Property E1 Ampp TSN

TSN based on the Lectures
AMPP Property of
Notes 1st Semester SY 2017-2018 Atty. Melissa Romana
SUAREZ
June 15, 2017 - Peroy
This is Property and this is one of the major subjects in Civil Law. A lot of questions come out of
Property. So, don’t take this subject lightly.
Let’s start with the definition of property. In the book of Paras, there are 2 definitions:
1. Property under the Civil Code – meaning how it is used in the Civil Code
2. Property considered as a Subject
Property – considered as an object is which, or may be appropriated.
Appropriate
– is either an adjective or a verb.
a) Adjective – “Is your attire appropriate for today?” That’s an adjective [meaning suitable or
proper].
b) Verb – But the word “appropriate” as used in the definition is as a verb. Meaning to allot for
specific use or to take possession of.
Example:
Thermos bottle – An object like this, is this property as an object? Is that which, or may be
appropriated? Can I allot this? Is this something that can be used specifically? Yes. Like to pound the
heads of unruly children taking law [joke]. There’s a specific use for this object. This can be
appropriated by me. This is considered property.
Property as a subject
Property is also a subject we are taking up right now. So, what is that?
Property is the branch of civil law which:

a) classifies and defines the different kinds of appropriable objects,
b) provides for their acquisition, and
c) in general, treats of the nature and consequences of real rights (rights over property).
Example: Water bottle, laptop, shoes, bags. How do we classify them? How do you differentiate
them? How do you define them? How do you acquire this? What happens if you use it? That
we will take up in this subject.
Property vs. Thing

How do you distinguish property from thing? If you went through the provisions of the Civil Code,
you will notice that “thing” and “property” are used interchangeably. They actually mean the same
in the Civil Code.
However, in reality “thing” is broader because it includes non-appropriable objects. Example: the
sun. It’s not human, nor an animal. It can be considered a thing. But you cannot appropriate the
sun. You cannot take possession of the sun and allot it for specific use. The sun cannot be considered
property but technically it’s a thing. Thing is broader than property.
Property involves not only material objects like this thermos bottle. But we have what we call
intangibles. And the most common example of an intangible is a right. The right to collect a sum of
Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 1

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money, that is property as you will see later. We don’t only deal with tangible objects here, we also
deal with intangibles.
Classification of things or property according to the nature of their ownership

1. Res Nullius
As mentioned earlier, these are things that cannot be owned by anyone.
Example:
Our authors are saying when we talk about res nullius, we have a thing that doesn’t belong
to anyone because maybe it has not yet been appropriated. Like a wild animal running in
the forest. A wild animal is not a thing technically, but it is an animal. But at that point while
it’s running in the forest it is res nullius, it does not belong to anyone because it has not yet
been appropriated.
Or maybe a pair of shoes in the trash can, abandoned, nobody owns it. It becomes res
nullius.
We can also consider the sun as res nullius. It is a thing but it doesn’t belong to anyone.
Compare that to sunlight (light that emanates from the sun), is res communis.
2. Res Communis
Belonging to everyone.
You cannot say “do not receive the sunlight, that is mine”. No. Everyone can receive the
sunlight. It cannot be touched or held but it’s there. That falls under res communis, belonging
to everyone.
The air that we breath. Can we prevent our neighbor from breathing the same air? No. Of
course it’s different when you have an oxygen bottle and you breathe from a mask. The air
that surrounds us, belongs to everyone.
3. Res Alicuius
Belonging to someone.
Objects tangible or intangible, owned privately either in a collective or individual capacity.
This thermos bottle is res alicuius, it belongs to me. This is considered again as property.
[I verified the spelling for numbers 2 and 3. These are the correct ones.]
In the book of Paras, there is a table there, classification of property. Our topic is classification. How
do we classify the different kinds of property?
Classification of Property
1. Mobility and non-mobility
a. Movable
b. Immovable

