been
contrast to wholesale leaf tobacco dealers and those that process marking, and packing of inspected by the Collector of Internal
partially manufactured tobacco such as stemmed leaf tobacco. RR tobacco for domestic sale or Revenue or his duly authorized
No. 17-67 did not create a new and restrictive classification but factory use and for representative and found to be
only expressed in clear and categorical terms the distinctions exportation so far as may be standard for export. — Collector of
between "manufacturers" and "dealers" of tobacco that were necessary to secure leaf customs shall not permit the
already implicit in RR No. V-39. tobacco of good quality and exportation of tobacco from the
Indeed, there is no repugnancy between RR No. 17-67 and RR No. to secure its handling under Philippines unless the shipment be in
V-39, on the one hand, and the Tax Code,on the other. It is safer to sanitary conditions, and to conformity with the requirements set
presume that the term "manufacturer" used in Section 137 on tax the end that leaf tobacco be forth in this Act. The prohibition
exempt removals referred to an entity that is engaged in the not mixed, packed, and contained in this section shall not
business of, and was licensed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as marked and of the same apply to waste and refuse tobacco
a, manufacturer of tobacco products. It does not include an entity quality when it is not of the accumulated in the manufacturing
engaged in business as a dealer in tobacco that, incidentally or in same class and origin. process when it is invoiced and
furtherance of its business as a dealer, strip or thresh whole leaf (b) To establish from time to time marked as such waste and
tobacco or reprocess partially manufactured tobacco. 187 DHATcE adequate rules defining the refuse. 191 (Emphasis supplied)
standard and the type of leaf xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 9. The Collector of Internal
Revenue may appoint inspectors of
tobacco for the purpose of making the
inspections herein required, and may
also detail any officer or employee of
the Bureau to perform such duty. Said
inspectors or employees shall likewise
be charged with the duty of grading
leaf tobacco and shall perform such
other duties as may be required of
them in the promotion of the
Philippine tobacco industry. The
Collector of Internal Revenue shall
likewise appoint, with the approval of
the Secretary of Finance, agents in the
United States for the purpose of
promoting the export trade in tobacco
with the United States, whose duty it
shall be to inspect shipments of
tobacco upon or after their arrival in
that country when so required, to
assist manufacturers of, exporters of,
and dealers in tobacco in
disseminating information regarding
Philippine tobacco and, at the request
of the parties, to act as arbitrators
between the exporter in the Philippine
Islands and the importer in the United
States whenever a dispute arises
between them as to the quality, sizes,
classes, or shapes shipped or received.
When acting as arbitrator as
aforesaid, the agent shall proceed in
accordance with the law governing
arbitration and award in the locality
where the dispute arises. All agents,
inspectors, and employees acting
under and by virtue of this Act shall be
subject to all penal provisions
applicable to internal-revenue officers
generally. 192 (Emphasis
supplied) ACDIcS
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 12. The inspection fees collected
by virtue of the provisions of this Act
shall constitute a special fund to be
known as the Tobacco Inspection
Fund, which shall be expended by the
Collector of Internal Revenue, with
the approval of the Secretary of
Finance, upon allotment by a Board
consisting of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the Director of Plant
Industry, the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry, two
manufacturers designated by the
Manila Tobacco Association, and two
persons representing the interests of
the tobacco producers and growers,
appointed by the President of the
Philippine Islands[.]
These funds may be expended for any
of the following purposes:
(a) The payment of the expenses
incident to the enforcement of this
Act including the salaries of the
inspectors and agents.
(b) The payment of expenses incident
to the reconditioning and returning to
the Philippine Islands of damaged
tobacco and the reimbursement of
the value of the United States
internal-revenue stamps lost thereby.
(c) The advertising of Philippine
tobacco products in the United States
and in foreign countries.
(d) The establishment of tobacco
warehouses in the Philippine Islands
and in the United States at such points
as the trade conditions may demand.
(e) The payment of bounties to
encourage the production of leaf
tobacco of high quality.
(f) The promotion and defense of the
Philippine tobacco interests in the
United States and in foreign countries.
(g) The establishment, operation, and
maintenance of tobacco experimental
farms for the purpose of studying and
testing the best methods for the
improvement of the leaves: Provided,
however, That thirty per centum of
the total annual income of the
tobacco inspection fund shall be
expended for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of said
tobacco experimental farms and for
the investigation and discovery of
efficacious ways and means for the
extermination and control of the pests
and diseases of tobacco: Provided,
further, That in the establishment of
experimental farms, preference shall
be given to municipalities offering the
necessary suitable land for the
establishment of an experimental
farm.
(h) The sending of special agents and
commissions to study the markets of
the United States and foreign
countries with regard to the Philippine
cigars and their propaganda in said
markets.
(i) The organization of exhibits of
cigars and other Philippine tobacco
products in the United States and in
foreign countries. 193
SEC. 13. The Collector Internal
Revenue shall be the executive officer
charged with the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act and of the
regulations issued in accordance
therewith, but it shall be the duty of
the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public
Instruction, to execute and enforce
the provisions hereof referring to the
cultivation of tobacco. (Emphasis
supplied)
The cigarette manufacturers, thus, erroneously concluded that Act
No. 2613 does not involve taxation.
Parenthetically, Section 8 of Act No. 2613 pertained to the
imposition of tobacco inspection fees, which are National Internal
Revenue taxes, these being one of the miscellaneous taxes
provided for under the Tax Code.Said Section 8 was in fact
repealed by Section 369 (b) of the 1939 Tax Code,and the provision
regarding inspection fees are found in Section 302 of the 1939 Tax
Code.
Since the two revenue regulations, RR Nos. V-34 and 17-67, are in
pari materia, i.e., they both pertain specifically to the regulation of
tobacco trade, they should be read and applied together.
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate
to the same person or thing or to the same
class of persons or things, or object, or cover
the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a
statute must be interpreted, not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize
with other laws on the same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi," or every statute must
be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 194(Citation omitted)
The foregoing rules on statutory construction can be applied by
analogy to administrative issuances such as RR No. V-39 and RR No.
17-67, especially since both are issued by the same administrative
agency.
Importation of stemmed leaf
tobacco not included in the
exemption under Section 137
The transaction contemplated in Section 137 does not include
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the reason that the law
uses the word "sold" to describe the transaction of transferring the
raw materials from one manufacturer to another. DHTECc
The Tax Code treats an importer and a manufacturer differently.
Section 123 clearly distinguishes between goods manufactured or
produced in the Philippines and things imported. The law uses the
proper term "importation" or "imported" whenever the
transaction involves bringing in articles from foreign countries as
provided under Section 125 (cf. Section 124). Whenever the Tax
Code refers to importers and manufacturers, they are separately
mentioned as two distinct persons or entities (Sections 156 and
160). Under Chapter II, whenever the law uses the
word manufacturer, it only means local manufacturer or producer
of domestic products (Sections 150, 151, and 152 of the 1939 Tax
Code).
Moreover, foreign manufacturers of tobacco products not engaged
in trade or business in the Philippines cannot be designated as L-7
since these are beyond the pale of Philippine law and regulations.
The factories contemplated are those located or operating only in
the Philippines.
Contrary to La Suerte's claim, Chapter V, Section 61 of RR No. V-
39 195 is not applicable to justify the tax exemption of its
importation of stemmed leaf tobacco because from the title of
Chapter V, the provision particularly refers to specific taxes
on imported cigars, cigarettes, smoking and chewing tobacco.
No estoppel against
government
The cigarette manufacturers contend that for a long time prior to
the transactions herein involved, the Collector of Internal Revenue
had never subjected their purchases and importations of stemmed
leaf tobacco to excise taxes. This prolonged practice allegedly
represents the official and authoritative interpretation of the law
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue which must be respected.
We are not persuaded.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 196 this court has held that this principle is not absolute,
and an erroneous implementation by an officer based on a
misapprehension of law may be corrected when the true
construction is ascertained. Thus:
The appellant argues that the Collector of
Internal Revenue, previous to the transactions
herein involved, had never collected the
franchise tax on items of the same nature as
those herein in question and this is strong
evidence that such transactions are not subject
to tax on the principle that a prolonged
practice on the part of an executive or
administrative officer in charge of executing a
certain statute is an authoritative construction
of great weight. This contention may be
granted, but the principle is not absolute and
may be overcome by strong reasons to the
contrary. If through a misapprehension of law
an officer has erroneously executed it for a long
time, the error may be corrected when the true
construction is ascertained. Such we deem to
be the situation in the present case.
Incidentally, the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply here. 197 (Emphasis supplied)
This court reiterated this rule in Abello v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 198 where it rejected petitioners' claim that the
prolonged practice (since 1939 up to 1988) of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in not subjecting political contributions to donor's
tax was an authoritative interpretation of the statute, entitled to
great weight and the highest respect:
This Court holds that the BIR is not precluded
from making a new interpretation of the law,
especially when the old interpretation was
flawed. It is a well-entrenched rule that[:]
. . . erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public
officers do not block subsequent
correct application of the statute, and
that the Government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the
part of its agents. 199 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Prolonged practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in not
collecting the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco cannot validate
what is otherwise an erroneous application and enforcement of
the law. The government is never estopped from collecting
legitimate taxes because of the error committed by its agents. 200
In La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 201 this court upheld the validity of a revenue
memorandum circular issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to correct an error in a previous circular that resulted in
the non-collection of tobacco inspection fees for a long time and
declared that estoppel cannot work against the government:
. . . the assailed Revenue Memorandum
Circular was issued to rectify the error in
General Circular No. V-27 and to interpret the
phrase "tobacco for domestic sale or factory
use" with the view of arresting huge losses of
tobacco inspection fees which were not
collected and imposed since the said Circular
(No. V-27) took effect. Furthermore, the
questioned Revenue Memorandum Circular
was also issued to apprise those concerned of
the construction and interpretation which
should be accorded to Act No. 2613, as
amended, and which respondent is duty bound
to enforce. It is an opinion on how the law
should be construed and there was no attempt
whatsoever to enlarge or restrict the meaning
of the law.
The basis for the issuance of said
Memorandum Circular was so stated in
Resolution No. 2-67 of the Tobacco Board,
wherein petitioners as members of the Manila
Tobacco Association, Inc. were duly
represented, the pertinent portions of which
read:
"xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this original
recommendation of Mr. Hernandez
was perfectly in accordance with
existing law, more particularly Sec. 1
of Republic Act No. 31 which took
effect since September 25, 1946, but
perhaps thru oversight by the former
Commissioners and officers of the
Tobacco Inspection Service the
propriety and legality of effecting the
inspection of tobacco products for
local sales and imported leaf tobacco
for factory use might have overlooked
resulting in huge losses of tobacco
inspection fees . . ." (Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Tobacco Inspection fees are undoubtedly
National Internal Revenue taxes, they being
one of the miscellaneous taxes provided for
under the Tax Code.Section 228 (formerly
Section 302) of Chapter VII of the Code
specifically provides for the collection and
manner of payment of the said inspection fees.
It is within the power and duty of the
Commissioner to collect the same, even
without inspection, should tobacco products
be removed clandestinely or surreptitiously
from the establishment of the wholesaler,
manufacturer or redrying plant and from the
customs custody in case of imported leaf
tobacco.Errors, omissions or flaws committed
by BIR inspectors and representatives while in
the performance of their duties cannot be set
up as estoppel nor estop the Government from
collecting a tax legally due. Tobacco inspection
fees are levied and collected for purposes of
regulation and control and also as a source of
revenue since fifty percentum (50%) of said
fees shall accrue to the Tobacco Inspection Fee
Fund created by Sec. 12 of Act No. 2613, as
amended and the other fifty percentum, to the
Cultural Center of the Philippines. (Sec. 88,
Chapter VII, NIRC) 202 (Emphasis in this
paragraph supplied, citation omitted) cECTaD
Furthermore, the December 12, 1972 ruling of Commissioner
Misael P. Vera runs counter to Section 20 (a) of RR No. V-39 in
relation to RR No. 17-67, which provides that only transfers of
stemmed leaf tobacco between L-7 permittees are exempt. An
implementing regulation cannot be superseded by a ruling which is
a mere interpretation of the law. While opinions and rulings of
officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws command much respect and weight, courts are
not bound to accept the same if they override, instead of remain
consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement. 203
Double taxation
The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed
because they are paying the specific tax on the raw material and on
the finished product in which the raw material was a part is also
devoid of merit.
For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to
exist, "the same property must be taxed twice, when it should be
taxed but once." 204 "[B]oth taxes must be imposed on the same
property or subject-matter, for the same purpose, by the same . . .
taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district,
during the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or
character of tax." 205
At all events, there is no constitutional prohibition against double
taxation in the Philippines. 206 This court has explained in Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of
Tanauan, Leyte: 207
There is no validity to the assertion that the
delegated authority can be declared
unconstitutional on the theory of double
taxation. It must be observed that the
delegating authority specifies the limitations
and enumerates the taxes over which local
taxation may not be exercised. The reason is
that the State has exclusively reserved the
same for its own prerogative. Moreover,
double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by
our fundamental law, since We have not
adopted as part thereof the injunction against
double taxation found in the Constitution of the
United States and some states of the
Union. Double taxation becomes obnoxious
only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the
benefit of the same governmental entity or by
the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but
not in a case where one tax is imposed by the
State and the other by the city or
municipality. 208 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
"It is something not favored, but is permissible, provided some
other constitutional requirement is not thereby violated, such as
the requirement that taxes must be uniform." 209
Excise taxes are essentially taxes on property 210 because they are
levied on certain specified goods or articles manufactured or
produced in the Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or
for any other disposition, and on goods imported. In this case,
there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the
specific tax is imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two
different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and
(2) on cigar or cigarette. 211
WHEREFORE, this court:
1. DENIES the petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar &
Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 125346 and AFFIRMS the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 38107;
2. GRANTS the petition for review filed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. Nos. 136328-29
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the challenged decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. Nos.
38219 and 40313. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
is ORDEREDto pay the following taxes:
a. P28,938,446.25 as deficiency excise tax for the period
covering January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989, plus 20%
interest per annum from November 24, 1989 until fully
paid; and
b. P1,989,821.26 as deficiency excise tax for the period
covering July 1, 1989 to November 30, 1990, plus 20%
interest per annum from March 1, 1991 until fully paid.
3. GRANTS the petition for review filed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 144942
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 51902. La Suerte
Cigar & Cigarette Factory's claim for refund of the amount
of P175,909.50 is DENIED.
4. DENIES the petition for review filed by Sterling Tobacco
Corporation in G.R. No. 148605 and AFFIRMS the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 38159;
5. DENIES the petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar &
Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 158197 and AFFIRMS the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 37124; and
6. DENIES the petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar &
Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 165499 and AFFIRMS the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 50241. ES
||| (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 125346, 136328-29, 144942, 148605, 158197, 165499,
[November 11, 2014])
 EN BANC KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for
[G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.] CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. petitioners in G.R. No 115525.
ARTURO CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for
M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE petitioner R.S. Roco.
OF FINANCE and THE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, Villaraza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for
REVENUE, respondents. JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
[G.R. No. 115525. August 25, 1994.] MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedom from Debts
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. TEOFISTO T. BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law
as Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS- BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO
Offices for petitioners in G.R. No 115873.
CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; TAÑADA, petitioners, vs. THE
R. B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R.
and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
No. 115931.
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. THE SECRETARYOF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and Rene A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.
[G.R. No. 115543. August 25, 1994.] DECISION
THE
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED MENDOZA, J p:
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
BAR OF THE
[G.R. No. 115852. August 25, 1994.] The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY O
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
F THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling
COMMISSIONERS OF THE INC., petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANC
E, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND
REVENUE, respondents. bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents. exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen
[G.R. No. 115544. August 25, 1994.] [G.R. No. 115873. August 25, 1994.]
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON.
Code. LexLib
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE LIWAYWAY V. CHATO in her capacity as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition,
JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on
L. DIMALANTA, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6,
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as 1994 of this Court, as follows:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. OCAMPO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance, respondents. I. Procedural Issues:
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
[G.R. No. 115931. August 25, 1994.] A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate
Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS Art. VI, §
OCAMPO, in his capacity
ASSOCIATION, INC., and 24 of the Constitution?
as Secretaryof Finance, respondents.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE B. Does it violate Art. VI, §
[G.R. No. 115754. August 25, 1994.]
BOOKSELLERS, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO 26(2) of the Constitution?
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; C. What is the extent of the
ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the power of the Bicameral
(CREBA), petitioner, vs. THE
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. Conference Committee?
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as II. Substantive Issues:
REVENUE, respondent.
[G.R. No. 115781. August 25, 1994.] the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
 A. Does the law violate the following
provisions in the Bill of Rights
(Art. III)?
1. § 1
2. § 4
3. § 5
4. § 10
B. Does the law violate the following
other
provisions of the Constitution
? 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were introduced in
1. Art. VI, § 28(1)
2. Art. VI, § 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are
stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these
questions are judicially cognizable, because not all
provisions of the Constitution are self executing
therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the
government are equally charged with
enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions
relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that
enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitutionbecause, although
H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives,
it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated
with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference
Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into
law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in
support of the proposition that because Republic Act No.
7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the
House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a
law:
Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed
to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22,
the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to
the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for
approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
and,
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCE ITS
the
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND
in 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V,
ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED.
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second
reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17,
1993, it was approved by the House ofRepresentatives after
third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and
later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and
Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee
submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630,
entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCE ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND
236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and
116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in
substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration
P. S. Res. No. 734 and H. B. No. 11197."
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began
consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on
the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994.
On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the
affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.
H. No. 1197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were
then referred to a conference committee which, after meeting
four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that
"House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No.
1630, be approved in accordance with the attached
copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT
RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the
House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate
on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the
President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It
became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act
No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its
implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow
time for the registration of business entities. It would have
been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was
stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its
members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30,
1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, § 24 ofthe Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American
Federal Constitution,2 it is notable in two respects: the verb
"shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by
the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the
American version is omitted. This means, according to them,
that to be considered as having originated in the
House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H.
No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it
is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by
the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the
conference committee will be discussed later. At this point,
what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law — must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but
also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress
and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to
limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying
power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the
House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are
different. We are dealing here with the legislative power.
which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The
exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the
exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise ofa check on the
executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the
Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the
U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of as giving it more
legislative powers than the House of Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provision (sec.
37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of vessels,
which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909,
was upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue
bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art.
I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend
limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill
emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as
changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and
substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck
out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and
wrote in its place its own measure, and the House
subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate
likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the
schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax
revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff
bill of 1992. 7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose
amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even
with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to
originate in the House.
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed
not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill
(S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was
merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting
S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then
writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it
would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a
bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that
the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body
is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court
cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the
fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House
passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it.
It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on
November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in
respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee
on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by
the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that
matter, if the question were simply the priority in the
time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a
bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July
22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before
S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only
a substitute ofthose earlier bills. LLphil
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was
within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We not
pass to the next argument ofpetitioners that S. No. 1630 did
not pass three readings on separate days as required by
the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were
done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because
on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2)
qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
(ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in
relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
"except" clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and
distribution three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very
premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the
immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the
printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the
time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in
insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted
whether doing away with the necessity of printing and
distributing copies of the bill three days before the third
reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the
face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election
for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such
a law is required to be made within seven days of the
convening of Congress in emergency session. 11
That upon the certification of a bill by the President
the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example,
the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which,
in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act
No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968)
after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. 12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that
presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement
for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before
its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on
separate days, also. cdasia
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill
in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the
condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget
deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit
to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second
and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted
the President's certification. Should such certification be now
reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been
shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and
third readings on the same day, the members ofthe Senate
were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital
piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the
existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art.
VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic
rights ofindividuals may be at hazard. But the factual
basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing
away with procedural requirements designed to insure that
bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly
should elicit a different standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the
President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is
because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering.
When the matter was before the House, the President likewise
certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which
became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference
Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report
included provisions not found in either the House bill or the
Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously"
inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the
fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25,
1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not
told, however, whether the provisions were not the
result of the give and take that often mark the
proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about
the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive
sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting
provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the
conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be
made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal
or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis
solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor
read anything into the incomplete remarks of the members,
marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The
incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's
own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes
characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such
lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the
United States.
In any event, in the United States conference
committees had been customarily held in executive sessions
with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only
in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open
sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees
may vote in public to close the meetings. 14
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency
out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure,
conference committees are not expected to
make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which
both houses have already agreed or by
inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when
one house amends a proposal originating in
either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting
provisions which make it an entirely new bill.
The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft
essentially a new bill . . . 15
The result is a third version, which is considered an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be germane
to the subject of the House and Senate bills. 16
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill
or in the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no
reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute,"
so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act ofthe legislative department. The
charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective
Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
conference committee can only act on the differing
provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary
to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions
not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions
are cited in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
§ Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate does not
agree with the House of Representatives on
the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet
within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the
members of the conference committee in
accordance with subparagraph (c), Section
3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall
contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure, and shall be signed by the
conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in
order unless the report has been filed with
the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof
have been distributed to the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
§ Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In
the event that the House does not agree with
the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
joint resolution, the differences may be settled
by conference committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee
reports shall always be in order, except when
the journal is being read, while the roll is being
called or the House is dividing on any question.
Each of the pages of such reports shall be
signed by the conferees. Each report shall
contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in
order unless copies thereof are distributed to
the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen
days of each session period it shall be deemed
sufficient that three copies of the report,
signed as above provided, are deposited in the
office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference
committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions.
But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the
effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the
precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines
shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted
from the Jefferson's Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine
themselves to the differences committed to
them . . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to
a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there
is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative
practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as
supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference
committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee. This
practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in
G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases.
Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual
must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought
in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that
"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."
This observation applies to the other contention that
the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in
the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because
the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject
measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to
indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting.
We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the
Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we
have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our
concern is with the procedural
requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As
far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases. cdphil
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the
Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there
would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek
modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill,
therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a
"take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is
not approved by both houses, another conference committee
must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a
compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to
both houses.
Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as
referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.
For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give
members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid
that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three reading;
that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the
Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it
submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by
"taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its part the
Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and
prepared a compromise version; that the Conference
Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and
the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their
members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the
provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference
Committee usurped the legislative power ofCongress is, in our
view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the
formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its
favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the
printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look
behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the
government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is
absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind" an enrolled
bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who
had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew
his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled
bill to consider. cda
But where allegations that the constitutional
procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions
into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it
violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that "Every bill passed
by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H.
No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for
removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the
payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the
Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No.
7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is sec.
103, which originally read:
§ Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. — The
following shall be exempt from the value-
added tax:
...
(q) Transactions which are exempt under
special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were
those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D.
No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in
the near future," in consideration of the payment by it
either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No.
7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:
§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following
shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
...
(q) Transactions which are exempt under
special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491,
1590. . . .
The effect of the amendment is to remove the
exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.
The question is whether this
amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the
title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made
therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute
amends. We think it is, since the title states that the
purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one
way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing
some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No.
1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition
to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to,
would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete
index ofits content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed
by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding
it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect
in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes,
although published, pass unnoticed until some event
somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the
title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the
title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no
mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No.
1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN
AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the
constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do
not unduly interfere with the enactment ofnecessary
legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the
general subject of the statute and all its provisions are
germane to the general subject thus expressed. 24
It is further contended that
amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by
special law, in view of sec. 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or
provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special
law or decree that shall specifically modify,
amend, or repeal this franchise or any section
or provision thereof. LexLib
This provision is evidently intended to prevent the
amendment of the franchise by mere implication resulting
from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in
consideration of the fact that a franchise is a contract which
can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 25it was held that an Act of the U.S.
Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain
goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not
amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all
taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that
a special law cannot be amended by a general law.
 In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No.
7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by
specifically excepting from the grant ofexemptions from the
VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the
power of Congress to do under Art.
XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a
franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the
common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought
and Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R.
No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper
publishers established for the improvement of journalism in
the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No.
115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit
organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles
and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim
violations of their rights under § §4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights
as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
The PPI question the law insofar as it has withdrawn
the exemption previously granted to the press under § 103
(f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently
restored by administrative regulation with respect to the
circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim
because of the possibility that the exemption may still be
removed by mere revocation of the
regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the
PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant
exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has
no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in
Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a
majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's duty is to
execute the law.
§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions
exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously
granted exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or
sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular
intervals with fixed prices for subscription and
sale and which is devoted principally to the
publication of advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting
par. (f) with the result that print media became subject to the
VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later,
however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations
No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation
income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against
abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The
exemption of "circulation income" has left income from
advertisements still subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the
exemption granted is beyond the
authority of the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's
contention that even with the exemption of the circulation
revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because ofthe imposition of the
VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements
and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for
publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has
effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find
no violation of press freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute
that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The
PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law
abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high
estate and its importance in a democratic society, however,
the press is not immune from general regulation by the State.
It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity
from the application of general laws. He has no
special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He
may be punished for contempt of court. Like
others, he must pay equitable and
nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . 27
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.
What it contends is that by withdrawing the
exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or
sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the
press for discriminatory treatment and that within the
class of mass media the law discriminates against print media
by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have
carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a
differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now
required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not
because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special
treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption
previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is
all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise
previously granted exemption, have been delisted as
part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the
VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the
charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege
withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not
the case. prcd
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry
from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim
that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory
taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was
clear either from the background of the law or from its
operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the
gross receipts derived from advertisements only on
newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000
copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the
volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the
extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the
thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four
papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies
a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was
well known that the thirteen newspapers had been
critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated
legislature of Louisiana responded by taxing what Long
described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a
tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their
revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court
noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the
guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which
the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties." 29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning
that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
 In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was
also found to have been singled out because everything was
exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press.
Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state.
To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on
the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state
tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents'
incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax
might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted
from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the
state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the
"use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication.
The law was held to have singled out the press because (1)
there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press
was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid
on an "intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail
sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the
differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the
U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory
because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to
exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further
narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a
handful of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any
significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was
thus very clear.
More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general
interest magazines but not newspapers and religious,
professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory
because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole,
it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by
differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general
interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law
became "entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press."
These cases come down to this: that unless justified,
the differential treatment of the press creates
risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at
bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and services.
The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media
whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than
P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has
not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has
been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation
does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and
broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on
its transactions involving printing and publication, which are
different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is
thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any
suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune from any
forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in
the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was "one
single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the
freedom of the press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis
Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not
prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and
the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations without creating
constitutional problems." 35
What has been said above also disposes of the
allegations of the PBS that the removal of the
exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and
religious articles, as well as their printing and publication,
likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a
generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
material by a religious organization.
This brings us to the question whether the
registration provision of the law, 337 although of general
applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press
because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The
case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by
both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that
the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an
ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee
on those engaged in the business of general merchandise,
could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other
religious literature. This Court relied
on Murdock v. Pennsylvania 39 in which it was held that, as a
license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the
receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a
religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for
the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that
reason, it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise." 40
But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed
amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege
but only for the purpose of defraying part of the
cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central
feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a
record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the
payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The
registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not
imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. cdrep
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack
on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the
free speech, press and freedom of religion
guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the
same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational
Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the
increase in the price of books and other educational materials
as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional
mandate to the government to give priority to education,
science and technology (Art. II, sec. 17) to be untenable.
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection,
and Impairment of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face
the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech,
press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may
have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and
the need to assure that the channels of communication are
open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this
Court's power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon
the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation
must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws. The reason for
this different treatment has been cogently stated by an
eminent authority on constitutional law thus: "[W]hen
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that
commands a moments of respect; when property is imperiled
it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This
dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
process clause." 41
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm
makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
underscores the essential nature ofpetitioners' attack on the
law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and
equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere
academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is
that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to
petitioners and no determinations at the administrative
levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual
operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment
regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these
suits. cdlex
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is
regressive and that it violates the requirement that "The
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42 Petitioners in
G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy
Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan
A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment
by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their
incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income
households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners
contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on
consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income
bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%,
has been reduced, while basic commodities, which before
were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a
higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is
regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents that
in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and
services as possible particularly to those which are within the
reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic
goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and
properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by
higher-income groups. These include real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial,
commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and
similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand,
small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less
than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents,
removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business
establishments. On the other hand, an occasional
paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cites
a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and
income distribution and that while additional expenditure for
the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a
family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any
conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion whether
the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and
middle-income group in society harder than it will the "rich,"
as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in
G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other
hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives,
marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while
maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only
goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives
as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies
such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a
policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a
policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754,
that the VAT will reduce the mark up ofits members by as
much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere
allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press
Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive
some of its members out of circulation because their profits
from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax
liability, while purporting to be based on the financial
statements of the newspapers in question, still falls
short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary
for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive
and confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for
courts to enforce. What Congress is required by
the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive
system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like the
directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the
enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social,
economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the
promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1).
These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision
in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the question now
raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made against
the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to
be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles
which this Court found to be "hearsay and [without]
evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands
the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in
the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and
wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless
hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the
imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by
virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the
law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law
impairing the obligation ofcontracts shall be passed." It is
enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through
the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought
as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation
save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No.
115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim.
Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the
removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but
only by a specific, law. dctai
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are
presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the
lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not
only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by "non-
Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable
provided they meet the standing
requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, par. 2
the Court has a "special function" of vindicating constitutional
rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do
not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual
record that alone can impart to our adjudication the
impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is
informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have
power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being
asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely
accused of having done in these cases — to sit as a third
legislative chamber to review legislation.
We are told, however, that the power of judicial
review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this
Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the
performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the
barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art.
VIII, § 1, par. 2 is cited in support of this view:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. cdll
To view the judicial power of review as a duty is
nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to justify
the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the
operation of each. 50
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936
in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by DISMISSED.
the Constitution to determine conflicting SO ORDERED.
claims of authority under the Constitution and ||| (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525,
to establish for the parties in an actual 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931,
controversy the rights which that instrument [August 25, 1994])
secures and guarantees to them. 51
This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in
several cases 52 of this Court following Angara.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this
"duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is essentially
a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must
still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our justification
in terms of"cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave
abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for
exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed
by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run
only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For,
as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment
according to what may appear to be the opinion ofthe day.
In the preceding pages we have endeavored to
discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in
its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in
the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural
requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal
requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is
precluded by the principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech,
expression or the press, nor interfere with the free
exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to
an education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual
foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights
protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised
and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by
writ of prohibition.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER
AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR, respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-
intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO
NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly
containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the
country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress. 1 cCSDTI
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8,
2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered
a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes", and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry,
several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But
on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent
House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of
the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged
and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes
were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House
Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports
based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the
resource persons. 3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.
Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction 4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these
tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to
desist from further using the recordings in any of the House
proceedings. 5
Without reaching its denouement, the House
discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped. AECacS
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator
Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, "The Lighthouse that Brought Darkness". In his
discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the
whole unvarnished truth — the what's, when's, where's, who's
and why's" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into
the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator
Lacson's speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate
the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to
prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a
lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on
the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her
considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use,
possession, replay or communication of the contents of the
"Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
(ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada
and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article
III of the Constitution. 11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the
Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci"
tapes on September 7, 12 17 13 and October 1, 14 2007.
Intervening as respondents, 15 Senators Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal
and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment 16 on the petition
on September 25, 2007. aAIcEH
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral
argument. 17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a
member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 18
 On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the
"Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives — the
first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the
House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct
of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R.
No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
I
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court
shall first resolve the issue on the parties' standing, argued at
length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 20 we explained that
"'[l]egal standing' or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act . . .," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to
litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. 21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions". 22 HTcDEa
However, considering that locus standi is a mere
procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed
the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo 23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings". 24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales 25 even
permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,
to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in
the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious
legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to
determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them". 26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his
standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the
person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was
publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the
recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano
stands to be directly injured by the House committees' actions
and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his
standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili
justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned
citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the
firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes
will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in
the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the
conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation. 28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due
process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein
through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct
of the questioned hearings. 29 CAaSHI
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an
interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process, 30they satisfy
the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The
House of Representatives, 31 we find sufficient petitioners
Ranada's and Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's allegation that
the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned
legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds. 32 It should be noted that in Francisco,rights
personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the
petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rights — as taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members
of the bar and of the legal profession — which were also
supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional
acts. 33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275
shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance
not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given
the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal
standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge. cHATSI
II
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for
being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases, we mean
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of
judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. 36Neither will the Court determine a
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be
granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale. 37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of
a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced. 38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores
from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees
from playing the tape recordings and from including the same
in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said
tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in
the House and heard by its members. 39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees. 40 Having
been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to
be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an
act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy
for an act already accomplished. 41
III
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants
the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process. 42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines." 44 EScaIT
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their
pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for
the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very
same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations, 46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
published rules of procedure". We quote the
OSG's explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of
procedure" requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after
it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of
the Senate's membership, the
composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure,the
subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and
Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization: CcSEIH
The present Senate under the 1987
Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has
twenty-four members, twelve of whom are
elected every three years for a term of six
years each. Thus, the term of twelve
Senators expires every three years,
leaving less than a majority of Senators to
continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution,
requires a majority of Senators to "constitute
a quorum to do business". Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority
of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules
of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators. 47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in
our Resolution 48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the
same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a
"continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue
a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate
that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. However,
in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the
end of the session shall be taken up at
the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings
shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all
pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration
of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule
is readily apparent considering that the
Senate of the succeeding Congress (which
will typically have a different composition as
that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the
Senate is a continuing body even with
respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the
same status. HSCAIT
This dichotomy of the continuity of
the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of
the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF,
THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session
in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their
term of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or
revision.
The Rules may also be amended by
means of a motion which should be
presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in
the session shall be required for its
approval. DCTSEA
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect
on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules
quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the
Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued
effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the
difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the
Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate
of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries
which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate
to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries
in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same
shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate
for its present rules on legislative inquiries to
be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate's internet web
page. 49 HIESTA
The Court does not agree. The absence of any
amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate's defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more,
that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument
raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of
Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling
which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even
provide that the rules "shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation",
precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of
Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A
 person who violates the Rules of Procedure
could be arrested and detained by the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions
of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. 51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being
the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. 52 It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of
the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred
until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because
it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure". ECaSIT
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact,
the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar
as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by
the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it
unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is
DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED.
Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., pls. see dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales and Azcuna, JJ., join the dissent of Chief Justice Puno.
Corona, J., is on leave.
Reyes, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:
The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing
between what is apparent and what is real, what is central and
what is peripheral, to get to the core of the issues that will
decide the controversy at bar. SCcHIE
The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R.
No 17925 as narrated in the ponencia are undisputed. Hence, I
will go direct to the issues.
First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These were
delineated in the Oral Argument held on October 2, 2007 as
follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to
bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the
Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation have been published,
in accordance with Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be
published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will
comply with the
constitutional requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on
the so-called "Garci tapes" violates
Section 3, Article III of
the Constitution and/or Republic Act
No. 4200. 1
As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on the
first issue, I shall limit my discussion to the second and third
issues. CDHSac
Publication of Senate Rules Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Let me hark back to the ruling of the Court on the
publication of the "Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation" (Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries) of
the Senate in its March 25, 2008 Decision 2 (March 25 Neri
Decision) and September 4, 2008 Resolution 3 (September 4
Neri Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponencia is not
in accord with the ruling of the Court in these Neri cases (Neri
Ruling). The proper application of the Neri Ruling to the case
at bar will yield the conclusion that the subject Senate
investigation should be allowed to proceed even if the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries were not published in the 14th
Congress prior to the subject investigation. Still, I maintain my
dissent to the Neri Ruling and arrive at this same conclusion
through a different track.
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court ruled, viz.:
Fourth, we find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
published rules of procedure". We quote the
OSG's explanation: AECDHS
The phrase 'duly published rules of
procedure' requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after
it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of
the Senate's membership, the
composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure,the
subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm. 4
 Subsequently, the Court clarified the above ruling in
the September 4 Neri Resolution. I quote the ruling at
length, viz.:
Having touched the subject of
the Rules, we now proceed to respondent
Committees' fourth argument. Respondent
Committees argue that the Senate does not
have to publish its Rules because the same
was published in 1995 and in 2006. Further,
they claim that the Senate is a continuing
body; thus, it is not required to republish
the Rules,unless the same is repealed or
amended. SaTAED
On the nature of the Senate as a
"continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue
a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate
that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. However,
in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the
end of the session shall be taken up at
the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings
shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time. (emphasis
supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all
pending matters and
proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration
of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule
is readily apparent considering that the
Senate of the succeeding Congress (which
will typically have a different composition as
that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the
Senate is a continuing body even with
respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the
same status. TCIEcH
This dichotomy of the continuity of
the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of
the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF,
THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session
in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their
term of office, the President
may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by
means of a motion which should be
presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in
the session shall be required for its
approval. (emphasis supplied) DSHTaC
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect
on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis
supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules
quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the
Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." (Section 24, Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation) The latter does not explicitly
provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In
view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress. The Senate of the next Congress
may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the
rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate
to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries
in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same
 shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate
for its present rules on legislative inquiries to
be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it
should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and
void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered
null and void, considering that the rationale
for the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation,
orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective. 5(emphasis supplied)
The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling
the September 4 Neri Resolution in holding, viz.:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of
the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." EDISTc
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275
admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half
of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its rules in
the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so
in only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure".
Very recently, the Senate caused
the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of
Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of the fact, the recent
publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the
instant petitions. In so far as the
consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still
could not be undertaken by the respondent
Senate Committees, because no published
rules govern it, in clear contravention of
the Constitution. 6 (emphasis
supplied) cHTCaI
While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support
its conclusion that the subject investigation cannot be
conducted without published rules, I submit that it fails to
adhere to the Neri Ruling, as the latter emphasizes that "not
all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is
to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective".
It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision,
the Court struck down not the entire proceedings of the
Senate investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal for want of
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but only
the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L.
Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his
arrest and detention (January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in
the dispositive portion of the Decision. 7 A faithful adherence
of the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion
that the "Garci tapes" investigation may be conducted even
without the published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
and that only those orders and proceedings that result in the
violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered null
and void. The ponencia did not, however, show which orders
or proceedings resulted in this violation and, instead, made a
blanket prohibition of the conduct of the "Garci tapes"
investigation for want of published Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the March
25 Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri Resolution, it is
my considered view that the subject "Garci tapes"
investigation is not constitutionally infirm for being conducted
without the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to said investigation. In
addition to the points raised in my two Dissents, I respectfully
submit that the following inconsistencies and erroneous
assumptions in the March 25 Neri Decision and September 4
Neri Resolution merit a review of the Neri Ruling and a
consequent conclusion that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, sans amendment since its publication in two
newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995, need
not be published by the Senate of every Congress. HAICcD
1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries but invalidity of the entire Rules
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court recognized
the validity and effectivity of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, even without publication in the 14th Congress, by
citing Section 18 of said rules and holding that the January 30
Contempt Order against therein petitioner Romulo Neri was
invalid for failing to comply with the majority voting
requirement under Section 18. In the same breath, however,
the Court held that the subject investigation on the NBN-ZTE
deal was procedurally infirm for being conducted without valid
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, as these were not
published in the 14th Congress. The inconsistency is apparent
in the Court's explanation of the third and the fourth of the
five reasons for holding that the therein respondent Senate
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
January 30 Contempt Order, viz.:
Third, a reading of the transcript of
respondent Committees' January 30, 2008
proceeding reveals that only a minority of
the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was present during the
deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of
majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of
the Committee or refuses to be sworn
or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of
its members." cTIESD
Clearly, the needed vote is a
majority of all the members of the
Committee. Apparently, members who did
not actually participate in the deliberation
were made to sign the contempt Order.
Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt Order dated January
30, 2008. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, we find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
published rules of procedure". We quote the
OSG's explanation: DISHEA
The phrase 'duly published rules of
procedure' requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after
it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of
the Senate's membership, the
composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure,the
subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally
infirm. 8 (emphasis supplied)
(footnote omitted)
In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court
reiterated its recognition of the validity and effectivity of
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, viz.:
In the present case, the Court's
exercise of its power of judicial review is
warranted because there appears to be a
clear abuse of the power of contempt on the
part of respondent Committees. Section 18
of the Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of
majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of
the Committee or refuses to be sworn
or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of
its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said
that there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt order because
during the deliberation of the three (3)
respondent Committees, only seven (7)
Senators were present. This number could
hardly fulfill the majority requirement
needed by respondent Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations which has a membership of
seventeen (17) Senators and
respondent Committee on National Defense
and Security which has a membership of
eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to
respondent Committee on Trade and
Commerce which has a membership of nine
(9) Senators, only three (3) members were
present. These facts prompted us to quote in
the Decision the exchanges between
Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the
issue of lack of the required majority to
deliberate and vote on the contempt
order. 9 (emphasis supplied) (footnote
omitted) HCSEcI
But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries and held that orders issued and
proceedings conducted pursuant to said rules, which result in
the violation of rights of witnesses were null and void, viz.:
The language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate
to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries
in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same
shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put the public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate
for its present rules on legislative inquiries to
be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it
should likewise be stressed that not all
 orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and
void. Only those that result in violation of the
rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for
the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation,
orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective. 10 AHSaTI
In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and
the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate
the entire Senate investigation proceedings conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
which were not published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the
Court ruled on the issue of executive privilege raised in said
proceedings. It struck down only the January 30 Contempt
Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to comply with
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, while
at the same time holding these rules as constitutionally infirm
for want of publication.
Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.
2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an institution and
the discontinuing nature of its business vis-a-vis the
continuing nature of the Rules of the Senate
In attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency
in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court, in its September 4
Neri Resolution, saw fit to "issue a clarification . . . (o)n the
nature of the Senate as a 'continuing body'" and dichotomized
this nature into the "continuity of the Senate as an institution"
and the "opposite nature of the conduct of its business". This
approach, however, spawned its own inconsistencies. DHcESI
In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries could not be given
continuing effect from one Congress to the next
unlessexpressly so provided in said rules, the Court
interpreted Section 136 on the "unfinished business" in
conjunction with Section 137 on the "date of taking effect" of
the Rules of the Senate, viz.:
This dichotomy of the continuity of
the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of
the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 136. Unfinished business at the
end of the session shall be taken up at
the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings
shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if
presented for the first time.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect
on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis
supplied) ACIDSc
Section 136 of the Senate Rules
quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the
Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules. The Rules simply
state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the
difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate
of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries
which come within the rule on unfinished
business. 11 (emphasis supplied) (footnote
omitted)
There is no quarrel — and my Dissent to
the September 4 Neri Resolution in fact acknowledges — that
the Rules of the Senate (Senate Rules) provide in Section 136
that all unfinished business or pending matters and
proceedings of the Senate terminate with the expiration of a
Congress. This provision, in conjunction with Section 137, does
not, however, lend support to the Court's ruling that absent a
provision in the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
explicitly stating the "continued effectivity of such rules until
they are amended or repealed", it "cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress" for the following reasons: AIDSTE
First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court
interpreted "pending matters" in Section 136 of the Senate
Rules to include the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
that "may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented
for the first time". This posture, however, comes also with the
interpretation that the Senate may choose not to take up the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, thereby leaving it
without rules to conduct legislative inquiries as the effectivity
of the rules had terminated with the previous Congress. This is
an absurd interpretation considering that the Senate is fully
aware that Article VI, Section 21 requires legislative
investigations to be conducted in accordance with duly
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
The September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that the
Senate Rules have continuing effect from one Congress to the
next, because it provides in Section 137 that the Senate Rules
"shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed". The
Senate Rules unmistakably state that their effectivity can be
interrupted only by amendment or repeal as provided in
Section 137 and not by termination of one Congress as
provided in Section 136. The Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries have the same character as the Senate Rules.
Both are not "pending matters and proceedings" that
terminate with the expiration of the Congress. Pending
matters and proceedings include investigations that have not
been terminated or bills that have not completed the
legislative process in the Senate of one Congress. ADCEcI
The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from
one Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in
its September 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the
Senate as a continuing body governed by its continuing
Senate Rules. If the Senate were not a continuing body, there
would be no reason for the Senate Rules to likewise have a
continuing effect. In contradistinction, the effectivity of the
Rules of Proceedings of the House of Representatives (House
Rules) — which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the
terms of all congressmen end at the same time — terminates
upon the expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 of
the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on November 20,
2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representatives of
adopting rules of proceedings on its first meeting and
organization upon the opening of a succeeding Congress, viz.:
RULE I Congress. 16 SIDTCa
Convening and Organizing the House
xxx xxx xxx
After the oath-taking of the newly-
elected Speaker, the body shall proceed to
the adoption of the rules of the
immediately preceding Congress to govern
its proceedings until the approval and
adoption of the rules of the current
Congress. (emphasis supplied)
On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the
14th Congress, pending the adoption of its own House Rules,
adopted the House Rules of the 13th Congress as its
provisional rules. 12 The House of Representatives of each
Congress adopts its own rules. 13 HTcDEa
Second, the above-quoted Sections 136 and 137 of
the Senate Rules, adopted under the regime of the 1987
Constitution, do not depart from the provisions of the Senate
Rules adopted under the 1935 Constitution, viz.:
Chapter XLVI
Unfinished Business in the Senate
Sec. 108. Unfinished business at the
end of one session shall not be affected by
the closing of same, but shall be taken up
again at the next session in the same status
in which it was.
Notwithstanding the provision of
the preceding paragraph, matters pending at
the expiration of one Congress shall no
longer be acted on.
Chapter LIII
Sec. 122. These Rules shall take
effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or
repealed. 14
Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I
have consistently maintained in my Dissents), it was well-
settled that the Senate was a continuing body as held
in Arnault v. Nazareno, citing the U.S. case McGrain v.
Daugherty. 15 The 1935 Constitution provided that two-thirds,
or a majority of the Senate, continued into the next
Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a
continuing body under the 1987 Constitution — as less than a
majority continue into the Senate of the succeeding
Congress 17 — the termination of the unfinished business of
the Senate at the expiration of a Congress and the effectivity
of the Senate Rules until amended or repealed as provided in
Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules under the 1987
Constitution, do not lend support to a departure from
the Arnault ruling that the Senate is a continuing body. Under
both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions, the Senate Rules
show that a continuing Senate's unfinished business
terminates at the expiration of one Congress, and its rules
remain in effect from one Congress to the next.
As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri
Resolution, the Philippine Senate is patterned after the U.S.
Senate, which is a continuing body as ruled by the U.S.
Supreme Court in McGrain. The continuing nature of the U.S.
Senate is also reflected in the Standing Rules of the Senate
under Rule V (2), viz.:
Rule V
SUSPENSION AND AMENDMENT OF THE
RULES
xxx xxx xxx
2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from
one Congress to the next
Congress unless they are changed as
provided in these rules. 18 (emphasis
supplied)
In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the
1935 and the 1987 Constitutions and the Standing Rules of the
U.S. Senate, after which the Philippine Senate was
patterned, reflect the nature of the Senate as a continuing
body. That the Senate is a continuing body proceeds from its
nature as created by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and
adopted by the 1935 and the 1987 Philippine Constitutions.
