Laurel v.

Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the prepara tion of the National
Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on
the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this
petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its
mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign
functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-
hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is
merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

Veterans Federation Philippines vs. Reyes

Facts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner
received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated
that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested suspension
until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government
corporation.

Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public office, considering that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of
thegovernment and considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds come from membership dues.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public. In the instant case, the
functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of
sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the DBM which will
not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper.

Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the
rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the
close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent
general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of
the resolution of NARRA board.

Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the
statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the
power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordinatio n and the approval of the president of
the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in
statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined
from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the
expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

De La Victoria vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 95275-76; July 23, 1991

FACTS: The contenders for the mayorship of Albuera, Leyte in the special local elections held on February 1, 1988 were petitioner Sixto De La Victoria who obtained
5, 093 votes, the late Genoveva S. Mesina who obtained 5, 103 votes and Loly C. Fian who garnered 982 votes. On February 3, 1 988, Mesina was proclaimed as the
duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte and her running-mate, Aquilino Cantiga Jr. as vice-mayor. In due time, the defeated mayoral candidate, De La
Victoria filed two pre-proclamation cases in the COMELEC but even while they were still pending, he file in the RTC an election protest Ex Abundante Cautela against
Mesina with claims for damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Mesina died and was substituted as protestee by her Vice-Mayor, Cantiga Jr., who assumed mayorship
by operation of law. Neither Mesina’s heirs nor her counsel informed the trial court about her death. On May 16, 1990, De la Victoria withdrew from the COMELEC
En Banc, his pre-proclamation complaints and the COMELEC granted his motion. The incumbent Mayor, Cantiga Jr., then filed with the RTC a verified “Motion to
Intervene” in the election protest of De La Victoria. On June 20, 1990, De La Victoria filed a “Manifestation/Motion” waiving his claim for damages and costs against
Mesina which the trial court granted. Two days later, counsel for Mesina filed a Notice of Death and Motion for Substitution of the deceased protestee by her heirs.
De La Victoria opposed the motion for substitution on the ground that the heirs of Mesina are not the “real party in interest” and that sinc e he waived his claim for
damages against the deceased, he heirs have no more right to intervene in the case. The trial court noted the Motion for Substitution and ruled that such motion
was without basis in law, or moot and academic since De La Victoria already waived his claim for damages. On July 17, 1990, the trial court promulgated a decision
in the Election Protest No. B-44, declaring De La Victoria, as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera, Leyte, by a margin of 134 votes over the deceased protestee,
Mesina. The heirs of Mesina appealed to the COMELEC to restrain the trial court from rendering the decision in Election Protest No. B-44 and filed with the trial
court a Notice of Appeal. The trial court denied the Notice of Appeal and held that the intervenor, Vice Mayor Cantiga is the “real party in interest” in the
continuation of the election protest after the demise of the protestee. On July 24, 1990, De La Victoria filed a motion for execution of the trial court’s decision which
was granted the next day. De La Victoria was then sworn into office as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera. He assumed office on August 8, 1990. As earlie r
mentioned, the heirs of Mesina appealed that decision to the COMELEC which then issued a status quo Order and set aside the trial court’s order denying the
motion for substitution and due course to the Notice of Appeal. It declared the writ of execution null and void. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of the deceased protestee in an election protest may be considered as real party-in-interest even if the vice mayor has been
allowed to intervene and the protestant had waived his claim for damages and costs in the proceedings.

HELD: NO. The late Genoveva Mesina's claim to the contested office was not in any sense a transmissible right that devolved upon her surviving spouse and her
children (herein private respondents) after her death. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs" (Santos vs.
Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848). Private respondents' only interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than their interest in defending her against the
protestant's claim for damages and costs (which the protestant, herein petitioner, has already waived). They may no longer prosecute her own counter-claim for
damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated her right to occupy the contested office of mayor of Albuera, Leyte.

