Soriano vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 165594.

April 23, 2007]

Facts: Soriano and others were employed by PLDT in 1980 as Switchman Helpers in its Tondo Exchange Office. After participating in several trainings and seminars,
some were promoted as Switchmen and Frame man respectively. In 1995, PLDT implemented a company-wide redundancy program. PLDT, through a letter,
informed them that they will be terminated due to redundancy. They sued for illegal dismissal.
Issues: 1. Was the dismissal valid? 2. Does acceptance of separation benefits amount to a waiver of the right to question the validity of dismissal?
Held: 1) The documentary evidence submitted constitute substantial evidence to support the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner’s
employment was terminated by PLDT due to a valid or legal redundancy program since substantial evidence merely refers to that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Redundancy exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may
be the outcome of a number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity
previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
2) Generally, deeds of release, waiver or quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the
legality of their dismissal since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. Where, however, the person making
the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.
The requisites for a valid quitclaim are: 1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; 2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible
and reasonable; and 3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It cannot be gainfully said that the petitioner did not fully understand the consequences of signing the “Receipt, Release, and Quitclaim” dated
15 August 1996. Petitioner is not an illiterate person who needs special protection. He held responsible positions in the office of the respondent PLDT and had
attended and passed various training courses for his position.

Magnolia Dairy Products Corporation vs. NLRC and Jenny Calibo, G.R. No. 114952, January 29, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Magnolia Dairy Products Corporation, a division of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), entered into a contract of service with Skillpower, Inc., which
is engaged in the business of offering and providing manpower services to the public. In 1983, Skillpower, Inc., assigned Jenny A. Calibo to petitioner’s Tetra Paster
Division. She was tasked with the removal, replacement and disposal of damaged goods and re-pasting of the dilapidated cartons. When Magnolia’s contract with
Skillpower expired, Calibo applied with Lippercon Manpower Services. In July 1987, Lippercon assigned her to Magnolia’s Tetra Paster Division as a cleaning aide.
In December 1987, Calibo was terminated from service due to Magnolia’s installation of automated machines. Two years later, Calibo instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Magnolia. Magnolia averred that the dismissal was prompted by the installation of labor saving devices - an authorized cause for dismissal
under the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the installation of labor saving devices was a valid ground for the termination of Calibo’s employment.
Meanwhile, NLRC modified the decision by directing Calibo’s reinstatement and payment of backwages not exceeding three (3) years. Magnolia asseverates that
Calibo was not illegally dismissed since the termination of her employment was due to a cause expressly authorized by the Labor Code and the absence of notice
did not make it so. Petitioner asserts its claim that Calibo is only entitled to an indemnity of P1000.00, but not backwages.
ISSUE:
1. Was Calibo’s termination illegal?
2. Did Magnolia failed to comply with the 30-day prior notice rule?
 3. Was the NLRC’s grant of backwages and order of reinstatement tenable?
DECISION: NO. The law authorizes an employer, like Magnolia, to terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. The
installation of these devices is a management prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with its exercise in the absence of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
or maliciousness on the part of management, as in this case.
However, Magnolia failed to comply with the required written notice to the employee and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month
before the intended date of termination, which is required under Article 283 of the Labor Code. This procedure enables an employee to contest the reality or good
faith character of the asserted ground for the termination of his services before the DOLE. The failure of petitioner to serve the written notice to private respondent
and to the DOLE, however, does not ipso facto make Calibo’s termination from service illegal so as to entitle her to reinstatement and payment of backwages.
Moreover, the grant of backwages and order of reinstatement by the NLRC was not proper because it is proper only for an illegally dismissed employee which is
obviously not the situation in this case. The appropriate award is separation pay pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code which explicitly provides that an
employee removed from service due to the installation of labor saving devices is entitled to separation pay.
REDUNDANCY; CONCEPT
Redundancy in an employer’s personnel force does not necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same
position that private respondent held prior to the termination of his services, does not show that his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well
organized business enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. We believe that
redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of
the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors,
such as over hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken
by the enterprise. The characterization of an employee’s services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of
business judgment on the part of the employer, and that the wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review.
However, such characterization may be rejected if the same is found to be in violation of law or is arbitrary or malicious.