The Senate Rules are not the bases for the continuing nature
of the Senate, but they embody and reflect this nature.
Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuing
body as reflected in the continuing effect of the Senate Rules
from one Congress to the next is not consistent with the
holding of the ponencia that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries must explicitly provide for this continuing effectivity
if such were the intent of the Senate, viz.:
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the
difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
theRules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. 19 (emphasis
supplied) DHcTaE
I reiterate my position in my Dissent to
the September 4 Neri Resolution that the publication of the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries on August 24, 1995 has
satisfied the requirement under Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that inquiries in aid of legislation be
conducted in accordance with the Senate's "duly published
rules of procedure." Interpreting Article 2 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which states that "(l)aws shall take effect after
fifteen days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .," the Court
ruled in the landmark Tañada v. Tuvera, 20 viz.:
 ". . . all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. . . Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation." 21
Publication must be made in the Official Gazette 22 or a
newspaper of general circulation. 23
As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to
satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a
rule that would govern it and affect its rights. It is not
uncommon for laws and rules to provide that they shall take
effect upon a certain date following publication in a
newspaper of general circulation without having to state that
they "shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed" for them to have continuing effect. These laws and
rules are published only once, and yet they continue to be in
force. The Court itself employs this language in its rules as
shown in the recently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo,respectively, viz.:
Section 25. Effectivity. — This Rule
shall take effect on February 2, 2008
following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
Section 27. Effectivity. — This Rule
shall take effect on October 24, 2007
following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation. HScaCT
The exception to the general rule that one-time
publication suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect
is when there are circumstances or factors that interrupt this
continuity. An example is the discontinuation of the existence
of the House of Representatives as a legislative body, which
terminates the effectivity of its published Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries and requires the publication of these rules
in the succeeding Congress for them to take effect. As
discussed above and in my Dissents to theMarch 25 Neri
Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate, unlike
the House of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus,
contrary to the holding of theponencia, the Senate's Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, need not be
published by the Senate of every Congress and need not also
state that they shall "remain in force until they are amended
or repealed" for them to be effective from one Congress to the
next. Quite the opposite of the ponencia's ruling, in the
absence of language stating that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries shall not continue in effect from one
Congress to the next, these rules shall have continuing effect.
In sum, the above discussion shows that the March
25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution themselves
provide bases for concluding that the Senate is a continuing
body and that one-time publication of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, suffices to satisfy the
publication requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution. I respectfully submit that the Court ought
to so conclude in order to uphold internal consistency in its
ruling with respect to the constitutional requirement of
publication of the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries. In line with my position in my Dissents to the Neri
Ruling, I submit that the publication of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to the conduct
of the subject "Garci tapes" investigation is not a requirement
for conducting such investigation. AIDTHC
Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional
requirement of publication of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, let us now proceed to the third issue.
The "Garci tapes" in relation to Article III,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 4200
Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of "whether
the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called 'Garci tapes'
violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/orRepublic
Act No. 4200" by stating what the disposition of the case at bar
is not about and proceed forthwith to what the disposition of
this case is about. To avoid clutter, let us excise the fat to get
to the lean meat of the controversy before the Court.
While the 1987 Constitution affords paramount
importance to the policy of transparency, public
accountability, and informed participation of the citizenry in a
democracy, the case at bar is not about balancing between the
right to privacy of communication under Article III, Section
3 24 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
information under Article III, Section 7 25 of the charter. The
petitioners in this case are not suing as citizens demanding
information from the government. aHTCIc
While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes
the indispensable role of legislative investigations in crafting
sound law and also gives prime recognition to the right to
privacy of communication, the case at bar is not about
balancing an asserted right to privacy of communication
against the Senate's exercise of its power of legislative
investigation. This case does not involve a situation in which a
witness in a legislative inquiry invokes the right to privacy of
communication, but the Senate compels him, under pain of
contempt, to disclose the communication on account of an
overriding public interest.
The bone of contention in the case at bar is whether
the Senate can use, in its legislative investigation, in
admissible evidence of a surreptitiously and illegally recorded
private communication.
The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law enacted in 1965. Introduced by
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, the explanatory note of the bill
provides the background and rationale for the law, viz.:
The privacy of communication and
correspondence is among the fundamental
rights of an individual secured and
guaranteed by our Constitution. Thus,
section 1(5) of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution provides that, "The privacy
of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court or when public safety and order
require otherwise." aEHAIS
xxx xxx xxx
At present, the laws penalizing the
violation of the privacy of communication
are inadequate to cope with modern
developments. As we are all aware of,
technology today has so far advanced, and
will inexorably continue to advance, that
there is now an ever-growing array of
devices or arrangements for eavesdropping .
. . There could, indeed, be no doubt that
 these modern devices or arrangements, if
availed of by any or officers of the
government, to spy on another, could be the
most obnoxious instruments of oppression
or arbitrary power. Sooner or later we will
have to deal with the danger that these
increasingly sensitive electronic ears, which
are as fantastic as they are alarming, may
annihilate completely the privacy of
communication. An additional and potent
deterrent is obviously called for if we are to
guard against what might well be subversive
of one of our cherished personal freedoms
which makes life worth living.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering our democratic set-up
which is founded, among others on our high
regard for the individual's rights and
freedoms, the proposed measure will be but
in accord with the principles of law and
government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution which are designed to
protect the feelings and sensibilities of
every individual as a human being against
the incursions of unwelcome intruders.
Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping
or unwelcome intrusions into private communications.
Section 1 of the law provides that these acts are
unlawful: SECIcT
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any
person, be he a participant or not in the act
or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully
or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit,
or cause to be done any of the acts declared
to be unlawful in the preceding section or
who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder,
or aids, permits, or causes such
violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than
six months or more than six years and with
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of
the commission of the offense, and, if the
offender is an alien he shall be subject to
deportation proceedings. (emphases
supplied)
A private communication is characterized as such
based not on the content of the communication, but on
the context that it was said in private and not for public
consumption. That the content or nature of the
communication is immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, 26 viz.:
. . . the nature of the conversations
is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication
by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law,) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be
professed." (emphasis supplied)(footnote
omitted) HIAESC
The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince the meaning
of private, as opposed to public, communication, viz.:
Senator DIOKNO.
Do I Understand, Mr. Senator, that under
Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if
a party secretly records a public
speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done
secretly.
Senator TAÑADA.
Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is
the communication between one
person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
Senator DIOKNO.
The wording of the law is "communication or
spoken word."
Senator TAÑADA.
Yes.
Senator DIOKNO.
The term "spoken word" would automatically
include speeches, including, Mr.
Senator, what we are doing here this
morning. HcACTE
 Senator TAÑADA.
As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this
bill is to prevent the tape recording or
interception of a communication
between one person and an another
— not between a speaker and a
public. Because precisely, the speaker
speaks so that the public may know
what he has in mind, what he wants
to communicate to the people, and
there should be no objection to tape
recording that speech. . .
. 27 (emphases supplied)
R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions
when wiretapping is allowed by written order of the court
under Section 3, viz.:
Section 3. Nothing contained in this
Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who
is authorized by a written order of the
Court, to execute any of the acts declared to
be unlawful in the two preceding sections in
cases involving the crimes of treason,
espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in
case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined
by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing
espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such
written order shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce
and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes
enumerated hereinabove has been
committed or is being committed or is about
to be committed: Provided, however, That in
cases involving the offenses of rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition,
such authority shall be granted only upon
prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually
been or are being committed; (2) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such
evidence. (emphasis supplied) CIaHDc
To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A.
No. 4200 makes illegally wiretapped communications
inadmissible in any proceeding, viz.:
Section 4. Any communication or
spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation. (emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the
wiretapping of the communication recorded in the "Garci
tapes" may be held legal only if it was recorded with consent
of the parties to the conversation or upon written court order.
As the wiretapping was done in the course of duty by the
witness, Technical Sergeant Vidal Doble, he may be presumed
to have been acting regularly in the performance of his official
duties. 28 Doble testified that he presumed that the order of
his superior to him to conduct a wiretap was legal, viz.:
Sen. Cayetano (P). . . Ngayon itong
— noong sinabi sa iyo ito, anong
pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang
normal lang sa iyo na, "Okay, bagong
assignment", may naisip ka bang baka
violation ito ng isang batas? May naisip ka
bang ganon?
Mr. Ooble. Ang nasa isip po kasi
naming noon since na galing sa military
hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a
legal order, Your Honor. 29
The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to
proceed to establish the circumstances surrounding the
wiretapping and determine whether or not the wiretap was
legally done with the consent of the parties or lawful court
order. AHDcCT
Should it be established, however, that the
conversations in the "Garci tapes" were illegally wiretapped,
the question that comes to the fore is whether the
"communication or spoken word (in the tapes), their
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained" may be used in the subject Senate investigations.
In Ramirez, in which the Court found that petitioner
Ramirez violated R.A. No. 4200 for secretly recording her
private conversation with therein respondent Garcia, the Court
published in its decision the transcript of the illegally
wiretapped conversation as part of the narration of the facts
of the case. A mechanical and literal reading of Sections 1 and
4 of R.A. No. 4200 would yield the absurd conclusion that the
Court violated these provisions for "communicat(ing) the
contents thereof (the illegally wiretapped conversation), either
verbally or in writing" and using the inadmissible transcription
in its judicial proceedings. It is clear to the eye that this was
not the intent of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 4200.
"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language
of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would be either impossible (Pacific
Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685,
[1971]) or absurd or would lead to an injustice. (12 Casela v.
Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). 30 (emphasis supplied)
There is thus a need to interpret Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No.
4200. CITcSH
Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No.
4200 provides an exception to the prohibition on the "use of
such record (of wiretapped conversation) or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial
of offenses mentioned in section 3. . ." The offenses under
Section 3 which allows wiretapping upon written order of the
court are as follows: "treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal
Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing
espionage and other offenses against national security."
The exception under Section 1 in t relation to Section
3 of R.A. No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally
wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecuting
violations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez.
Not reading this exception into the law would impede the
prosecution of the acts it prohibits and contradict the very
purpose for adopting the law as clearly stated in its title, "An
Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for Other
Purposes." Well-settled is the rule in statutory construction
that "where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. 31 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est,
ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be
given a sensible construction, so as to give effect to its
rationale and intent and thus avoid an unjust or absurd
interpretation. The ineluctable conclusion is that the use of
illegally wiretapped communication must be allowed in a
prosecution under R.A. 4200 precisely to deter the commission
of illegal wiretapping.
Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence
should be an exception to inadmissible evidence under Section
4 of the law. Judges and prosecutors who possess and use
illegally wiretapped communications in prosecutions for
violations of R.A. No. 4200 are thus not liable for violating this
law in the same manner that, by way of exception, they are
not liable for illegal possession of firearms where the firearm is
presented in evidence in a case involving the prosecution of a
violation of R.A. No. 8294. 32 This is true despite the absence
of such an exception to illegal possession, in contradistinction
to the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which
explicitly provides the following exception to infringement of
copyright under Section 184 (l)(k): "Any use made of a work for
the purpose of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of
professional advice by a legal practitioner." TCacIE
For similar reasons, another exception that ought to
be read into Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No 4200 is the use and
admissibility of illegally wiretapped communication
inlegislative investigations whose particular purpose is
precisely to craft or improve laws that will address the evil of
illegal wiretapping. Without this exception, the absurd result
would be that legislators cannot at all investigate illegal
wiretaps as they happen on the ground and plug loopholes in
the law, because Section 4 of R.A. No. 4200provides that even
the fact of existence of an illegally wiretapped communication
is inadmissible in evidence. To be sure, this could not have
been the intent of the law.
Lest the herein recognized exceptions be
misconstrued and open the floodgates to violations of R.A. No.
4200, it must be emphasized that as a general rule, illegally
wiretapped material is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, including legislative investigations, in accordance
with R.A. No. 4200. 33 As a very narrow exception, however,
the wiretapped material may be used and is admitted in a
judicial proceeding for prosecution of violations of R.A. No.
4200 and, akin to this, in a legislative investigation in aid of
legislation whose purpose is precisely to address the problem
of illegal wiretap. IASEca
In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate
investigation as shown by the transcripts of its hearings 34 has
been the illegal wiretapping of several personalities including
the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Philippines, the
possible involvement of telecommunication providers in the
illegal wiretap, the use of scarce intelligence resources for
wiretapping in connection with the conduct of the 2004
Presidential elections, and electoral fraud. The purpose of the
investigation may also be gleaned from two bills previously
filed in relation thereto by the Chairperson of the National
Defense and Security Committee, seeking to (1) control and
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment;
and (2) prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
performing electoral duties. 35
Prescinding from the very narrow contours of the
exception in using illegally wiretapped communications, the
Senate may proceed with the use of the "Garci tapes" in a
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation whose purpose is to craft
or improve legislation on wiretapping. On the other hand, the
"Garci tapes" are not admissible in evidence in legislative
investigations for a different purpose such as the punishment
of electoral fraud. While electoral fraud is a serious anomaly
that erodes the foundation of democracy and should not go
unpunished, evidence obtained not through illegal wiretap
should be presented in proceedings investigating this matter.
Resort to illegal wiretapping to catch perpetrators of electoral
fraud will only further erode our democracy. As Senator
Tañada exhorted in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 9,
which became the Anti-Wiretapping Law: CAHTIS
Considering our democratic set-up
which is founded, among others on our high
regard for the individual's rights and
freedoms, the proposed measure will be but
in accord with the principles of law and
government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution which are designed to
protect the feelings and sensibilities of
every individual as a human being against
the incursions of unwelcome intruders.
In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation
for the purpose of crafting or improving laws on wiretapping,
the legislature ought to abide by the constitutional command
under Article VI, Section 21 that in conducting such inquiries,
"(t)he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." The legislature should thus use
mechanisms and procedures available to it, such as executive
sessions, in avoiding any further and unnecessary incursion
into the right to privacy of communication. THaAEC
With respect to the question of whether the use of
the "Garci tapes" violates Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of
Rights, the above disquisition on R.A. No. 4200 sufficiently
addresses this issue. Under this constitutional provision, the
privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except (1) upon lawful order of the court, or (2)
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law. There is ostensibly no lawful order of the court under
the first exception, and any argument anchored on the second
exception will lead to R.A. No. 4200, being the only Philippine
law on wiretapping.
Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that
the petition is moot and academic. 36 The petition prays that
the Court issue a Resolution:
 a) Ordering the immediate issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and
preventing the House of Representatives
Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms from making use of the sound
recording of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in their Report for
the inquiries conducted relative thereto, or
from otherwise making use of said
recordings for any other purpose. TAcSaC
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of
Prohibition by commanding the Respondent
Committees to strike off the record of the
proceedings any and all references to the
illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and
to desist from further using the sound
recordings of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in any of its
proceedings. 37
The first prayer is moot and academic, as the "Garci tapes"
were already played in the session floor of the House of
Representatives on July 5, 2005. 38 The second prayer is also
moot and academic, as the subject records of proceedings and
reports belong to the House of Representatives of the
Thirteenth Congress, which has already been terminated. The
House of Representatives not being a continuous body, the
current House of Representatives of the Fourteenth Congress
is different from the House of Representatives of the
Thirteenth Congress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano ought to first
seekk recourse to the current House of Representatives with
respect to his second prayer.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and
G.R. No. 179275.
REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the
petition in G.R. No. 170338 but dissent insofar as it grants the
petition in G.R. No. 179275.
I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should be
dismissed for being moot.
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano,
via a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, implores the Court to issue a Resolution as
follows: TaHDAS
a) Ordering the immediate issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and
preventing the House of Representatives
Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms from making use of the sound
recording of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in their Report for
the inquiries relative thereto, or from
otherwise making use of said recordings for
any other purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of
Prohibition by commanding the Respondent
Committees to strike off the record of the
proceedings any and all references to the
illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and
to desist from further using the sound
recordings of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in any of its
proceedings. 1
The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner
Garcillano because it has been mooted. It is of public
knowledge, a fit subject of judicial notice, 2 that the "Hello
Garci" tapes were already played in the House of
Representatives and heard by its members. 3 Then, separate
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" tapes were submitted
to then House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. 4
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the
presence of an actual controversy. Courts are prohibited from
deciding hypothetical, conjectural or anticipatory questions
despite their vast judicial power. Otherwise, a decision
rendered would amount to nothing but an advisory opinion,
which would not augur well with the function of courts as
arbiters of controversies. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association
v. Sec. Ramos, 5 the Court held: TSIDaH
An actual case or controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The power does not extend to
hypothetical questions since any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. 6
While it is true that the Court is not absolutely
precluded from resolving issues that are otherwise moot, 7 no
compelling circumstance is present here that would warrant
the exercise of judicial review.
Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to
prevent the execution of an act which is about to be done. It is
not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. 8 The office of prohibition is to arrest
proceedings rather than to undo them. 9 A preventive remedy,
as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli. 10
II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 should likewise be
dismissed because the Senate need not republish its Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners
have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure
of the Senate and the Senate Committees
 governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation have been published, in
accordance with Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be
published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will
comply with the constitutional
requirement?
3. Whether the inquiry, which is
centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"
violates Section 3, Article III of
the Constitution and/or Republic Act No.
4200. 11
Anent the first issue, I agree with the ponencia and
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato Puno that
petitioners Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili,
plus intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, possess the
requisite locus standi to bring the suit.
Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules
which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure
are tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the attainment
of justice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if they result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be eschewed. Substantial rights must
not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the
rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with
public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in
order. 12 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 13 CSEHIa
There is no question that the issues raised by
petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge are of
paramount importance. Thus, any procedural barrier to their
suit should be put aside.
Now to the second issue — the meat of the second
petition.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation on
the "Hello Garci" tapes is infirm because the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had not
been duly published at the time of the legislative inquiry in
question.
I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my
separate opinion on the motion for reconsideration in Senate
v. Ermita, 14 thus:
True it is that, as
the Constitution mandates, the Senate may
only conduct an investigation in aid of
legislation pursuant to its
duly published rules of procedure. Without
publication, the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is
ineffective. Thus, unless and until said
publication is done, the Senate cannot
enforce its own rules of procedure, including
its power to cite a witness in contempt under
Section 18.
But the Court can take judicial
notice that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was
published on August 20 and 21, 1992 in
thePhilippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine
Star during the 9th Congress.
The Senate again published its said
rules on December 1, 2006 in the Philippine
Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the
13th Congress. That the Senate published its
rules of procedure twice more than complied
with the Constitutional requirement. aCHDST
I submit that the Senate remains a
continuing body under the 1987
Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing
body is premised on the staggered terms of
its members, the idea being to ensure
stability of governmental policies. This is
evident from the deliberations of the
framers of the Constitution, thus:
"MR. RODRIGO. . . .
I would like to state that in the United States
Federal Congress, the term of the
members of the Lower House is only
two years. We have been used to a
term of four years here but I think
three years is long enough. But they
will be allowed to run for reelection
any number of times. In this way, we
remedy the too frequent elections
every two years. We will have
elections every three years under the
scheme and we will have a continuing
Senate. Every election, 12 of 24
Senators will be elected, so that 12
Senators will remain in the Senate. In
other words, we will have a
continuing Senate. 15
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE.
This is just a paragraph of that section that will
follow what has earlier been
approved. It reads: "OF THE
SENATORS ELECTED IN THE ELECTION
IN 1992, THE FIRST TWELVE
OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF
VOTES SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS
AND THE REMAINING TWELVE FOR
THREE YEARS."
This is to start the staggering of the Senate to
conform to the idea of a continuing
Senate.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
What does the Committee say?
MR. SUAREZ.
The Committee accepts the Davide proposal,
Mr. Presiding Officer. 16
The Senate does not cease to be a
continuing body merely because only half of
its members continue to the next Congress.
To my mind, even a lesser number of
Senators continuing into the next Congress
will still make the Senate a continuing body.
The Senate must be viewed as a collective
body. It is an institution quite apart from the
Senators composing it. The Senate as an
institution cannot be equated to its present
occupants. It is indivisible. It is not the sum
total of all sitting Senators at any given time.
Senators come and go but the very
institution of the Senate remains. It is this
indivisible institution which should be
viewed as continuing. HDTISa
The argument that the Senate is not
a continuing body because it
lacks quorum to do business after every
midterm or presidential elections is flawed.
It does not take into account that the term of
office of a Senator is fixed by
the Constitution. There is no vacancy in the
office of outgoing Senators during midterm
or presidential elections. Article VI, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The term of office of the Senators
shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
The term of a Senator starts at noon
of June 30 next following their election and
shall end before noon of June 30 six years
after. The constitutional provision aims to
prevent a vacuum in the office of an
outgoing Senator during elections, which is
fixed under the Constitution unless changed
by law on the second Monday of
May, 17 until June 30 when the Senators-
elect assume their office. There is no vacuum
created because at the time an outgoing
Senator's term ends, the term of a Senator-
elect begins.
The same principle holds true for
the office of the President. A president-elect
does not assume office until noon of June 30
next following a presidential election. An
outgoing President does not cease to
perform the duties and responsibilities of a
President merely because the people had
chosen his/her new successor. Until her term
expires, an outgoing President has the
constitutional duty to discharge the powers
and functions of a President unless
restricted 18 by the Constitution.
In fine, the Senate is a continuing
body as it continues to have a full or at least
majority membership 19 even during
elections until the assumption of office of
the Senators-elect. The Senate as an
institution does not cease to have a quorum
to do business even during elections. It is to
be noted that the Senate is not in session
during an election until the opening of a new
Congress for practical reasons. This does not
mean, however, that outgoing Senators
cease to perform their duties as Senators of
the Republic during such elections. When the
President proclaims martial law or suspends
the writ of habeas corpus, for example, the
Congress including the outgoing Senators are
required to convene if not in session within
24 hours in accordance with its rules without
need of call. 20 aSTAcH
The Constitutional provision
requiring publication of Senate rules is
contained in Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its
respective Committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The above provision only requires
a "duly published" rule of procedure for
inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on
republication. There is nothing in the
constitutional provision that commands that
every new Congress must publish its rules of
procedure. Implicitly, republication is
necessary only when there is an amendment
or revision to the rules. This is required
under the due process clause of
the Constitution.
The Senate in the 13th Congress
caused the publication of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation. The present Senate (14th
Congress) adopted the same rules of
procedure in the NBN-ZTE investigation. It
does not need to republish said rules of
procedure because it is not shown that a
substantial amendment or revision was
made since its last publication that would
affect the rights of persons appearing before
it.
On a more practical note, there is
little to be gained in requiring a new
Congress to cause the republication of the
rules of procedure which has not been
amended or revised. The exercise is simply a
waste of government funds. Worse, it unduly
burdens and hinders the Senate from
discharging its constitutional duties.
Publication takes time and during the
interregnum, it cannot be gainsaid that the
Senate is barred or restricted from
conducting an investigation in aid of
legislation.
I agree with the Chief Justice that
this Court must be wary of the far-reaching
consequences of a case law invalidating the
Senate rules of procedure for lack of
republication. Our ruling in this petition will
not only affect the NBN-ZTE investigation,
but all other Senate investigations conducted
under the 10th, 11th, 12th, and the present
14th Congress, for which no republication of
the rules has been done. These
investigations have been the basis of several
 bills and laws passed in the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Putting a doubt
on the authority, effectivity and validity of
these proceedings is imprudent and unwise.
This Court should really be cautious in
making a jurisprudential ruling that will
unduly strangle the internal workings of a co-
equal branch and needlessly burden the
discharge of its constitutional
duty. 21 SHADEC
In addition, let me point out the Philippine
Constitution, past and present, were largely influenced by the
United States Constitution. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 22 the
United States Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the American
Senate is a continuing body. In Arnault v. Nazareno, 23 the
Philippine Supreme Court, relying on McGrain, held that the
Philippine Senate is a continuing body. There is no plausible
reason why the rule should be different today.
In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to delve
on the third issue which the ponencia does not also address.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R.
No. 170338 and G.R. No. 179275.
||| (Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, G.R. Nos. 170338 & 179275, [December 23, 2008], 595
PHIL 775-844)
SECOND DIVISION
[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to
the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO
COURT AND PUBLIC. — By its declared objective, Republic Act
No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation
for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of the legal profession adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the
times become more difficult.
2. ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — In the judicial
system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law
in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of titles."
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER
OR SUPPLEMENT RULES. — The Constitution has not conferred
on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing
the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to
reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF
SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED. — Being coordinate
and independent branches the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to
the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility
which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on
each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public
interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture,
training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has
the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of
the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is
desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of
a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION. —
Republic Act No. 972 is a class legislation. There is no actual
nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful bar candidates by
years nor to exclude those of other years.
6. ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS
PROVISIONS. - Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
7. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972, PART OF SECTION 1
DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE. — There being no unanimity in the
eight Justices who constitute the majority of the court in this
case, that part of article 1 Republic Act No. 972 which refers to
the examinations of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.
DECISION
DIOKNO, J p:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a
candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying
degree of strictness with which the examination papers were
graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law
as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70
per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the
views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted
written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on
the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on
June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered
on hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of seventy per cent in any bar
 examinations after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a
grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more
of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the
Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, motions, which ar still pending because they could be
should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, - although as has
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more reconsider their grades.
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
data are set forth: administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question
classified as follows: of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
1946 (August) 206 121 18 We have been enlightened in the study of this
1946 (November) 477 228 43 question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar
who have amply argued, orally and in writing, on the various
1947 749 340 0 aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
1948 899 409 11 studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco,
Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the
1949 1,218 532 164
validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the
1950 1,316 893 26 Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M.
Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del
1951 2,068 879 1964
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
1952 2,738 1,033 426 Ozaeta against it, aside from memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
1953 2,555 986 284
Cornejo and and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners
Total 12,230 5,421 1,168.
Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic the matter. The question has been the object of intense
Act, or mere motions for reconsideration. deliberation for along time by the Tribunal, and finally, after
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to
in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
as provided for by Republic Act 972. proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by David stated:
this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have "The reason for relaxing the standard
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
to 1951 had individually presented motions for handicap which students during the years
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful immediately after the Japanese occupation has
 to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon
after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading
materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared
individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is
to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement
that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is
grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette has been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some
even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports
began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts
of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an
identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly
derived the judicial system established where with its lofty
ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we
have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous juridical history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the law, we
can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had
been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among
others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the President
which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the
proponent of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81),
where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision
of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the petition of
Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold
any other office of public trust. All votes for
either of them for any elective office except
that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They
shall not exercise any power of appointment to
public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty- one years, of good moral character,
and who possesses the requisite qualifications
of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this
State." (p. 93)
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public
officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was
the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the
restrictions which the judges had imposed
upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision respecting the admission of
attorneys, in its particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to
preserve any portion of their power over this
subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word
'admission' in the action referred to. It is urged
that the admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies
the power of refusing, and of course the right
of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded,
without affecting the validity of the act." (p.
93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession
of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the
legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants
for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:
 "The motive for passing the act in
question is apparent. Columbia College being
an institution of established reputation, and
having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of
the institution, but to a certain definite period
of study before being entitled to a diploma as
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no
doubt justly, considered this examination
together with the preliminary study required
by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary examination by
the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with
reference to the learning and ability of the
applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court.
It could have had no other object, and hence
no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the
Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to
the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it
was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else.
To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is
to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to
determine the present condition of the law on
the subject." (p. 89)
xxx xxx xxx
"The Legislature has not taken from
the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what
shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question." (p. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of
the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law;
in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at the time and that
of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,
its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by
the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than
six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules
and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the
case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From
the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of
legislative power without parallel in the history
of the English speaking people so far as we
have been able to ascertain. There has been
much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorneys at law, but in
England and in every state of the Union the act
of admitting an attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act
of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this
respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon
this court than that of preserving in form and
substance the exact form of government set up
by the people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative
power is vested in a Senate and Assembly.
(Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting
within its constitutional authority when it sets
up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
"But when the Legislature has
prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court
to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial
and legislative departments are distinct,
 independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty, but each is supreme in
that branch of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither department
should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting
upon the form of government under which we
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney
General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis.,
567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of
government is responsible for the plane upon
which the administration of justice is
maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is
exclusive. By committing a portion of the
powers of sovereignty to the judicial
department of our state government, under a
scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference
by any other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility for the
manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are
exercised. (p. 445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts
is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar
is an attaché of the courts. The quality of
justice dispensed by the courts depends in no
small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and
bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.
445)
"Through all time courts have
exercised a direct and severe supervision over
their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the
Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as
follows: For more than six centuries prior to
the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercised the
right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of
all titles.' If the courts and the judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine
who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be
difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent
power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but
that it is a power belonging to the judicial
entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed
from England this judicial entity and made of
not only a sovereign institution, but made of it
a separate independent, and coordinate
branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally
exercised to determine who should constitute
its attorneys at law. There is no express
provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject
to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant
thought of the framers of our constitution was
to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one
another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department, and
such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provision.
While the Legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its
power in that respect does not rest upon any
power possessed by it to deal exclusively with
the subject of the qualifications of attorneys,
but is incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the public
interest. When it does legislate fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys
at law in order that public interests may be
protected, such qualifications constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its selection. Such
legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court
cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course for the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful
attempt to exercise the power of appointment.
It is quite likely true that the Legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is
in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys
to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all
of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch,
83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court
so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe,
19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7
Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48
Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021,
130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an attorney
to practice having been perpetually exercised
by the courts, it having been so generally held
that the act of a court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment for the court, and
an attempt as this on the part of the
 Legislature to confer such right upon any one
being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial function, no
matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside." (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of
that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the
administration of justice and to interpretation
of the laws that there be members of the bar
of sufficient ability, adequate learning and
sound moral character. This arises from the
need of enlightened assistance to the honest,
and restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.
L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R.
851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions.' One is admitted to the
bar 'for something more than private gain.' He
becomes 'an officer of the court, and, like the
court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His cooperation
with the court is due 'whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties.
That has been the history of attorneys under
the common law, both in this country and in
England. Admission to practice as an attorney
at law is almost without exception conceded to
be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records.
The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work,
and to protect itself in this respect from the
unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and
those not possessing good moral character.
Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with
finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15
L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counsellor, and for what
cause he ought to be removed.'" (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in
part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the
test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office as
follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and
fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this
evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such
officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong, for three
years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such
and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct.
They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment of
the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss.
127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430.
Their admission or their exclusion is not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the
exercise of judicial power, and has been so
held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of
the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and
Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court,
and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of
their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
"Admission to practice of law is almost
without exception conceded everywhere to be
the exercise of a judicial function, and this
opinion need not be burdened with citations in
this point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of the
inherent powers of the court." — Re Bruen,
102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is
the exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court." — A. C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac.
1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.
 On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
"The distinction between the
functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall regulate
and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise
of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital
one and not subject to alteration or change
either by legislative action or by judicial
decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its
province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government." — 16 C. J. S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus
indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law
according to its own views, it is very plain it
cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new
trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken in
the progress of a judicial inquiry." — Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the
bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting
the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by
this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law,
is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
"Section 13.The Supreme Court shall
have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines." — Constitution of the Philippines,
Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary
power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would
have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility
over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate
group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does
not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to
the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a
Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guariña took the examination and failed by a few
points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This Tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of
section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this
case seeks admission to the bar, without taking
the prescribed examination, on the ground that
he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act No. 1597,
enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section
thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and
ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"1. Those who have been duly
licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this code; Provided, That any person who,
prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority
of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the
City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial
fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may
be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippines Islands without an examination,
upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said
court."
"The records of this court disclose that
on a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March
23, 1907, shows that he received an average of
only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined,
thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and
to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
the required qualifications of learning in the
law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him a license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now
'possesses the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the
provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted
to the bar without taking the prescribed
examination 'upon motion before the Supreme
Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that
he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is
urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination, the clause
may be licensed to practice law in the courts of
the Philippine Islands without any
examination.' It is contended that this
mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power
exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus
conferred upon this court by the commission
and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in
the above citation from Act No. 1597, a
mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But
any act of the commission which has the effect
of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to
that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who
were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
"In the various cases wherein
applications for admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that
such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.
"In the case under consideration,
however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he
last applied for admission to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof
of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not
think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of
his possession of the necessary qualifications
of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
 that this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that
when he took the examination he fell only four
points short of the necessary grade to entitle
him to a license to practice; and in view also of
the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that
the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought
to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal,
we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a
special examination which will be given him by
a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule." — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix
the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the Case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of
that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those
students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and
had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and
would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for
three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this
law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this court for
admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is
made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of
an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved
March 28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The
amendment, as far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of
the following: 'And every applicant for a license
who shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in force
at the time such applicant commend the study
of law, either in a law office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this
act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules'." — In re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.
. . . "After said provision there is a
double proviso, one branch of which is that up
to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the laws of
this state, whose regular course of law studies
is two years, and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such
years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the
proviso is that any student who has studied law
for two years in a law office, or part of such
time in a law office, 'and part in the aforesaid
law school,' and whose course of study began
prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required
by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed, confers
substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules
of legislative creation for their admission to the
bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as
an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons
to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, and not by granting special and
exclusive privileges to certain persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The
right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of
the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to
collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has
some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes
a reasonable basis for different legislation as to
the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary
one, having no just relation to the subject of
the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People,
147 III. 66, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.
S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has
practiced, and the skill acquired by experience,
may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N. E. 881); but
the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making
an enactment based upon it void
(Statevs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878).
Here the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession
of the law and plainly, any classification must
have some reference to learning, character, or
ability to engage in such practice. The proviso
is limited, first, to a class of persons who began
the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes - First,
those presenting diplomas issued by any law
school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the
period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time
for making application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the rules are
dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the
law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers
may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there
be anything with relation to the qualifications
or fitness of persons to practice law resting
upon the mere date of November 4, 1897,
which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study,
while those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit. The
one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed
of a diploma, is to be admitted without
examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while
as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless.
Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N. W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held
with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another
reason. If it be granted that the legislature has
power to prescribe ultimately and definitely
the qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as attorneys
at law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity
to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to
exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of
Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S.
Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the
United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject
only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This
right may in many respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate' acquired
in them - that is, the right to continue their
prosecution - is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken
from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of government
that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities.
Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring examinations to establish
the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the
exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State
ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76
N. W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99
N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and
assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an officer of
this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace
or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that
one time he possessed the requisite learning
and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no manner affect the power
of the Legislature to select from the great body
of the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota
(Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme
Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had 'serve in the military
or naval forces of the United States during the
World War and received an honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924,
 known as 'World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re
Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
"The general rule is well settled by
unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person
included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial
once. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be
based on some substantial difference between
the situation of that class and other individuals
to which it does not apply and must rest on
some reason on which it can be defended. In
other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all
the members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and
natural reason for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all." (12
Am Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in
1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification? If there is
none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally
defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941
or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court
has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify
that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued
that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional.
What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure? Only from 1946 to
1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as
prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed
to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to
or criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain
the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law
clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by
those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and
1955, increasing each year the general average by one per
cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the
Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the
judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised
was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution
has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to
apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to
which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing
of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws
and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate
finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the
said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of
this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that
the article is not expressed in the title of the Act. While this
law according to its title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1),
article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article
2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is
obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers;
second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or
forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third,
because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the
following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952,
and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become
members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility
of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and
after them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No.
972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are,
as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to
its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue
in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary
to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify
the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void..
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close
of the debate among the members of the Court, and after
hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their
decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No.
972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that
part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive,
is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions
of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the
date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered..
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.
These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who
have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced
to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per cent in
1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the
prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent
those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the
introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No.
12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16
of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The
proposed amendment is as follows:
"SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order
that a candidate may be deemed to have
passed the examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10
per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20
per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates
shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have
obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and
such rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any
subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.
"SEC. 16. Admission and oath of
successful applicants. — Any applicant who has
 obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without falling below 50 per cent in
any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office.(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
pertinent to the matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that
unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations
should be compelled to repeat even those
subjects which they have previously passed.
This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore
been amended in this measure to give a
candidate due credit for any subject which he
has previously passed with a rating of 75 per
cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress
on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed
by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any
and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
"The next amendment is of section 14
of Rule 127. One part of this amendment
provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per
cent or higher in any subject, although failing
to pass the examination, he need not be
examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar
Examination on the installment plan, one or
two or three subjects at a time. The trouble
with this proposed system is that although it
makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so
as to insure passing them, by the time that he
has passed the last required subject, which
may be several years away from the time that
he reviewed and passed the first subjects, he
shall have forgotten the principles and theories
contained in those subjects and remembers
only those of the one or two subjects that he
had last reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the law
which requires a candidate to continue taking
the Bar examinations every year in succession.
The only condition imposed is that a candidate,
on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more than three installments; but there is no
limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken.
This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed
and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to
practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold
true of the candidates who may have obtained
a passing grade on any five subjects eight years
ago, another three subjects one year later, and
the last two subjects the present year. We
believe that the present system of requiring a
candidate to obtain a passing general average
with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent
is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires
one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission
to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx.
"We now come to the last
amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127.
This amendment provides that any applicant
who has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath
of office. In other words, Bar candidates who
obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme
Court because they failed to obtain a passing
general average in any of those years, will be
admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
"We have already stated in our
comment on the next preceding amendment
that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
per cent to govern even in the future. As to the
validity of making such reduction retroactive,
we have serious legal doubts. We should not
lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have
obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but
less than the general passing average fixed for
that year. It is clear that this question involves
legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of
the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate
a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in
force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the
final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
 "Another aspect of this question to be
considered is the fact that members of the bar
are officers of the courts, including the
Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any
year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the
Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not
prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be
its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts
and resolutions of the Supreme Court and
practically and in effect says that a candidate
not accepted, and even rejected by the Court
to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and
in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by
this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat,
that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously
considered."
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating
the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed
objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the
standard of the legal profession and maintain it
on a high level. This is not achieved, however,
by admitting to practice precisely a special
class who have failed in the bar examination.
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which
I find serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant
who has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed
to take and subscribed the corresponding oath
of office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one
group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful
candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and
1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to
revoke or set aside final resolutions of the
Supreme Court made in accordance with the
law then in force. It should be noted that after
every bar examination the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained
a passing general average but also rejecting
and denying the petitions for reconsideration
of those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those
who may have failed to obtain the passing
average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government
would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering,
architecture and certified public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress
of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate.
It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING
1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the
August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in
the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1964
bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per
cent passing general average shall be restored
in all succeeding examinations; andProvided,
finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall
be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon
its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the
objections of the President and to afford
another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme
Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who
would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions of
the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction
to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this
bill a gradual increase in the general averages
for passing the bar examinations as follows; For
1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent;
for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953
bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in
any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The
reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade, is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials
and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under
normal conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether
the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed
the supervision as well as the administration of
the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill
last year stated among his objections that the
bill would admit to the practice of law 'a
special class who failed in the bar examination'.
He considered the bill a class legislation. This
contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have
already established as precedent by making as
low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those
who took the Bar examination in 1947. These
bar candidates for whom this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having
passed the bar examination on the strength of
the established precedent of our Supreme
Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We
believe that such precedent cannot or could
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the
Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or
vested in the bar candidates who took the
examination when the precedent was not yet
altered, or in effect, was still enforced and
without being inconsistent with the principles
of their previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall
be considered as a simple curative act or
corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a 'valid
classification' as against class legislation, is very
expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
"'A valid classification must include all
who naturally belong to the class, all who
possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural"
and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and
then have the dissevered factions of the
original unit designated with different rules
established for each.'" (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
"Another case penned by Justice
Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new
conditions which must be cared for by new
laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting statute
must apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting
statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws
inflexibly and always. It permits them when
there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special form.
*** The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in
the case of plain abuse will there be revision by
the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 71 L. Ed.
1015, 63 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932).
"This bill has all the earmarks of a
corrective statute which always retroact to the
extent of the care or correction only as in this
case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first
deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the
Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the
approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the
Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary,
Manila, with the information that, with respect
to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the
Court are taking the same views they
expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by
Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first
indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5,
1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS.
The President allowed the period within which the bill
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which
it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI,
Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as
No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
election year, and that both the President and the author of
the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however,
they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has
always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because
lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should
be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of
the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit
is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise.
This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given
in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the
discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the
holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc, are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has
made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise
of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in
1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is
necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial
authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as
discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in
1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a
lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are
not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared
unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference
with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and
because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order
that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject." This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in
August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or
more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per
cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18,
1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful candidates
covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per
cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19
candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those
having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75
per cent were included. After the original list of 1947
successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion
for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69
per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948.
With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in
addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all
those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the
year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing
average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this
amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment
of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held
subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged
from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration,
invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948,
but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings
where law deans and professors, practicing attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared
and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing,
among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar
examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of
Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and
Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the
previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important
difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill
regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation
and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of names
of the bar examiners before the holding of the examinations,
and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This
second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No.
972, by the President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the
people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952
bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73
per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also
provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75
per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946,
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar
examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed
with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they
be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said
Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July
6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said
petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or
submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said
hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects
past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new
question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the
power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now
governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13,
provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the
power to promulgate rules concerning
 pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive right. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter,
or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
Under this constitutional provision, while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the
power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this
Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the
practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on
the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of
decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become
executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters,
specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any given year, are subject to revision by this Court at any
time, regardless of the period within which the motions were
filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious
reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice
of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said
matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and
our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial
function involved, in the strict and constitutions sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing
litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining
boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not
prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or
vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract
or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process
and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a
mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious
inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different
passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July
1, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer
have any record of those who might have failed before the
war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always
been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that
there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those
benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter
of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by
the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress
held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or
encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is
any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication
prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the
empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and
equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case
involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one
and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not
affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for
instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted
to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below
80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said
statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission
of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by
the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of
Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution.
Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they
filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section
14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations
held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the
general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. It
stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court
and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly
pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the
ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since
this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent
for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948
examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom
of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that
ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates
benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is
to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or
harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings,
and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do
the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all
the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the
question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic
Act No. 97" as an expression of the will of the people through
their duly elected representatives.
 I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting
that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do
so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy,
where we can and should only hope that the right men are put
in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.
||| (In re: Cunanan, Resolution, [March 18, 1954], 94 PHIL 534-597)
 EN BANC underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional In 1950, it has been documented 15 that post-enactment legislator
[G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.] challenge. participation broadened from the areas of fund release and
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE The Facts realignment to the area of project identification. During that year,
M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN I. Pork Barrel: General Concept. the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent
M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American-English
DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For
origin. 3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black
JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND Members of Congress, they 'being the representatives of the
slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, officials or civil leaders.'" 16 During this period, the pork barrel
of their well-fed master. 4 This practice was later compared to the process commenced with local government councils, civil groups,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in
FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects.
favor of their districts. 5 While the advent of refrigeration has
SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator's
made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator's district
S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was
and constituents. 6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers
OF THE HOUSE, respondents. then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the
to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the
[G.R. No. 208493. November 19, 2013.] projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT representative's district. 7 Some scholars on the subject further
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President —
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. use it to refer to legislative control of local
the Public Works Act. 17 In the 1960's, however, pork barrel
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his appropriations. 8 ACTIHa
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as House of Representatives and the Senate. 18 IEHaSc
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF Legislature, 9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive. While the previous "Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when
[G.R. No. 209251. November 19, 2013.] II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
"one man controlled the legislature," 19 the reprieve was only
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor- A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972). temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Act 3044, 10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered 11 as introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
Member — Province of the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines called the "Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under
Marinduque, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III * and subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the reports, 20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-
SECRETARY FLORENCIO "BUTCH" ABAD, area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides that the sums sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND appropriated for certain public works projects 13 "shall assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen
MANAGEMENT, respondents. be distributed . . . subject to the approval of a joint committee would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of
DECISION elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives." "[T]he Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p: committee from each House may [also] authorize one of would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
"Experience is the oracle of truth." 1 its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or
Commerce and Communications." 14 Also, in the area of fund municipal treasurers in the assemblyman's locality. It has been
- James Madison
realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 2 taken under Rule 65 "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so-
of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the members thereof, may, for the purposes of said called "hard projects", but also "soft projects", 21 or non-public
Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of works projects such as those which would fall under the categories
the Court shall heretofore discuss the system's conceptual appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder." of, among others, education, health and livelihood. 22
 C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino
Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the
restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel"
was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development
Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created
with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million,
respectively, for the funding of development projects in the
Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented 23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the
Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of
the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated
into the 1990 GAA 24 with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover
"small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects." SaHIEA
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, 25 CDF funds were,
with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the
implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities." Although the GAAs from
1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any
limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of
project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges,
and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration
(1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993, 28 the GAA explicitly stated that the
release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the
list of projects and activities identified by, among others,
individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF
Article included an allocation for the Vice-President. 29 As such,
Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994, 30 1995, 31 and 1996, 32 the GAAs contained the same
provisions on project identification and fund release as found in
the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to
the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on thereleases made from the funds. 33
Under the 1997 34 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing
agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of
50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations
which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate,
and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was
to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article
also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM, 35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that
"[n]o funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects
not included in the list herein required." CcaASE
The following year, or in 1998, 36 the foregoing provisions
regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced,
except that the publication of the project list was no longer
required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the
administration's political agenda. 37 It has been articulated that
since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as
well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing
agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of
Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and
the Poverty Alleviation Fund. 39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, "shall be made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative
district concerned." 40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to
direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be
spent. 41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada)
Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999, 42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three
(3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program
Fund," 43 the "Lingap Para Sa MahihirapProgram Fund," 44 and
the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
Fund," 45 all of which contained a special provision requiring
"prior consultation" with the Members of Congress for the
release of the funds.
It was in the year 2000 46 that the "Priority Development
Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of
"prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in
the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover,realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition
that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other
personnel benefits. 47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained
the same in view of the re-enactment 48 of the 2000 GAA for the
year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo)
Administration (2001-2010).
The 2002 49 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it
merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of
the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government
unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following
year, 2003, 50 the same single provision was present, with simply
an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign.
Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the
Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd 52 required prior consultation with Members of
Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project
list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-
enacted. 53 DHcSIT
In 2005, 54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used
"to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda
of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu
concept, 55 which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agenciesfrom which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005
GAA was re-enacted 56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same
bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into
the 2007, 57 2008, 58 2009, 59 and 2010 60 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with
respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the
PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress 61 anent certain aspects of
project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed
formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in
the implementation of government projects were introduced. In
the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the
appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged
to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount
of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million allotted for the
construction and completion of school buildings shall be made
available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio
School" program[,] with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings . . . ." 62 The same
allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs
under the DepEd Budget. 63 Also, it was in 2007 that the
Government Procurement Policy Board 64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB
Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and
regulations 65 of RA 9184, 66 the Government Procurement
Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement, 67 the procedure whereby the Procuring
Entity 68 (the implementing agency) may enter into
a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, providedthat "an
appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to NGOs." 69 ADEacC
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF
Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF Article included an express statement
on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President: Representatives were given P70 Million each,
broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million
for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as
well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for
"hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of
funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be
allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries
of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and
Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy,
and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original
project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not
yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the
request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned. 71
In the 2012 72 and 2013 73 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the
"[i]dentification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency [(priority list requirement)] . . . ."
