Juan P.

Villeno vs NLRC

Juan P. Villeno was employed on 29 December 1961 as electrician in one of the

vessels of private respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. Twenty-seven (27) years later he was
separated from the service

M/V Sulpicio Container XI after leaving the port of Cebu for Manila was forced to return
due to the death of the purser on board. Upon reaching port, the crew members were
instructed not to leave the vessel as it would pursue its voyage immediately after turning
over the body to the proper authorities. The ship's cook however was granted
permission upon his request to leave the vessel to buy additional foodstuff for their
provisions. The petitioner on the other hand, without seeking permission, left the vessel
purportedly to settle a marital problem. Before leaving he disconnected the ship's
steering line cable so that the vessel could not leave port without him. His explanation
was that he wanted to prevent pranksters from toying around with the steering wheel as
what had happened in the past.|||

According to petitioner, when he returned to the port thirty (30) minutes later, the ship
was only a few inches away from the wharf but was prevented by a representative of
respondent corporation from boarding the vessel. It turned out that the vessel had hired
another electrician to reconnect the steering line cable. The consequence of petitioner's
actuation was that the departure of the vessel was further delayed. Petioner filed
against private respondents a complaint for illegal dismissal

Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was indeed guilty of misconduct but found the penalty
of dismissal harsh considering that there was no evidence showing that petitioner
intended to sabotage the voyage of the vessel. Besides, for the duration of his long
years of service, it was his first offense.||| (Villeno v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995], 321 PHIL 880-889)

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) held that the circumstances that
petitioner had been employed by respondent corporation for a long period of time and
that it was his first offense were not by themselves sufficient to warrant mitigation of the
consequences of his serious misconduct. What were material were the facts that he
disembarked from the vessel despite explicit instruction to the contrary, and he
disconnected the steering line cable so that the vessel could not leave, which in the
context of respondent corporation's business could not be tolerated.||| (Villeno v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995], 321
PHIL 880-889)

Petitioner argues that although his reason for disconnecting the steering line cable was
personal yet it was highly commendable since he was concerned with family unity. In
addition, the disconnection was done to protect the vessel from pranksters who in the
past would play with the steering wheel. By terminating his services respondent
corporation thus set to naught his twenty-seven (27) years of service, completely
ignoring the fact that it was his first offense. He claims that the delay he caused to the
vessel was almost nil considering that it took him only thirty (30) minutes to return as
compared to the delay that the voyage had already incurred.||| (Villeno v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995], 321 PHIL 880-889)

ISSUE: whether petitioner's act of disconnecting the steering line cable and disembarking
from the vessel without permission constitute serious misconduct and willful
disobedience justifying his dismissal

Ruling:

Yes, Among the basic duties of an employee are to conduct himself properly and to yield
obedience to lawful orders of his employer. It is in this regard that serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work is a just cause for his termination. This is
explicitly provided under Art. 282, par. (a), of the Labor Code. The misconduct must be
related to the performance of his duties and of such grave character rendering him unfit
to continue working for the employer. As regards willful disobedience, we stated in San
Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo 3 that at least two (2) requisites must concur: (1) the
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude;" and, (2) the order violated must
have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

Consequently, we sustain the NLRC in holding that petitioner was guilty of

serious misconduct and willful disobedience —
. . . Granted that his act was without malice or willful intent to cause
damage, this does not excuse him for putting his personal interests over
that of his employers in the sense that he . . . unnecessarily disrupt(ed)
and prejudice(d) the normal operations of respondent to attend to
personal matters. No amount of good faith or lack of intention to cause
damage can diminish the degree of responsibility of complainant for his
actuations . . . . 4
By disconnecting the steering line cable before disembarking, petitioner must have
deluded himself into believing that he was the master in command of the vessel and
that during his absence the vessel should be immobile. His lack of concern for his
employer's interests or for his responsibility towards his employer
Petitioners engaged the services of private respondent as a packaging clerk responsible
for the following tasks:
1. Receives (sic) product from supplier and sort them out;
2. Record incoming and outgoing deliveries to stock ledger and stock
card;
3. Received (sic) requisition from branch retail outlets;
4. Select products from storage and place them inside the box, label the
boxes and prepare the corresponding delivery receipts;
5. Make physical count at regular intervals and reconciles physical count
with book records;
6. Other assignments as and when required by supervisor from time to
time.
Initially, the private respondent's employment status was probationary. Six months
later, or on 1 March 1992, however, she was regularized.
But before her employment status was made permanent, private respondent was given
a Memorandum by Miguel Acebedo III, Operations Manager of petitioner corporation.