Asian Alcohol v NLRC GR 131108 March 25, 1999

FACTS
The Parsons family who owned controlling stocks in Asian Alcohol Corporation suffered major business losses prompting it to sell the corporation to Prior Holding
which took over its management and operation. Prior Holding implemented re-organizational plan and other cost-saving measures for the company. As a result
117 employees were separated. Of 72 of them occupied redundant positions, 21 were held by union members and 51 by non-union members. 6 private
respondents were members of the union whose positions were abolished due to redundancy. Private respondents Carias, Martines, and Sendon were water pump
tenders, Amacio was a machine shop mechanic, Verayo was plant operator while Tormo was a plant helper under him. They received individual notices of
termination; were paid the equivalent of one month salary for every year of service as separation pay. The money value of their unused sick vacation, emergency,
and seniority leave credits, 13th month pay, medicine allowance, tax refunds and good will cash bonuses for those with at least 10 years of service. All of them
executed sworn releases, waivers and quitclaims. Private respondents filed with the NLRC complaints for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement and
backwages. Moral damages and attorney’s fees. They alleged that Asian Alcohol used the retrenchment to dismiss them because they were members of the union.
They also alleged that Asian Alcohol was not bankrupt as it has engaged in aggressive scheme in contractual hiring.
Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaint. The dismissal of the respondents on the ground of redundancy/retrenchment is valid or legal. The fact that the Asian
Alcohol incurred losses in its business operations was not seriously challenged by the complainants. The facts of business losses incurred in its business operations
prior to the implementation of the retrenchment program was sufficiently supported by documents indicating a deficit of 26, 117,889.
NLRC: Revered. Illegal dismissal. The positions of the respondents were not redundant because casuals replaced them. The company was not in the state of
reverses at the time of retrenchment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid retrenchment thus making the dismissal of private respondents illegal.
RULING:
There was a valid dismissal. The right of management to dismiss workers during periods of business recession and to install labor saving devices to prevent losses
is governed by Art. 283 (Please see Art 283 of Labor Code) Under the said provision, retrenchment and redundancy are just cause for the employer to terminate
the services to preserve the viability of the business. In exercising its right, however management must faithfully comply with the substantive and procedural
requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. The requirements for a valid retrenchment which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence are (1) the
retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business loses which, if already incurred are not merely diminish but substantial, serious, actual and
real or if only expected are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively in good faith by the emploter (2) that the employer served written notice both the
employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. (3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay
equivalent to one month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. (4) that the employer exercise its prerogative to retrench
employees in good faith for the (5) that the employers used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retained among the employees.
An important requirement would also to state the condition of the business losses. This is normally shown by audited financial documents like yearly balance
sheets and profit and loss statements as well as annual income tax return. In the case at bar, private respondents never contested the veracity of the audited
financial documents proferred by Asian Alcohol before the LA. Documents show that the petitioner has an accumulated losses amounting to 306, 764, 349
In rejecting the petitioner’s claim the NLRC stated that the alleged deficits of the corporation did not prove anything for the petitioner since they were incurred
before the take over of Prior Holdings. Under Art 283 of the Labor Code, retrenchment to prevent losesse means that retrenchment must be undertaken by the
employer before loses are actually sustained. The employer need not keep his employees until after loses shall materialize.
The law gives the new management every right to undertake measures to save the company from bankruptcy. In this case, when Prior Land bought the corporation
and took over the management of it there were no signs that the loses would end, hence Prior land undertook re-organizational plan which retrenched number
of employees because ultimately they will absorb all the loses that the prior corporation incurred.
In the issue of redundancy, when the service capability of work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands on the enterprise. Under this
condition the employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than necessary for the operation of its business. For the implementation of
redundancy program to be valid it must (1) written notice served on both the employees and the DOLE (2) payment of separation pay at least one month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher, (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions
are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.
In this case, when the company made introduction of the services of an independent contractor it was justified when the latter is undertaken in order to effectuate
more economic and sufficient methods of production. Respondent failed to prove that company acted in malicious or arbitrary manner to operate the Laura wells.
PEÑAFRANCIA TOURS AND TRAVEL TRANSPORT, INC. VS. JOSELITO P. SARMIENTO AND RICARDO S. CATIMBANG (G.R. NO. 17897, 20 OCTOBER 2010)
DOCTRINE: RE SALE OF COMPANY DONE IN BAD FAITH WILL NOT FREE EMPLOYER FROM LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEE
FACTS:
Bus drivers Respondents ABC and DEF were told by their employer Petitioner XYZ that the company is now sold to RST. Respondents were given separation pay
and other benefits. Later, respondents learned that it was still XYZ operating the company. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
the case. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed NLRC Decision. XYZ filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Was there illegal dismissal.
RULING:
Yes, there was illegal dismissal. The alleged sale or transfer of ownership was done in bad faith. The sale or disposition must be motivated by good faith as a
condition for exemption from liability.[1][21]Thus, where the change of ownership is done in bad faith, or is used to defeat the rights of labor, the successor-employer
is deemed to have absorbed the employees and is held liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor.
The verbatim ruling of the SC follows:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there is a complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the
doors of the establishment, usually due to financial losses. Closure of business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent further
financial drain upon an employer who can no longer pay his employees since business has already stopped.[2][19]
Closure or cessation of operation of the establishment is an authorized cause for terminating an employee, as provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
On this ground, petitioner terminated the employment of respondents. However, what petitioner apparently made was a transfer of ownership. It is true that, as