However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who
would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74
Provisions on legislator allocations 75 as well as fund
realignment 76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles;
but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at
P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the
2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement the projects. 77 Legislators were also allowed to
identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent
patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative
district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the
legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker
of the House. 78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds,
modification and revision of project identification, as well
as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the
present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term's usage has expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund. IDcAHT
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special
fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910, 81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on
March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the
need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital
to economic growth. 82 Due to the energy-related activities of the
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project", 83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as
Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under
Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869, 85 or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD
1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than
two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly
issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86 amending Section
12 87 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund
has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which
the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR. 88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously, 89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents
who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain
congressional support. 90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks." 91 He said that "the kickbacks were 'SOP' (standard
operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19
percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which
could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, asphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other
sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of
the money trail became the banner story of the [Philippine Daily]
Inquirer issue of [August] 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration
of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the stories, including those
about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including P3.6 [B]illion for a [C]ongressman, sparked public
outrage." 94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects." 96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation — "JLN"
standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) — had swindled billions
of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer
than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles'
private accounts. 97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers' chiefs-of-
staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set
up by Napoles. 98 cDSAEI
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the
results of a three-year audit investigation 99 covering the use of
legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3)
years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the
DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs). 101 The
total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in
PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%,
respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found
to have been made nationwide during the audit
period. 102 Accordingly, the CoA's findings contained in its Report
No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows: 103
• Amounts released for projects identified by a
considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.
• Amounts were released for projects outside
of legislative districts of sponsoring
members of the Lower House.
• Total VILP releases for the period exceeded
the total amount appropriated under
the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
• Infrastructure projects were constructed on
private lots without these having been
turned over to the government.
• Significant amounts were released to
[implementing agencies] without the
latter's endorsement and without
considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical
capabilities to implement
projects. SAHITC
• Implementation of most livelihood projects
was not undertaken by the
[implementing agencies] themselves
but by [NGOs] endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the
Funds were transferred.
• The funds were transferred to the NGOs in
spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
• Selection of the NGOs were not compliant
with law and regulations.
• Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
implementation of seven hundred
seventy two (772) projects amount to
[P]6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or
failed to liquidate in whole or in part
their utilization of the Funds.
• Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some
implementing agencies, of goods and
services reportedly used in the
projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that
"[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian
reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO]." 104 According
to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of
preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds. 105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report
and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows: DHIcET
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara),
President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for
Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form
and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving
further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The Alcantara Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B.
Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an
Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad
(Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the government" under the same provision; and (d) setting the and (d) the Court's Decision dated
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013. August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105,
Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 113174, 113766, and 113888,
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the entitled "Philippine Constitution
Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting Association v.
the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of Enriquez" 114 (Philconsa) and Decision
availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No.
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. 113 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of
and (b) "the use of the Executive's [lump-sum, discretionary] funds, directing petitioners to reply to the Comment. Budget and
including the proceeds from the . . . Malampaya Fund[s] [and] Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the re-
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their
remittances from the [PAGCOR] . . . from 2003 to 2013, specifying litigation of the issue of
respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013,
the . . . project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also, they pray for the Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas System" under the principles of res
Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated
"inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all judicata and stare decisis.
September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013,
presently off-budget, [lump-sum], discretionary funds including, II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional
Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Fund[s] [and] Pork Barrel."
remittances from the [PAGCOR]." 109 The Belgica Petition was On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the
guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all
docketed as G.R. No. 208566. 110 other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno similar thereto are unconstitutional
issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General
(Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 considering that they violate the
(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with
him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and principles of/constitutional provisions
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
Congress who would be able to competently and completely
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and delegability of legislative
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process
and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was power; (c) checks and
and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified balances; (d) accountability; (e) politic
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear
and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation al dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
before the Court during the Oral Arguments. TAHCEc
with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their Pork Barrel."
Department of Transportation, and Communication and the
respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such
National Economic Development Authority. 111 The Nepomuceno
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951. 112 acHTIC October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did. other purposes as may be hereafter
The Issues Before the Court directed by the President" under
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to
(a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments,
the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to
comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO the following are the main issues for the Court's resolution:
finance the priority infrastructure
(September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, I. Procedural Issues. development projects and to finance
the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the the restoration of damaged or
authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to consolidated petitions involve an destroyed facilities due to calamities,
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya actual and justiciable controversy; (b) as may be directed and authorized by
Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be the issues raised in the consolidated the Office of the President of the
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD petitions are matters of policy not Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
910 but not for the purpose of "financ[ing] energy resource subject to judicial review; (c) 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
development and exploitation programs and projects of the petitioners have legal standing to sue; relating to the Presidential Social
 Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have
been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary
issues as prompted by the present cases. cHaICD
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. 118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are
the most important 119 and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that
"[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable . . . ." Jurisprudence provides that an
actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute." 121 In other words, "[t]here must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." 122 Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional
scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or Justice Carpio:
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged And so the President cannot refuse to
action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional implement the General
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to Appropriations Act, correct?
resolve hypothetical or moot questions." 124 Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the
actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. case, for example of the PDAF, the
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by President has a duty to execute the
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of laws but in the face of the outrage
the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated over PDAF, the President was saying,
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
"I am not sure that I will continue the
provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for release of the soft projects," and that
the PDAF,PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as started, Your Honor. Now, whether or
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are
not that . . . (interrupted)
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an Justice Carpio:
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
Yeah. I will grant the President if there are
unconstitutional use of these public funds. cEAaIS
anomalies in the project, he has the
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues power to stop the releases in the
related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the meantime, to investigate, and that is
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when Section [38] of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of
there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no the Revised Administrative Code 128 .
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the . . . So at most the President can
merits. 125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that suspend, now if the President believes
respondents' proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
he just refuse to implement it?
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget,
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the
President's declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" specific case of the PDAF because of
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive the CoA Report, because of the
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or reported irregularities and this Court
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or can take judicial notice, even outside,
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the outside of the COA Report, you have
passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration the report of the whistle-blowers, the
of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following President was just exercising precisely
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice the duty . . . .
Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126 xxx xxx xxx
Justice Carpio:
Justice Carpio:
[T]he President has taken an oath to faithfully Yes, and that is correct. You've seen the CoA
execute the law, 127 correct? Report, there are anomalies, you stop
Solicitor General Jardeleza: and investigate, and prosecute, he has
done that. But, does that mean that
Yes, Your Honor.
PDAF has been repealed?
 Solicitor General Jardeleza: cCSDTI
No, Your Honor . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Carpio:
So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in
two (2) cases. Congress passes a law
to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
The President has no power to legally abolish
PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless,
dictates that "the 'moot and academic' principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. 129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners — they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the
principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the
nature of the interests involved — the constitutionality of the very
system within which significant amounts of public funds have been
and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at
a time when the system's flaws have never before been magnified.
To the Court's mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government's own
recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported
abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of
abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is
also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners' claims as not
merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos
Santos v. CoA, 131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the
CoA's disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was
emphasized that:
[T]he CoA is endowed with enough latitude
to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
of government funds. It is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding
the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among
the constitutional mechanisms that gives
life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government. IAEcCT
[I]t is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the
CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is
only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a
petition questioning its rulings. . . . .
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an
actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems
the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely
due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system's
constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA
Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances
will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in
the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these
would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly,
there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the
recognition that the preparation and passage of the national
budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. 133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does
not cease with the passage of a "PDAF-free budget for
2014." 134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its
multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a
semblance of truth to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will
just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, 136 the government had already backtracked
on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of
repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent
similar questions from re-emerging." 137 The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying
the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved
at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence,
must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies" carries the assurance that "the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government." 138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the
classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is
found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion."
Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "[t]he political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-
related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific
demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge [the Court] not
to impose a solution at this stage." 140
The Court must deny respondents' submission. cdrep
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not
present political but legal questions which are within its province
to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The
intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours
of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political
branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely
because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly,
the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right
to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to
proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
effect on the political question doctrine was explained as
follows: 143
To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
,jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. . . . (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that "when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution." 144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably
cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of
government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court's avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in
fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm
constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the
people that each great branch of government, within its own
sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and
genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons,
the Court cannot heed respondents' plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing." 145 EHCDSI
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
"dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury." 146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to
be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if
the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law, 147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may
be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." 148 The CoA Chairperson's statement during the Oral
Arguments that the present controversy involves "not [merely] a
systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls" 149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed,
the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told, petitioners have
sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis
non quiets et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means
"follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled")
are general procedural law principles which both deal with the
effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent
cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of
these principles in relation to its prior rulings
in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case
if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 151 This
required identity is not, however, attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny
of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality — and,
thus, hardly a judgment on the merits — in that petitioners therein
failed to present any "convincing proof . . . showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support [to demonstrate the] illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks [and] has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court
upheld, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to
every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or
reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for
the foregoing reasons, the res judicataprinciple, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine
created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil
Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same
issue. 153 cAHIST
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge
against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was
resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context,
petitioners' posturing was that "the power given to the [M]embers
of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be
funded by the [CDF] is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the
Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the
appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made
by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it
is apparent that the Philconsa resolution wasa limited response to
a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and
PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire
"Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the inter-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of
the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be
deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa's
fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose
and identify of projects would be that the said identification
authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged
inCongress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should
exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such
authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law
passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has
already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the
GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitug's Concurring Opinion in the same
case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it
be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority,
however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise,
I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court
now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the
matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress
on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This
postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot
be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is
"imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out
that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima 155 (Abakada) has effectively overturnedPhilconsa's
allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional
inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed
on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive
issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply. STaCIA
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of
these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System,"
"Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they
are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion
between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse." 156 They assert that the following elements make up the
Pork Barrel System: (a)lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is
given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will
be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the
funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or
inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a
definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help
the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich
patronage benefits. 157 They further state that the Pork Barrel
System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds:
first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known
as the PDAF; 158and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork
Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993. 159
Considering petitioners' submission and in reference to its local
concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel
System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein
defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the
fund's utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it
appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it
is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power; 160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein
defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows
the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such
term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to
discuss the substantive issues of these cases. TAHCEc
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional
Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In
the celebrated words of Justice Laurel inAngara v. Electoral
Commission, 162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." 163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, 164 belongs the power to make laws; to the
executive branch of government, through the
President, 165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the
power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have
been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[e]ach
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere." 167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law." 168 The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is
hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with
the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To achieve this purpose, an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the
the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of GAA, Congress' law-making role necessarily comes to an end and
government that are equally capable of independent action in from there the Executive's role of implementing the national
exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the between them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. 170 implementation by the Executive." 176
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on in Abakada where the Court held that "[f]rom the moment the law
the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
other's performance of its constitutionally assigned powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified,
function"; 171 and "[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
is entrusted to another." 172 In other words, there is a violation of exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and
the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions. clear that Congress' role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation beyond
the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178
explained that the phase of budget execution "covers [A]ny post-enactment congressional
the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly measure . . . should be limited to scrutiny
includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual and investigation. In particular,
activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all congressional oversight must be confined to
"other related activities" that comprise the budget execution the following:
cycle. 174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of (1) scrutiny based primarily
power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of on Congress' power of
all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the appropriation and the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should budget hearings conducted
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the in connection with it, its
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA power to ask heads of
as well as any other appropriation law. aHcACI departments to appear
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, before and be heard by
much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of either of its Houses on any
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same matter pertaining to their
is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the departments and its power
Court stated that "Congress enters the picture [when it] of confirmation; and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
(2) investigation and
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and monitoring of the
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the implementation of laws
process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
pursuant to the power of
 Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork
Barrel — among others, the 2013 PDAF Article — "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it
is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the
time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is
passed." 179 They state that the findings and recommendations in
the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and
definitive the power of legislators wield over project
implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
[principle of separation of powers.]" 180 Further, they point out
that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist
on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to
recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation. 181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers
principle has not been violated since the President maintains
"ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA" and that
he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators'
proposals. 182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld
the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to
propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and
identification are recommendatory." 183 As such, they claim that
"[e]verything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article]
follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional." 184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of
all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
At its core, legislators — may it be through project lists, 185 prior
consultations 186 or program menus 187 — have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from
the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past
PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects
for as long as the identified project falls under a general program
listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that
the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard
or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from
which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision
further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his
district for as long as the representative of the district concerned
concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that
PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by
legislators" 188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the
total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification
and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing
special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators
have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF
projects. IaHAcT
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also
been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund
release through congressional committees is contained in Special
Provision 5 which explicitly states that "[a]ll request for release of
funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under
Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to
participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first,
paragraph 2, Special Provision 41 189 which explicitly states,
among others, that "[a]ny realignment [of funds] shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be";
and, second, paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which
authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy,
Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public
Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade
and Industry 190 . . . to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to [among others] (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it —
"the various operational aspects of budgeting," including
"the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of
the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the
said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents' reliance on the same
falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless
failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority
of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the
contrary, respondents — through the statements of the Solicitor
General during the Oral Arguments — have admitted that the
identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source,
thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the
entire budget execution process: 192
Justice Bernabe:
Now, without the individual legislator's
identification of the project, can the
PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
It cannot. . . (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe:
So meaning you should have the identification
of the project by the individual
legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Bernabe:
In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not
done and then there is no
identification.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Bernabe:
Now, would you know of specific instances
when a project was implemented
without the identification by the
individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: CIaHDc
I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so
but I have no specific examples. I
would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need
[for] a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by
an identification from the legislator.
xxx xxx xxx
Solictor General Jardeleza:
What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is
we were replying to a question, "How
can a legislator make sure that he is
able to get PDAF Funds?" It is
mandatory in the sense that he must
identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he
cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his
district would not be able to have
PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your
Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be
deemed asacts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist
and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years
has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the
Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative
of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses
of Congress, if we enforces the initial
thought that I have, after I had seen
the extent of this research made by
my staff, that neither the Executive
nor Congress frontally faced the
question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were
engineering the budget process. In
fact, the words you have been using,
as the three lawyers [of the DBM, and
both Houses of Congress] has also
been using is surprise; surprised that
all of these things are now surfacing.
In fact, I thought that what the 2013
PDAF provisions did was to codify in
one section all the past practice that
[had] been done since 1991. In a
certain sense, we should be thankful
that they are all now in the PDAF
Special Provisions. . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not
have, whether through formal measures written into the law or
informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else
the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has
vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative
Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only
Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local
matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as
the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency, 197 or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government. 198 acCETD
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused
as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing
agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making). 199 The conceptual treatment and
limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case
of People v. Maceren 200 as follows:
 The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondelegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote
the public interest are necessary because of
"the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."
xxx xxx xxx
[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that]
[t]he rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa —
is lodged in Congress. 201That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an
act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor 202 (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described inBengzon, and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-
Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended
to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be
the President's power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress
for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The
President's item-veto power is found in Section 27 (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27.. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The President shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the
President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms
part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution. 204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-
making process is the "submission [of the bill] to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication." 205 Elaborating on the President's item-veto power
and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court,
in Bengzon, explained that: 206 SEHDIC
The former Organic Act and the
present Constitution of the Philippines make
the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-
making power. His disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a
legislative act. The questions presented to the
mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the
same as those the legislature must determine
in passing a bill, except that his will be a
broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the
power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of
power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which
he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his
authority in the Constitution. But in exercising
that authority he may not be confined to rules
of strict construction or hampered by the
unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts
will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto [in the same
manner] as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed
by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President's item-veto power rests on a
variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation, 207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well
as to fortify the executive branch's role in the budgetary
process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
the US Supreme Court characterized the President's item-power as
"a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any
impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant
to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." 209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily
follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object
of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations,
pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US Supreme
Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to
ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and
not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation
must be an item characterized by singular correspondence —
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a
specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-
item." 211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent
with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also
ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based
on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund,
Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations
which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then
be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully
subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage
or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for
such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover,
as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may
even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MODE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the
related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the President's item veto power. Finally, special
purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with
the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they
follow the rule on singular correspondenceas herein discussed.
Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25 (4),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with
respect to discretionary funds, Section 25 (6), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law." DTAcIa
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.
Since such appropriation type necessitates the further
determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must
still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a
"specific appropriation of money" and hence, without a proper
line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so
as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not
be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-
delegability issues considering that the implementing authority
would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the
power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect,
be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of
non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "[i]n the current . . . system
where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator's
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later
on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the
President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
[which] effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless." 213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the
Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum
appropriations are essential to financially address situations which
are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the
decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations
is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. 214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a "budget
within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President's power of
item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described
system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the
entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects. 215 IcEaST
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited
form of lump-sum appropriation as above-characterized. In
particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of
spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not
readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President's power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting
scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limit[ed] state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would
aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds." 216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency." 217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting
system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
commendable ends. 218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or
its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional
Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the
smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them
"from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners." 219 They
also claim that the system has an effect on re-election as "the PDAF
excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add
that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds
are indeed quite useful, 'to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.'" 220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government
should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of
the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability, 221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public
officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper
expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of
congressional oversight. As mentioned
inAbakada, 222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of
confirmation; 223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 224 cETCID
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded
in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the
2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would,
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially
in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation — a matter before another office of
government — renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator's control of his
PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator's use
thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF
for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the former's post-enactment participation,
may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders
on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System's intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional
oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF
Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate
funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as
may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by
and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right
but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. 226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement,
the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this
score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State's policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section
25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy
of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
 Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, 227 otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the
policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as
follows: cHATSI
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is
hereby declared the policy of the State that
the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State
shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process
of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local
government units.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to
require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people's organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC
reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units
(LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and
effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the
Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court: 228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the
commitment of the Constitution to the policy
of local autonomy which is intended to
provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our
local political subdivisions as "self-reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson,
"Municipal corporations are the small republics
from which the great one derives its strength."
The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their
resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body
politic. This objective could be blunted by
undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are
best resolved by the officials and inhabitants
of such political units. The decision we reach
today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution. 229 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork
Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development. 230
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal
the unequal" and that "[i]t is also a recognition that individual
members of Congress, far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project." 231Drawing strength from this pronouncement,
previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the
relatively small projects implemented under [the Congressional
Pork Barrel] complement and link the national development goals
to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas
which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied
with mega-projects. 232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on
the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino
mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally
established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the
representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU
concerned cannot afford. 233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court
observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly
not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a
far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives
— and in some years, even the Vice-President — who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork
Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional
Pork Barrel's original intent which is "to make equal the unequal."
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under
the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the
sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already
legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs, 235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy
caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter
was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply
bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take
sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type
of personality-driven project identification
has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in
purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy,
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the
Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential
Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork
Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12
of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide
for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as
invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary
and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds
from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD
910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific"
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board
and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto. 237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12
of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation
of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary
and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In view of the foregoing,
petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any
valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law." 239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law" under the contemplation of
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable 240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for
a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of
amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
"appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the
law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made
by law, "' an appropriation law may — according to Philconsa — be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as
the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in
the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241
[T]here is no provision in
our Constitution that provides or prescribes
any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation
under the questioned presidential decrees.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by
past but subsisting legislations) as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress),
just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned
decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly
and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations,
32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the
present. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La
Grave: 242
To constitute an appropriation there must be
money placed in a fund applicable to the
designated purpose. The word appropriate
means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the
constitution means the setting apart a
portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is
necessary for the purpose, if the intention
to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied) aTIAES
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law
to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate
or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under
contemplation ofthe Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. . . .
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board
from any and all sources including receipts
from service contracts and agreements such
as application and processing fees, signature
bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus;
all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines
and penalties under the Petroleum Act of
1949; as well as the government share
representing royalties, rentals, production
share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development
and exploitation of energy resources, shall
form part of a Special Fund to be used to
finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
 government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.
(Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. —
After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share
of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall
be set aside and shall accrue to the General
Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases
supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it
may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates
a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
[Energy Development] Board from any and all sources" (a
determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" (a specified public purpose),
and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the
aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and . . . the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section
29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article
cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it
contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after
the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court
observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense,
only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of
the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be
used." 243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to
apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and
thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other
purposes related "to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244
The Court agrees with petitioners' submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount
for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation
to exist, the appropriation law must containadequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive 245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making,
or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making. 246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called
the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test
is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a
law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. 247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President's authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives
the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning
that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include — or
be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3)
reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for
non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents' own position that it is limited only to
"energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD
910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the
aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya
Funds would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance
with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended
by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties' submissions on the
same. 252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be
readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the
Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. TSCIEa
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates
that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to [first,] finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund
for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority
infrastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the
delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as
follows: "[t]he underlying framework of a system, [especially]
public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges,
sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well
as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since — similar to the
aboveassailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 — it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers.
1. Petitioners' Prayer to be Furnished
Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System
unconstitutional — as the Court did so in the context of its
pronouncements made in this Decision — petitioners equally pray
that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release
to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive's [lump-sum, discretionary] funds, including the proceeds
from the . . . Malampaya Funds] [and] remittances from the
[PAGCOR] . . . from 2003 to 2013, specifying the . . . project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto" 255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners'
prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public
interest.
ARTICLE III
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners' submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the
case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256
[W]hile the manner of examining public
records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford
access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered
nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty,
not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in
a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to
issue? In the case before Us, the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ
of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is
within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte),
it has been clarified that the right to information does not include
the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential
that the "applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the
foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular
request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted: 258
Although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern. cTACIa
It must be stressed that it is essential for a
writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the thing demanded and that it is
the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding
duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific [Lemi
v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,
1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA
 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to
meet this standard, there being no duty on
the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in
the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork
Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter's
duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While
petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded
as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the
Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information
requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only
to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted
and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of
the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners' prayer on
this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which
they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition. EHSCcT
It bears clarification that the Court's denial herein should only
cover petitioners' plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and
report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access
to official documents which are already existing and of public
record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid
statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be
proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the
application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list
requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to
the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the
custodian's reasonable regulations, viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the
GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the
latter may promulgate relating to the manner
and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured
[Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p.
538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387.] The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard
to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos." caHCSD
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners' Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional
Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "[order] the inclusion in
budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-
budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to,
proceeds from the . . . Malampaya Fund, remittances from the
[PAGCOR] and the [PCSO] or the Executive's Social Funds[.]" 260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners
covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the
political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself
overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents' Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of
Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation
accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response
to the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of
the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued
Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular
2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded
under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been
issued by the DBM and such SARO has been
obligated by the implementing agencies prior
to the issuance of the TRO, may continually
be implemented and disbursements thereto
effected by the agencies concerned. aSCHcA
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the
continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as
long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and,second, that said
SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned
prior to the issuance of the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the
issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds
under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a
Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should
remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only
covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that
once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing
agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are
already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be
considered as 'remaining PDAF.'" They conclude that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not
the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter
rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of
the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential
effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent
one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of
the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined. DHETIS
The propriety of the DBM's interpretation of the concept of
"release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical
impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the
Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered
by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may
still be disbursed following the DBM's interpretation in DBM
Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners' posturing for the
fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are
yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined
by the DBM itself in its website, is "[a] specific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall
cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to
separate approval or clearance by competent
authority." 263 Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a
SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the
direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the
control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be
withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the
actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of
funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is
subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from
the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral
Arguments: 265 HIETAc
Justice Bernabe:
Is the notice of allocation issued
simultaneously with the SARO?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ruiz:
It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only
the go signal for the agencies to
obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor,
is already the go signal to the
treasury for us to be able to pay or to
liquidate the amounts obligated in
the SARO; so it comes after. . . . The
NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for
the MDS for the authorized
government-disbursing banks to,
therefore, pay the payees depending
on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe:
Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled
or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz:
Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that
there are instances that the SAROs
issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe:
They are withdrawn? SEHDIC
Atty. Ruiz:
Yes, Your Honor . . . . (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be
treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect,
therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only
covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decision's promulgation, be
enjoined and consequentlyreverted to the unappropriated surplus
of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds
appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though
already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds
coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the
Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released —
meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced
from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds
should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but
instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional. CaHAcT
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court's
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional
Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated
as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that
until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of
a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed
constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and
should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in
the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine merely "reflect[s] awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration
of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.'" 268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied
prospectively. CcAITa
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has
persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the
Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System
asunconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules
within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed
legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving
them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted
the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the
process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as
it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize,
the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it
has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle
of non-delegability. SaCDTA
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the
multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court
has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any
system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or
similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think
that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its
Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor
bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged
by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its
cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court's
bounden duty and no other's.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court
hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF
Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators
— whether individually or collectively organized into committees
— to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-
enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited
to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of
project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws,
such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum
allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific
projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal
practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly
deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to
violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of
power. HaEcAC all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
Accordingly, the Court's temporary injunction dated September 10, This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the SO ORDERED.
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for ||| (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 208493, 209251, L-20768,
the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds [November 19, 2013], 721 PHIL 416-732)
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this
Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations
(NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs),
whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining
PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise
declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners' prayer
seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of
Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports
related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of
these cases. Petitioners' access to official documents already
available and of public record which are related to these funds
must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the
custodian's reasonable regulations or any valid statutory
prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a
proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit
may choose to pursue through a separate petition. ATCEIc
The Court also DENIES petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of
the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of
Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the
political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008.]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS) * OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO
R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V.
PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR.,
in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D.
LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This petition for prohibition 1 seeks to prevent
respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 2 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). 3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and
the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the
fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted
amount of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of
the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy
Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated
by their recognized organization. 6 AaHcIT
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and
guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the
service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual
report to Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose. 9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system
of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration
of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the
system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not
apply to officials and employees of all other government
agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as
it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7
(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may
be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however,
fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President
to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel. TCASIH
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed
upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will
necessitate the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy
requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in
this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward
system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does
not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the
declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR
and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient
standard that will guide the executive in the implementation
of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the
legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-
accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the
implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting
contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
ACTUAL CASE AND RIPENESS
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication. 10 A closely related requirement is
ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication.
And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. 11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial
adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12 IaHAcT
In this case, aside from the general claim that the
dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt
act, 13petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete
legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the
law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the
outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this
account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners.
The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on
the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And
where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 14
ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism,
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by
its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of
the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding
accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the
people they are called upon to serve. caIDSH
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily
obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA
9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose
of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection. 15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the
contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by
mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would
have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA
9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into
"bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any
factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong
presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
theConstitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To
invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners' baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding
the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and
reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty
to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews, 17 the U.S. Supreme
Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs
as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of
the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against
smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States, 18 the U.S.
Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such
penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and
reward their zeal and industry in detecting
fraudulent attempts to evade payment of
duties and taxes. HaTSDA
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC
may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of
their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they
exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes
safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it
will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary
activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official
duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in
Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials,
Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the
BOC. — The officials, examiners, and
employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who
violate this Act or who are guilty of
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or
misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties
shall be held liable for any loss or injury
suffered by any business establishment or
taxpayer as a result of such violation,
negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance
or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection
clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished. 19 When things or persons are different in fact
or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 20 this Court
declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of
the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of
the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of
rights.The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate. CDTSEI
The equal protection of the laws
clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact
of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction
is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make
classifications for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the
state is recognized as enjoying a wide range
of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or
marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical
nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in
many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature
from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they
may appear. 21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect
to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC,
the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for
the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue,
which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed
by the President upon the recommendation
of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the
following functions: SECcIH
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees
and charges and account for
all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police
powers for the proper
performance of its functions
and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax
evasions and all other illegal
economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control
over its constituent and
subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as
may be provided by law. 24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following
functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. —
The Bureau of Customs which shall be
headed and subject to the management and
control of the Commissioner of Customs,
who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the
Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner, shall have the
following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and
the corresponding fees,
charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues
collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the
enforcement of tariff and
customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling,
pilferage and all other
economic frauds within all
ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports,
imports, foreign mails and
the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements
that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling
and other illegal activities in
all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control
over its constituent
units; cAEaSC
(9) Perform such other functions as
may be provided by law. 25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis
supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF.
They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its
great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection. SHTEaA
UNDUE DELEGATION
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate. 26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 27 To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce
the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented. 28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards
to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is
the policy of the State to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing
for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for
the purpose of encouraging their officials
and employees to exceed their revenue
targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President to fix
revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives
Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of
the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection Percent (%) of the
of the Excess the Excess Collection to
Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first
30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed
automatically appropriated the year
immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and
shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the
original estimated revenue collection
expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as stated in the Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit
to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies'
revenue targets as allocated among its
revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and
the collection districts in the case of the
BOC. CEDScA
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated
revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated
in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 30 Thus,
the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of
the Board's authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the
Board. — The Board in the agency shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and
procedures for removing from service
officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least
seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided
in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this Act, subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions
shall apply:
1. Where the district or
area of responsibility is newly-
created, not exceeding two years in
operation, as has no historical
record of collection performance
that can be used as basis for
evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or
customs official or employee is a
recent transferee in the middle of
the period under consideration
unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets
or potential nonperformance of
revenue targets: Provided, however,
That when the district or area of
responsibility covered by revenue or
customs officials or employees has
suffered from economic difficulties
brought about by natural calamities
or force majeure or economic
causes as may be determined by the
Board, termination shall be
considered only after careful and
proper review by the Board. IAETSC
(c) To terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such
decision shall be immediately executory:
 Provided, further, That the application of
the criteria for the separation of an official
or employee from service under this Act
shall be without prejudice to the application
of other relevant laws on accountability of
public officers and employees, such as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of
tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than
those provided by law and only after due process is accorded
the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a
reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground
for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32The action for
removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural
due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity",
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy
and welfare". 33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest. STcDIE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee. — There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members
from the Senate and seven Members from
the House of Representatives. The Members
from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members
from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After
the Oversight Committee will have approved
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
it shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as
any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter). ATDHSC
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief
Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight
in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections 34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional
oversight
Broadly defined, the power of
oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over theimplementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
(d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been
held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. . . .
Over the years, Congress has
invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an
enormous amount of legislative authority to
the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight
power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the
authority delegated to them. . . .
Categories of congressional
oversight functions
The acts done by Congress
purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny,
investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a
lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary
purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information
and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or
pass resolutions for consideration of the
agency involved. AaCTID
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is
regarded as a passive process of looking at
the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation
involves a more intense digging of facts. The
power of Congress to conduct investigation
is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under
section 21, Article VI, . . .
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most
encompassing form by which Congress
exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision"
connotes a continuing and informed
awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in
a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation
involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the
exercise of delegated law-making authority,
and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over
the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions
when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations
with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present
the proposed regulations to Congress, which
retains a "right" to approve or disapprove
any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law
after the expiration of a certain period of
time, only if Congress does not affirmatively
disapprove of the regulation in the
meantime. Less frequently, the statute
provides that a proposed regulation will
become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it. EHCDSI
Supporters of legislative veto stress
that it is necessary to maintain the balance
of power between the legislative and the
executive branches of government as it
offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast
power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercise of such
power without having to pass new legislation
or to repeal existing law. They contend that
this arrangement promotes democratic
accountability as it provides legislative check
on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the
merits of this delegation policy: the
policy is too deeply embedded in
our law and practice. It suffices to
say that the complexities of modern
government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or
perceived necessity — to legislate
by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving
the choice of policy options to the
discretion of an executive officer.
Congress articulates legislative aims,
but leaves their implementation to
the judgment of parties who may or
may not have participated in or
agreed with the development of
those aims. Consequently, absent
safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effected: Congress
proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the
legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law.
But without some means of
overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch,
Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have
been implemented in accordance
with legislative intent and thus
whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the
legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge
that any post-enactment measures
undertaken by the legislative branch should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any
measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. They contend that
legislative veto constitutes an impermissible
evasion of the President's veto authority and
intrusion into the powers vested in the
executive or judicial branches of
government. Proponents counter that
legislative veto enhances separation of
powers as it prevents the executive branch
and independent agencies from
accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and
congressional committee investigations
allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise
of delegated law-making authority. They do
not allow Congress to review executive
proposals before they take effect and they
do not afford the opportunity for ongoing
and binding expressions of congressional
intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of"subordinate
law" or those enacted by the executive
branch pursuant to a delegation of authority
by Congress. They further argue that
legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by
forces outside its chambers". In an era of
delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means
Congress has yet devised to retain control
over the evolution and implementation of its
policy as declared by statute". SAHEIc
In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the validity of legislative veto
provisions. The case arose from the order of
the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to §
244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing
the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2)
authorizing either House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the
executive branch to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the
deportation proceedings to implement the
House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed the alien's appeal, holding that it
had no power to declare unconstitutional an
act of Congress. The United States Court of
Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House
was without constitutional authority to order
the alien's deportation and that § 244(c)(2)
violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But
the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that
the provision violates the presentment
clause and bicameralism. It held that the
one-house veto was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of
the Constitution requiring the passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to
the President. . . .
Two weeks after
the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in
memorandum decision, two lower court
decisions invalidating the legislative veto
provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this
precedence, lower courts invalidated
statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions
required the approval of both Houses of
Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of
these veto provisions were not even
exercised. 35 (emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of
the power of congressional oversight and considering the
nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision
in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was
tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve
the IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The
Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections. 36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere",
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power. 38 And,
when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution, 39 including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. cECaHA
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure
such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power
of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of
confirmation 40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring 41 of the
implementation of laws pursuant to
the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. 42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes
fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional
leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. 43 It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own
laws. 44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation
to define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence. 45 It can itself formulate the details or
it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for
making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with
those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what is left for the
executive branch or the concerned administrative agency
when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law
is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain
facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making). 48 CSDcTH
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative
agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. 49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of
a statute 50 and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. 51Congress, in the
guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval
without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA
9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
CONSIDERED OPINION OF
MR. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing
rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a
condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
(emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact,
amend and repeal laws) 53 is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires
the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised
neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee
of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a
congressional committee legislative veto are invalid. EHTCAa
Additionally, Section 27 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by
the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections
at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(emphasis supplied) SCcHIE
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to
the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law. In this sense, law-making under
the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the
Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative
act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such
presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes
a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress. 54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by
the President. 55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz 56 and
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., 57 the following is the procedure for
the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member
of the House of Representatives or the
Senate except for some measures that must
originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a
reading of the number and title of the
measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper
committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the
committee or it may be recommended for
approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held
thereon. If there are other bills of the same
nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be
calendared for second reading. It is at this
stage that the bill is read in its entirety,
scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired. The second reading is the
most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second
reading is printed in its final form and copies
thereof are distributed at least three days
before the third reading. On the third
reading, the members merely register their
votes and explain them if they are allowed
by the rules. No further debate is
allowed. ATHCDa
Once the bill passes third reading, it
is sent to the other chamber, where it will
also undergo the three readings. If there are
differences between the versions approved
by the two chambers, a conference
committee 58 representing both Houses will
draft a compromise measure that if ratified
by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to
the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as
finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the
Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers. .
. 59
The President's role in law-making.
 The final step is submission to the
President for approval. Once approved, it
takes effect as law after the required
publication. 60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to
implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to
have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes
effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that
legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled
by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the
determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive
branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly
of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a
provision that requires Congress or its members to approve
the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows
Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with
the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should
be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be
similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for
failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time
when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought
before us. 64 SEcADa
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect
of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the
other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law
unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. — If
any provision of this Act is declared invalid
by a competent court, the remainder of this
Act or any provision not affected by such
declaration of invalidity shall remain in force
and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy, 65 the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part
of a statute is void as repugnant to
the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
presence of a separability clause in a statute
creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute. To justify this result,
the valid portion must be so far independent
of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the legislature would have
enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other.
Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is
that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant
a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with
one another, the legislature intended the
statute to be carried out as a whole and
would not have enacted it if one part is void,
in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected
must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the
intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid
provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the
remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible
and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. CAcDTI
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations
must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR
of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation 66 and became effective 15
days thereafter. 67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the
IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is
UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the
provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, [August
14, 2008], 584 PHIL 246-331)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 176951. February 15, 2011.]
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P.
TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF
CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN
SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF
EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 177499. February 15, 2011.]
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P.
TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF
AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
AND MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 178056. February 15, 2011.]
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P.
TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR,
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL;
MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU; and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J p:
For consideration of this Court are the following
pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" dated August 24, 2010
dated and filed on September 14,
2010 by respondents Municipality of
Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the "Motion for
Reconsideration of the 'Resolution'
dated August 24, 2010"].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20,
2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
'Resolution' dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. This motion
was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background —
These cases were initiated by the consolidated
petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16)
laws, 1 each converting the municipality covered thereby into
a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the
Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, 2 granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for
violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection
clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En
Banc, by a 7-5 vote, 3 denied the first motion for
reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a
Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, 4 which denied the second
motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En
Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise —
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration
is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that: "No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be
entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final
and executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and
admit a second motion for reconsideration is
granted by the Court, the Court therefore
allows the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. In such a case, the second
motion for reconsideration is no longer a
prohibited pleading. aTADCE
In the present case, the Court voted on the
second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed
the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for
reconsideration was no longer a prohibited
pleading. However, for lack of the required
number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution,
the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009
Resolution. 5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009,
the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, 6 declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a
Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, 7 resolved the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the
Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and
the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City,
Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City,
reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the
aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En
Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of
the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty
of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010
deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the
following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of
the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides —
Section 10.No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008
Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the
exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450
thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which
took effect on June 30, 2001, viz. —
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. — a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a
locally generated annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least One
Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
at least two (2) consecutive years based on
2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of
the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for
the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant
prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was
introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills
filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities.
During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these
bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills.
Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were
converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can
be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel
on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit —
Senator Pimentel.
Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill
to be included in the whole set of
proposed amendments that we have
introduced to precisely amend
the Local Government Code. However,
it is a fact that there is a mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities. Whereas in
1991, when the Local Government
was approved, there were only 60
cities, today the number has increased
to 85 cities, with 41 more
municipalities applying for conversion
to the same status. At the rate we are
going, I am apprehensive that before
long this nation will be a nation of all
cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we
are proposing among other things,
that the financial requirement, which,
under the Local Government Code, is
fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100
million to enable a municipality to
have the right to be converted into a
city, and the P100 million should be
sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is,
the municipalities aspiring to become
cities say that they qualify in terms of
financial requirements by
incorporating the Internal Revenue
share of the taxes of the nation on to
their regularly generated revenue.
Under that requirement, it looks clear
to me that practically all municipalities
in this country would qualify to
become cities. CHTcSE
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that
we are seeking the approval of this
Chamber to amend, particularly
Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160,
the requisite for the average annual
income of a municipality to be
converted into a city or cluster
of barangays which seek to be
converted into a city, raising that
revenue requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the last two
consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices. 8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon,
Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood
Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified
under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section
450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate President Franklin
Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus —
THE PRESIDENT.
The Chair would like to ask for some
clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT.
This is just on the point of the pending bills
in the Senate which propose the
conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which
qualify under the present standard.
 We would like to know the view of the
sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber
apply the standard as proposed in
this bill to those bills which are
pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, it might not be fair to make
this bill, on the assumption that it is
approved, retroact to the bills that
are pending in the Senate conversion
from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT.
Will there be an appropriate language
crafted to reflect that view? Or does it
not become a policy of the Chamber,
assuming that this bill becomes a law
tomorrow, that it will apply to those
bills which are already approved by
the House under the old version of
the Local Government Code and are
now pending in the Senate? The Chair
does not know if we can craft a
language which will limit the
application to those which are not yet
in the Senate. Or is that a policy that
the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is
necessary to put that provision
because what we are saying here will
form part of the interpretation of this
bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think
that the bill would have any
retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT.
So the understanding is that those bills
which are already pending in the
Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. 9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the
11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher
income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the
amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of
the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the
compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th
Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both
the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended
byR.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress,
when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses
found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange
between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it
cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting
respondent municipalities from complying with the higher
income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No.
9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves
viable and capable to become component cities of their
respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were
centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other
natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard,
it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each
respondent municipality, viz.— aSADIC
Batac, Ilocos Norte — It is the biggest
municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte,
2nd largest and most progressive town in the
province of Ilocos Norte and the natural
convergence point for the neighboring towns
to transact their commercial ventures and
other daily activities. A growing metropolis,
Batac is equipped with amenities of modern
living like banking institutions, satellite cable
systems, telecommunications systems.
Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public
transport systems, sports, and entertainment
facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental — It is located at
the center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial
Corridor and home to a number of industrial
companies and corporations. Investment and
financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly
credited to its industrious and preserving
people. Thus, it has become the growing
investment choice even besting nearby cities
and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery
as distribution port of their product in
Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of
Companies is also doing business in the area.
So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to
spur economic and financial prosperity to this
coastal place in North-Western Misamis
Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte — It is the
largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the
province of Agusan del Norte. It plays strategic
importance to the administrative and socio-
economic life and development of Agusan del
Norte. It is the foremost in terms of trade,
commerce, and industry. Hence, the
municipality was declared as the new seat and
capital of the provincial government of Agusan
del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No.
8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000. Its
conversion will certainly promote, invigorate,
and reinforce the economic potential of the
province in establishing itself as an agro-
industrial center in the Caraga region and
accelerate the development of the area.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094,
introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M.
Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar — It is the capital
town of Eastern Samar and the development of
Eastern Samar will depend to a certain degree
of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for
the modernization and progress of adjacent
towns considering the frequent interactions
between the populace. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 2640, introduced by Rep.
Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan — Before Basilan City was
converted into a separate province, Lamitan
was the most progressive part of the city. It has
been for centuries the center of commerce and
the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people
of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-
industrial and others notably copra, rubber,
coffee and host of income generating ventures.
As the most progressive town in Basilan,
Lamitan continues to be the center of
commerce catering to the municipalities of
Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 5786, introduced by
Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar — It has always been the
socio-economic-political capital of the Island of
Samar even during the Spanish era. It is the
seat of government of the two congressional
districts of Samar. Ideally located at the
crossroad between Northern and Eastern
Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and
commerce activates among the more
prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban
City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol region.
The numerous banks and telecommunication
facilities showcases the healthy economic
environment of the municipality. The
preeminent and sustainable economic
situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the
call of residents for a more vigorous
involvement of governance of the municipal
government that is inherent in a city
government. [Explanatory Note of House Bill
No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V.
Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu — Bogo is very qualified for a city
in terms of income, population and area
among others. It has been elevated to the Hall
of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in
the clean and green program. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced by
Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur — This over 350 year
old capital town the province has long sought
its conversion into a city that will pave the way
not only for its own growth and advancement
but also help in the development of its
neighboring municipalities and the province as
a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role
as the province's trade, financial and
government center. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep.
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur — It is a first class
municipality and the biggest in terms of
population in the entire province. It has the
most progressive and thickly populated area
among the 14 municipalities that comprise the
province. Thus, it has become the center for
trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a
more developed infrastructure and facilities
than other municipalities in the province.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899,
introduced by Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G.
Plaza.] DcCIAa
Carcar, Cebu — Through the years, Carcar
metamorphosed from rural to urban and now
boast of its manufacturing industry,
agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry
and its thousands of large and small
commercial establishments contributing to the
bulk of economic activities in the municipality.
Based on consultation with multi-sectoral
groups, political and non-government agencies,
residents and common folk in Carcar, they
expressed their desire for the conversion of the
municipality into a component city.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990,
introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental — Its population
is second highest in the province, next only to
the provincial capital and higher than Canlaon
City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes
heavily to its economy. There are very good
prospects in agricultural production brought
about by its favorable climate. It has also the
Tanon Strait that provides a good fishing
ground for its numerous fishermen. Its
potential to grow commercially is certain. Its
strategic location brought about by its existing
linkage networks and the major transportation
corridors traversing the municipality has
established Guihulngan as the center of
commerce and trade in this part of Negros
Oriental with the first congressional district as
its immediate area of influence. Moreover, it
has beautiful tourist spots that are being
availed of by local and foreign tourists.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628,
introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon — It flourished and expanded
into an important politico-cultural center in
[the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (1179-
1910), it served as the cabecera of the province
which originally carried the cabecera's own
name, Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture,
heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of
the more active centers of coordination and
delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and
services within the first district of Quezon
Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga — It not only serves as the main
hub of commerce and trade, but also the
cultural center of the rich customs and
traditions of the different municipalities in the
province. For the past several years, the
income of Tabuk has been steadily increasing,
which is an indication that its economy is
likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by
Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati,
Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their
economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay
[Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23 of
which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69
are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as
a first class city. It is situated on the western
coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4
climate, which is generally wet. Its topography
is generally mountainous in the eastern portion
as it slopes down west towards the shore line.
Generally an agricultural city, the common
means of livelihood are farming and fishing.
Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall
activities. The most common crops grown are
rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables.
Industries operating include the Specialty
Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan
Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be
found in the city such as bamboo and rattan
craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food
preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine
Philippine furniture manufacturing and other
related activities. Baybay has great potential as
a tourist destination, especially for tennis
players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and
history, but it also houses the campus of the
Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte
State University/Visayas State College of
Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural
College/Baybay National Agricultural
School/Baybay Agricultural High School and the
Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river
systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves
for spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine
treasures. This richness, coupled with the
friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a
successful tourism program. Considering the
role of tourism in development, Baybay City
intends to harness its tourism potential.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City>
visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the
eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is
one hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers away
from Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive
from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from
Davao City through the Madaum diversion
road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-
Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea are
possible, with the existence of an airport and
seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut
capital of Mindanao if not the whole country. A
large portion of its fertile land is planted to
coconuts, and a significant number of its
population is largely dependent on it. Other
agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn,
coffee and cacao are also being cultivated, as
well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia
oranges. Mati has a long stretch of shoreline
and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like
white sand. A number of resorts have been
developed and are now open to serve both
local and international tourists. Some of these
resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada
Bay and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western
coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home
of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and
trees grow, some of which are believed to be a
hundred years old or more. On its peak is a
lake, called "Tinagong Dagat," or hidden sea, so
covered by dense vegetation a climber has to
hike trails for hours to reach it. The mountain is
also host to rare species of flora and fauna,
thus becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these
life forms.