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If you think in a practical manner, what is movable? Something you can move around from
place to place, like this thermos bottle. What is immovable? Something you cannot move
around. But it is not that simple.
2. Ownership
Who owns the property.
a. Property of Public dominion
b. Private property – owned by you and me or a corporation, a private corporation.
c. Jura Regalia – belonging to the state, principle that you take in your constitutional law.
d. Property belonging to Local Government Units – LGUs like the city
Those are the 2 main topics as to classification. But there are other classifications such as:
3. Alienability
a. Within the commerce of man, can be the subject of a contract
b. Outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of a contract. Example: prohibited
drugs, you are not allowed to sell prohibited drugs.
4. Existence
a. Present property
b. Future Property
There is no such thing as past property.
5. Materiality or immateriality
a. Tangible or corporeal – one you can touch. Example: thermos bottle
b. Intangible or incorporeal – one you cannot touch. Example: right to collect a sum of
money
Example:
An insurance policy. You have a piece of paper that says this is the policy in favor of Mr. X.
This piece of paper is tangible, you can touch it, you can see it.
How about the insurance policy? Can you see that? No. Is it something you can touch? You
just know it exists. It is a right to collect. That is Intangible.
You can have one thing that contains a tangible object with an intangible right.
6. Dependence or importance
a. Principal – Example: car
b. Accessory – Example: car’s seat covers
We will take this up when we reach accession.
7. Capability of substitution
a. Fungible
b. Non-fungible
You took that up in ObliCon. You just have to remember the difference between the 2.

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8. Nature
a. Generic
b. Specific
You know that already.
3 Main Characteristics of Property

Remember, property as an object is that which can be, and that which is or may be appropriated.
1. Utility for the satisfaction of moral or economic wants

It can be used for something.
Example: clothes they’re used to cover you up, shoes. They all have their own uses. You will not
buy anything that is useless to you. But you buy a painting, you may not use it, but you need it
to feel good by looking at it. Still, utility. It’s not only for economic wants but for moral wants.
An aesthetic value of a thing can be considered useful.
2. Susceptibility of appropriation
If something cannot be appropriated it is not considered property.
3. Individuality or substantivity
Example: hair on one’s head. As long as it is connected to a person, it does not have its own
identity, it does not have its own individuality. But the moment hair is cut off, especially long,
beautiful hair, that can be sold to a salon. They buy natural hair and turn that into extensions,
wigs, etc. The moment hair is cut off, it acquires its own individuality and substantivity and
therefore it can now be appropriated by somebody else and used for something else. To be
considered property it must have individuality or substantivity.
Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property. (333)
All properties here are either immovable or movable. You cannot say that is not immovable nor
movable. What is it? Nothing. There is no such this as not immovable, not movable. It’s either this
or that. That’s why we have to know what are immovable, what are movable.
1. Immovable – is synonymous with real property.
2. Movable – is used interchangeably with personal.

And you encounter this in your criminal law, what can be the object of theft – personal property.
Hindi pwede nakawin ang immovable under the Revised Penal Code. But pwede yan sa Civil
Code, we will go to that later.
Let’s look at the classification of immovable property first. Let’s classify them first.
Classification of Immovable Property

1. Immovable by Nature
It cannot be moved from place to place because of their nature.

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Examples:
Like this building (D Building). You cannot move this building to Tagum, this is immovable by
nature.
You cannot move Davao City to Luzon. You cannot move Agdao to Calinan. That’s very easy,
that’s the easiest one, immovable by nature.
2. Immovable by Incorporation
Immovables that are not really immovable by nature. Essentially movalbes but when attached to
an immovable becomes an integral part of the same. By incorporation, the essentially movable
object acquires the status of immovability under the law. We are not talking about practicality,
we are talking about what the law says. The law says if it is attached to an immovable, it acquires
the status of immovability by incorporation.
3. Immovable by Destination or Purpose

Essentially movables but for the purpose by which they have been placed they become
immovable. The law will also dictate that. A painting (in a frame) is essentially movable, you
can move it. But that painting can be considered immovable under the law because of purpose.
We are looking at the classification. The nitty-gritty details you will see when we reach Art. 415.
4. Immovable by Analogy or Law

Like the insurance policy. While I’m not saying that an insurance policy is immovable agad, it
is something that you cannot see when you go to what are immovable under the law under Art.
415.10.
Let’s go to Art. 415. It does not define immovable property. It is not a definition. It is an enumeration.
And this enumeration is exclusive.
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part
of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in
case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them
permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these
places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters
either running or stagnant;