invoked by petitioner, in Manlimos, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,[3][20] we held that a change of ownership in a business concern is not proscribed by law. Lest petitioner
forget, however, we also held therein that the sale or disposition must be motivated by good faith as a condition for exemption from liability.[4][21] Thus, where the
charge of ownership is done in bad faith, or is used to defeat the rights of labor, the successor-employer is deemed to have absorbed the employees and is held
liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor.[5][22]
But, in this case, there is no successor-employer because there was no actual change of ownership. We sustain the uniform factual finding of both the NLRC and
the CA that no actual sale transpired and, as such, there is no closure or cessation of business that can serve as an authorized cause for the dismissal of respondents.
Notable in this regard are the following observations of the CA:
Petitioner PTTTI sent notices of termination to private respondents Sarmiento and Catimbang on the alleged ground that it would cease operations effective
30 October 2002 due to business reverses and it would eventually sell the same to another company. (Id. at p. 77) However, the records explicitly show that it
(PTTTI) failed to establish its allegation that it was suffering from business reverses. Neither was there proof that indeed a sale was made and executed on 01
October 2002 involving the company’s assets in favor of ALPS Transportation owned by the Perez family. It did not present any documentary evidence to support
its claim that it sold the same to ALPS Transportation. On the contrary, it (PTTTI) continuously operates under the same name, franchises and routes and under
the same circumstances as before the alleged sale. It (PTTTI) tried to convince us that it is under a new management, by presenting series of memoranda where
the signatory thereon is Edelberto E. Perez, VP-Finance/Operations (Id. at pp. 78-83). To us, the series of memoranda do not conclusively show that there had
been a sale in favor of ALPS Transportation. And considering that there was no sale which transpired, we also find no basis for the rescission thereof. The letter
dated 19 March 2003 addressed to its employees, informing the latter that it had rescinded its sale to ALPS Transportation and thus, there is a change of
management, ownership and operation of the company and it (PTTTI) is intending to sell the company to Southern Comfort Bus Co., Inc. headed by Mr. Willy D.
Deterala (Id. at p. 89) could not convince us that there was actually a rescission of sale. If indeed there was sale and a consequent rescission thereof which
transpired, why is it that the ALPS Transportation did not give much a fight when the contract of sale was unilaterally rescinded by Bonifacio Cu who signed as
President/General Manager of petitioner PTTTI in a letter dated 28 February 2003. It is quite unconceivable for a company like ALPS Transportation which had
already parted a considerable sum not to question the rescission undertaken by petitioner PTTTI. This only confirms the public respondent NLRC’s finding, that
the sale was indeed a sham, designed to circumvent the law on the rights of the workers. There is thus, no basis for us to believe that there was a consequent
rescission of the alleged sale made by petitioner PTTTI in favor of ALPS Transportation.
Corollarily, we opine that the alleged second sale made by petitioner PTTTI, this time in favor of Southern Comfort Bus Co., Inc. represented by one Willy D.
Deter[a]la is also simulated considering that the ten million pesos consideration is unbelievably too small for thirty five (35) aircon buses including its franchise
and facilities thereon. It is quite an illogical move for the company to have allegedly rescinded the previous sale involving a higher consideration of sixty million
pesos (P60,000,000.00) made in favor of ALPS Transportation and to resell the same, this time just for a measly amount of ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00). Additionally, the observation of private respondents Sarmiento and Catimbang is quite impressive when they claimed that the Southern Comfort
Bus Co., Inc., presided by one Willy D. Deterala is a dummy corporation since it has not operated any single bus under its name, even prior to the sale and up to
the present. In fact, its principal business office at No. 4 Cathedral St., Ateneo Avenue 4400 Naga City is not even known. Suffice it to stress, these private
respondents’ allegations/observations have not at all been refuted nor controverted by petitioner PTTTI.[6][23]
It is likewise evident that, even in the petition before this Court, Bonifacio Bryan Cu signed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[7][24] and
Antonio Cu signed the Secretary’s Certificate.[8][25] The fact remains that the Cu family continues to operate petitioner’s business. Despite the alleged recent sale
to SCBC, represented by Willy Deterala, petitioner failed to refute the allegations of respondents that the Cu family still continues to own and operate petitioner,
or even to show that Willy Deterala is actually in charge of petitioner’s business. Petitioner did not confront this issue head-on, and its failure to do so is fatal to
its cause. Petitioner having failed to discharge its burden of submitting sufficient and convincing evidence required by law, we hold that respondents were illegally
dismissed.
Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding
and conclusive upon this Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the
present case.[9][26]
All told, we find no reversible error to justify disturbing, much less, reversing the assailed CA Decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Omar O. Sevillana vs. I.T. International Corporation G.R. No. 99047 April 16, 2001
Topic Query: Who has the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases?
Facts
Omar Sevillana was contracted to work as a driver in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia for a period of two years, with a monthly salary of US$370.00. However, when he arrived
at his place of employment, he was only paid $100.00 a month for 12 months before being repatriated. He then filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the
POEA. against I.T. International. In its reply, the recruitment company contended that he was dismissed for health reasons; that due to Sevillana’s recurring blood
pressure spikes, headaches and dizziness, the employer was forced to have him repatriated. I.T. claimed that after the petitioner had received all the benefits
accorded to an employee consisting of full salaries and separation pay, the petitioner refused to be repatriated and instead decided to run away. Having found
that it failed to substantiate its claim, the POEA rendered judgment holding I.T. and the employer solidarily liable, whereas the NLRC, on appeal by I.T., reversed
the judgment, holding that the burden of proving that the dismissal was for cause attaches to the employer only in case the same has admitted that there has
actually been dismissal, which is not the case here, because according to I.T.’s account, Sevillana ran away before he can be repatriated.
Issue(s)
Is the NLRC’s contention correct?
Ruling
No. The contention of NLRC is erroneous, because the Labor Code (Article277(b)), in line with prevailing jurisprudence, has clearly placed the burden of proving
the validity of the cause of the dismissal upon the employer. It is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the court
should not distinguish. Furthermore, when the conflicting interest of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter
must be counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. Clearly therefore, Sevillana was illegally dismissed
by his employer.