(<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed
on September 19, 2008.) cDCHaS
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and
copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the
Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, emphasized the big potential of
the mining industry in the province of Davao
Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends
Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&s
ec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&dat
e, accessed on September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical Background — In the
early times, the place now known as Naga was
full of huge trees locally called as "Narra." The
first settlers referred to this place as Narra,
derived from the huge trees, which later simply
became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest
settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga
became a municipality on June 12, 1829. The
municipality has gone through a series of
classifications as its economic development has
undergone changes and growth. The tranquil
farming and fishing villages of the natives were
agitated as the Spaniards came and discovered
coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of
the municipality, as the Spaniards mined and
sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered
the industrial development of Naga. As the
years progressed, manufacturing and other
industries followed, making Naga one of the
industrialized municipalities in the Province of
Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35
Agricultural, Industrial,
Agro-Industrial, Mining
Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?optio
n=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-facts-
and-figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-
figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19,
2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them. 10 The Constitution, as the expression of the
will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government.
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by
the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest. 11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress
through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to
alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such
power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted
the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of
economic viability for the creation of local government units
— income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit
to modify the income requirement with respect to the
conversion of municipalities into component cities when it
enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million,
computed only from locally-generated sources. However,
Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting
flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which
is countryside development and autonomy, especially
accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is
also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the
Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to
theLGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18,
2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their
strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws,
particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August
24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the
equal protection clause enshrined in theConstitution. Further,
it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because
the Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that petitioner
and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the national
taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we
declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood
Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of
the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided
that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same
class. 12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills
in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish
one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. This contention misses the point. CIAHaT
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions
of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator
Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No.
9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension that
before long the country will be a country of cities and without CITY
municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of
the P100 million average annual income requirement for the
1.
creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure,
there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation2.
rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition
3. of Sipalay City
a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased
4. for Canlaon City
from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult
municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight
5.
such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created
6.
thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities
at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under 7. Section Muñoz City
452 of the LGC, to wit —
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. — (a)
Cities with a minimum population of two
hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office,
and with the latest annual income of at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized
cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above
requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are
geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed
by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be
conclusively said to be the only amount "sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population," per Section 7 13 of theLGC. It
was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply with.
While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than
P20 million, could, of course, provide the essential
government facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis
the population of a municipality wanting to become a
component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of
P20 million would be insufficient. This is evident from the
existing cities whose income, up to now, do not comply with
the P100 million income requirement, some of which have
lower than the P20 million average annual income. Consider
the list 14 below —
AVERAGE ANNUAL
INCOME
Marawi City 5,291,522.10
Palayan City 6,714,651.77
9,713,120.00
13,552,493.79
Himamaylan City 15,808,530.00
Isabela City 16,811,246.79
19,693,358.61
Dapitan City 20,529,181.08 39. Balanga City 61,556,700.49 respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood
Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No.
Tangub City 20,943,810.04 40. Sagay City 64,266,350.00 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its
Bayawan City 22,943,810.04 41. Cavite City 64,566,079.05 Section 2 (a), thus —
Island Garden City of Samal 23,034,731.83 42. Koronadal City 66,231,717.19 SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.— (a) It is
hereby declared the policy of the State that the
Tanjay City 23,723,612.44 43. Cotabato City 66,302,114.52
territorial and political subdivisions of the State
Tabaco City 24,152,853.71 44. Toledo City 70,157,331.12 shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
Oroquieta City 24,279,966.51 45. San Jose City 70,309,233.43 autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
Ligao City 28,326,745.86 46. Danao City 72,621,955.30 make them more effective partners in the
Sorsogon City 30,403,324.59 47. Bago City 74,305,000.00 attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive
Maasin City 30,572,113.65 48. Valencia City 74,557,298.92
and accountable local government structure
Escalante City 32,113,970.00 49. Victorias City 75,757,298.92 instituted through a system of decentralization
Iriga City 32,757,871.44 50. Cauayan City 82,949,135.46 whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities and
Gapan City 34,254,986.47 51. Santiago City 83,816,025.89 resources. The process of decentralization shall
Candon City 36,327,705.86 52. Roxas City 85,397,830.00 proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
Gingoog City 37,327,705.86 53. Dipolog City 85,503,262.85
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and
Masbate City 39,454,508.28 54. Trece Martires City 87,413,786.64 viability of respondent municipalities to become component
Passi City 40,314,620.00 55. Talisay City (Cebu) 87,964,972.97 cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
Calbayog City 40,943,128.73 56. Ozamis City 89,054,056.12
respondent municipalities to become the State's partners in
Calapan City 41,870,239.21 57. Surigao City 89,960,971.33 accelerating economic growth and development in the
Cadiz City 43,827,060.00 58. Panabo City 91,425,301.39 provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the
Alaminos City 44,352,501.00 59. Digos City 92,647,699.13 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to
Bais City 44,646,826.48 the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition
San Carlos City 46,306,129.13
component cities of their respective provinces emphasizes the continues to exist.
Silay City 47,351,730.00 arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as the new income Petitioners in these cases complain about the
Bislig City 47,360,716.24 requirement for the conversion of municipalities into purported reduction of their "just share" in the IRA. To be
component cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned sure, petitioners are entitled to a "just share," not a specific
Tacurong City 49,026,281.56
from the respective distinctive traits and level of economic amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when,
Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609,790.00 development of the individual respondent municipalities as after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their
Kabankalan City 53,560,580.00 above submitted. respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the
Verily, the determination of the existence of table 15 below —
Malaybalay City 54,423,408.55
substantial distinction with respect to respondent CITY CY 2006 IRA CY 2008 IRA
La Carlota City 54,760,290.00 municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of
(Before (Actual Release After
Vigan City 56,831,797.19 their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees
Implementation of Implementation of
the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction with
 Sixteen [16] Cityhood Sixteen [16] Cityhood What these petitioner cities were stating as a SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Laws) Laws) reduction of their respective IRA shares was based on a No, Mr. President.
computation of what they would receive if respondent SENATOR SOTTO.
municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of
Bais 219,338,056.00 242,193,156.00 It should not have been included?
course, that would mean a bigger amount to which they have
Batangas 334,371,984.00 388,871,770.00 staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down to SENATOR PIMENTEL.
money and how much more they would receive if respondent The internal revenue share should never
Bayawan 353,150,158.00 388,840,062.00 have been included. That was not the
municipalities remain as municipalities and not share in the
Cadiz 329,491,285.00 361,019,211.00 23% fixed IRA from the national government for cities. intention when we first crafted
Calapan 227,772,199.00 252,587,779.00 Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. the Local Government Code. The
9009, should prove enlightening: ATCaDE financial capacity was supposed to be
Calbayog 438,603,378.00 485,653,769.00 demonstrated by the municipality
SENATOR SOTTO.
Cauayan 250,477,157.00 277,120,828.00 wishing to become a city by its own
Mr. President, we just want to be effort, meaning to say, it should not
Gen. Santos 518,388,557.00 631,864,977.00 enlightened again on the previous rely on the internal revenue share
Gingoog 314,425,637.00 347,207,725.00 qualification and the present one that comes from the government.
being proposed. Before there were Unfortunately, I think what
Himamaylan 248,154,381.00 277,532,458.00 three . . . happened in past conversions of
Iloilo 358,394,268.00 412,506,278.00 SENATOR PIMENTEL. municipalities into cities was, the
Iriga 183,132,036.00 203,072,932.00 There are three requisites for a municipality Department of Budget and
to become a city. Let us start with the Management, along with the
Legaspi 235,314,016.00 266,537,785.00
finance. Department of Finance, had included
Ligao 215,608,112.00 239,696,441.00 SENATOR SOTTO. the internal revenue share as a part
Oroquieta 191,803,213.00 211,449,720.00 Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh of the municipality, demonstration
us? I used to be the chairman of the that they are now financially capable
Pagadian 292,788,255.00 327,401,672.00 and can measure up to the
Committee on Local Government, but
San Carlos 239,524,249.00 260,515,711.00 the new job that was given to me by requirement of the Local Government
the Senate has erased completely my Code of having a revenue of at least
San Fernando 182,320,356.00 204,140,940.00
memory as far as the Local P20 million.
Santiago 508,326,072.00 563,679,572.00 SENATOR SOTTO.
Government Code is concerned.
Silay 216,372,314.00 241,363,845.00 SENATOR PIMENTEL. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President,
Surigao 233,968,119.00 260,708,071.00 Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are has spread that into
three requirements. One is financial. the Record because otherwise, if he
Tacurong 179,795,271.00 197,880,665.00 did not mention the Department of
SENATOR SOTTO.
Tagaytay 130,159,136.00 152,445,295.00 Finance and the Department of
All right. It used to be P20 million. Budget and Management, then I
Tarlac 348,186,756.00 405,611,581.00
SENATOR PIMENTEL. would have been blamed for the
Tangub 162,248,610.00 180,640,621.00 It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to misinterpretation. But anyway, the
Urdaneta 187,721,031.00 207,129,386.00 P100 million of locally generated gentleman is correct. That was the
funds. interpretation given to us during the
Victorias 176,367,959.00 194,162,687.00 hearings.
SENATOR SOTTO.
Zamboanga 918,013,016.00 1,009,972,704.00
In other words, the P20 million before
includes the IRA.
 So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 SENATOR SOTTO. acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to
million from locally generated income Does the gentleman not think there will no those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the
as far as population is concerned. longer be any municipality that will enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same
SENATOR PIMENTEL. qualify, Mr. President? footing or "class" as the respondent municipalities. Congress
As far as population is concerned, there will SENATOR PIMENTEL. merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent
be no change, Mr. President. Still municipalities to become component cities of their respective
There may still be municipalities which can provinces.
150,000. qualify, but it will take a little time.
SENATOR SOTTO. They will have to produce more Petitioners complain of the projects that they would
babies. I do not know — expand their not be able to pursue and the expenditures that they would
Still 150,000?
territories, whatever, by reclamation not be able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent
SENATOR PIMENTEL. municipalities' obligations arising from the contracts they have
or otherwise. But the whole proposal
Yes. already entered into, the employees that they have already
is geared towards making it difficult
SENATOR SOTTO. for municipalities to convert into hired, and the projects that they have already initiated and
And then the land area? cities. completed as component cities. Petitioners have completely
overlooked the need of respondent municipalities to become
SENATOR PIMENTEL. On the other hand, I would like to advert to
effective vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in
As to the land area, there is no change; it is the fact that in the amendments that
the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the
still 100 square kilometers. we are proposing for the entire Local newly-borns so that their inheritance would not be
SENATOR SOTTO. Government Code, we are also
diminished.
raising the internal revenue share of
But before it was "either/or"? Apropos is the following parable: AcDHCS
the municipalities.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire
SENATOR SOTTO.
That is correct. As long as it has one of the workmen for his vineyard. After reaching an agreement with
I see.
three requirements, basically, as long them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his
as it meets the financial requirement, SENATOR PIMENTEL. vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men
then it may meet the territorial So that, more or less, hindi naman sila standing around the marketplace without work, so he said to
requirement or the population dehado in this particular instance. them, "You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay you
requirement. SENATOR SOTTO. whatever is fair." They went. He came out again around noon
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late
President, I throw my full support afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he
So, it remains "or"?
behind the measure. said, "Why have you been standing here idle all day?" "No one
SENATOR PIMENTEL. has hired us," they told him. He said, "You go to the vineyard
We are now changing it into AND. Thank you, Mr. President.
too." When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to
SENATOR SOTTO. SENATOR PIMENTEL. his foreman, "Call the workmen and give them their pay, but
AND? Thank you very much, Mr. President. begin with the last group and end with the first." When those
(Emphasis supplied) 16 hired late in the afternoon came up they received a full day's
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of pay, and when the first group appeared they thought they
Yes. would get more, yet they received the same daily wage.
Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious,
SENATOR SOTTO. especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted Thereupon they complained to the owner, "This last group did
I see. into component cities almost immediately prior to the only an hour's work, but you have paid them on the same basis
SENATOR PIMENTEL. enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood as us who have worked a full day in the scorching heat." "My
Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered friend," he said to one in reply, "I do you no injustice. You
That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other
thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the agreed on the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go
words . . .
abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, home. I intend to give this man who was hired last the same
pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I
not? Or are you envious because I am generous?" 17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in
enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of
respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces,
temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By
allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component
cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of
the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units "enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals," which is the very mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules
of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of
justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end,
even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather
for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in
order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following
pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to
declare whether enactments of the legislature
exceed the constitutional limitations and are
invalid has always been considered a grave
responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The
courts invariably give the most careful
consideration to questions involving the
interpretation and application of
theConstitution, and approach constitutional
questions with great deliberation, exercising
their power in this respect with the greatest
possible caution and even reluctance; and they
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond
reasonable doubt. To justify a court in
pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional,
or a provision of a state constitution to be in
contravention of the Constitution . . ., the case
must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the
conflict of the statute with
theconstitution must be irreconcilable,
because it is but a decent respect to the
wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the
legislative body by which any law is passed to
presume in favor of its validity until the
contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary
pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to
the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality
of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its
validity. 18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on
September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et
al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws — Republic
Act Nos.
9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,9405, 9407, 9
408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 — are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Perez and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., I maintain my vote in the original
ponencia. Hence, I concur with the dissent of J. Carpio.
Nachura andDel Castillo, JJ., took no part.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I certify that J. de Castro left
her vote concurring with J. Bersamin — Corona, C.J.
Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., join the
dissenting opinion of J. Carpio.
Abad, J., see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
I dissent.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents
argue that: (1) the petitions on their face do not call for the
exercise of judicial power considering that the share of local
government units in the Internal Revenue Allotments does not
constitute rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable; (2) the 16 Cityhood Laws are not
unconstitutional; and (3) there was no violation of the equal
protection clause.
The crux of the controversy is whether the 16
Cityhood Laws are constitutional. 1
As I have consistently opined, which opinion is
concurred in by the majority members of this Court in the
reinstated Decision of 18 November 2008 and in the assailed
Resolution of 24 August 2010, the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional. cTSDAH
First, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution. This provision reads:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay
shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is
only one Local Government Code. 2 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code to increase the income requirement from
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took
effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from
this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any
exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress
passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be
valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Second, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution permits a valid classification under
the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on
substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane
to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be
limited to existing conditions
only; and
4. The classification must apply
equally to all members of the
same class. 3
As I have previously stressed, there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills
in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of
a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
ABAD, J., concurring:
the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In
short, the classification criterion — mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress — is not rationally related
to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific
condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only.
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood
Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on
an arbitrary date — the filing of their cityhood bills before the
end of the 11th Congress — as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
I repeat, Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution expressly provides that "no . . . city shall be
created . . . except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code." This provision can only be
interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation
of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are
unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code,
provided an exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly,
the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated 24 August
2010. HCITcA
The Court has received flak on this case for supposed
"flip-flopping." But its shifting views are understandable
because of the nearly even soundness of the opposing
advocacies of the two groups of cities over the validity of the
sixteen cityhood laws. 1 It also does not help that the
membership of the Court has been altered by retirements and
replacements at various stages from when it first decided to
annul the laws, to when it reconsidered and upheld their
validity, and to when it reverted to the original position and
declared the laws involved unconstitutional. This to me is a
healthy sign of democracy at work, the members being blind
to the need to conform.
In its Resolution of August 24, 2010, the Court
reversed its December 21, 2009 Decision and denied the quest
for cityhood of sixteen municipalities on the ground that the
laws creating them violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution 2 and the equal protection clause. 3 By that
resolution, the majority also held that the Court erred in
setting aside its November 18, 2008 decision since this latter
had attained finality after the Court's denial of the second
motion for reconsideration of the respondent cities, albeit the
6-6 deadlock vote and the corresponding entry of judgment.
The Issues Presented
The motion for reconsideration of respondent cities
presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the sixteen cityhood laws violate
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Whether or not such laws violate the equal
protection clause; and
3. Whether or not the Court could still modify its
decision dated November 18, 2008.
Discussions
One. In ruling that the sixteen cityhood laws violated
Section 10 of Article X, the majority in the Court held that the
creation of local government units must conform to the
criterion prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. 4 Since those laws, which were passed after the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) 9009, 5 covered
municipalities that did not comply with the amended income
requirement set by the Local Government Code, their
conversion into cities were constitutionally infirm. The
majority held that R.A. 9009 did not provide exemptions from
its application. Although the provisions in the sixteen cityhood
laws established exemptions from such requirement for the
subject municipalities, the same can not be considered
without violating Section 10, Article X, taking into account the
legislature's primary intent in passing R.A. 9009. 6
I take exception on how the majority of the Court
selectively chose to focus on the sponsorship speech of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel to come up with a "primary intent"
theory for R.A. 9009. Surely, the intent of R.A. 9009 can not be
based solely on that speech. The Court should not ignore the
legislative history of R.A. 9009, including the pertinent
exchanges during the interpellation of Senator Pimentel and
Senate President Franklin Drilon, thus:
THE PRESIDENT.
 The Chair would like to ask for some
clarificatory point. . . . HCITcA
THE PRESIDENT.
This is just on the point of the pending bills
in the Senate which propose the
conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which
qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the
sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber
apply the standard as proposed in
this bill to those bills which are
pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, it might not be fair to make
this bill . . . [if] approved, retroact to
the bills that are pending in the
Senate for conversion from
municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT.
Will there be an appropriate language
crafted to reflect that view? Or does
it not become a policy of the
Chamber, assuming that this bill
becomes a law . . . that it will apply to
those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old
version of the [LGC] and are now
pending in the Senate? The Chair
does not know if we can craft a
language which will limit the
application to those which are not
yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy
that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is
necessary to put that provision
because what we are saying here will
form part of the interpretation of this
bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think
that the bill would have any
retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT.
So the understanding is that those bills
which are already pending in the
Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
These will not be affected Mr.
President. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Two things are clear from the above exchanges. First,
the legislature intended to exempt from the amended income
requirement of R.A. 9009 the municipalities that had pending
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. As a matter of fact,
such legislative intent was carried over to the 12th and the
13th Congress when the House of Representatives adopted
Joint Resolutions 8 that sought the exemption of twenty-four
municipalities, including the sixteen, from the application
of R.A. 9009. The continuing intent of Congress culminated in
the inclusion of the exemption clause in the cityhood bills and
their subsequent passage. HEcTAI
Second, it is also clear from the above exchanges
between Senators Pimentel and Drilon that Congress did not
anymore insert an exemption clause from the income
requirement of R.A. 9009 since such exchanges, when read by
the Court, would already reveal the lawmakers' intent
regarding such matter.
Besides, the exemption clause found in each of the
cityhood laws serves as an affirmation of Congress' intent to
exempt them from the increased income requirement of R.A.
9009. These new cities have not altogether been exempted
from the operation of the Local Government Code covering
income requirement. They have been expressly made subject
to the lower income requirement of the old code. There
remains, therefore, substantial compliance with the provision
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitutionwhich provides that
no city may be created "except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code."
The above interpretation accommodates the
"primary" intention of Congress in preventing the mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the
other intention of Congress to exempt the municipalities
which have pending cityhood bills before the enactment
of R.A. 9009.
This is not to say that the views of the majority in the
Court are absolutely illogical or wrong. They are admittedly
plausible. But, given the unstable footing of such views as
evidenced by its shifting positions on the issue, the Court
should have adopted an attitude of becoming humility,
upholding the constitutionality of the acts of a co-equal branch
of government regarding a matter that properly fell within its
powers.
Two. The equal protection clause of
the Constitution seeks to protect persons from being deprived
of life, liberty, or property by the uneven application of
statutes. In invoking this protection, it is incumbent on
petitioner League of Cities to show, not only that the
exemption granted to the sixteen cities amounted to arbitrary
classification but, that the League or their members have been
deprived of life, liberty or property, by reason of the
exemption. The League of Cities has failed to discharge this
burden.
The Court explained in Ichong v. Hernandez 9 the
limits of the equal protection clause, thus:
The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either
in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists (sic) for making a
distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not. (Emphasis
supplied)
 Far from baselessly favoring the sixteen
municipalities, Congress gave them exemptions from the
application of R.A. 9009 based on its sense of justice and
fairness. Senator Alfredo Lim explained this in his sponsorship
speech on House Joint Resolution No. 1, thus:
. . . The imposition of a much higher income
requirement for the creation of a city virtually
delivered a lethal blow to the aspirations of
the 24 municipalities to attain economic
growth and progress. To them, it was unfair;
like any sport — changing the rules in the
middle of the game.
xxx xxx xxx
I, for one, share their view that fairness
dictates that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they could be allowed to
prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status using the criteria
set forth under the Local Government
Code prior to its amendment by R.A. 9009.
xxx xxx xxx
In essence, the Cityhood bills now under
consideration will have the same effect as
that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because
each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the
higher income requirement of R.A. 9009. The
proponents are invoking the exemption on
the basis of justice and fairness. . .
. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
What makes the injustice quite bitter is the fact that
the sixteen cities did not merely have pending cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress. They also met at that time the
income criteria set under Section 450 of the then Local
Government Code.The Court owes to these cities the
considerations that justice and fair play demands. It can not be
denied that substantial distinction sets them apart from the
other cities. AaCEDS
Further, petitioner League of Cities failed to show
that the creation of the sixteen new cities discriminated
against other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the
majority of the present cities in our midst do not meet the
P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local
Government Code. 11 It boggles the mind how these deficient
cities can complain of denial of equal protection of the law.
Besides, assuming an improper classification in the
case of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities can not
invoke the equal protection clause since it has failed to show
that it will suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property by
reason of such classification.
Actually, the existing cities would not cease to exist
nor would their liberties suffer by reason of the enactment of
the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to
deprivation of property since the IRA is not their property until
it has been automatically released. 12 Mere expectancy in the
receipt of IRA can not be regarded as the "property"
envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
Three. The majority maintain that the Court did not
properly set aside its original decision dated November 18,
2008, which earlier invalidated the Cityhood laws since,
procedurally, the Court had previously declared such decision
already final. 13 But a question had been raised regarding the
propriety of such declaration of finality, given a pending
question respecting the consequence of a 6-6 vote on the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws. At any rate, the Court
has under extraordinary circumstances 14reconsidered its
ruling despite an entry of judgment. It will not allow the
technical rules to hinder it from rendering just and equitable
relief. 15
The issues presented in this case do not only involve
rights and obligations of some parties but the constitutionality
of the exercise by Congress of its power to make laws. There is
no reason to uphold the November 18, 2008 decision since the
petitioner League of Cities has failed to overcome the strong
presumption in favor of the cityhood laws' constitutionality.
I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent cities, REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the Court dated August 24, 2010, REINSTATE the Decision of
the Court dated December 21, 2009, and DISMISS the
Consolidated petitions of the League of Cities.
||| (League of Cities of the Phils. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 176951, 177499, 178056 (Resolution), [February 15, 2011], 658
PHIL 275-322)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011.]
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal
capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN
TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, petitioners, vs. SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President
Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,
Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,
Treasurer of the Philippines, respondents.
[G.R. No. 196305. October 18, 2011.]
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, petitioner, vs. SIXTO
BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD,
JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,
PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in
his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 197221. October 18, 2011.]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, petitioner, vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,respondents.
[G.R. No. 197280. October 18, 2011.]
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN
CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
LABAN), petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in
his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, respondents.
[G.R. No. 197282. October 18, 2011.]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 197392. October 18, 2011.]
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011.]
JACINTO V. PARAS, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents-intervenor.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was enacted.
The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to
the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the country's regular national and local
elections. The law as well granted the President the power to
"appoint officers-in-charge(OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.
10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill
No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions
filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No.
10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to
enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely
carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic
act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region. aSCHIT
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November
6, 1990 as required by Section 18 (2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus
fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled
the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on
a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM — RA No. 9140 1 —
on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise
set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15,
2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on
the same date.
RA No. 9333 2 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No.
6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on
June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House
Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM
elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the
House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred
ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version,
Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the
House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments,
and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a
petition filed with this Court — G.R. No. 196271 3 — assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and
challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance
with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another
petition 4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise
as well to the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 5 filed
by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of
the House of Representatives against
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as
the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition 6 filed by Atty. Romulo
Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction 7 filed by Louis "Barok"
Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and CHIaTc
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus 8 filed
by Jacinto Paras as a member of the
House of Representatives against
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.
and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the
ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus 9 against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011,
the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court
ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011.
Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform
their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26 (2), Article VI of theConstitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage
of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the
"elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs
to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of
the Constitution.
 The Issues
From the parties' submissions, the following issues were
recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of
August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No.
10153 violates Section 26 (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No.
10153 requires a supermajority vote
and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the
ARMM regular elections
constitute an amendment to
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA
No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a
supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions
to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the
corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws? DSHcTC
C. Does the requirement of a
plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the
autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint
OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special
elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented
above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that
the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date
to be determined by the President, which may
be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the
election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992,
the first twelve obtaining the highest number
of votes shall serve for six year and the
remaining twelve for three years.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has
to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, 10 which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections. 11
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections —
whether national or local — to once every three years. 12 This
intention finds full support in the discussions during
the Constitutional Commission deliberations. 13
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve
as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of
the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate.
In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 14 we explained: cIECaS
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of
the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office
of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been
synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned Sections that the term
of synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President
 and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the . . . records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used
should be understood in the sense that they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. 15 As this Court explained in People v. Derilo, 16 "[a]s
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political
subdivision. 17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the
elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."
Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections
15 to 21 of this Article — the article wholly devoted to Local
Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of
local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention — that the synchronization mandated
by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM — unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the
course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the
consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be
recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The President's Certification on the Urgency of RA No.
10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA
No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution 18 which provides that before bills
passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception
is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill's
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 19 explained the
effect of the President's certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with
the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The
phrase "except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc."
in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is finally
approved. CADacT
xxx xxx xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the
President, the requirement of three readings
on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported
by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in
consolidation with the Senate version, became
Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second
and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14,
1968] after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. 20 Following
our Tolentino ruling, the President's certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to
our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18,
or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary
powers to the President under Art. VI, Section
23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the
factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with
procedural requirements designed to insure
that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate — in the exercise of
their legislative discretion — gave full recognition to the
President's certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.
Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review. 21
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certification by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them
by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. 22
In any case, despite the President's certification, the two-fold
purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our
legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of
the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment process. 23
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that
both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments
to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions
require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of
the Constitution, this Organic Act may be
reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of
the Members of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of
this Organic Act shall become effective only
when approved by a majority of the vote cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which
shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or
later than ninety (90) days after the approval of
such amendment or revision. ISCaTE
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA
No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No.
9054 only provides for the schedule of the firstARMM elections
and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws — RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 — cannot be considered amendments
to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in
the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or
supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.
This view — that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion — finds support in ARMM's recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled
the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act — RA No. 6734 — not
only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not
even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, 24 leaving
the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647, 25 RA No. 8176, 26 RA No. 8746, 27 RA
No. 8753, 28 and RA No. 9012 29 were all enacted by Congress to
fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not
change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were
not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no
need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act — RA No. 9054 — which lapsed into law
on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held
on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9140 30 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for
the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA
No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, 31 which
further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this
law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections as separate and distinct from theOrganic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA
No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 32 has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
"majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business."
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Court's pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS 33 on this subject
best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to
democratic principles for a legislative body to
have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of
omniscience. CIHAED
xxx xxx xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making
power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or
repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or
by implication by the federal constitution or
limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable
laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power
of repeal may be exercised at the same session
at which the original act was passed; and even
while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a
future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent
of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes. 34(Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is
a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and
flexibility.
 III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively
enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section
18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an
unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.
As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be
included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective, 35 questions on the
extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise
because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the
obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be
required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings as
standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, theOrganic Act constitutionally-
essential to the creation of autonomous regions — i.e., those
aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act — require ratification through
a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b)
the region's judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent
of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. 36
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of theOrganic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide
for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On
this point, an existing law in fact already exists — RA No. 7166 — as
the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already
provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is
an old matter for local governments (with the exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms
are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of
what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections
are in reality local elections by express constitutional
recognition. 37
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile
the schedule of the ARMM's regular elections (which should have
been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed
schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No.
7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options
are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7 (1), Article VII
of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; 38 (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with
the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the
President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in
choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose
the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid
law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying
material premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent
of the powers of Congress to legislate; the secondis the
constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and
the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 39 The legislative body possesses plenary power
for all purposes of civil government. 40 Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 41 Except as limited by theConstitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest. 42 EcHIAC
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either
express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided
in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3).
Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the
autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express
limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident
purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a
part of organic law." 43
The constitutional provisions on autonomy — specifically, Sections
15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution — constitute express
limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise
the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of
the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government
— i.e., that the government must have an executive department
and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and
representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers
granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly
reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and functions not
granted by thisConstitution or by law to the autonomous regions
shall be vested in the National Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve
as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with
legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The
terms of these sections leave no doubt on what
the Constitution intends — the idea of self-rule or self-government,
in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under
these provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15. 44 In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio 45 in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is
in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy — as the term suggests —
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and
limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To
succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its
decision to synchronize the regional elections with the national,
congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataanelections) left it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office — twenty-one
(21) months away — of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this
period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its
established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to
the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a
strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitution's Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the
new 46 and for the introduction of new concepts. 47 As previously
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus,
the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances
when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del
Sur 48 and Dinagat Islands, 49 the creating statutes authorized the
President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive
officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall
have been elected and qualified. 50 A similar authority to appoint
is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-
province to a province. 51 ADCEcI
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity;
out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner
that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably
accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures
was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall
serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the
options available to Congress to address the problems brought
about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly
understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The
proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA
No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional
objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did
Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections
necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option — holdover for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during
the 2008-2011 term — as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC: 52 aEACcS
It is not competent for the legislature to extend
the term of officers by providing that they shall
hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitutionhas in effect or
by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated
as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the
legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an
office the term of which is limited by
the Constitution, extend the term of
the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution."
[Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that
where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its
mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be
respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary
corollary is that none of the three branches of government can
deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as
the Constitution itself may allow. 53 If at all, Congress may only
pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the
constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is
non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only
interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called
for. 54
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness
that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by theConstitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress. ADSTCa
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view — like the extension of the elective term — is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. 55Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. 56 Hence, holdover — whichever way it is
viewed — is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where
the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, 57 Adap v.
Comelec, 58 and Montesclaros v. Comelec, 59 where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers
to local elective officials — the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
— whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII
of RA No. 9054) in the past, 60 we have to remember that the rule
of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it
had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The
deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers;
this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, 62 except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is
for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall
be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. . . . Unless otherwise provided by
law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for . . .
the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so
provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or
the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power. 63 AECDHS
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing
the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date —
May 13, 2011 — for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary
can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the
call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively
legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to
declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional
or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. 64 But
our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done
in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the
petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to
call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional
power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to
call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. 65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the
holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881,
COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date.
However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within,
the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We
quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. — When
for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and
other analogous causes of such a nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu
proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are
afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shallpostpone the election therein to a date
which should be reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for
such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
 Section 6. Failure of election. — If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to
address instances where elections have already been scheduled to
take place but have to be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b)
terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such
a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous causes" will be
restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent
the holding of the scheduled elections. These "analogous causes"
are further defined by the phrase "of such nature that the holding
of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible."
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place
because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c)terrorism, (d) fraud,
or (e) other analogous causes the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6
addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be
suspended because
of unexpected andunforeseen circumstances. EcIDaA
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is
by law — i.e., by congressional policy — and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be
given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers. 66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP
881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no
legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective
officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel
the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise
exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold
office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized
elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms
of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in
the case of barangay officials, 67 is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when
the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes, 68 and extended the terms of the President and
the Vice-President 69 in order to synchronize elections; Congress
was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms
fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute. 70 More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not
this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local
officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years 71 as this tinkering would directly
contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled
in Osmeña.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will
happen — a term of less than two years — if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved,
the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those
officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on
their term (where the "term" means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the "tenure" represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office). 72 As with the fixing of the
elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit
an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do
so.
E. The President's Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress' chosen interim
measure — RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law — as the only measure
that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of
this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. 73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in
thisConstitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
 the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours] aHIDAE
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in
this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone. 74
Since the President's authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA
No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the
authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be "elective and representative of the
constituent political units." This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged
constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law
that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in
terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the
supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is
that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the
interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read — in the manner it was written
and based on its unambiguous facial terms. 75 Aside from its order
for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim
measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the
legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with
it. In more concrete terms and based on the above
considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for
a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials,
is the choice of the President's power to appoint — for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution — an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make? cEaCTS
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend
beyond the adjustment period for synchronizationwould be to
foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For
then, the people's right to choose the leaders to govern them may
be said to be systemicallywithdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach
the "elective and representative" governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is
fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance — both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 —
will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution,
save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily
disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as
well as the community's choice of leaders, but this will take place
under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the
manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units 76 and the adjustments of sub-
provinces to the status of provinces. 77 These measures, too, are
used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization
of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved).
The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the
State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the
interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders
need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this
requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only
the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the
Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing
OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 —
viewed in its proper context — is a law that is not violative of
the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one
that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral
arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the
power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing
him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of
Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as
discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake
with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was
for a very specific and limited purpose — the synchronization of
elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end — the
synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support
that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific,
and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of
elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance
with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as
above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue
to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms,
and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special
elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum
in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be
forgotten that a period of 21 months — or close to 2 years —
intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective
officials' terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao
history — past and current — teach us, many developments, some
of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the country's Muslim
areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the
past. 78 Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the
present circumstances is an absolute necessity. SEIDAC
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We
hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc.,
et al.: 79
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act
No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the
filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary
provision in the Local Government Code and
in the best interest of public service, we see
no cogent reason why the procedure thus
outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit.
As between the President who has supervision
over local governments as provided by law and
the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling
in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and
finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own
local government.
In a republican form of government, the
majority rules through their chosen few, and if
one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc.,
the management of governmental affairs is, to
that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily,
there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing. 80 (Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM.
Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a
conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates —
synchronization and regional autonomy — such that it is necessary
to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic
principle in constitutional construction — ut magis valeat quam
pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole, 81 and one mandate should not be given importance over
the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear. 82 We refer to the Court's declaration inAng-Angco v.
Castillo, et al., 83 thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be
construed in isolation from the rest. Rather,
the constitution must be interpreted as a
whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions
should be reconciled and harmonized in a
manner that may give to all of them full force
and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that
Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to
transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected.
Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or
modify its governing features, except in a very temporary
manner and only as necessitated by the attendant
circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should
not be synchronized with the national and local elections in order
to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own
electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and
local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its
merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of
the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions: EHSADc
Mr. Bennagen. . . . We do not see here a
complete separation from the central
government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region
and the central government. We see this as an
effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is
not really thought of as complete
independence.
 Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-
government within the larger political
framework of the nation. 84 [Emphasis
supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the
above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by
the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article
that autonomy shall be "within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in
light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions
in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection,
the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to "make it
clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of
the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national government[.]"85 Of note is the
Court's pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre 86 which
we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local
autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.
The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. [Emphasis ours.] AIcECS
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a
national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy
granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from
having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional
mandate — the synchronization of national and local elections —
when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the
manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does
not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. 87 As judges, we can only interpret and
apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it. 88
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which
Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem. It
is not within the Court's power to enlarge or abridge laws;
otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive
prerogative of Congress. 89 The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the
realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most
basic principles of a republican and democratic government — the
separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress
acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 90
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly
within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it
acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused
of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty.
We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners' claims of
grave abuse of discretion. aHESCT
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can
only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed
valid. 91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of
a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption. 92 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the
law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. 93 As this
Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary: 94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid
in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of
the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted. 95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED. DHSCTI
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Velasco, Jr., JJ., with dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
The Cases
These are original actions 1 assailing the validity of statutes and
bills on the holding of elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Background
The ARMM Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054), mandated the
holding of the "first regular elections for Governor, Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly . . . on the
second Monday of September 2001." 2 The elected officials would
serve a three-year term beginning 30 September 2001. 3 Before
the September 2001 elections could take place, however, Congress
moved the elections to 26 November 2001 by enacting Republic
Act No. 9140 (RA 9140). 4
Nearly four years later, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9333
(RA 9333) fixing the date of the "regular elections" in the ARMM
"on the second Monday of August 2005 [and] . . . every three years
thereafter." 5 Elections in the ARMM took place on the second
Mondays of August 2005 and August 2008 following RA 9333.
A few months before the ARMM elections on the second Monday
of August 2011, several members of the House of Representatives
jointly filed House Bill No. 4146 (HB 4146), moving the date of the
elections to "the second Monday of May 2013 and . . . every three
years thereafter." As the term of office of the then incumbent
elective officials in the ARMM would expire on 30 September 2011,
HB 4146 authorized the President to appoint officers-in-charge
who would hold office from 30 September 2011 until 30 June 2013
when the officials elected in the May 2013 elections would have
assumed office. HB 4146 aimed to synchronize the ARMM
elections with the local and national elections scheduled on the
second Monday of May 2013. 6 The House of Representatives
approved HB 4146 on 23 March 2011, voting 191-47 with two
abstentions.
After receiving HB 4146, the Senate, where a counterpart measure
(Senate Bill No. 2756 [SB 2756]) was pending, approved its own
version on 6 June 2011 by a vote of 13-7, modifying some parts of
HB 4146 but otherwise leaving its core provisions intact. The
affirmative votes were two votes short of 2/3 of the Senate
membership (23). The following day, the House of Representatives
adopted the Senate's version. On 30 June 2011, the President
signed the measure into law as Republic Act No. 10153 (RA
10153). CTHDcE
After the House of Representatives approved HB 4146, petitioners
in G.R. No. 196271 filed their petition assailing the constitutionality
of HB 4146, SB 2756 and RA 9333. Soon after, petitioner in G.R. No.
196305 filed suit assailing the constitutionality of RA 9333. After
the President signed into law RA 10153, petitioners in G.R. Nos.
197221, 197280, 197282, 197392 and 197454 filed their petitions
assailing the constitutionality of RA 10153. Petitioners in G.R. No.
197280 also assail the constitutionality of RA 9140 and RA 9333. In
a supplemental petition, petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 joined
these latter petitions in questioning the constitutionality of RA
10153.
The petitions against RA 9140, RA 9333 and RA 10153 7 treat these
laws as amending RA 9054 and charge Congress with failing to
comply with the twin requirements prescribed in Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA 9054 8 for amending RA 9054. These twin
requirements are: (1) approval by a 2/3 vote of the members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate voting separately, and (2)
submission of the amendments to ARMM voters in a plebiscite. RA
9140, RA 9333 and RA 10153 do not provide for their submission to
ARMM voters in a plebiscite. On the other hand, although the 191
affirmative votes in the Lower House for HB 4146 satisfied the 2/3
vote threshold in RA 9054, the 13 affirmative votes in the Senate
for SB 2756 fell two votes short of the 2/3 vote threshold.
Petitioners' unanimity ends here, however, for they differ on when
the elections in the ARMM should take place. The petitions
against RA 10153 favor the holding of elections on the second
Monday of August 2011 9 while those attacking RA
9333 only, 10 or together with RA 9140 and RA 10153, 11 seek the
holding of elections on the second Monday of September 2011,
purportedly following RA 9054. Another petition, which finds RA
10153 unconstitutional, leave it to the Court to order special
elections within a period "reasonably close" to the elections
mandated in RA 9333. 12
The petitions against RA 10153 further raise the following issues:
(1) postponing the ARMM elections to the second Monday of May
2013 undermines the republican and autonomous nature of the
ARMM, in violation of the Constitution and RA 9054; (2) granting
the President the power to appoint OICs unconstitutionally
expands his power over the ARMM to encompass not only general
supervision but also control; and, for the petition in G.R. No.
197280, (3) Congress, in enacting RA 10153, defectively waived
theConstitution's requirement for the separate reading of bills and
the advance distribution of their printed copies because the
President's certification for the urgent passage of HB 4146 and SB
2756 was not grounded on public calamity or emergency.
The petition in G.R. No. 196271 extends the reach of its attack to
HB 4146 and SB 2756, for failing to include a provision requiring
the submission of the anticipated law to ARMM voters in a
plebiscite.
In their separate Comments to the petitions in G.R. No. 196271 and
G.R. No. 196305, the Senate and the House of Representatives pray
for the dismissal of the petitions. The Senate disagrees with the
proposition that RA 9333 constitutes an amendment to RA 9054,
treating RA 9333 as merely filling the void left by RA 9054 in failing
to schedule the succeeding regular elections in the ARMM. Thus,
the Senate finds irrelevant the twin requirements in RA 9054 in the
enactment of the assailed laws. Alternatively, the Senate gives a
narrow construction to the plebiscite requirement in RA 9054,
limiting the plebiscite to cover amendatory laws affecting
"substantive matters," as opposed to "administrative concerns"
such as fixing election dates. 13 aESHDA
The House of Representatives accepts the amendatory nature
of RA 9333 but attacks the constitutionality of the twin
requirements in RA 9054 mandating a supermajority vote of each
House of Congress and the approval by ARMM voters in a
plebiscite for purposes of amending RA 9054. The Lower House
grounds its attack on two points: (1) save in exceptional cases not
applicable to the present petitions, the Constitution only requires a
simple majority of a quorum in each House of Congress to enact,
amend or repeal laws; and (2) the rule against the passage of
irrepealable laws. Alternatively, the House of Representatives, like
the Senate, narrowly construes the plebiscite requirement in RA
9054 to cover only amendatory laws creating or expanding the
ARMM's territory.
The Senate and the House of Representatives uniformly contend
that the question on the constitutionality of HB 4146 and SB 2756
is non-justiciable.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the other individual
public respondents, joined causes with the House of
Representatives on the issue of the validity of the twin
requirements in RA 9054 for the passage of amendatory laws. In
defending the President’s authority under RA 10153 to appoint
OICs, the OSG treats the authority as a species of legislation falling
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution authorizing the
President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint." The OSG rejects petitioners' treatment of this authority
as granting the President control over the ARMM, contending
instead that it is analogous to Section 7, Article XVIII of
the Constitution, authorizing the President for a limited period to
appoint sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives.
On 9 August 2011, the Court heard the parties in oral argument.
On 13 September 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from implementing RA 10153.
Meanwhile, the Court authorized the then incumbent elective
officials in the ARMM to continue in office in the event that the
present petitions remain unresolved after the officials' term of
office expires on 30 September 2011.
The Court granted intervention to four groups of parties who filed
comments-in-intervention joining causes with respondents.
The Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
I. Did the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution?
II. Do Section 2 of RA 10153, Section 1 of RA 9333 and Section
2 of RA 9140 constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA 9054? If in the affirmative —
1. Is Section 1, Article XVII of RA
9054 repugnant to Section 1 and
Section 16 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution and violative of the
rule against the passage of
irrepealable laws?; and
2. Does Section 3, Article XVII of RA 9054 apply
only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution? CSHEAI
III. Do Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 —
1. Violate Sections 15, 16, and 18, Article X of
the Constitution?;
2. Fall under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution?; and
3. Repeal the second sentence of Section 7 (1),
Article VII of RA 9054?
IV. Does RA 10153 implement Sections 2 and 5, Article XVIII of
the Constitution?
I vote to declare RA 9333 constitutional, and RA 10153 partly
unconstitutional. The synchronization of the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional.
However, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 authorizing the President
to appoint OICs in place of elective ARMM officials are
unconstitutional. Save in newly created local government units
prior to special or regular elections, elective officials of local
government units like the ARMM cannot be appointed by the
President but must be elected in special or regular elections.
Hence, respondent COMELEC should be ordered to hold special
elections in the ARMM as soon as possible.
Pending the assumption to office of the elected ARMM Governor,
the President, under his general supervision over local
governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the
ARMM Governor. Such appointment is absolutely necessary and
unavoidable to keep functioning essential government services in
the ARMM. On the other hand, I vote to declare unconstitutional
the second sentence of Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA
9054 authorizing ARMM elective officials to hold over until the
election and qualification of their successors. Such hold over
violates the fixed term of office of elective local officials under
the Constitution.
The challenge against the constitutionality of HB 4146 and SB 2756
raises a non-justiciable question, hence immediately dismissible.
Until legislative bills become laws, attacks against their
constitutionality are premature, lying beyond the pale of judicial
review. 14
The President's Certification on Urgency of Legislation
Not Subject to Heightened Scrutiny
Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 claim that Congress defectively
passed RA 10153 for failing to comply with the requirement in
the Constitution for the reading of bills on three separate days and
the advanced distribution of their printed copies in final form
under the second paragraph of Section 26, Article VI, which
provides:
No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal. (Emphasis
supplied) ADaSET
Although the President certified HB 4146 and SB 2756 as urgent
measures, thus dispensing with the bills' separate reading and
advanced distribution, petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 find the basis
of the President's certification, namely, the "need to protect . . .
ARMM’s autonomy . . . and provide mechanism to institutionalize
electoral reforms," as "flimsy," falling short of the Constitution's
requirement of public calamity or emergency. 15
The Court has refused in the past to subject to heightened scrutiny
presidential certifications on the urgency of the passage of
legislative measures. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 16 petitioners in that case questioned the sufficiency of
the President's certification of a "growing budget deficit" as basis
for the urgent passage of revenue measures, claiming that this
does not amount to a public calamity or emergency. The Court
declined to strike down the President’s certification upon a
showing that members of both Houses of Congress had the
opportunity to study the bills and no fundamental constitutional
rights were "at hazard":
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of
the bill in this case was invalid because there
was no emergency, the condition stated in the
certification of a "growing budget deficit" not
being an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate
saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual
basis of the certification. To the contrary, by
passing S. No. 1630 on second and third
readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate
accepted the President's certification. Should
such certification be now reviewed by this
Court, especially when no evidence has been
shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up
on second and third readings on the same day,
the members of the Senate were deprived of
the time needed for the study of a vital piece
of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18,
or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary
powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2),
is subject to judicial review because basic rights
of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual
basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress,
 certainly should elicit a different standard of
review. (Emphasis supplied)
As in Tolentino, Congress, in passing RA 10153, found sufficient the
factual bases for President Aquino's certification of HB 4146 and SB
2756 as emergency measures. Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 do
not allege, and there is nothing on record to show, that members
of Congress were denied the opportunity to examine HB 4146 and
SB 2756 because of the President’s certification. There is thus no
basis to depart from Tolentino. 17
RA 9333 and RA 10153 Supplement
and do not Amend RA 9054
The petitions assailing RA 9333 and RA 10153 are united in their
contention that these amendatory laws to RA 9054 are invalid for
failure to comply with the twin requirements inRA 9054, namely,
that the amendments must be approved by a 2/3 vote of each
House of Congress and submitted to ARMM voters in a plebiscite.
The underlying assumption of petitioners' theory — that RA
9333 and RA 10153 amend RA 9054 — is legally baseless.
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA 9054 on the holding of ARMM
elections provides in part:
First Regular Elections. — The first regular
elections of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice-Governor and members of the regional
legislative assembly under this Organic
Act shall be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. The Commission on Elections
shall promulgate rules and regulations as may
be necessary for the conduct of said election.
(Emphasis supplied) HTSAEa
xxx xxx xxx
The ambit of Section 7 is narrow, confined to the "first regular
elections," scheduled "on the second Monday of September 2001."
This left open the scheduling of electionssucceeding the
"first regular elections."
