G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.
* Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B.
CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as public interest
that every person must have a name.—For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished
from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper name
and the surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an individual
has two parts: (1) the given or proper nameand (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which
he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child; The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act
No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother.—Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother,
as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is
a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted
child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which
may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil
Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.” This provision, according to the
Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when
the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Br. 13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to
_______________
1Rollo at pp. 34-36.
2Annex “C”, Id., at p. 33.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his
surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence
of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the
child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.”4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino
to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of
the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use
the middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
(6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
_______________
6Annex “H”, Id., at p. 49.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname
of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother.”7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.9
_______________
7 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10,
1985, p. 8.
8 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209
SCRA 189, citing 38 Am. Jur., Name 594-595.
9 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509,
citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I,
1993 ed., 672.
547
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 547
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman,
or a widow, thus:
“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
1. (1)Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
2. (2)Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
3. (3)Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as ‘Mrs.’
 Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her
maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband’s surname, unless:
(1)The court decrees otherwise, or
(2)She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surnameemployed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband’s surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged
to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnamesbetween ascendants and descendants,
the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1)Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2)Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x”
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name—
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to
what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article
365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus:
“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he
belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but
that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is
that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in
the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s
surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that
it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa
that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like
the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition,
which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion.”12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters.”13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption
Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, of adoption.
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that SO ORDERED.
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. 18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”19 secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section
1722Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for
all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
“Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to
use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption

Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.”
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some
way of interpreting the law.”28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her middle
name.
 G.R. No. 146737. December 10, 2001.*
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN “JHONNY” LOCSIN, SR.
LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late
LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate estate
of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
Evidence; Appeals; The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal
does not apply when there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been
misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.—The rule that factual
findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal does not apply when there appears in the
record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would
affect the result of the case. Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
that would have altered its conclusion.
Actions; Special Proceedings; Testate and Intestate Proceedings; Parties; Words and
Phrases; An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; In estate
proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.—An “interested party”, in
estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase “next
of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that in the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
administrator.
Civil Registry; Birth Certificates; It is highly unlikely that any of the employees of the Civil
Registry General in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City, while with respect to Local Civil Registries,
access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.—Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753
(An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in
the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro
Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades and come
from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires
expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more,
has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would
have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of
Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is
obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit “D,” more convincing evidence
than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
Same; Same; When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General,
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and
rational manner.—The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit
“D” are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. The event
about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent’s birth which took
place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that
time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer’s knowledge of respondent’s birth record
allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on
her general impressions of the existing records in that Office. When entries in the Certificate
of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy
transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has
to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer’s
explanation not convincing.
Same; Same; While a birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by
both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation,
it offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.—A birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172
of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered
in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit “D” was machine copied) has all
the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
Same; Same; Where there are glaring discrepancies between the Certificates of Live
Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry and the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General,
the latter prevails.—At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court that “(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits “D”
and “8”) have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit “D” entered in the Local Civil Registry.
What is authentic is Exhibit “8” recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Same; Filiation; Photographs; A person’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of
the alleged father cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest the Court recklessly sets
a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims.—
Incidentally, respondent’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate
of the deceased.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Torres for petitioners.
Justiniani & Associates for private respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted
to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one
entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking the reversal of the September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of
the trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan “Jhonny” Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan “Jhonny”
Locsin, Sr.1 died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a “Petition for Letters of Administration”
(docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with
various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his
siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester
Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
January 13, 1992, which order was duly published,2thereby giving notice to all persons who
may have opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs
of Maria Locsin, Manuel, Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the
deceased, filed an opposition to respondent’s petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed “Sr.” in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Solinap (sole heir
of the late Maria Locsin Vda. de Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the
successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent’s claim as a natural child is
barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an
appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of
Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent
and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and,
therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit “D”)3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found
in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Exhibit “D” contains the information that respondent’s father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he
was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibits “D-2”
and “D-3”). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from
which Exhibit “D” was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records
of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit “C”) 4 showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin’s dead body. The
photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”)
is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in
the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit “8”,5 indicating that the birth of
respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain
the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit “D”) was recorded on a December 1, 1958
revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit “8” appears on a July, 1956 form, already used
before respondent’s birth. This scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit “D” was falsified.
Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that
the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) are forgeries. He thus concluded that
the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of
birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) and
the photograph (Exhibit “C”) are sufficient proofs of respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the
deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan
E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan “Johnny”
Locsin, Sr.
“Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a bond in the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
“SO ORDERED.”6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order
of the trial court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while
respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however, denied
by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents—Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “8”) is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal7 does not apply when
there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if
considered, would affect the result of the case.8 Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
“Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.” (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:
“Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x” (Emphasis ours)
An “interested party”, in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.9 Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.10 In Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals,11 this Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, Sr., was not survived by a
spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is
an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the
estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an
acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, held:
“The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order
to establish the child’s acknowledgment.”12 (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial
court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) and a photograph (Exhibit “C”) taken
during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit “D”, the trial court made the
following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
“It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan
E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of
an acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was
summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the
deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial
that the standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may
also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477, the
signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary evidence. The anomalous and
suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by
oppositors was found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the forms
sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually paste the pages
of the bound volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness
of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of
the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer.”
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of
births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded
to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of
births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in
the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass,
a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these
employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously
easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit “D,” more convincing evidence than those
considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit “D” are
dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent’s birth
which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer’s knowledge of respondent’s birth
record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely
on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from
those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this
regard, we find Vencer’s explanation not convincing.
Respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) was recorded in a December 1,
1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent’s birth was
recorded, Vencer answered that “x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the
1958 Revised Form.”13
The answer is a “maybe”, a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain
how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or
almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit “8” of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here.
Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit “D”. The back cover of the
1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit “D” is merely pasted with
the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit “D” is a carbon copy of
the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are
typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of
those other certificates, Exhibit “D” does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged
father’s religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of
the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit “D”, there is a purported
signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer
except to state, “I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder.” As to why Exhibit “D”
was not sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as follows:
“COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees
would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live
Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to
replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the
record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to
be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we
have to paste them.”14(Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit “D”, was
merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer’s testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous
circumstances surrounding Exhibit “D”, she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances
surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit “8” for the
petitioners, not respondent’s Exhibit “D”, should have been given more faith and credence by
the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar
General, thus:
“Duties of Local Civil Registrar.—Local civil registrars shall (a) file registrable certificates and
documents presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same monthly and prepare and send
any information required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies
of any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly
classified, of all certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil
Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made during
the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and identification in case
any information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register
purposes”15 (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept
by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit “8”, as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit “D” as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit “D” a spurious document.
Exhibit “8” shows that respondent’s record of birth was made by his mother. In the same
Exhibit “8”, the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent’s father and the
entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not
appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court’s pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar16 that:
“Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines x x x explicitly
prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed
only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.” (Emphasis
ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of
Appeals 17 where this Court said that “a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who
had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity.”
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth
certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit “D” was machine
copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office
was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court that “(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of
a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” In this case, the
glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits “D” and “8”) have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit “D” entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic
is Exhibit “8” recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,19lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate
of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.
His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit “D”) is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not
an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s petition
for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 29759. May 18, 1989. *
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian
of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his natural
guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot
be raised on appeal. ___ This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised
in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II,
134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the
herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction (Philippine
National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover,
there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the
Regional Trial Courts.
Civil Law; Insolvency; Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are
both proceedings in rem; A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests
the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. ___ This Court has invariably ruled that
insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are both proceedings in rem
which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter
involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs.
Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed x x x and any order that may be entered
therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate
of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the estate of
a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Same; Prescription; Presentation for rescission of the agreement of partition among
petitioners already barred by prescription. ___ Intestate proceedings were terminated as
alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period
expired on November 9, 1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which
has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition among the petitioners,
as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.