DUE PROCESS
G.R. No. 166208 June 29, 2007 KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT INC., CLAIRE DELA FUENTE and MELISSA LIM, petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO O.
MAMAC, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public transportation and managed by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim. Respondent was a conductor for Don Mariano
Transit Corporation (DMTC). He was one of the few people who established Damayan ng mga Manggagawa, Tsuper at Conductor-Transport Workers Union.
Pending the union’s certification election, respondent was transferred to KKTI. The KKTI employees later organized the Kaisahan ng mga Kawani sa King of Kings
(KKKK) which was registered with DOLE. Respondent was elected KKKK president.
Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Report of respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered that respondent declared several sold tickets as
returned tickets causing KKTI to lose an income of eight hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregularity report was prepared on the October 28, 2001 incident,
KKTI nevertheless asked respondent to explain the discrepancy. In his letter, respondent said that the erroneous declaration in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report
was unintentional. He explained that during that day’s trip, the windshield of the bus assigned to them was smashed; and they had to cut short the trip in order
to immediately report the matter to the police. As a result of the incident, he got confused in making the trip report.
On November 26, 2001, respondent received a letter terminating his employment effective November 29, 2001. The dismissal letter alleged that the October 28,
2001 irregularity was an act of fraud against the company. KKTI also cited as basis for respondent’s dismissal the other offenses he allegedly committed since 1999.
After that, he filed an action for illegal dismissal, among other claims. He denied committing any infraction and alleged that his dismissal was intended to bust
union activities. Moreover, he claimed that his dismissal was effected without due process.
KKTI averred that it had observed due process in dismissing respondent and maintained that respondent was not entitled to his money claims such as service
incentive leave and 13th-month pay because he was paid on commission or percentage basis.
LABOR ARBITER: he was validly dismissed
NLRC: Affirmed. CA held that there was just cause for respondent’s dismissal. It ruled that respondent’s act in “declaring sold tickets as returned tickets x x x
constituted fraud or acts of dishonesty justifying his dismissal.”
ISSUE: WON respondent was given due process (procedural)
HELD: NO. There was failure to observe the requirements of due process. Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first, substantive––the valid
and authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor Code; and second, procedural––the manner of dismissal.
Section 2(d) of Rule I of Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.––In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
1. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side.
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.