In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress filled this
void by enacting RA 9333, Section 1 of which provides:
Section 1. Date of Election. — The regular
election for regional Governor and Regional
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall be
held on the second Monday of August
2005. Succeeding regular elections shall be
held on the same date every three years
thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
In the discharge of the same power, Congress subsequently
passed RA 10153, Section 2 of which states:
SEC. 2. Regular Elections. — The regular
elections for the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall be
held on the second (2nd) Monday of May
2013. Succeeding regular elections shall be
held on the same date every three (3) years
thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress intended RA 9054 to govern not only the
"first regular elections" but also succeeding regular elections, it
would have included in Section 7 of Article XVIII a provision stating
to the effect that the succeeding regular elections shall be held on
the same date every three years thereafter, consistent with the
three-year term of office of elective officials in the
ARMM. 18 Instead, RA 9054 confines itself to the "first regular
elections." Tellingly, it is only in Section 1 of RA 9333 and Section 2
of RA 10153 that Congress touched on the succeeding regular
elections in the ARMM, by uniformly providing that
"[s]ucceeding regular elections shall be held" on the date indicated
"every three years thereafter."
The legislative practice of limiting the reach of the ARMM Organic
Act to the first regular elections, leaving the date of the succeeding
regular elections for Congress to fix in a subsequent legislation,
traces its roots in the ARMM's first Organic Act, RA 6734. Section 7,
Article XIX of RA 6734 fixed the date of the "first regular elections,"
to take place "not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety
(90) days" after the ratification of RA 6743. Section 7 reads in full:
The first regular elections of the Regional
Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the
Regional Assembly under this Organic Act shall
be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later
than ninety (90) days after the ratification of
this Act. The Commission on Elections shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary for the conduct of said election.
(Emphasis supplied) DaAISH
To fix the date of the succeeding regular elections, Congress
passed several measures, moving the election day as it deemed
proper. 19 Like RA 9333 and RA 10153, these enactments merely
filled a void created by the narrow wording of RA 6734. RA
9333 and RA 10153 are therefore separate, stand-alone statutes
that do not amend any provision of RA 9054.
RA 9140 Rendered Functus Officio
after 26 November 2001 Elections
Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 attack Section 2 of RA 9140 also for
its failure to comply with the twin requirements in amending RA
9054. 20 To recall, under Section 2 of RA 9140, which immediately
preceded RA 9333, the date of the first elections in the ARMM
under RA 9054 was moved to 26 November 2001.
There is no reason to traverse this issue for the simple reason that
Congress passed RA 9140 solely for the narrow purpose of fixing
the date of the plebiscite for RA 9054 (Section 1) and the date of
the first regular elections in the ARMM under RA 9054 (Section 2).
These electoral exercises took place on 14 August 2001 and 26
November 2001, respectively. Hence, RA 9140 became functus
officio after 26 November 2001. It is futile, in this case, to review
the validity of a functus officio law.
Granting that RA 9333 and RA 10153 Amend
RA 9054, these Laws Remain Valid
That RA 9333 and RA 10153 merely filled a void in RA 9054 would
have sufficed to dispose of the argument that these laws are
invalid for non-compliance with the twin requirements in RA 9054.
These requirements would have been left unreviewed were it not
for the fact that respondents and intervenors vigorously insist on
their invalidity. The issue having been raised squarely, the Court
should pass upon it.
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054
Requiring 2/3 Vote to Amend RA 9054
Unconstitutional
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 requires a 2/3 supermajority vote
of the members of each House of Congress to amend or repeal RA
9054. This provision states:
Consistent with the provisions of
the Constitution, this Organic Act may be
reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of
the Members of the House of Representatives
 and of the Senate voting
separately. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents House of Representatives, COMELEC and individual
officials assail this provision’s constitutionality on two grounds.
First, it is repugnant to Section 16 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution requiring a mere majority of members of both
Houses of Congress to constitute a quorum to do
business. 21 Second, it violates the doctrine barring the passage of
irrepealable laws, a doctrine rooted on the plenary power of
Congress to amend or repeal laws that it enacts. TEcADS
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that "[a] majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business . . .," sets the vote threshold for Congress to conduct its
legislative work in plenary session. Under this provision, a majority
of each House suffices for Congress to hold sessions and pass,
amend, or repeal bills and resolutions, upon a vote of a majority of
the members present who constitute a quorum. In short, a
majority of a quorum, or a majority of a majority, can enact, amend
or repeal laws or approve acts requiring the affirmative action of
Congress, unless the Constitution prescribes a qualified or
supermajority in specific cases. 22
By providing that RA 9054 "may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately," Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 raised the vote
threshold necessary to amend RA 9054 to a level higher than what
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution requires. Thus, without
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054, it takes only 72 23 votes in the
Lower House and 7 24 votes in the Senate to pass amendments or
revisions to RA 9054, assuming a simple quorum in attendance in
either House. With the same provision in the statute books, at least
189 votes in the House of Representatives and at least 15 in the
Senate are needed to enact the same amendatory or repealing
legislation, assuming the same simple quorum in either House. The
repugnancy between the statutory provision and
the Constitution is irreconcilable. Needless to say,
the Constitution prevails.
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 also runs afoul of the inherent
limitation on Congress’ power barring it from passing irrepealable
laws. 25 Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote
threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and
unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’
amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the
plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a
higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact,
amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher
vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution.
The Constitution's rule allowing a simple majority of each House of
Congress to do business evinces the framers' familiarity with the
perennial difficulty plaguing national legislative assemblies in
constituting a quorum. Set the quorum requirement any higher
and plenary legislative work will most likely slow down if not grind
to a halt. The 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA
9054 effectively ensures the near immutability of RA 9054, in
derogation of Congress' plenary power to amend or repeal laws.
Unless theConstitution itself mandates a higher vote threshold to
enact, amend or repeal laws, 26 each House of Congress can do so
by simple majority of the members present who constitute a
quorum.
There is no merit in the proposition that Section 1, Article XVII
of RA 9054 is an "additional safeguard[] to protect and guarantee"
the autonomy of the ARMM. 27 Autonomy, even of the expanded
type prevailing in the ARMM, means vesting of more powers and
resources to the local or regional government units. To say that
autonomy means shackling the hands of Congress in improving
laws or passing remedial legislations betrays a gross misconception
of autonomy.
Nor is the provision in Section 27 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution requiring a 2/3 vote for Congress to override a
presidential veto an argument for the validity of Section 1, Article
XVII of RA 9054. The veto-override provision neither negates the
simple majority rule for Congress to legislate nor allows the
passage of irrepealable laws. The Presidential veto is a power of
the Executive to reject a law 28 passed by Congress, with the
associated power of Congress to override such veto by a 2/3 vote.
This associated power of Congress isnot an independent power to
prescribe a higher vote threshold to enact, amend or repeal laws,
an act which does not involve any Presidential veto but operates as
an auto-limitation on the plenary power of Congress to legislate.
The veto-override provision is a small but vital mechanism
presidential systems adopt to calibrate the balance of power
between the Executive and the Legislature. It ensures the Executive
a substantial voice in legislation by requiring the Legislature to
surmount a vote threshold higher than the simple majority
required to pass the vetoed legislation. The veto-override provision
cannot be used to immobilize future Congresses from amending or
repealing laws by a simple majority vote as provided in Section 16
(2), Article VI of theConstitution. EIASDT
Plebiscite Mandatory only
in Approving Creation or Expansion
of the ARMM
The second paragraph of Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution requires the holding of a plebiscite in the
autonomous region for the approval of its creation, thus:
The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 18 of Article X is substantially similar to Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, mandating that no local government unit
shall be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered" 29 unless, among others, voters of the
affected units approve the proposed measure in a plebiscite.
The narrow ambit of these constitutional provisions, limiting the
plebiscite to changes in the size of the unit's territory, is
commonsensical. The Constitution requires that territorial changes,
affecting the jurisdiction, income, and population of a local
government unit, should not be left solely for politicians to decide
but must be submitted for approval or rejection by the people
affected. 30
In sharp contrast to the narrow scope of Section 10 and Section 18
of Article X of the Constitution, Section 3, Article XVII of RA
9054 mandates the holding of a plebiscite in the ARMM to approve
"[a]ny amendment to or revision of" RA 9054, thus:
Any amendment to or revision of this Organic
Act shall become effective only when approved
by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety
(90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners give a literal interpretation to this provision by applying
it to all amendments to or revisions of RA 9054, including the fixing
of the date of elections in the ARMM thatRA 10153 mandates.
By requiring the holding of a plebiscite to approve
"any amendment to or revision" of RA 9054, Section 3, Article XVII
of RA 9054, a supposed statutory implementation of the second
paragraph of Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution, impermissibly expands the scope of the subject
matter that the Constitution requires to be submitted to a
plebiscite. By barring any change to RA 9054 from taking effect
unless approved by ARMM voters in a plebiscite, even if unrelated
to the ARMM's creation, reduction or expansion, Section 3 of
Article XVII directly contravenes Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution. 31 cDACST
True, the Court held in Disomangcop v. Datumanong 32 that
Republic Act No. 8999 (RA 8999) creating an engineering office
within the ARMM is an "amendatory law which should . . . first
obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it can
validly take effect." 33 This statement, obviously an obiter dicta,
furnishes no ground to support petitioners' interpretation of
Section 3, Article XVII of RA 9054. What the Court resolved
in Disomangcop was whether RA 8999, creating an office
performing functions inconsistent with those created under the
ARMM Organic Act, prevails over the latter. The Court anchored its
negative answer, not on the ground that RA 8999 was invalid for
not having been approved in a plebiscite, but on the fact that RA
8999, signed into law in January 2001, "was repealed and
superseded by RA 9054," enacted in March 2001. Thus, in
disposing of the case, we ruled:
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act
No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and
rendered DPWH Department Order No.
119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it
seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. 34 . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Court was not confronted in Disomangcop, as it is now, with
the issue of whether a law changing the date of elections in the
ARMM should be submitted to ARMM voters in a plebiscite.
Congress' Power to Synchronize National and Local Elections
does not Encompass Appointment of OICs
in Place of Elective Officials
The Constitution impliedly requires the synchronization of
elections for President, Vice-President, members of Congress and
local officials after the end of their first term by simultaneously
ending their tenure on 30 June 1992, extending in the process the
initial tenure of the members of Congress and local officials. 35 As
the Court confirmed inOsmeña v. Commission on
Elections: 36 "[t]he Constitution has mandated a synchronized
national and local election prior to June 30, 1992 or more
specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 — on the second
Monday of May 1992." 37 After the Court struck down Republic
Act No. 7065 in Osmeña for desynchronizing local and national
elections, Congress subsequently passed Republic Act No. 7166 (RA
7166) synchronizing elections for presidential, vice-presidential,
congressional, provincial, city and municipal officials.RA
10153 widens the ambit of the Constitution’s policy of
synchronizing elections by including the ARMM into the loop of
synchronized elections. With the passage of RA 10153, only
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections are excluded from
the synchronized national and local elections. 38
The contention of petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 that the elections
in the ARMM cannot be synchronized with the existing
synchronized national and local elections is untenable. Petitioners
advance the theory that elections in the ARMM are not "local
elections" because ARMM officials are not "local officials" within
the meaning of Sections 2 and 5, Article XVIII of
the Constitution. 39
Under Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, the ARMM is a local
government unit just like provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. Section 1, Article X of the Constitutionprovides:
The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. (Emphasis supplied)
The entire Article X of the Constitution is entitled "Local
Government" because Article X governs the creation of, and the
grant of powers to, all local government units, including
autonomous regions. 40 Thus, elective officials of the ARMM are
local officials because the ARMM is a local government unit, just
like provinces, cities and municipalities.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years . . . ." In
compliance with this provision, ARMM elective officials serve
three-year terms under RA 9054. 41 Congress cannot fix the term
of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than three
years. Clearly, elective officials in the ARMM are "local officials"
and elections in the ARMM, a local government unit, are "local
elections." SDcITH
Congress' power to provide for the simultaneous holding of
elections for national and local officials, however, does not
encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint
officers-in-charge in place of elective local officials, canceling in the
process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise is to sanction
the perversion of the Philippine State's democratic and republican
nature. 42 Offices declared by the Constitution as elective must
be filled up by election and not by appointment. To appoint
officials to offices mandated by the Constitution to be elective,
absent an absolutely unavoidable necessity to keep functioning
essential government services, is a blatant violation of an express
command of the Constitution.
Options to Fill Vacancies in the ARMM
Elective Offices After 30 September 2011
In desiring to include elections in the ARMM in the existing
synchronized national and local elections, Congress faced a
dilemma arising from the different schedules of the election cycles
under RA 7166 and RA 9333. Under RA 7166, national and local
elections simultaneously take place every second Monday of May
in a three-year cycle starting 1992. On the other hand, under RA
9333, elections in the ARMM take place every second Monday of
August in a three-year cycle starting 2005. Thus, a 21-month gap
separates the two electoral cycles. The horn of the dilemma lies in
how to fill up elective offices in the ARMM during this gap.
There are three apparent ways out of this dilemma, namely: (1)
allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a
hold over capacity; (2) authorize the President to appoint OICs; or
(3) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire on 30 June 2013. Two petitions favor partial hold
over pending the holding of special elections. 43 On the other
hand, the OSG defends Congress' choice under RA
10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs who will hold
office until 30 June 2013.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 Authorizing
the President to Appoint OICs
in Elective Local Offices in the
ARMM Unconstitutional
Historically, the legislature has authorized the President to appoint
OICs for elective local offices only as an incident to the creation of
a new local government unit or to its transition from a sub-unit to a
full-fledged political subdivision. Thus, statutes creating the
provinces of Quezon del Sur 44 and Dinagat Islands 45 uniformly
authorized the President to appoint "an interim governor, vice-
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, who
shall serve only until a new set of provincial officials have been
elected and qualified." 46 Similarly, the statute creating the
municipality of T'boli in South Cotabato authorized the President to
"appoint the elective officials of the new Municipality who shall
hold office until their successors shall have been duly elected in the
general elections next following the issuance of this
Decree." 47 The same authorization is found in the Local
Government Code for sub-provinces, authorizing the President to
appoint the interim governor, vice-governor and members of
thesangguniang panlalawigan while the sub-provinces are
transitioning to the status of a province. 48 aCTHEA
These legislative authorizations are rendered imperative by the
fact that incipient or transitioning local government units are
devoid of elective officials prior to special or regular local elections.
Where the law provides for the creation of a local government unit
prior to the election of its local officials, it becomes absolutely
necessary and unavoidablefor the legislature to authorize the
President to appoint interim officials in elective local offices to
insure that essential government services start to function.
In authorizing the President to appoint OICs in the ARMM, Section
3 of RA 10153 provides:
Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. —The
President shall appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.
Section 3 is supplemented by Section 4 which provides the manner
and procedure of appointment 49 while Section 5 states the
qualifications for the OICs. 50
It takes no extensive analysis to conclude that Section 3 is neither
necessary nor unavoidable for the ARMM to function. The ARMM is
an existing, as opposed to a newly created or transitioning, local
government unit created more than two decades ago in 1989. At
the time of the passage of RA 10153, elected officials occupied all
the elective offices in the ARMM. No one claims that it is
impossible to hold special local elections in the ARMM to
determine its next set of elective officials.
Section 3 of RA 10153 negates the representative and democratic
nature of the Philippine State and its political subdivisions such as
the ARMM. 51 Section 18, Article X of theConstitution on
the organic act of autonomous regions expressly requires
the organic act to define the "[b]asic structure of government for
the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
constituent political units." 52 The ARMM’s Organic Act, RA 6734,
as amended byRA 9054, implements Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution by mandating the popular election of its executive
and legislative officials. 53 Section 3 of RA 10153, however,
negates Congress' implementation of the Constitution under RA
9054 by making the executive and legislative offices in the
ARMM appointive.
There is no merit in the OSG's argument that Section 3 of RA
10153 is similar to Section 7, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
authorizing the President to appoint sectoral representatives in
Congress pending the passage of legislation on party-list
representation. 54 The filling of seats in the House of
Representatives under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution is
authorized by the Constitution itself and thus can never be
questioned as unconstitutional. In ratifying the Constitution, the
Filipino people authorized the President to appoint sectoral
representatives for a limited period. However, the appointment by
the President of OICs in the ARMM under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA
10153 is not authorized under the Constitution but is in fact in
violation of the Constitution that the Filipino people ratified
overwhelmingly.
What Section 3 of RA 10153 approximates is the provision in the
Freedom Constitution allowing "[a]ll elective . . . officials [to]
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of
one year from February 25, 1986." 55 Wisely enough, none of the
respondents saw fit to invoke this provision as precedent. The
mass replacement of elective local officials following the EDSA
uprising in 1986 was part of the then revolutionary government's
purging of the local government ranks of officials linked to the
excesses of the previous regime. In making her appointments, then
President Corazon C. Aquino wielded executive and legislative
powers unconstrained by any specific constitutional limitation. This
is not the situation in the present case. HIAESC
Nor is Section 3 of RA 10153 a species of legislation falling under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution authorizing the President
to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint."
This provision does not empower Congress to authorize the
President to fill up by appointment positions that, by express
mandate of theConstitution, are "elective and
representative" offices. Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution obviously refers only to appointive and not
elective offices.
Clearly, authorizing the President to appoint OICs in place of
elective officials in the ARMM, an existing local government unit,
contravenes Section 18, Article X of theConstitution, which
mandates that the "executive department and legislative
assembly" of the ARMM "shall be elective and
representative." Elective local offices in the ARMM, after the
ARMM's creation and holding of regular local elections, cannot be
filled up through the appointment of OICs by the President without
violating Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
However, under Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, the
President exercises "general supervision" over all local
governments. In case it is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to
keep functioning essential government services, the President
may, under his power of general supervision over local
governments, appoint OICs where vacancies occur in existing
elective local offices and the law does not provide for succession,
or where succession is inapplicable because the terms of elective
officials have expired.
Thus, the President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office
of the ARMM Governor pending the holding of special local
elections in the ARMM. The appointment of such officer-in-charge
is absolutely necessary and unavoidable because someone must
insure that essential government services continue to function in
the ARMM. The officer-in-charge shall exercise the powers and
perform the functions of the ARMM Governor under RA 9054 and
related laws until the assumption to office of the elected ARMM
Governor. However, all appointments made by the officer-in-
charge shall terminate upon the assumption to office of the elected
Governor.
It is, however, not absolutely necessary and unavoidable to appoint
OICs in the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly because Section
22, Article VII of RA 9054 provides for the automatic reenactment
of the ARMM budget if the Regional Legislative Assembly fails to
pass the appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal year. 56 Even
without OIC regional assembly members, the ARMM will have an
operational budget for the next fiscal year. However, following the
Local Government Code, which applies suppletorily to the
ARMM,57 "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages
of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and
essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and
supplemental budgets for the preceding year" are deemed
reenacted. 58 The officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM
Governor shall disburse funds from the reenacted budget in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Local Government
Code and its implementing rules. IcESaA
Second Sentence of Section 7 (1),
Article VII of RA 9054 Authorizing
the Hold Over of ARMM Officials
Unconstitutional
Petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 invokes the second sentence of
Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054, which provides:
Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. —
(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor
and members of the Regional Assembly shall
be for a period of three (3) years, which shall
begin at noon on the 30th day of September
next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date three (3) years
thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of
the autonomous region shall continue in
office until their successors are elected and
qualified. 59(Emphasis supplied)
as statutory authorization for ARMM elective officials at the
time of the passage of RA 10153 to remain in office until their
successors, elected in special elections, assume office.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 invokes the same provision to
allow ARMM officials to remain in office until 30 June 2013. On
the other hand, respondents-intervenors 60consider the same
provision unconstitutional for extending the term of office of
ARMM officials beyond the three years mandated in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. There is merit to this latter claim.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution limits the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three years:
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. (Emphasis supplied)
Elective ARMM officials are "local officials" 61 within the meaning
of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The ARMM Charter, RA
9054, complies with Section 8, Article X of theConstitution by
providing that "[t]he terms of office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice-Governor and members of the Regional Assembly
shall be for a period of three (3) years." 62
The question of whether a law may constitutionally mandate the
"hold over" of local officials beyond the expiration of their term as
fixed in the Constitution is not novel. The Court reviewed such a
law in Osmeña and struck down the law, holding that "it is not
competent of the legislature to extend the term of officers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the [C]onstitution has . . . prescribed
the term":
[S]ection 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution . . .
provides that the local official first elected
under the Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA
7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold
over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve
until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified. It has been held
that: AaCEDS
It is not competent for the legislature to extend
the term of officers by providing that they
shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where
theconstitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the
official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that
period, even though the successors fail to
qualify with the time. . . .
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated
as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature
cannot, by an act postponing the election to
fill an office the term of which is limited by
the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by
the Constitution.
Also, there is Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution which provides that:
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. . .
xxx xxx xxx. 63 (Boldfacing supplied;
italicization in the original)
Osmeña is grounded on reasons of power and public policy. First,
the power of Congress to fix the terms of public offices stems from
(1) its inherent power to create such public offices or (2) a
constitutionally delegated power to that effect. Thus, if a public
office is created by the Constitution with a fixed term, or if the
term of a public office created by Congress is fixed by
the Constitution, Congress is devoid of any power to change the
term of that office. Thus, statutes which extend the term of an
elective office as fixed in theConstitution — either by postponing
elections, changing the date of commencement of term of the
successor, or authorizing the incumbent to remain in office until his
successor is elected and qualified — are unconstitutional as it
amounts to an appointment of an official by Congress to a
constitutional office, a power vested either in the Executive or in
the electorate, 64 or a negation of the term of office fixed in
the Constitution.
Second, constitutional provisions fixing the terms of elective
officials serve the ends of democratic republicanism by depriving
elective officials of any legal basis to remain in office after the end
of their terms, ensuring the holding of elections, and paving the
way for the newly elected officials to assume office. 65 Such
provisions, which are found in the1987 Constitution, are framed
upon the belief that to ensure democratic values, there must be
periodic electoral exercises. By refusing to include hold over
provisions in fixing the terms of elective national and non-barangay
local officials, the framers of the 1987 Constitution guaranteed not
only the elective nature of these offices 66 but also secured our
democratic values. ScHAIT
The wisdom of Osmeña is magnified when the evils it seeks to bar
are applied to the elective officials whose terms of office the 1987
Constitution fixed, namely:
 1. President, with a single term of six years,
beginning at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the
election; 67
2. Vice-President, with a term of six years
beginning at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the
election, eligible for one reelection; 68
3. Senators, with a term of six years beginning
at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election,
unless otherwise provided by law,
eligible for two consecutive
reelections; 69
4. Members of the House of Representatives,
with a term of three years beginning
at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election,
unless otherwise provided by law,
eligible for two consecutive
reelections; 70 and
5. Local officials, except barangay officials, with a term of three
years, for a maximum of three consecutive terms. 71
A ruling contrary to Osmeña would allow Congress to pass a law, in
the guise of ensuring the continuity of public service and
preventing a hiatus in office, mandating the President, Vice-
President, Senators, Congressmen and elective local officials other
than barangay officials to remain in office "until their successors
are elected and qualified." In doing so, Congress would have
arrogated to itself the power to lengthen the terms of office of the
President, Vice-President, Senators, Congressmen and non-
barangay elective local officials in contravention of their terms as
fixed in the Constitution. The absence in the Constitution of any
provision allowing the hold over of national and non-barangay
elective local officials or of any provision vesting on Congress the
power to fix the terms of office of these officials means that any
alteration in their terms of office can only be effected through a
constitutional amendment.
The Local Government Code does not authorize the hold over of
elective local officials. 72 This is consistent with the constitutional
provision fixing the term, without hold over, of all elective non-
barangay local officials. With the exception of the hold over
provision in RA 9054, Congress refrained from passing laws
allowing hold over of non-barangay elective local officials. Congress
passed a law to that effect (Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 [RA
9164]) only for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials which
the Court reviewed and upheld in Sambarani v. COMELEC. 73 The
legislature's passage of RA 9164 is in accord with the Constitution's
grant to Congress of the power to determine the term of barangay
officials. HIAEaC
In contrast, Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054, allowing for the
hold over of elective local officials in the ARMM, finds no basis in
the Constitution. Indeed, Section 7 (1) contravenes
the Constitution by extending the term of office of such elective
local officials beyond the three year period fixed in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution.
Beyond the question of power, Osmeña protects democratic values
and assures public order. The certainty of departure from office
that term endings and term limits bring carries with it the certainty
of the holding of regular and periodic elections, securing the
voters' right to elect the officials for the new term. On the other
hand, faced with no choice but to leave office on the day their
terms end, elective officials stand to gain nothing in sabotaging
electoral processes to extend their stay in office.
It is immaterial that the laws Congress enacted in the past
postponing elections in the ARMM all contained provisions for the
hold over of the incumbents until the election of their
successors. 74 None of these laws were challenged before the
Court, thus the Court had no occasion to pass upon their
validity. 75
Nor is the Court’s Resolution of 13 September 2011 authorizing the
then incumbent ARMM elective officials to continue in office under
Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054 a prejudgment of the
provision's validity. The Resolution of 13 September 2011 is a
preliminary, ancillary remedy to ensure the continued functioning
of essential government services in the ARMM. Implicit in the
issuance of the Resolution of 13 September 2011 is the
understanding that such was without prejudice to the resolution of
the issues raised in these petitions, including the validity of Section
7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054.
Section 5, BP 881 Basis for
Holding of Special Elections
The unconstitutionality of Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054 and
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 leaves the holding of special
elections as the only constitutionally permissible option to fill up
the offices of the ARMM Governor, Vice-Governor and members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly after 30 September 2011.
Section 5 ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881), as amended,
authorizes respondent COMELEC to hold special elections "[w]hen
for any serious cause such as . . . loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records . . . the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision . . . ." 76 The tight timeframe in the enactment and
signing into law of RA 10153 on 30 June 2011, and the filing of the
present petitions shortly before and after the signing, rendering
impossible the holding of elections on 8 August 2011 as scheduled
under RA 9333, is a cause analogous to the administrative mishaps
covered in Section 5 of BP 881. The postponement of the ARMM
elections was an unavoidable result of the time lag legislative and
judicial processes normally entail. The ARMM officials to be elected
in the special ARMM elections shall hold office until 30 June 2013,
when the terms of office of elective national and local officials
covered by the synchronized elections also expire.
Electoral and Other Reforms Must be Consistent
With Principles of Regional Autonomy and
Representative Democracy
Beyond the expressly stated policy in RA 10153 of synchronizing
national and local elections, the OSG calls the Court's attention to
the government's other policy goals in enacting RA 10153. The OSG
presents RA 10153 as the cure for the ills plaguing the ARMM,
manifested in the symptoms of padded voters' list, rampant
criminality and highly dynastic politics, among others. "Genuine
regional autonomy," in the OSG's view, starts upon the assumption
to office of the newly elected officials on 30 June 2013, when the
national government, through the OICs, is done cleaning the
ARMM government. 77
In the first place, these policy goals to reform the ARMM society
are nowhere stated or even implied in RA 10153. Electoral reform
is mentioned in the President’s certification on the urgency of HB
4146 and SB 2756 but RA 10153 itself is silent on such policy goal.
The only apparent reason for the enactment of RA 10153 is to
synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections, a policy the legislature can pursue even in the absence of
a constitutional directive to synchronize all elections. HTScEI
In any event, it is a terribly dangerous precedent for this Court to
legitimize the cancelation of scheduled local elections in the ARMM
and allow the appointment of OICs in place of elected local officials
for the purpose of reforming the ARMM society and curing all
social, political and economic ills plaguing it. If this can be done to
the ARMM, it can also be done to other regions, provinces, cities
and municipalities, and worse, it can even be done to the entire
Philippines: cancel scheduled elections, appoint OICs in place of
elective officials, all for the ostensible purpose of reforming society
— a purpose that is perpetually a work-in-progress. This Court
cannot allow itself to be co-opted into such a social re-engineering
in clear violation of the Constitution.
One has to see the problem in the Muslim South in the larger
canvass of the Filipino Muslims' centuries-old struggle for self-
determination. The Muslim problem in southern Mindanao is
rooted on the Philippine State's failure to craft solutions sensitive
to the Filipino Muslims' "common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics." 78 The framers of the 1987 Constitution,
for the first time, recognized these causes and devised a solution
by mandating the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao, a political accommodation radically vesting State
powers to the region, save those withheld by the Constitution and
national laws. 79 Lying at the heart of this unprecedented
empowerment is the Constitution's guarantee that the executive
and legislative offices of the autonomous region shall be "be
elective and representative of the constituent political
units." 80 The essence of an autonomous region is the
untrammeled right of the people in the region to freely choose
those who will govern them. A region is not autonomous if its
leaders are not elected by the people of the region but appointed
by the central government in Manila. It is the solemn duty of this
Court to uphold the genuine autonomy of the ARMM as crafted by
the framers and enshrined in the Constitution. Otherwise, our
Muslim brothers in the South who justifiably seek genuine
autonomy for their region would find no peaceful solution under
the Constitution.
By disenfranchising voters in the ARMM, even for a single electoral
cycle, denying them their fundamental right of electing their
leaders and representatives, RA 10153 strikes at the heart of
the Constitution's project of creating autonomous regions. In the
opinion of the biggest Islamic rebel group in the region, the
cancelation of elections under RA 10153 "speaks loudly why this
entity [ARMM] is not autonomous; it is controlled, nay dictated,
by Manila." 81 Contrary to the OSG's view, denial of the right of
suffrage is always too high a price to pay in exchange for promised
reforms to be undertaken by OICs with no mandate from the
people. Incidentally, the OICs to be appointed under RA 10153 are
not even barred from running in the next ARMM elections,
immediately putting at risk the promised reforms due to obvious
conflict of interest.
The ARMM enjoys no monopoly of the evils the government now
belatedly claims it wants to eradicate in passing RA 10153. Private
armies and political dynasties litter the length and breadth of this
archipelago and spurious voters' registration has perennially
polluted the national voters' list. The solutions to these problems
lie not in tinkering with democratic processes but in addressing
their root causes. Notably, the government recently upgraded the
country's age-old manual elections into an automated system,
ridding the elections of the fraud-prone manual system, without
skipping a single electoral cycle. Similarly, the cleansing of the
voters' list is on track, with the incumbent head of respondent
COMELEC himself admitting that the COMELEC is now 65%-70%
done with biometrics registration. 82
In reviewing legislative measures impinging on core constitutional
principles such as democratic republicanism, the Court, as the last
bulwark of democracy, must necessarily be deontological. The
Court must determine the constitutionality of a law based on the
law's adherence to the Constitution, not on the law's supposed
beneficial consequences. The laudable ends of legislative
measures cannot justify the denial, even if temporal, of the
sovereign people’s constitutional right of suffrage — to choose
freely and periodically "those whom they please to govern
them." 83 The Court should strike a balance between upholding
constitutional imperatives on regional autonomy and republican
democratic principles, on the one hand, and the incumbent
administration's legislative initiative to synchronize elections, on
the other hand. Had it done so here, the Court would have
faithfully performed its sworn duty to protect and uphold
the Constitution without fear or favor. DCHIAS
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT in part the petitions in G.R. Nos.
196271, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392 and 197454 and
declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3, 4 and 5 ofRepublic Act
No. 10153. Respondent Commission on Elections should be
ordered to hold, as soon as possible, special elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao for the positions of
Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly. The officials elected in the special elections should hold
office until 30 June 2013. Pending the holding of special elections
and the assumption to office of the elected ARMM Governor, the
President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the
ARMM Governor.
I further vote to declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the second sentence
of Section 7 (1), Article VII and Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of Republic Act No. 9054.
VELASCO, JR., J., dissenting:
I join Justice Carpio's dissent and agree that the "[C]ongress' power
to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national
and local officials . . . does not encompass the power to authorize
the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective
officials . . . . To hold otherwise is to sanction the perversion of the
Philippine State's democratic and republican nature," and so
sustain the holdover of the incumbent ARMM officials pending the
election and qualification of their successors.
At bar are original actions assailing the validity of statutes and bills
on the holding of elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), the latest of which is Republic Act No. (RA)
10153 entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes. RA
10153 provides, in part:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — In
accordance with the intent and mandate of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166,
entitled: "An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
and for Other Purposes", it is hereby declared
the policy of the State to synchronize national
and local elections. Pursuant thereto, the
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) is hereby synchronized
with the national and local elections as
hereinafter provided.
SEC. 2. Regular Elections. — The regular
elections for the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall be
held on the second (2nd) Monday of May 2013.
Succeeding regular elections shall be held on
the same date every three (3) years thereafter.
 SEC. 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. —
The President shall appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
The petitions assailing the validity of RA 10153 argue that (1) the
postponement of the ARMM elections to the second Monday of
May 2013 undermines the republican and autonomous region of
the ARMM, in violation of the Constitution and RA 9054, 1 the
expanded organic law of ARMM; and (2) granting the President the
power to appoint OICs unconstitutionally expands his power over
the ARMM to encompass not only general supervision but also
control. ICacDE
The ponencia sustains the constitutionality of RA 10153 in toto,
while Justice Carpio's dissent declares unconstitutional Sections 3,
4, and 5 of RA 10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs in
place of elective ARMM officials, ordering instead the respondent
COMELEC "to hold special elections in the ARMM as soon as
possible." On this, I am in full agreement with Justice Carpio's
dissent.
But unlike Justice Carpio's curious proposal that in
the interregnum and pending the holding of special elections, the
President has the power to appoint an OIC in the Office of the
ARMM Governor, I differ and vote for the holding over of the
incumbent pursuant to Sec. 7 (1), Article VII of RA 9054, which
states:
Sec. 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional
Officials. — (1) Terms of Office. The terms of
office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional
Assembly shall be for a period of three (3)
years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th
day of September next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same
date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent
elective officials of the autonomous region
shall continue in effect until their successors
are elected and qualified. (Emphasis supplied.)
The ponencia holds that the foregoing provision is unconstitutional
in accordance with our previous ruling in Osmeña v.
COMELEC. 2 However, it must be noted that the issue inOsmeña on
the power of local elective officials to hold on to their respective
positions pending the election of their successors was not the
very lis mota of the case. The main issue in Osmeña was the
proposed desynchronization of the elections. Hence, the
statement on the issue of holdover can be considered a
mere obiter dictum that cannot be held a binding judicial
precedent.
To recall, in Osmeña, the Congress enacted RA 7056, entitled An
Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Paving
the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections beginning
1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor. Sec. 2 provided for
two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows:
Section 2. Start of Synchronization. — To start
the process of synchronization of elections in
accordance with the policy herein before
declared, there shall be held.
(a) An election for President and Vice-President
of the Philippines, twenty-four (24)
Senators, and all elective Members of
the House of Representatives on
the second Monday of May 1992; and
(b) An election of all provincial, city, and
municipal elective officials on
the second Monday of November
1992. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the Court struck down RA 7056 on the principal ground that
it occasioned a desynchronized election, viz.:
With the clear mandate of the 1987
Constitution to hold synchronized
(simultaneous) national and local elections in
the second Monday of May, 1992, the
inevitable conclusion would be that Republic
Act 7056 is clearly violative of
the Constitution because it provides for the
holding of a desynchronized election. Stated
differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly
Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article
XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the determination of the validity of RA 7056
in Osmeña relied mainly on the resolution of the issue of the
postponement of elections, and the judicial opinion on the issue of
holdover was not necessary for the disposition of the case. Since
an opinion expressed by the Court in the decision upon a cause "by
the way" –– i.e., incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon
the question before it –– is not a binding precedent, 3 the obiter
dictum of the Court in Osmeña on the issue of holdover is not a
binding judicial doctrine material to the resolution of the issue on
desynchronization.
Nonetheless, even assuming that the pronouncement in Osmeña v.
COMELEC on the issue of holdover is not an obiter dictum, the facts
of the present case do not justify a similar conclusion, since the
rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere states that a principle of
law laid down by the court as applicable to a certain state of facts
will only be applied to cases involving the same facts. 4 DcSEHT
A comparison of the factual milieu in Osmeña and the instant
petition reveals an ocean of dissimilarities. In Osmeña, RA 7065
provided for synchronization of the national and local elections in
1995 but it also prescribed that the national elections will be held
in May, 1992 while the local elections will be held in November
1992. There is also no provision for the President to appoint OICs.
Meanwhile, in RA 10153, the law provided for synchronization in
May 2013 but suspended the elections scheduled in August, 2011
and authorized the President to appoint OICs. In view of the
substantial and significant differences in the factual setting of the
two cases, then it cannot be gainsaid that theOsmeña ruling is not
a precedent to the instant petitions.
Further, the Court in Osmeña opined that the holdover of elective
officials espoused by RA 7065 violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII and Sec. 8,
Art. X of the Constitution by adopting and applying certain selected
American jurisprudence. The assailed obiter dictum reads:
[T]here are other provisions of
the Constitution violated by RA 7056. For one,
there is Section 2, Article XVIII of
the Constitution which provides that the local
official first elected under
the Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified. It has been held that:
 It is not competent for the legislature to extend
the term of officers by providing that they shall
hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitutionhas in effect or
by clear implication prescribed the term, (citing
State v. Clark 89 A. 172, 87 Conn537) and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the
official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that
period, even though the successors fail to
qualify with the time. (See 67 CJS p.379,
Citing Minn.-State v. McIntosh, 122 N.W. 462,
Emphasis supplied)
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated
as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature
cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill
an office the term of which is limited by
the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by
the Constitution. (43 Am Jur., 152, page 13)
citing Gemmer v. State, 71 NE 478
Also, there is Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution which provides that:
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms . . . .
A closer look of the American cases on which the above
quoted American Jurisprudence (Am Jur) and Corpus Juris
Secundum (CJS) passages were ultimately based, however, reveals
that they do not justify the conclusions reached in Osmeña and so,
with more reason, they are inapplicable to the present case.
The passage quoted from CJS was based on State v.
Clark 5 and State v. McIntosh. 6 The 1913 case of State v. Clark,
however, does not have the same factual milieu as Osmeña or this
case: the office involved in State v. Clark was not elective but
appointive and a successor has already been appointed. 7 More
importantly, the pivotal issue of the case was whether an
appointment for a period beyond the term set by
the constitution vests the appointed official with a de jure, as
opposed to a de facto, title to occupy the office beyond the
constitutionally prescribed period. 8 That is not the issue of the
present case.
Similarly, State v. McIntosh is not squarely in point with
either Osmeña or this case involving as it does the validity of an act
performed by the outgoing members of the board of county
commissioners less than two hours before their successors, who
were already elected, were qualified to assume office. 9 The
principal doctrine laid down in State v. McIntosh was the limitation
of the acts performed by outgoing officials to the closing up of
pending matters and to matters of necessity, and not to matters
naturally pertaining to the official year. The case did not preclude
the possibility of a holdover when no successor has yet been
elected. In fact, the case intimated that the rule is that in the
absence of constitutional restrictions, outgoing officers are
entitled to holdover until such time as their successors will
qualify. 10 Thus, the cases of Clark and McIntosh cited
inOsmeña are likewise not precedent to the instant
petitions. IaAHCE
Indeed, numerous American cases laid down the rule allowing
holdover of officials beyond the term set by the Constitution as
long as there is no constitutional proscription against it. This is
obvious in the CJS passages omitted in Osmeña v. COMELEC. The
annotation quoted from 67 CJS 379 in Osmeña on holding over is
incomplete and the full and complete text reads:
It is not competent for the legislature to extend
the term of officers by providing that they shall
hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitutionhas in effect or
by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors
fail to qualify with the time. (Quoted
in Osmeña) When the legislature has the
power to fix the commencement of the term, a
provision for holding over under such
circumstances is not in violation of a
constitutional provision that the term of no
officer shall be extended to a longer period
than that for which he is elected or appointed,
and such a provision, contained in an act
creating an office, is not violative of a
constitutional provision that the legislature
shall not create any office, the tenure of
which shall be longer than a prescribed
number of years, when a like provision is in
the constitution. 11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, on the specific topic of "holding over," the CJS
provides:
The term "holding over" when applied to an
officer, implies that the office has a fixed term,
and the incumbent is holding over into the
succeeding term. Since the public interest
ordinarily requires that public offices should be
filled at all times without interruption, as a
general rule, in the absence of an express or
implied constitutional or statutory provision
to the contrary, an officer is entitled to hold
his office until his successor is appointed or
chosen and has qualified. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As previously explained, the annotation that "it is not competent
for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that
they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term" 13 has no application to the instant petitions,
because the cases of Clark andMcIntosh upon which it is anchored
are factually dissimilar to the herein petitions. I point out, however,
that the second sentence in the annotation that a provision for
holdover is not unconstitutional when the legislature has the
power to fix the commencement of the term applies squarely to RA
9054, particularly its assailed Sec. 7, Art. VII which, to reiterate,
reads:
SEC. 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional
Officials. — (1) Terms of Office. The terms of
office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional
Assembly shall be for a period of three (3)
years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th
day of September next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same
date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent
elective officials of the autonomous region
shall continue in effect until their successors
are elected and qualified. (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be disputed that the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao (RA
6734) did not provide for the commencement of the term of the
Governor, Deputy Governor and the Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of ARMM. As such, it falls on the shoulders of
Congress to fix the date of elections which power is concededly
legislative in nature. In the exercise of this power, Congress
enacted RA 9054 which set the elections of the ARMM officials on
the second Monday of September 2001. In addition, said law, in
the aforequoted Sec. 7, Art. VII of said law provided for the
holdover of said officials until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified. Following the jurisprudence cited in CJS,
then the provision of holdover in Sec. 7, Art. VII of RA 9054 is valid
and does not offend the Constitution. To restate, "when the
legislature has the power to fix the commencement of the term, a
provision for holding over under such circumstances is not in
violation of a constitutional provision that the term of no officer
shall be extended to a longer period than that for which he is
elected or appointed, and such a provision . . . is not violative of a
constitutional provision that the legislature shall not create any
office, the tenure of which shall be longer than a prescribed
number of years . . . ." 14 Ergo, it is clear as day that the holdover
provision in RA 9054 is valid and constitutional. SacTCA
More importantly, neither Sec. 2, Art. XVIII or Sec. 8, Art. X of
the Constitution contain any provision against a holdover by an
elective local official of his office pending the election and
qualification of his successor. To recall, Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of
the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives, and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in
1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and
the remaining twelve for three years.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, the absence of any prohibition in Sec. 8, Art.
X of the Constitution is clear:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Thus, the Constitution does not bar a holdover situation.
Accordingly, Congress may legislate what elective positions can be
accorded holdover privilege of the incumbent officials.
Also, besides the absence of a constitutional prohibition against a
holdover, the legislature was conferred by the Constitution with (1)
the power to create the executive and legislative offices in the
ARMM, with the sole limitation that they be elective and
representative, and therefore, (2) the authority to determine the
commencement of the term of the ARMM local officials. Hence, in
conformity with the foregoing American cases, the holdover clause
in Sec. 7 (1), Art. VII of RA 9054 is constitutional and must be
respected as a valid legislative intent.
Even under the passage quoted by Osmeña from Am Jur, the same
conclusion can be reached considering that it is not disputed in this
case that the possibility of holdover by the ARMM officials is but
incidental to the synchronization of the ARMM elections with the
national elections. Hence, the holdover of the incumbent ARMM
officials can be sustained. Read in full, the passages from the Am
Jur provide that a holdover occasioned by a legislation postponing
an election, which is not passed for the sole purpose of extending
official terms but which merely effects an extension as an
incidental result, 15 is valid:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature
cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill
an office the term of which is limited by
the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by
the Constitution. (Quoted in Osmeña). It has
been declared, however, that legislation
postponing an election which is not passed for
the sole purpose of extending official terms,
but which merely effects an extension as an
incidental result, does not affect a legislative
appointment of his successor. In this respect,
however, a distinction is sometimes drawn
between constitutional and statutory
offices. Postponement of an election by the
legislature does not fly in the face of
the Constitution so long as such
postponement is reasonable and does not
destroy the elective character of the office
affected. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
The part quoted by Osmeña v. COMELEC does not apply to the case
at bar, since the facts of the cases from which the quoted sentence
was culled — Gemmer v. State, 17 State ex rel. Hensley v.
Plasters, 18 and Commonwealth v. Gamble 19 –– are not the same
as either the facts of Osmeña v. COMELEC or the present case:
in Gemmer v. State the holdover of the officials per se was not
declared invalid, rather, since the date of election was specifically
provided in the state's constitution, the court found the
postponement of the elections invalid and unconstitutional and so
declared the holdover incidental to the postponement unnecessary
and equally invalid; similarly, State ex rel. Hensley v.
Plastersinvolved a nullification of the postponement of an election
and, hence, the nullification of the incidental holdover;
and Commonwealth v. Gamble principally involved the declaration
of the abolition of a judicial office created by the constitution as an
unwarranted intrusion by the legislature into judicial
independence. Clearly, the passage from the Am Jur quoted
by Osmeña v. COMELEC and the cases of Gemmer, Hensley,
and Gamble cited in Am Jur cannot be considered applicable to the
present case.
Furthermore, it should be considered that a holdover is not
technically an extension of the term of the officer but a
recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer, which is made
imperative by the necessity for a continuous performance of public
functions. In State v. Clark, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held: aTAEHc
The claim of the respondent that it was his
right and his duty to hold over and exercise the
duties and functions of the office after the
expiration of his term until his successor should
be appointed may be conceded. The public
interest requires that such officers shall hold
over when no successor is ready and qualified
to fill the office . . . . The rule has grown out of
the necessities of the case, so that there may
be no time when such offices shall be without
an incumbent. But such hold-over incumbent
is not a de jure officer. He is in for no term,
but holds the office only temporarily until the
 vacancy can be filled by competent authority .
. . . 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, considering the weight of authority and the circumstances of
the present case, the incumbent ARMM officials have the right, as
well as the duty, to continue in office under the principle of
holdover pending the holding of the special elections and the
election and qualification of their successors. This is to prevent a
vacuum in the government services. It is imperative that there shall
be continuity in the vital services so as not to prejudice the public
in general. In Adap v. COMELEC, 21 it was held that "the
application of the holdover principle preserves continuity in the
transaction of official business and prevents hiatus in government
pending the assumption of a successor into office." InTopacio
Nuevo v. Angeles, 22 the Court explained that cases of extreme
necessity justify the application of the holdover principle.
The majority is of the view that if a public office is created by
the Constitution with a fixed term or if the term of a public office
created by Congress is fixed by the Constitution, Congress is devoid
of any power to change the term of that office. Hence, the
holdover of the incumbent officials which amounts to an
appointment by Congress is unconstitutional. I beg to disagree. RA
9054, by providing a holdover of the incumbent officials did NOT
extend the term of said officials. RA 9054 is clear and devoid of any
equivocation. The law merely provided for a procedure in case the
scheduled elections for one reason or another do not push through
and COMELEC resets the elections pursuant to its power under Sec.
5 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The
possibility of a vacuum in the performance of essential government
services is addressed by the holdover provision to avoid any
uncertainty, as in this case, as to the procedure on how the gap is
resolved in determining the interim official who will perform the
functions of the incumbent. As aptly pointed out by Justice Carpio
in his dissent, the necessity of providing for a successor in the
office contested in the last elections in case of failure of elections is
"absolutely necessary and unavoidable to keep functioning
essential government services."
And to reiterate a previous point, a holdover is not technically an
extension of the term of a sitting officer but a recognition of the
incumbent as a de facto officer made necessary to obviate a
detrimental hiatus in public service.
