People of the Philippines Vs. Norieto Monroyo y Mahaguay; G.R. No.

223708; June 28,

2017
June 28, 2017 Art. 266-A Rape, Art. 336 - Acts of Lasciviousness, Child
Abuse, Jurisprudence, Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant Norieto Monroyo y
Mahaguay (Monroyo) assailing the Decision 2 dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06078, which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 in
Crim. Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04- 7786 and C-04-7787 and the Decision 4 in Crim.
Case No. C-04-7788 both dated November 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 (RTC), finding Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and one (1) count of Rape under the Revised
;Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,5 otherwise known as
“The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.”
The Facts
On October 13, 2004, four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, charging
Monroyo of the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA 6 and Qualified Rape
against her sister, BBB, viz.:
Criminal Case No. C-04-7787 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 24 August, 2003, at around 11 :30 o’clock in the morning, in the
dwelling of complainant AAA located at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and lewd desire, with force and
intimidation, did and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit acts of
lasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by then and there touching her
private parts, against her will and without her consent, [an] act which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said AAA, to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law. 7
Criminal Case No. C-04-7786 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 15 October, 2003, at around 10:30 o’clock in the morning, at Barangay
San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and
lewd desire, with force and intimidation, did and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, commit acts of lasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by
then and there touching her private parts, against her will and without her consent, [an]
act which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said
AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 8
Criminal Case No. C-04-7785 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 13 October, 2003, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in the
dwelling of complainant AAA located at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and lewd desire, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and [feloniously], commit acts
oflasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by then and there touching her
private parts, against her will and without her
consent, [an] act which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the said AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 9
Criminal Case No. C-04-7788 (Rape)
That on or about November 18, 2003, at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in the
dwelling of complainant BBB, IO located at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of
Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire and by
means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old-virgin, against the will and without the
consent of said private complainant, thereby violating her person and chastity, [an] act
of sexual abuse which debase[s], degrade[s] and demean[ s] her intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being, to the damage and prejudice of said private complainant.
In the commission of the offense the qualifying circumstance of relationship is attendant,
the accused being a relative of the complainant by affinity within the 3rd civil degree and
the complainant being then under eighteen years of age.
Contrary to law. 11
On the charges of Acts of Lasciviousness, the prosecution alleged thatat around 11 :30
in the morning of August 24, 2003, AAA was alone in her house when her uncle,
Monroyo, arrived. While AAA was cleaning the house, Monroyo approached her,
touched her private organ, and warned her against telling her parents about what
happened. 12
The incident was repeated on October 13, 2003, at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon,
when Monroyo went to AAA’ s house to ask for cigarette sticks. AAA went out to buy the
cigarette sticks, handed them to Monroyo, and went to the living room to resume
cleaning the house. Monroyo followed her to the living room and once more, touched
her private organ. 13
Finally, at around 10:30 in the morning of October 15, 2003, AAA went to Monroyo’ s
house looking for her cousin, Norton, but the latter was not at home. When she was
about to leave, Monroyo touched her private organ. 14
On the charge of Rape, the prosecution claimed that on the night of November 18,
2003, BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old girl, slept on a bed with her siblings, AAA and EEE.
At around 11 o’clock in the evening, BBB woke up when she felt someone touching her
breast. She saw Monroyo, the husband of her mother’s half-sister, 15 sitting on the floor
beside their bed. Her uncle instructed her to sit down on the floor and told her not to
make any noise. He then forced her to lie down on the floor and started kissing her all
over her body while BBB cried. He forcibly removed her shorts and panty and thereafter
stood up to remove his shorts and brief. He then placed himself on top of her, inserted
his penis into her private organ, and made a push and pull motion. BBB cried loudly but
Monroyo covered her mouth with his hand. After satisfying his lust, he put on his clothes
and threatened to kill BBB and her family if she tells anyone about what happened. BBB
did not see him again after the incident. 16
In March 2004, BBB mustered enough courage to tell her mother about the incident
when the latter saw her crying. BBB subjected herself to a medical examination
administered by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Ma. Virginia R. Valdez (Dr. Valdez), who
found healed hymenal lacerations that could have been caused by a hard object, like an
erect penis. 17
For his part, Monroyo denied the accusations against him and testified that on October
15, 2003, AAA and BBB asked for money from him to buy junk food while he was buying
cigarettes from a store. When he refused to give them money, they grabbed the belt bag
tied around his belt. Monroyo tried to retrieve the bag by tickling them on the side of
their bodies but the bag was ripped in the process. Monroyo slapped AAA and BBB for
destroying the bag and then he went home. He claimed that he does not know why the
cases were filed against him by complainants but speculated that it was probably
because of a familial tiff with the latter’s father regarding the house that he and his wife
were residing in. 18
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision 19 dated November 16, 2011, the RTC found Monroyo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness (Crim. Case Nos. C-04-
7785, C-04-7786 and C-04-7787) and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer in each case
the penalty of two (2) months and one ( 1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period,
as minimum to four ( 4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium
period, as maximum, and ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, as well as
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. 20
The RTC gave more credence to AAA’ s testimony clearly and convincingly narrating the
details of each lascivious conduct committed by Monroyo against her. It added that AAA
had no ill motive against Monroyo, while the latter’s excuses were too shallow and
insignificant for AAA to concoct a story that she was molested. 21
In another Decision 22 dated November 16, 2011, the RTC similarly found Monroyo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape (Crim. Case No. C-04-7788), and
accordingly, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay BBB Pl
00,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages. 23
The RTC gave full faith and credence to BBB’s testimony, as she was likewise able to
narrate the details of how Monroyo raped her inside their house, noting further that her
youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. The foregoing account was
corroborated by the medical certificate issued by the physician who examined BBB (i.e.,
Dr. Valdez) that confirmed the latter’s hymenal lacerations, which could have been
caused by a hard object, like an erect penis. On the other hand, Monroyo merely
interposed the defense of bare denial, which cannot be given greater weight than the
positive declaration of a credible witness like BBB. The RTC however, did not consider
the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority because these were
not purportedly alleged in the Information. 24
Dissatisfied, Monroyo elevated his case to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 25 dated May 27, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling, observing that
the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies
deserve the highest respect absent any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied material facts or circumstances. 26 The CA added that the minor
inconsistencies in AAA and BBB’ s testimonies do not refer to the essential elements of
the crimes; thus, they are not grounds to reverse the conviction. 27 Notably, the CA no
longer discussed the attendant circumstances of relationship and minority in the Rape
case.
Aggrieved by his impending conviction, Monroyo filed the present appeal. 28
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Monroyo’s conviction for
three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and one (1) count of Rape should be upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The Court first examines the charges of Acts of Lasciviousness against Monroyo in
Crim. Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04-7786 and C-04-7787, committed against AAA.
