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Valderrama vs, North Negros Sugar The defendant admitted some allegations thereof and denying others.

The defendant admitted some allegations thereof and denying others. It alleged that the
plaintiffs respectively granted the defendant, for the period of 50 years from the date of
CATALINO VALDERRAMA, plaintiff-appellee, the aforesaid contracts, an easement of way 7meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs
vs. for the construction and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane; that
THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.,defendant-appellant. said easement of way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the
ownership of the cane to be transported over the said railroad; that said contract was then
G.R. No. L-23810 in full force and effect and had never been annulled or modified.
December 18, 1925
Ponente: VILLAMOR, J. The trial court entered one single judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant had
no right to pass through the lands of the plaintiffs for the transportation of sugar cane not
Facts: grown from any of the haciendas of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendant
Several hacienda owners Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into a contract with Osorio, appealed.
known as milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a
minimum capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by Issue:
the hacienda owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane Whether the defendant has the right to an easement of 7meters wide upon the lands of
they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract, all in the plaintiffs as stipulated in the milling contract.
accordance with the conditions specified therein.
Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar acquired the rights and interest of Osorio in Yes.
the milling contract aforesaid. Thereafter, Valderrama (case No. 23810) and the following
month of the same year, Rodriguez (case No. 23811) and Urra, Huarte and Auzmendi (case Court Ratio:
No. 23812) made with the appellant other milling contracts identical with the first one, with The object of such a milling contract, from which arises the easement in question, is
some new conditions. Thereafter transferred to Auzmendi, and the latter to Echarri, their undoubtedly to obtain mutual benefit to the procedures of sugar cane and the corporation
interest in the milling contract executed by them. putting up the central. It is only by taking this principal idea into account that it may be
conceived why the parties had come to an agreement to assume such obligation as are set
In view of the fact that the haciendaowners, who were up to that time customers of the forth in the milling contract. But the contract could not produce any benefit to the parties,
central, could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said if the explanation given by the plaintiffs would be admitted, as to their intention in creating
central, the defendant made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners in order the aforesaid easement of way upon their respective haciendas, that it was only in favor of
to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their their respective haciendas. Such an explanation is inadmissible because it is contrary to the
complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his object of the milling contract. It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was
respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar established in favor of the servient estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve
cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.
to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the
sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily created by the
Occidental Negros. plaintiffs upon their respective estates for the construction of a railroad connecting said
estates with the central of the defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is
The plaintiffs, in separate complaints, prayed the CFI of Occidental Negros to pronounce apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the use and
judgment, holding that the defendant had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if
cause its locomotives and wagons to run across the estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose to be transported to the central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the
of transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. easement was created for the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central, it may cause
its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to the needs
of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the
central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the burden of ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR CRUZADA and ANTONIO SISON,
maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient cane with petitioners,
which to maintain its business; this is specially true here, because in the milling contract vs.
with the plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling contracts
with other planters, and obtain in that way all cane necessary to cover the capacity of the
central. and MARCELINO FLORETE, SR., respondents.

SC Ruling: G.R. No. 72837

For the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in finding that the April 17, 1989
appellant could not transport on its railroad passing through the haciendas of the appellees, PARAS, J.:
where it has an easement of way established in its favor, the cane grown in the haciendas
of the procedures of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, to be milled in the central of the appellant. NATURE OF THE CASE
And, therefore, the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant absolved, Petition for certiorari to review the Decision 1 dated August 14,1985 promulgated by
as it is hereby absolved, from the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. C.V. No. 03781 which set aside the
So ordered. decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Iloilo City,
dated December 15, 1983 in Civil Case No. 12791.


The case at bar arose from a complaint for recovery of damages filed by Marsal & Co., Inc.
and Marcelino Florete, Sr. (private respondents herein) against defendants Jose C. Hernani,
Ester J. Javellana, Rolando Demafiles, Cesar Crusada and Antonio Sison for allegedly
denying plaintiffs' access to, and use of a canal leading to plaintiffs' property and to enjoin
the City Mayor and City Engineer of Iloilo City from demolishing the existing structures
within plaintiffs property serving as dike entrance gate to said canal situated at Barangay
Navais, Mandurriao, Iloilo City. Before the pre-trial conference the complaint as against
the City Mayor and City Engineer, was dismissed at the instance of plaintiffs on the ground
that said defendants had agreed not to demolish the pendency of the action.