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(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
(334a)
Let’s go to Art. 415. It does not define immovable property. It is not a definition. It is an enumeration.
This enumeration is exclusive. Only those that are found under Art. 415 are immovable, the rest are
movable, everything else is movable.
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
a. Land
Is immovable by nature. We’re talking about soil in a flower pot. We are talking about the
land that we walk on. Like a subdivision lot in Las Terrazas, that is immovable under Art.
415 par. 1. And what is the classification of land? Immovable by nature. You cannot move
your lot in Las Terrazas to Insular Village. You can move maybe a shovelful or a pailful of
soil. Soil is different, ilagay mo sa balde dalhin mo ‘dun. That’s different, that is movable.
You already disengaged the soil from the land. Land is our main immovable property, that
is immovable by nature.
b. Buildings
This (D Building) is definitely immovable unde par. 1. Is it essentially movable? Of course
not. It is immovable, you cannot move it from place to place, the entire building.
Q: Are all buildings immovable under par. 1?

A: No. For a building to be considered immovable our legal luminaries are saying that there
must be permanence. This building is permanent, you do not move it from here to there. It’s
permanently here, so this is definitely immovable under par. 1.
There used to be a bahay kubo there (Between the C and D buildings), is it still there, the
bahay kubo? Wala na. That is also a building. You know yung mga nabibili sa Toril. You can
move that from place to place, it’s not permanent. Wala na nga ngayon, tinanggal na. So not
all buildings are immovable.
For a building to be considered immovable, it must be a permanent structure substantially

adhering to the land.
If a bahay kubo is permanently placed on land. Cemented into the land, with all those bolts,
you cannot really move the building. That can be considered immovable because it is
adhered to the land.
Land is considered immovable whether it is owned, or rented, or owned by the state. The ownership
does not matter. We are talking about the classification as to immovability or mobility. Same with
the building. Even the rented building is immovable under Art. 415.1.
c. Construction of all kinds adhered to the soil

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Any kind of construction as long as it is adhered to the soil. That’s why roads, yung semento,
immovable yan, nakadikit yan e. You cannot move it from place to place. If another road is
put here, that is another road. You close the road here, thenwe have another road, that is
immovable.
Jurisprudence tells us that railroad tracks, they’re made of steel. They are essentially movable
when they are manufactured they are movable. The moment they are attached to the ground
permanently, they acquire the status of immovability under 415.1. There is no more
argument about railroad tracks, they are immovable.
Q:What about scaffoldings? When you see buildings being constructed, tapos lalagyan ng
mga kahoy so the construction workers can paint or plaster.
A:They don’t have this character of permanence. Because even if they are embedded in the
soil, tatanggalin yan eventually. Anything that will be eventually removed, that would not
stay there are not immovable, they are movable.
The constructions adhered to the soid, again, like buildings must have this character of
permanence.
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part
of an immovable;
All kinds of plants, trees, etc. that are growing are there, attached to the land are immovable. It
doesn’t matter how small the weed is, it could be a weed, as long as it is attached to the ground it
is considered immovable under the law. Even the flowers, the fruit, yung mga durian, mangosteen,
lanzones, rambutan, other trees. They are immovable under the law because the trees are attached
to the land and the fruits are attached to the tree. E immovable yung tree, immovable din yung fruit.
Q: Pano kung ninakaw yung durian? Syempre you have to cut it.
A:The moment it is cut, hindi na sya immovable. That’s why they have to form an integral part of an
immovable to be considered immovable.
The moment they are detached, if you uproot a tree, hindi na sya immovable.
There is a discussion in the book of Paras. It’s just his opinion […] jurisprudence. But it is not here
in the law, when it comes to uprooted timber, these are naturally grown trees and they are uprooted,
according to Paras they do not lose their immovable character. They are still considered immovable.
The question is what if they are stolen? Pwedeng sabihin ng magnanakaw na how can I plan to […]
that? It’s not personal property, it is immovable, hindi pwedeng nakawin ang immovable. May
konting argument dyan that can be raised. Definitely I will not ask that in my exam but you never
know in the Bar they might ask that. Timberland are considered immovable eventhough uprooted.
All trees, plants when they are detached from the ground they will automatically lose their
immovable character and become movable.
What classification of immovable property do we have under paragraph 2? We have immovable by

nature. Immovable by nature are those, according to our author, are spontaneous products of the
soil. Yung mga natural grown trees, weeds, etc. If they are planted, they are immovable by