Same; Same; The rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in
common not applicable to the case at bar. ___ While as a general rule the action for partition
among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-
owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
Same; Same; Minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for minors
who have parents, guardians or legal representatives. ___ Moreover, private respondent
cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on the plea of minority under the New
Civil Code which provides: “Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs
against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives: x x x x x x x x x Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother,
Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under
the above-cited provision.
Same; Same; Action for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parent. ___ Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the
deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during
the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment
of majority (Art. 285[1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs
against him even during minority (Wenzel, etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108
Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4)
years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95
Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint
for acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960.
Hence, prescription had set in.
Same; Same; Partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations. ___ Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one
for recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly
stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate,
Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate
proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be
that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Same; Laches; The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. ___ This court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
439
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 439
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Same; Same; Same; No explanation for the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint
in the case at bar. ___ As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for
the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact
that during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving
support until the latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse
or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to assert their rights despite
Andrea Jongco’s allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.’s death.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not
those who sleep when the law requires them to act. ___ Thus, it is well established that “The law
serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them
to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept.
29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154). “The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or
ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he x x x
must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
Evidence; Generally factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, exception. ___ Finally on the merits of this case,
petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of
Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The established
principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed
on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of
the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when
the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
Same; Same; This case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule. ___ It is
readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule,
specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Alvendia, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Tañada, Carreon & Tañada for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R ** entitled “Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural
guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her
individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto,
Jr., defendants-appellees”, reversing the August 10, 1964 Decision *** of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on
September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private
respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural
guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint,
private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto,
and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which,
he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and mother
lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had
no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued
living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the
public as his
_______________
**
Penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia and concurred in by Justices Julio Villamor and
Ruperto G. Martin.
*** Penned by Judge Francisco Arca.
441
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 441
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
natural child; that even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the
year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein
petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were
born ___ herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father
was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own
child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del
Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as
Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately
omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of
his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate
proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at
P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitled to at least
P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings
and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners
who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to
acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned
over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by
the statute of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition
on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid,
pp. 97-98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
to Defendants’ Counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104-123). The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
“Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without
pronouncement as to the costs. The counter-claim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.”
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a
Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:
“Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another
rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the
deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5)
of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the defendants to deliver to
plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in said estate, subject to the
usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles
834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27, 1968, resolved to give due course to the
petition (Rollo, p. 91).
 Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE,
443
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 443
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.’S
CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN
UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO
AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS’ EVIDENCE.
VII
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
JU RISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO
OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8,
1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 ___ creating the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the
jurisdictional pale of the Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners
admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over
the subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the said court or in the
Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on appeal, they
contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court
cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA
243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein
petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National
Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470[1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29[1968]). Moreover,
there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the
Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356[1986]).
445
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 445
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on November
9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs
of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case which seeks to secure the recognition of
Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish
his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners’ Brief, p. 47)
despite private respondent’s insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate
proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners’ submission is impressed with merit.
 This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s
estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons
having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally
bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed x x x
and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final
order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate
in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond
his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would
be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already
final and executed and reshuffle properties
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
“Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from
the time the partition was made.”
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953
so that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957. Hence, the present
action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the
agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already
barred by prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a
compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which
is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil
Code as follows:
“Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons
interested; x x x.”
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the
Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval
of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the
case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was
approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already prescribed when respondent filed
the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-
447
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 447
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized
(Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-
heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on
the plea of minority under the New Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives:
x x x x x x x x x”
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed
the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr.,
the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child,
the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285
[1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even
during minority (Wenzel, etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]).
In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death
of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio
C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and
partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set
in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of
property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by the
petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate
proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be
that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is
an injury to the rights of plaintiff, this action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and
1149 of the same Code which provide that the action must be brought within four and five
years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners’ claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and
unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:
“About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto’s marriage to Natividad del
Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect the interests of her child, Antonio, although she was
already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of Antonio’s infidelity and the hallowness
of his promises.