Ismael Mathay Jr. v. CA

Facts: In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon
City mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall
be automatically absorbed into the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined
that PD 51 never became a law because it was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at the same time, they were not
reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC Commissioner ruled
that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.

HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to
choose as to who should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who
should fill such office – that is a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code. The power to
appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing
city officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city
council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.

On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the
mayor’s right to choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it has no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence the
QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it.

Tuanda v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

FACTS:
Private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohanwere designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral
representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the Department of Local Government. They
took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. However, the secretary of the local
government thru a letter denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. Undaunted,
petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private responde nts as sectoral
representatives.Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners for violationof section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on
the ground that petitioners refused to give them their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitionersfiled a motion
with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a prejudicial question exists inthe civil case pending before the R TC of Dumaguete
City. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as
sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners.

Issues:
Whether the legality or validity of private respondents’ designation as sectoral representatives is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the
proceedings in thecriminal case against petitioners? And if those private respondents’ designations are finally declared invalid, may they still be considered de
facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered?

Held:
The issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant Suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
Petitioners. The facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners’
alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted
precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.The conditions and
elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; And
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the foretasted elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there
may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
 Menzon v. Petilla
Facts:
In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been
proclaimed in the province of Leyte. Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-
Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath of office. In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar,
Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to
succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since
the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. As a result of the
foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon then
wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued. Rubillar replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was
not appointed to the post since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of. As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor
Petilla that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive his salary as vice governor, if he was deprived of such.
However, Petilla and the Sanggunian refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-
Governor. It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled to the emoluments for his services rendered as
designated acting vice­­governor. During the pendency of this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed
Governor of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy

Held: Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario,
there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. In this case, it can be readily seen that the
office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office
to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no showing that Leopoldo
Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to
discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the
position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his
time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments

Held: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence
of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of
Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections. The two-year
interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to l eave the situation without affording
any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code. Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of
Local Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies
of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. The records show that it was primarily for this contingency
that Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor. It may be noted that
under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any
contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two
laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no
merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor,
we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the
law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. In a republican form of government, the majority
rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered.
Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. Whether or not
the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As
shown in this case where for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy
in the Office of the Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might happen
to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-
year period. The contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time Governor and an
acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations. The
appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection
with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. The Local
Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent vacancy, viz: Section 49:In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor
assumes the Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately
preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . . By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of
succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the
vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted
correctly in extending the temporary appointment.
 Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit
Facts:
In 1992, Zosimo Dimaandal, then Supply Officer III of the province of Batangas, was designated by then Governor Vicente Mayo as Acting Assistant Provincial
Treasurer. Pursuant to the designation, Dimaandal filed a claim for allowance of P68, 308 as his salary and RATA differential for the year 1993. The provincial auditor
disallowed the claim to the extent of P52,908 and allowed only P8,400 which corresponds to the difference in the allowance attached to the designation and the
position occupied by him. The grounds relied upon for the disallowance were: (1) that the power to appoint or designate an assistant provincial treasure is lodged
with the Secretary of Finance and not with the governor; and (2) that the designation is temporary, no appointment was actually issued. The governor asked for
reconsideration but was denied. Dimaandal then appealed the auditor’s decision to the Commission on Audit. COA affirmed. It pointed out that Dimaandal was
merely designated as Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer in addition to his regular duties hence, he is not entitled to receive additional salary. It also declared that
Dimaandal was not entitled to the RATA differential previously awarded to him since the party that designated him was not a “duly competent authority.” In the
present petition, Dimaandal argues that he is entitled to the amount being claimed because he actually rendered services and that he should at least be deemed as
a defacto officer citing the case of Menzon v. Petilla.

Issue:
WON an employee who is designated in an acting capacity is entitled to the difference in salary between his regular position and the higher position to which he
was designated.