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incorporation. That’s very academic. The important this is you know what are immovables under
415.2.
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
Everything means everything, no exception. As long as this thing is attached to an immovable. The
everything here is tangible, it can be attached. We have been talking about tangibles so far. So this
is the provision that talks about immovable by incorporation. Everything attached, anything that is
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner that you cannot remove it without destroying the object.
Let’s look around us. Speaker, that is essentially movable. It is anything, kasama yan sa everything.
Now, if that speaker is busted and it has to be repaired, it has to be detached you cannot repair it
from there. Do you think that speaker is immovable under par. 3? You unscrew it and there will be
no damage to the speaker and to the wall. Even though that speaker is attached to an immovable
which is the wall of the building, it is not immovable under par. 3.
What are the characteristics of immovability under paragraph 3. The most important thing is that the
thing that is attached cannot be separated from the immovable without substantial deterioration.
And it can be placed by whoever, it doesn’t matter. There is no requirement that it needs to be
placed by some person. It is real property by incorporation and it is the fact of the incorporation that
determines its immovability.
The classic example for that particular immovable under paragraph 3 is the fire escape. That is the
example given by Paras. A fire escape is a ladder and most of the time it is attached to a building,
could be embedded in the cement. If this ladder is embedded in the cement, it’s definitely a kind of
immovable under paragraph 3. It is attached in a fixed manner that if you remove the fire escape
you have to break the cement. Once it is detached, for example kinakalawang na sya, it has to be
cleaned or painted. Once it is detached, it will lose its immovable character, it becomes movable.
Because it is the fact of incorporation that determines its immovability. Once it is no longer
incorporated to an immovable it becomes movable. Once it is reattached in the same manner, it
will then reacquire its immovable character.
Just remember that under paragraph 3, it is the fact of incorporation that determines its immovability.
And it’s the kind of incorporation. Hindi pwedeng ganyan lang (referring to the speaker on the wall),
that is only attachment. Incorporate the movable with the immovable.
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;
We are encountering this person, the owner. We have the owner of the statue and the owner of the
building. If the owner of the statue is the owner of the building, we have no problem. If they are
different people, who is this owner being referred to? It is the owner of the building, not the owner
of the statute. A statue, painting, sculpture, can be considered immovable under par. 4 if it is placed
by the owner of the building.

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Let’s say that we have here Mr. X, he has a portrait by Kublai that he places on the wall of his
bedroom and he wants that painting of himself to stay there forever kahit mawala na sya para
maalala sya. Pag nililinis yung painting, tanggalin. It’s still immovable. You have to distinguish par.
4 from par. 3. Par. 4 it doesn’t have to be incorporated, it becomes immovable because of the
purpose it’s placed there. If you look at the characteristics, it can be separated like that one (speaker)
but that is not a statue, relief, nor painting, that will not fall under par. 4 but that can be separated
without breaking. Yung painting din, that’s not to be embedded. The important thing under par. 4 is
that it must be placed by the owner of the building. Kunwari si Mr. X is only a tenant nagrenta lang
sya ng apartment at nilagay nya yung portrait nya dyan. Even though that is his portrait and he placed
it there, he is not the owner of the building, he is only a lessee or tenant, then that painting will
remain movable, not immovable under par. 4.
Going back, the owner of the building and the owner of the statue he puts it there because his
purpose is for it to stay there forever for as long as it can, there is no intention to move it to any other
place. Even if it is removed for cleaning lang, trapo-trapo ibabalik sya, then that is immovable by
purpose or destination.
Are we saying na hindi pwede ang embedded? What about yung mga fresco? You know what a
fresco is? Yung mga painting ni Michelangelo the ceiling, that’s a fresco. You cannot remove that,
that is part of the ceiling, yung mga domes. It also incorporated in the ceiling. Hindi ba yan pwede
sa par. 4? Pwede rin. It’s just not a requirement that it cannot be removed without breaking. Like a
mural, you put a painting there on the wall, you cannot remove that. That is still immovable under
par. 4 because it is a painting. But can it be also considered an immovable under par. 3? Pwede rin
because par. 3 talks about everything. Par. 4 lang naman ang paintings, statues, relief. Pwede rin
sya immovable at par. 3 if it is embedded. The nice thing about par. 3, need not be placed by the
owner. And par. 4 kasi may requirement e, it has to be placed by the owner of the immovable. So
dapat ang painting was done by commissioned by the owner. Anyway, you have to know the
difference between the 2.
What are the distinctions between par. 3 and par. 4?