“It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto’s not denying that
Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If this was so, however, how can we explain her
inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when
she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to have her child recognized as the son
of the alleged father. Her laches, as well as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony
rendered it unworthy of belief.
“ x x x It is evident that the plaintiff’s case is adversely affected by his long delay in bringing
this action. ‘Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack
of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly
when they are threatened or invaded.’ (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440).” (Record
on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should
449
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 449
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA
78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA
540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA
800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising
delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that during the
lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the
latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until
September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to assert their rights despite Andrea
Jongco’s allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.’s death.
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners’ allegations that such delay is prejudicial
to them. Private respondents could have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned
of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16
years when the supposed father’s lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like
Antonio Alberto, Sr.’s mother had become too old to give coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:
“The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time
inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the
recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be
hopelessly lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar
in equity jurisprudence to the effect that laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff
in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the
circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites
subvenit.” (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227
[1961]).
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his
supposed father’s death. But such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of
prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of
the prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.
Thus, it is well established that “The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not
those who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606,
610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154). “The law does not
encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to
deserve the considerations of the courts, he x x x must show that he is not guilty of any of the
aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yatco, August 28, 1958; 104 Phil. 378).
V.
Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the
conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does
not undertake. The established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary
to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA
576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule,
specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
451
VOL. 173, MAY 18, 1989 451
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the
view that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit not only her
testimony but also her entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of
her claim being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her
testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and sister
of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the
outcome of the controversy. They testified that during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that
Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at
the family residence except for his brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164;
Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five
children (aside from her son Antonio) with four different men. The assumption, therefore, is
that she lived with at least four different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the
trial court aptly ruled that “This propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men,
render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of any one of
her children.” (Ibid, p. 121).
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father, since
the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged
former lessor of Andrea Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found
by the trial court to be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and
deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the
testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encar-nacion Peralta and declared that their testimonies
have sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio
C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds further proof in the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128
SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs.
C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not
signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent
evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad’s testimony, the Court of
Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she
was married to the deceased in 1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were
married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a
secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of
the former. The lack of marriage certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of
Appeals as an impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war
records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate
Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have chosen
a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the
supposed marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good reason for the non-
presentation of the marriage certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides
petitioners’ reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage was positively
confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147
SCRA 29, 30 [1987]; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA
381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 [1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis
Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA479 [1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending
parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial
court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments
of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the
decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 33659. June 14, 1990.*
VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA. FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all
minors, represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO,
petitioners, vs. FELICIDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Compromise; Parents and Child; Status of a child cannot be the subject of compromise.—
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance extended to
petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo)
is in the nature of a compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering,
however, that the issue involved in this case is whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma.
Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of
the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition cannot be
granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and of future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code).
Same; Same; Succession; An alleged illegitimate child, who is not natural, must prove
not mere filiation, but filiation acknowledged by alleged father.—However, proof of filiation of
the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any
hereditary right in the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established by an
illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under
Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a
filiation acknowledgedby the putative parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of
________________
*FIRST DIVISION.
Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.
507
VOL. 186, JUNE 14, 1990 507
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
this Court since the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al.,
102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701,
702.
Same; Same; Voluntary recognition may be done incidentally in any of the documents
required by law for proof of recognition; but in compulsory recognition evidence of direct or
express acknowledgment is required.—The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling
the heirs of Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession
by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were
conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the petitioners
were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for compulsory
recognition was correctly filed by petitioners’ guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano.
However, as correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought
in the case is compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with
respondent appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high
standard of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory recognition.
Same; Same; Same.—Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the
application of law regarding compulsory recognition as first laid down in the Javellana v.
Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case was in fact the forerunner of the
liberal view that has found its way into the present provisions of the New Civil Code governing
paternity and recognition. Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court’s ruling in
the Javellana case. That the case was the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way
into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of liberality enunciated therein applied only to
cases involving voluntary recognition specifically in a public document and not to cases of
compulsory recognition.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed
Baluyut, then minors, repre-
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
sented by their mother and guardian ad litem,Norma Urbano, which seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled “Felicidad S. Baluyut,
Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees.” The decision
brought to this court for review reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga (now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by
petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled “Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,”
filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965
a petition for intervention. The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the
estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children
of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners’ mother and
guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when
Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad
S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of
the deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and
maintained them. The petitioners also alleged that they were deliberately excluded from the
estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18, Record on Appeal).
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed
the petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on
Appeal), the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.
After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered declaring the
intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of deceased Enrique
Baluyut and ordering administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support
to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor children. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:
1. “1)FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay
 509
VOL. 186, JUNE 14, 1990 509
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
1. P150.00 as monthly support out of the Estate of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano
guardian ad litem for the three minor children, Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza
Baluyut.
2. “2)That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are forced heirs of the late
Enrique Baluyut.
3. “3)That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said Estate of Enrique Baluyut
under the provisions of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).”
On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s decision.
On February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed their Objection to Appeal and Motion for
Execution. The latter motion was based on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823,
April 29, 1953, that an order granting support pendente lite is final and executory.
On May 4, 1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal) declaring that it
considers intervenors’ motion for execution as a motion for reconsideration and amended the
decision to the effect that it granted the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly
support pendente lite in the amount of P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their
guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-41, Rollo) reversing the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and the intervenors’ petition in
intervention is hereby declared dismissed, without costs. The order granting alimony pendente
lite to the intervenors is hereby set aside.” (p. 41, Rollo)
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals’ decision was denied
on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed on June
19, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On July 1, 1971, We
required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo). Respondents, on the other hand, filed
their brief on October 28, 1971 (p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was
considered submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).
On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a “Motion and Manifesta-
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
tion” praying for the reinstatement of the order of the trial court to grant the petitioners
monthly support during the pendency of the case. The said order for monthly support granted
by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966 was terminated in the early part of 1971 (p.
90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation and motion of petitioners,
respondents opposed said motion in view of respondent Court of Appeals’ finding that
petitioners were not the recognized spurious children of deceased Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).
On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner’s motion for continuation of their monthly
support pendente lite effective June 1975 until further orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange
of pleadings by the parties regarding the order of this court on the matter of the continuation
of petitioners’ support pendente lite,and after a motion filed by petitioners to cite
administratrix for contempt, private respondents filed a manifestation on January 6, 1978,
informing this Court that: 1) the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by
one of her daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they have
complied with the September 13, 1977 resolution of the court requiring them to show cause
why they should not be dealt with as in contempt for failing to obey the order to pay
petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private respondents also manifested their
compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 1, a
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank check in the amount of P4,350.00 representing the
required support until October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount of P300.00
representing support pendente lite for November and December, 1977 was also deposited
with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).
On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad litem and private
respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both parties assisted by their respective counsel,
filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners’ filing of a “Petition for
Withdrawal of Intervention” with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga taking cognizance of
the Intestate Estate of Enrique Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based on a waiver by
petitioners of any right or interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in
consideration of the financial assistance granted them by the administratrix of the
511
VOL. 186, JUNE 14, 1990 511
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
estate (p. 371, Rollo). The petition for withdrawal of intervention was approved by the
intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the Joint Motion to Dismiss the
instant petition was noted by this court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance extended to
petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo)
is in the nature of a compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering,
however, that the issue involved in this case is whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma.
Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of
the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition cannot be
granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and of future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code).
(See Advincula v. Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased Enrique
M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent Court of Appeals:
“x x x, the testimony of Norma Urbano, supported by that of Liberata Vasquez on the one hand
as against that of the administratrix who declared that she and her late husband were always
together and that of Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had a suitor named Lieut. Alex
on the other, leads us to give credence to the proof of the intervenors specifically the
testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in fact her illegitimate children with the late
Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).
