MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as
an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence
of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place
them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10
years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then
based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US
to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24,
2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced
her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE
is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines.
Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 152154,

FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery
of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand
E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order
(EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of
the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the
"recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines
or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned
or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice
to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should
now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government
initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such
cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.

Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during
his term of office

Held:
Yes

Ratio:
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b)
in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition
and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to
or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents
since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from
which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos
as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or
any other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations
to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold
any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government
owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be
subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3,
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory
and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent
Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income
from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner
and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of
lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have
specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was
enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima
facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other
material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos
couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could
be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their
violation of the law.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to
1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa
in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of
a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

JALOSJOS V. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and
lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return,
he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in
September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village,
Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before
the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the
lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga

Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to
comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to
be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the
election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person
must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met
the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted
that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there
at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia,
clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss
of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient
that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for
public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived
and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with
political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover,
Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all
doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELE

FARIÑAS ET AL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval”
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections
as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy
as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It
is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether
it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment
of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the
range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling
of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement
in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving
members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take
effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire
law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law
is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such
transgression has been shown in this case.

PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions
of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices
to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives,
the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives and to leave his cell.

Held:
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will
virtually make him a free man.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.

ARROYO ET AL V. DE VENECIA
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

OSMEÑA V. PENDATUN
FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member
of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the
annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and
asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by
Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during
his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of
the President’s administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of
his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the
speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself as stated in the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not
the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which
the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the
suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be
done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

GUINGONA, JR. V GONZALES

Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the
Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5;
NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able
to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP
majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12
senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the
membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect
12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the
maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership
thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it
results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed
by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the
required quorum.

ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P
500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates
respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the
first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both
instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments.
As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary
of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was
borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of
whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was
the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum
of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him
on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the
name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks;
one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the
senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought
him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character
of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result
of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is
the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate
himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable.” Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him.
SABIO V. GORDON, ET ALB.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it
means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.