 Plaintiff Marsal & Co., Inc., is presently the owner of the parcel of land adjoining
the Iloilo River up to and adjacent the lot where the L. Borres Elementary School
is located at Barangay Navais Mandurriao, Iloilo;
 In 1961, when Marcelino Florete, Sr. was still the owner of said Marsal property
having acquired the same by purchase from its former owners sometime in 1959,
there existed a main canal from the Iloilo River cutting across said property
towards the lot where the said school is located and thru a canal that traverses the
school premises going towards Lot 2344;
 Before 1971, there were no houses standing within the school compound and
premises of L. Borres Elementary School;
 At present, there are 15 to 16 houses in the said school compound one of which is
the house of the barangay captain of Barangay Navais
 Sometime in July 1978, plaintiffs closed the dike entrance of the main canal to the manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient
canal running across the L. Borres Elementary School premises to Lot 2344; to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important
 On petition of school P.T.A. officials of Barangay Navais, an ocular inspection of works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he
the premises was made as a result of which a report dated November 7, 1978 was offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused
prepared and submitted by 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Serafin Abogado; thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of
 The plaintiffs had demolished the dike connecting the main canal in plaintiffs' the easement.
property with the canal running thru the school premises toward 2344.
Plaintiffs, however, did not recognize, much less, follow the above-quoted law on
ISSUES easement. They closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike
Whether or not an easement or servitude of water-right-of-way was constituted on the thus impairing the use of the servitude by the dominant estate. And by so doing, plaintiffs
property of the plaintiffs as servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School land violated not only the law on easement but also Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins
and nearby lands as dominant estates. any person, natural or juridical, to demolish structures or improvements which tend to
obstruct the flow of water through rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels.
The Court finds from the evidence that the main canal had been in existence long before For this canal did not serve merely to supply salt water to the school fishpond but also
defendant Marcelino Florete, Sr. acquired ownership of the land thru which the same serves as drainage charged or channel of rainwater from adjacent lands to the Iloilo River.
passes from the Iloilo River up to the premises of what is now known as the L. Borres Before the canal was closed, the residents had not experienced any flood in the area or in
Elementary School. This fact was clearly brought to light by the testimonies of at least three the school premises. It was only after the canal was closed by plaintiffs on July 25, 1978,
witnesses, including a member of the Maranon family from whom Florete, Sr. acquired the that the residents began to experience flood in the school premises particularly in the
land, in addition to the testimony of defendant Antonio Sison, Barangay Captain of month of August every year thereafter when rainy season comes. Rainwater from adjoining
Barangay Navais where the subject canal is situated. The Court, indeed, finds no reason to areas accumulate at the school premises without any chance of going out. Flood waters
doubt the testimonies of these witnesses not only because they ring true throughout but remain stagnant for days and became filthy and veritable breeding place of mosquitoes.
also because the same emanate from reliable sources who had been actual residents of the
place, having had occasions to take their bath in the same canal and with separate Plaintiffs claimed that they closed the canal because the residents of the place threw waste
individual experiences incident thereto to relate. As heretofore stated, the main canal had matter and garbage into the canal and so the waters therein were dirtied and rendered
long been in existence even before plaintiff Marcelino Florete Sr. acquired ownership of totally unsanitary for human use, particularly for salt-making. But this claim was belied by
the fishpond of the Maranons thru which the same passes. This canal served as passage of defendants' showing that what motivated plaintiffs to close the canal was the fact that the
salt water from Iloilo River to the school fishpond and at the same time, as outlet and residents engaged in salt-making using plastic bags and thus, somehow, competed with
drainage canal or channel of rainwater from the school premises and adjacent lands that plaintiffs in the production of salt in the area. At any rate, regardless of what motivated
empties to the Iloilo River. An easement or servitude of water-right of way had thus been plaintiffs into closing the canal, the fact is that plaintiffs act ran roughshod over the
constituted on the property of the plaintiffs as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres aforequoted provisions of law on easement and transgressed Presidential Decree No. 296.
Elementary School land and the nearby lands as the dominant estates.
Even on the assumption that it was plaintiff Florete Sr. who constructed the subject canal WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the respondent
in 1961, an easement or servitude of water-right-of-way had nonetheless been constituted appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Regional Trial
on subject property because since then the same had been in continuous use for no less Court in Civil Case No. 12791 is hereby REINSTATED.
than fifteen (15) years — by the school fishpond as well as by the adjacent lands. A positive SO ORDERED.
easement (Art 616, New Civil Code) had thereby been created and plaintiffs have no right
to terminate it unilaterally without violating Art. 629 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude. Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the
EDUARDO C TAÑEDO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUANITO BERNARD Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila

G.R. No L66580 August 30, 1988 DOCTRINE:The powers of the City administration do not extend to the establishment of
new easements upon private property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent
Extinguishment of Easement and easily proven usurpation exists.

An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs,
persons is not a ground for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing vs.
it. THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants.

FACTS: G.R. No. L-3144

November 19, 1907
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He Ponente: ARELLANO, C. J.:
constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house,
Nature of Case:
bodega and a septic tank for common use of the occupants of the two lots.
Petition for Certiorari
Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Tañedo (pet). He also agreed that
should be decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Tañedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to
This is a petition for certiorari regarding the demurer entered by Supreme Court affirming
Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the the decision of the City of Manila not to grant license to construct a terrace to the plaintiffs.
septic tank. He also asked Tañnedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot
B. Facts:
On 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the Escolta,
Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal of San
that he had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of 23.50 meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G.
Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. Dieck, the defendant herein, for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3
meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of
RTC dismissed the complaint and the cross claim.
Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her"; but the defendant
refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.

Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of
That the plaintiff's ownership of the whole ground and of the strip in question is beyond all
the land and its subsequent sale to different owners.
doubt, both by reason of her title thereto and the entry thereof in the registry of property,
and by the acknowledgment thereof made by the city itself when obtaining by means of
condemnation proceedings a portion of the same property adjoining the public road.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the
That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the said
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter for
continued by operation of law as provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or shipwrecked persons and for fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips
extinguishment was provided in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing through
of the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim the canal.
cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.
The intention of the Municipal Board when denying the permit asked for by the plaintiff is EASEMENT
to subject the place the "easement of public use for the general interest of navigation,
flotation, fishing, and salvage," citing the Law of Waters and the Civil Code.
Macario Solis vs. Benedicta Pujeda, G.R. No. L-16392, January 13, 1922, En Banc
Issue/s of the Case:
1. Whether the City of Manila was correct in denying the application of permit by the

Actions of the Court The defendant Benedicta Pujeda is the owner of a strip of land in the barrio of Calibuyo,
SC: Overruled the defendants’ demurred to the amended complaint municipality of Tanza, Cavite, lying along a stream known as the estero of Calibuyo. Prior to
the institution of this action the three plaintiffs named in the caption hereof constructed a
Court Rationale on the Above Facts: dam of stone or concrete across said stream in order to obtain water for irrigation purposes,
The matter at issue herein being the enforcement of the Law of Waters and of the Civil and one of the wings of the dam was made to rest upon the bank which belongs to
Code, it is not out of place nor untimely, even now, to point out the administrative law Benedicta Pujeda. As a result of this construction, not only were several square meters of
which ought to have been applied had this act of the city of Manila been carried out by the land belonging to Benedicta Pujeda appropriated by the plaintiffs for purposes of
late ayuntamiento during the former sovereignty; an administrative law which, owing to its construction, but several hundred additional square meters lying along the stream above
having been so often repeated, is now raised to the rank of an incontrovertible principle of the dam and belonging to her were flooded by the rise of the water consequent upon the
law on the matter. building off the dam. Believing herself to be aggrieved by this, Benedicta Pujeda, with the
aid of one Roman Arañas, on or about July 20, 1918, made an opening in that portion of the
The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of new easements dam which abuts upon her property, to the extent necessary to free the water that had
upon private property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven accumulated upon her property. The perforation thus effected in the dam was about 1
usurpation exists. Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an easement upon private meter wide and 2 meters deep.
property; therefore, any order thus given cannot be held to have been issued in the exercise
of their lawful powers. Thereafter the present action was instituted by the plaintiffs to restrain Benedicta Pujeda
(with whom is joined her husband Valentin Giongco) and Roman Arañas from interfering
The question involved here is not the actual establishment of an easement which might be with the reparation of the dam by the plaintiffs, and to enjoin the same defendants from
objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond molesting the plaintiffs in the use of said dam in the future. The plaintiffs also asked that
the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with the defendants be adjudged to pay the sum of P90 to the plaintiffs as damages resulting
building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights from the breaking of the dam. The defendants answered generally and interposed a
which are attached to the right of ownership. counterclaim, praying that they be absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiffs in
turn be required to remove the aforesaid dam and that they be enjoined from
Supreme Court Ruling: reconstructing it or maintaining any other dam in that place to the prejudice of the
Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as defendants. The defendants furthermore prayed that the plaintiffs should be required to
city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue a license in pay damages to the defendants in the amount of P3,000, with costs.
favor of the plaintiff herein, Doña Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as
aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification as per Exhibit A, the said defendants In this connection it appears that when this work was first undertaken several years ago,
to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered. the plaintiffs expected to obtain the approval of the Director of Lands for the project, and
at that time they promised to indemnify Benedicta Pujeda for any damaged caused to her
by the construction of the dam. However, after the work had progressed to a certain extent,
the Director of Lands ordered its removal. Later, the Director of Lands proposed as a
reasonable solution of the controversy that, if the plaintiffs desired to continue with the
construction of the dam, they should within thirty days deposit with the Bureau of Lands
the sum of P371.68 to cover the damage that would probably be done to Benedicta Pujeda. to these lands, gives the Government special authority to construct, or to authorized
This deposit was apparently made. Still later, upon further protest from Benedicta Pujeda, another to construct, improvements of this character upon such lands. However, we
security was given by bond to the extent of P1,000. The Director of Lands having thus, discover nothing in said provision which, when rightly interpreted, could be considered as
inferentially at least, approved the project under the conditions stated, the plaintiffs conferring upon the Director of Lands any such extraordinary power as has been here
proceeded with the construction, and reliance is now placed by them upon the authority claimed.
thus granted by the Director of Lands as sufficient justification for their continuing the work.
It results that the dam in question has been constructed without legal authority, and the
Issue. whether the plaintiffs have justified the invasion by them of the rights of Benedicta action instituted by the plaintiffs cannot be maintained. The judgment appealed from will
Pujeda in the manner above stated for it is evident that if the building of the dam by the therefore be reversed, and the defendants will be absolved from the complaint.
plaintiffs was unauthorized, so much of the construction as rests upon the land of Benedicta
Pujeda constitutes a private nuisance and may be lawfully demolished or removed by her Under the prayer of their cross-complaint the defendants Benedicta Pujeda, with her
or by any person acting under her directions. It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove husband, Valentin Giongco, are entitled to an order, which will be accordingly entered,
that they had legal authority to build the dam. requiring the plaintiffs within a reasonable time to remove so much of the dam as
constitutes a burden upon the land of Benedicta Pujeda, and to the extent necessary to
Held. avoid the flooding or her land by the obstruction of the dam. In addition to this, judgment
will be entered that the same defendants recover of the plaintiffs the sum of P80, plus the
For the purposes of this decision it may be taken for granted that the Bureau of Lands is the further sum of P6.80 for each year from April, 1915, until the obstruction mentioned shall
proper repository of the administrative authority conferred in said article with respect to have been removed, as ordered. No special pronouncement will be made as to costs of
the decreeing of the easement in case of public waters, and the Director of Lands may be either instance. So ordered.
assumed to be the proper official to conduct the investigation and make the appropriate
order. Nevertheless, the making of the investigation of record is an essential prerequisite
to the exercise of the power. This implies that the interest parties shall have an opportunity
to be heard and that record be made of the proof adduced with reference to the proposed
servitude and the damage to result therefrom. These formalities are essential; otherwise
the decreeing of the servitude would be obnoxious to the constitutional provision which
forbids the taking of property without due process of law. The administrative investigation
contemplated in article 143 of the Law of Waters must proceed along the lines of a judicial
inquiry, at least to the extent of giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and making
record of the proof pertinent to their respective contentions.