1. The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. “Reasonable opportunity” under the Omnibus Rules
means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.15 This should
be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against
them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to
enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances
that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically
mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
2. After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity
to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented
against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
 assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to
an amicable settlement.
3. After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1)
all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of
their employment.
Respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of committing an infraction. A verbal appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply with
the first notice requirement.
The court observed from the irregularity reports against respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a general description of the charges against
him. The reports did not even state a company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated.
No hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondent’s written explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and present evidence in support
of his defense. Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Trip
Report. He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected. Thus, he was surprised to receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter
indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his previous infractions.

PEREZ V PTTC
FACTS:
Felix Perez and Amante Doria were employed by Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor. There was an alleged
anomalous transactions that the freight costs for goods and shipping documents showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition. The said petitioners
were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days which was extended for 15 days twice for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Pursuant to the suspension
and filing of criminal charges, petitioners were then dismissed from the service. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal and alleged
that they were dismissed on the same date that they received the complaint memorandum.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were denied due process entailed in their dismissal.
HELD:
Respondents failed to prove just cause and to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must
furnish the worker with two written notices:
1. a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and
2. another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer’s decision to
dismiss the employee.
In the said case, petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated
from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
Petition is granted.
FACTS:
Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and
supervisor, respectively, in PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the
Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight
costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.
Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then
in a Memorandum, petitioners were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.
LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA. CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for
15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of
the CA decision before the SC. They contend that there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they were illegally
suspended for 30 days.
ISSUE: Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.
RULING:
1. Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted. Other than their bare
allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners’
functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners
were involved. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners
alone had control of or access to these documents.
Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of
confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be
arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution
and the Labor Code. The employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to
rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal
of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee
a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.
Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work
and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement for terminating employees.
We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides
that an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires.
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law
itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As such, it cannot amend the law either by
abridging or expanding its scope.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.” Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which ordinarily means “considerably more than
adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or
conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).
Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference
is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under
Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity to be
heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.
The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or
adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit.
Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be
observed “substantially,” not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue
of due process.
A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account
in the adjudication of the controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written
explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a
formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be
heard.
Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was
conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to
follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.
In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit
evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company
rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and
regulations.
On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days,
after which the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.
Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because
of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14 years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed.
To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So petitioners will just be paid their separation pay.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.

PDI vs. MAGTIBAY and PDIEU G.R. No. 164532 July 24, 2007
TOPIC: TERMINATING A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE
FACTS: The Philippine DAily Inquirer (PDI) hired Magtibay, on contractual basis, to assist, for a period of 5 months, the regular phone operator.
After the expiration of Magtibay’s contractual employment, PDI announced the creation and availability of a new position for a 2nd telephone operator who would
undergo probationary employment.
After the usual interview for the 2nd telephone operator slot, PDI chose to hire Magtibay on a probationary basis for a period of 6 months. The signing of a written
contract of employment followed.
A week before the end the agreed 6-month probationary period,a PDI officer handed Magtibay his termination paper, grounded on his alleged failure to meet
company standards. Aggrieved, Magtibay immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the LA.
ISSUE: was there illegal dismissal?
HELD: NO
LABOR CODE, Art. 281. Probationary employment. ̶ Probationary employment shall not exceed 6 months from the date the employee started working, unless it
is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a (1) just cause or (2) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
It is undisputed that PDI apprised Magtibay of the ground of his termination, i.e., he failed to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement, only a week before the expiration of the six-month probationary period. Given this perspective, does
this make his termination unlawful for being violative of his right to due process of law?
It does not.
Unlike under the first ground for the valid termination of probationary employment which is for just cause, the second ground does not require notice and
hearing. Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known
to him at the time of his probationary employment. By the very nature of a probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be
under close observation and his performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous scrutiny by his superiors. It is in apprising him of
the standards against which his performance shall be continuously assessed where due process regarding the second ground lies, and not in notice and hearing
as in the case of the first ground.