However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to
confer upon them any hereditary right in the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be
established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional
rights under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a
filiation acknowledged by the putative parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of
this Court since the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102
Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702.
In the Paulino
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
case, it was held:
“An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his
putative or presumed parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by
the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child. Recognition is
voluntary when “made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing.” It is compulsory when by court action the child brings about his
recognition. x x x”
“x x x.
“It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that
the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino.
Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It
is necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such.
Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.”
This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 121 Phil.
261, where this Court held that:
“x x x the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from
his parents, must prove his filiation and this may be done by means of voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the provisions concerning natural children
are held applicable. x x x.”
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary
recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court
of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory
recognition under Article 283 of the same law.
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his
illegitimate spurious children?
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were
recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners’ records
of birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not
513
VOL. 186, JUNE 14, 1990 513
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of
record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where the father
is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when
the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct
acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of Baluyut to recognize
them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the status
of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when
their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the petitioners were still minors at the time
of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition was correctly filed
by petitioners’ guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed
out by respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory,
strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent appellate court
that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required
for the success of their action for compulsory recognition. Respondent court held:
“The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the
issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique M.
Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented
from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support of the claim of
Norma and Liberata that Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And, according to Norma and
Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in the house where she kept her as his
mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger children of
Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital
bills but he gave the money for the payment of the
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Baluyut
hospital bills to Liberata and he requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only
shows that Baluyut was hiding his identity as the father of the chidlren of Norma, an act which
is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his own.
“If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the intervenors who were born at the
Ortañez hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata to pay the hospital bill of Norma
for the delivery of her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily done this himself. There is
not even evidence showing that he visited Norma at the hospital when she delivered there.
Coupled with the circumstance that Enrique tried to hide his being the father of the
intervenors, there is absence of positive and convincing proof that Enrique treated the
intervenors as his children in all relations in society and in life. Far from treating them in society
as his children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors from society and visited them only
once in a while evidently only to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma but with no genuine desire
to have and treat the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous possession of the
status of recognized illegitimate (not natural) children. There is not even any proof that he had
brought out these intervenors to show them publicly as his children. With the single exception
of Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor of Norma in the rather populous area of Project 4,
Quezon City, was produced to testify on any act of Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat
the intervenors as his very own in his actual relations. The foregoing deficiencies in the
intervenors’ proof is fatal to their case.
‘In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts must be
of such a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously’ (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Oños, et al. vs. Vda. de
Oños, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).
“The birth certificates Exhibits `A,’ `B’ and `C’ of the intervenors do not help their case for
these are not evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut because, firstly,
they were admitted in evidence by the lower court merely as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who referred to them in the course of said witnesses’ testimony and hence, they are
not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly, they are merely evidence of the fact that
gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing else, much less of recognition
as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut.
‘In an action for compulsory acknowledgment under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code,
a birth certificate which, on its face, was not signed by the supposed natural father is
incompetent evidence on paternity, being in violation of section 5 of Act 3753 and Article 280
of the Civil Code’ (Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo vs. Macadaong, No. L-
7017, April 19, 1954; Bernabe, etc. vs. Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).
“If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the presumed father as required by section 5
of Act No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are incompetent evidence even to prove
paternity alone, with more reason are birth certificates incompetent evidence to prove
recognized filiation.” (pp. 36-39, Rollo)
Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application of law regarding
compulsory recognition as first laiddown in the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They
opined that the said case was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way
into the present provisions of the New Civil Code governing paternity and recognition.
Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court’s ruling in the Javellana case. That the
case was the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into our statute books, is
true. But, the rule of liberality enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary
recognitionspecifically in a public document and not to cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,
“Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment may be done incidentally in a
public document, a distinction must be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may be incidental, but in the latter,
it must be direct and express.