In the case now before us no investigation of record was made. About all that appears to
have been done was that the watermaster, as representative of the Director of Lands,
inspected the site of the dam and recommended that it be removed, reporting that it had
been a failure. The letters referred to by the court as constituting a license from the Director
of Lands to the plaintiffs to proceed with the work, under the conditions already stated,
show a praiseworthy effort on the part of that official to adjust the controversy upon a fair
basis, but they afford no legal warrant for the plaintiffs to proceed with the construction of
the dam.

It appears that the land owned by Benedicta Pujeda is of the class known as friar lands; and
his Honor, the trial judge, seems to have supposed that section 19 of Act No. 1120, referring
G.R. No. L-57641 | October 23, 1982  No signatures or initials of the two witnesses are found with any of the insertions. To
ANTOLIN A. JARIOL, and PAULO S. RODRIGUEZ, In their capacities as Joint Executors of be noted from the partition agreement is the fact that four heirs were to contribute
the Estate of Humiliano Rodriguez, deceased, petitioners vs. for the easement of right-of-way three (3) meters each, while Humiliano, to whom
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINO JAGDON, in his Capacity as Administrator of the Lot "F" appertained, was to give six meters.
Estate of Timoteo Rodriguez, et al, respondent  Upon the contention that they had discovered the annotations only in 1964,
Nature of Case: petitioners Antolin A. Jariol and Paulo S. Rodriguez, as joint executors of Humiliano's
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in its estate, together with Ines Rodriguez de Pages, filed an action with the Court of First
Case No. CA-G.R. No. 47020-R. The Petition was initially denied but upon a second Instance of Cebu on March 11, 1965 against respondents Dominino Jagdon as
Motion for Reconsideration, the denial was reconsidered and it was given due course. administrator of the estate of Timoteo Rodriguez, Clemente Rodriguez, Dolores
Facts Rodriguez, and Ines Vda. de Rodriguez, seeking to declare the nullity of the
 The deceased Quirino Rodriguez left four children: Humiliano, Timoteo, Jose, all annotations and insertions for having been surreptitiously and maliciously added long
surnamed Rodriguez, and Ines Rodriguez de Pages. after the execution of the principal document, and the cancellation of the easements
 On November 25, 1951, these heirs (Jose, then deceased, being represented by Ines of right of way noted as encumbrances on the Certificates of Title issued for the
Vda. de Rodriguez and his adult children Abdulia, Dolores and Juanita), entered into subdivided lots, particularly on "Lot F". It was alleged that the initials of Humiliano
an extrajudicial partition to divide a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of and Ines Rodriguez de Pages affixed to the insertions were forged as found by a
Title No. RT-345 (T-193) of the Registry of Deeds, Cebu City, in the name of the handwriting expert; that not all the parties to the document had affixed their initials
deceased. The deed was signed by two witnesses and notarized by Atty. Bernardo B. to the insertions; that had the annotations been made at the time of the execution of
Solotan. In this agreement, the property was divided into Lots "A" to "G" inclusive. Lot the document, Timoteo, who was still alive, should have signed the annotations and
"F" was adjudicated to Humiliano, and Lot "G" to Timoteo. Lot "G" has no egress to not his son Clemente. The Complaint was amended three times to include other heirs
the public roads. either as parties plaintiffs or parties defendants.
 On November 16, 1953, the original and copies of the Deed of Partition were allegedly  During the trial, petitioners presented the deposition of Ines Rodriguez de Pages, then
burned when the Quirino Rodriguez Building was razed by fire. 81 years old, to the effect that the initials "I.R.P. " appearing in the insertions were
 On May 22, 1956, Timoteo died and his son, Clemente Rodriguez, was appointed not her own.
executor of the estate, but was later replaced by Dominino Jagdon. They are two of  Defendants-respondents, on the other hand, sustained the genuineness and due
the private respondents herein. execution of the annotations or additions and presented their own handwriting
 After Humiliano's death in 1961 or 1962, petitioners Antolin A. Jariol, his son-in- law, expert. They averred that the agreement merely confirmed the existing right of way.
and Paulo S. Rodriguez, his son, were appointed executors of his estate.
 On June 27, 1960, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, with annotations and additions ISSUE/S of the CASE:
on the left and right hand margins on page 4 and below the notarial acknowledgment (a) Whether or not lot “G” is entitled to a legal easement of right-of-way
on page 5, was registered by Clemente Rodriguez, son of Timoteo, in the Office of the automatically attaches to lot “F” adjudicated to Humiliano, as the servient estate.
Register of Deeds of Cebu. The annotations are: (b) Whether or not the forged alterations and insertions on the Deed of Extrajudicial
(a) That on the approved subdivision plan with reference to the existing actual Partition are legally binding and are relevant.
private lane, Lots 802-B-2-B-2-C, 802-B-2-B-2-D, 802-B-2-B-2B shall allot for the
private lane three (3) meters each on their respective sides and thence six (6) ACTIONS of the COURT
meters for lot 802-B-2-B-2-F following the existing private lane, more particularly RTC: - It is the conclusion of this Court therefore, that the initials of Ines Rodriguez de Pages
described at the bottom of page 5 of this document. and Humiliano Rodriguez were forged and that Clemente Rodriguez, in initialing the said
