chapter 3 the constitution and the courts

■ Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections

95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office
after Being 65

Judicial Review; Requisites thereof

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office
as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never
been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case
does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that
have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have
been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good
policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective
echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below
65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same
office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

■ G.R. No. L-33517 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, SALVADOR ARANETA, JUAN V. BORRA,

JOSE NUGUID, JOSE NOLLEDO, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Manila, CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, House of Representatives, Manila, and AUDITOR, House of
Representatives, Manila, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

Ramon C. Aquino for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:p

Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association, joined by other petitioners,1 all delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, suing in their capacity as such as well as citizens and taxpayers,
filed this mandamus proceeding on May 15, 1971 praying that a writ be issued ordering
respondents Cornelio T. Villareal, in his capacity as Speaker of the then House of Representatives,
the Chief Accountant thereof, as well as its Auditor, to inspect and examine the books, records,
vouchers and other supporting papers of the House of Representatives that have relevance to the
alleged transfer of P26.2 million from various executive offices to the House of Representatives as
well as its books, records, vouchers and other supporting papers dealing with the original outlay of
the P39 million as appropriated for the 1969-1970 fiscal year. On May 19, 1971, this Court
adopted a resolution of the following tenor: "The respondents are hereby required to file an answer
to the petition for mandamus within 10 days from notice hereof, and not to move to dismiss the
petition."2 There was, on June 16, 1971, an answer and motion to dismiss on behalf of
respondents seeking the dismissal of the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the theory
of separation of powers, absence of a cause of action, lack of legal personality to sue, nonjoinder
of indispensable parties as well as the mischievous consequences to which a suit of such character
would give rise. Subsequently, there was a reply by petitioners on June 26, 1971 and a rejoinder
by respondents on June 28, 1971. There was even a surrejoinder by respondents on July 6 of the
same year, as well as a reply thereto on the very same day. Then came the hearing on August 4,
1971.

There is no need, however, to pass on the merits of the various legal issues raised as in accordance
with the ruling in Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,3 promulgated on February
28, 1974, a suit of this character has become moot and academic with the effectivity of the present
Constitution and the consequent abolition of the House of Representatives. It may not be amiss to
quote this excerpt from the resolution declaring moot and academic the above case against Auditor
General Gimenez: "Parenthetically, it is to be observed that such difficulty need not attend a
petition of this character if filed now in view of the specific provision in the present Constitution:
'The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall
publish annually the itemized expenditures for each Member.' "4

WHEREFORE, the above petition is declared moot and academic.

■ SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO

SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948
(R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A.
296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals'
adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc.
vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape
a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc.
vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation
et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to
the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent
but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

■ Zandueta v. de la Costa
66 Phil. 615 (1938)
In re: Necessity of deciding Constitutional Questions

The case is an original quo warranto action with the Supreme Court instituted by Honorable
Francisco Zandueta against Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from the Supreme Court a
judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth
Branch of the CFI of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from the said office and holding
that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof.

Facts

Prior to the promulgation of the Commonwealth Act No. 145, petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely of the City of Manila and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the CFI of the said city, by
virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June
2, 1936, with the corresponding confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly on September 8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on which the Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as
the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan. The new appointment of the petitioner was not acted upon by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and as it adjourned on November 20, 1937, the petitioner
was issued with a new ad interim appointment to the same office, over which the petitioner took
oath on November 22, 1937 and subsequently discharged the duties of the said office. The
petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts which consist of
designation of several personnel to the Courts over his jurisdiction.
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments disapproved the aforesaid ad interim
appointment of the petitioner, prompting the President of the Philippines to appoint the Honorable
Sixto de la Costa to the same office, who took the necessary oath and discharged the duties of the
said office, and was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Issues
1. Can the petitioner impugn the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145?
2. Is the petitioner entitled to continue to discharge the duties of the office he occupied prior to his
appointment by virtue of the Commonwealth Act No. 145?

Held

The petitioner cannot impugn the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was appointed.
The petitioner is estopped by his own act proceeding to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting said appointment
and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein.
In accepting the new appointment on November 7, 1936 and qualifying for the exercise of the
functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath on November 22, 1937, and in
discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the CFI
of Manila and Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased to
exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof. The petitioner abandons
his old office and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the
law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued; and said new appointment
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim
to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure
ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Petition denied and dismissed.

■ MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL T. FLORES, defendant-appellant.

Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for appellant.

Zafra, Lara, De Leon and Veneracion for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:
In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to
recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which
fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954. The complaint was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention
that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting
the time during which said laws were in operation — three years and eight months1 — the ten
year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said
court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.

Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of
suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court
in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites jurisprudence holding that when a statute is
adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no rights can be
built upon it.2

Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the lower court was appealable in
nature; but we agreed not to discuss the point, inasmuch as the question submitted by appellant
could speedily be disposed of. In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held that the moratorium
laws suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It
should be stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he
had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted
from a resolution of this Court4

2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the decision the
Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At
any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute —

"confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it."
(11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)

there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its
effects "since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371)
and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep.,
1025, 1030).

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

■ Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada vs Commission on Elections

120 SCRA 337 – Political Law – Vacancy in the Legislature

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution which provides:

In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular
election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.

COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant
petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies
in the legislature.

HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads:

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed
by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is
the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must
come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not
IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the
exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in
the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

■ Juan Antonio Oposa vs Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.

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224 SCRA 792 – Political Law – Harmony in Nature – Inter-Generational Responsibility – Inter-
Generational Justice

A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) together
with the minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al and their parents. All were duly represented. They
claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel
all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements, Factoran being the
secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all
Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s
forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of
that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

■ 23127 April 29, 1971]

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB
on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from
March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit
in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official.” 4

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of
the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive
in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started
by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period
was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18,
1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months
and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.