Paragraph 3 Paragraph 4
Must be incorporated May or may not be incorporated. Important
thing is the purpose or the destination.
Cannot be separated May be separated
Need not be placed by the owner Must be placed by the owner
What else can be considered immovable under par. 4? Wall-to-wall carpeting. We are talking about
objects for use or ornamentation. Objects for use, carpet. Wall-to-wall carpet, permanent, pwedeng
tanggalin. It’s the purpose again that reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements.
But baseboards that you can see in the nice houses they're big mouldings those are also under par.
4. They may be removed, kahit nakapako pwedeng tanggalin it doesn't matter for the purpose of
having them there permanently.
Statue of David at Queensland. The original statue of David is in Florence, Italy. The one in
Queensland is an imitation. That statue was built by the owner of Queensland, si Mr. Adarna. Is it
immovable under par. 4? It depends. Kasi they’re saying the land on which that statue is standing is

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reclaimed. Pag reclaimed, that is owned by the state. We will discuss that later. If reclaimed land,
the statue is movable because the land does not belong to Mr. Adarna. For it to be considered
immovable the land must belong to him, the one who placed the statue there
Please don’t say “stay-Choo” ha, say “stah-Choo”.
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
If par. 4 talks about work of art, ornamentation, carpets; par. 5 talks about machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements. It’s specific. What is general? Par. 3. Par 4 and 5 are specific.
Take note of the enumeration. Plural yan, they’re all plural. Parang cheese ba, yung keso. You don’t
say “cheeses”, the plural is still cheese. The same with machinery, you don’t say “machineries”,
wrong grammar yan. Machinery, can be both singular or plural. Do not write down in your exam
“machineries”, yan ang nakalagay sa law, sundin nyo nalang.
Under par. 5, when is machinery considered immovable?

Requisites for machinery to be considered immovable under par. 5:
1. The machinery must be placed by the owner of the immovable.
Refers not to the owner of the machinery, but the owner of the land or building.
Like San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Darong. That beer making machine. That building must
be owned by SMC to be considered immovable. Kung renta lang yung building na yan, as a
general rule, hindi yan immovable under par. 5.
2. The machinery is placed for an industry or work which is carried on in the building or the land.
If you put a sawmill there in the SMC plant. Even if it was placed there by SMC it’s not for beer
making. It should match.
3. The machinery must tend to directly meet the need of such industry or said work.
4. The machinery must be essential and principal elements of the industry.

It must be essential and not merely incidental.
Example: In a lumberyard. Computers for accounting of the lumberyard is not essential

machinery. It must be the sawmill itself.
Those are the requisites for immovability under par. 5.
Exception:
If the machinery is placed by the tenant, then it does not become immovable. The machine will
remain movable.
Exception to the exception:

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There are lots of lease contracts entered into wherein improvements are made. Kunyari lalagyan ko
ito ng machine and at the end of the contract there is a stipulation there that upon the termination
of the contract the machine will be left behind. Then that is the exception to the exception.
Par 5 Summary:
General Rule: Placed by the owner to be immovable.
Exception: Placed by the tenant, movable.
Exception to the exception: By stipulation, immovable.
Cases:
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, GR 40411, Aug 7, 1935. Ang Davao Sawmill hindi nagbayad ng
kuryente. So, nagfile ng kaso ang Davao Light and Davao Light won. The judgment was for a certain
sum of money. Let’s say its P1M. Davao Sawmill was not able to pay, di nabayaran ang P1M. Under
the Rules on Civil Procedure 39, if the losing party in a case cannot pay, the sheriff will go to the
premises and levy property. The purpose of the levy is to sell the property in an auction sale so that
the proceeds can be used to pay the debt. What was levied was the machinery belonging to Davao
Sawmill. Davao Sawmill contends that the machinery cannot be levied because it is immovable
property. What happens next? There is a provision in the contract between Davao Sawmill and the
owner that all machinery that all machinery placed there will not accrue to the owner of the land.
Davao Sawmill will bring the machinery with it. It does not fall under the exception to the exception.
The machinery is placed by the owner of the machinery but not the owner of the land. The important
thing is to become immovable under the law, it must be placed by the owner of the immovable to
which the movable is attached. It does not have to be attached like paragraph 3, pwedeng
nakapatong lang dun.
Machinery and Engineering vs. CA, GR L-7057, Oct 29, 1954. Ipo Limestone is a marble
manufacturing company. It has a machinery here that it uses for its marble manufacturing processing.
Is that machinery movable or immovable? Yes, it is immovable under par. 3 because it is
incorporated under the building, etc. Yes, it is immovable under par. 5 because it is machinery that
is used to directly meet the needs of the business of marble manufacturing. Yun lang, no need to
tackle the filing of the complaint. Again, we are not taking procedure. Just mention the facts that are
important.