(b) That the contracting parties to the aforementioned extrajudicial partition of the insertions or additions without any power of attorney from Timoteo Rodriguez does not
estate of the deceased, Quirino Rodriguez, hereby will and bind themselves bind the latter. Hence, the alleged agreement creating the easement is of no force and legal
together with all the heirs, successors, and assigns to an the provisions of the said effect upon the heirs of Quirino Rodriguez.
document. Declared the alterations or annotations complained of illegal and unlawful and
(c) That the owners of the following lots bind themselves for their mutual benefit a without any legal force and effect; ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel the
perpetual easement of right of way. easement of right of way noted as encumbrances on the title; and finding that Clemente
Rodriguez was responsible for the "falsification of the insertions" and the "forgery" of the
initials of Humiliano and Ines Rodriguez de Pages, required defendants therein to pay 2. No. The questioned insertions and annotations refer to an "existing actual private lane."
actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees for having "abetted" the The question of legality of those insertions is linked with the need for its continued
"wrondoing" of Clemente. existence and the laws on easement cannot but have a definite bearing. The annotations
After defendants-respondents' Motion for New Trial on the ground that the did not "create" a right-of-way, contrary to the opinion of the Trial Court. They merely
deposition of Ines R. de Pages should not have been admitted in evidence, was denied, confirmed are existing one. Respondent Appellate Tribunal did not "by judicial fiat"
they appealed to the Court of Appeals. establish a "legal easement of right- of- way" on Lot "F". It found that it had been pre-
existing and that under the circumstances, the laws on easement were applicable. A chapel
CA: - reversed the judgment appealed from and dismissed the Third Amended Complaint exits in the interior constructed by the deceased Quirino Rodriguez, who was also
as well as all counterclaims principally on the ground that the right-of-way involved, which responsible for giving chapel-goers access thereto from the street. 9 The right-of-way exists
was a pre-existing one, even prior to the extra judicial partition, sprang not from any for the mutual benefit of most of the heirs of Quirino Rodriguez. As aptly stated by
voluntary concession but from law. Hence this petition. respondent Court "justice and equity demand that the status quo be maintained with
regards to the easement of right of way."
1. YES. It cannot be denied that easements of right-of-way, being discontinuous, cannot be WHEREFORE, let this Petition for Review be, as it is, hereby denied for lack of merit.
acquired by prescription. However, a close perusal of the subdivision plan of Lot 802-B-2-
B-2 reveals that Lot 802-B-2-B-2-G with an area of 1422 square meters has no access to the Costs against petitioners.
public roads. Corner no. 1 of this lot is almost 80 meters from Juan Luna street and about
73 meters from Colon Street, the latter through Lot No. 802-B-2-B-2-F. Under the partition
agreement, Lot 802-B-2-B-2- G appertained to Timoteo Rodriguez and his heirs. A legal
easement of right-of- way can therefore be established in favor of the heir to which this lot
went. Section 652 of the New Civil Code reads: "Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale,
exchange or partition is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-
owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right-of-way without indemnity." Section 651 explains:
"The width of the easement of right-of-way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs
of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." From the
foregoing discussions, it would be immaterial to delve into whether the insertions in the
extrajudicial partition are illegal and unauthorized. The right of the dominant estate to
demand a right-of-way springs not from any voluntary concession but from law. Appellees
must provide the owners of the dominant estate (Lot 802-B-2-B-2-G in this case) egress to
the public road. Had the partition been the other way around, surely appellees would want
a way out to the street. Justice and equity demand that the status quo be maintained with
regards to the easement of right-of-way.

In point of fact, a road right of way providing access to the public road from "Lot G" existed
long before the execution of the extrajudicial partition even during the lifetime of Quirino
Rodriguez. The Deed of Partition merely sought to legalize and give stability to the access
road already existing. That was confirmed by the testimony of Mrs. Casafranca. That is also
the position taken by the other heirs who have been included as defendants respondents.
As a matter of law, considering that "Lot G " has no access to the public road, the easement
is explicitly provided for in Article 652 of the Civil Code 7 , its width being determined by
the needs of the servient estate pursuant to Article 651 8 of the same law.
Eusebio Francisco vs. IAC and Cresencio Ramos Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to
keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.
DOCTRINE: Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis
for the creation of a legal or compulsory easement of way. To justify the imposition of this Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on
servitude, there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall, also in August, 1973. 10 Shortly thereafter,
Francisco was served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73
EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, petitioner, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, instituted by Ramos, as well as a writ of preliminary
vs. mandatory injunction directing him to remove his stone fence and keep his lot open for

