CASES FOR PFR ON VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Moe v. Dinkins
533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982)

 Raoul (who was 18) wanted to marry Maria (who was 15). They lived together
and had a child (Ricardo). However, in order to get a marriage license, they
needed parental consent, which Maria's mother would not give.
o Maria's mother wanted to continue getting welfare benefits from her
minor child, and would lose the benefits if Maria married.
 Raoul, Maria, and Ricardo sued (in Federal Court) to have the New York
parental consent requirement declared and unconstitutional violation of due
process.

o In New York, parental consent was required for those under 18.

 Another underage couple (Pedro (17) and Cristina (15 and pregnant))
intervened to turn this into a class action suit.
 The Trial Court found for New York and dismissed the suit.

o The Trial Court found that while minors do have constitutional rights,
courts have long recognized the government's power to make
adjustments to the constitutional rights of minors.

 For example, children can't get driver's licenses or buy alcohol.

o The Court found that the right of minors to marry is not a fundamental
right, and that the courts do not need to apply strict scrutiny. All that is
required is that New York have a rational basis for making the law.

 The rational basis test only asks whether the governmental

action at issue is a rational means to an end that may be
legitimately pursued by government.

o The Court found that New York had a rational basis for the law.
 The State has the paternalistic power to promote the welfare of
children who lack the capacity to act in their own best interest.
The State interests in mature decision-making and in preventing
unstable marriages are legitimate under its parents
patriae power.
 In addition, the Court found that the State has a legitimate
interest in supporting the fundamental privacy right of a parent
to act in what the parent perceives to be the best interest of the
child free from State court scrutiny.
o Raoul et. al. argued that the courts were in a better position to
determine maturity on a case-by-case basis because they were
disinterested parties. But the Court found that in most cases, "the
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their
children."
 o The Court found that they weren't denying Raoul and Maria's rights,
they were simply delaying those rights. As soon as they turned 18
they'd be allowed to marry anyone they want.

 The Appellate Court affirmed.

 Maria did not argue equal protection, right to privacy, or right to free
association. All of those could theoretically been the basis for finding that she
has a right to marry.

o She could have also gone to another State where the age of consent
was lower.

 Under the historical common-law, the age of consent for marriage was 14 for
males and 12 for females. Children as young as 7 were presumed to have the
capacity to consent to a future marriage.

Katipunan v. Tenorio, 38 OG 172 (1937)

Facts: Marcos Katipunan seeks for the annulment of his marriage to Rita Tenorio
alleging thatRita was not of sound mind when they got married in 1919.Rita
contended that she was mentally sound during the celebration of their marriage
andthat her mental disorder came only several years after the wedding, for the
reason she wasconfined in San Lorenzo Hospital in 1926.

Issue: Whether Rita’s insanity can be used as a ground for annulling the marriage?

Held: Insanity of one of the spouses after the celebration of marriage cannot
constitute acause of nullity. The law makes it always necessary to show that the
insanity of one ofthe contracting parties existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage. Without proof,every presumption goes in favor of the validity of marriage.

Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998)

FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a
will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s
father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and
void.” Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the
CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an
illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion
of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be
upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion
thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents
a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its
judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage
be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art.
85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes
for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and
the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme
Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by
legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment
of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the
second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate.”

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil 21 (1960)

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954,
concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April
1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial,
Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented
any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was

affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not

constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat.
It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.

Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97 (1970)

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an
action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld
the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount
of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months
prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his.
According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted
fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence,
the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment
of marriage.

Jimenez v. Republic, 109 Phil. 273 (1960)

Facts:

In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of

Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
with the following facts:

(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal
court of Zamboanga City;

(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendant’s genitals was
to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation;

(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the
complaint. She did not file an answer.

(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to
intervene for the State to see that the evidence of the plaintiff is not a frame-up,
concocted, or fabricated;

(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt
of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.

(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply
in relation to the order issued in the preceding number.
(g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show. The Court deemed lack of
interest on her part in the case. The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant.

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
thus entered upon the ground that:

(a) The defendant’s impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;

(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for
contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a
medical certificate; and

(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples,
who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them.

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical
examination.

On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues:

The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was
and is impotent.