On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was imposed on private

respondent on the ground of her being tardy twenty-six times within the period of
January to March 1994. The suspension notice was served on
her via a Memorandum dated the same day. It was averred that private respondent
incurred twenty-six counts of tardiness within the above-specified months which number
far exceeded the maximum allowable limit per month of only four times.||| (Acebedo
Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554
PHIL 524-547)

28 February 1995, private respondent was served a fourth Memorandum. 10 For having
incurred twenty-one counts of tardiness for the months of [unreadable] to December
1994, the latter was meted another suspension, this time for seven days, or four days
longer than the first.||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)

On 22 May 1995, private respondent filed an application for an indefinite leave of

absence and it was not approved considering the nature of the leave.|| (Acebedo
Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554
PHIL 524-547)

On 29 August 1995, private respondent was suspended for the third time, this time for
thirteen days. The reason given for the imposition of such penalty was the employee's
failure "to meet the company policy on tardiness.||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)
 On 12 November 1996, private respondent did not report for work allegedly due to
the demolition of the place that her family was renting.
On 2 December 1996, private respondent again absented herself from work this
time because her child was allegedly hospitalized.
Six days later, or on 8 December 1996, the Head of the Personnel Department of
petitioner corporation issued a Notice of Termination against private respondent.
||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July
17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)

ISSUE: Whether or not employee had been dismissed for just cause

No, petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of evidence needed to

substantiate a ending of legitimacy or validity in the termination of employment of
private respondent, the reason for which was supposedly her repeated de􏰀ance of
company policy. According to the appellate court, petitioners' failure to adduce in
evidence a copy of the contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent
proof of evidence of such document embodying the 􏰀outed rule, the appellate court,
along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to make a categorical 􏰀nding on
the issue of whether or not the private respondent's accumulated absences and/or
tardiness were, indeed, in violation of petitioner company's rules and regulations.
Further, as to the allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of
1991 to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of the Daily
Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave error. It held that the numerous
memoranda issued to private respondent were mere self-serving evidence and made
the following observations —

Petitioners' stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record. Thus, the Private
Respondent was employed, (sic) on a probationary basis or status . . . [she] incurred
tardiness in the accumulated time of one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month
of August, 1991, and yet, the Private Respondent was promoted and made a
permanent employee on March 1, 1992.

[A]fter her one (1) hour and thirty — four (34) minute tardiness in September 1991,
nothing on record reveals that she had been tardy for the year 1992. The
"Memorandum" reminding the Private Respondent about her tardiness did not establish
that Private Respondent again incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private
Respondent was not tardy in the year 1993. Although she was tardy during the period
from January to March 1994, however, she was ordered suspended on May 10 to 12,
1994. Thereafter, Private Respondent did not report late for the rest of the year as the
next "Memorandum" of the Petitioner Corporation was issued on February 28, 1995,
informing Private Respondent of her suspension on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and 27,
1995.
Based on the "Memorandum" of the Petitioners, the Private Respondent was tardy for
seventeen (17) times for the quarter from April to June, 1995. However, the
"Memorandum" of the Petitioners did not indicate the dates and precise times when the
Private Respondent was tardy. Without the "Daily Time Records" of the Respondent
during the period envisaged in the Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be
ascertained whether Private Respondent's tardiness was habitual and incorrigible.

Anent the 􏰀nding by the NLRC that herein petitioners' appeal was 􏰀led out of time, the
Court of Appeals clari􏰀fid that Sec. 224 of the Labor Code requires that both party and
counsel must be served their respective copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In
the instant case, herein petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision only
on 5 March 1999. They then 􏰀led an appeal, 15 March 1999. Therefore, it cannot be
said that their recourse to the NLRC was filed out of time.