G.R. No. L-63996 Francisco moved to dissolve the mandatory injunction. The Court appointed a
September 15, 1989 commissioner who conducted an ocular inspection of the lots in question, Lots 860-A, 860-
Ponente: NARVASA, J.: B and 266 and submitted a report of his findings. On the basis of the commissioner's report,
the Court issued another Order on September 10, 1973,
Nature of Case: ----granting Ramos.
Petition for Certiorari
Ramos posted the required bond of P 350 (P 20 per square meter), and Court issued the
Brief: writ of preliminary injunction.
Contested in the appellate proceedings at bar is the entitlement of Cresencio J. Ramos,
owner of Lot 860-A of the Malinta Estate, to an easement of right of way through the land After filing his answer with counterclaim, Francisco once more moved for the setting aside
belonging to petitioner Eusebio Francisco, Lot 266 also of the same Malinta Estate. The of the injunctive writs on the ground that they had been issued in excess of the Court's
Court of First Instance of Bulacan declared Ramos to be so entitled, by judgment rendered jurisdiction. By Order dated November 19, 1973, the Court dissolved the injunctions, setting
in Civil Case No. 66-V-73. That judgment was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court aside its Orders of August 31, and September 10, 1973. Six (6) days later, however, the
in CA-G.R. No. 60968-R, promulgated on September 7, 1982. Francisco contends that both Court handed down its verdict, adversely to Francisco. The CA affirmed the Trial Court’s
Courts are wrong, and asks this Court to reverse them. About the basic facts there is no judgement.
Issue/s of the Case:
Facts: 1. Whether the right of way instituted to Franscisco’s lot was valid.
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate. Lot 860 was owned by
Cornelia and Frisca Dila, and had a frontage along Parada Road measuring 51.90 meters. Actions of the Court
Adjoining Lot 860 was Lot 226, owned by Eusebio Francisco, as aforestated; it also had a SC: Reversed CA and Trial Court’s decision
frontage along Parada Road of 62.10 meters.
Court Rationale on the Above Facts:
Some months later, in March, 1972, after having set up a piggery on his newly acquired In Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, Inc., 22 this Court held that a
property, Ramos asked for a right of way to Francisco through the latter's land. Negotiations compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained without the presence of four (4)
thereafter had however failed to bring about a satisfactory arrangement. requisites provided for in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which the owner of the
dominant tenement must establish, to wit:
Later that year, 1972, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of Councilor Tongco of
Valenzuela, in obtaining a three-meter wide passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila (1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on his lot, this adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
was in August, 1973, and thereby closed the very right of way granted to him across Lot
860-B. It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through (2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; G.R. No. 75905; October 12, 1987

(4) That the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient Brief
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650). This is a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 29, 1986 which affirmed the November 14, 1984 order of the RTC of
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been Pasay City dismissing the petitioner’s civil action for a right of way with prayer for
granted an adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent preliminary injunction.
estate of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with
petitioner Francisco for another passageway through the latter's property.
But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own
act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through Plaintiff Ramos acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision a house and lot
an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has containing an area of 901 square meters situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro
not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent Manila. In the subdivision survey plan, two road lots abut plaintiff's property namely lot
had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an 4133-G-12 with an area of 2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the
easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135 of the Parañaque Cadastre now known as Pambansa
diffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue. Respondents Asprec own Lot
to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted
inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec
similar easement in an alternative location. subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs. On April 30, 1981, Ramos filed a complaint for an
easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private
Supreme Court Ruling: respondents, alleging, among others the that he constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Avenue (also known as Pambansa Road), Paranaque, and has since resided therein with his
The complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is family from 1977 up to the present; that during construction of the house, Gatchalian
DISMISSED, the private respondent declared without right to the easement sued for, and Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in said case is LIFTED. Costs against the entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest being only about 100 meters, most
private respondent.. So ordered. convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, the Sucat Road (now
known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque); that with the construction of the 7-8 feet
concrete wall has constrained plaintiff and his family to use as temporary ingress/egress
and with great inconvenience and hardship other lots belonging to different owners, and
this becomes all the more pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud; and,
lastly, that the aforesaid concrete wall is dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises
posing great danger or hazard. The lower court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff failed to establish the
existence of the pre-conditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of
a right of way as it affirmed the lower court's order.
Issue undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the plaintiff when he uses it to reach the public
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. The Court agree with
the appellate court's observation that the plaintiff should have, first and foremost,
Whether the plaintiff has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and
of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present. (No) maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision
that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec. To allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in spite of a
Action of the courts road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its buyers simply because
Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much greater ease in going to and coming from the
RTC – dismissed main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained
CA – affirmed RTC decision through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the
SC – affirmed CA decision dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial,necessity for it."

Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as
aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a
legal or compulsory right of way.
The Court finds the petition not to be impressed with merit. An easement or servitude in
an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established
either by law, in which case it is called legal or by the will of the parties, in which event it is
a voluntary easement. Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this
case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary
easement between the plaintiff and the respondent company and/or the other private
respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way.

A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the following four requisites are first
shown to exist:
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet toa public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest." (Art.650).

On the first requisite, the Court finds no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of
fact that the plaintiff failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat
Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there
is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as
Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo Held:

GR No. 911, March 12, 1903 Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a wall belonging to
the wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the windows opened in one’s own wall
Facts: is of negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of
the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner
The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has
of the dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the servient
certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on
estate from doing something which it would be lawful for him to do were it not for the
the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; that these windows have been in existence
easement. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act
since the year 1843, and that the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has
of opposition to the right of the owner of house No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the
commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner
defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct the light of
that one-half of one of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving
house No.65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior
the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. The
to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not
court practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not proven
acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long
that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63 from making
a time might have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house
improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.
no.65, because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could
The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having
during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of light in favor been performed.
of the house No.65, and as a servitude upon house No.63, and, consequently, has acquired
When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an
the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any
act of ownership inherent in the right of property with no limitations other than those
manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the easement
established by law. By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on
of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
a thing which is wholly the property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the
establish any easement, because the property is used by its owner in the exercise of
same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that
dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement. It is that the use if the windows opened
said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No.63, and
in a wall on one’s own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement to
without opposition on his part. However, the defendant contends that the easement is
the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the
negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin
abutting property and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal
of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting
act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for
owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does
the existence of the easement.
it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of possession according to Art.1942 of the
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative. Civil Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement
of light with respect to the openings made in one’s own edifice does not consist precisely
Issue: in the fact of opening them or using them. The easement really consists in prohibiting or
restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt
Whether or not the easement of light in the case of windows opened in one’s own wall is
the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding the light.
Fabie vs. Lichauco, G.R. No. L-3598, July 24, 1908 Ruling and Ratio:

Doctrine: Respondent who claims the said easement is obliged to prove the NO. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in
aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign of easement is made to consist controversy was constructed in as much as he limits himself to sustaining and
in the present case, existed at the time of ownership of her property and that of defending the freedom of his property, denying easement of light and view of the
the petitioner were separated. respondent pretends to impose over it. A property is assumed to be free from all
encumbrances unless the contrary is proved. Respondent who claims the said
Facts: easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent
Petitioner Fabie applied for the registration of his property in Manila free form any sign of easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time of
encumbrances except to the easement of right of way in favor of the respondent. ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated. And in as
In addition to the right of way, the respondents also claim that of light and view much as this issue has not been proven, the claim of the respondents as to the
and drainage. However, the claim was later reduced only to that of light and view. easement of light and view which the petitioner does not admit, must of necessity
Lichauco claimed that when Juan Baustita Coloma, the original owner of both be dismissed. Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the parties that
estates, establish not only an easement of right of way but also of light and view the respondent has balconies over the land of the petitioner, and as it is, since it
and that when both properties are alienated, the apparent signs were not has not been positively shown that the said balconies exceed the limit of the land
removed. The apparent sign allegedly consists of a gallery with windows through owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of the loft
which light is admitted. It was supported on columns erected on the ground belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory
belonging to the petitioner and a balcony on Lichauco’s property is supported by maintained by the respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we
upright erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted the existence of consider it unnecessary to deal hear in as to its other aspect, the easement of view,
such gallery. The house was now afrontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which might result in such case from the existence of the balconies alluded to,
which 16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and would be negative and not a positive one, because the erection of the same would
1 meter and 90 centimeters to gallery in question. It results therefore, that at the not constitute, according to their statement, an invasion of the right of another,
present day, the houses has nearly 2 meters more frontage than when it was but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents to
alienated by Coloma. Therefore, at the present day the house is erected partly on construct within their own lot. And as said easement is negative, it cannot be
the land belonging to the owner and partly, that gallery, over the lot belonging to prescribed in favor of the property of the respondent in the absence of any act of
another, that is over that of the petitioner. When it was sold on October 1848, no opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or their principals would
portion of the house occupied that lot last mentioned, but the entire building was have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which obstructs the
erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set forth in the instrument of the sale. balconies in question, in as much as the said act of opposition is what constitutes
The lower court held that the right of way and drainage exist in favor of the the necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing the time
respondent’s respective properties. The claim as to the easement of light and view required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus the judgment
was dismissed by the Court. appealed from is affirmed intoto.

Issue: WON the Respondents are entitled to the easement of light and view.
PROPERTY | EASEMENT  Saenz claims that, under articles 581 and 582 of the Civil Code, Hermanos is prohibited
from constructing his house and opening the windows and balconies looking directly
ART. 581. The owner of a wall which is not a party wall, adjoining another's estate, may upon his property in the manner above described, and prays that the court issue an
make in it windows or openings to admit light, at the height of the ceiling joists or order directing the defendant to close said windows and that the said defendant be
immediately under the ceiling, of the dimensions of thirty centimeters square, and, in prohibited perpetually from constructing openings in its house except in conformity
with said articles of the Civil Code.
any case, with an iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.