Held:

No. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by
will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be
proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the
husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,

The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with the decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Sarao v. Guevara, 40 O.G. 15 Supp. 263 (1940)

Plaintiff and appellee: Sarao

Defendant and Appelle: Pilar Guevara
Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of laguna
Ponente: Reyes, A. J

Issue: NO reason in disturbing the decision appealed from. Decision CONFIRMED.

FACTS:
1) Appeal from decision of CFI dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for annulment of
marriage in the ground of impotency
2) Married: June 3, 1936: Manila
3) Afternoon: plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge but defendant asked to wait for
the evening
4) Night came: plaintiff again approached defendant—though he found orifice of
her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains of her private
parts and he notices oozing there from some purulent matter offensive to the smell
5) Upon advice of physician—defendant submitted to operation (august 7, 1936) and
as medical verdict that the uterus and the ovaries were bound to be effected with
tumor—surgically removed with consent of plaintiff
6) Rendered defendant incapable of procreation but did not incapacitate her to
copulate
7) Under marriage law: marriage may be annulled if the party, was at the time of
marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state and such incapacity
remains incurable
8) Plaintiff wants to construe phrase of physically incapable of entering into married
state into incapacity to procreate
9) US generally held that the meaning on impotency is not the ability to procreate but
the inability to copulate
10) Defect must be of copulation not reproduction—barrenness will not invalidate the
marriage
11) Defendant is not impotent in this case—removal of parts rendered her sterile but it
by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse
12) It was due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance (memory of first unpleasant
experience) that made him give up the idea of again having carnal knowledge of her
even after she had already been rid of her disease
13) Contention of fraud: she did not inform him of her disease in sex organs—but this
contention is untenable since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has not been
proved at the trial

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937)

FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On
January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919,
she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing. On October 25, 1919,
the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration
of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official
newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921, the court
issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication
thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927,
Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones,
Marciana’s daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the
only heir of her mother and that her mother’s marriage to Felix was null and void on
the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking
effect of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother
and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-year prescriptive period. With this, the
marriage would be null and void and would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a
legitimate heir of Marciana.

HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be
counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W.
Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed.
The validity of the marriage makes him a legitimate heir.

SSS v. De Bailon, GR No. 165545, March 24, 2006

FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted
marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of
Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. On December 10, 1970, the
CFI granted the petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita
Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS beneficiary of Bailon. SSS
cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death
benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage
with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage
with Alice. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of
justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent
Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures
until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage
pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing
spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. The two marriages involved here
falls under the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is
necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee‘s mere
reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step
was taken to nullify Bailon & Jargue’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

Valdez v. Republic, GR No. 189863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not
bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her
child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years
have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up
and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was
already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application
for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration
of presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of

presumptive death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and
no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to
have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid
under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

* Case digest by Immanuel Y. Granada, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY

2017-2018

Republic v. Granada, GR No. 187512 (2012)

FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company,
got married in 1993. In May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she
did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to
have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On February 7,
2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10
March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had
failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded
belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the
case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable.. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory.
Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

Yu v. Yu, 484 SCRA 485 (2006)

Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and

dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court. The petition contains a prayer for the award of sole custody of his daughter
Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
 The CA dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for becoming
moot and academic. Caroline Tanchay-Yu, on the other hand, filed before the RTC
Pasay a petition for habeas corpus, with a prayer for the award of the sole custody to
her of Bianca.

Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction
over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the
RTC Pasay or before the RTC Pasig

HELD:

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC,
regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas
corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter.

There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in
the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in both
actions – whether it would serve the best interest of Bianca to be in the custody of
Eric rather than Caroline or vice versa.

Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Pasig RTC is Caroline‘s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to
support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of Caroline‘s fitness to take
custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other, are present.

By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC
he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.
After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no
need for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the
Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed
pleaded.

Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common
children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new
action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the
Family Code is when “such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings,” which is not the case here.

The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate action
criterion guides this Court in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.

The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties
should have custody over Bianca in view of the express provision of the second
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the policy of
avoiding multiplicity of suits.

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998)

FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen.
Tamano died, he married Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death,
Zorayda and her son filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her
husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed
that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as single, hence, their marriage
was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no
jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment
against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda
were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the
case is vested in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied
the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be referred to CA first. The CA
ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only
when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no
sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and
the nature of action.

HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were
married through a civil wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a
Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over
marriages married under civil and Muslim law.