I.

RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE

Classification of Employment Under the Labor Code:

1. AS TO NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT

a. Regular

1. Cals Poultry Supply Corp. vs. Yap, G.R. No. 150660, July 30, 2002

FACTS: CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressed chicken. On May 16, 1995, it hired
Candelaria Roco as helper at its chicken dressing plant on a probationary basis. On March 5, 1996, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against CALS alleging that she was illegally dismissed on November 15, 1995. She averred that she was terminated
without cause from her job as helper after serving more than six (6) months as probationary employee. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It upheld CALS’ decision not to continue with her probationary employment having
been found her unsuited for the work for which her services were engaged. NLRC affirmed the said ruling. However, the CA ruled
that she had attained the status of a regular employee as the termination on November 15, 1995 was effected four (4) days after
the 6-month probationary period had expired, hence, she is entitled to security of tenure in accordance with Article 281 of the
Labor Code. CALS argues that the Court of Appeals’ computation of the 6-month probationary period is erroneous since the
termination of her services on November 15, 1995 was exactly on the last day of the 6-month period.

ISSUE: Was Candelaria Roco terminated as a regular employer?

DECISION: NO. Candelaria’s services were terminated within and not beyond the 6-month probationary period. The probation
was from May 16, 1995 to November 15, 1995; the 180th day was November 11, 1995. But the Court ruled that November 15,
1995 (184th day) was still within the 6-month period because the computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned
from the date of appointment up to the same date of the 6th month following. In other words, November 15, 1995 was still
within the six-month probationary period.

2. Alcira vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004

FACTS: Respondent Middleby Philippines Corporation hired petitioner Radin Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on
a probationary basis for six months. Alcira asserts that, on November 20, 1996, a senior officer of respondent Middleby in bad
faith withheld his time card and did not allow him to work. Alcira filed a complaint in the NLRC against respondent Middleby.
Alcira insists that he already attained the status of a regular employee when he was dismissed on November 20, 1996 (he had
started work on May 20, 1996). According to Alcira’s computation, since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that one month is
composed of thirty days, six months total one hundred eighty days, the 180th day fell on November 16, 1996. Thus, when he was
dismissed on November 20, 1996, he was already a regular employee. Respondents claim that, during petitioner’s probationary
employment, he failed to meet company standards and thus Alcira’s application to become a regular employee was disapproved
and his employment was terminated. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner’s dismissal o n
November 20, 1996 was before his “regularization,” considering that, counting from May 20, 1996, the six-month probationary
period ended on November 20, 1996.

ISSUE: Was Alcira already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal?

DECISION: NO. He was still a probationary employee. The probation was for 6 months starting May 20, 1996. The 180th day was
November 15, 1996. But the Court ruled that on November 20, 1996 (the 185th day), when the employer terminated the
probation, the employee was still probationary. In CALS Poultry Supply vs. Roco, computation of the 6-month probationa ry
period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. In short, since the
number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary employee when respondent Middleby
opted not to “regularize” him on November 20, 1996.

3. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS CORP V. CPLU, GR. NO. 148738

Facts:
MMPC is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembly and distribution of Mitsubishi motor vehicles. CPLU is a legitimate
labor organization and the duly certified bargaining agent of the hourly paid regular rank and file employees of MMPC. Nelson
Paras was a member of CPLU. His wife, Cecille Paras, was the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union
(CPSU).
Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned
on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from
1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from November 1,
1994 to March 3, 1995.

On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance
Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with respect to the company’s rules and guidelines, started
reporting for work on May 27, 1996.

Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors rating Paras’ performance were
Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the MMPC’s company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an
average rating.

Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average performance rating but it is a
rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C.
Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations of the
supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for
regularization.

Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25, 1996. This letter’s intent is to
formally relieve him off of his services and position effective the date since he failed to meet the company’s standards.

Issue:
(a) Whether or not respondent Paras was already a regular employee on November 26, 1996; (b) whether or not he was legally
dismissed

Held:
YES, HE IS ALREADY A REGULAR EMPLOYEE. Paras received the letter of termination on November 26, 1996, the same was served
on the 183rd day or after the expiration of the six-month probationary period. The CA stated that since he was allowed to work
beyond the probationary period, Paras became a regular employee. Hence, his dismissal must be based on the just and
authorized causes under the Labor Code, and in accordance with the two-notice requirement provided for in the implementing
rules. The appellate court concluded that for MMPC’s failure to show that Paras was duly notified of the cause of his dismissal,
the latter was illegally dismissed; hence, his actual reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages
up to the time of his reinstatement were in order.

NO, HE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. The basis for which respondent Paras’ services were terminated was his alleged
unsatisfactory rating arising from poor performance. It is a settled doctrine that the employer has the burden of proving the
lawfulness of his employee’s dismissal. The validity of the charge must be clearly established in a manner consistent with due
process. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an unsatisfactory rating can be a just cause for dismissal only if it amounts to gross
and habitual neglect of duties. Gross negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to
amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.[36] A careful perusal of the records of this case does not show that respondent Paras was
grossly negligent in the performance of his duties.

4. ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION and/or JESS MANUEL, petitioners, vs. IRENE R. RANCHEZ,
respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Ranchez was a probationary employee for 5 months. She was hired as a cashier by Robinsons sometime within that
period. Two weeks after she was hired, she reported the loss of cash which she had placed in the company locker. She offered to
pay for the lost amount but the Operations Manager of Robinsons had her strip-searched then reported her to the police even
though they found nothing on her person. An information for Qualified Theft was filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
She was detained for 2 weeks for failure to immediately post bail. Weeks later, respondent Ranchez filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages. A year later, Robinsons sent to respondent by mail a notice of termination and/or notice of expiration of
probationary employment.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that at the time of filing respondent Ranchez had not yet
been terminated. She was merely investigated. However, the NLRC reversed this ruling, stating that Ranchez was illegally
dismissed and that Robinson's should reinstate her. It held that Ranchez was deprived of due process when she was strip-
searched and sent to jail for two weeks because such amounted to constructive dismissal, making it impossible for the
respondent to continue under the employment. Even though she was merely a probationary employee, the lapse of the
probationary contract did not amount to a valid dismissal because there was already an unwarranted constructive dismissal
beforehand.