Preliminarily, although the three Informations designated the crime committed only as
“Acts of Lasciviousness,” the facts alleged therein pertain not only to violations of Article
336 of the RPC but also of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, otherwise known as the “Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” It is settled
that a designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense. 29
Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to the law violated does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
charged. 30 As the Court had ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the legal
provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the information. 31 In the present case, the recital of facts in the
Informations constitute violations of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
Article 336 of the RPC provides:
Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. – Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Its elements are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
32
On the other hand, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 states:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – xx x
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xx xx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The elements under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are: (1) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age. 33 In Quimvel v. People, 34 the Court held
that the allegation of “force and intimidation” is sufficient to classify the minor victim as
one who is “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” 35
Common to both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness. The
term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene. It is characterized
by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or
unchaste design is a mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. 36
In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that
the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the aforementioned elements. As
correctly observed by the lower courts, AAA clearly and convincingly narrated in detail
each lascivious act committed by Monroyo against her. On various occasions, i.e.,
August 24, October 13 and 15, 2003, Monroyo succeeded in touching the latter’s private
organ. The Court finds that Monro yo’ s overt acts were done against AAA’ s will and
much more, committed without any other justifiable reason, hence, demonstrating its
lewd character. AAA also sufficiently established that she was a minor during that time.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that Monro yo was AAA’ s uncle and thus,
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her, which according to case law,
constitutes intimidation. 37
Verily, AAA’s testimony is worthy of full faith and credence as there is no proof that she
was motivated to falsely accuse Monroyo of the crimes charged. To this, it may not be
amiss to state that in several cases, the Court has observed that no young and decent
girl (like AAA in this case) would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to
undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not impelled by a
sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her. 38 Ultimately, the
credibility of AAA’s testimony, as well as Monroyo’s opposite account involves findings
of fact which the Court does not generally review. Case law dictates that factual findings
of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court barring
arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance, 39 of
which there are none in this case.
In view of the foregoing, Monroyo’ s conviction for three (3) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness is proper under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA
7610. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 40 Monroyo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of fourteen ( 14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as 41 Furthermore, in order to conform with prevailing maximum. 42
jurisprudence, his civil liabilities are adjusted, in that he is ordered to pay the amounts of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, also for each count.
Separately, Monroyo was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape in Crim. Case No.
C-04-7788, this time committed against AAA’s sister, BBB. At the outset, it should be
clarified that, contrary to the RTC’s observation, the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship were sufficiently alleged in the Information in Crim. Case No. C-04-
7788, the pertinent portion of which reads:
In the commission of the offense the qualifying circumstance of relationship is attendant,
the accused being a relative of the complainant by affinity within the 3rd civil degree and
the complainant being then under eighteen years of age. 43 (Emphases supplied)
The presence of these circumstances is readily verifiable from the records of this case.
As to BBB’s minority (i.e., sixteen years old at the time the crime was committed), the
prosecution formally offered a photocopy of her birth certificate, the authenticity of which
was not in any way disputed by the defense. 44 Meanwhile, the fact that Monroyo is
BBB’ s relative by affinity within the third civil degree was attested to by BBB, who
testified that Monroyo is the husband of her mother’s half-sister. 45 In fact, Monroyo
admitted their relationship on cross-examination, stating that “his wife is the sister of the
mother of [BBB].” 46
Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
scrutiny on any question, even one not raised by the parties as errors, 47 and that the
appeal confers the appellate court with full jurisdiction over the case, enabling the court
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law. 48 Thus, given that the circumstances of minority
and relationship were alleged and proven in this case, the Court examines Monroyo’ s
criminal liability for Qualified Rape as charged.
Article 266-A (1) (a), in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353,
defines and penalizes the crime of Rape, including the circumstances which qualify the
penalty to be imposed:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
xx xx
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xx xx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are: (a) the victim is a female
over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age; (b) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and ( c) the offender
has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation. 49
A perusal of the records reveals that all these elements are present. Both the RTC and
the CA found credible BBB’s categorical testimony that on November 18, 2003,
Monroyo had carnal knowledge of her without her consent; that she was sixteen ( 16)
years old at that time; and that Monroyo is her uncle, being the husband of her mother’s
half-sister. In addition, the results of Dr. Valdez’s medical examination corroborated
BBB’s account. The lower courts also noted BBB’ s testimony that Monroyo previously
molested her five (5) times prior to the rape incident but she opted not to inform her
parents due to Monro yo’ s threats against her. 50
As in the Acts of Lasciviousness cases, the Court defers to the findings of fact of the
trial court, as affirmed by the CA. Jurisprudentially settled is the principle that if a
victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it
passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, 51 as in this case.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that Monroyo only proffered the defense of
denial, which the courts a quo, found to be too shallow and insignificant so as to impel
BBB to falsely charge her uncle and publicly disclose that she was raped. Case law
edifies that “[ d]enial cannot prevail over [a] private complainant’s direct, positive and
categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently a weak defense which
cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical statement that has the
earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is generally
held to prevail. ” 52
Based on the foregoing, Monroyo’ s criminal liability in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788 is
thus upheld. However, for the reasons initially stated, his conviction is modified from
Rape to Qualified Rape, which, based on Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA
8353, is penalized with death. Pursuant to RA 9346, 53 courts shall impose the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and the offender shall not be eligible
for parole. As for his civil liability, jurisprudence states that when death is the imposable
penalty for the crime committed but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346, the Court
shall award the following to BBB: (a) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Pl00,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. 54
Finally, the Court imposes interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, for each count of
Acts of Lasciviousness and Qualified Rape. 55
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06078 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS,
finding accused-appellant Norieto Monroyo y Mahaguay GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and one ( 1) count of Qualified
Rape.
Accordingly:
(a) In Criminal Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04-7786, C-04-7787, Monroyo is SENTENCED
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of fourteen ( 14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count and is ORDERED to pay AAA the
amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, also for each count;
(b) In Criminal Case No. C-04-7788, Monroyo is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is ORDERED to pay BBB the
amounts of Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl 00,000.00 as moral damages, and Pl
00,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
( c) All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLON BELMONTE Y