“In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural child, based upon
recognition in an indubitable writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the
father must `expressly recognize his paternity.’ This provision has been strictly construed by
Spanish and Philippine jurisprudence against the alleged natural child. Thus, in the Sentence
of July 5, 1906, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an action to compel acknowledgment
under article 135, that a mere allusion, more or less clear, by the alleged father to his supposed
child,if there is no express recognition of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the Sentence of April
8, 1915, that same Tribunal declared that there should be an indubitable documentary proof
or uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been adhered to in several decisions by
this court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action was filed to compel
recognition of a natural child, based in part on a letter of defendant telling the mother of his
affection toward her and asking her to take care of the child. This court held that the letter did
not expressly recognize the child, under article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the
alleged father wrote the child a letter advising him how to conduct himself. This court held
that the letter did not contain an express recognition under article 135.
“But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing principle is true with respect to
indubitable writings according to article 135, par. 1 of the Civil Code, however, in cases of
voluntary acknowledgment in a public document under article 131, the law is more liberal and
permits an incidental recognition. x x x.” (Javellana, et al. v. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014.*
GRACE M. GRANDE, petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, respondent.
Civil Law; Illegitimate Children; Surnames; The general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father.—It is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may
use the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Parental Authority; Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art.
176 on the mother. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.—Parental authority over
minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal
mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children
also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Same; Same; Surnames; An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.—Now comes the matter of the change of surname
of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the
surname to that of respondent? Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will
contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by RA 9255. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.
Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has
no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word “may” in the provision readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of
his illegitimate father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
the illegitimate children.
Same; Same; Same; On the matter of children’s surnames, the Supreme Court has, time
and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the
minor child.—It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this
Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the
best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, 97 SCRA 858 (1980), for instance, this
Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than
that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to
prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon
v. Republic, 19 SCRA 721 (1967), this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned,
even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother.
Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that
the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
Administrative Law; The hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend
a legislative act.—The hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 (2007),
We held: After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment
itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance
— an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus, We can disregard
contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is
clearly erroneous. What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to
strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nancy Villanueva Teylan for petitioner.
Romeo N. Bartolome for respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24,
2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period
of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married
to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February
8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4The children were not expressly recognized
by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States
with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that “[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the
children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of
[respondent Antonio].”6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s]
prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently,
the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the
Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry
of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth
from Grande to Antonio;
 b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande]
over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard
Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor
children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with
[Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and
to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days
covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors
outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and
permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis
Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the
rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and
for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of
the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole
custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate
court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati
City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth, and
record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by
virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor
children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the
rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that
petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children 4or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition
made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with
the universally protected “best-interest-of-the-child” clause, compels the use by the children
of the surname “ANTONIO.”11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that
not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his
acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no
reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the
constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of
the minors’ surname to “Antonio.” When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this
Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code — as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language — may not be
invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the
consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the
application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shalluse the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case
his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his
children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody,
and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
 Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.16Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word “may” in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate
children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children
are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has,
time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest
of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child
to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it
serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname
of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding
the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible
situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an
illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name
to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as
to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as
it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
(Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s
surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document
is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the
following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use
of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument
duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:
“The surname of the child is hereby changedfrom (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255.”
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register
of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
“Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
 After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened
by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend
an act of Congress.
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande];
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for
the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1,
and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23What is more, this Court has the constitutional Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special SO ORDERED.
courts and quasi-judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the
Constitution.25Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255
insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon
the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word “shall” in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen
(13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names
changed to “Antonio.”26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated
by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or
against petitioner.27A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children’s
choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which
shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part
and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to
the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
G.R. No. L-66574
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp.
Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,"
praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and
that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973
and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of
Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent
Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene
in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980
adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking
part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as
in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980,
Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A
decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the
decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable,
the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and
9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering
oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same
respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the
following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art.
1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren
Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of
the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and
therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand
children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable
provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which
are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here
is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990
of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil
Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970)
to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but
that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
(990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to
his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4,
Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the
kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti
Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any
error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders
of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such
contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the
proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of
either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and
executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only
power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its
execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated
May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void.
"
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed
by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon.
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles