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After reading this chapter. you should have an appreciation of the fo owinE:
l!
chapter 12 dis{us.s€d research into how capital markets react to th€ releas€ of a.counting
information. A dimculty of capital markets research is that it does Dot investigak how
information is actually processed by market panicipants because it coDc€ntraks on
only two it€ms, the release of information and the capital market readion (if any), not
what goes on between these rwo evmrs. One of the respons€s to this limitation was the
development of agency theory as described in chapter 1 1 . ABency theory €xamines why
fiIms droose panicular accounting methods ftom a set of acceptable alt€matives. Aldrough
agency theory is concemed with the actions of individual manag€rs and olh€r pani$, it
make8 the important assumption that all individuals ar€ hotivated to maximise their self-
inrciest. This assumption makes it easier to dev€lop testable predictions for research but
it does not r€ally e{prain why people act as th€y do because the seme rcason is given for
different behaviou$. For instance, when a manager choos€s the FIFO m€thod of inventory
measurem€nl, agency theory saF this is because it is in the s€lf-intarest ofihe manager to
do so. similarly, if another manager chooses rhe weighted a\'era8e method instead, the
same reason b given by the theory that is, the choice was in the manager's self interest.
As we make different choices for different reasons, 'self-interes! is a very incomplete
explanation for p€oplds behaviour. Cl€arlt ifwe are to have a betei undeFtanding about
how people use accounting information, then we need to study pmpl€t actual behaviouis
and decision processe$. This is the role of a rhird arca of accounting reseaKh, popularly
knovllr as'behaviouEl accountinS research' [BAR).
This chapt€r inuoduces you to the field of behavioural accounting research by
describin8 some of the key qu€stions it investigates and some ofth€ main research tools
used by researchers. AlonS the way w€ will indi(ate some oflhe imponaot findin$ so
far fiom this research, particularly in the area of financial accounting. Like the capital
marke$ and agen.y theory schools of r€search, behavioural accoundng also has ils
limitations and these will be m€ntioned throuShout lhe €hapter wher€ rclevanr.
@- erHnvlouRAl- ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH: DEFINITION AND SCOPE
Behavioural ?ccountin8 researqh has b€en defned as:
The srudy olth€ behaviour of accounonrs or the behaviour of non-accountants as they
are influenced by a.coundng functions and repons.I
Behavioural accounting res€arch (BAR), capital markets research and agency theory
research can all b€ called'positive'research in the sens€ that they all are concern€d
with dis{ov€ring 'facts': capital mark€$ research aslis 'hou, do securities markets react
to accounting informationl'; agelcy theory asks 't ft41 ar€ the e.onomic incentives that
determine the (hoice of a(counting methods?'; and behavioural research asks 'llop do
people a€tually use and process accounting information?' However, they are also very
different in many respects. For instance, capital markeb rcsearch look at the macro
level of aggreSate securities markets, whereas agency theory and behaviounl a.counting
foclls on the micro level of individual managers and firms. Capital markets res€arch
and agency th€ory are both deriv€d ftom the disciplin€ ofeconomics and disPense wirh
people's actual motivations by assuming (hat everyone is a rational wealth maximiser'
Behavioural accounting on the other hand, is derived from other disciplines such as
psychology, sociology and organisational theory, and 8€nerally mak€s no assumptions
aboui bow people behave; rather, ils objective is to discover utry People behave as th€y do
Consequently, each of thes€ three schools of accounhng research is desrgned to answer
very different tpes ofqu€stions about the pnctice ofaccounting.