Held:
No. Since the governor has no power to appoint him to the position of acting assistant provincial treasurer, such power being lodged with the President or the
Secretary of Finance, his designation to such position by the governor confers him no right to claim the difference in salaries and allowances to the position
occupied by him. Assuming the governor has that power, the fact is that what was extended to Dimaandal was designation and not an appointment. Designation
and appointment are entirely different concepts. While an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office, designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or additional duties on the officer or employee to be performed by him in a special manner.
It does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. As such, there being
no appointment issued, designation does not entitle the officer designated to receive the salary of the position. For the legal basis of an employee’s right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position. The nature of petitioner’s designation and the absence of authority of the
Governor to authorize the payment of the additional salary and RATA without the appropriate resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawiga n does not make him a
de facto officer. Ade facto officer is defined as one who derives his appointment from one having colorable a uthority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office,
and whose appointment is valid on its face. It is likewise defined as one who is in possession of an office, and is dischargi ng its duties under color of authority, by
which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer. Then a de facto officer is one
who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may
be irregular. Menzon v. Petilla does not apply. In Menzon, what was extended was an appointment unlike here which was only a designation. Theappointment in
Menzon was with color of validity while here, there was none.
JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO
G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he
returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent
Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at
the MCTC and at the RTC. Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC). COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed
to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was
merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

HELD:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his
domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections. For the
purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also
have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine compliance with the
residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city. When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice. On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, i t is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a
man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and
local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil
and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 MAQUERA vs BORRA

Facts:
Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-
year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate,

ISSUE: whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional

HELD:
Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same. The court reasoned out that Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates fromthem, and
this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be den ied the chance to be elected to public
office.

Monsanto vs. Factoran

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was
that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guil t. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase
the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has bee n suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No.
78239, February 9, 1989)
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
On July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7;
and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions
in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Mateo Caasi v. CA
Facts:
Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on
the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA
and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides: Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent
resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including
the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987. After hearing, the Comelec
dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in
the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective
local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own
handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding
his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the
upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He
did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local
elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
office." Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities
before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case
are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold
that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3)
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid
down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved
that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are
resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here,
they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the
United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)
 Frivaldo v.Comelec
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against
President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he
really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

Labo vs. COMELEC

Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9,
1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only
after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this
case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of
Baguio.On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set
aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with
his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding
the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final
and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of
Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate
for mayor of Baguio City.

Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of ca ndidacy
had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was
promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to
rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an ele ctive office. The fact that he was elected
by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as
the Mayor of Baguio City. While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the
choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having
yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code). The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
 David Aguila v. Melecio Genato

Facts: Dominador Borje was an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Misamis Occidental Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELC). While still serving as a
director for MOELC, he ran for an elective position to the Sangguniang Bayan of Ozamiz City. Therafter, David Aguila of the National Electrification Administration
issued a memorandum which states that all officials and employees of electric cooperatives who run for public office, win and assume office, shall be considered
resigned. Borje won in the elections. The other directors of MOELC then sought to enforce the memorandum against Borje. Borje filed a petition in court
questioning said memorandum. Borje claimed that the memorandum is not applicable to him because when he assumed the Directorship in MOELC he was already
qualified and so he must be allowed to continue holding office. Judge Genato agreed with Borje and so he issued a TRO against M OELC from considering Borje as
resigned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling is correct.

HELD: No. The court has no jurisdiction over the said matter. PD 269 which created NEA provides that electric cooperatives (like MOELC) have the right to prescribe
qualifications of its directors and their manner of election and removal. MOELC has to comply with the memorandum of NEA, a superior office under which MOELC
is being administered. Further still, Borje has not shown that he has an explicit right to continue holding the Directorship. Further, Borje being considered resigned
by reason of his election to the Sanggunian is not merely grounded on the NEA memorandum. It is also grounded on PD 269 which provides that elective officials
are ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any cooperatives except if such elective position is no higher than a barangay captain.

There is no merit to Borje’s contention that since he was originally qualified he shall be allowed to continue his unexpired term in MOELC. Eligibility to an office
should be construed as of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during occupancy of the office. Borje ceased to be qualified
and so he must be resigned from MOELC.