SUMAGIT, MARVIN BELMONTE Y SUMAGIT, ENRILE GABAY Y DELA TORRE
A.K.A "PUNO", AND NOEL BAAC Y BERGULA, Accused,

MARLON BELMONTE Y SUMAGIT, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
Accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte y Sumagit assails the Decision 1 dated April 22,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05774, affirming his
conviction for Robbery with Rape in Criminal Case No. 135982-H.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his co-accused, namely, Marvin Belmonte (Marvin), Enrile

Gabay (Enrile), and Noel Baac (Noel) were charged with Robbery with Rape in an
Information dated September 3, 2007 that reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Marlon Belmonte
y Sumagit, Marvin Belmonte y Sumagit and Enrile Gabay y Dela Torre @ "Puno" with
the crime of robbery with rape, committed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On or about September 1, 2007, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating
together with one Noel Baac who is still at-large and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and divest from
complainants the following, to wit:

xxxx
x x x [A]nd on the occasion thereof said Noel Baac, by means of force, threats and
intimidation and with the use of a gun, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with AAA,2 against her will and consent, which is aggravated by the
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.

Contrary to law.3
The trial of the case proceeded against the accused-appellant, his cohorts, Marvin and
Enrile, who all pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, Noel remained at
large.4

The prosecution evidence established that, in the evening of August 31, 2007, Hiroshi
Emmanuel Zorilla (Hiroshi) celebrated his 17 th birthday with his friends in the house of
his aunt Teodora and uncle Robert Dela Cruz in Pasig City. When it was already 12:00
midnight, Jolly Pantaleon (Jolly), one of Hiroshi's friends who was present at the
celebration, left the group to buy some beer from a nearby store. At the store, Jolly met
Enrile, who asked him if he could join them in the drinking spree at Hiroshi's place.
Enrile then helped Jolly carry the half case of beer and joined in the drinking spree at
Hiroshi's house.5

At around 2:00 a.m. of September 1, 2007, Jolly left the group and was followed by
Enrile, but the latter soon returned to the party and was accompanied by accused-
appellant and his brother Marvin, and Noel. Armed with guns and a knife, 6 the three
men approached and suddenly boxed Enrile, then tied the hands of all the persons
inside the house and ordered them to lie down on the floor as they took their personal
belongings.

Meanwhile, the maids of spouses Teodora and Robert, namely, AAA and Rhea Brioso,
were awakened inside their quarters by the presence of two men, later identified as
accused-appellant and Noel. Upon Noel's order, AAA was left inside the room. Noel
immediately locked the door, and at gunpoint, ordered AAA to remove her pants. He told
AAA to lie down, then he inserted his penis into her vagina. 7

Thereafter, Noel and Marvin entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through
the window. Teodora was awakened and was surprised, hence, she shouted which
prompted Robert to get up from bed. At gunpoint, Noel and Marvin ordered the spouses
to lie on the bed while they searched the room; then they took away some pieces of
jewelry, laptop, ATM card, cash amounting to PhP 6,700 and 23 pieces of Yen. 8 Teodora
recognized the faces of Noel and Marvin since the room was illuminated by light coming
from a lamp shade.

For his part, Enrile, testified that, at around 1:00 a.m. of September 1, 2007, he and
other bystanders were in front of a. bakery store, about four streets away from Hiroshi's
house when Jolly arrived to buy one and a half cases of beer. He helped Jolly carry the
cases of beer upon the latter's request, and when they arrived at Hiroshi's house, he
was asked to join in the drinking session. Thereafter, some men entered the house and
suddenly ordered them to lie down on the floor and tied their hands. The men took away
his jewelry and cellular phone.9

Accused-appellant and Marvin, on the other hand, proffered alibi and claimed that they
were sleeping in their house when the alleged crime was committed. 10

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant, Marvin, and Enrile of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Marlon Belmonte y Sumagit, Marvin Belmonte y
Sumagit, and Enrile Gabay y Dela Torre a.k.a. "Puno" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Rape and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused are also ordered to jointly and severally pay
Hiroshi Emmanuel L. Zorilla the amount of P23,000.00, as actual damages; Spouses
Teodora and Robert Dela Cruz, the amount of P132,150.00, as actual damages; and
[AAA], the amount of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity and P50,000.00, as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.11
On appeal, the CA modified the trial court's decision as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 6, 2012 is modified as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Accused-appellant Enrile Gabay y Dela Torre is acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt Unless detained for some other lawful reasons, accused-appellant Enrile Gabay y
Dela Torre is hereby ordered released immediately.

(2) Accused-appellant Marvin Belmonte is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of simple robbery and .is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment at
4 years and 2 months of prision correccionalmedium, as the minimum period, to 10
years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum period. As ordered by the trial court,
accused-appellant Marvin Belmonte and accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte should
jointly and severally pay actual damages to Hiroshi Emmanuel Zorilla in the amount of
Php23,000.00, and to spouses Teodora and Robert Dela Cruz in the amount of
Php132,150.00.

(3) The conviction of accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte for robbery with rape is
affirmed. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for
parole. He is also ordered to pay AAA Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00
as moral damages and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.12
Only accused-appellant appealed to this Court for review.

The Issue

Whether or not accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is
a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where
the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime.13

In People v. Tamayo,14 the Court ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the
rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way
around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof
or as an accompanying crime.15
There is no basis to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA
respecting accused-appellant's criminal culpability. The prosecution's evidence
established with certainty that accused-appellant, together with his brother Marvin, and
co-accused Noel, have intruded the house of spouses Teodora and Robert on the
occasion of Hiroshi's birthday celebration thereat. They aided each other in divesting the
guests of Hiroshi of their personal belongings through violence and intimidation. The
evidence disclosed that they were armed with guns and knife, and they tied the hands
of their victims and threatened them with harm if they disobeyed their orders. Noel and
Marvin, on the same occasion, entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert
through the window and succeeded in taking away from their possession some pieces
of jewelry, laptop, ATM card, and cash.

It behooves Us to rule that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Teodora and

Hiroshi, as to the foregoing, are sufficient and credible to sustain the conviction of
accused-appellant. Evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in .itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of mankind. 16 Here, the prosecution witnesses'
positive identification of the accused-appellant as one of the malefactors in the robbery
that took place on September 1, 2007 defeats accused-appellant's lone defense of alibi.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the witnesses, a categorical, consistent,
and positive identification of the accused-appellant shall prevail over the
latter's alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, alibi and
denial are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law. 17

The evidence further show that, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA was raped. The
RTC and the CA are correct in their appreciation that the original intent of the accused-
appellant and his cohorts was to take, with intent to gain, the personal effects of their
victims. Rape was committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.
Accused-appellant was implicated because he was positively identified as Noel's
companion inside the room where AAA and Rhea were soundly sleeping. The CA,
affirming the RTC's finding ruled, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape even if he did not rape AAA, as accused-
appellant Marlon Belmonte had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop
accused Noel Baac from raping AAA. x x x The accused's failure to prevent his co-
accused from committing rape despite an opportunity to do so made him liable for the
rape committed. x x x.18 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
While the evidence directly points to Noel as AAA's rapist, accused� appellant did not
prevent him from committing the lustful act despite an opportunity to do so.

Pertinently, in People v. Verceles, et al.,19 We held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the course of the robbery, one of them, particularly Mamerto Soriano, succumbed to
lustful desires and raped [the victim] while accused-appellants just stood outside the
door and did nothing to prevent Mamerto Soriano. We have previously ruled that once
conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on
the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent
the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a
rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those
who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape,
although not all of them took part in the rape. (Emphasis ours)
As stated above, once conspiracy is established between several accused in the
commission of the crime of robbery, as in the present case, they would all be equally
culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the
robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from
committing rape.20 The immediately preceding condition is absent in this case. The
factual finding of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is already irreversible holding that
while accused-appellant did not rape AAA, he, however, did not endeavor to stop Noel
despite an opportunity.

The fact that AAA was raped cannot be over-emphasized. The CA made the following
categorical findings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
AAA's testimony was straightforward, candid and consistent on material points detailing
the bestial act of accused Noel Baac in ravishing her. Besides, her statement was
corroborated by the medical certificate dated September 7, 2007 finding AAA's genitals
to have suffered from deep fresh laceration. No young and decent woman in her right
mind especially of tender age as that of AAA who is 18 years old would concoct a story
of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself
by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by her desire to
obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.21
On the face of the evidence against him, accused-appellant's defense consisting merely
of his bare allegation that he and his brother Marvin were at their house when the crime
was committed does not persuade Us to rule in his favor. By their own admission, they
live at 97 Eastbank Road, Kapitbahayan, Floodway, Sta. Lucia, Pasig City. It was easy
for them to negotiate the distance between their house and the victims' house. Their
place of residence and the place where the crime was committed are both situated in
Barangay Sta. Lucia, and the distance could be negotiated within 15 minutes.