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June 20 - Alcomendras
SERGE PRODUCTS VS PCI
Serge Products is a chocolate making company. it bought chocolate making machines

from abroad and entered into a lease agreement with PCI Lending who paid for the
machines. In the lease agreement, they agreed to treat the machines as personal
property. Serge placed the machines in the chocolate making company.
Issue: What kind of property are the chocolate making machines?
Held: The Chocolate Making Machines are immovable property under Article 415 (5).
They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry.Hence,
although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements
in the industry.”
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and
shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY
or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached
to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon,
or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”
Thus, the machines are personal property in so far as the contracting parties are
concerned.
The enumeration under Article 415 is exclusie. But under the principle of estoppel, if the
parties treat the object as moveable, then as between the parties it is moveable. This is an
exception to Article 415.
In the old case of Meralco vs CA, the Supreme Court said that electric towers/posts are
moveable. Therefore they are not subject to real property tax.
CALTEX VS CA
Caltex is an oil company that owns underground gasoline tanks and gasoline pumps.
The said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under
an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the
operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment. The lessor
of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines

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and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of
the lease.
Issue: WON the tanks are immoveable
Held: Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some
purposes they might be considered personalty.
Note: The SC did not rule on the immoveability of the machines
BENGUET CORPORATION VS CBAA
The controversy arose in 1985 when the Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed that
tailings dam and the land as taxable improvements.
Issue: WON tailing dams are immoveable and thus taxable.
Held: Immoveoable under Article 415 (1) and (3). Whether a structure constitutes an
improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of
permanence intended in its construction and use, The expression "permanent" as
applied to an improvement does not imply that the improvement must be used
perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been
accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the
land to which it is annexed is still used for the said purpose.
The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an
"improvement" because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value and
utility of petitioner’s mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its
character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code.
MERALCO VS CITY ASSESSOR
MERALCO is a private corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws to

operate as a public utility engaged in electric distribution. It owns among others
transformer and electric post, transmission lines, insulators and electric meters. The City
Assessor imposed a real property tax on these properties
Issue: WON the properties are immoveable
Held: The properties under Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code are immovables
by destination, or "those which are essentially movables, but by the purpose for which
they have been placed in an immovable, partake of the nature of the latter because of
the added utility derived therefrom."These properties, including machinery, become
immobilized if the following requisites concur: (a) they are placed in the tenement by
the owner of such tenement; (b) they are destined for use in the industry or work in
the tenement; and (c) they tend to directly meet the needs of said industry or works.
The first two requisites are not found anywhere in the Local Government Code.They
traverse the lands of other people.

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On the other hand, the Local Government Code defines machinery as those which may
or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily, to the real property. It includes the
physical facilities for production, the installations and appurtenant service facilities,
those which are mobile, self-powered or self- propelled, and those not permanently
attached to the real property which are actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet
the needs of the particular industry, business or activity and which by their very nature
and purpose are designed for, or necessary to its manufacturing, mining, logging,
commercial, industrial or agricultural purposes.
As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations,
and the Local Government Code, a special law granting local government units the
power to impose real property tax, then the latter shall prevail. Thus, while they may
not be immovables under the Civil Code, they are considered immovable under the
Local Government Code.
Note: This case reversed the 1964 Meralco Case.
CAPITOL WIRELESS VS PROVINCIAL TREASURER
Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing

international telecommunications services. The Provincial Assessor had determined that
the submarine cable systems described in Capwire's Sworn Statement of True Value of
Real Properties are taxable real property. Capwire argues that they are not real property
as they are just water cables.
Issue: WON submarine cable systems are immovable
Held: Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission

lines. Both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not
directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but both
may be classified under the term "machinery" as real property under Article 415(5) of
the Civil Code for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate.
Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters" is classified

as an immovable under Article 415(8) of the Code. A classic example is a boathouse
which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the
shore and used as a residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is
considered real property.
The subject cables are fixed so they can fall under number 8. They call also fall under number 3
because they are attached to the land since they are submerged in the water.
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR VS FILIPINAS PALM OIL

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Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. is a private organization engaged in palm oil
plantation5 with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National Development
Company lands in Agusan del Sur.6 Harvested fruits from oil palm trees are converted
into oil through Filipinas' milling plant in the middle of the plantation area. Within the
plantation, there are also three (3) plantation roads and a number of residential homes
constructed by Filipinas for its employees. Road equipment traversed the roads.
Issue: WON road equipment is immovable
Held: Yes. It falls under Article 415 (5). Filipinas Palm Oil is engaged in palm oil
plantation. Thus, it harvests fruits from palm trees for oil conversion through its milling
plant. By the nature of respondent's business, transportation is indispensable for its
operations.
Physical facilities for production is comprehensive enough to include the road

equipment and mini haulers as actually, directly, and exclusively used by respondent to
meet the needs of its operations in palm oil production. Moreover, "mini-haulers are
farm tractors pulling attached trailers used in the hauling of seedlings during planting
season and in transferring fresh palm fruits from the farm [or] field to the processing
plant within the plantation area.” The indispensability of the road equipment and mini
haulers in transportation makes it actually, directly, and exclusively used in the
operation of respondent's business.
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature,
in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them
permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these
places are included;
Animal houses are considered immovable property if the owner of the animal house places or
preserves them with the intention of it having permanently attached to to land.
The animals are also considered immovable. However, it can be subject of theft because when they
are stolen they are no longer inside the animal house and thus becomes immovable.
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
The fertilizer comes from the sack and you spread it on the ground. You cannot separate it once it
is spread out as it is incorporated in the soil. It becomes part of the land.
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and
waters either running or stagnant;

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(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
Vessels, ships, are movable. But boathouses, light houses, although they are floating in the water,
by express provision of law, they are immovable for as long as they remain in a fixed place.
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable
property.
Example: Company X has a contract to build a bridge in Diversion Road. That contract is immovable.
Other rights over immovable property. Examble: I can file an action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land, that right is considered immovable under the law.
The piece of paper where the contract is written is movable. The right is immovable.

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June 21, 2017 - Manligoy
In JG Summit vs CA, there’s this foreign corporation who was granted the right to lease what? Share
in what? What was the property involved here? Long term leasehold rights. Long term leasehold
rights were granted to a foreign corporation. Now, the rate does not matter. We don’t really care
about the name. We forget the name later. So, PHILSECO, a foreign corporation was granted more
than 40% long term leasehold rights. Why is there an allegation that the more than 40% long term
leasehold rights is violative of the Constitution? Why? Why is it argued? What particular provision
of Article 415 was being referred to here? Paragraph 10 which is? Long term leasehold rights are
what? What kind of immovable property? What does paragraph 10 say? Rights over real properties.
So, leasehold, meaning the right to lease real property. 40% ang share ng foreign corporation to the
rights over the leasehold right. According to JG Summit, this is violative of the Constitution because
that kind of right is one of those enumerated in Article 415, particularly paragraph 10, contracts or
public works and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
Now, the question is, the issue is, is there a violation of the Constitutional provision? There is no
violation because the prohibition in the Constitution only applies to land, as in Land only. It does
not apply to the other immovable enumerated in Article 415. Otherwise, the SC said, in a strange
situation where the ownership of immovable properties such as trees, plants, fruits attached to the
land, machinery, what else… fire escape and all those things will be limited to Filipino corporations
only. So, that constitutional prohibition does not apply to that entire Article 415 but only to land.
Are we clear?
JG SUMMIT vs CA
GR 124293 | January 31, 2005
Case Digest
FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,

entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the
construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and
Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the
right of first refusal in case of a sale.
Through a series of transfers, NIDC’s rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the
National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should
be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After
negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasaki’s right of first refusal under the JVA be “exchanged” for
the right to top by five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings,
Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead.
During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to
top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summit’s bid. JG Summit protested,
contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-
40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECO’s capital stock at bidding,
Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock.