The NLRC denied Robinson's motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally terminated from employment by petitioners.

HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious.
LABOR LAW: Probationary employees; termination of employment
There is probationary employment when the employee upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period during which the
employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable standards made known to him at the
time of engagement.

A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment,
aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e.,
the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.Thus, the services of an employee who
has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:
(1) a just or
(2) an authorized cause; and
(3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that the employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be
terminated, a written notice containing a statement of the causes of termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and
regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.

In the instant case, based on the facts on record, petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and procedural due process.
The haphazard manner in the investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the determination of the police authorities and
the Prosecutor's Office, left respondent with no choice but to cry foul. Administrative investigation was not conducted by
petitioner Supermarket. On the same day that the missing money was reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the
company already pre-judged her guilt without proper investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as the suspected
thief, which resulted in her languishing in jail for two weeks.

The due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not be replaced with police investigation or court
proceedings. An illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each
other and are awarded conjunctively.

In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee at the time she was constructively dismissed by petitioners, she is
entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of respondent is no longer viable considering the circumstances.
DENIED

5. ST. PAUL COLLEGE QUEZON CITY, ET. AL v. REMIGIO MICHAEL A. ANCHETA II and CYNTHIA A. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 169905
September 7, 2011
FACTS:
Remigio Michael was hired by the St. Paul College (SPCQC) as a teacher in the Gen. Education Dept. with a probationary rank in
SY 1996-1997 which was renewed the following year. His wife, Cynthia was also hired as a part time teacher of the Mass Comm
Dept in the 2nd Sem SY 1996-1997 and her appointment was renewed for SY 1997-1998. In February 1998, the spouses both
wrote a letter addressed to Sr. Lilia asking for their contract to be renewed which was indeed granted by the College Council as
evidenced by a letter sent by petitioner.

On April 22, 1998, a letter, whose signatures includes that of the respondents, was sent to Sr. Bernadette. The said letter
contains teachers’ sentiments regarding school policies. However, on April 21, 1998, a letter written by the latter was shown,
reiterating the conversation of Sr. Bernadette and Remigio regarding the non-compliance of respondent to instructional school
policies. Accordingly, Sr. Bernadette wrote a letter endorsing the termination of the spouses. Respondents submitted their
comments however they were still terminated and their letter for reconsideration denied thus the filling of a complaint for illegal
dismissal which was dismissed by both NLRC and Labor Arbiter but was granted by the CA. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No, the spouses were not illegally dismissed.
The Court finds that there was a valid and just cause for dismissal. The Labor Code commands that before an employer may
legally dismiss an employee from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural due process must be complied with.
Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of employment must be based on just or
authorized causes. Petitioner school charged respondent Remigio Michael of non-compliance with a school policy regarding the
submission of final test questions to his program coordinator for checking or comment which was admitted by the respondent in
his letter. Respondent Remigio Michael's spouse shared the same defenses and admissions as to the charges against her. The
plain admissions of the charges against them were the considerations taken into account by the petitioner school in their
decision not to renew the respondent spouses' employment contracts. This is a right of the school that is mandated by law and
jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a
mandate of the Constitution. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government
recognition. The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring
its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code.

A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during which the latter determines whether or
not he is qualified for permanent employment. The probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity
to observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become an efficient and
productive employee. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or
period, not its length. It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity.
The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year
probationary period. Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner, which were void of any specifics cannot be considered as
contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal correspondence among the said individuals. As such, petitioner
school has the right not to renew the contracts of the respondents, the old ones having been expired at the end of their terms.

6. Tamsons Enterprises Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 192881, November 16, 2011

Facts:

This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims filed by respondent Rosemarie L. Sy (Sy) before the
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, NLRC, against petitioners Tamson’s Enterprises, Inc. (Tamson’s), Nelson Lee (Lee), the
company President; and Lilibeth Ong (Ong) and Johnson Ng (Ng), her co-employees.

On September 1, 2006, Sy was hired by Tamson’s as Assistant to the President. Despite the title, she did not act as such because,
per instruction of Lee, she was directed to act as payroll officer, though she actually worked as a payroll clerk.
On February 24, 2007, four days before she completed her sixth month of working in Tamson’s, Ng, the Sales Project Manager,
called her to a meeting with him and Lee. During the meeting, they informed Sy that her services would be terminated due to
inefficiency. She was asked to sign a letter of resignation and quitclaim. She was told not to report for work anymore because her
services were no longer needed. On her last day of work, Ong humiliated her in front of her officemates by shouting at her and
preventing her from getting her personal things or any other document from the office.

During her pre-employment interview, Lee had nice comments about her good work experience and educational background.
She was assured of a long-term employment with benefits. Throughout her employment, she earnestly performed her duties,
had a perfect attendance record, worked even during brownouts and typhoons, and would often work overtime just to finish her
work.

Sy claimed that the remarks of her superiors about her alleged inefficiency were ill-motivated and made without any basis. She
had been rendering services for almost six (6) months before she was arbitrarily and summarily dismissed. Her dismissal was
highly suspicious as it took place barely four (4) days prior to the completion of her six-month probationary period. The
petitioners did not show her any evaluation or appraisal report regarding her alleged inefficient performance. As she was
terminated without an evaluation on her performance, she was deprived of the opportunity to be regularly part of the company
and to be entitled to the benefits and privileges of a regular employee. Worse, she was deprived of her only means of livelihood.

She further claimed was illegally terminated from service and insists that the petitioners cannot invoke her failure to qualify as
she was not informed of the standards or criteria which she should have met for regular employment. Moreover, no proof was
shown as to her alleged poor work performance. She was unceremoniously terminated to prevent her from becoming a regular
employee and be entitled to the benefits as such.

ISSUE: WON the termination of Sy, a probationary employee, was valid or not.

HELD:

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

The pertinent law governing the present case is Article 281 of the Labor Code which provides as follows:

Art. 281. Probationary employment. — Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee
started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee
who has been engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the constitutional protection
of security of tenure. This means they may only be terminated for a just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular
employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement.

Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known to the [employees] on probationary status at the
start of their probationary period, or xxx during which the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in
invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the [employer] should show – as a matter of due process – how
these standards have been applied.

For failure of the petitioners to support their claim of unsatisfactory performance by Sy, this Court shares the view of the CA that
Sy’s employment was unjustly terminated to prevent her from acquiring a regular status in circumvention of the law on security of
tenure. As the Court previously stated, this is a common and convenient practice of unscrupulous employers to circumvent the
law on security of tenure. Security of tenure, which is a right of paramount value guaranteed by the Constitution, should not be
denied to the workers by such a stratagem. The Court can not permit such a subterfuge, if it is to be true to the law and social
justice.

The law is clear that in all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards
under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the
employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. The standards under which she would qualify as a regular
employee not having been communicated to her at the start of her probationary period, Sy qualified as a regular employee. As
held by this Court in the very recent case of Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v. Villegas.

Being a regular employee whose termination was illegal, Sy is entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages granted
by the Labor Code. Article 279 provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to her full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to her other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time her compensation was withheld from her up to the time of actual
reinstatement. Likewise, having been compelled to come to court and to incur expenses to protect her rights and interests, the
award of attorney’s fees is in order.

7. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JAN CARLO GALA

Facts:

On March 2, 2006, respondent Jan Carlo Gala commenced employment with the petitioner Meralco Electric Company (Meralco)
as a probationary lineman. He was assigned at Meralco’s Valenzuela Sector. He initially served as member of the crew of
Meralco’s Truck No. 1823 supervised by Foreman Narciso Matis. After one month, he joined the crew of Truck No. 1837 under
the supervision of Foreman Raymundo Zuñiga, Sr.

On July 27, 2006, barely four months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical
supplies, particularly, for the incident which took place on May 25, 2006. On that day, Gala and other Meralco workers were
instructed to replace a worn-out electrical pole at the Pacheco Subdivision in Valenzuela City. Gala and the other linemen were
directed to join Truck No. 1891, under the supervision of Foreman Nemecio Hipolito.

When they arrived at the worksite, Gala and the other workers saw that Truck No. 1837, supervised by Zuñiga, was already there.
The linemen of Truck No. 1837 were already at work. Gala and the other members of the crew of Truck No. 1891 were
instructed to help in the digging of a hole for the pole to be installed.

While the Meralco crew was at work, one Noberto “Bing” Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, arrived. He appeared to be known to
the Meralco foremen as they were seen conversing with him. Llanes boarded the trucks, without being stopped, and took out
what were later found as electrical supplies. Aside from Gala, the foremen and the other linemen who were at the worksite when
the pilferage happened were later charged with misconduct and dishonesty for their involvement in the incident.

Unknown to Gala and the rest of the crew, a Meralco surveillance task force was monitoring their activities and recording
everything with a Sony video camera. The task force was composed of Joseph Aguilar, Ariel Dola and Frederick Riano.

Meralco called for an investigation of the incident and asked Gala to explain. Gala denied involvement in the pilferage,
contending that even if his superiors might have committed a wrongdoing, he had no participation in what they did. He claimed
that: (1) he was at some distance away from the trucks when the pilferage happened; (2) he did not have an inkling that an illegal
activity was taking place since his supervisors were conversing with Llanes, giving him the impression that they knew him; (3) he
did not call the attention of his superiors because he was not in a position to do so as he was a mere lineman; and (4) he was just
following instructions in connection with his work and had no control in the disposition of company supplies and materials. He
maintained that his mere presence at the scene of the incident was not sufficient to hold him liable as a conspirator.

Despite Gala’s explanation, Meralco proceeded with the investigation and eventually terminated his employment on July 27,
2006. Gala responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint against Meralco.

Issue: Whether or not Gala’s reinstatement despite his probationary status is proper.

Ruling: Yes, it is proper

We find merit in the petition.

Contrary to the conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, there is substantial evidence supporting Meralco’s position that Gala had
become unfit to continue his employment with the company. Gala was found, after an administrative investigation, to have failed
to meet the standards expected of him to become a regular employee and this failure was mainly due to his “undeniable
knowledge, if not participation, in the pilferage activities done by their group, all to the prejudice of the Company’s interests.”

Gala insists that he cannot be sanctioned for the theft of company property on May 25, 2006. He maintains that he had no direct
participation in the incident and that he was not aware that an illegal activity was going on as he was at some distance from the
trucks when the alleged theft was being committed. He adds that he did not call the attention of the foremen because he was a
mere lineman and he was focused on what he was doing at the time. He argues that in any event, his mere presence in the area
was not enough to make him a conspirator in the commission of the pilferage.

Gala misses the point. He forgets that as a probationary employee, his overall job performance and his behavior were being
monitored and measured in accordance with the standards (i.e., the terms and conditions) laid down in his probationary
employment agreement. Under paragraph 8 of the agreement, he was subject to strict compliance with, and non-violation of the
Company Code on Employee Discipline, Safety Code, rules and regulations and existing policies. Par. 10 required him to observe
at all times the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the performance of his duties and responsibilities,
free from any form of conflict or contradicting with his own personal interest.

The evidence on record established Gala’s presence in the worksite where the pilferage of company property happened. It also
established that it was not only on May 25, 2006 that Llanes, the pilferer, had been seen during a Meralco operation. He had
been previously noticed by Meralco employees, including Gala (based on his admission), [23] in past operations. If Gala had seen
Llanes in earlier projects or operations of the company, it is incredulous for him to say that he did not know why Llanes was there
or what Zuñiga and Llanes were talking about. To our mind, the Meralco crew (the foremen and the linemen) allowed or could
have even asked Llanes to be there during their operations for one and only purpose — to serve as their conduit for pilfered
company supplies to be sold to ready buyers outside Meralco worksites.

The familiarity of the Meralco crew with Llanes, a non-Meralco employee who had been present in Meralco field operations,
does not contradict at all but rather support the Meralco submission that there had been “reported pilferage” or “rampant
theft,” by the crew, of company property even before May 25, 2006. Gala downplays this particular point with the argument that
the labor arbiter made no such finding as she merely assumed it to be a fact, [24] her only “basis” being the statement that “may
natanggap na balita na ang mga crew na ito ay palagiang hindi nagsasauli ng mga electric facilities na kanilang ginagamit o
pinapalitan bagkus ito ay ibinenta palabas.” [25] Gala impugns the statement as hearsay. He also wonders why Meralco’s
supposed “video footage” of the incident on May 25, 2006 was never presented in evidence.

The established fact that Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, was often seen during company operations, conversing with the
foremen, for reason or reasons connected with the ongoing company operations, gives rise to the question: what was he doing
there? Apparently, he had been visiting Meralco worksites, at least in the Valenzuela Sector, not simply to socialize, but to do
something else. As testified to by witnesses, he was picking up unused supplies and materials that were not returned to the
company. From these factual premises, it is not hard to conclude that this activity was for the mutual pecuniary benefit of himself
and the crew who tolerated the practice. For one working at the scene who had seen or who had shown familiarity with Llanes (a
non-Meralco employee), not to have known the reason for his presence is to disregard the obvious, or at least the very
suspicious.

We consider, too, and we find credible the company submission that the Meralco crew who worked at the Pacheco Subdivision
in Valenzuela City on May 25, 2006 had not been returning unused supplies and materials, to the prejudice of the company.
From all these, the allegedly hearsay evidence that is not competent in judicial proceedings (as noted above), takes on special
meaning and relevance.

With respect to the video footage of the May 25, 2006 incident, Gala himself admitted that he viewed the tape during the
administrative investigation, particularly in connection with the accusation against him that he allowed Llanes (binatilyong may
kapansanan sa bibig) to board the Meralco trucks. [26] The choice of evidence belongs to a party and the mere fact that the
video was shown to Gala indicates that the video was not an evidence that Meralco was trying to suppress. Gala could have, if he
had wanted to, served a subpoena for the production of the video footage as evidence. The fact that he did not does not
strengthen his case nor weaken the case of Meralco.

On the whole, the totality of the circumstances obtaining in the case convinces us that Gala could not but have knowledge of the
pilferage of company electrical supplies on May 25, 2006; he was complicit in its commission, if not by direct participation,
certainly, by his inaction while it was being perpetrated and by not reporting the incident to company authorities. Thus, we find
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Gala does not deserve to remain in Meralco’s employ as a regular employee.
He violated his probationary employment agreement, especially the requirement for him “to observe at all times the highest
degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the performance of their duties and responsibilities[.]” [27] He failed to
qualify as a regular employee. [28]

For ignoring the evidence in this case, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and, in sustaining the NLRC, the CA
committed a reversible error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

8 & 9. Aliling v. Feliciano

G.R. No. 185829
April 25, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando Aliling (Aliling) on June 2,
2004 as “Account Executive (Seafreight Sales),” with a compensation package of a monthly salary of PhP 13,000, transportation
allowance of PhP 3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of living allowance of PhP 500, each payable on a per month basis
and a 14th month pay depending on the profitability and availability of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a
six (6)-month probation period condition with this express caveat: “Performance during probationary period shall be made as basis
for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status.”

On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under the terms of conversion to regular status shall be
determined on the basis of work performance; and employment services may, at any time, be terminated for just cause or in
accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.

However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express (GX), a new company product
launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon. Marketing this product and finding daily
contracts for it formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.

A month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed Aliling to express
dissatisfaction with the latter’s performance.

On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his resignation to San Mateo. While WWWEC took no action on his tender, Aliling
nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated October 1, 2004 to
management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.

On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services effective as of that date owing
to his “non-satisfactory performance” during his probationary period. Records show that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid
his outstanding salary.

However, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as
well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC.

On April 25, 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision declaring that the grounds upon which complainant’s dismissal was based did
not conform not only the standard but also the compliance required under Article 281 of the Labor Code, Necessarily,
complainant’s termination is not justified for failure to comply with the mandate the law requires. Respondents should be
ordered to pay salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract of employment and all other benefits amounting to
a total of P35,811.00 covering the period from October 6 to December 7, 2004.

Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. And sustained by the Court of
Appeals.

Case was elevated to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 Review on Certiorari Comment was made that WWWEC hired petitioner
on a probationary basis and fired him before he became a regular employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aliling is a regular employee.

RULING:
Petitioner is a regular employee

Petitioner Aliling, albeit hired from managements standpoint as a probationary employee, was deemed a regular employee by
force of the following self-explanatory provisions:

Article 281 of the Labor Code

ART. 281. Probationary employment. - Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months xxx The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause
or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the Labor Code

Sec. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the employee, upon
his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period where the employee determines his fitness to qualify for
regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:

xxxx

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the
standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no
standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Respondents further allege that San Mateos (Supervisor) email dated July 16, 2004 shows that the standards for his
regularization were made known to petitioner Aliling at the time of his engagement. To recall, in that email message, San
Mateoreminded Aliling of the sales quota he ought to meet as a condition for his continued employment, i.e., that the GX trucks
should already be 80% full by August 5, 2004. Contrary to respondents contention, San Mateos email cannot support their
allegation on Aliling being informed of the standards for his continued employment, such as the sales quota, at the time of his
engagement. As it were, the email message was sent to Aliling more than a month after he signed his employment contract with
WWWEC. The aforequoted Section 6 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the Code specifically requires the
employer to inform the probationary employee of such reasonable standards at the time of his engagement, not at any time later;
else, the latter shall be considered a regular employee. Thus, pursuant to the explicit provision of Article 281 of the Labor Code,
Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the Labor Code and settled jurisprudence, petitioner Aliling is
deemed a regular employee as of June 11, 2004, the date of his employment contract.

10. MYLENE CARVAJAL, Petitioner, vs. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK AND/OR OSCAR Z. RAMIREZ, Respondents.

FACTS:

Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon Development Bank (Bank) under a six-month probationary employment
contract. Ramirez is the President and CEO of the Bank. A month into her employment, she was send a Memorandum directing
her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for her eight tardiness on November 2003. A
second Memorandum was sent to her on January for her again chronic tardiness on December 2003. She submitted her written
explanations for both events and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions. She was terminated for three
days effective 21 January 2004. However, on 22 January, her termination was lifted but at the same time, her services were
terminated. In the respondents’ position paper to the LA, they explained that the reasons for her absence are chronic tardiness,
absenteeism and failure to perform satisfactorily as a probationary employee.

LA Decision: The petitioner was illegally dismissed because she was not afforded the notice in writing informing her of what the
Bank would like to bring out to her for the latter to answer in writing.
NLRC Decision: NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

CA Decision: The CA found that the petitioner was not entitled to backwages because she was rightfully dismissed for failure to
meet the employment standards.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be considered a regular employee at the time of her dismissal.

HELD:

No. Carvajal’s appointment letter reads that “Possible extension of this contract will depend on the job requirements of the Bank
and your overall performance. Performance review will be conducted before possible renewal can take effect.” Therefore,
petitioner knew, at the time of her engagement, that she must comply with the standards set forth by respondent and perform
satisfactorily in order to attain regular status. Even the NLRC upheld the petitoner’s probationary status, stating that
reinstatement is not synonymous to regularization.

Although probationary employees also enjoy security of tenure, he may still be terminated because of just and authorized causes
of termination and the additional ground under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e. the probationary employee may also be
terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance to the reasonable standards set by the
employer. Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector. This,
together with absenteeism, underperformance and mistake in clearing a check are infractions that cannot be tantamount to
satisfactory standards.

11. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, petitioners, vs. APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V.
ALMONTE, and JOSEPH H. SAGUN, respondents.

FACTS:

Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other
money claims as well as damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta
for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they
were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as
regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also
claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.

The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine out of the twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the
decision to the NLRC which reversed the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They moved for
reconsideration but this was denied. They then brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and the
three others were illegally dismiised.

The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and
second apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004 then he entered into his
first apprenticeship agreement with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second apprenticeship agreement
was from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004. However, the CA found the apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were
executed in violation of the law and the rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements.

Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary and
desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business. Sebolino and the three others were,
therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three others were illegally dismissed.

HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious.

LABOR LAW - Illegal dismissals

The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in affirming the labor arbiters ruling, as it applies
toCostales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1)
they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were
invalid.

The following considerations support the CA ruling.

Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering
service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the
respondents status through relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for
December 2003 which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12,
2005 cited by the CA.

The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against
these documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the said documents
sufficientto establish the employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.

The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo
apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are
concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator,
scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article
280 of the Labor Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the
opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.

Therefore, the Petition is DENIED.

12. GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (PHILS.), INC.

Fact:
Manufacturers Life Insurance, Co. is a domestic corporation engaged in life insurance business. De Dios was its President and
Chief Executive Officer. Petitioner Tongko started his relationship with Manulife in 1977 by virtue of a Career Agent's Agreement.

Pertinent provisions of the agreement state that:

It is understood and agreed that the Agent is an independent contractor and nothing contained herein shall be construed or
interpreted as creating an employer-employee relationship between the Company and the Agent.

a) The Agent shall canvass for applications for Life Insurance, Annuities, Group policies and other products offered by the
Company, and collect, in exchange for provisional receipts issued by the Agent, money due or to become due to the Company in
respect of applications or policies obtained by or through the Agent or from policyholders allotted by the Company to the Agent
for servicing, subject to subsequent confirmation of receipt of payment by the Company as evidenced by an Official Receipt
issued by the Company directly to the policyholder.

b) The Company may terminate this Agreement for any breach or violation of any of the provisions hereof by the Agent by giving
written notice to the Agent within fifteen (15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach. No waiver, extinguishment,
abandonment, withdrawal or cancellation of the right to terminate this Agreement by the Company shall be construed for any
previous failure to exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement.

c) Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his Agreement at any time without cause, by giving to the other party
fifteen (15) days notice in writing.

Sometime in 2001, De Dios addressed a letter to Tongko, then one of the Metro North Managers, regarding meetings wherein De
Dios found Tongko's views and comments to be unaligned with the directions the company was taking. De Dios also expressed
his concern regarding the Metro North Managers' interpretation of the company's goals. He maintains that Tongko's allegations
are unfounded. Some allegations state that some Managers are unhappy with their earnings, that they're earning less than what
they deserve and that these are the reasons why Tonko's division is unable to meet agency development objectives. However,
not a single Manager came forth to confirm these allegations. Finally, De Dios related his worries about Tongko's inability to push
for company development and growth.

De Dios subsequently sent Tongko a letter of termination in accordance with Tongko's Agents Contract. Tongko filed a complaint
with the NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissal, alleging that he had an employer-employee relationship with De Dios instead
of a revocable agency by pointing out that the latter exercised control over him through directives regarding how to manage his
area of responsibility and setting objectives for him relating to the business. Tongko also claimed that his dismissal was without
basis and he was not afforded due process. The NLRC ruled that there was an employer-employee relationship as evidenced by
De Dios's letter which contained the manner and means by which Tongko should do his work. The NLRC ruled in favor of Tongko,
affirming the existence of the employer-employee relationship.

The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the NLRC's ruling. It applied the four-fold test for determining control and found the
elements in this case to be lacking, basing its decision on the same facts used by the NLRC. It found that Manulife did not exert
control over Tongko, there was no employer-employee relationship and thus the NLRC did not have jurisdiction over the case.

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and ruled in favor of Tongko. However, the Supreme Court issued
another Resolution dated June 29, 2010, reversing its decision. Tongko filed a motion for reconsideration, which is now the
subject of the instant case.

ISSUE: Did the Supreme Court err in issuing the June 29, 2010 resolution, reversing its earlier decision that an employer-employee
relationship existed?

HELD:

The Supreme Court finds no reason to reverse the June 29, 2010 decision. Control over the performance of the task of one
providing service both with respect to the means and manner, and the results of the service is the primary element in
determining whether an employment relationship exists. The Supreme Court ruled petitioners Motion against his favor since he
failed to show that the control Manulife exercised over him was the control required to exist in an employer-employee
relationship; Manulifes control fell short of this norm and carried only the characteristic of the relationship between an insurance
company and its agents, as defined by the Insurance Code and by the law of agency under the Civil Code.

In the Supreme Courts June 29, 2010 Resolution, they noted that there are built-in elements of control specific to an insurance
agency, which do not amount to the elements of control that characterize an employment relationship governed by the Labor
Code.The Insurance Code provides definite parameters in the way an agent negotiates for the sale of the companys insurance
products, his collection activities and his delivery of the insurance contract or policy. They do not reach the level of control into
the means and manner of doing an assigned task that invariably characterizes an employment relationship as defined by labor
law.

To reiterate, guidelines indicative of labor law "control" do not merely relate to the mutually desirable result intended by the
contractual relationship; they must have the nature of dictating the means and methods to be employed in attaining the result.
Tested by this norm, Manulifes instructions regarding the objectives and sales targets, in connection with the training and
engagement of other agents, are among the directives that the principal may impose on the agent to achieve the assigned
tasks.They are targeted results that Manulife wishes to attain through its agents. Manulifes codes of conduct, likewise, do not
necessarily intrude into the insurance agents means and manner of conducting their sales. Codes of conduct are norms or
standards of behavior rather than employer directives into how specific tasks are to be done.

In sum, the Supreme Court found absolutely no evidence of labor law control.

B. CASUAL
13. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF DIRECTORS and REYNALDO P. MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed against the Respondent for allegedly confronting, badmouthing and shouting
invectives at Mr. Guemo, in the presence of other employees and seeking assistance from the PSCO. The PCSO Board of Directors
found her guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties and grave misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal
from service.

On appeal with the CSC, the Commission dismissed the respondent’s appeal for being moot and academic. Moreover, they ruled
that the respondent is a casual employee which means that she is not entitled to security of tenure. However, the CA reversed
the decision of the Commission by reinstating the respondent in the service until the expiration of her casual employment.

ISSUE: Did the CA gravely err in granting the respondent’s petition, in effect, reversing the CSC’s resolutions.

HELD: A new ruling recognizes that casual employees are covered by the security of tenure and cannot be terminated within the
period of his employment except for cause. Despite this new ruling, it is not the intention of the Court to make the status of a
casual employee at par with that of a regular employee, who enjoys permanence of employment. The rule is still that casual
employment will cease automatically at the end of the period unless renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment.
Casual employees may also be terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or qualifications. Thus, they may be laid-
off anytime before the expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs:(1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance
are below par.

Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes
other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry
a penalty affecting their rights and future employment in the government.

In the case at bench, the CSC itself found that Lapid was denied due process as she was never formally charged with the
administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from
the service. To somehow remedy the situation, the petitioners mentioned in their Memorandum before the CA that there was no
reason anymore to pursue the administrative charge against Lapid and to investigate further as this was superseded by
Memorandum dated September 14, 2005 recommending the termination of respondent Lapid’s casual employment. They
pointed out that this was precisely the reason why no Formal Charge was issued. Clearly, the action of petitioners clearly violated
Lapid’s basic rights as a casual employee.

Therefore, the petition is denied and the respondent is allowed to continue rendering services as teller of PCSO and is also
entitled to payment of backwages.

DENIED.

C. PROJECT

14. Exodus International Construction Corporation, et al. v. Guillermo Biscocho

Facts: Exodus International Construction Corporation (Exodus) is a duly licensed labor contractor for the painting of residential
houses, condominium units and commercial buildings. Exodus obtained from Dutch Boy Philippines, Inc. (Dutch Boy) a contractor
for the painting of the Imperial Sky Garden located at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila. Dutch Boy awarded another contract to
Exodus for the painting of Pacific Plaza Towers in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. Exodus hired Guillermo Biscocho, Fernando Pereda,
Ferdinand Mariano and were assigned at the Imperial Sky Gaden Gregorio Bellita was assigned to work at the house of Mr.
Teofilo Yap in Ayala Alabang, and Miguel, who, together with the four, was assigned in Pacific Plaza Towers.
Later, the five filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay
and night-shift differential. Exodus denied the allegations and contended that Gregorio absented himself from work and applied
as a painter with SAEI-EEI which is the general building contractor of Pacific Plaza Towers. Since then, he never reported back to
work; Guillermo absented himself from work without leave.

When he reported for work the following day, he was reprimanded for being AWOL, and thereafter was unheard of until the
filing of the instant complaint; and Fernando, Ferdinand, and Miguel were caught eating during working hours for which they
were reprimanded. Since then the no longer reported to work.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating petitioners from the charge of illegal dismissal as respondents chose not to
report for work but ordered the reinstatement of the latter. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter dismissed the appeal. A petition
for certiorari was filed before CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Hence,
the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent are non-project employees?

Ruling:
There are two types of employees in the construction industry. The first is referred to as project employees or those employed in
connection with a particular construction project or phase thereof and such employment is coterminous with each project or
phase of the project which they are assigned. The second is known as non-project employees or those employed without
reference to any particular construction project or phase of a project. The second category is where respondent are classified. As
such they are regular employees of petitioner. It is clear from the records of the case that when one project is completed,
respondents were automatically transferred to the next project awarded to petitioners. There was no employment agreement
given to respondent which clearly spelled out the duration of their employment, the specific work to be performed and that such
is made clear to them at the time of hiring. It is now too late for petitioners to claim that respondents are project employees
whose employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which they are assigned.

Nonetheless, assuming that respondents were initially hired as project employees, petitioners must be reminded of our ruling
in Maraguinot, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission[28] that [a] project employee x x x may acquire the status of a regular
employee when the following [factors] concur:

1. There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project; and

2. The tasks performed by the alleged project employee are vital, necessary and indespensable to the usual business
or trade of the employer.

In this case, the evidence on record shows that respondents were employed and assigned continuously to the various projects of
petitioners. As painters, they performed activities which were necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioners, who
are engaged in subcontracting jobs for painting of residential units, condominium and commercial buildings. As regular
employees, respondents are entitled to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights.

15. D.M. Consunji v. Jamin

G.R. No. 192514: April 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), a construction company, hired respondent Estelito L. Jamin as a laborer. Sometime in 1975,
Jamin became a helper carpenter. Since his initial hiring, Jamins employment contract had been renewed a number of times. On
March 20, 1999, his work at DMCI was terminated due to the completion of the SM Manila project. This termination marked the
end of his employment with DMCI as he was not rehired again.

Jamin filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal, with several money claims (including attorneys fees), against DMCI and its
President/General Manager, David M. Consunji. Jamin alleged that DMCI terminated his employment without a just and
authorized cause at a time when he was already 55 years old and had no independent source of livelihood. He claimed that he
rendered service to DMCI continuously for almost 31 years.

DMCI denied liability. It argued that it hired Jamin on a project-to-project basis, from the start of his engagement in 1968 until
the completion of its SM Manila project on March 20, 1999 where Jamin last worked. With the completion of the project, it
terminated Jamins employment.

The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. On further appeal, the CA
reversed the NLRC decision and ruled that Jamin was a regular employee. Hence, DMCI seeks a reversal of the CA rulings on the
ground that the appellate court committed a grave error in annulling the decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jamin is a regular employee

HELD: Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.

Once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same employer
for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of
the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.

While the contracts indeed show that Jamin had been engaged as a project employee, there was an almost unbroken string of
Jamins rehiring from December 17, 1968 up to the termination of his employment on March 20, 1999. While the history of
Jamins employment (schedule of projects) relied upon by DMCI shows a gap of almost four years in his employment for the
period between July 28, 1980 (the supposed completion date of the Midtown Plaza project) and June 13, 1984 (the start of the
IRRI Dorm IV project), the gap was caused by the companys omission of the three projects above mentioned.

To reiterate, Jamins employment history with DMCI stands out for his continuous, repeated and successive rehiring in the
companys construction projects. In all the 38 projects where DMCI engaged Jamins services, the tasks he performed as a
carpenter were indisputably necessary and desirable in DMCIs construction business. He might not have been a member of a
work pool as DMCI insisted that it does not maintain a work pool, but his continuous rehiring and the nature of his work
unmistakably made him a regular employee.

Further, as we stressed in Liganza, respondent capitalizes on our ruling in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. NLRC which reiterates the rule
that the length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of employment tenure but whether or not the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee."

"Surely, length of time is not the controlling test for project employment. Nevertheless, it is vital in determining if the employee
was hired fora specific undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer. Here, private respondent had been a project employee several times over. His employment ceased to be
coterminous with specific projects when he was repeatedly re-hired due to the demands of petitioners business.Without doubt,
Jamins case fits squarely into the employment situation just quoted.

PETITION DENIED

D. SEASONAL

16. UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION & CABATI vs ACIBO, ET AL.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari after the CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling finding the herein respondents, who were
hired on various dates and on different capacities, to be regular employees of URSUMCO, a domestic corporation engaged in the
sugarcane milling business. However, herein petitioners argued that the legal standards – length of the employee’s engagement
and the desirability or necessity of the employee’s work in the usual trade or business of the employer – apply only to regular
employees under paragraph 1, Article 280 of the Labor Code, and, under paragraph 2 of the same article, to casual employees
who are deemed regular by their length of service.
Issue: What is the status of the respondents’ employment?

Ruling: The respondents are regular seasonal employees of URSUMCO for the following reasons: 1. They were tasked to
perform duties regularly and habitually needed in URSUMCO’s operations during the milling season; 2. They were regularly and
repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks year after year; and 3. Petitioners assert that the respondents were free to work
elsewhere during the off- season, and there is no evidence on record showing that after the completion of their tasks at
URSUMCO, the respondents sought and obtained employment elsewhere.
Article 280 of the Labor Code provides for three kinds of employment arrangements, namely: regular, project/seasonal and
casual. Regular employment emphasizes on the necessity or desirability of the employee’s activity. A project employment, on the
other hand, is legally and automatically terminated upon the end or completion of the project as the employee’s services are
coterminous with the project. But, the continuous rehiring of the employee even after the cessation of the project may serve as a
badge of regular employment when the activities performed by the purported "project" employee are necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Under the seasonal employment, the employee must be
performing work or services that are seasonal in nature; and an employee had been employed for the duration of the season.
Hence, when the "seasonal" workers are continuously and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or activities for several
seasons or even after the cessation of the season, this length of time may likewise serve as badge of regular employment. In fact,
even though denominated as "seasonal workers," if these workers are called to work from time to time and are only temporarily
laid off during the off-season, the law does not consider them separated from the service during the off-season period. The law
simply considers these seasonal workers on leave until re-employed. Casual employment, the third kind of employment
arrangement, refers to any other employment arrangement that does not fall under any of the first two categories, i.e., regular
or project/seasonal.
Therefore, the nature of the employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for
hiring and the manner of designating the employee. Rather, the nature of the employment depends on the nature of the
activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the employer’s business, the duration and scope to be
done, and, in some cases, even the length of time of the performance and its continued existence.

D. OTHER CLASSIFICATION

1. Construction Industries (Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993)

2. TV and Radio Broadcasting Industries

17. Sonza v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 138051, 431 SCRA 583, June, 10, 2004

FACTS: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation (MJMDC).
Referred as “agent” in the Agreement, MJMDC agreed to provide Jose “Jay” Sonza’s services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for
radio and television. ABS-CBN engaged SONZA’s services to co-host its television and radio programs because of SONZA’s peculiar
skills, talent and celebrity status. ABS-CBN agreed to pay for SONZA’s services a monthly talent fee of P310000 for the first year
and P317000 for the second and third year of the Agreement. However, SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before DOLE
since ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries and several other employment benefits. Soon after, ABS-CBN moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and that Sonza was an
independent contractor.

ISSUE: is SONZA an independent contractor?

DECISION: YES. SONZA is merely an independent contractor. Sonza was hired by ABS-CBN due to his "unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees," a circumstance that was indicative of an independent contractual
relationship. Moreover, the power to bargain talent fees way above the salary scales of ordinary employees is a circumstance
indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. SONZA’s talent fees, amounting to P317000 monthly in
the second and third year, are so huge and out of the ordinary that they indicate more an independent contractual relationship
rather than an employer-employee relationship. Applying the control test to the present case, SONZA is not an employee but an
independent contractor. The less control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor.
Even though ABS-CBN provided SONZA with the place of work and the necessary equipment, SONZA was still an independent
contractor since ABS-CBN did not supervise and control his work. Furthermore, a radio broadcast specialist who works under
minimal supervision is an independent contractor.

3. Hospitals
18. UERMMMC-RDU VS. LAGUESMA GR NOS. 125425-26

Facts: The resident physicians formed a union called the UERMMC-Resident Doctors Union and filed the petition for certification
so that it will be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the resident physicians in the hospital for purposes of
collective bargaining. The petition for certification was dismissed by the Undersecretary, acting under the authority of the
Secretary of Labor, on the ground that there exist no employer-employee relationship between the resident doctors and the
hospital. Issue:

Issue: WON resident doctors are employees of the hospital.

Held: The resident doctors are not employees of the hospital. It is clear that physicians undergo residency training in order to
hone their skills and develop or improve their knowledge in a specialized medical field or discipline. Hence, residency is basically
and simply a continuation of their medical course. However, they are not required or mandated under any law to further
undergo a residence training program. Having passed the medical board examinations, they are already licensed physicians and
could very well engage in the general practice of medicine. It is for the practice of highly specialized medical disciplines which
necessitates further on-the-job training thereon. Viewed from this perspective, residency training clearly amounts to a pursuit of
further education on a specific discipline. Thus, the relationship between the teaching/training hospital and the resident doctor is
not one of employer-employee. The training/teaching hospital may simply be likened to a medical school/university, but in this
instance, the emphasis is on the practical application and training of its students, the resident doctors.

19. UERMMMC-RDU vs. the Hon. Undersecretary of Labor, Bienvenido Laguesma, et.al. G.R. Nos. 125425-26, December 24, 1993

FACTS: The resident physicians formed a union called the UERMMMC-Resident Doctors Union and filed the petition for
certification so that it will be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the resident physicians in the hospital for
purposes of collective bargaining. The petition for certification was dismissed by the Undersecretary, acting under the authority
of the Secretary of Labor, on the ground that there exist no employer-employee relationship between the resident doctors and
the hospital.

ISSUE: Are the resident doctors considered employees of the hospital?

DECISION: NO. The resident doctors are not employees of the hospital. It is clear that physicians undergo residency training in
order to hone their skills and develop or improve their knowledge in a specialized medical field or discipline. Hence, residency is
merely a continuation of their medical course. However, they are not required or mandated under any law to further undergo a
residence training program. Having passed the medical board examinations, they are already licensed physicians and could very
well engage in the general practice of medicine. It is for the practice of highly specialized medical disciplines which necessitates
further on-the-job training thereon. Viewed from this perspective, residency training clearly amounts to a pursuit of further
education on a specific discipline. Thus, the relationship between the teaching/training hospital and the resident doctor is not
one of employer-employee. The training/teaching hospital may simply be likened to a medical school/university, but in this
instance, the emphasis is on the practical application and training of its students, the resident doctors.

20. Calamba Medical Center, Inc. vs. NLRC, GR No. 176484

FACTS: The Calamba Medical Center engaged the services of Ronaldo Lanzanas (Dr. Lanzanas) and Merceditha Lanzanas (Dr.
Merceditha) as one of its team of resident physicians. The hospital required them to report twice a week on 24-hour shifts but
they are allowed to practice their profession elsewhere the rest of the week. Aside from their P4800 monthly retainer, they were
also entitled a percentage share out of the fees charged by the hospital on its patients. The hospital even enrolled them under
the Social Security System (SSS). The controversy began when Dr. Raul Desipeda, the medical director of the hospital, placed Dr.
Lanzanas under a 30-day preventive suspension for committing acts inimical to the interest of the hospital. The hospital later
terminated Dr. Lanzanas due to his alleged participation in union activities and failure to observe the return-to-work order issued
by the Secretary of DOLE. Dr. Lanzanas then filed complaint for illegal dismissal. The hospital, however, denies the existence of an
employer-employee relationship since the resident physicians are free to practice their profession elsewhere the rest of the
week despite the twice-a-week reporting arrangement.

ISSUE: Are the resident physicians considered employees of the hospital?

DECISION: YES. Under Section 15, Rule X of Book III of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, an employer-employee
relationship exists between the resident physicians and the training hospitals, unless there is a training agreement between
them, and the training program is duly accredited or approved by the appropriate government agency. In respondents' case,
they were not undergoing any specialization training. Hence, they were considered non-training general practitioners assigned at
the emergency rooms and ward sections.

21. Ramos v. CA, GR No. 124354

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old woman, was normal except for her experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of
stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The result in the examinations she underwent
indicate that she was fit for the operation.

Dr. Hosaka, one of the defendants, advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get a
good anesthesiologist, namely Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez.

On the day of the operation, Dr. Hosaka arrived late. Herminda, Erlinda’s sister-in-law, saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient
and saw a bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. Dr. Hosaka issue an order to place the patient in trendelenburg
position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the
brain.

Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.

Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka and the hospital guilty
and ordered them to be solidarily liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. MR was also denied. Hence,
the petition for certiorari was filed.

As a defense on their part, the hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition because Dr. Hosaka and Dr.
Gutierrez are “consultants” which are not technically employees of the hospital.

ISSUE: WHETHER AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXIST BETWEEN A “CONSULTANT”, ATTENDING AND VISITING, AND THE
HOSPITAL?

RULING:

Yes. Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultants” staff. The control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.

The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found under Art. 2180 of the CC
which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas.

22. PSI v. CA, GR. NO. 126297

FACTS:

 April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement
and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.
 April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
 Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy.
 After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about the excruciating pain in her anal
region. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist.
 May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer.
 August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her
house and extracted by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
 When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal fistula forcign her
stool to excrete through the vagina.
 October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage

ISSUE: W/N DR. AMPIL, attending physician, is an employee of PSI?

RULING:

Yes.

(a) RAMOS v. CA ruling

(b) Doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel

PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or
accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it "is now
estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public
to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence."

(c) Doctrine of Corporate Responsibility

PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene of the count nurse.
Such failure established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. It is worthy to note that
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident
doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or
constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of
gauze were missing.