Ergo, his conviction is sustained.

The CA correctly noted that the imposable penalty upon accused�-appellant should
have been death considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was alleged
in the Information and proven. However, with the passage of R.A. No. 9346 22prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court correctly reduced the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.23

Clearly, the imposable penalty against accused-appellant is death. However, by reason

of R.A. No. 9346 as stated above, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. In
view hereof, the CA's award of civil indemnity in the amount of PhP 75,000, moral
damages in the amount of PhP 75,000, and exemplary damages in the amount of PhP
30,000 to AAA, must be modified pursuant to the guidelines laid down in People v.
Jugueta,24 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
RA 9346:

�� �a. Civil indemnity - PhP 100,000.00

�� �b. Moral damages - PhP 100,000.00

�� �c. Exemplary damages - PhP 100,000.00
Accordingly, accused-appellant shall pay AAA civil indemnity of PhP 100,000, moral
damages of PhP 100,000, and exemplary damages of PhP 100,000.

The CA's order directed against accused-appellant to pay, jointly and severally with
Marvin. Belmonte, actual damages to Hiroshi and spouses Teodora and Robert must
stand. The CA on the matter held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court correctly awarded actual damages suffered by Hiroshi Emmanuel L.
Zorilla and spouses Teodora and Robert Dela Cruz in the amounts of P23,000.00 and
P132,150.00, respectively, as they are duly supported by receipts.25 (Emphasis ours)

Truly, actual damages to be compensable must be proven by clear evidence, as in this

case.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05774 dated April 22, 2014, finding accused-appellant Marlon
Belmonte GUILTY of the crime of Robbery with Rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA civil indemnity
of PhP 100,000, moral damages of PhP 100,000, and exemplary damages of PhP
100,000. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all the
damages awarded in this case from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. The
rest of the assailed CA Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINADOR

LADRA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated June 30, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01160-MIN, which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 dated February 6,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 (RTC) in FC Crim.
Case Nos. 2008-426 and 2008-427 finding accused-appellant Dominador Ladra
(accused� appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and Unjust Vexation.

The Facts

Private complainant AAA4 was born on September 3, 1995 5 and the eldest of five (5)
siblings. At the time material to these cases, she lived with her family in a remote area in
Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.6

On the other hand, it was alleged that accused-appellant was a relative of BBB, AAA's
mother, who allowed him to stay with their family out of pity. He ran errands for them
and attended to the children when BBB was busy washing clothes and her husband,
CCC, was tending to their farm.7

Sometime between 2000 to 2001,8 when AAA was around five (5) years old, she and
her siblings were left at home with accused-appellant. After their meal, accused-
appellant ordered them to sleep. Suddenly, AAA was awakened when she felt accused-
appellant, who was already naked, on top of her, forced his penis into her vagina, and
made push and pull movements, causing her pain. Accused-appellant threatened to kill
her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused-appellant repeatedly molested her, each
time bringing his bolo with him. 9 The sexual abuse ceased in 2002, when accused-
appellant left their house. 10

Years later, or on the evening of April 16, 2008, AAA - who was already twelve (12)
years old at the time - was surprised when she saw accused-appellant in their kitchen.
To her shock, accused-appellant squeezed her vagina and told her that they were going
to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the incident. 11 She
also told DDD about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones committed by
accused� appellant. Eventually, AAA told BBB about her traumatic experiences in the
hands of accused-appellant when she was five (5) years old. Together, they reported
the incident to the barangay and thereafter, had the incident recorded in the police
blotter.12 Later, AAA filed criminal cases against accused-appellant, who was
subsequently arrested.13

On April 19, 2008, Dr. Ma. Josefina Villanueva Taleon (Dr. Taleon), Medical Officer III at
the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, conducted a physical examination on AAA and
found the presence of old healed lacerations in her genitalia at the three (3), eigth (8),
and ten (10) o'clock positions. 14

Hence, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7610 in an Information15 that reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sometime in 2000 up to 2001, when the private complainant is about five to six [5 to 6]
years old, at Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above� named accused knowing full well the minority, with
obvious ungratefulness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual abuse on one [AAA], five to six years old, by inserting his penis into her
vagina, against her will and without her consent, and which act debases, degrades and
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of [AAA] as a child and as a human being and is
prejudicial to the child's development.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section 5 Paragraph B of RA 7610. 16

Likewise, accused-appellant was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in an
Information17 that reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 16 April 2008 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, who knew full well the minority of the victim, through force
and intimidation, actuated by lust or lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct on twelve-year [12] old [AAA] by squeezing
her vagina against her will and to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as

amended.18
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offenses
charged.19

In defense, accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed that AAA's family were
angry at him when he left their house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He
asserted that he left them because he could no longer understand what they were
asking him to do for them.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision21 dated February 6, 2013, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of:
(a) Rape in FC Crim. Case No. 2008-426, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) Unjust
Vexation in FC Crim. Case No. 2008-427, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00 with
accessory penalties.22

In finding accused-appellant guilty of Rape in FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the RTC
found that although the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a case
for child abuse, it also constitutes Statutory Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Relative thereto, it found that AAA's narration of her
defloration in the hands of accused-appellant more than sufficiently established the
offense, as well as the identity of the offender. Despite her tender age, she was
straightforward, clear, categorical, and positive in her testimony, indicating that she was
telling the truth. Moreover, her account of the incident was supported by the medical
findings of Dr. Taleon, who testified that there were healed lacerations in AAA's genitalia
at the 3, 8, and 10 o'clock positions. 23

As regards FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, the RTC found that the prosecution has
established that on the evening of April 16, 2008, when AAA went to their kitchen, she
encountered accused-appellant who, without warning, "just squeezed her vagina." 24 The
RTC opined, however, that the prosecution failed to establish the element
of lasciviousness or lewdness as would justify accused-appellant's conviction for the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. The overt act of accused-appellant of squeezing AAA's
vagina did not show that he intended to gratify his sexual desires nor was it
demonstrative of carnal lust. Nonetheless, AAA was clearly annoyed by the act;
perforce, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of Unjust Vexation, defined and
penalized under Article 28725 of the RPC.26

Conversely, the RTC brushed aside the defense proffered by accused� appellant,
which it found insufficient to debunk the positive evidence of the
prosecution.27 Dissatisfied, accused-appellant appealed his conviction. 28

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision29 dated June 30, 2015, the CA affirmed in toto30 the RTC's Joint
Decision convicting accused-appellant of Rape and Unjust Vexation. Apart from
concurring with the RTC's findings and conclusions, the CA found no merit in accused-
appellant's contention that it was impossible for him to commit the crime as AAA's
younger brother was sleeping beside her at the time of the alleged rape incident.
Disregarding the argument, the CA ruled that the presence of another person at the
scene does not render it impossible for accused-appellant to commit the crime of Rape.
As regards its affirmance of accused-appellant's conviction for Unjust Vexation, the CA
did not proffer any justification. 31

Aggrieved, accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking the reversal of his
conviction.32

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming
accused-appellant's conviction for Rape and Unjust Vexation.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, the Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions such as where there
exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been ignored or
misconstrued, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the
facts.33

In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the Court accords credence to the RTC's finding, as
affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant indeed committed the crime of Rape against
then five (5)-year-old AAA. As astutely observed by the RTC, which had the opportunity
to personally scrutinize AAA's conduct and demeanor during trial, she was a credible
witness whose testimony must be given great weight. The trial judge's evaluation, which
the CA sustained, now binds the Court, leaving to the accused-appellant the burden to
bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight, which were otherwise overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted that would materially affect the disposition of the
case differently if duly considered. 34 Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he miserably
failed to discharge this burden, and the Court finds no reason to reverse the CA's
conclusions.