ART. 582. Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting
over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least,
two meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. Is Hermanos entitled to the easement of light and view which the windows and openings
give him? Is Hermanos in violation of Art 581 and 582?
G.R. L-No. 2085 August 10, 1909
TIBURCIO SAENZ, plaintiff-appellant, HELD
FIGUERAS HERMANOS, defendant-appellee. Lower Court

Although the windows of the house come within the prohibition contained in article 582
of the Civil Code, Saenz is not entitled to the judgment asked for, or for any other judgment
 The plaintiff Saenz and the defendant Hermanos own adjoining lots within the in his favor. Therefore, it is ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant for
municipality of Iloilo. the recovery of the costs herein. — (Signed) Henry C. Bates, judge of the Ninth Judicial
 Hermanos had constructed or was constructing a house of strong materials upon its lot.
The line of the said house on the side toward the lot belonging to Saenz was less than Supreme Court
two meters from dividing line of the two lots. The said house was of two stories.
Defendant Hermanos is not entitled to the easement of light and view which the windows
 The side of the house toward the lot of Saenz, the Hermanos placed three windows; and openings, which he was made in the house in question, give him, and, because of the
and in the second story had placed five windows, each looking directly upon the lot of fact that he has constructed his houses nearer than 2 meters to the dividing line between
the Saenz. Hermanos had not obtained the permission of the plaintiff to place the said his property and the property of the plaintiff, he is only entitled to the easement of light
windows and balconies in the manner above indicated.
and view provided for in said article 581 above quoted. Therefore, let a judgment be
entered reversing the judgment of the lower court with costs, and directing the
 The defendants have constructed a two-story house on their lot at a distance of 71
centimeters from the dividing line at the front part, and at a distance of 70 centimeters defendants, within a period of thirty days from the receipt of the notice of this decision, to
at the rear. The defendants’ 3 windows on the ground floor of their house, in the part close the said openings and windows, in the said house, looking directly upon the property
that overlooks the lot of the plaintiff, are 1 meter and 20 centimeters wide and 2 meters of the plaintiff. So ordered.
high; on the upper floor there are 5 windows, each 2 meters and 11 centimeters high
and 1 meter and 60 centimeters wide; a balcony was constructed at the front part of Court Rationale
the house above the ground floor, opening directly upon the lot of the plaintiff, and
another balcony at the rear part of the house, which up to the present time opens Article 582 absolutely prohibits the construction of windows with direct views, or
directly upon the plaintiff's lot, although the defendants state that, according to the balconies or any similar openings projecting over adjoining property, unless there is a
plan, said part is to be closed with boards. distance of at least 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and the adjoining
property. The distance between the wall of the house of the defendant and the dividing CHOCO VS. SANTAMARIA
line between the two lots was only 71 centimeters. The defendant, therefore, has violated GR No. 6076
the provisions of said article 582 by building in his house nearer the line of the property of December 29, 1911
the plaintiff than a distance of 2 meters. Mapa, J.

Article 581 provides the character of windows or openings in a wall adjoining the Nature of case:
property of another when such wall is constructed nearer the dividing line of the two Defendant is in possession of a parcel of land on the corner of Calles Pescadores
properties than 2 meters. In the present case the defendant constructed his house so that and P. Rada in the district of Tondo, City of Manila, and he erected a house thereon
the wall looking upon the property of the plaintiff was less than 2 meters from the dividing flush with the boundary line of the adjacent property. The plaintiffs, on the other
line. He can, therefore, only construct such windows as are provided for in said article 581. hand, are the owners of the land on both sides of the defendant’s house. The
defendant in the building of his house has made several openings and windows in
the walls of the house on both sides overlooking the properties of the plaintiffs. At
the time the defendant was building his house and the windows and the openings
were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made
written protest and demand on the defendant, and the defendant received the
written protest and referred it to his counsel who, from evidence, appears to have
suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was not
made. Hence, this action was brought.

Whether the openings made in the house of the defendant Santamaria should be
closed because it directly overlook the premises of the plaintiffs.

CFI: Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for closing all the windows or openings in the
walls of the defendant’s house which directly overlook the premises of the
plaintiffs or that in some other way the provisions of the law be complied with so
that they may remain open.
SC: Affirmed CFI’s decision with modification.

It is unquestionable that Window 1 directly overlooks the appellants’ lot and it is
situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants
which is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which
requires that (i) windows with direct views or balconies or any similar openings
projecting over the estate of the neighbor, can not be made if there is not a
distance of at least 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and said
estate; and (ii) neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property,
unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack of the distance
required by law, the window in question must be closed.

With regards to windows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 which are all situated immediately

under the ceiling of the first door and are provided with wire screen – some of
them measure more and other less than 30 centimeters square and none of them
have iron gates embedded in the wall – which do not comply with Article 581 of
the Civil Code. The appellants alleged that the option allowing defendant to keep
these windows open, provided that he brought them within the terms of the law,
is illegal.

Every story has a ceiling and not, as the appellants maintain, the upper one alone.
Each floor necessarily has joists, that is, beams, since they are what support and
secure the structure of the story immediately above, therefore it is not true that
there may be joists only in the top story, as the appellants claim by saying that they
understand to be such the long timbers to which are fastened the boards of the
ceiling at the top of the building. The object of the law in authorizing the opening
of the windows in question in all the stories of the building, without any exception,
is clear. Their purpose is, as article 581 itself says, to furnish light to the rooms and
it is evident at a glance that the rooms of the lower stories have as much need for
light as those of the top story. No good reason exists for having one story in better
condition than another, whichever it may be, connection with this provision of law.