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Increase
orifice size
The application of this procedure is considered to result in Is
adequate protection against realistic hydrocarbon fires. A No flare
capacity
supplement to the procedure is to use a risk based approach Improve utilised
?
design/apply PFP
for the fire scenarios, the heat loads and acceptance criteria for
rupture. It must be documented that the chosen solution is Yes
within the risk acceptance criteria. This approach is not Are the
Will
followed any further in the current version of the guideline. No consequence Yes equipment/pipe Failure
of the rupture criteria
acceptable rupture
? ?
Description of the guideline
The guideline starts with establishing and discussing the main Yes
No
The guideline focuses on minimising the use of PEP, i.e. The flange connection is in the test exposed to a propan jet
the prime focus should be to design a depressurisation system fire. The fire is designed to give a high heat loading (>250
with capacity to reduce the pressure in the system fast enough kw/m2), as uniform as possible over the test object. In order to
to avoid critical escalation of the fire. The main concerns achieve this high heat loading the environment for the test is
relating to the use of PEP are increased corrosion of materials based on the jet fire test procedure developed by the
covered by PEP, reduced possibilities for inspection and Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory.
maintenance of equipment covered with PEP, increased The first part of the test program comprises a 10”
weight, increased need for space, increased need for pipesegment, with an ANSI RTJ flange connection being
maintenance of the PEP and increased cost. exposed to the propane jet fire. The pipe segment is
The guideline also focuses on the importance of keeping pressurized to 150 barg with methane prior to the tests. The
the integrity of the flare system during a fire situation. Rupture pressure is maintained during the tests until an eventual
of parts of the flare system during a fire might result in leakage starts and continues as long as practicable possible.
massive release of hydrocarbons (e.g. due to an ongoing The temperatures, pressures and displacements are
depressurisation) and, hence, cause a severe escalation of the measured in the pipe itself, flanges, and the bolts.
accident. If fire exposed, the flare piping is most vulnerable to The first tests indicate that, when exposed to a gas-jet fire
rupture just after start of depressurisation due to high mass a flange connection is a weak link in a piping system.
rates/highest pressure in the system. Delayed depressurisation The tests are carried out at Norwegian Fire Laboratory,
should therefore be avoided. Trondheim, Norway.
Conclusion References
The guideline issued in 2002 provides a comprehensive /1/ ISO 13702: "Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Control
approach for optimum fire protection of pressurized process and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production
equipment. The guideline introduces a specific procedure for Installations - Requirements and Guidelines", 1999.
design of fire protection with focus on fast depressurization as
a key factor for minimizing the need for PFP. /2/ Norsk Hydro: "Best Practice Depressurization and Fire Relief
Design", NHT-0101512, December 2001
The guideline realize that there are lack of knowledge on
several topics, and has therefore initiated research programs /3/ NORSOK Standard S-001: "Technical Safety", Rev. 3, January
and testing to start closing these gap. Large scale fire 2000.
experiments are carried out to determine the effect on flanged
connections under realistic conditions. Material data at high /4/ ASME VIII: "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes".
temperatures will be established through material testing in
fire situations. /5/ NPD: "Forskrift om utforming og utrasting av innretninger med
The guideline is under continuous development, and when mer i petroleumsvirksomheten (Innretningsforskriften)",
new knowledge is available new versions will be issued. 3 September 2001.
Results from experiments will be implemented in new
versions.
SPE 86601 5
Step 1:
Step 2: Estimate the size of all orifices and calculate the
Reduse the size pressure profile and flare rates for all segments.
of the orifice Use the global average heat load with the largest
heat input (kW). No PFP in this initial iteration.
In case
Step 2: of any of
Is the flare Step 2: the "OR's"
system capacity Evaluate to increase the depres-
NO surisation rate, preferrably for the
utilized (when adding all of the
simultaneous blowdown most hazardous process segment.
rates together)?
Step 8:
Add insulation if required. Calculate the process
segment pressure profile. Use the fire with largest
YES heat input (kW).
Tip: Do several calculations with varying amount
of fire insulation.
Step 2: Step 3:
NO Is the YES Calculate the wall temperature profile for all pipes
blowdown rate less and equipment.
than maximum Use the local peak heat load (kW/m2).
I-dP/dt.I
Step 4:
Use the temperature profiles from step 3 to calculate the rupture
pressure for all pipes and equipment.Compare with the pressure
profile from step 1 or 8.
Is the
minimum NO Define start depressurisation
design temperature at a higher temperature
acceptable? (or change material).
YES
The design of this section's blowdown orifice and fire insulation requirements is finished