Moreover, the CA correctly disregarded accused-appellant's argument that he could not

have committed the crime in the presence of AAA's younger brother, who slept beside
her.35 It cannot be denied that the presence of AAA's brother in the room does not
negate the commission of the crime. "Rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house
where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of
the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the
victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is
being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is
known to happen in the most unlikely places." 36

In view thereof, the courts a quo correctly found accused-appellant guilty of Rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the Court modifies
the amounts of damages awarded conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence.37 Accordingly, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, however, the Court disagrees with the CA's
affirmance of the RTC's finding that accused-appellant can only be held guilty of Unjust
Vexation. After a punctilious review of the evidence, the Court finds that he should
instead be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, as charged in the information, in relation
to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.

Acts of Lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Conviction for such crime requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) that te
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of
the following circumstances: (i) through force, threat, or intimidation, (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (iii) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, and (iv) when the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present; and (c) that the offended party is another person of either
sex.38

Meanwhile, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

x x x x.
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5
(b) of RA 7610, the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under
Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in addition to the requisites for
sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows: (1) the accused commits the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is perfonned with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 39

A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness under the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610 have been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to prove AAA's
minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live
Birth40 showing that she was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission
of the lascivious act, AAA was then 12 years old. It was likewise established that
accused-appellant, an adult who exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious
act by "squeezing" her vagina.

The courts a quo convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Unjust Vexation instead of
Acts of Lasciviousness on the finding that there was no element of lasciviousness or
lewdness in accused-appellant's act. In its Decision, the RTC even pointed out that
accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with AAA at that moment considering
that she still had her underwear on, and the act of "squeezing" her private part was not
demonstrative of camallust.41

The Court disagrees.

"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the

Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.
In Amployo v. People,42 the Court expounded on the definition of the word "lewd," to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is
entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of
which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can
only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is
inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez we had already lamented that -
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what
conduct makes one amenable to the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code. What
constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are
lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say just where
the line of demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an
ardent lover.43
After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private
part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age - could not have signified any other
intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several
years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was
appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so,
"squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's
genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to
annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time,
which led the courts a quo to believe that accused-appellant could not have intended to
lie with her, is inconsequential. "'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that
which is carried on a wanton manner." 44 As such, accused�appellant's act of squeezing
AAA's vagina was a lewd and lascivious act within the definitions set by law and
jurisprudence.

Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the prescribed penalty for lascivious conduct
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be
taken from the medium period 45 thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be taken within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.46 Accordingly, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. In addition, and conformably with recent jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as
fine, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment. 47

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01160-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay private complainant the amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(2) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of 10 years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four (4), months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay private complainant the amounts of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P15,000.00 as fine;

(3) Accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is ordered to pay the private complainant

interest on all monetary awards at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210615

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

There is never any justification for a husband to hit his wife with a maso (mallet).

This resolves the appeal1 of the Court of Appeals' July 17, 2013 Decision, 2 affirming the
February 4, 2010 Decision3of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, which
found Abenir Brusola (Abenir) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the deceased the amount of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. 4
In the Information dated July 14, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was charged with the
killing of his wife, Delia Brusola (Delia), as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of July 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
husband of complainant DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO, now deceased, with intent to kill
and with the use of ball hammer (maso), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit his said wife, DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO with the said ball hammer on
her head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death.

Contrary to Law.5

On August 1, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 6

The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:

Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer, 7 testified that they, together
with their parents and other sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006, at around
6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and had an open sala, a kitchen,
and one (I) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was eating with her
back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were
watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would
occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly,
Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement
wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said he
saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no one.
Kristofer was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still
holding the maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was
on the floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir. Delia was rushed to the
hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness but arose when their neighbors
massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station. The next day, their
neighbor Joy Tabamo informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away. 8 Dr.
Joseph Palmero, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, testified on the cause of Delia's death. 9

The defense's version of the events, as testified by Abenir, is as follows:

Abenir worked in Saudi Arabia as a mason, a steel man, and a pipe fitter from 1986 until
he returned in 1992, when his sister informed him that Delia had a paramour. He and
his family lived in Muntinlupa City while he worked for the Makati Development
Corporation until 2001, when he moved them to Batangas where Delia's family could
take care of them, considering that he was often at work. Sometime in September 2002,
at around 2:00 a.m., he was on his way to their house in Batangas when he saw his
brother-in- law on the road. When his brother-in-law saw him, he ran inside Abenir's
house and re-emerged with a shirtless man. When Abenir went inside, he asked Delia
why she was still awake and who the shirtless man was. Delia just nagged him so he
slept as he was very tired. The following day, he went to the store, and some men
mocked him. Abenir later asked Delia about the shirtless man again. Delia responded
by throwing a glass at him. Thus, Abenir went back to Alabang in 2006 to avoid mockery
and a fight with his brother-in-law.10

On the night of July 12, 2006, Abenir came home at around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. Two
(2) of his children were asleep and one (1) was watching the television. While Abenir
was preparing things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for somebody.
After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was going
somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom for his
personal effects. While inside, he heard people talking outside and looked out through a
crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified the woman
as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The man
embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso,
went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked
the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward Abenir, causing them to
stumble on the ground. Delia went inside while Abenir chased the man. After a failed
pursuit, he returned to the house where Joanne hugged him and inquired what
happened. Abenir answered that Delia was having an affair. He noticed that Kristofer
was carrying Delia whose head was bleeding. He instructed his children to take her to
the hospital. He informed Joanne that he would surrender and asked his children to call
the barangay officials and the police. He voluntarily went with the officers to the police
station where he learned that Delia was hit on the head. He asserted that he planned to
attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but accidentally hit Delia instead. 11

In the Decision12 dated February 4, 2010, the trial court found Abenir guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Abenir Brusola y Baragwa GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the children of the deceased, Delia
Brusola y Ramilo, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.13

Abenir appealed the trial court Decision to the Court of Appeals. 14 He argued that there
was inconsistency between the testimonies of Joanne and Abegail. 15 Moreover, Joanne,
the prosecution's lone eyewitness to the attack, purportedly had ill motive against him
since he had opposed her plans of early marriage. 16 Further, in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of
passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender.17

The Court of Appeals found no merit in Abenir's arguments. Thus, in the

Decision18 dated July 17, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated February 4, 2010, of the
Regional Trial Comt of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206, in Criminal Case No. 06-650, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.19

Abenir filed a Notice of Appeal. In compliance with its Resolution 20 dated August 23,
2013 which gave due course to accused-appellant Abenir's notice of appeal, the Court
of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court. In the Resolution 21 dated
March 10, 2014, this Court directed both the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Public Attorney's Office to file their respective supplemental briefs. Both parties filed
their respective manifestations that they would not be filing supplemental briefs. 22

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, this Court
resolves to dismiss accused-appellant Abenir's appeal for failing to show reversible error
in the assailed decision.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.

The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the
credibility of their respective witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime of
parricide were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There was no dispute as to the
relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim. 23 As for the act of killing, the
trial court held:

With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly
testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet.
Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and
credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that it is
unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do
so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were
actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made
under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. 24 (Citations omitted)
Thus, this Court quotes with approval the Court of Appeals' Decision:

It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the
witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is
deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is
that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and
note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. Thus, the trial
court's evaluation shall be binding on the appellate court unless it is shown that certain
facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied. There is no reason to deviate from the rule.

The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the
credibility of either witness. What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise
moment that appellant struck his wife with a maso is absolutely insignificant and
unsubstantial to merit consideration . . . Inconsistencies that refer only to minor details
do not weaken the credibility of witnesses but are rather signs that the witnesses were
not rehearsed.

What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal
occurrence and the identity of the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and
forthright manner how she saw appellant hit her mother with a maso on the head and
her testimony is supported by the physical evidence of the injury sustained by the
victim. While Abigail and Kristofer did not actually see appellant in the act of hitting their
mother, nevertheless, they saw appellant holding the murder weapon and their mother
fallen on the floor with a bloodied head immediately after the criminal act was committed
...

The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne
and her siblings had lost their mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison,
leaving them virtual orphans. Assuming that appellant had previously disapproved of
Joanne's early marriage, such would not have been a sufficient motive for her to
wrongly accuse her own father of a heinous crime ... 25 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, the trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are
mitigating circumstances in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed
is reclusion perpetua.26 In People v. Sales,27 this Court explained:

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the

presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the
proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

-...

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

....

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

....

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to

death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and
not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper. 28(Citation omitted)

Accused-appellant Abenir cited People v. Genosa29 to support the imposition of a lower

penalty in light of the mitigating circumstance. 30 True, this Court in Genosa applied
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 63, to determine the penalty for
parricide:

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be
lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one
degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the
commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree - prision mayor -
and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1)
day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum
period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole. 31 (Citations
omitted)

However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Articles 63 and
64 of the Revised Penal Code provide:

Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. - In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. - In
cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a
single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there
are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.

3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the
courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum
period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties-
reclusion perpetua to death-Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

In line with current jurisprudence, 32 the civil indemnity and the moral damages awarded
to the victim's children are increased to ₱75,000.00 each and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages is added.

The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one's spouse. If anything,
it is an obligation to love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to
anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a manifestation of this sacred
understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. The accused-
appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter the reasons. He
committed a crime. He must suffer its consequences.

WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
Court of Appeals in its July 17, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04419. Accused-
appellant Abenir Brusola y Baragwa is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the heirs of the victim are entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

LEONEN, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused's
second petition for bail. Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case, [1] not
in an interlocutory order in a criminal case. [2] An order disposing a petition for bail is
interlocutory.[3] This order does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second
look on the application for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which
was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the Order [4] dated October 6, 2008 and by the
Court of Appeals in the Decision [5] dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in
the accused's case[6] compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail
Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied [7] this on the ground of res
judicata. In the Decision[8] dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the
Regional Trial Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-
Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng
(Robert), and two (2) other victims.[9] Robert was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,
[10]
a manufacturing company of foams and mattresses. [11]

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres),
and her driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall,
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way.
[12]
Another group of suspects helped as lookouts. [13]

Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside
the vehicle.[14] The incident happened in broad daylight.

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled
and detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas.
[15]
Afterwards, the group headed to Club Solvento, a resort [16] in Calamba, Laguna
owned by Escobar,[17] who personally served them food.[18]

Some of the accused[19] stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others,
namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate
the price for the victims' release.[20] Cheng paid the ransom of P15,000,000.00. [21]

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento, [22] followed by
co-accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were
alleged advisers of Villaver. [23] The group then locked themselves in a room where
Villaver partitioned the ransom money. [24] Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,
[25]
confessed to have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation. [26]

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally released.
[27]
They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they
were abducted.[28]

Cubillas became a state witness.[29] On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial

confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver. [30] Cubillas
believed that Escobar was involved after he saw Escobar talk to Villaver while they were
in Club Solvento.[31] In his extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar
received a portion of the ransom money from Villaver. [32]

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial
Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator [33] in the kidnapping for ransom.[34] The
charging portion stated:

That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, with others not present during the actual kidnapping but
performing some other peculiarly contributory roles, did, then and there, by force and
intimidation, with the use of long firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, carry away and thereafter detain at some undisclosed place, after
having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP Campus,
Diliman, Quezon City, MARY GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her driver DIONISIO F.
BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against their will and consent
thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than twelve (12) hours for the purpose of
extorting ransom for their release in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), and which amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr.
Robert Cheng, owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E.
Rodriguez Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap
victims somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same day all to the
damage and prejudice of the three (3) victims and their families in such amount as may
be awarded to them and their families under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[35]
Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008. [36]

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court.
[37]
During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and
the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers. [38]

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied [39] Escobar's First
Bail Petition. The dispositive portion read:

The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of merit
considering that state witness Cancio Cubillas positively identified said accused as the
owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna; that he was the one who served
food to the group of Rolando Villaver, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny
Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre, Biboy Lugnasin and witness
himself, Cancio Cubillas; that it was also in said Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas,
Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre rested
and slept after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to
negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on the
night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom
money to him.

SO ORDERED.[40]
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals. [41] On March 8, 2011, the Court of
Appeals affirmed[42] the denial of the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas'
extrajudicial confession was generally incompetent evidence against his co-accused
and was admissible against himself only[43] for being hearsay and for violating the res
inter alios acta rule.[44] Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to this
rule and held that the Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on the extrajudicial
confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on Cubillas' testimony during
the bail hearing.[45]

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011 Decision. [46]

Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of the co-
accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando), [47]who applied for bail before the
Regional Trial Court.[48] As in Escobar's bail hearing, the prosecution relied solely on
Cubillas' statements to establish the strength of Fajardo's guilt. [49] In an Order dated
September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail. [50]

However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its
previous order and granted Rolando's bail application. [51] The Regional Trial Court
stated:

To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that accused
Rolando Fajardo participated during the actual abduction of Rosagas, Burca and Torres
or that during the actual abduction, accused Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction
to the other accused herein. The evidence for the prosecution likewise does not
establish that accused Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando Villaver
and his group in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is no
testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused Rolando Fajardo in
connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is thus a paucity of evidence
establishing the participation of accused Rolando Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas,
Burca and Torres.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to Cubillas,
"[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the kidnapping." [53] There was
paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged participation. [54]

Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's motion for
reconsideration.[55] He no longer appealed before this Court.[56]

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final judgment on the
merits of the case as all the other accused who had active participation in the
kidnapping had been granted bail. [57] Escobar saw Rolando's release on bail as a new
"development which warrant[ed] a different view" on his own bail application. [58]

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition)
before the Regional Trial Court. [59] He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either
Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent
before, during, and after the kidnapping. [60] Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was
granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial
court should likewise grant him provisional release. [61]

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied [62] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on
the ground of res judicata,[63] reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which has already attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is
actually a second petition for bail[,] must be necessarily denied." [64]

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.
[65]
On January 14, 2013, he appealed before the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second Bail
Petition.[66]

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted [67] the petition for
certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine the appropriate bail for
Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012, September 14, 2012,
September 17, 2012 and November 6, 2012 Orders, are SET ASIDE. The trial court is
directed to determine the appropriate bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner,
Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.[68]
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration. [69] According
to the Court of Appeals, Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata,
which applies only if the former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an
interlocutory order.[70] An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature. [71]

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed [72] Escobar's bail at P300,000.00. The
dispositive portion read:

In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014, the bail for
the provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed at Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[73]
In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied [74] the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
a Petition for Review[75] via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution
does not pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals
Decision;[76]rather, in assailing the grant of Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the
prosecution avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.[77]

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment, [78] arguing that res judicata did not
apply here,[79] that there was no strong evidence of his guilt, [80] and that the Court of
Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in the greater interest of justice. [81] According to
Escobar:

13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused, [Rolando],
and considering that both [Rolando] and [Escobar]'s alleged participation in the crime
are based on the same court-declared unreliable "speculations" of the state witness
Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail
hearings, it was in the interest of justice and fairness to re-open the matter of bail with
respect to [Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And the Honorable Court of Appeals
agreed.[82]
This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden Randel H. Latoza
(City Jail Warden Latoza) to review Escobar's case. [83] In his manifestation dated August
18, 2016, City Jail Warden Latoza informed this Court that there was no temporary
restraining order against the Regional Trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed
Escobar's provisional liberty at P300,000.00. He also acknowledged the Court of
Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar the right to bail. [84] He mentioned
that Escobar had posted the P300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the trial court. [85] Thus, he
moved to allow Escobar's provisional release on bail. [86]

City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety bond [87] and
attached a copy of Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's surety bond undertaking
to his manifestation.[88] However, the attached surety bond undertaking was neither
notarized nor approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. [89]

In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution of the case as Escobar was
already 78 years old.[90]

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and

Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested
and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable
doubt.[91] The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent.
In People v. Fitzgerald:[92]

The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed
innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of
a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions.[93] (Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if
the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial Court. [94] However, if the accused
is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—andwhen
evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court. [95]

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, [96] reduced
to reclusion perpetua.[97] Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided
that the evidence of his guilt is not strong. [98]

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

....

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court denied [99] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res
judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned[100]this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail
Petition was not barred by res judicata.

In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." [101] This doctrine bars
the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion
or bar by former judgment. [102] It likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a
different claim between the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or
conclusiveness of judgement.[103] It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice,
fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity." [104]

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan[105] held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in
Section 47 of Rule 39"[106] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:

....
(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not
recognized in criminal proceedings.[107]

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between
the parties or their successors-in-interest. [108]Trinidad v. Marcelo[109] declares that res
judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law
and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings." [110] Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied
to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in
criminal cases,[111] Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the
enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad:[112]

Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman
twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and
that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a
reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.

But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in

prison grey" or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it
inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. [113]
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in
nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the
argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or
double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. [114] Double jeopardy requires that the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been
dismissed or terminated without his express consent. [115] Here, while there was an initial
ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has
had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's
Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter;

3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.[116]

In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an

interlocutory order. A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period
to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. [117] In
contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and the
termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final
judgment on the entire controversy.[118]

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter

arising in an action";[119] in other words, something else still needs to be done in the
primary case—the rendition of the final judgment. [120] Res judicata applies only when
there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an
interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed. [121] In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:
[122]

Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17,
1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing
questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said Order has become final
and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.

We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule
39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no
longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been
affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is
an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory. The phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a judgment or an
order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing
intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply
only to those falling under the second category.

....

For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res
adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely
interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment .
[123]
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter [124]—whether
accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt
or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it
deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the
case.[125] Thus:

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course
of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.[126](Emphasis in the original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an
interlocutory order."[127] The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out
in a full-blown proceeding.

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying
Escobar's First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case
itself has not attained finality. Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011
Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of
Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against
him.

In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, notwithstanding its
denial of the First Bail Petition on March 8, 2011.

Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive

him or her of fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified
where executing it in its present form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts
or circumstances:[128]

[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment]
impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to
direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
circumstances."[129] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for
technicality."[130] Thus, an accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there
are sudden developments or a "new matter or fact which warrants a different view."[131]

Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case. [132] The Court of
Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail:
Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because Cubillas' testimony against him was
weak.[133] "[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail
was denied."[134] Escobar's fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the
meantime.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not used
similarly in Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals found: [135]

We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused were all
granted bail except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail due to the weakness of
Cubillas' testimony against him.[136]
In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second
Bail Petition should have been given due course. It should not be denied on the
technical ground of res judicata.

II

The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile, City Jail
Warden Latoza has informed this Court of the absence of any temporary restraining
order against the Court of Appeals Decision granting the Second Bail Petition, as well
as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his bail at P300,000.00. [137] Thus, the Court of
Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar's provisional liberty can be
executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the surety bond.

In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional

evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar's guilt in the main case. "[A] grant of bail
does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from making a final assessment of the evidence
after full trial on the merits." [138] As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for the
prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt in the course of the
proceedings in the primary case.[139]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24,
2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must
be contained in a public document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge.
Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 219581

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Maximo De La Peña (appellant) filed this appeal assailing the December 16, 2014
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 which affirmed
with modification the October 22, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. CC-2006- 1608 finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy.

Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 532 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 24 th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning,
more or less, a1ong the river bank of Barangay San Roque, Municipality of Villareal,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7,537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[:]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* cash money worth [₱] 1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos
(₱49,679.00)to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Romy Real (Romy),
Danny Real (Danny), and Onyong Reyes (Onyong), have not been an-ested and remain
fugitives from justice.

Version of the Prosecution

On September 24, 2005; at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband,
Jose Nacoboan (Jose), and their son, Marwin Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board
their pump boat loaded with 13 sacks of copra. These sacks of copra were supposed to
be loaded and transferred to a bigger passenger boat that would ferry the copra to
Catbalogan, Samar. Their barangay is situated along a river which opens to the sea.
When the tide is low, the bigger passenger boat cannot dock along the shore so a
smaller pump boat has to be used to ferry the cargo to a bigger passenger boat.

As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its
path. For fear of collision, Jose stopped the engine of their pump boat Three armed men
then immediately ordered the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a firearm at
Jose arid ordered him to proceed to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Julita identified
him as the appellant. Jose's hands were tied and his head covered.

Another armed person grabbed Julita’s bag and took the following items:

1) ₱1,000.00 Cash; 2) Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace.