A scenario where Congress passes a law that provides holdover for
all the elective officials (except barangay officials) from President
down to the local officials is flawed in the sense that if the
President does not qualify, Sec. 7, Art. VII of the Constitution kicks
in. However, we can concede that Congress may so provide if the
President is not elected. In this factual setting, it is claimed that the
Congress has arrogated to itself the power to lengthen the terms of
office of said officials in contravention of the Constitution. Again, I
submit that the power of holdover in the imagined statute does
NOT lengthen the prescribed terms of offices of said officials under
the Constitution, unless said law also postpones the elections as
in RA 10153. In such a case, I agree that the postponement of the
elections and the attendant holdover provision are clear
contraventions of the basic law. In RA 9054, however, the elections
are fixed but with the corollary holdover provision in case elections
are not held. To me, this is perfectly valid and constitutional. To
reiterate, the holdover provision has no relevance to the
prescribed terms of offices in the Constitution and is simply a
temporary measure to avoid a vacuum in the office.
Further, while the Local Government Code does not authorize the
holdover of elective officials, there is nothing to prevent Congress
from subsequently enacting a law that effectively amends the
general law for local governments and empowers, pursuant to its
law making power under the Constitution, local officials to hold
over in case of failure of elections or in case all the elective officials
failed to qualify. RA 9054 did not trench on the Constitution,
because there is no prohibition in the Constitution against the
holdover of elective officials. Consequently, Congress by law may
provide for holdover as it did in RA 9054 and other laws postponing
elections in the ARMM, namely, RA 7647, RA 8746, RA 8753, RA
8953 and RA 9140. Over the passage of time, these laws were not
assailed as unconstitutional. Even up to the present time, these
laws have not been challenged as void. As a matter of fact, it
appears that not one of the petitioners sought the nullification
of RA 9054 as unconstitutional. The Court, without such an issue
being presented in any of these fused petitions, should not declare
the assailed portion of RA 9054 unconstitutional. However, even if
the Court feels it proper to take the bull by the horns on that issue,
the outcome will be in favor of the validity and constitutionality of
Sec. 7, Art. VII of RA 9054. DCcHIS
The alternative choice to allow the President to appoint the ARMM
Governor pending the holding of the special elections is not only
intrinsically infirm but also constitutionally invalid for violating the
only limitation provided by the Constitution when it conferred on
Congress the power to create the local offices of the ARMM.
Sec. 18 (1), Art. X of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall enact an organic act for
each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall
be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the express requirement that the executive and
legislative offices in the ARMM be both "elective and
representative," it should not have even been contemplated to
allow the President to substitute his discretion for the will of the
electorate by allowing him to appoint, no matter how briefly, the
ARMM Governor pending the holding of the special elections.
As can be clearly gleaned from Sect. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the appointing power of the President is limited only to appointive
offices. Consider:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in
thisConstitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments,
 agencies, commissions, or boards. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, this Court cannot expand the appointing power of the
President to encompass offices expressly required by
the Constitution to be "elective and representative." The
republican form of government can only be preserved by ensuring
that elective offices can only be filled by persons voted by the
electors.
Even the ponencia recognizes that the grant of the power to
appoint the ARMM officials to the President would trample on the
democratic and republican nature of our government as "the
people's right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to
be systematically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime . . . . [It] would likewise frontally breach the
'elective and representative' governance requirement of Section 18
Article X of the Constitution." However, the ponencia evades the
application of its own observation to the present case on the
ground that "this conclusion would not be true under the very
limited circumstances contemplated under RA 10153where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance . . .
will not systematically be touched or affected at all."
Clearly, the ponencia has discounted the consequences of this
supposedly "limited" enroachment of the President into the very
core of the "elective" and "representative" nature of the offices
subject of the present petitions, which cannot be remedied by
provisions setting the manner and procedure for the appointment
of the OICs or their quaifications.The fact still remains that Secs. 3,
4, and 5 of RA 10153 deprive the ARMM electorate of their choice
of governors and legislators.
Meanwhile, the holdover provision will not affect the elective and
representative nature of the contested offices. For one, the
periodic elections are prescribed by law and must be implemented.
Even if there is failure of elections on the scheduled dates,
COMELEC can set another day when it will be held. With this power
of the COMELEC, the elections will, as sure as day, be held. Thus,
the assurance of having an election has no relevance or connection
to the holdover provision. The mode of holdover is merely a
stopgap solution whenever elections are not held and only for the
period from the date of failed elections up to the eventual holding
of the elections. If we are to ensure democratic values, then the
holding over of a duly elected official is undeniably the proper
remedial action than the appointment of OICs who were not
elected by the peopleand were merely chosen by the President
whose choices may be viewed, rightly or wrongly, as biased, he
being the titular head of the administration political party. TAEDcS
Indeed, the appointment of a person by the President thwarts the
popular will by replacing the person who has been previously
elected by the ARMM electorate to govern them. On the other
hand, an approval of the holdover of the incumbents pending
the election and qualification of their successsors is a ratification of
the constitutional right of the people of the ARMM to select the
their own officials.
With more reason, the authority granted the President to appoint
the ARMM Governor cannot be excused by an expanded
interpretation of the President's power of "general supervision"
over local governments in Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution, as it is
basic that "general supervision" does NOT authorize the President
or any of his alter egos to interfere with local affairs. In Pimentel v.
Aguirre, 23 We explained the scope of the power of the general
supervision, thus:
Section 4 of Article X of
the Constitution confines the President's
power over local governments to one of
general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments. . . ."
This provision has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,
the Court contrasted the President's power of
supervision over local government officials
with that of his power of control over executive
officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms — supervision
and control — differed in meaning and extent.
The Court distinguished them as follows:
". . . In administrative law, supervision
means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter."
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the
Chief Executive wielded no more authority
than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as
they act within the scope of their
authority. "Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such
body," we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the
difference between control and supervision
was further delineated. Officers in control lay
down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are
not followed, they may, in their discretion,
order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it
themselves. On the other hand, supervision
does not cover such authority. Supervising
officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to
such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government,
executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive
officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the
 President, at whose will and behest they can
be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions
are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to
whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by
the Constitution and the law. (Emphasis
supplied.) EHSIcT
Clearly, the President cannot fill the executive and legislative
ARMM Offices by appointment, even temporarily and pending the
holding of the special elections. Such action will not only be outside
the scope of his constitutional authority to do so, but also
further violates the principle of local autonomy, nullifies the will
of the electorate, and contravenes the only limitation set by
the Constitution — that the offices of the executive and legislative
ARMM officials be "elective" and "representative."
Thus, as between the holdover provision per Sec. 7 (1), Art. VII
of RA 9054 and the nebulous unconstitutional exercise of the
general supervision of the President to appoint the officers of
ARMM, I submit that the holdover provision is undeniably superior,
valid, constitutional, and anchored on relevant constitutional
provision, pertinent laws, and foreign and local jurisprudence.
I, therefore, vote to allow the holdover of the ARMM officials
pending the holding of the special elections and the election and
qualification of their successors, and for the holding of the special
elections within three (3) months from the finality of the decision.
Consequently, Sec. 7 (1), Art. VII of RA 9054 is valid and
constitutional. In other respects, I join the dissent of Justice Carpio.
||| (Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271,
196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 197454, [October 18,
2011], 675 PHIL 316-442)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28089. October 25, 1967.]
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION O
N ELECTIONS, respondent.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Ramon Barrios for the Comelec.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor H. C. Fule for the
Republic of the Philippines.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILLS MUST NOT EMBRACE MORE THAN
ONE SUBJECT EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE — This constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power: (1)
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects; (2) the title to the bills is to be couched in
a language sufficient to notify the . . . and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
2. ID.; BILLS, SUBJECT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN TITLE OF. — This
constitution requirement breathes the spirit of command.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does
not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the same,
being of local application, originated.
3. ID.; ID.; MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE TITLE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — Where the title of the statute reads "An
Act Creating The Municipality of Dianaton, in The Province of Lanao
del Sur" which projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by such creation although, in fact, the
two-pronged purpose is to create such municipality purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, and to dismember at the same time two
municipalities in Cotabato, different from the province of Lanao del
Sur, such title is misleading and deceptive, because (1) it did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law;
(2) it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory was being taken away from their towns and province and
being added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur; and (3) it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which weigh
heavily against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
4. ID.; ID; SIZEABLE TERRITORIAL TRANSFER MUST BE REFLECTED IN
TITLE. — Respondent's stance that the change in boundaries of the
two provinces resulting in the substantial diminution of the
territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely the incidental legal
results of the definition of the boundary of the municipality of
Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to said diminution need
not be expressed in the title of the law, such posture but
emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down
the title of the bill, as transfer of a sizeable portion of territory
from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of
area, population and income of the first and the corresponding
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation
of a municipality; yet, the title failed to reflect this fact.
5. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN FELWA VS'. SALAS NOT APPLICABLE;
GERMANE MATTERS NEED NOT BE REFLECTED IN TITLE OF BILL. —
(64 Off. Gaz. [35] 8822) where the constitutionality of the statute
reading "An Act Creating The Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao" has been upheld by the
Court despite the fact that no reference had been made as to the
elective officials of the provinces thus created, is not in focus, "for
surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide
for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is
"manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth
in its title. The statute at bar stands altogether on a different
footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate
provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton,
for a change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made
without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
6. ID.; STATUTES; RULE OF SEPARABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS. — Although the general rule is
that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced; yet, where parts of the
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole,
and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would
not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fall with them.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where the explanatory note to
House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790 states that the twenty-one
barrios (only 9 in Lanao del Sur and 12 in Cotabato, with the seat of
government in Togaig, Cotabato) comprising the new municipality
of Dianaton "is now a progressive community; the aggregate
population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to
maintain an independent municipality" and that "if enacted into
law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves
and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy," unquestionably
the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof,
and the Court may not now say that Congress intended to create
Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches
judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility
point, and to do so indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes
the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect
to the traditional separation of powers, the Court may not now
melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine
instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios, and if these
nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not the Court's, to spell out that congressional
will. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible and it is accordingly null
and void in its totality.
8. ID.; A QUALIFIED VOTER AS PARTY IN INTEREST. — Where
the Commission on Elections has resolved to implement Republic
Act 4790 unless declared unconstitutional despite
recommendation until "clarified by correcting legislation," and
where the right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a
community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that
the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence has
been recognized in this jurisdiction, a qualified voter who expects
to vote in the elections in his own barrio before its annexation to
the newly created town, is an affected party, as he may not want
to vote in a town different from his actual residence; may not
desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities
which are formed into the new town; may prefer to remain in the
place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy
the rights and benefits he acquired therein; may not even know
the candidates of the new town; may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; may feel that his vote should be cast for
the officials in the town before dismemberment, and it stands to
reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part
of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a
suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by
Congress. cdasia
FERNANDO, J ., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NO BILL SHOULD EMBRACE
MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN ITS
TITLE. — The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill. This provision is similar to
those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is
aimed against the evil of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling
legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.
Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the
members of the legislature as well as the people should be
informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject
matter of the bill.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IF ALL PARTS OF THE ACT
WHICH RELATES TO THE SUBJECT FINDS EXPRESSION IN ITS TITLE.
— It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not
technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary
for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The legislative is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is
satisfied if all parts of all act which relates to its subject find
expression in its title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN TO REPUBLIC ACT
4790. — To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it
must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of
the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative
intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios
named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures
precisely that.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADOPTION OF INTERPRETATION TO SUPPORT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION. — Both Philippine and
American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in
the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction
which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to
construction free from such peril." (Chippewa Indians v. United
States (1937) 301 US. 358, 376). Republic Act No. 4790 as above
construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J .:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections 1 is
this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," but
which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate
that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill? "
Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present
original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill
1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the
statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
"SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum,
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung,
in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from
said municipalities and constituted into a
distinct and independent municipality of the
same province to be known as the Municipality
of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The
seat of government of the municipality shall be
in Togaig.
SECTION 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the new municipality shall be
elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven
general elections for local officials.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval."
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just
mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabatoand not of
Lanao del Sur. cdasia
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec
adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the
pertinent portions of which are:
"For purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that
pursuant to R.A. 4790, the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the
barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos
and Magolatung situated in the municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig
and Madalum situated in the municipality of
Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato."
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios - in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of
the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary,
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and
prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15,
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement
aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill. 2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case
of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title
was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of
Representatives, 4 where the bill, being of local application,
originated. 5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. 6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute
conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we
believe, may be taken as guidelines:
"The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether
or not it is misleading; and, while technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need
not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a
title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the
act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its
substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the
constitutional requirement, of giving notice to
all persons interested, should be kept in mind
by the court." 7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the
disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 — projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by
the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated
in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation
has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates
the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios
in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato,
a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are
the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality
of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two
provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of the territorial
limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results
of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato
are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This
posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of
constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill.
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to
another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the
other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And
yet, the title did not reflect this fact. cdphil
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29,
1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there,
the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the
Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the
averment that the provisions of the law (Section 8 thereof) in
reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created,
were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this
pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said
provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall
run the affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly germane to the
subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now
before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping
together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one
statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation
of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the
two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new
municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn
to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the
statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the
Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its Section 1 reads: "The people of the state of
Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the
counties of Muskegon and Ottawa, Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and
the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of
the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by
plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restrain the
Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing of
his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The
Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of
nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
"It may be that the words, `An act to
incorporate the village of Fruitport,' would
have been a sufficient title, and that the words,
`in the county of Muskegon,' were
 unnecessary; but we do not agree with
appellant that the words last quoted may, for
that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a
court cannot reject a part of the title of an act
for the purpose of saving the act.
Schmalz vs. Wooly, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is
to `challenge the attention of those affected by
the act to its provisions.' Savings Bank vs. State
of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the
operation of the act to Muskegon county. The
act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in
Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: `The title is
erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading." 9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title,
were likewise declared unconstitutional. 10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be
salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of
the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the
municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of
Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the
Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del
Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long
standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however,
gives the exception to this rule, thus:
". . . But when the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are
thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them." 11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized
in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
"The general rule is that where part of the
statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced. But in order to do this,
the valid portion must be so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume
that the Legislature would have enacted it by
itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. . . . Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible,
and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . . The language used in the
invalid part of the statute can have no legal
force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
and what remains must express the legislative
will independently of the void part, since the
court has no power to legislate. . ." 12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by
the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if
the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato,
were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the
negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve
as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of
government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in
the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that
they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration
of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an
independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory,
and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced
the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the
new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247,
now Republic Act 4790, reads:
"The territory is now a progressive community;
the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain in
independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the
inhabitants concerned to govern themselves
and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy."
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios— not nine
barrios—was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so,
is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted
into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which
is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the
reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the
observations as to progressive community, large aggregate
population, collective income sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine
barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that
they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent
duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation?
Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived
in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation,
and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the
answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain
deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still
cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to
Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that
Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive
community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we
may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with
only nine—of the original twenty-one—barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches
judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility
point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the
judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to
the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and
recastRepublic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of
the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine
barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress,
not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will. cdasia
Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is accordingly null and
void in its totality. 14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent,
namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely
affected by the implementation ofRepublic Act 4790. Stated
differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party
in interest. cdrep
Here, the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it
violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill
be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on
whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by
lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato,
where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so
created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance
with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction. 15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967
elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed
to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to
vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not
desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities
which are formed into the new town; he may prefer to remain in
the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to
enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even
know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of
desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should
be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since
by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in
its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional
right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is
affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null
and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of
the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence these few
words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation
of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.
The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an
enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios
found in two other municipalities of another province were
included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of
the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be
free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must be
construed as not including the barrios, located not in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang
and Buldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill. 1 This provision is similar to
those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is
aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-
rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. 2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular
matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the
insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill. cda
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not
technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary
for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is
satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find
expression in its title. 3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a provision
of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 4 held
that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization
law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of
the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment
levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the
Bank Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the
Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however,
vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of
the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with
reorganization but with taxation. While the case of
Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare
majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to
be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test
as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos,
and not the strict test as desired by the minority headed by Justice
Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning
with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 5 up to and including
Felwa v. Salas, a 1966 decision, 6 the opinion coming from Chief
Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez, 7 one of the
grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was
predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision.
This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled
"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHT-SIX, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No.
3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government
Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter
which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other
words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for
Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in
any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.
186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and
which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits for its
members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there
was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "We are
not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition
in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference
to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic
Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that the
constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject
which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was
the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in
the title. LLjur
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this
Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious for their
mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition,
that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris
Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State
decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of this
Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be
doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat,
several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were
included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That
itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question
considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by
Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What
justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make
explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato
would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to that validity of such statue, it must be
construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of
the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative
intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios
named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures
precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in
basic principles underlying precedents, which if not precisely
controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealthv. Agregado, 8
certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and
given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the
tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon
Construction, 9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the
Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the
relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle
gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional
history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guariña: 10 "In construing a
statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty
not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of peril." 15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such
another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing risk and is free from the peril of nullity. llpr
so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the
touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead practical considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of
to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in the Court.
violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument ||| (Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-28089, [October
may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be 25, 1967], 128 PHIL 526-547)
disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention
that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful
limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact
an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye
to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to
[their] validity." 11 From the pen of the articulate jurist,
Frankfurter: 12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the
resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed
to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional
adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair
alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional
questions avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely case
continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other
former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is
our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach
conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality',
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48
S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statue is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and
cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice
Clark in a 1963 decision, 13 is that courts "have consistently sought
an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of
legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary
favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater
change of surviving the test of constitutionality." 14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions
unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the language of Van
Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its
validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,
INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR
ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO
PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M.
ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M.
SERRANO and ROMAN
OZAETA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO
M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO
SALITA, and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero
H . Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano, for petitioners.
Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTE INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF
PUBLIC FUNDS; PERSONALITY OF TAXPAYERS TO ATTACK ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY. — In the determination of the degree of
interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761)
2. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 3836; INCREASE IN EMOLUMENTS OF
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. — Republic Act No. 3836 provides for
the retirement benefits for members of Congress which in effect
are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of the
Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder without awaiting the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly
runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of
the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; LAW VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION. — The features of Republic Act 3836 are
discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.) In the first place, while the
said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not
include other elective officials of the provinces, municipalities and
chartered cities. Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of
and employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at Congress). The suit was instituted by
least twenty years. In the third place, all government officers and the PhilippineConstitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a
employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of non-profit, civic organization, duly incorporated
their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic under Philippine laws, by way of petition for prohibition with
Act 3836 because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the
House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress
entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the
salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator
an employee who had been retired and reappointed is suspended or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement
during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and
amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House
Act 3836grants retirement benefits to officials who are not and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying
members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the
have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their end that it provided for the retirement of the members of Congress
monthly salaries to the System. in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void.
4. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF LAW NOT GERMANE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the
— Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of following propositions:
section 12, subsection (c) ofCommonwealth Act 186, as amended 1. The provision for the retirement of the
by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are members and certain officers of
granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System Congress is not expressed in the title
who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of of the bill, in violation of Section 21(1)
age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of Article VI of the Constitution.
of Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding 2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an
paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress attempt to circumvent the
and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Constitutional ban on increase of
Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement salaries of the members of Congress
benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject during their term of office, contrary to
matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. the provisions of Article VI, Section 14
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURT TO DECLARE VOID THE STATUTE. — of the Constitution.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its 3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class
title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to legislation" because it allows
Congress; it is mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to declare members and officers of Congress to
void any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision. retire after twelve (12) years of
(See Walker vs. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional service and gives them a gratuity
Limitations, 8th Ed., Volume I, pp. 162-164.) equivalent to one year salary for every
DECISION four years of service, which is not
REGALA, J p: refundable in case of reinstatement or
re-election of the retiree, while all
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and
fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. other officers and employees of the
 government can retire only after at
least twenty (20) years of service and
are given a gratuity which is only
equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service, which, in any
case, can not exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION
TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
"SECTION 1, Subsection (c), Section twelve
of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred eighty-six as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further
amended to read as follows:
'(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a
member, regardless of age, who has rendered
at least twenty years of service. The benefit
shall in addition to the return of his personal
contributions plus interest and the payment of
the corresponding employer's premiums
described in subsection (a) of Section five
hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for every year
of service, based on the highest rate received,
but not to exceed twenty-four
months; Provided, That the retiring officer or
employee has been in the service of the said
employer or office for at least four years
immediately preceding his retirement.
'Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a
member of the House of Representatives and
to an elective officer of either House of the
Congress, regardless of age, provided that in
the case of a Senator or Member, he must have
served at least twelve years as a Senator
and/or as a member of the House of
Representatives, and, in the case of an elective
officer of either House, he must have served
the government for at least twelve years, not
less than four years of which must have been
rendered as such elective officer:Provided, That
the gratuity payable to a retiring senator,
member of the House of Representatives, or
elective officer, of either House, shall be
equivalent to one year's salary for every four
years of service in the government and the
same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever
and shall be neither liable to attachment or
execution nor refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
This gratuity is payable by the employer of
office concerned which is hereby authorized to
provide the necessary appropriation or pay the
same from any unexpended items of
appropriations or savings in its appropriations.
'Elective or appointive officials and employees
paid gratuity under this subsection shall be
entitled to the commutation of the unused
vacation and sick leave, based on the highest
rate received, which they may have to their
credit at the time of retirement."
"SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
"Approved, June 22, 1963."
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the
respondents, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and contends,
by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the
officers objected to by the petitioner
does not constitute "forbidden
compensation" within the meaning of
Section 14 of Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently
complies with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VI, of
the Constitution that "no bill which
may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."
3. The law in question does not constitute class
legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the
elected officers of Congress who are
authorized to approve vouchers for
payments for funds under the law in
question, and the claimants to the
vouchers to be presented for payment
under said items, were not included in
the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute
this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and
sick leave benefits under the said Act
is merely "in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each
retiring member" and, therefore, is
not an indirect scheme to increase
their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836.
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which
was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines
Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on
May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee
on Civil Service, which on the following May 8, submitted its
REPORT No. 3129, recommending approval of the bill with
amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as
filed — representing the number of years that a senator or
member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under
the bill — must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the
following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME (referring
to GRATUITY) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER
AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION
NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR RE-ELECTION
OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed
amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on
third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to
the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without
amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among
others —
"The inclusion of members of Congress in
subsection (c), Section 12 C. A. 186, as
amended, will enable them to retire
voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a
minimum of twenty years as a Member of
Congress. This gratuity will insure the security
of the family of the retiring member of
Congress without the latter engaging in other
activities which may detract from his exalted
position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is
expected that with this assurance of security
for his loved ones, deserving and well-
intentioned but poor men will be attracted to
serve their people in Congress."
As finally approved, the law (subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section
1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of the House of
Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress
to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must
have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as
member of the House of Representatives. For an elective officer of
either House, he must have served the government for at least
twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been
rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the
employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for
every four years of service in the government. Said gratuity is
exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and
not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the
retiree.
First legal point — personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has
a standing to institute this action. This Court has not hesitated to
examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has
repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is
composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect
their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v.
Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 ([1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic
organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life
whose main objective is to uphold the principles of
theConstitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case
of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other
things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that the expenditures of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of the taxpayers." 1 This legislation
(Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
". . . the relation of a taxpayer of the United
States to the Federal Government is very
different. His interest in the money of the
Treasury — partly realized from taxation and
partly from other sources — is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and
indeterminable; and the effect upon future
taxation of any payment out of the funds, so
remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no
basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of equity "
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is
stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus —
"In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute the
general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and
may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditures of public
moneys." (II Am. Jur. emphasis supplied)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that
the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point — Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836
falls within the
prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act
3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which
reads as follows:
"The senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred
pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only
of travelling expenses to and from their
respective district in the case of Members of
the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of
Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos." (Emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that
the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions upon
the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or
employment in the Government
without forfeiting their respective
seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time
for which they are elected, to any civil
 office which may have been created
or the emoluments whereof shall have
been increased while they were
members of Congress; (Section 16,
Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any
franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein
the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any
Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any
criminal case where an officer or
employee of the Government is
accused. (Section 17, Article
VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic
Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have any special
interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be
favored by any law or resolution authorized by them during their
term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely
surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and
prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical
demonstration or application of the principle of checks and balance
which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In
the light of this background, can We conclude that Congress can
validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its
members, without violating the provisions in the aforementioned
Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the
compensation as including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the
National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per
annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the
enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the
unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress,
composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act
4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to
P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the
Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for
the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only
P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads
as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase." In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase
the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
(See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300;
Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how, zealous were the members of the
Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation for
members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the
original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent
provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in
1940. 2
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14,
Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments".
This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act
3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded
"emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that
which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed
to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." 3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the
profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession
of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain public or
private. The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the
definition or significance of the word "emolument" as applied to
public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or
advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers'
League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 901, 49 Wy.
26; 106 A.L.R. 767).
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright vs. Craig, 202 App.
Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it
has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are
part of compensation of public officials; otherwise their payment
would be unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N. W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it
is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of
Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold
any office, the emoluments of which have been increased during
the session of the Legislature of which he was member, until after
the expiration of his term of office in the Legislature, the word
"emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but includes
fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law
entitled to receive because he holds such office and performed
some service required of the occupant thereof ."
From the decisions of this cases, it is evident that retirement
benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a
part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take
effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963.
Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point — Whether or not the law in question
violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that
the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory,
and therefore violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. (Art III, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who are
elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as
the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial
boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and
chartered cities.
The principles of equal protection of law embodied in
our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case
of People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where we stated that the
classification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial
distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to
the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States (second edition) p. 1937, the principle of the requirement of
equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated.
Why limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to
the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification
here is not reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62],
p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are
given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not
necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and
employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least
twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for
twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given
only one retirement benefits irrespective of their length of service
in the government, whereas, underRepublic Act 3836, because of
no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to
two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an
employee who had been retired and reappointed is suspended
during his new employment (underCommonwealth Act 186, as
amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement
benefits to officials who are not members of the Government
Service Insurance System. Lost grantees of retirement benefits
under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at
least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the system. 4
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features
of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress are
concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each
House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms.
Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms of
each House are given the benefits of retirement without having
served for twenty years as required with other officers and
employees of the Government.
Fourth Legal Point — Whether or not the title of Republic Act
No. 3836 is
germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title
of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of paragraph 1
section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision
with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act
3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding
the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave
privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner
learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco,
disbursing officer of the House, testified on January 30, 1964,
before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case,
and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law
for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year
1964-1965, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of
members of the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED,
That no portion of this Appropriation shall be
transferred to any other item until approved
claims shall have been paid — P210,000.000.
In the appropriation for the House of Representatives, the
following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life
insurance and retirement of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives, as
provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 —
P1,300,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of
the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act. No. 611, and
retirement gratuities of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 — elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeant-at-arms for
P1,300,000.00."
In the Appropriations Act of 1965 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the
following item appears in the appropriations for the Senate:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of
Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED. That no
portion of this appropriation shall be
transferred to any other item until all approved
claims shall have been paid — P100,000.00."
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the
item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act
3836, was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966) the following
items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life
insurance and retirement of members and
employees of the House of Representatives, as
provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 —
P1,200,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of
the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and
retirement gratuities of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 — P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the
first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act
186, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 660 and3096, the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government
Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years
of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane
to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act
3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers
thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for
these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane
to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the
amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and
each House) is not related in any manner to the subject
of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service
Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and
insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory
requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its Construction, Sec. 111.)
title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We
fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not
through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, the Constitution.
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 162; See also Martin, In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions,
Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965] p. 119) namely: first, the pr prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases: Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and
"The Constitutional requirements with respect third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more
to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their than one subject.
contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No.
to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the
necessary that the title be a complete index of retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials
the content." (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535) thereof, as being-unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in
"The Constitutional requirement that the our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent.
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title No costs.
should be reasonably construed so as not to Bengzon, C . J ., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
interfere unduly with the enactment of Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ ., concur.
necessary legislation. It should be given a
practical, rather than technical, construction. It
||| (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-
should be a sufficient compliance with such
23326, [December 18, 1965], 122 PHIL 894-912)
requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject." (Sumulong v.
The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288,
291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title is wholly illustrated and explained in Central
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was
whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act,
was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or
whether its provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in
private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands
of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include
private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this
provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an
Act in its title, is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure,directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty
of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this
constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.]
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by
SALVADOR B.
BRITANICO,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition 1 with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction 2 filed by petitioner Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) 3 and enjoining respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and
House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006
and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On
23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May
2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two
newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business
Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus
took effect on 10 February 2007.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-
sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging
that RA 9369 violated Section 26 (1), Article VI of
theConstitution. 4 Petitioner also assails the constitutionality
of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to
petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application
and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions
of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both
maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to
declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. — Every registered
political party or coalition of political parties,
and every candidate shall each be entitled to
one watcher in every polling place and
canvassing center: Provided That, candidates
for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan
belonging to the same slate or ticket shall
collectively be entitled to only one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant
minority party, which the Commission shall
determine in accordance with law, shall each
be entitled to one official watcher who shall be
paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos
(400.00).
"There shall also * recognized six principal
watchers, representing the six accredited
major political parties excluding the dominant
majority and minority parties, who shall be
designated by the Commission upon
nomination of the said parties. These political
parties shall be determined by the Commission
upon notice and hearing on the basis of the
following circumstances: cACEHI
"(a) The established record of the said parties,
coalition of groups that now composed them,
taking into account, among other things, their
showing in past elections;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective officials
belonging to them ninety (90) days before the
date of election;
"(c) Their identifiable political organizations
and strengths as evidenced by their
organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of
candidates from the municipal level to the
position of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may
determine their relative organizations and
strengths."
2. Section 37 which provides:
SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers for the Election of President and
Vice President: The Commission en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators: Determination of Authenticity and
Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. —
Congress and the Commission en banc shall
determine the authenticity and due execution
of the certificate of canvass for president and
vice president and senators, respectively, as
accomplished and transmitted to it by the local
boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1)
each certificate of canvass was executed,
signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and
transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them; (2) each certificate of
canvass contains the names of all of the
candidates for president and vice president or
senator, as the case may be, and their
corresponding votes in words and their
corresponding votes in words and in figures;
(3) there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificates of canvass
or any of its supporting documents such as
statement of votes by city/municipality/by
precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the
certificate; and (4) there exists no discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the certificates of canvass against the
aggregate number of votes appearing in the
election returns of precincts covered by the
certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified
print copies of election returns or certificates
of canvass may be used for the purpose of
verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province,
city of district, appears to be incomplete, the
Senate President or the Chairman of the
Commission, as the case may be, shall require
the board of canvassers concerned to transmit
by personal delivery, the election returns form
polling places that were not included in the
certificate of canvass and supporting
statements. Said election returns shall be
submitted by personal delivery within two (2)
days from receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certificate of
canvass or supporting statement of votes by
city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures
or alteration which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated herein
and may affect the result of the election, upon
requested * of the presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidate concerned
or his party, Congress or the Commission en
banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for president, vice president or
senator, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness,
erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies
shall be adopted and applied as provided in
Section 17, 18, 19 and 20.
"Any person who present in evidence a
simulated copy of an election return, certificate
of canvass or statement of votes, or a printed
copy of an election return, certificate of
canvass or statement of votes bearing a
simulated certification or a simulated image,
shall be guilty of an election offense shall be
penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881." *
3. Section 38 which provides:
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections
for President, Vice President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. —
For purposes of the elections for president,
vice president, senator, and member of the
House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation
cases shall be allowed on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be,
except as provided for in Section 30 hereof.
However, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu
proprio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns
before it. DTAaCE
"Questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers may be
initiated in the board or directly with the
Commission in accordance with Section 19
hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before
the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on
the municipal certificates of canvass before the
provincial board of canvassers or district board
of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noticed in the minutes of the
respective proceedings."
4. Section 43 which provides:
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 265.Prosecution. — The Commission
shall, through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the power, concurrent with the other
prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same."
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution;
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section
17, Article VI 5 and Paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII 6 of
the Constitution;
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2 (6),
Article IX-C of the Constitution; 7 and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution. 8
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
It is settled that every statute is presumed to be
constitutional. 9 The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who
petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail. 10
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA
9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared
unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution
 Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is
misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of
election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37,
38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to
the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the
title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which
deal not only with the automation process but with everything
related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair,
and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. 11 The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. 12 The title of a law does not have to
be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title. 13 Moreover, a title which declares a
statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and
the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated. 14
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled 'An Act Authorizing
the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in
Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of
Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes'". Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP
881), 15 Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), 16and other related
election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal
with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP
881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26,
30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA
9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed
provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA
9369 which is to amend RA 7166 andBP 881, among
others. CTDAaE
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and
Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate
the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET). According to petitioner, under the amended provisions,
Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election
of President and Vice President (Congress), and the
COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
(COMELEC en banc),for the election of Senators may now
entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the
President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes
that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments
introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and
application of the procedures on pre-proclamation
controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness,
erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The
COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress
and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-
proclamation cases for national elective posts.
The OSG argues that the Constitution does not
prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national elective
posts. According to the OSG, only Section 15 of RA
7166 17expressly disallows pre-proclamation cases involving
national elective posts but this provision was subsequently
amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC, 18 we already discussed
the implications of the amendments introduced by Sections 37
and 38 to Sections 15 and 30 19 of RA 7166, respectively and
we declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of
the amendments introduced by Republic Act
No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the
authenticity and due execution of certificates
of canvass are now allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, and Senators. The
intention of Congress to treat a case falling
under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-
proclamation case is apparent in the fourth
paragraph of the said provision which adopts
and applies to such a case the same procedure
provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20
of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation
controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-
President, Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives, the general rule is still that
pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized
exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions
affecting the composition or proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of
the authenticity and due execution of
certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30
of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369. 20
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en
banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the
SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET
and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions
and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET
can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.
On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential,
and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of
the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that
the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power"
to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is
unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms
of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to
investigate and prosecute election offenses. 21
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC
that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the "exclusive power"
to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws.
Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in
the COMELEC the power to "investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices". This was an important innovation
introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not
in the 1935 22 or 1973 23 Constitutions. 24 The phrase
"[w]here appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power to
determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC
shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other
prosecuting arms of the government. EATCcI
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC
can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government:
Provided, however, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of
Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)
This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history
of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such "exclusive
power" was ever bestowed on the COMELEC. 25
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in
the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise
authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC
was subsequently qualified and explained. 26 The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 — Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to
Prosecute Election Offenses. — The
Commission shall have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the election laws
and to prosecute the same, except as may
otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a
legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of
the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the "exclusive
power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the
framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution.
They did not.
In People v. Basilla, 27 we acknowledged that without
the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants
and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the
course of nationwide elections would simply not be
possible. 28 In COMELEC v. Español, 29 we also stated that
enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload,
the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal officers
to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such
cases. 30 The prompt investigation, prosecution, and
disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable
part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. 31 Thus, given the plenary power of the
legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law
amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate
the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of
the Constitution
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision
which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant
majority and dominant minority parties at P400 on election
day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the
parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and
conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just.
Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using
private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked
the non-impairment clause because this only applies to
previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no
perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is
a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a
contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just
an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty
to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is
vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress
in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that
the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and
equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The
OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation
considering that the dominant majority and minority parties
will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the
right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause.
First, the non-impairment clause is limited in application to
laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties. 32 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes
the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract
yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable
obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than
three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when
the dominant majority and minority parties hired their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they
were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the
provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to
the non-impairment clause. 34 The constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. ETaHCD
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution
1405 35 specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers:
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the
space reserved for them inside the polling
place. They shall have the right to witness and
inform themselves of the proceedings of the
board; to take notes of what they may see or
hear, to take photographs of the proceedings
and incidents, if any, during the counting of
votes, as well as the election returns, tally
board and ballot boxes; to file a protest against
any irregularity or violation of law which they
believe may have been committed by the
board or by any of its members or by any
person; to obtain from the board a certificate
as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon; to read the ballots after
they shall have been read by the chairman, as
well as the election returns after they shall
have been completed and signed by the
members of the board without touching them,
but they shall not speak to any member of the
board, or to any voter, or among themselves,
in such a manner as would disturb the
proceedings of the board; and to be furnished,
upon request, with a certificate of votes for the
candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and all the members of the board
of election inspectors.
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and
minority parties in a precinct shall, if available, affix their
signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that
precinct. 36 The dominant majority and minority parties shall
also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass 37 and
election returns 38 through their respective poll watchers.
Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in the elections.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may
deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 40 we said:
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not
absolute;all contracts and all rights are subject
No. to the police power of the State and not only
may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from
time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts,
Section 34 would still be constitutional because the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with the
COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public
interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers
not only guard the votes of their respective candidates or
political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly
counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest
elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the elections are
transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the
per diem of the poll watchers of the dominant majority and
minority parties promotes the general welfare of the
community and is a valid exercise of police power.
WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 177508, [August 7, 2009], 612 PHIL 793-817)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188179. January 22, 2013.]
HENRY R. GIRON, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG
JR.,and RICARDO L. BAES JR., petitioners-in-
intervention.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Section
12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing
Clause) ofRepublic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act. The present Petition also seeks to prohibit the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from further implementing
the aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on the ground that
these provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign
advantage and allow them to disburse public funds from the time
they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.
On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the
insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner
avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of
the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12
refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14
pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective
office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns
the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after
they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office
other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent
capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the
COMELEC, opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this
Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas v. Executive
Secretary. 1 ECTIHa
Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr., and Ricardo L. Baes Jr.
filed their respective petitions-in-intervention, 2 which essentially
reiterated the ratiocinations of Giron.
Issue permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
Election Act violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule. xxx xxx xxx
Ruling The proscription [under Section 26(1), Article
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal VI of the Constitution] is aimed against the
interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, 3 as evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-
Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
law. 4 Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, provision merely calls for all parts of an act
and unequivocal breach of theConstitution; otherwise, the petition relating to its subject finding expression in its
title.
must fail. 5
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we find that To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a
compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of requirement that the subject of an act shall be
validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They expressed in its title, the Court laid down the
have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling rule that —
in Fariñas, in which we have already ruled that the title and the Constitutional provisions relating to
objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the subject matter and titles of
subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for statutes should not be so narrowly
election propaganda. Below is a reproduction of our exhaustive construed as to cripple or impede the
exposition on the matter in the 10 December 2003 En power of legislation.The requirement
Banc Decision: 6 that the subject of an act shall be
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical
the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which provides: construction. It is sufficient if the title
[SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. —] Sections 67 and 85 of be comprehensive enough
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect,
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby
repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third without expressing each and every
paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of
rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part that object.Mere details need not be
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are set forth. The title need not be an
hereby repealed or modified or amended abstract or index of the Act. aCHDAE
accordingly. aATHIE The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Practices." Section 2 of the law
Election Code, quoted earlier, reads: provides not only the declaration of principles
[SECTION 67]. Candidates holding elective office.— Any but also the objectives thereof:
elective official, whether national or local, running for any
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. —
office other than the one which he is holding in a The State shall, during the election
 period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication
or information to guarantee or ensure
equal opportunity for public service,
including access to media time and
space, and the equitable right to reply,
for public information campaigns and
fora among candidates and assure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation.To require that
the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title
be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code,which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding, to
the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does
not violate the "one subject-one title"
rule.This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the
constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public.In
this case, it cannot be claimed that the
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively
deliberated upon by the members of the
House.(Emphases supplied and citations
omitted)
The reasoning behind Fariñas similarly applies to the claim of
unconstitutionality with respect to Section 12 of the Fair Election
Act. The questioned provision reads:
SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. — In
case of valid substitutions after the official
ballots have been printed, the votes cast for
the substituted candidates shall be considered
as stray votes but shall not invalidate the
whole ballot. For this purpose, the official
ballots shall provide spaces where the voters
may write the name of the substitute
candidates if they are voting for the
latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute
candidate is of the same family name, this
provision shall not apply. aADSIc
To give a contextual background, we observe that Congress
consciously looked for a more generic title in order to express the
thrust of the law. Below is an excerpt from the Bicameral
Conference Committee deliberations: 7
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
....First of all, we will need to answer when we
get back to our own chamber what it
is that there seems to be a rider here
that does not seem to be pertinent or
relevant to the ...germane to the
spirit.And in fact that title and
the purpose for this very Act — It is
an Act to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections through fair
election practices.
It is the opinion of many of us in the House that
this should be the subject of another
legislation rather than a
rider "kuno" on legislation that is
...that refers totally to a different
subject matter. So that's one. ...
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
Okay. May we jump a little ahead of
ourselves, no.But I think it's necessary
to get a little ahead so that we can be
enlightened as to how this will fit,
these particular things will fit into the
whole pie, no.So, what sort of title
then would emanate so as to
accommodate a subject matter which
under the present title or the
proposed titles or the title from the
House or the title from the Senate
would seem to be more
appropriately the subject of another
legislation?
May I draw on the experience of the Chairman
for this, please?
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Yes. We really studied that very carefully and
we weighed, and that's why we
recommended as a last thing was fair
election practices, and we combed in
fact the laws. It becomes fair election
practices. We went through all the
different laws pa kung meron pa
kaming maii-spot na unfairness para
ipapasok pa, pero wala na eh.The
unfairness were in the
opportunity lang to run and then
you're disqualified when you run for
something else. Ngayon we restrict it
only for President and Vice President.
You forfeit ...it's the reverse really of
the present law. ....
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
Okay. So do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that
we can find an appropriate title for
this so that it will not stick out like a
sword and seem to be inappropriate
as part of the whole body?
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Will you feel comfortable with fair election
practices? Baka okey na because it's
really fair na..... ACSaHc
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
So if the scope can be widened so as to cover
this as well, then it should be all
right.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE.
Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to clarify. So
all we're looking for now is
appropriate title to make it broader
so that it would cover this
provision.Is that correct?
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
We're looking for an appropriate coverage
which will result in the
nomenclature.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE.
Because I really do not believe that it is out-of-
place. I think that even with the term
FAIR ELECTION PRACTICE it really
covers it. Because as expressed by
Sen. Roco, those conditions stated
earlier seemed unfair and it is an
election practice and therefore, I
think I'm very comfortable with the
title FAIR ELECTION PRACTICE so that
we can get over with these things so
that we don't come back again until
we find the title. I mean it's one
provision which I think is fair for
everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually
provides for fairness in election
practices as the title implies. ....
CHAIRPERSON MARCOS.
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation
that although it is true that the bulk
of provisions deals with the area of
propaganda and political advertising,
the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage.It says, AN ACT
TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE,
ORDERLY, HONEST, etcetera
ELECTIONS through fair election
practices. But as we said we will put
that aside to discuss later on.
Secondly, I think the declaration of principles
contained in Section 2, paragraph 2, is
perfectly adequate and that it says
that it shall ensure candidates for
public office that be free from any
form of harassment and
discrimination. Surely, this provision in
Section 67 of the old Election Code of
the existing Omnibus Election Code is
a form of harassment or
discrimination. And so I think that in
the effort at leveling the playing field,
we can cover this and it should not be
considered a rider. . . . .
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are
not disputing this but we are looking
for a title that is more generic so that
then we have less ...of an objection
on constitutionality.I think that's the
theory. So, there is acceptance of
this.Maybe we should not call
it nga limitation on elected officials.
Maybe we should say, special
provision on elected officials. So, how
is that? Now, also, then we say. ..On
the short title of the Act, we say.
..(unfinished) .... SHacCD
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
It's done. So, okay na iyun. The title will be FAIR
ELECTION ACT. The rest are wala nang
problema, ano? Wala na. Wala
na. (Italics and boldface supplied)
What the above discussion tells us is that Congress did not limit the
law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing through
various laws, they found other election practices that they
considered inequitable. Some of these practices included the
appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of
candidates and the ipso factoresignation of certain elective officials
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the
playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what
they determined were unfair election practices; hence, the birth of
the Fair Election Act.
After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we find that the assailed
Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing
Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title
of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the
measures embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we
dismiss the Petition and the petitions-in-intervention for failure to
establish a clear breach of the Constitution.
On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention raise various arguments that we deem are matters of
policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate
that the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the
law. Judicial power does not include the determination of the
wisdom, fairness, soundness, or expediency of a statute.
Otherwise, the Court may be accused of engaging in judicial
legislation. As it is Congress that is empowered by
the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we
feel that petitioner's reasoning would be best addressed by the
legislature.
WHEREFORE,the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, [January
22, 2013], 702 PHIL 30-39)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.]
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly
rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs,
MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C.
FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on
Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85,
Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed
of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President, REINATO
QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT
COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its
President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by
themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of
the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his
capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ,J p:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the
Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of
republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not
also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government,
however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge,
because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall
therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment
and fairness. cdrep
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as
implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices. cdphil
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that
their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has
taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such
as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect
judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to
intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the
grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage;
and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of
the Judiciary. cdphil
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to
wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The
theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted.
Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed,
the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of
the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-
rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the
people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered,
in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is
not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its
purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which
provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives
of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy
transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of
their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange,
cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal
matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal
services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to,
philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and
the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are
generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the varied
range of postal delivery and messengerial
services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by
the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the
petition, reads as follows:
SECTION 35. Repealing Clause.— All acts,
decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly. cdphil
All franking privileges authorized by law are
hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic
 Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059.
The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October
24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under
such arrangements and conditions as may
obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the
title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there
is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment
of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title
would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be
specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the
title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in
the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same
act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way
of its execution. If such matters are properly
connected with the subject as expressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also
have special mention in the title (Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley
writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It
would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act
and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of
previous legislations connected therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly
expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an
act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed
that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must
be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be
neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege
from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to
be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35
covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners
and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26was not included
in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of
the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the
House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress
that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between
both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been
validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is
not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally
with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences between the
two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits
the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where
the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on
the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nayson the final reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate
and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the
 legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on
the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the
same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines;
the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in
the filing of complaints against public offices or officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because
the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the
equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
Education; the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces
of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the
Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang
Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial
and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide
for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism
or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.
This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as
where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first
place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the
Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents
of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is
it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or
because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the
statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon by the political
departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to
suspect, however, that not enough care (or attention) was given to
its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere
courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments
would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third
of the major and equal departments of the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee
was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and
even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and
the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the
departments of the government, it is the Judiciary that has been
denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is
any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is
the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out.
Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the
basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary
the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data
from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June
1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00.
of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies
whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as
the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from
the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from
the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable
volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be
withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect
saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those
who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former
Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice).It is like saying that a person may be allowed
cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an
operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of the government, including those
who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may
not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. LexLib
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on
the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may
appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as
that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we
are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in
the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable
need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippine Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former
Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as
much frank mails as the Judiciary).
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a
government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected
to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it
may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter,
like exemption from taxes, customs and tariff duties. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail
for certain offices of the government that need the franking
privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is
capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the
sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the tax exemptions it
enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege by
the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the
administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking
privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves,
should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal
service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the
judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the
national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%,or
less than 1%,is allotted to the Judiciary. It should not be hard to
imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix ||| (Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371,
a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of [November 11, 1993], 298 PHIL 502-517)
their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35
of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of
the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary
may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has
the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject
is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of
the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar
discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our
own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however
undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are
prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot even debate with our
detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as the law
imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us
the light to be right. cdll
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35
of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-
28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and
the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds
to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20740. June 30, 1964.]
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,
CHRONICLE BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,
and MONSERRAT BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
INC., petitioners, vs. BRIGIDO VALENCIA,
Secretary of the Department of Public Works
& Communications and ROBERT SAN ANDRES
of the Radio Control Division, respondents.
V. J. Francisco and A. Almeda Lopez and San Juan,
Africa & Benedicto for petitioners.
Solicitor General for respondents.
Enrique Fernando as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT MAY NOT VETO
SEPARATELY A CONDITION ATTACHED TO AN ITEM IN THE
APPROPRIATION BILL. — The President may not legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill without at the same time vetoing the
particular item or items to which it relates.
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL VETO. — If
the veto of a condition attached to an item of an appropriation
bill is unconstitutional, the same produces no effect
whatsoever and the condition imposed by the appropriation
bill remains.
3. RADIO CONTROL LAWS; NO BASIS FOR
INVESTIGATION WHERE VIOLATION BEING INVESTIGATED
CEASED TO EXIST. — Where it appears that the circulars issued
by the respondent officials condoned the previous non-
observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations
regarding late-filing of applications for renewal of licenses, and
the lone reason given for the investigation of a station
operator's application is the late — filing thereof, it is held that
said reason being no longer tenable, the violation, in legal
effect, ceased to exist, and, hence there is no legal basis for
said investigation.
4. ID.; NO ABANDONMENT OF TELEVISION STATION
TO OPERATE CHANNEL IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT;
STATEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT DOES NOT ESTABLISH
AGREEMENT. — A statement appearing in the construction
permit to transfer a television station from one city to another,
does not establish any agreement between the radio control
authority and the station operator on the switch or change of
operations from one channel to another, and therefore does
not constitute any evidence of abandonment of a television
station to operate its channel.
5. ID.; ID.; REMARKS IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT TO
ONE STATION DOES NOT BIND ANOTHER STATION. — The
remarks appearing in the construction permit issued to one
broadcasting station cannot bind another operator where the
latter had no participation in the preparation of said permit.
DECISION
BARRERA, J p:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory
injunction with preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao
Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.,
and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and
operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control
Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of
the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to
intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station
in Manila.
From the various pleadings presented by the parties
including their written memoranda as well as the oral
arguments adduced during the hearing of this case, the issues
presented to the Court for resolution are: (1) whether the
investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection
with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station
licenses, has any legal basis; (2) whether or not there was
abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting
Network (CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3) whether
or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate
Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give
up operations thereof.
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act
584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications (formerly Commerce and
Communications), provides:
"SEC. 3.
"(1) He may approve or disapprove
any application for renewal of station or
operator license: Provided, however, That no
application for renewal shall be disapproved
without giving the licensee a hearing."
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents
allegedly are now conducting the investigation in connection
with the petitions for renewal.
The notices of hearing, sent by respondents to
petitioners, in connection with the applications involved
herein, are uniformly worded, thus:
"(Name of station operator)
_____________________
(Address)
_____________________
_____________________
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your application
for renewal of your radio station license No.
___ authorizing you to operate (Name of
station), a (broadcast or TV) station, which
expired on (Expiration date of previous license.)
It is noted that said application was
received in this Office on (Date of receipt of
application) or (length of period of delay)
month after said license has expired which is a
clear violation of Sections 12 and 14 of
Department Order No. 11, which is hereunder
quoted:
'SEC. 12. — License Required
for Operation of Transmitter,
Transceiver, or Station. — No radio
transmitter or radio station shall be
operated without first obtaining from
the Secretary of Public Works &
Communications a radio station
license.
'SEC. 14. — When to Apply
for Renewal. — If renewal of a station
license is desired, the licensee shall
submit an application to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications
two (2) months before the expiration
date of the license to be renewed,
Application should be made on
prescribed forms furnished for the
purpose.'
"Please take notice that on January
28, 1963, at 9:00 a.m., the matter will be heard
before the duly authorized representative of
the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, at the Conference Room,
Office of the Secretary, Third Floor, Post Office
Building, Plaza Lawton, Manila
(Commonwealth Act No. 3846, Sec. 3,
subsection h). Your failure to appear at the said
hearing will be construed as a waiver on your
part to be heard and this Office shall forthwith
act on said application in accordance with
existing Radio Laws, Rules and Regulations.
"Very truly yours,
"s/ Jose L. Lachica
"t/ JOSE L. LACHICA
"Acting Undersecretary"
Also, passing upon petitioners' motion for dismissal of
the aforementioned investigation conducted by respondents,
it was ruled, thus:
"The present hearing, as the notices
quoted above show, is precisely the hearing
required by Section 3 (1) of Act 3846, as
amended. It is an indispensable step in the
processing of application of licenses, when and
if summary approval, for one reason or
another, real or fancied, could not be given as
in the instant case. Certainly, the respondents
(movants) themselves would be the first ones
to raise their voice of protest, if their
application for renewal were to be summarily
disapproved, without benefit of any hearing."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out
whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for
renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to
be the ground for the disapproval of the applications, is the
alleged late filing of the petitions for renewal. The notices sent
to petitioners (which in effect take the place of a complaint in
civil or administrative cases or an information in a criminal
action) alleged only one supposed violation which would
justify disapproval. But petitioners claim that this violation has
ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or
pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July 24, 1962, which in its pertinent part, reads: cdt
"CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS,
MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO TRAINING
SCHOOLS
"It has come to the attention of this
Office that a great number of radio station
operators have been conducting their
operations resorting to practices which are in
violation of existing laws and regulations, such
as:
xxx xxx xxx
"6. Late submission of
applications for new and renewal
licenses.
"It is now the intention of this Office
to correct whatever laxity which in the past has
encouraged this illegal practices, to strictly
enforce the radio regulations and to take
drastic action against violators of these
regulations.
"You are, therefore, requested to
examine closely your operating practices,
permits and licenses and take remedial
measures as soon as possible but not later than
August 10, 1962.
"(Sgd.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES
Radio Regulation Chief
"APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. FELICIANO
Undersecretary"
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains
petitioners' contention that the previous non-observance by
station operators of radio laws and regulations of the Radio
Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among
others, was condoned if the necessary steps were taken to
correct their records and practices before August 10, 1962. It is
not denied that herein subject applications for renewal were
all made before said date, or even before the issuance of the
circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason given for the
investigation of petitioners' application, i.e., late filing thereof,
is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect,
ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the
present investigation. The raison d'etre for it has disappeared.
Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation
of the law authorizing investigations in connection with
applications for renewal of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to
condone or pardon violations of the radio control regulations
cannot be upheld: Firstly, by specific provision of law, 1the
respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion
either to "bring criminal action against violators of the radio
laws or the regulations and confiscate the radio apparatus in
case of illegal operation; or simply suspend or revoke the
offender's station or operator licenses or refuse to renew such
licenses; or just reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited
circular specifically approved by the Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications (who has not been shown to have
acted beyond his powers as such in representation of the
Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act
authorized under the law. Secondly, the circular having been
issued by respondents themselves, the latter can not now
claim its illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or
renunciation by petitioner CBN of its right to operate on
Channel 9. It is admitted that there was no express agreement
to this effect. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement
"Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the
construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from
Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This
statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement
between the radio control authority and the station operator,
on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9
to Channel 10. As explained by petitioner, it was made to
understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in connection
with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be
effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This was
necessary to avoid interference of its broadcast with that of
the Clark Air Force base station in Pampanga which is
operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would be
assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to
operate. When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to
be abandoned, it did not mean abandonment by the station of
its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks
appearing in the construction permit No. 793, issued to the
Philippine Broadcasting Service, that "construction of this
station shall be begun after DZXL- TV (Channel 9) Manila of
Chronicle Broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is
approved." It is claimed that upon the approval of the request
to transfer, the petitioner was deemed to have renounced or
abandoned Channel 9. This statement cannot bind petitioner.
In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause
"Chronicle Broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is
approved" was merely placed by respondents' personnel after
erasing the original words written therein. And, it does not
appear what were really written there before the erasure. In
the second place, CBN had no participation in the preparation
of said permit. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an inter
alios acta which can not bind it. And finally, the fact that CBN
was allowed to continue and did continue operating on
Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed transfer, is
proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that
channel upon the approval of its petition to transfer. There
being no proof that petitioner had really waived or renounced
its right to operate on Channel 9, respondents committed
error in refusing to grant or approve petitioner's application
for renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV, Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would
have been sufficient to state that it having failed to prove the
alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the
exchange of use of Channels 9 and 10, no right belonging to
said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to
give up its present operation of Channel 9. However, it may
also be added that as the records show, the appropriation to
operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines, was provided as follows:
"PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
"1. For contribution to the operation
of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,
including promotion, programming, operations
and general administration; Provided, That no
portion of this appropriation shall be used for
the operation of television stations in Luzon or
any part of the Philippines where there ore
television stations . . . P300,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
"VI. — SPECIAL PROVISIONS
"1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. No amount appropriated for
televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the
Philippines where there are television
stations." (Emphasis supplied.)
Disallowing some of the items in the
said Appropriations Act, the President included
the following in his veto message:
"(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
"IV. — SPECIAL PURPOSE
"1. For contribution to the operation
of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, . . .
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation
shall be used for the operation of television
stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines
where there are television stations.
"5. No amount appropriated for
televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the
Philippines where there are television stations.
"These two provisions if approved will
render inoperative the television stations
currently operated by the Philippine
Broadcasting Service which started last
September, 1961, in Manila."
Under the Constitution, the President has the power
to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill.
However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one
or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item
or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)
It may be observed from the wordings of the
Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the
operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made
subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or
 expended for operation of television stations in Luzon where
there are already existing commercial television stations. This
gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally
veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little
effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough
authority to guide action on the matter. For, in the leading
case of State vs. Holder 2 it was already declared that such
action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the
executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. 3 If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows
that the same produced no effect whatsoever, 4 and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the
purpose of installing or operating a television station in
Manila, where there are already television stations in
operation, would be in violation of the express condition for
the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and
void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove
its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not
have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
writ prayed for by petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J.,took no part.
||| (Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, [June
30, 1964], 120 PHIL 469-478)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1123. March 5, 1947.]
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE
LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera,
Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio
Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General
Tañada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF
ENACTMENT OR RESOLUTION DISTINGUISHED FROM. —
Jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, should not
be confused with conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIARY;
POLITICAL QUESTIONS NOT WITHIN PROVINCE OF. — Political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except
to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPOSAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT A POLITICAL QUESTION. — If ratification of a
constitutional amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The
two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of
the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and with-holding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
politics function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even
independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of
a ratification.
4. EVIDENCE; DULY AUTHENTICATED BILL OR
RESOLUTION, CONCLUSIVENESS OF. — A duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts. The rule conforms to the policy of the law making body
as expressed in section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 2210.
DECISION
TUASON, J p:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
theConstitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto." The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The
validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as
contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation
of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the
facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the
proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices
to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the
plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority
vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23,
1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in
their election. The eight representatives since their election
had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take
part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution
for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to
the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-
fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the
jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court
has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of
an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the
petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which
is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an
enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and
practice. This objection, however, is purely academic.
Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between
the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil
down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are
synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the
judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent
departments of the Government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of
authorities, that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This
doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation
or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The
term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of
the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with
the actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its
circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in
122 A. L. R., 695. That case, by a majority decision delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that
the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of
the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted
within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the
state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question,
a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme
intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV
of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of
a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the
submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could
render it dangerous to the stability of the
government; because the measure derives all
its vital force from the action of the people at
the ballot box , and there can never be danger
in submitting in an established form, to a free
people, the proposition whether they will
change their fundamental law. The means
provided for the exercise of their sovereign
right of changing their constitutionshould
receive such a construction as not to trammel
the exercise of the right. Difficulties and
embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government,
which is inherent in the people; and the best
security against tumult and revolution is the
free and unobstructed privilege to the people
of the State to change their constitutionin the
mode prescribed by the instrument."
(Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L. R.
A., N. S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by
Justices Roberts, Flankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating
between proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion
we quote the following paragraphs:
"The Constitution grant Congress
exclusive power to control submission of
constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by
three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is
conclusive upon the courts.' In the exercise of
that power, Congress, of course, is governed by
the Constitution. However, whether
submission, intervening procedure or
Congressional determination of ratification
conforms to the commands of
the Constitution, call for decisions by a
'political department' of questions of a type
which this Court has frequently designated
'political.' And decision of a 'political question'
by the 'political department' to which
the Constitution has committed it 'conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of . . . government.'
Proclamation under authority of Congress that
an amendment has been ratified will carry with
it a solemn assurance by the Congress that
ratification has taken place as
the Constitution commands. Upon this
assurance a proclaimed amendment must be
accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving
to the judiciary its traditional authority of
interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly
assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional
authority of Congress over submission and
ratification of amendments, we are unable to
agree.
"The State court below assumed
jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between
submission and final adoption. However, it is
apparent that judicial review of or
pronouncements upon a supposed limitation
of a 'reasonable time' within which Congress
may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded
properly in ratifying or voting for ratification;
or whether a State may reverse its action once
taken upon a proposed amendment; and
kindred questions, are all consistent only with
an ultimate control over the amending process
in the courts. And this must inevitably
embarrass the course of amendment by
subjecting to judicial interference matters that
we believe were entrusted by
the Constitution solely to the political branch
of government.
"The Court here treats the amending
process of the Constitution in some respects as
subject to judicial construction, in others as
subject to the final authority of the Congress.
There is no disapproval of the conclusion
arrived at in Drillon vs. Gloss, that
the Constitution impliedly requires that a
properly submitted amendment must die
unless ratified within a 'reasonable time.' Nor
does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a
pronouncement. And it is not made clear that
only Congress has constitutional power to
determine if there is any such implication in
Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the Court's opinion declares that
Congress has the exclusive power to decide the
'political questions' of whether a State whose
legislation has once acted upon a proposed
amendment may subsequently reverse its
position, and whether, in the circumstances of
such a case as this, an amendment is dead
because an 'unreasonable' time has elapsed.
No such division between the political and
judicial branches of the government is made by
Article 5 which grants power over the
amending of the Constitution to Congress
alone. Undivided control of that process has
 been given by the Article exclusively and
completely to Congress. The process itself is
'political' in its entirety, from submission until
an amendment becomes part of
the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion
to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the
same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of
standing in court — a point which not having been raised by
the parties herein we will not decide — his reasoning
inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the
legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in
that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as
political. saying:
"The right of the Kansas senators to
be here is rested on recognition by
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U. S., 130; 66 Law. ed.,
505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect
his franchise. The historic source of this
doctrine and the reasons for it were explained
in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U. S., 536, 540; 71
Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an
action for $5,000 damages against the Judges
of Elections- for refusing to permit the plaintiff
to vote at a primary election in Texas. In
disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had
no cause of action because the subject matter
of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Holmes
thus spoke for the Court: 'Of course the
petition concerns political action, but it alleges
and seeks to recover for private damage. That
private damage may be caused by such political
action and may be recovered for in a suit at law
hardly has been doubted for over two hundred
years, since Ashby White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92
Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld.
Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been
recognized by this Court.' 'Private damage' is
the clue to the famous ruling in
Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its
scope as well as that of cases in this Court of
which it is the justification. The judgment of
Lord Holt is permeated with the conception
that a voter's franchise is a personal right,
assessable in money damage of which the
exact amount 'is peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of a jury,' see Wiley vs. Sinkler,
179 U. S., 58, 6a; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct.,
17, and for which there is no remedy outside
the law courts. 'Although this matter relates to
the parliament,' said Lord Holt, 'yet it is an
injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my
Lord Hale said in the case of
Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83
Eng. Peprint, 475. The parliament cannot judge
of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff
for it: they cannot make him a recompense.' (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521. )
"The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and
the practice which has followed it leave intra-
parliamentary controversies to parliaments
and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies
— who are members, how and when they
should vote, what is the requisite number of
votes for different phases of legislative activity,
what votes were cast and how they were
counted — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very
essence of political action, if 'political' has any
connotation at all. Marshall Field &
Co. vs. Clark, 143 U. S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36
Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser V8.
Garnett, 268 U. S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505,
511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they
matters of private damage.' They pertain to
legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative
process. To open the law courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment
on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies.
If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White indicating the
private rights of a voting citizen has not been
doubted for over two hundred years, it is
equally significant that for over two hundred
years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to
be put to purposes like the present. In seeking
redness here these Kansas senators have
wholly misconceived the functions of this
Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas
Supreme Court should therefore he dismissed."
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they
accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of
constitutional and popular government as conceived in the
fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer
enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United States
institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than
persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the
opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions
raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is
necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to
make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller
case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American
Law Reports, supra, comes to our aid and lightens our labor in
this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in
mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-
one members of the Senate, including twenty senators who
had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of
representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to
erase an indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it
had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the
words "as not passed They sought to restrain the offices of the
Senate and House of Representatives from signing the
resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from
authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been
that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress ill
June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansas
adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the ,resolution
was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in
January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the Senate
of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were
forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against
the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant
Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was
challenged, and the petition set forth the prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June
1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been r
ejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states
and had been ratified only in five states, and that by reason of
that rejection and the failure of ratification within a
reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction
of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United
States the questions were framed substantially in the following
manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is,
whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the
Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as
he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the
light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and
his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as
construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant
Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under
Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to
have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed
amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third,
the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of
the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The
second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating:. Whether this
contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question
which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a
question upon which the Court is equally divided and
therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On
the third question, the Court reached the conclusion before
referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate
power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the
Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to
the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable
time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Kansas was affirmed but on the grounds stated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were
aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter
and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to
bring the petition and that all the questions raised are political
and nonjusticiable. Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that
all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had
jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should
have been granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of
Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend
had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and
Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and
nonjusticiable, passed by the question of the authority of the
Lieutenant Governor to cast a deciding vote, on the ground
that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the
rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Ml. Justice Butler
and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand, and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other,
was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be
reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement
between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on
the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and
Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part of the
decision which declares certain questions political and
nonjusticiable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes,
the foregoing four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed." It
cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1466, amusing entitled
"Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the
divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries "whether
the proper procedure for the Supreme Court could not have
been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of
the suit for want of jurisdiction.'' It says that these
divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power to
dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision
should be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr.
Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to
decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to
vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered
the "equally divided" court would seem under any
circumstances to be an equal division of an odd number of
justices, and ask "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse
to vote only this issue? And ;f he did, was it because he could
not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertical
in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?"
But speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says
that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of
irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case,
decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have
required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the
disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the
concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the
rule of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the
contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule
prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of
numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally and con
the general principle (of these, two or three have changed
from their original position), two or three adopted a special
variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and
one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore
on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear
in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme
Court is on the side of those which favor the rule.
(Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood,
38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the
expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow
the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may
be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for
conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of
decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and
exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend
to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said.
With such vast mass of cases to guide our ,judgment and
discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and
borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of
adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as
contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion,
almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50
American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
"Sec. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness.
— It has been declared that the rule against
going behind the enrolled bill is required by the
respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the govern, and it would be an
inquisition into the conduct of the members of
the legislature, a very delicate power, the
frequent exercise of which must lead to
endless confusion in the administration of the
law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published
session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature
and often to any printed bills and amendments
which might be found after the adjournment of
the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the
prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution,
for years, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has been
declared that there is quite enough uncertainty
as to what the law is without saying that no
one may be certain that an act of the
legislature has become such until the issue has
been determined by some court whose
decision might not be regarded as conclusive in
an action between the parties."
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV
Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
"I think the rule thus adopted accords
with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation,
few things would be more mischievous than
the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The
rule contended for is that the Court should
look at the journals of the Legislature to
ascertain whether the copy of the act attested
and filed with the Secretary of State conforms
in its contents with the statements of such
journals. This proposition means, if it has any
legal value whatever, that, in the event of a
material discrepancy between the journal and
the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as
the standard of veracity and the act is to be
rejected. This is the test which is to be applied
not only to the statutes now before the Court,
but to all statutes; not only to laws which have
been recently passed, but to laws the most
ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more
certain than that the acceptance of this
doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire
statute law of the State. We have before us
some evidence of the little reliability of these
legislative journal . . . Can any one deny that if
the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect,
so unauthenticated, the stability of all written
law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . .
We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption
of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too
much to say that the legal existence of almost
every legislative act would be at the mercy of
all persons having access to these journals. . . .
( [1866], Beasley, C. J., in Pangborn vs. Young,
32 N. J. L., 29, 34.)
"But it is argued that if the
authenticated roll is conclusive upon the
Courts, then less than a quorum of each House
may by the aid of corrupt presiding officers
impose laws upon the State in defiance of the
inhibition of the Constitution. It must be
admitted that the consequence stated would
be possible Public authority and politic power
must of necessity be confided to officers, who
being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided
absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should
claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor
has it been able at all times with truth to say
that its high places have not been disgraced.
The framers of our government have not
constituted it with faculties to supervise
coordinate departments and correct or prevent
abuses of their authority. It cannot
authenticate a statute; that power does not
belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative
journal." (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans T S. Browne,
30 Ind., 514, 524. )
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence
considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a
noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution
to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth
century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" —
unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the
soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer
to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i. e., the
impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of
constitutional restrictions on legislation action, says:
"(1) In the first place, note that it is
impossible of consistent application. If, as it is
urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the
constitutional requirements of three readings,
a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore
an act must be declared no law which in fact
was not read three times or voted upon by
two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine
according to the actual facts of the readings
and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot
allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be
shown beyond doubt that the facts were
otherwise than therein represented. The duty
to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong
as the duty to repudiate an act
unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will
be going as far wrong in repudiating an act
based on proper votes falsified in the journal as
it will be in upholding an act based on
improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This
supposed duty, in short, is to see that the
constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop
short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough,
it is unanimously conceded that an
examination into facts as provable by the
testimony of members present is not
allowable. If to support this it be said that such
an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this
concedes the supposed constitutional duty not
to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get
at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must
be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is
merely a duty that is limited by policy and
practical convenience, then the argument
changes into the second one above, namely,
how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with
regard to policy and practical convenience; and
from this point of view there can be but one
answer.
"(2) In the second place, the fact that
the scruple of constitutional duty is treated
thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a
certain point suggests that it perhaps is based
on some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical
consequences. Such indeed seems to be the
case. It rests on the fallacious notion that every
constitutional provision is 'per se' capable of
being enforced through the Judiciary and must
be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can
be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a
large field of constitutional provision which
does not come before the Judiciary for
enforcement, and may remain unenforced
without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is
not necessary to invoke in illustration such
provisions as a clause requiring the Governor
to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature
to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitute on may remain unexecuted by the
failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and
yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce
the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration
may be had by imagining the Constitution to
require the Executive to appoint an officer or
to call out the militia whenever to the best of
his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose
he appoints or calls out when in truth he has
no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to
enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his
belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin
on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain
subject whenever in their belief certain
conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the
law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a
belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands
the Judiciary to decide a case only after
consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the
Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be
done?
"These instances illustrate a general
situation in which the judicial function of
applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases
to operate. That situation exists where
theConstitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular
independent department of government, —
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Such
duties are simply beyond enforcement by any
other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide
that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act
would not be treated as void because the
majority had been bribed. So far as
the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in
matters leading up to and motivating the
action of E3 department, injunctions must be
left to the conscience of that department to
obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature
as a whole is for this purpose of the same
nature as the vote of a single legislator.
The Constitution may expressly enjoin each
legislator not to vote until he has carefully
thought over the matter of legislation; so, too,
it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature
not to act finally until it has three times heard
the proposition read aloud. It is for the
Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in
the former, to take notice of this in junction;
and it is no more the function of the Judiciary
in the one case than in the other to try to keep
the Legislature to its duty:
xxx xxx xxx
"The truth is that many have been
carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in
the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by assailing the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful,
and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular government."
(4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has
not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case
of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this
Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or
not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the
petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative
proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or
Separate Opinions
printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the legislature,
by a copy signed by the presiding Officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs.
Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly
authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed
before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had
been done, this Court would not have held the copy conclusive
proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered
that the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the
question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its
contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy
of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of
the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of
the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects
of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not
do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such
copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in
conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents and the court did not say
or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it
unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators
and representatives who were ignored in the computation of
the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress
within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as
petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon us.
A.. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are
of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to
the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the in the
required by such constitution properly belongs to the judiciary.
That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and
Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16 C. J. S., 437.) (See also 11
Arn. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have
adopted a different view. (16 C. .J. S.. 437, notes 41 and 43.)
'The authorities are thus practically
uniform in holding that whether a
constitutional amendment has been properly
adopted according to the requirements of an
existingconstitution is a judicial question.'
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn.,
392, 409; 119 N. W., 408.)" (12 C. J., 880.)
" ' An examination of the decisions
shows that the courts have almost uniformly
exercised the authority to determine the
validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of constitutional amendments. It
has been judicially determined whether a
proposed amendment received the
constitutional majority of votes.
(Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423;
Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W., 396;
Green vs. State Canvassers, .5 Ida., 130; 47 P.,
2.59; 95 Am. S. R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind.,
104; 59 N: E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722;
Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh
Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.
W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N. J. L., 289; 43 A.,
744, 811 45 L. R. A., 251; State vs.Foraker, 46
Oh. St., 677; 23 N. E., 491; 6 L. R. A., 422.)"' (12
C. J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers)
is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal theory
of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members
of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers,
and even the members of the American Congress that
approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation,
contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in
this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in
Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the
subject of this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed
amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and
some members of the House of Representatives were not
allowed to participate and were not considered in determining
the required three-fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revise
the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all
practical purposes did not belong to the Congress of the
Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and
approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to
submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress
of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of
that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress
of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on
September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall be
submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a
general election which shall be held on March eleven,
nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act."
By this provision, the Legislative Department with the
concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most solemn
manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was
July carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire
whether those petitioners who are members of the Congress
that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from
questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and
prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default
of a contrary showing, is it not reasonable to suppose that as
members of Congress they endorse — or at least are bound by
— the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private
party is estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy
of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C. J. S., 198
and 11 Am. .Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be
estopped from impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to
pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining
petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable
claim. (Cf. 16 C. J. S., 169.)
C. But perhaps these points should be left to future
study and decision, because the instant litigation may be
solved by the application of other well-established principles
founded mainly on the traditional respect which one
department of the Government entertains for the actions of
the others. On account of the separation of powers, which I
firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of
section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210,
which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of
Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine
expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question
admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence:
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution upon the
judicial authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be
denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the time
honored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative
journals to contradict their veracity. ( United States vs. Pons,
34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3
in the Senate sixteen (16) senators approved the resolution
against five (6), with no absences: whereas in the House sixty-
eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen (18) voted "no",
one abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16
being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-one of
the Senate (16 plus a), and 68 being more than three-fourths
of the total membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of
Representatives (68 plus ]8 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that
the measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by
the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two
Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes did
not constitute the majority required by theConstitution.
However, in the face of the incontestable arithmetical
computation above shown, those protests must be attributed
to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having
then assaulted that "there were absent Senators or
Congressmen who had not been taken into account." For
although are might have judicial notice of the number of
proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better
qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of its
actual membership at any given moment, what with demises
or demissions, remotions or suspensions.
Bengzon, J., concurs.
HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well
as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my
concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). but I
dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante)
wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the
Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring
opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions
therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive
province of the legislature, and, second, that the judicially
does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me
evident that the questions involved in the present proceeding
are no less political than those involved in that former Senate
case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon
the grounds of my said concurring opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted
statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is
that the suspension of the said members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives being a political question, the
judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with the
determination thereof by the proper political department of
the government, has perforce to abide by said de termination
if it were to go any further in the consideration of the case. In
other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court
will have to start from the premise that said members have
been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and
that we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said
suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the
determination of said political branches of the government. As
said by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Philipps vs. Payne ( 2 Otto. [U. S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in
cases involving the action of the political departments of the
government, the judiciary is bound by such action."
(Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12
Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38;
Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio vs. East Ind.
Co., Ves. Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R. I. vs. Mass., 12
Pet., 714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon
the premise that said members have been thus suspended,
there will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground
nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether
or not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case
was entirely different from that of members who, not having
been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to
vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had,
like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives,
namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or
to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their
votes had to be counted among those supporting the
resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had to
be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from
voting, there would be sound justification for counting them as
not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention
they impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not
favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they
would have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those
suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose
validity or legality w e are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into,
cannot be similarly treated. In their case there would be no
way of determining which may their votes would have gone or
whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this
connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in
case they had not been suspended, I must go upon the
assumption that while those suspended members may belong
to the political party which, as a party, was opposed to the
resolution, still they would have voted Independent and
following their individual convictions. In this connection, it
might not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number
of minority members of the legislature who voted for the
resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said
suspended-members, if they had not been suspended, would
have voted against the resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor
that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should
they be counted with the members who voted against the
resolution or those who, having the right to vote, abstained
from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew
that they would have voted against the resolution, or even
that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly
construed, I submit that the Constitution does not, and could
not, include suspended members in the determination of the
required three-fourths vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV,
section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint
session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .",
advisedly used the vital and all-important word "voting"
therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members
voting undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended
or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or
the other. But I am here even making a concession in favor of
the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to
vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those not in
favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself to
conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to
count suspended or disqualified members as opposed to the
measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible
to know which way they would have voted or that they would
have abstained from voting — that they would never have
voted in favor of the measures. If I should ask why we should
not count such suspended or disqualified members among
those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine
differently would answer, because we do not know that they
would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they
should ask me why we should not count them among those
against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that
they would have voted against it or that they would have
abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the
conclusion — the only one possible — that such suspended or
disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due
to that very impossibility of knowing which way they would
have voted or whether they would have abstained from
voting. I stand for a sound and rational construction of the
constitutional precept.
Paras, J., concurs.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up
without the least resistance, and the banner of
the Constitution is silently and meekly hauled own from its
pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers
of a new brand of Fascism. In the words of Cicero, "recedere
de statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the
psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all
ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate
efforts to attain at all costs individual sulvival, even in
ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats at the
hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are
subject to determinate and indeterminate ideological
pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind
alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and
unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the genes
of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the
middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to
be wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early
youth we begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since
then we set them as the guiding stars in our actions and
decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds
dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only
to rely on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming
unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to
their guidance in calm and cloudless nights. We are sitting in
judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and
disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day
shall come that we will be judged on how we are judging.
Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time
solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered
the final verdict as to whether we have faced our task
fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the
magnitude of our duties and have chosen the most
comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known
whether we have kept burning the fire of justice as the vestals
did keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of
us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of
historical oblivion; others will have their names as bywords
repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general
contempt; and still others will be remembered with universal
gratefulness, love and veneration, the guerdon accorded to all
those who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of
justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future
generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage
to keep its responsibility in proper high level. It will need the
passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive
verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our
fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred
Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the
United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each
future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our
memory will be remembered with gratefulness, because we
have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief
Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock
bottom foundations which made of the
American Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land
and established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate
keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered,
and it will be impartial and unbiased, exacting and pitiless,
with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante
wrote this lapidary line: "lasciati ogni speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut
up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality or
should be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is
no question that at the time when the resolution in question,
proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted,
the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of the
House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members
of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by
undisputable mathematical computation, do not constitute
three-fourths of the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members
of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution,
by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute
three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The
official certifications made be the presiding officers of the two
houses of Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members
of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution,
being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence
can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public
document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot
give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in
conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers
and electors, and besides some of them are members of the
Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives,
and still others are presidents of political parties, duly
registered, with considerable following in all parts of the
Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and
members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and
the remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually
composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23,
1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of
98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2 who resigned
to assume other positions in the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for
adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which
reads as follows:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in joint
session assembled, by a vote of not less than
three-fourths of all the Members of each
House voting separately, To propose, as they
do hereby propose, the following
amendmentto the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance
thereto:
"'ORDINANCE APPENDED TO
THE CONSTITUTION
"Notwithstanding the provisions of
section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight,
Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution,
during the effectivity of the Executive
Agreement entered into by the President of
the Philippines with the President of the United
States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred
and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred
and thirty-three, but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation,
development, and utilization, of all agricultural.
timber. and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public
utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open
to citizens of the United States and to all forms
of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
States in the same manner as to, and under the
same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the
Philippines.'
"This amendment shall be valid as a
part of the Constitution then approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election at
which it is submitted to the people for the
ratification pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution."
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and
a against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18
against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the
purpose of submitting to the people the proposed amendment
embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for
said purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as
unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said act,
submit to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed
amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit
B inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article
XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24
members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators,
2 more than those who actually voted for the resolution in
question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House
of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or 4
more than those who actually voted for the resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24
Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose 0. Vera,
Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House
of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only
90. They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider
the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16 votes
were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
68 and 5 in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No.
73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein
provided are being taken, but deny that said act is
unconstitutional, and by of defense, allege that the resolution
Exhibit was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No. 73,
ordering its submission to the people for approval or
disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and
appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and
constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the
following stipulation:
 "The parties through their
undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the
following facts:
"1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the
majority vote of the Commission on Elections,
proclaimed elected senators in the election of
April 23, 1946;
"2. That when the Senate convened
on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took
part in the election of the President of that
body; but that before the senators-elect were
sworn in by the President of the Senate, a
resolution was presented, and subsequently
approved, to defer the administration of oath
and the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose E. Romero pending the
hearing and decision of the protest lodged
against their election;
"3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the
said senators individually took their alleged
oath of office before notaries public, and not
on the floor, and filed said oaths with the
Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess
of the said date;
"4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero
filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths
of office accomplished by them outside of the
floor before a notary public and the Secretary
of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31,
1946, respectively; and that their
corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946,
were paid on August 31, 1946;
"5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the
United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a
copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office
dated May 26, 1946, with the Auditor of the
Senate on October 15, 1946, and on said date
his salary was paid corresponding to the period
from April 23 to October 15, 1946;
"6. That all three have subsequently
received their salaries every fifteen days;
"7. That since the approval of the
resolution deferring their seating and oaths up
to the present time, the said Messrs. Vera,
Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to
sit and take part in the deliberations of the
Senate and to vote therein, nor do their names
appear in the roll of the Senate;
"8. That before May 25, 1946, the
corresponding provincial boards of canvassers
certified as having been elected in the election
held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight
representatives, among them Messrs Alejo
Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose
Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva
Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for
Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and
Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;
"9. That the aforesaid eight members-
elect of the House of Representatives took part
in the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
"10. That before the members-elect of
the House of Representatives were sworn in by
the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno,
representative for Manila, submitted a
resolution to defer the taking of oath and
seating of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson for
Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose
Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco for
Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan,
and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental
'pending the hearing and decision on the
protests lodged against their election,' copy of
the resolution being attached to and made part
of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
"11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was,
upon motion of Representative Escareal and
approved by the House, referred for study to a
committee of seven, which up to the present
has not reported, as shown by the
Congressional Record for the House of
Representatives;
"12. That the eight representatives-
elect included in the resolution were not sworn
in on the floor and have not been so sworn
;nor allowed to sit up to the present time, nor
have they participated in any of the
proceedings of the House of Representatives
except during the debate of the Escareal
motion referred to in paragraph 11 hereof, nor
cast any vote therein since May 2.5, 1946, and
their names do not appear in the roll of the
members of the House except as shown by the
Congressional Record of the House of
Representatives, nor in the roll inserted in the
official program for the inauguration of the
Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as
Exhibit 2 hereof;
"13. That the eight representatives-
elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths
of office on the date set opposite their namos,
as follows:
"Jose Cando May 25, 1946
"Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
"Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
"Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
"Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
''Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
"Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
"Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946
all of which oaths were taken before notaries
public, with the exception of the first four who
took their oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel,
Secretary of the House;
"14. That said oaths were filed with
the Auditor through the office of the Secretary
of the House of Representatives;
"15. That the persons mentioned in
paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term
beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present,
with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and
 Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended
since August 16;
"16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and
Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and
were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the
last day of the Special Sessions;
"17. That in addition to the eight
persons above mentioned, two members of
the House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and
Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the
resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution was discussed and passed on
September 18, 1946;
"18. That the voting on the resolution
proposing an amendment to
the Constitution was made by the Secretary
calling the roll of each house and the votes cast
were as shown in the attached certificate of
the Secretary of the House of Representatives
hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a
part hereof; and
"19. That the Congressional Records
for the Senate and House of Representatives
and the alleged oaths of office are made a part
of this Stipulation by reference thereto,
respondents reserving the right to question
their materiality and admissibility. "Manila.
Philippines, November 25, 1946.
"For the petitioners: "For the respondents:
"JOSE E. ROMERO "ROMAN OZAETA
"ANTONIO BARREDO "Secretary of
Justice
"JOSE B. L. REYES
"First Asst. Solicitor General"
PETITIONERS' PERSONALITY
Whether petitioners have or have not the personality
to file the petition in this case is the first question we have to
consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in
the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade
deciding it and giving what in law and justice should be the
answer.
To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have
the personality to institute the present recourse of prohibition.
If petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect
would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents
themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates
their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal
personality to file the petition, and we do not see any reason
why such personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is
composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and the
third, of presidents of four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups,
with the exception of Senators Jose 0. Vera, Ramon Diokno,
and Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses
of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution
Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three
excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the
consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted
for purposes of determining the three-fourths constitutional
rule in the adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that
respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the holding
of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that the
carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the
resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of
the Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents'
jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the
petitioners who are members of the Congress, and will cause
the illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and
end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of
the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those
represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners
who are either senators or members of the House of
Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues
involved in this case as members of the Congress which
adopted the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution,
and passed the act intended to make effective such
unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they
are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the
bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the
people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a
flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of
the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that
the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign
people is not trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third
group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population,
perhaps nearly one-half of the-latter, and the numerous
persons they represent are directly interested and will
personally be affected by the question whether
the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be
violated without any relief and whether it can be amended by
a process open]y repugnant to the letter of
the Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this
case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and
inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is
supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of
paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter
of far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal
freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital
question will necessarily affect the way of life of the whole
people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one
of the individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall have to
make plans for the future depending on how the question is
finally decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it
will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal
personality to institute the present action; and much more,
those who are members of Congress have the legal duty to
institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them
bY the electorate.
24 SENATORS
The first question raised by respondents' answer
refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate.
According to petitioners there are 24 of them while according
to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according
to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of
the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven
paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both
parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or
logodaedaly may change the meanings and effects of the
words placed by respondents themselves in said ;seven
paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into
believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not
senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as
elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the
President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of
office, and their receiving salaries as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been
driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the
pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia
ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting to the human
mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senator Vera, Diokno, and
Romero should be counted as members of the Senate, with
out taking into consideration whatever legal effects the
Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon
which we have already elaborated in our opinion in
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended,
they are senator s anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a
fact so clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time.
Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators
in all in the present Senate.
96 REPRESENTATIVES
The next question raised by respondents is their
denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present
House of Representatives is composed of 98 members and
their own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90
members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have
taken their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by
paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to
whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla,
Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in
paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the
House of Representatives.
The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively
that said eight persons are actual members of the House of
Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness
about said eight representatives is even greater than in the
case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no
resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House
of Representatives against said eight members, who are being
deprived of the exercise of some of their official functions and
privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the
Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only
be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian rulers
have replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of
decent government, raises again a constitutional question:
whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving
representatives duly elected by the people of their
constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow
the existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its
exercise unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a
wanton onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the people,
an onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to
take justice in their own hands. No system of representative
government may subsist if those elected by the people may so
easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their
constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any
question that at the last national election, 98 representatives
were elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was
adopted on ,September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual
members of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and
Ramos) had resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 2
senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths
of them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in
favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives,
three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68
who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is
that, since not three-fourths of the senators and
representatives voting separately have voted in favor of the
resolution as required by Article XV of theConstitution, there
can be no question that the resolution has not been validly
adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who
have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion,
have skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the
senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact
that they are :among the first important ones squarely raised
by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them into
consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness
will bring them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at
least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of
Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the
Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident that
the remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the
strength of their own position concerning the questions of the
actual membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the
written arguments they have retreated to the theory of
conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by the
presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as their last redoubt.
The resolution in question begins as follows:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less
than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting
separately . . .."
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the
above statement, appears to be certified over the signatures
of the President of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses,
respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not.
They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as
absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears
to be a brazen official falsehood.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical
proposition.
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred
temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the
administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is
not and then perform our official functions upon that
voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurd to be
entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the
minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel against at the
perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will
result from the suggestion.
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the
jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false
certification made by the presiding officers and the secretaries
of the two Houses of Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of
the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an
enrolled bill or resolution.
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the
parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices A, B,
and C, 1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and
respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and
ably discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda
will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on stronger
ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their
arguments.
In what follows we will try to analyze the positions
taken in the majority opinion.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The majority enunciates the proposition that "political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary," except
"by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the
contrary. Their argues that "a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of
respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the
separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of
discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem
unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our
opinion in said case, where we have elaborated on the
question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call
the doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary is "too-well-established to need
citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in
determining what matters fall under the meaning of political
questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its
face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a
general proposition made without a full comprehension of its
scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind
it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question"
shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly
been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no
doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in
determining what matters fall within the designation of
political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is
not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of
the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to middle with
the acts of the political department of the government."
Doctrine is that "which is taught; what is held, put
forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a
principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of
knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith." It is a synonym of
principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. In
its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth or
working principle, especially as taught to others or
recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it
should be expressed on simple and self-evident- terms. A
doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the
subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an
established truth, as a starting point for developing new
propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many
problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual
system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal structure.
If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main
columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork,
cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose
existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a
pseudo doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of
political question.
The general proposition that "political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the
many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse
for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to
refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to
them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted
principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with
which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted
blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to
drive away a danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to
amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective,
as provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of
political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion
that a litigation as to whether said article has been complied
with or violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals,
because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major
premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed
as erroneous and false.
Is there anything more political in nature than
the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore, be
taken away from the courts? Then, what about the
constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the
power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty or a law?"
COLEMAN versus MILLER
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the
mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are
occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of the
Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion
that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and that
"the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of
State of the questions of whether an amendment has been
adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission
to the State legislature," are political questions and not
justiciable.
 At the outset it must be noted that the two above
mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the
constitutional questions herein discussed. The question as to
the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the
Child Labor amendment proposed by the United States
Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said
Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether
the amendment has been adopted "within a reasonable time
from the date of submission to the State legislature," either
one of them does not raise a controversy of violation of
specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the
present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been
mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925,
the Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of
the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the
United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying
the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-
20 division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote.
Neither was there such mention of constitutional violation as
to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time
after submission of the amendment to the State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to
have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had cast
his vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to
March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its
vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a
constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a
State legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the
ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the
question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its
constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of
State, and the promulgation of the adoption of amendment
could not be controlled by the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all
with the matters in controversy in the present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that
the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the
American Law-Reports, show "interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject of an
amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing
a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-
member United States Supreme Court could not reach a
decision on the question of the right of the Lieutenant
Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number
of justices was "equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion
decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond
our comprehension.
GREEN versus WELLER
One of the authorities upon which the majority relies
is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Green vs. Weller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph
thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority,
unless taken in its reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is
nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of a
proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the
free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it
dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making
this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made
"in a established form," adding that the means provided for
the exercise by the people of their sovereign right of changing
the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not
to trample upon the exercise of their right, and that the best
security against tumult and revolution is the free and
unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to change
their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."
So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to
the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because the
Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement,
upon the assumption that the submission to the people is
made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by
the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the provisions of
the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if,
as in the present case, the submission of the proposal of
amendment to the people is made through a process
flagrantly violative of the Constitution, aggravated by wanton
falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the
constitutional prerogatives of duly elected representatives of
the People.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in
by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in
Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this
other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping
hand to a helpless, desperate position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as
follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power
to control submission of constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited,
unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our fundamental
law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may
propose amendments or call a convention to make the
proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be
found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest
hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the
people, Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the
submission." That submission must be provided by law, and no
law may be enacted and come into effect by the excDATEve
power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the
President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate
the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its
effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves
upon the Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the
Executive Department which actually submits to the people
the proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of
submission, but the President of the Philippines may refuse to
submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or
insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his
argument from a major premise not obtainable in the
Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the majority in any
way.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is
the next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion
does not offer much help. The Justice maintains that the
proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters
that concern not merely political actions but are also of the
very essence of political action," and then advances the
following argument: "To open the law-courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold
disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument
merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the idea,
but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. In a
totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in
answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as
expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers,
Mr. .Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law,
but then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the
category of a fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law.
Her e, justice must be founded on reason, but never on
passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's
sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their
judgment are in accord "with sound principles of political
jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on
the workings of constitutional and popular government." Our
regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to
accept as authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental
attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it
even with the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding
the fact that it represents the whimsical rule of personal
attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of
the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C.
Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion,
we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is
stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the
full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the
absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity
of the presiding officers' certification that the resolution in
question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives,
when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false?
How can we accept a theory which elevates a falsehood to the
category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing
in England. Because the English have committed the nonsense
of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow
suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals
not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided
by simians trained in the art of imitation but by human beings,
and human beings must act according to reason, never just to
imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may happen to
be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be
inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on
Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the United
States the jurisdictions are divided almost
equally proand con on the theory, although in petitioners'
memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date
evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the
rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con
seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether the theory
is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
The majority contends that the theory conforms to
the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said
effect the now obsolete section 3~3 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of
deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have been
repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the
majority does not support their contention. Section 313
alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the
procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines,
with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said
commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive
proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in
the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
conclusively that this-Supreme Court, in making the rules
effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take
judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section 41
provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts,
but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that would
make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses of Congress even if we know by
conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms
to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very
evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to
banish as a midsummer night's dream.
50 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, SECTION 150
In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the
enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is
invoked as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the government. This must be the strongest
one, when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much
discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a
social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown
between different departments of the government? Has our
sense of evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted
that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when
have the social or official amenities become of paramount
value to the extent of overshadowing the principles of truth
and justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to
make "an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the
legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is
premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a
Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the
members of the majority are a kind of emperors of Japan, to
be worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology
depicted by the second reason should be relegated to where it
belongs: the archeological museum.
3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason
again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is justice
to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie
evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by
the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a
law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth
degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the
extent to which legal stupidity may reach.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
No let us examine the arguments of the next
authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We
will also analyze the arguments relied upon.
1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle
the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it
appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the
unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a
mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: "We
are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a
doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption
of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say
that the legal existence of almost every legislative action
would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in
connection with American experience, which seems not to be
too flattering to our former metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade
in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's
assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in
the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few
instances in which there had been disagreement between
what has actually Been passed, as shown by the journal, and
the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few
to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by
Wigmore in America. Although those in stances were few, we
fought to correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention,
where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary
provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their
final form furnished each member at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have
certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon
the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and says entered in the
journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the
situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is
conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon
the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution,
Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided
absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit
that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all
others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that
its high places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be
and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt
judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers
and members of the legislature should be allowed to have
their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and
balances established by the Constitution presupposes the
possibility of error and corruption in any department of
government and the system is established to put a check on
them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary
or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of
justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is
corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper
remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot
with impunity commit "culpable violation of theConstitution,
treason, bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to
be removed from office on impeachment, and we hope, if
there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the
Senate will do their duty in accordance with Article IX of
the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example
which is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV
of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of
amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability
than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it, it
must be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to
sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule
has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the
other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt
that it must be complied with mathematical precision, with the
same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or
expressible in arithmetical figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible
of any more or less. All the members means that no single
member should be excluded in the counting. It means not
excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as
respondents want us to do in order not to cause any
inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both
Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying that
the three-fourth rule had been complied with in the adoption
of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as
false as any falsehood can be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice
of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell of
constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision
can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of the
resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the
vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a
whimsical government of men.
The Constitution contains several numerical
provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24
Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law
make an apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI);
that each House may expel a member with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that
electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine members,
three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislative
members (section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of
the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article
VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all
the members of each House i6 necessary (section 20 [2] ,
Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power
to declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court (section
10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have
the sole power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all
its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the Senate shall
have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in
the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of
momentous importance. Each and every one of them should
be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our
loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also because
by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by
the wise teachings of experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those
responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution
in question to have their way is to set up a precedent that
eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of
lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of
evils and disasters.
The power to declare war can only be exercised by
Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. From now on, by the simple
expediency of certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a
bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our
people into a maelstrom of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of
impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members
of the House of Representatives. From now on, a mere
plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high
officials, including the President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law
requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members
of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be
dispensed with of circumvented by not counting three actual
Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and
thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he happens not
to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed
constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people high
handed means have been resorted to, there can be no
question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will
affect future generations to unimaginable extent. The
Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such
a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the
three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.
QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the
clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to
wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put on the
armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the
vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in
the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the
United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in
People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that the
future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in
that same opinion we ventured that the historian may, under
the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
"At no epoch of its history has the
Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary
and retrogressive. When the victims of a
constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group
of the highest officials of the government,
came to it for redress, it adopted a hands-off
policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to
grapple with the situation and finding refuge in
a comfortable retreat, completely
disappointing those who have pinned their
faith and hope in it as the first pillar of
the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark
of human fundamental rights. The issue of
human freedom was disposed of by them most
discouragingly by nullifying the right of an
accused to be free on bail on appeal, in flagrant
violation of a constitutional guarantee and of
one of the fundamental purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United
Nations."
Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant
case, the same historian may record that the highest tribunal
of the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest
blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do
its duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the
fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and
apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are
pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of
humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by
progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs
of the United Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single
standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our
planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the
pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is
liable to crash if it is not founded on the rockbed of the
elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be
held supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary
that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes and
habits of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling,
and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be
replaced with more progressive ones and inconsonance with
truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong ones
which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this
case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and
often thankless, but innovation and reform should
continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be
avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas
created. New formulas must be devised and invented, and
those outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be
preserved, but those hampering the progressive evolution of
culture should be stored in the museum of memory. The past
and the present are just stepping stones for the fulfillment of
the promises of the future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century,
physical science has progressed by leaps and bounds.
Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie,
Roentgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta
and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of
matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of
neutrons, protons, and electrons.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons
veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water,
without any soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust
has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood
sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-
stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to
serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and
other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human
purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the
acetic acid to produce vinegar for the asking. The penicillum
notanum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin
and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives
from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful
insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used
to claim more than one million victims a year in the world. The
creation of synthetics has enriched the material treasures
offered to man by nature. Means of transportation are
developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific
dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science
marches on. There is no reason why the administration of
justice should not progress onward, synchronized with the
rhythm of general human advancement towards a better
future.
The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of
Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of
the Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of
granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt
the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a
situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the
fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to
foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.
FERIA, M., disidente:
Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos llaman a
decidir y arbitrar sobre una violacion de la Constitucion — el
codigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A mediados del año
pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta misma
Corte Suprema por tres Senadores que se quejaban de haber
sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a
sentarse en el Senado de Filipinas y a participar y votar en sus
deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la
Constitucion que ampara tal derecho.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.]
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO.,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in
his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his
capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the
Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as
the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.
To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in
said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and
December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
— which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and
hardboard producers — bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main
raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase
of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin
fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the
first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of
the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last
importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee
therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the
Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said
vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the
Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of
Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609 n. On
appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this
petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is
whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law
from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent
portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2069 reads:
"The margin established by the Monetary
Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of
foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture
of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users."
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea
formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed
as "urea and formaldehyde" (italic ours) and that respondents
herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central
Bank have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it
should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that.
"Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution.
It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature,
acidity, and time of reaction. This produce
when applied in water solution and extended
with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low
cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
plywood."
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from "urea"
and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea
formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz.,
615; Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 27, 1960].
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which
uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961 ). If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
||| (Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-
17931, [February 28, 1963], 117 PHIL 363-367)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29658. November 29, 1968.]
ENRIQUE V.
MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO
SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondent.
A. de Santos for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; PUBLIC OFFICERS;
CHIEFS OF POLICE; REQUIRED EDUCATIONAL AND SERVICE
QUALIFICATIONS; SERVICE NOT ALLOWED TO COMPENSATE FOR
LACK OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY. — The petitioner's argument
that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory
service in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible under
Section 9 of the Police Act of 1966, so must a person be considered
qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree, is
fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between
eligibility and qualification. The statute may allow the
compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility, but not
necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, Section
9 governs the appointment of members of a police agency only. On
the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is governed by
Section 10. While the Act gives credit for service and allows it to
compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a
member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil
service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by
providing in Section 10 that a person, who is not a civil service
eligible, may be provisionally appointed chief of police "[p]rovided,
[t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational
qualifications," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of
a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is
an indispensable requisite.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE WHO HAS
SERVED IN A CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT NOT NECESSARILY
QUALIFIED FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF POLICE. — A high
school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police
department, is not, by reason alone of such service, qualified for
appointment as chief of police.
3.ID.; STATUTES; INCLUSION OF DESIRABLE ENLARGEMENTS
ADDRESSED TO THE JUDGMENT OF CONGRESS. — The inclusion of
desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment
of Congress, and unless such enlargements are by it accepted
courts are without power to make them.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who
has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least
three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified
for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an
interpretation of the following provisions of Section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
"Minimum qualification for appointment as
Chief of Police Agency. — No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city
with the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; or any high
school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with
the rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of detective bureau
of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually
rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen.
Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated
acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner
but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as
qualified for the post and called the attention of the mayor to
Section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the
filing of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence.
Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan
newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was
vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants should
possess. The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a
demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and
qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as
chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as
captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department
qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a
letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The
mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused
to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to
compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five
next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
The petitioner's reading of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is,
per his own phrasing, as follows:
"NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless HE.
"(1)holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning AND
has served in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines OR the National Bureau of
Investigation, OR
"(2)has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, OR
"(3)has served in the police department of any
city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three
years; OR
"(4)any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least
eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher."
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant
colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is
that he falls under the third class of persons qualified for
appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act
"to place the local police service on a professional level," 1 and
contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one
who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the
other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman
to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view, still we
do not see how the requirement of a college degree as additional
qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On
the contrary, we should think that the requirement of such
additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of
petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that the choice is
between one who has served long and loyally in a city police
agency and another who, not having so served, has only a
bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue
rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law,
in addition to service qualification, one should have educational
qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of Section 9 of the Act
which provides:
"Persons who at the time of the approval of
this Act have rendered at least five years of
satisfactory service in a provincial, city or
municipal police agency although they have
not qualified in an appropriate civil service
examination are considered as civil service
eligibles for the purpose of this Act."
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at
least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is
considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be
considered qualified even though he does not possess a
bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails
to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute
may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of
eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, Section 9 governs the appointment
of members of a police agency only. On the other hand, the
appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of Section
10, the last paragraph of which states:
"Where no civil service eligible is available,
provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and
rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses
the above educational qualification: Provided,
further, That in no case shall such appointment
extend beyond six months, except for a valid
cause, and with the approval of the Civil
Service Commission."
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to
compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of
a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil
service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by
providing that a person, who is not a civil civil service eligible, may
be provisionally appointed 2chief of police "[p]rovided, [t]hat the
appointee possesses the above educational qualification," the Act
makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a
high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable
requisite.
It is next contended that to read Section 10 as requiring a
bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as
chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city
police department for at least three years, would be to create an
"absurd situation" in which a person who has served for only one
month in the AFP or the NBI is in law considered the equal of
another who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a
city police agency for at least three years. From this it is concluded
that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of
Police with exemplary record and Police Captain for at least 3 years
in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity
service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an
admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not
necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in
cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the
NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The
logical implication of the petitioner's argument that a person who
has served as captain in a city police department for at least three
years need not have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such
person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the
case would there still be need for a person to be at least a high
school graduate provided he has had a least eight years of service
as captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning
of which is not in issue in this case), Section 10 of the Act needs no
interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to
require both educational and service qualifications of those
seeking appointment as chief of police is evident from a reading of
the original provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive
revisions it underwent. Thus, Section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) reads:
"Minimum Qualification for Appointment as
Chief of a Police Agency. — No chief of a police
agency of a province or chartered city shall be
appointed unless he is a member of the
Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in police administration. Any holder of a
bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police
department of any city from the rank of
captain or inspector, second class, or its
equivalent for at least three years shall be
eligible for appointment to the position of chief
of the police agency.
"No chief of the municipal police force shall be
appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year
college degree course or a holder of a
Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or
Criminology.
"Where no civil service eligible is available
provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and rules,
provided the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification but in no case shall
such appointment exceed beyond six months."
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as
requiring both educational and service qualifications that the
following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the House
of Representatives:
"MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum
Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a
Police Agency, provides that the Chief of a
police agency of a province or a chartered city
should be at least a member of the Philippine
Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in Police
Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a
four years' college degree or holder of a
bachelor's degree in Police Administration or
Criminology.
"At first blush, there is no reason why I should
object to these minimum requirements; but I
find such requirement very rigid because it
would not allow a man to rise from the
 ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the
ranks. He became a corporal, a sergeant, a
police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to
go higher? If he merited it, he should also be
appointed chief of police of a city or
municipality.
"MR. AMANTE. During our committee
discussions, I objected to this provision of the
bill because it is a very high qualification.
However, somebody insisted that in order to
professionalize our police system and also to
attain a high standard of police efficiency, we
must have a chief of police who has a college
degree. The point which the gentleman is now
raising was brought up by one Member in the
sense that a policeman who rose from the
ranks through serious hard work, even after
serving for fifteen or twenty years in the police
force, cannot become chief of police for lack of
a college degree.
"The gentleman's objection is a very good and
reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it
up during the period of amendments, I will
consider it.
"MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the
Committee will accept my amendment. My
only regret, however, is that because I made a
number of proposed amendments, I will not be
ready to submit them immediately. We should
just limit ourselves to the sponsorship this
evening." 3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement
contained in the bill that objections were expressed, but while it
was agreed to delete this requirement during the period of
amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change. 4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to
which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a
substitutemeasure. 5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of
the Act owes its present form and substance. Parenthetically, the
substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous
phrase "and who has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision
of the substitute bill reads:
"No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department
of any city and has held the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain and/or higher."
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the
capacity of captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served
as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the
provision read:
"No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department
of any city and has held the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city or who has served
as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher." 6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of
an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department
of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,"
under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school
graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the
second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However,
somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was dropped and
only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by
mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly
read and examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the
legislative secretary of the Office of the President, 7 and found that
the text of Section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of
this opinion. The text of the Act bears on page 15 thereof the
signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and
Speaker of the House of Representative Cornelio T. Villareal, and
on page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the
Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of
Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the
enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito 8 this
text of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as
binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States
said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark: 9
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is
an of official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill,
thus attested, has received in the form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, its
authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when
the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution." 10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that when
the two chambers of the legislature met in conference committee,
the phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record"
was added, thereby accounting for its presence in Section 10 of the
Act. 11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that —
except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher" — a high school graduate, no matter how long he
has served in a city police department, is not qualified for
appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who hag served as
captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years
irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be Chief
of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the
Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of
Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he
was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the
Congressional Commendation — the highest award ever conferred
in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede
its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law
because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in
the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless
such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to
make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
"An omission at the time of enactment,
whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however much later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion.
"The vital difference between initiating policy,
often involving a decided break with the past,
and merely carrying out a formulated policy,
indicates the relatively narrow limits within
which choice is fairly open to courts and the
extent to which interpreting law is inescapably
making law." 12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the
petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief
of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has
no corresponding legal duty — and therefore may not be
compelled by mandamus — to certify the petitioner as qualified
and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No
pronouncements as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., did not take part. Petition denied.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., concurring in the result:
As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the Manila Police
Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position — that of Chief of the Detective Bureau thereof — and
holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be reasonably
expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police Department. But
the issue before us is not whether or not his training and
experience justify that expectation, but whether or not, under and
in accordance with the pertinent law, he is qualified for
appointment to such of office to the extent that he is entitled to
the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of mandamus
compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to include
him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the
mayor of the City of Manila might choose the appointee who will
fill the vacant position of Chief of Police of the City of Manila.
Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) — which
controls the issue before us, reads as follows:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high
school graduate who has served as of officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher."
The above legal provision may be construed as providing for two
different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning, and (2) a high
school degree, each of which is coupled with separate and distinct
service qualifications. Any one of the latter, joined with either of
the aforesaid academic requirements, would qualify a person for
appointment as Chief of a city police agency. In other words, an
applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation would make
the grade, in the same manner as would another applicant with a
similar bachelor's degree who has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, etc.
In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, the
service qualification is not only different but is higher and more
exacting for obvious reasons.Petitioner, however, would construe
and read the law as follows:
"NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless HE.
"(1)holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation,
OR
"(2)has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
OR
"(3)has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; OR
"(4)any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher."
While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not unreasonable,
it falls short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning and
intent of the law aforesaid. This, in my opinion, must lead to the
conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus for the purpose stated in his petition because to be
entitled thereto he must show that, in relation to the matter at
issue, he has a clear enforceable right, on the one hand, and that
the respondent has an imperative legal duty to perform, on the
other. Because of this I am constrained to concur in the result.
||| (Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. L-29658, [November 29,
1968], 135 PHIL 346-359)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN
HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,
AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO
ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V.
Saguisag for petitioners.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging
the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-
called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents claiming
that the latter violated Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103,
Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule XVI, Section 97, Rule XX Section 121-
122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the House
Rules. For this matter, petitioners assert that violation of the House
Rules is a violation of the Constitution thereof. AEDISC
In its decision, the Supreme Court finds no ground for
holding that congress committed grave abuse of discretion in
enacting Republic Act 8240. It is clear from the facts of the case
that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than the constitutional requirement for the enactment of a law,
that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution,
pertaining to the existence of the quorum. The established rule is
that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself.
Verily, it follows that the case at hand does not present a situation
in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the
constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of
Article VIII, Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of
House No. 7198 by speaker of the House and President of the
Senate and certification by secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS
HAVE NO CONCERN WITH THEIR OBSERVANCE; FAILURE TO
CONFORM THEREWITH WILL NOT INVALIDATE ACTION WHEN THE
REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS HAVE AGREED THERETO. —
Cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS OR VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS. — In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was
stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal." CIHAED
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case no
rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF
LEGISLATURE VOID FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES
OF PROCEDURE. — If, then, the established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of
the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT
THE CHAIR MUST RESTATE THE MOTION AND CONDUCT A VIVA
VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. — No rule of the House of
Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee
report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General
has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique
one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the
conference committee report on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report
on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do
not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a
second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding
the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution
be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
REQUIRING THAT THE YEAS AND NAYS OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN
EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS TO VOTE; EXCEPTIONS. — Nor does
the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in
the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing
a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact
that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer
tedium to repeat the process.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION
REGARDING MOTION TO APPROVE AND RATIFY CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE ENTITLED TO
PRECEDENCE. — Petitioners claim that they were prevented from
seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It would
appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the
parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40
p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While
it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at
least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. It is
thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their
own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the
House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep.
Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.
Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or
a question of privilege entitled to precedence. And even if Rep.
Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would
have precedence and would have put an end to any further
consideration of the question.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DEFINED. — The phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has
a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends
to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction."
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF
SPONSOR, AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF QUORUM. —
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE
BILL BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE AND CERTIFICATION BY THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH
HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT. — Under the
enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by
the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. The
enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is
cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled
bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent
urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence.
11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO
MATTERS THAT ARE REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE
RECORDED THEREIN. — The Journal is regarded as conclusive with
respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of
the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as
"public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They
should be public, because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the
faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only
in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.
12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET
ASIDE LEGISLATIVE ACTION AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS
THE HOUSE DISREGARDED ITS OWN RULES. — It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of
a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED
BILL DOCTRINE; APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR
MATTERS RELATING TO FORM AND FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO
NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE ESSENCE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE
LAW. — Reliance on the enrolled bill theory is not to be
discontinued but its application must be limited to minor matters
relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially
alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS
IN THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT
UPON THE LAST READING. — The introduction of several provisions
in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate
the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power
of the conference committee but that the Constitutional
proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought
that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold
the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking
the same principle which should have justified the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES; BOUNDARIES. — In the 1891
case of US. v. Ballin, (144 US 1 [1891]) the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. Ballin clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of
courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether
they are constitutional. Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case
of US v. Smith (286 US 6 [1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying
on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily
at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to
their constitutionality." Smith, of course, involves the right of a
third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out
in Ballin. Smith was followed by the 1948case of Christoffel v.
United States (338 US 89 [1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr.
Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the
House had establishedand whether they have been followed." The
US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the
case of Yellin v. United States (374 US 109 [1963]). In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, (369 US 186 [1962]), the US
Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
appointment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political
question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order,
will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fidecontroversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority." THEDCA
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — In the Philippine setting, there is more
compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is
new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions n. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitutional or any foreign state constitution. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former, Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light
and not the experience of foreigners.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
LAW-MAKING POWER; ENROLLED BILL, DEFINED. — An enrolled bill
is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both
Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and approved
by the President. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested,
has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall
be presented to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; RULES. — The
enrolled bill originated in England where there is no
written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the
government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their
nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in the
land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same
veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be
collaterally attacked. In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was
premised on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is
the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and
by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation.
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in
favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes
validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in
the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been
compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rulewhich
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has
been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however,
can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been
violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are
allowed to be received. Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to
issues of fraud or mistakes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERN RATIONALE. —
The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in
Field v. Clark, viz.: . . . "The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to
the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form,
the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that
it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether
the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RULE
SHOULD BE ABANDONED. — The enrolled bill doctrine no longer
enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . . the tendency
seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only
a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any
authoritative source of information." It is high time we re-
examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in
the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil. 1 [1947]) that
this Court, with three (3) Justices dissenting, first embraced the
rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts. In the 1969 case of Morales v.
Subido, (27 SCRA 131, 134-135) we reiterated our fidelity to the
enrolled bill doctrine. Significantly, however, Morales diluted the
conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia
stressed: "All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy." In the 1974 case of Astorga v.
Villegas, (56 SCRA 714) wefurther diluted the enrolled bill doctrine
when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled: As far as Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by
the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by
both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In
other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Finally in 1994 came the case
of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al., and its companion cases.
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made
that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is
now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that
we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill
doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in
stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written
Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of
the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity
and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution,
laws and rules. In Mabanag, we relied on Section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules
will show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry
the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is
not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under
the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands
that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of
truth. Our Constitutionalso adopted a national policy requiring full
public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest.
Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be
disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given
the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to
bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth
in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for
the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an
enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will
facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. — I do
not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting petition. As the ponencia points
out, the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was
prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does
not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution.
Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question
the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact
laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the
House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH
POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON ANY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT; GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — When the 1987 Constitution has
embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or
not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which
that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought
of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave
abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence
as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise
of judgmentas amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of
a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it
would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the
fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone
departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term
"judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may
even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that
grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues — is shown to have attended the contested
act. DEICTS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Codeby
imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. cdphil
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H.
No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which
approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report
to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after
a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to
interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the
sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He
was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move
that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any
objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr.
Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a
minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked
the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for
the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so
I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to
adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different
versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40
p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by
Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by
Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which
appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2)
in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word "no" on
line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated
three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the
sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise
the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by
respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as
petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the
resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents.
Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word
"approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.
Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that
these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3)
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and
that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of
the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of
Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the
Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the
House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its
approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX,
§112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's
motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to
act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report
approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI,
§123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is
a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of
the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary
situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
 Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified
by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the
certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1
to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination
of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed
membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all
respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the
principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although
the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each
House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot
be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings
on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia
denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and
contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20
and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being
no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court
finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse
of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was
no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum. cdrep
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted
pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason
they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention
stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose
of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, 11it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rule was
stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that
each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not
restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or
to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but
in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a
majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken
by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power,in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty
conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is
no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the
control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with
rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares
that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings
and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature
of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the
servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority
may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly
within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set
aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no
court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or
suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to
follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these
cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings
on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the
house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation
of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation
of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this
contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision
requiring that the legislature should read a bill
in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from
legislative sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an
act, its passage through the legislature in a
hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but
this alone, even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the legislature had
made to govern its own proceedings, could be
no reason for the court's refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a
majority of each branch of the legislature, and
duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on
account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407,
50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W.
187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the
rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the
power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in
character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have
no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above
principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as
no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on
which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of
our system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit
in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the
case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national
security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function is
merely [to] checkwhether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence
of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare
an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case
does not present a situation in which a branch of the government
has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as
to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power. prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the
House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's
motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation
of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At
the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the
House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference
committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later
the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They
say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare
because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some
legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited
which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate
the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the
other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to
the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair.
Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody
objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I
came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody
objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was
raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of
order. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance with
the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that
refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to
my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second
reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote,
any motion to divide would have been proper.
So, if that motion is not presented, we assume
that the House approves the measure. So I
believe there is substantial compliance here,
and if anybody wants a division of the House
he can always ask for it, and the Chair can
announce how many are in favor and how
many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate and even more
just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a
method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In
the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot
provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and
esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and
the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of
the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the
process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension
and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to
settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that
day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that
the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of
Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of
the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o'clock in the
afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November
21, 1996. (Emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again,
no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of
their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions
for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the
pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the
passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form
or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question
were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have
precedence and would have put an end to any further
consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be
contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
respondent Speaker of the House acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning
in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice
Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power
granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where "a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not
be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of
the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only
the five, i.e. petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have
objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep.
John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep.
Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was
approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep.
Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference committee
report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H.
No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to
disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or
in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]
that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate. Cdpr
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of
both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this
Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had
not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been
carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in
the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful,
and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular
government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that
the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which
had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the
constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more
basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to
go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI,
§26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the
tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority
to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving
the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to
repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to
warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members
may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin,
and Quiason, JJ .) have departed from the Court since our decision
in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four
new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ .) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in
the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law
in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November
21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day.
The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI,
§16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and
theyeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of
its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court
spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals
as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus:
"They should be public, because all are required to conform to
them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the
bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its
due enactment has been duly proven.
xxx xxx xxx
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of
a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made
in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners
can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment
of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body. 49 cdtech
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan,
Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo, J ., took no part due to relationship to parties.
Panganiban, J ., took no part; former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J ., took no part; on leave during deliberations.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the
instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent which I
expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat
bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today
might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and
inconsistent with, my firm stance inTolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under
consideration, involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality
of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were
posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also
the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I
did not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the
opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues.
My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead
on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the
Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my
opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by
hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept
that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise
sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much
because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather
because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe
did not call for their application. cdtai
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied
the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that
reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application
must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual
issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself. Thus:
"As applied to the instant petition, the
issue posed is whether or not the procedural
irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630,
outside of the reading and printing
requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been 'saved' by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see
no cogent reason why we cannot continue to
place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with
respect to matters pertaining to the procedure
followed in the enactment of bills in Congress
and their subsequent engrossment, printing
errors, omission of words and phrases and
similar relatively minor matters relating more
to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater
ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since
constitutional rules on legislative procedure
are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are
over facts — whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever
— not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better
position than a court to rule on the facts. The
argument is also made that legislatures would
be offended if courts examined legislative
procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot
conceivably apply to substantive changes in a
bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous
trip through Congress, catching both legislators
and the public unawares and altering the same
beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the
majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to
qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal
procedures in this wise:
"I wish to consider this issue in light of
Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that '(j)udicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.' We are
also guided by the principle that a court may
interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold
the Constitution." 5
 I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that
principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and
Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference
committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any
amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.
Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the
majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which
should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of the
legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing
adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino dissent.
At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent
would not hold true in the instant petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House
of Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct
of the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus
to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the
passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's
intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way
complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced
in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in
attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the fact
that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the
question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends
constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel
called upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill
theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in
a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through
Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the
circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal
disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the
case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the
alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as
well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of
what I perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by
the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I each house to determine its rules of
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by
the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US
v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries
of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It
held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Constitution, in the same
section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It
appears that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this as one
of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or
at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal,
and reported to the Speaker with the names of
the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230,
v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII
Feb. 14, 1890) cdll
of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:
The action taken was in direct
compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own
motion resort to for determining the presence
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a
rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is
only one of power. The Constitution empowers
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force
for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is
a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court
did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US
"xxx xxx xxx
"3. When a nomination is confirmed
or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority
may move for a reconsideration on the same
day on which the vote was taken, or on either
of the next two days of actual executive
session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination
shall have been sent to the President before
the expiration of the time within which a
motion to reconsider may be made, the motion
to reconsider shall be accompanied by a
 motion to request the President to return such
notification to the Senate. Any motion to
reconsider the vote on a nomination may be
laid on the table without prejudice to the
nomination, and shall be a final disposition of
such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected
by the Senate shall not be returned by the
Secretary to the President until the expiration
of the time limited for making a motion to
reconsider the same, or while a motion to
reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate."
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of
the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the US
Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US
President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The
Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and
requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation.
The President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed
against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdictionover the dispute relying on Ballin. It
exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue
relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate
interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be
accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Sixth. To place upon the standing
rules of the Senate a construction different
from that adopted by the Senate itself when
the present case was under debate is a serious
and delicate exercise of judicial power.
The Constitution commits to the Senate the
power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule
would be better. A rule designed to ensure due
deliberation in the performance of the vital
function of advising and consenting to
nominations for public office, moreover,
should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. But the reasons,
above stated, against the Senate's construction
seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in
the view we have taken by the fact, since the
attempted reconsideration of Smith's
confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly
to have treated the ordering of immediate
notification to the President as tantamount to
authorizing him to proceed to perfect the
appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its
ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel
v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee on
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied
he was a communist and was charged with perjury in the regular
court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee
had no quorum when the perjurious statement was given.
Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the
members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that —
"xxx xxx xxx
". . . the defendant Christoffel
appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen
members of the said Committee, and that at
least that number must have been actually and
physically present . . . If such a Committee so
met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at
the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the
progress of the hearing some of them left
temporarily or otherwise and no question was
raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact
that the majority did not remain there would
not affect, for the purposes of this case, the
existence of that Committee as a competent
tribunal provided that before the oath was
administered and before the testimony of the
defendant was given there were present as
many as 13 members of that Committee at the
beginning of the afternoon session . . ."
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it
allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply
because it was present at the start of the meeting of the
Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is
presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the
court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court,
with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what
rules the House had established and whether they have been
followed." It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Congressional practice in the
transaction of ordinary legislative business is of
course none of our concern, and by the same
token the considerations which may lead
Congress as a matter of legislative practice to
treat as valid the conduct of its committees do
not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for
its own governance, nor whether presumptions
of continuity may protect the validity of its
legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether
they have been followed. It of course has the
power to define what tribunal is competent to
exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of
this case is that by the charge that was given it
the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even
though the basis in fact was not established
and in face of a possible finding that the facts
contradicted the assumption. llcd
We are measuring a conviction of
crime by the statute which defined it. As a
consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from
two to six years. An essential part of a
procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of
the crime charged shall be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. An element of the crime
charged in the instant indictment is the
presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial
court properly so instructed the jury. The
House insists that to be such a tribunal a
committee must consist of a quorum, and we
agree with the trial court's charge that to
 convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were 'actually and
physically present' a majority of the
committee.
Then to charge, however, that such
requirement is satisfied by a finding that there
was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony,in
the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is
to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need
not be present when the offense is committed.
This not only seems to us contrary to the rules
and practice of the Congress but denies
petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of
all the elements of the crime charged against
him. A tribunal that is not competent is no
tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body
can be the instrument of criminal conviction."
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the
rule and practice that a quorum once established is presumed to
continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this
decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . ." The minority
view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin was
indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions
put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court
of contempt of Congress on four counts. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On
certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the
Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV
which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-
committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the
House of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a
witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or
unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an
executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity
or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in
a public hearing." In a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Yellin should be permitted the same
opportunity for judicial review when he
discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the
Committee's practice leads witnesses to
misplaced reliance upon its rules. When
reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which
must be distributed to every witness under
Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation
is that the Committee actually does what it
purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules,
simply because the witness was deceived by
the Committee's appearance of regularity, is
not fair. The Committee prepared the
groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously.It is not too exacting to require
that the Committee be equally meticulous in
obeying its own rules."
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the
judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark
case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed
jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the
Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not
be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as
to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled
to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions n. It was not also xeroxed from
the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can
no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of
Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ."
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political
question defense in national security cases. To a great degree,
it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the
new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the
following postulates:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Former Chief Justice Roberto
R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in
the Constitutional Commission explained the
sense and the reach of judicial power as
follows:
'xxx xxx xxx
'. . . In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
This is the background of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute political question.'
The Constitution cannot be any
clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a
mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, theConstitution imposed it as a
duty of this Court to strike down any act of a
branch or instrumentality of government or any
of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the
legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this
provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for
the view misses the significant changes made
in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal
deficiencies we discovered during martial law.
One of the areas radically changed by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the
three great branches of our government — the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To
upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some
more the independence of courts. Thus, it
further protected the security of tenure of the
members of the Judiciary by providing 'No law
shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when
it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.' It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy
to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments
in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar
Council which was tasked with screening the
list of prospective appointees to the judiciary.
The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress.
The President was likewise given a specific time
to fill up vacancies in the judiciary — ninety
(90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in
case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days
from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council
in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To
further insulate appointments in the judiciary
from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court
was given the power to 'appoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.' And to make the
separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government more watertight, it
prohibited members of the judiciary to be '. . .
designated to any agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions.' While
theConstitution strengthened the sinews of the
Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the
two other branches of government, especially
the Executive. Notable of the powers of the
President clipped by the Constitution is his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of
this power is now subject to revocation by
Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the exercise of said power may
be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen. cdt
The provision defining judicial power
as including the 'duty of the courts of justice . .
. to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law
which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to
this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as a nation,
is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and
1973Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating
a past that petrifies the present.
 I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To
be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword
that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government
to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light
and not the experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar
as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of
the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced,
finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper officers of
each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by
the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President
that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no
written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the
government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their
nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in the
land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same
veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be
collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the bill
was premised on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus
made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and
by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
The rule concedes validity to the enrolled
bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with
one or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other
jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rulewhich holds
that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been
regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be
destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated.
For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed
to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues
of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the
rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for the enrolled
bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
"The signing by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the
two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that
it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon
the assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when
the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal
prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a
rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too
many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed
by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity
of every act published as law is to be tested by examining its
history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the
legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and
painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying
a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law." The
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground
that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to
mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been
rejected in various jurisdictions in the United States. In his
Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its
companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the
leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the
withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Even in the land of its source, the so-
called conclusive presumption of validity
originally attributed to that doctrine has long
been revisited and qualified, if not altogether
rejected. On the competency of judicial
inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder
the 'enrolled bill rule'by which an enrolled bill is
sole expository of its contents and conclusive
evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it
is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire
as to what prerequisites are fixed by
the Constitution of which journals of respective
houses of Legislature are required to furnish
the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et
al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the
enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices
and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill
as it passed, yet this presumption is not
conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed
and enrolled, and signed by the legislative
officers, contains provisions that have not
passed both houses, such provisions will be
held spurious and not a part of the law. As was
said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade
vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633,
41 So. 72, 73:
'This Court is firmly
committed to the holding that when
the journals speak they control, and
against such proof the enrolled bill is
not conclusive.'
More enlightening and apropos to the
present controversy is the decision
promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et
al. vs.Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent
excerpts wherefrom are extensively
reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must,
perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line
of decisions of this court which created and
nurtured the so-called 'enrolled bill' doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the
Kentucky Constitution sets out certain
procedures that the legislature must follow
before a bill can be considered for final
passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as
it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look
behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the
appropriate officers, to determine if there are
any defects. cdta
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in
question violated this provision, yet the bill was
properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to
determine the propriety of its enactment, the
court enunciated three reasonsfor adopting the
enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant
to scrutinize the processes of the legislature,
an equal branch of government. Second,
reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to
preserve its records and anticipated
considerable complex litigation if the court
ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged
the poor record-keeping abilities of the
General Assembly and expressed a preference
for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather
than opening up the records of the legislature.
...
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted
without reason, or as a result of judicial whim.
There are four historical bases for the doctrine.
(1) An enrolled bill was a 'record' and, as such,
was not subject to attack at common law. (2)
Since the legislature is one of the three
branches of government, the courts, being
coequal, must indulge in every presumption
that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule
was originally formulated, record-keeping of
the legislatures was so inadequate that a
balancing of equities required that the final act,
the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There
were theories of convenience as expressed by
the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the
several states, however and it has not been
without its critics. From an examination of
cases and treaties, we can summarize the
criticism as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are
not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not
accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to
fraud, forgery, corruption and other
wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by
legislatures remove one of the original reasons
for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary
obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to
provide a remedy for a wrong committed by
any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time
has come to re-examine the enrolled bill
doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the
admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The
maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta
movere," which simply suggests that we stand
by precedents and to disturb settled points of
law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
such a nature as to require perpetuation of
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v.
Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(1941)."
The force of the rule depends
upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the
disturbance of rights and practices
which a change in the interpretation
of the law or the course of judicial
opinions may create. Cogent
considerations are whether there is
clear error and urgent reasons 'for
neither justice nor wisdom requires a
court to go from one doubtful rule to
another,' and whether or not the evils
of the principle that has been
 followed will be more injurious than
can possibly result from a change.'
Certainly, when a theory
supporting a rule of law is not
grounded on facts, or upon sound
logic, or is unjust, or has been
discredited by actual experience, it
should be discarded, and with it the
rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major
premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor
record-keeping of the legislature, has
disappeared. Modern equipment and
technology are the rule in record-keeping by
our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric
typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
equipment, printing presses, computers,
electronic voting machines, and the like
remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of
the General Assembly to keep accurate and
readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that
the 'convenience' rule is not appropriate in
today's modern and developing judicial
philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding
purpose of our judicial system is to discover the
truth and see that justice is done. The existence
of difficulties and complexities should not deter
this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that
the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our
copartners in government. We simply do not
agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides that any law contrary to
the constitution is 'void.' The proper exercise of
judicial authority requires us to recognize any
law which is unconstitutional and to declare it
void. Without elaborating the point, we believe
that under section 228 of the Kentucky
Constitution it is our obligation to 'support . . .
the Constitution of the commonwealth.' We
are sworn to see that violations of
the constitution — by any person, corporation,
state agency or branch or government — are
brought to light and corrected. To countenance
an artificial rule of law that silences our voices
when confronted with violations of our
constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable
rule is the one which Professor Sutherland
describes as the 'extrinsic evidence.' . . . Under
this approach there is a prima facie
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but
such presumption may be overcome by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishing that constitutional requirements
have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty
v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-
called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that
there is no longer a conclusive presumption
that an enrolled bill is valid. . . ."
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once
unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that
starting in the 1940's, ". . . the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption
of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity
which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information." 19
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled
bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first
embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963,
we firmed up this ruling in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly
a finished product which is patently distinct
and different from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,'
as separate articles used in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin known as 'urea
formaldehyde.' Petitioner contends, however,
that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction 'and' between the
term 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt
'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called 'urea formaldehyde,'
not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on
the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view
of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives (see
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank,
54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000
[March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727
[February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well
settled that enrolled bill —which uses the
term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and
formaldehyde' — conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118,
120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias
vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14,
1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which we cannot speculate
without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree." cdti
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated
our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz.:
 ". . . We cannot go behind the enrolled
Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of
a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. The investigation which the
petitioner would like this Court to make can be
better done in Congress. After all, House
cleaning — the immediate and imperative need
for which seems to be suggested by the
petitioner — can best be effected by the
occupants thereof . Expressed elsewise, this is a
matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes."
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness
rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
"By what we have essayed above we
are not of course to be understood as holding
that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to
have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which we do not now decide. All we
hold is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of
any discrepancy."
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further
diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid.
We ruled:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Petitioner's argument that the
attestation of the presiding offices of Congress
is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-
equal department of the government, is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the
bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation for his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously
this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it
invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is
merely a mode of authentication. The law-
making process in Congress ends when the bill
is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the
bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the
(1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the
President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said
that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as
a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has 'passed both
houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation
in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would
only mean that there was no attestation at all,
but would not affect the validity of the statute.
Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument
begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry
to the presence or absence of the attestation
and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however,
goes farther. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not
the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case
the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each
House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true
that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risk of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This
Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can
do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were
not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking,but to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President
of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the
Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
 mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body."
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as
a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado. 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part
of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of
the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report.
In rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:
"While it is true that a conference
committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described
thus:
'A conference committee
may deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where
the conference committee is not by
rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).' prcd
It is a matter of record that the
Conference Committee Report on the bill in
question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by
both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays
on the final reading of the bill). The journals
are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the
reason thus:
'To inquire into the veracity
of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.'
Applying these principles, we shall
decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy."
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, et al. and its companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on
the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Fourth. Whatever doubts there may
be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not
even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or
that certain provisions of a statute had been
'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the
government. There is no reason now to depart
from this rule.
No claim is here made that
the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that
the President of the Senate himself, who had
signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there
was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the
constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more
basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the'enrolled bill' rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government."
 These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made
that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is
now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that
we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill
doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in
stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no
written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another,
many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the
rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution,
laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules
will show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry
the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is
not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under
the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands
that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of
truth. Our Constitutionalso adopted a national policy 29 requiring
full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public
interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on
transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these
policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike
down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of
conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the
search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of
dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are
justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting said
petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves
the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion
question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No.
rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant
a non-member of the House which requires constitutional petition. cdtai
protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a ||| (Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, [August 14, 1997],
quorum are procedural in character. They are malleable by nature 343 PHIL 42-104)
for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated,
these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the
part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to
reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J ., concurs.
VITUG, J ., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its
circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of
the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which
that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought
of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave
abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence
as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise
of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of
a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it
would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the
fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone
departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term
"judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may
even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that
grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues — is shown to have attended the contested act.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 11530. August 12, 1916.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; LEGISLATIVE
JOURNALS; JUDICIAL NOTICE. — The courts in the Philippine
Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is
and, to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites
to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their
right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative
journals.
2. ID.; ID.; PAROL EVIDENCE. — When the legislative
journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of the
Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the
same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be
admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
3. OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION. — Where a
person takes a direct part in the illegal importation into the
Philippine Islands of a large quantity of opium and profits
thereby, a penalty of two year's imprisonment and a fine of
P1,000 is not excessive.
DECISION
TRENT, J p:
The information in this case reads:
"The undersigned charges Gabino
Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the
crime of illegal importation of opium,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of
April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring
together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to
wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez
y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing
125 kilograms of opium of the value of
P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then
and there, the said accused, also conspiring
together and plotting among themselves, did
receive and conceal the said quantity of opium
and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the
said opium had been imported, knowing that
said drug had been unlawfully brought,
imported and illegally introduced into the
Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an
act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso
were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been
arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid
Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The
same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he
was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso
later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has
become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-
five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under
the many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed
brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these:
The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated
May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in
finding that the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of
the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and
offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February;
that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special
session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation,
February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having
violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is
the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved,
whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and
(2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
These questions will be considered in the reverse order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the
Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be
required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing
law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the
Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately
stated on the journal." and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission
Journal for the ordinary and special sessions of the Third
Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
"The Journal for Saturday, February
28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine
die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight
having arrived, on motion of Commissioner
Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature adjourned sine die."
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides,
among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly
"shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which shall be
published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of
the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly
published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p, 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United States and
of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be judicially recognized by
the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may
receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section
stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information,
and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No.
2210], of the same Code also provides that;
"Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . (2) The proceedings of the
Philippine Commissions, or of any legislative
 body that may be provided for the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journal of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by
their order: Provided, That in the case of Acts
of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Act and of the
due enactment thereof."
While there are so adjudicated cases in this
jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may
take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled
in the United States that such journals may be notice by the
courts in determining the question whether a particular bill
became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Heron vs. Smith, 44
Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law
and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial
notice of the legislative journal of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the
Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act
(no. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive
evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire
whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for
the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when
such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is
clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of
legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of
evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the
Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight
on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this
allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous
evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the
contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as
to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these
opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and
character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is
understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter
in question or to influence the belief respecting it," and
"conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in
the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq. ) Counsel for the appellant, in
order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend
upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the
legislative journals are the acts of the Government or
sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records
of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary,
and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel
in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's
clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left
so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were
stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an
adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the
resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering
the probative force and character of legislative records, and
making the proof of legislative action depend upon entertain
oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long
centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the
adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to
legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one
purpose, it must be taken for all, and the evidence of the laws
of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and
durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.)
Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel.
Heron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
"Counsel have exhibited unusual
industry in looking up the various cases upon
this question; and, out of multitude of
citations, not one is found in which any court
has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of
the legislature, as recorded in the journal a law
has been adopted. And if reasons for this
limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters
have not generally been stated, it doubtless
arises from the fact that they are apparent.
Imperative reasons of public policy require that
the authentic of laws should rest upon public
memorials of the most permanent character.
They should be public, because all are required
to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired to-day upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in
the memory of individuals."
In the case from which this last quotation is taken the
court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the
American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and
we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where
the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the
legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the
Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states we do not hesitate to
follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight
on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court
did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish
mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain,
bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were
manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino
Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in
the business of a wine merchant, with an office and
warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The
shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels
were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by
Beliso. These documents were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to
Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit
conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the
merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five
barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of
Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed
the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the
customs authorities, having notice that shipments of
merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila
from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not
listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of
the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and
traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to
Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry
number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five
barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse
about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the
merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons,
went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in latter's office,
where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and
shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were
unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees,
Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart.
This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then
carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-
five and told Sese to lead these five on the cart and to deliver
them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order
was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at
the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which
started on the 10th, the customs secret service agents entered
Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and
awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega
and places under arrest. The agents then proceeded to
separated the recent shipment from the other merchandise
stored in the warehouse, identifying the barrels by the
customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the
twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon
being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs
agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him
to Pons at 144 Calle Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano
and here found the five missing barrels, which were identified
by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial
numbers. The five barrels were empty, the staves having been
sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, were
found on the floor nearby. The customs officers notice several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house
and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of
these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search
was made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the
initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents
to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle
General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap,
and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was
rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was
produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the
same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering
these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected
three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was
found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel
with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large
tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found
at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that
they were in every way identical in size, form etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and
warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons,
apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on,
arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to the
office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service,
and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his
participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained,
however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General
Solano represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the
customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels were
opened and the customs officers appearing to be in doubt as
to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed
the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the
end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle
stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195
tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated
that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment
to a Chinaman at 7:30 a.m. on the morning of April 10,
following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners
in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle
General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of
Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and
that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous
importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a
previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard
several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those the
barrels at the customhouse. At firstPons stated that F. C.
Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in and between the
Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this
statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person.
But during the trial of this case in the court
below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a
resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter
directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and retain it
until the arrival in the Philippine Island of Garcia. According
to Pons this letter arrived on the same streamer which brought
the 25 barrels of "wine", but that he had destroyed it because
he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked
during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from
Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on
the Lopez y Lopez, he answered, "Naturally because F. C..
Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in
barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man by the name of Jacinto
Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of
wine."
The foregoing are substantially the facts found by the
trial court and these facts establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble
attempt to show that the opium was shipped to him from
Spain by a childhood friend named Garcia. The appellant took
a direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited
thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is in
accordance with law and the decisions of this court in similar
cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
||| (U.S. v. Pons, G.R. No. 11530, [August 12, 1916], 34 PHIL
729-739)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23475. April 30, 1974.]
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as
Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO
J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of
Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of
Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF
MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO
GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO,
FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER,
AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO
TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO
QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO
OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE
BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA
FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of
the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V . Panganiban & Renito V . Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas
& Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc.,
et al.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo
L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V . Raquiza as amici
curiae.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, C .J p:
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill
No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application,
was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on
third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith
the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred
to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee
favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment,
suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be
the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as
Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second
reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section
1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in
the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the
House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which
was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the
Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its
approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies
thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16,
1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of
the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his
signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill
thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate
reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a
press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong
version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the
Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to
the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as
well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly
approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated
July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by
the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which
his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate
and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed
it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them
that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the
Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority
of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-
Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on
September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the
Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never
became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate,
and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the
enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the Issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was
then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining
order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice Mayor
Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting
Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila
under the so-called Republic Act 4065and not otherwise conferred
upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders
from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been
succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato
de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court,
appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly
enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities,
principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts,
have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill"
doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and
elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez
Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority
of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it
cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that
the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both
Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935)
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called
parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV ofthe Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred
in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which
was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle
of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill"
theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the
jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds
the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by
Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to
resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that
"the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190,
as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of
Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be
the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It
reads:
"The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or
by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary,
printed by their order; provided, that in the
case of acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
beconclusive proof of the provisions of such
acts and of the due enactment thereof."
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly
approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of
the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a
mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the
bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress
and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an
attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered
approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such
attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are
divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such
that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The
affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the
presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary. 6 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the
Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers
should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the
(State) Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and
this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same
circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence
of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case
of Field vs. Clark as follows:
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is
an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill,
thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
 Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when
the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity withthe
Constitution."
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on
"the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which
requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has
also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its
due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a
number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of
due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to
certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the
following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of
its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may in its
judgment require secrecy; and
theyeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21(2). "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior to
its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers
of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required,
it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and
issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable
in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in
the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when
the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus
the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President." 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the
final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as
a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it
has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there
was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the
statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would
limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a
case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed
by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by
the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences
not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and
the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING
THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have
been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, [April 30, 1974], 155
PHIL 656-668)