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and
JONATHAN CAGABCAB, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondents were hired by JAKA but their services were eventually terminated on August 29, 1997 due to “dire financial straits”. It is not disputed
by the parties that the termination was effected without compliance of Article 283 of the LC because no written notice was served on the employees and the DOLE
at least one month before the respondents’ termination.
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JAKA. JAKA was defeated on appeal in the lower court hence this petition.
ISSUE: The issues boil down to one question: What are the implications where an employee is dismissed for cause BUT without compliance of the notice
requirement under the LC?
HELD: It is clear that an employer is liable for nominal damages even if the termination were upheld due to just causes. However, it is also important to note the
different implications between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and one for authorized causes under Article 283.
SC ruled that the termination was based on authorized cause (retrenchment), but since JAKA did not comply with the notice requirement they have to pay 50k as
nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. JAKA, however should not pay separation pay because where it is true that the rule is to grant
separation pay to employees terminated due to authorized causes, the EXCEPTION is where the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, duly proved, as in this case.
FACTS:
Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It was not disputed that they
were terminated without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the employees and DOLE at least
one month before the intended date of termination.
ISSUE: Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers effected termination without complying with the twin
notice rule.
RULING:
The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or
culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the
employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when… he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.
Accordingly, it is wise to hold that:
1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered
because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee.
2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the
amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

RELIEFS FROM ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

Alcantara & Sons, Inc vs. CAG.R. 155109, September 29, 2010
Facts:
The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. At
some point the parties began negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike. After
efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) failed, the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of
its members favoring it. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE and, after the observance of the mandatory cooling-off period, went on strike. During the
strike, the Company filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the strikers from intimidating, threatening, molesting, and impeding by barricade the entry of non-
striking employees at the Company’s premises. On June29, 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, declaring the Unions strike illegal for violating the CBAs no
strike, no lockout, provision. As a consequence, the Labor Arbiter held that the Union officers should be deemed to have forfeited their employment with the
Company and that they should pay actual damages. With respect to the striking Union members, finding no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during
the strike, the Labor Arbiter ordered their reinstatement without backwages.
Issues:
1. Whether or the strike conducted is illegal?
2. Whether or not the union members should also be terminated?
Held:
1. Yes, a strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the
Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. Here, the CBA between the parties
contained a no strike, no lockout provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under
the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes. No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually
waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used as a badge for not complying with a
lawful agreement.2. Yes, given that their illegal acts of threatening, coercing and intimidating non-strikers, obstructing the free ingress and egress from the
company premises and resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers, their employment can no longer
reinstated. However, the records also fail to disclose any past infractions committed by the dismissed Union members. Taking these circumstances in consideration,
the Court regards the award of financial assistance to these Union members in the form of one-half month salary for every year of service to the company up to
the date of their termination as equitable and reasonable.

Pfizer v. Velasco G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011

FACTS:
Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco
had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her
sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003.
While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice" dated 25 June 2003.
Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or
samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the
same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently
ordered to surrender some of the accountabilities from her employer.
Velasco sent a letter denying the charges claiming that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch covered by her check (no. 1072) in the amount
of P23,980.00 was merely to accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo.
Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. According to the notice, a certain Carlito Jomen
executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented text messages
originating from Velasco’s company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons. Again, Velasco was given 48 hours to submit her written
explanation on the matter. On 16 July 2003, Velasco sent a letter to PFIZER via Aboitiz courier service asking for additional time to answer the second Show-cause
Notice.
Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, 17 July 2003, PFIZER sent her a letter
inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that
she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the
preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. On 25 July 2003, Velasco received
a "Third Show-cause Notice," together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally,
on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment.
LA: The dismissal of Velasco is illegal. Reinstatement was ordered with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s fees.
NLRC:
· Upheld the ruling of LA, but deleted the award on moral and exemplary damages.
· Pfizer then filed an MR but was denied for lack of merit in the next NLRC Resolution.
· A special civil action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances
was filed to the CA
CA:
· Reversed the ruling of LA and NLRC. Having found the termination of Geraldine L. Velasco’s employment in accordance with the two notice rule pursuant to
the due process requirement and with just cause, her complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed.
· Velasco filed an MR with CA. It affirmed the legality of the dismissal of Velasco but directed Pfizer to pay her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.
· Velasco filed with the Court a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which assailed the CA Decision but was denied by the SC’s
Second Division.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s decision
ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco’s dismissal valid
Pfizer’s Contention:
· There was no unjustified refusal on its part to reinstate Velasco during the pendency of the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, PFIZER claimed that
it had already required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005. However, according to PFIZER, it was respondent who refused to return to work when she
wrote PFIZER, through counsel, that she was opting to receive her separation pay and to avail of PFIZER’s early retirement program.
· It should no longer be required to pay wages considering that (1) it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution
issued by the Labor Arbiter; (2) it was allegedly ready to reinstate respondent as of July 1, 2005 but it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to report for work;
(3) it would purportedly be tantamount to allowing respondent to choose "payroll reinstatement" when by law it was the employer which had the right to choose
between actual and payroll reinstatement; (4) respondent should be deemed to have "resigned" and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation
pay; and (5) this Court should not mechanically apply Roquero but rather should follow the doctrine in Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission which was
supposedly "more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice.
HELD: NO.
PFIZER’s previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00 (representing her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter
decision, until May 5, 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiter’s Writ of Execution dated May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor. Not
only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted PFIZER’s unreasonable delay in complying with
the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. A perusal of the records, including PFIZER’s own submissions, confirmed that it only required respondent to report
for work on July 1, 2005, as shown by its Letter dated June 27, 2005, which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed down in the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003.
An award or order of reinstatement is immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph
of Article 223 of the Labor Code. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even
pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. If the requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance
of a writ of execution] were to govern, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and
rendered ineffectual.
In the case at bar, PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award
of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a writ of execution. Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to
her under the aforementioned writ of execution. At most, PFIZER’s payment of the same can only be deemed partial compliance/execution of the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated October 23, 2006 and would not bar respondent from being paid her wages from May 6, 2005 to November 23, 2005. It would also seem that
PFIZER waited for the resolution of its appeal to the NLRC and, only after it was ordered by the Labor Arbiter to pay the amount of P1,963,855.00 representing
respondent’s full backwages from December 5, 2003 up to May 5, 2005, did PFIZER decide to require respondent to report back to work via the Letter dated June
27, 2005.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll."
It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person
reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed
still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee.
it cannot be said that with PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 Letter, in belated fulfillment of the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order, it had shown a clear intent to reinstate
respondent to her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position. To begin with, the return-to-work order PFIZER
sent respondent is silent with regard to the position or the exact nature of employment that it wanted respondent to take up as of July 1, 2005. Even if we assume
that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZER’s June
27, 2005 letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms and conditions" as her previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent
to report to its main office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondent’s previous job had her stationed in Baguio City (respondent’s place of residence)
and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including her relocation benefits.
It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held
by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages.
In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of
execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution
should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from
the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. It
cannot be denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential framework, respondent is entitled to payment of her wages for the period after December 5, 2003
until the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her dismissal was legal and for just cause. Thus, the payment
of such wages cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment on respondent’s part.
FACTS:
On 5 December 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco, an employee of Pfizer, illegal, ordering her reinstatement with
backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same but deleted the award of moral and
exemplary damages. Pfizer filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the
aforementioned NLRC issuances.In a Decision dated November 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of respondents dismissal from employment.

Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals resolved in the assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2006, wherein it affirmed the validity
of Velasco's dismissal from employment but modified its earlier ruling by directing Pfizer to pay respondent her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters Decision
dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.

Pfizer filed the instant petition assailing the CA decision. In PFIZER's view, it should no longer be required to pay wages considering that it had already previously
paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision
ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velascos dismissal valid.

HELD:
The petition is without merit.
LABOR LAW: Reinstatement orders; "refund doctrine."

Pfizer's previous payment to respondent of the amount ofP1,963,855.00 (representing her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision,
until May 5, 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiters Writ of Execution dated May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor.Not only was
this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted Pfizer's unreasonable delay in complying with the
reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. It only required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005, almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement
was handed down in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated December 5, 2003.

In the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that an award or order of reinstatement is
immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code. In the
case at bar, Pfizer did not immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award of
reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a writ of execution.Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her
under the aforementioned writ of execution.

In any case, Pfizer implores the Court to annul the award of backwages and separation pay as well as to require respondent to refund the amount that she was
able to collect by way of garnishment from Pfizer as her accrued salaries, considering the reversal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter by the CA. However, this is
without merit, since the prevailing principle is that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. DENIED.