Another person operated the pump boat and docked it on a small island after nearly two
hours of travel. During the trip, Marwin’s shirt was taken off and used to blindfold Julita.
When they arrived at the small island, the appellant unloaded the 13 sacks of copra.

The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island
where its engine, prope1lertube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat.
Consequently, the Nacoboan’s boat was left without an engine and they had to paddle
to safety. They discovered that they were already in Equiran, Daram, Samar.

The following day, Julita went to the police authorities in Villareal, Samar to report the
incident. She reported that the value of the copra was then ₱15.00 per kilo and that the
engine and other equipment lost were valued at ₱30,000.00. She identified the
appellant as one of the armed men who took control of their boat and took away its
engine, propeller tube, and tools since she had known him for 16 years already arid she
recognized him when he boarded their boat.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the accusa6on against him and testified that he was a resident of
Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar for 15 years. He had been engaged in fishing for l0
years as a source of livelihood. He claimed that from September ), 2005 up to
December 5, 2005 he was fishing in Daram, Samar with Edgar Pojas, Jose Dacletan
(bacletan), Tope Dacletan, Nestor Bombay, and Esok Pojas. During the said period, he
smyed at the house of Barangay Kagawad Edgar Pojas and used the boat of Dacletan
to fish.

After their fishing activity, appellant went home to Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar. On
December 6, 2005, four soldiers arrested and beat him up. He was brought to the
Municipal Hall thereafter and was imprisoned. He declared that he knew the
complainants who were also residents of Brgy. San Roque; Villareal, Samar but did not
knew his co-accused Romy, Onyong, and Danny.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 22, 2007, the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33 rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty of piracy under PD 532. The RTC was convinced that the testimonies of
Julita and Marwin positively identifying the appellant as the one who boarded their boat
and took away their cargo through violence or intimidation were credible. The RTC ruled
that appellant's denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive identification made by
the victims.

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the accused MAXIMO DE LA

PEÑA is sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA, without
[eligibility for] parole, and to pay the victims the following:

1. ₱49,679.00, total amount lost;

2. ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages;

3. ₱15,000.00 in moral damages;

4. ₱25,000.00 in nominal damages;

5. and to pay the costs.

Let the continued detention of the accused be transferred to the Leyte Regional Prison,
as soon as possible.

Issue an alias order for the arrest of Onyong Reyes, Romy Real and Danny Real,
accordingly.

Furnish copies of this decision to [the] PNP station, PNP Regional Office and its
Directorate for operations.4
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant filed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 16, 2014, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of piracy
under PD 532 and held as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2007,
convicting accused-appellant for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and
sentencing him accordingly to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without (eligibility
for) parole is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as follows:

a. [₱]30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

b. the award of moral damages, nominal damages, and exemplary damages are
deleted; and.

c. interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment until such amounts shall have been fully paid.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, and after denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 6

Issue

The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty of piracy. According to appellant, the
prosecution failed to prove the elements of piracy under PD 532. Appellant insists that
the RTC erroneously convicted him since the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows:

Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof
or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or pa5sengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy. x x x
In his Appellants Brief, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the
elements of piracy under PD 532. He posits that the Information failed to allege the
elements of the crime of piracy. Appellant maintains that the Information did not state
that the vessel in question was in Philippine waters and that its cargo, equipment, or
personal belongings of the passengers or complement were seized.

The Court disagrees.

The Information7 charged appellant of the crime of piracy to wit:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning,
more or less, along the river bank of Barangay San Roque. Municipality of Villareal,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court; the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7.537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[;]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold] valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* Cash money worth [₱]1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos
(₱49,679.00) to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of
Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD
532, "Philippine waters''' is defined as follows:

[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and
connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth,
breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by
historic or Iegal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)

From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters.
The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal
belongings of the passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. It
stated, in no uncertain terms, that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant
through force and intimidation. Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra were part of the
vessel's cargo. The Information also stated that the vessel's equipment which consisted
of the engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and carried away by the appellant.
Furthermore, the Information also stated that the personal belongings of the passengers
consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the
appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when
he, along with armed companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and seized control of
the same. Armed with firearms, appellant and his companions tied Jose's hands,
covered his head, and operated their pump boat. They travelled to an island in Samar
where they unloaded the sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed
companions travelled to another island where the engine, propeller tube, and tools of
the pump boat were taken out and loaded on appellant's boat.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the
victims' pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions
boarded the same and seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the
passengers.

The Court finds no merit in appellant's contention that he was not positively identified by
the prosecution's witnesses. Fron1 the testimony of Julita, she positively identified the
appellant as follows:

Q: Among the three (3) accused, can you recall who particularly pointed and levelled at
your husband with his knife?

A: It was Maximo De la Peña, ma'am

xxxx

Q: Who [among the three (3) accused unloaded the 13 sacks of copra]?

A: The [ones] who unloaded our [copra] were Maximo De la Peña and the person who
was guarding me with a short [fire]arm [whom] I do not know x x x. [T]he other one who
was carrying a long [fire]arm [was] in charge of the engine. 8

The Court finds no reason to doubt the testimony of Julita identifying appellant as one of
the assailants who boarded their vessel and seized its cargo, equipment, and the
passengers' personal belongings. Julita testified that she was able to identify appellant
because of the moonlight that illuminated the area. Further, she testified that she then
had a flashlight that allowed her to see who boarded the vessel. More importantly, Juljta
had known the appellant for 16 years since they reside in the
same barangay.9 Appellant's bare denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by Julita. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that
positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is
inherently unreliable."10 Since both the RTC and CA found Julita's testimony to be
credible and straightfo1ward, the Court thus finds no reason to disturb the same.

Lastly, appellant argues that the proper penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum: periods and not reclusion perpetua as imposed by the RTC.

Appellant's contention is incorrect, Section 3 of PD 532, provides:

Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as

herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:

a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium ai.1d maximum periods shall
be imposed.1âwphi1 If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof: the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape murder
or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companionsboarded
the victims’ boat and seized 13 sacks of copra, the boat's engine, propeller tube, and
tools, as well as the contents of Julita’s bag. Hence, from the provision above, the
proper imposable penalty should be death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346,
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court thus finds. that the penalty
imposed by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, was
correct since the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was accomplished by boarding the
vessel.

Anent the award of damages, the Court sustains the modification made by the CA in
deleting the amount of ₱49,679.00 as actual damages and instead, awarding Julita
temperate damages since she failed to substantiate her losses with the necessary
receipts. As we explained in Tan v. OMC Carriers. Inc.:11

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
To justify an award of actual damages there must be competent proof of the actual
amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.

The award of temperate damages is proper since under .Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperature damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
had been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. Likewise, the Court finds the deletion of nominal damages proper. The CA is
correct in holding that temperate and nominal damages arc incompatible and thus,
cannot be granted concurrently. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages
are given in order that a right of the plafr1tift: which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may he vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Last1y, the deletion of the awards of moral and
exemplary damages are also proper for lack of factual and legal basis.

All told, based on the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that appellant was guilty of piracy under PD 532.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The December 16, 2014 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 finding appellant Maximo De La
Peña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy defined and penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.