Choi, F, & tsich, R 1990, Tne upital ftarket 6ects ol intemadanal ao tinS diretsit!' Homewoad
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Achievemot
In developing a specific version of the Brunswik lens model, subiecls are asked
to make iudg€ments for a large number of cas€s which are based on the same set
of cues. For example, they may be asked to ass€ss whether several 6rms are likely to
fail, given rhe 6fms' working capftal, price-€arnings, eamings per share, quick, debt
to equity and otlrer ratios. A linear model describinS the fuDctioml rdationship
betw€en the cues (ratios) and responses (likelihood of failure), i! then constructed as
a means of representinS the way in h,hich infofilation is processed by individuals.r2
UsinS 6gure 13.1 as an example, oul bank loan officer is gv€n fimncial ratios and
other accounting information for differ€nt companies. Th€ bank loan officer is asked
to make a iudBement, on fi€ b.sis of this information, about which ofthe companies
will default on their loan paym€nts and which companies will not default. A regression
analysis is ihen conducted using the bank office/s responses (i.e. default/non-default)
as the dependent vadable and the financial ratios and other data as tb€ independent
variables that are attempting to explain the ofncels iudg€ments. As a result of the
analysis we might, for inslancq enive at a model of the bank loan offrcels judgements
in th€ form of the following simplified equation:
Uk€lihood ofd€faulvnon-default = a consrant term - 0.t5 profr + o.25.ash flow + o.50 debt
to equity ratio +... oth€r informarion cues ... + enor
some researchers have tried to overcome th€ g€nenl limitations ofboth the lens and
prccess tracing methods by combining the predictive and descdptive powen of the two
approach€s. On€ such ah€mative is a statisiical technique known as 'classification and
regression tr€es' (CAFI) thar uses stalstical methods to partitioo (or split) the output of a
decision mak€1s ,udgements into decision 'nodes' that maximise th€ power of the model
to correcdy predict th€ dassificatior of different cases into th€ dght t?e of d€cision.
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FICURt 13.3 Extra.t of CART decision tree for an Australian share analyst
sour.€: 8A Howieson, 'A s(urny.nnlyst s,ction recommendirionr: an ippli.ation oi recuEive
pnrr tion fg to nrodeL .g tldSeren r', / uir/a/,.ai /o!"a/ ol M 8€mear, vol I ij, fo. 2, De.emb€r
'Ih€ diagram shou's how va$ous accoundng variables were used by the aDalyst to
affi\.e at bq', hold or sell de.isions. The CAKI Dodels combired stong power to
colr€clly classify analysts'recommendations with an inruitively appealing descriptor of
their decision proc€sses. Ilo$,€\€r itwas lound that the mo.r data available foraDalysis,
the more complex the r€sult;ng decision trees, makiDg it more dificult to deril.e simpl€
rules lor training other analysts. lhe relativc complexiry oi decision ir€es has been a
common problenr no matter whether process iracing or CART methods have be€lr used
to deri!,e them.
Probabilistic judgement
The probabiiis(ic judgement model is useful for looking at situations in ac(oundDg
*'here initial beliefs aboul a prediction or evaluarion need ro be revised once funher
evid€nce becoDres availabl€. An in\'€sror's revision of an invesnrent decision in the
li8ht of ne$, eviden.e concerning rhe ourcom€ ofa laNsuit againsr a firm is an exarnple
of this t).pe ofsituation.
l-his model a.gues that ahe 'normatively' correct way to revise initial beli€fs, stated
as subjecrive probabiliries, is by applying Bayes's rheoreDr, a basic renet ofconditional
probabilitv tlreory. Bay€s's theorem states that rhe levised (posrerior) probability in the
light ofadditional evidence is equal to the original belief (base ra(e) muhiplied by the
Qustion
If rhe €nployee produced a decePtive resPonse to the question, 'Did you steal flom
$e storel'what is the probabilitythat the €mployee did in fad steal?
- NorEative Bays's colution
Posterior odds = Likelihood ratio x Prior odds
= 0.90/0.12 x 0.02/0.98
= 0.153/l
Probability =0.i53/1.r53
= r3tk
Libby argues 1hat most people suSSest that the Probability is quite high, around 80 p€r
cent.?l
The findin8 that human declsion makers do not apPly Bayes's multiplicative rule when
revising prior beliefs is pervasive iD th€ HIT research lit€nture. This led researchers in
psychology to investigate what rules, ifany, are used. They found that the explanation
seems 10 lie in the use of n-lles of rhumb or biases, which humans reson to in order to
simplify complex tudgement task.
Libby was th€ first toresearch the lask of assessing busin€ss failure' and several
studies have followed.'?r what has emerged in the literature is the question ofwhether
disclosing to the subjects rhe actual rate of failure is necessary to achieve realism in
rhe task. Th€ actual rate of business failure is very low, less than 5 per cent Therefore
subjects. unless they are told otherwise, bring to the judgement task the expectation
that the number offailure cases will be marginal.
on the other hand, research€rs cannot hope to Sain evidence Fom this task setting
unless a 'reasonable' number of adual failure cases arc included in the materials
provided. Researchers hav€ generally used a failure rate of berl\'een 33 per cent and
50 per cen! and experiNents manipulating the rate of failure and ils Prior disclosure/
non'disclosure have been carded out.:r lhe results have been inconclusive25 ir lerms
of rhe e{ten1 to which prior disclosure of the sample failure rate matters, bul it seems
that rask predictability'z6 and information rePresentativeness play a role'?7
other variations of this line of research include obseNing the effect of allowing
subiects to choose their own ratios, exanining the impact of information overload,
Although thi$ statem€nt rvas made in 1981, the evidence gained since then has not
violated the thrust ofLibby's observation-
Theory in acaion l3.t provides an exampl€ ofhow accountin8 in0uences behaviour
by investors. This media rclease illustrates the Srowing influenc€ of the AustraliaD
Shareholdels' Associarion.
iohn Curry, Chairman olth€ ASA'S Company Monitoring Commjttee in Victoria, sa d "The
NAB Risk Committee has failed ln its oversight ot the bank's rlsk managemeni, as evldenced
by the si8nificant provGions and hedging costs $,hich the bank has incurred in relation to its
pottolio of collateralized debt obllgations".
"Mr Rizzo, as chairman ot NAB'5 Risk Committee, should be held accolntable Ior th s
The ASA has commenced a campaign lo obtain the 100 signatures necessary to movc a
reso ution atthe NAB ACM on 18 December2008forthe removalofNlr Rizzo. MrCurry sald,
"We have emailed our mernbers today and wl I be giving NAB shareholders the oppodunity
to sign the reque( at ASA meetings-"
"Civen the coniact we have been receiving from disgruntled NAB sharehold€rs, w€ do not
expect to have any difficulty mising the required 100 signaturcs."
Upon obtainin8 the 100 signatures the ASA will request that NAB place a resollrtion
before the ACM seeking the removal of Mr Rizzo, and circulate a statement ln support of
the resolution to all shareholders with lhe notice of meeting. The statement the ASA seeks to
circu are in accordance with Secilon 249P oflhe Corporations Act 2001, is below.
A previous rcsoLution moved by ASA membeB in 2005 to dismiss a NAB director, Cco{frey
Tomlinson, received 39% ofthe vote.
National Australia Bank Limited (NAB)
Statement pursuant to Se.tion 249P ofthe Corporations A.t
National Australia Bank's Rlsk Committee has fail€d to adequately consider the underlylng
value ot or risks invo ved in, the significant portfoiio ol collateralised debt ob lgatiorrs (CDOs)
held by the bank. These asseis have resulted in la€e provlsions that have significant y reduced
whi enlire board i5 responsible, Mr Paul Rizzo, as a director and chajrmai ot NAB's
st the
Risk Commiltee, should be heldaccountablelortheweak riskmanagenrentculturewh ch has
led to the loss of shareholder vi ue and bank credlbility in re atjon to thcse assets.
when ofnolncin8 the $l8l nrillion charge against lhe valuc of its port{olio ol CDos in
March 2008, NAB claimed to be avoiding high rlsk bu5lness.
ln N.lay, the chajrman of NAB, Mr Mich.el Chaney, wrote ro shnreholders stati g "1he
volatiliq,inworldfinancialmark€tshashighightedtheimporranceofrobustriskmanaSement
syslenB and prudent capital management in financlal institutions. The efforts of our people
to strenBthen o!r risk framework dnd balance sheet in recent year has been validated by the
companyrs resil ence durinB fie recent p€riod oi sign ficant iinancial di,rupt on".
ln Julv the bank announced a iLfthet provis on of $8309 mil ion against the va ue of this
ln September, NAB announced .dditional co5t5 of $100 mi llon in 200B, $60 million per year
for s tears afd a lesser ycarl) amount thereafter to hedg€ againstdefaultolthe cDo portfol o.
ln addition NAB still has a substantial poldo io of CDO5, corporate bonds and comnrercial
mo{8age backed securities that are neither pro!Gioned nor hedged.
Shareholderu will have an opportunity to hold Mr Rizzo accountabLe fo. this failLrre of risk
manag€mentby supponinSa resolution to remove him as a directorofNAB at thefo hcomlng
annua general m€eting.
lf you are unable to attend and wlsh to nominate the ASA as your rePresentative at that
meetlng p ease inse'1 lhe name "Australian Shareholders' Associat on" as your proxy of the
proxv Iorm and lodge it in accordance with the instructions shown on the torm itse 1..
solr.er Nredia Re ease posled b,v r\urt'a an Sharcho.lcr' A$o.iation, I O.robcr 2008, r'ww xa sr ar IZ
'1972
1973 1974
The faces are construct€d by mapPing transformed financial variables onto facial
featLres. Mathematical precision in terms of nose length brow angle and mootir
curvature isusedto iepr€sent changes in financia I posltion from one period to the nej':t
Interest in this mode of prcsentation arose io 1979 wben Moriarity reporl€d that
subiects usins financial information represented by such graPhics outperformed a
$,ell'accepled financial distress model.aT As previously noted, it has been a consisreni
research finding that models generally oulperform humans and so lhis form of
presentatior offered promise. Stock and Watson found only weak confirmation of
lvtoriarity's r€sults in a predicrion of bond ratings task aB Howevet they did lind that
accuracy performance using mulddimensional graphics was superior to thal artained
with a conventional tabular presentadon. This latter result held even when the subiecr
had minimal accounting training. Sto& and Watson concluded:
... a muhidimensional Sraphi.s approach would be usetul when€ver cost or dau
availability nakes good staristical models impossible to build, especiallv if the resulls
ae
using multidimensional graphics are at least as good as the rcsults ofa model
To date, financial stalement pleparen have not been prepared to pLrblish graphics as
ndical as the Chernoff fac€s. Howev€r, the us€ ofcolour and more convenlional graphs
. lraiiariliry. The availabilhy rul€ ofrhunlb refcrs ro the assessment ofthe probability
ofan event based on the ease with $hich instances ofthat event come 10 mind 53 1he
consequence ofuse ofthis rule ofthull)b is that probabilities rclated to sensational'
even!s are likely lo be overestimat€d.
. Atlchotin| and adjustmrrr. 'l h is rule o f to a general judgelnent proccas
rhunb rc iers
in which aD initiall_v gen€rated or Siven responsc anchol and o(her
@-.utrlrrnnoNs oF BAR
This oveNiew of BAR has shown that we have learnt a 8rcal deal about holv different
d€cision makers use accounting information. However, it has also revealed that there
is significantly much more for us 1() learn in this ar€a The frequenr (and frustrating)
cortradictions between th€ findings of similar studies simply mean that human
information processing is far more complex than the developnent of current research
fteo es and methods.
Maines has argued:
Unfodunately, three criticisms leveLled against this r€search have limit€d iL, impact
Firs! studies on the same topichave produ.ed conflicting lesults, Preventjng conclusive
guidance for policy decisions. In addition, the o{perim€ntal subiecls and settings
;s€d in these studies often differ from dose found in real iudgment sertings. finally,
accountingresearchers have ql€stioned"h€theI policyshould be inl'luenced bvresearch
on individual decision makers.33
These limitations of BAR have meanl that it is yet to achieve the same level of
dominance in the academic literature Presendy enjoyed by rhe capital markets and
agency theory research schools. O\€rall, the maior limiration of BAR is the lack of a
single und€rlying theorywhich heLps in the uniication olthe diverse r€search questions
and findings of BAR. Unlike the capital markets and agency theory research schools
which have grounded their research activities and theoreiicai development within
a particdlar 6eld of economics, BAR rcsearchers have borrow€d from a multilude of
disciplines and contants and have no common framework with;n wllich to develop
usetul generalisations for poliq' nakers. There is also no signal that the developmenr
ot su l- d rheor) is lilel\ rr Lhe fore{eable furure
Nelertheless. it remains trlre that BAR is a valuabl€ and practical research school
BAR methods have b€€n used bv many groups of decision makers 1o develop eryeft
systems and other practicai tools for information processing aDd training purposes
in the workplace. BAR also offers the promise of revealing systematic errors (such as
rhe {lifferent rules of lhumb dncussed previouslv) made by all decision makers within
specific (ontexts thar have implications for improvemeni at the macro lev€l For
lnstance, research is stardng to show ho$' the q?es of inceDtives share anal''sts fac€ in
the workplace bias their decisioDs.sa For example, they are less inclin€d to make selL
r€commendations than buy recommendalions for (ompanies with {'hich ihey enioy
close business relationshiPs.
Questions
l. Consid€ra decision task, other dran a bankruptc.v prediction lask, that uses
accounting informarion (e g. nraking recommendations for shar€ investors).
Assume thar -vou are intending to conduct a Brur$rvik lens model experiment
on your select€d decision rask. Lisl seven information cues you think would be
imporlant vn riables to use in naking your decision. \Mry did-vou choose th€se
cues? Compare and contrast)'our list of information cu€s with a coll€ague. Dis.uss
wiLh each orher the similadties and differences in your choices.
2. Nlost humaD judgement research is undenaken in an €Ipenmental setting. Holv
(ould yoLr respond to the assertion drat exp€rinrenis cannot be generalised to
ihe real rvorld? \dhat are the rLeaknesses and strengths ofthis research methodl
{Hinti See R, Swieringa and KE weick, 'An assessment of laboratory exp€riments
in accounring, .iorrrndl of A.Iountins Reseafth, lal. 20, Supplement, 1982,
pp. s6-93.)
3. Use the probabilistic iudgement fraDrework io describe an accounling or auditing
related decision task.
4. Lxplain the implicarions for a.counting ifd€cision makers in an accounring
context display any or all of the represeDtativeness, availability, or anchoring and
adiustm€nt rules of thumb.
5. D€scdbe how (and why) ihe informatron ptocessing s''stems of exP€ri accouqtants
might be different ftom those ofaccounting students. How might the exp€nise
of experienced accounting practitione$ be effectively Passed on to accounting
students?
6. 'Most people are not good intuitive statisticiam.' Discuss this statement in an
accounong context, dra\ting on research using the Probabilistic model
7. Crmpare and contrast the etncient markets h)?othesis and human judgement
theory. fue they inconsistent with each other? Explain
8. Does consensus always imply accuracy in studies of accounting decrsion makingl
Justi& your answer.
9. why is a 'model ofhuman belavioul generally superio. to human iudgem€nts?
10. what ahernativ€s exist for improving the format and presentation of accounting
information? what is the research evidence regarding the merit of the various
11. Human tudgement rheory does nol puryon to peneuate the 'black box of
cogniuve processing. verbal protocol research, however, has that ability. What are
th€ $reng$s and weak'nesses ofthis r€search methodology? (Hittt S€e CF Klersey
and Tj Mock rr'€rbal protocol research in auditin g: , AccoufitinS, Oryanizatiofls a
Sociery. vol. 14, no. l l2, 1989, pp. 133-5r-)
12. Re.oncile normative accounting studies and human judg€ment th€ory.
13. why do individuals form lobby grouPs to influence companies' behaviour and
informadon disclosures? what g?es of information would shareholder Sroups
require to determine whether company directon should be censured for poor
perfotmance?
14. What is mor€ imponant for an organisation the 'right' Physical assets or the
'righf peopl€? Explain-
-
15. Accouming is a function ofhuman behaviour and activity. As such, is not atl
accounting research behaviouml? lustiry' your answer'
16. List nine or more factors that will influence the accounting system adopted by a
6Im and lhe information disdosed- Which of these factors is a direct function of
human behaviour!
17. What is ao industry specialist auditor?Will an indusary specialist auditor always
perform beter lhan a non-specralist auditorl Explain.
18. wbat is the difference betlveen independence in fac! and independenc€ in
appearance? Which is more imPo(ant?
Additional readings
Burgslahler, D & Sundem, CL 1989, "fhe €volution ofbehavioral accounting research in
the unit€d states, 1968- 1987', Behauiorul Research in Acco nlins, 'tol l, pp 75 108'
Caplan, EH 1989, 'Behavioral accounting a peGonal view'Behavioral Research in
-
AccountinS, vol.7, PP rO9-43-
Gibbint M 1977,'Human inf€rence, heuristi€s and auditor's iudgmenl process" CICA
Audit Research SYmPosium, CICA
Hogarti, RM &Einhom, HI 1992, 'Order effects in beliefupdating: the belief-adiustment
nr.odel,' Cognitiue Psvcholog" vol 24' pp l-55'
Hoprvood, Aa 1989, 'Behavioral accounting reuospecr and ProsPect" Bel auioral Research
in Ac.o ntinS,'rol. 1, 1'989' pp 1'22
' A66orntitl&
Johnson. Pg ,amal, K & Berrfnan, RG 1989, 'Audit iudgement tesearch
OrS^nizarions and Societv. vol 14, no r/2, pp 83-99-
one area of research;n BAR is to discover the differences in the iudgements ofvarious
/€xperts'and to discover what characteristics and skills lead to expertise in aparticular
Questions
'L Why would the Te stra board appolnt an iniernal candldat€ to the position of chief
€xecutive, ratherlhan an externa candidate?
2. \rvhy miSht Davl.lThodey have been preferred to the othcr int€rnal candidates one
jndustry
oi whori had flnance experience and the secord of whom had other telco
3. The aticle repods that David Thodey had internal exPerience. How might his skill
set have changed during his iime wilh Telstra and what miSht have been his main
means of learning new skills?
4, Descrlbe the complex environment in which TeLstra is operating and identify the
paftic!lar skills th;t the new chief execut ve might be able to use to inflLrence that
Lowdebt
Too much debt was a feature behind last yea/s corporate casuakies such as ABC
Leaming Centres, Allco Finance and Babcock & 8rown.
"Companies with little or no debtwillcome out{ofthe cufient crisis) stronger," Price
says. He look for a debt-to-€quity ratio of under 50 per cent.
Ceddes says cash-flow problems are an important sign that a company's financial
posilion is deteriorating. H€ cites Qantat which sprung a nasty surpris€ on investors
earlierthie month, announcinga $500 million capitalrais;ng to pay down debt. "Qantas
is one of the best-run airlines in the world bur given the stare of the global€conomy the
airline market will be among the last to recover," he says-
solrce: Exceryls frcm t e A6e 25 february 2009, h(pr'lthebigchan.com.a!.
Qu€stion$
l. lf cash i5 the be5t meesure of success, why have the accounting profession and
reSulalors persevercd with analysing debt-to-equity ratios?
2. What do analysts means by the term'nasty surprise'?
3. Why does the market so rcadily interpret a cashjlow p.oblem as a sign that a
company's tinancial poeition mighl be deteriorating but was appar€ntly prepaled to
focus on debt-to-equity ratios for a number of years?
4. The anicle refers to the need to'sort the wheat lrom the chafi'by focusing on
companies lhat are copingwell. How are such judgernents made?
Endnotes
r. T Hofst€dland i Kinard, A state8y 4. S€e pp. 3a6-7 ofSE Bonrer, adudes and pedoman.d. Iormal
for behavioral ac.ounrin8 rekarch', 'tud8m€nt and d€ck'on-nal.jng oJ AccorntinS Rardfth, vol s, t967 ,
A.c@nnn8 Revieu', lantary 1970, Iesea(h in arcounting', Accountir8 pp. 22s-8.
p- 43. Honzonr, vol. 13, tro. 4, December 7. W Edrvads, The tbory ofdecision
2. c Sieael and H iamanauskas 1999, pp.38s-98 makind, Pr/.loldSicdl Bulenn, tuly
M^rcni, Behaviotul Acctu in$, Ohi,o: 5. See paiagnph 43 ofSAC 2 Objecdve 1954, pp. 380-417
South'W6reh Publishjry Co., I 989, of CeneBl Purpose Financial 8. RH Ashon, 'An experimenial srudy
p. 4 dBcribes hos'wjdely BAx.an Reponin& Melbouhe: Publi. Sector of int€mal odrol judsmenls,
Accounring Sted.rds Board and lor 4l of A. r tins Rcserrch, spnnA
3. EM Bambd, 'Opponmides itr AccountinS Standards Rdiry Boa.d, 1t74, pp. 143-57.
behdioBl accounting researcb , Au8usr, 1990, 9. E Br.ttswik, me Con.ett@l Ftu'ne@ft
B.h4tbtul R.eotdt i^ Ac.ouht' 8, 6- Sw Becker, 'Discussiod ofthe of Prtr,DloSl, ChicaSo: UniveBity of
eol- 5, 19t3. pp. 1-29. effed of ftequenry of feedback on Chicago, 1952