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In the year 2000 case, it was settled by the Court that PHILSECO is a public utility and is therefore
required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the constitution. On the other hand,
Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock
should not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock due to the constitutional and contractual
proscriptions. NIDC being a government corporation may purchase even beyond the 60% of the
total shares. Petitioner now assails the SC decision through a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO continues to violate the Constitution by owning long-term leasehold
rights which are real rights within the meaning of immovable property under Art. 415 of the Civil
Code
HELD:
Petitioner cites Article 415 of the Civil Code alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate the
constitution by owning long-term leasehold rights. It states that in the definition of immovable
property, it includes: “contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.” The Court ruled that whether or not owning long-term leasehold rights are
questions of fact, the veracity of which would require introduction of evidence and the Court
needs to validate these factual allegations based on competent and reliable evidence. As such,
the Court cannot resolve the questions they pose.
Second, J.G. Summit misreads the provisions of the Constitution cited in its own pleadings, to wit:
Petitioner has consistently pointed out in the past that private respondent is not a 60%-40%
corporation, and this violates the Constitution x xxThe violation continues to this day because
under the law, it continues to own real property…
To review the constitutional provisions involved, Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
(the JVA was signed in 1977), provided:
“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.”
This provision is the same as Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. It was correctly
observed by the public respondents that the prohibition in the Constitution applies only to
ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415
of the Civil Code which embraces real rights. Otherwise, we would be confronted with a strange
situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit
attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.
Let’s go to our next topic. Let’s talk about immovable property under Article 416. So remember, 415
is an enumeration and it is exclusive. So, 416 says, “the following are deemed to be personal
property”. There is also an enumeration.
Article 416. Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:

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(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;
So, if not included in Article 415, it is movable. There’s no such thing as not immovable, not
movable. It’s movable or immovable. If it’s not immovable, it is movable. If it is not movable, it is
immovable. So, anything else not included in Article 415 is movable.
Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personal property;
Anything that is considered real or immovable under Article 415 is immovable but if there is a
special law that says “aaah, that particular immovable property is movable for this particular
purpose”, then that is movable. So, in relation to that, did I assign Sibal vs Valdez?
What are growing crops? What are they? Why is it that for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
they are considered movable property? They are mobilized by anticipation.
So, when there is an action filed, diba you are taking up procedure, there is an action filed by Sibal
against Valdez. Valdez won and the Court ordered Sibal to pay Valdez a certain sum of money.
Because Sibal was not able to produce the amount, the amount of attachment, the sheriff would
look around for property of the losing party in the case. In this case, Sibal. And, levy on those
properties he can find and those properties will be sold in an auction sale and the proceeds of the
sale will be used to pay the party who won the case. In this case, it’s Valdez. So, what was levied
here? It was the sugar cane of Sibal growing in his land. Hindi yung land but yung sugar cane lang.
Immovable property yan. So, the sugar cane was sold in an auction sale and the highest bidder was
Valdez.
Now, the thing is, in an auction sale or foreclosure sale, if what is sold is personal property, there’s
no right of redemption but what if what is sold is immovable or real property? There is this one year
right of redemption. So, etong si Sibal, within that one-year period, wanted to redeem the sugar cane
from Valdez. Sabi ni Valdez, hindi pwede kasi personal property yan. Walang right of redemption
to a personal property. Sabi ni Sibal, “No. My sugar cane is immovable under Article 415, paragraph
2.”
So, who is correct? Sibal is correct. Immovable siya under Article 415, paragraph 2 but he failed to
notice that there is Article 416. And, there is this special law, the Chattel Mortgage Law, which
considers growing fruits as movable for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage. Meaning, if growing fruits
are mortgaged or foreclosed for that matter, then they are considered movable because, as already
mentioned, the growing fruits will not stay there attached to the ground forever. They are there to
be harvested and therefore, they are mobilized by anticipation. Soon, they will be harvested. So,
this is “THE” case that explains Article 416, paragraph 2.
SIBAL vs VALDEZ
GR 26278 | August 4, 1927
Case Digest

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Facts:
Sibal alleged that Deputy Sheriff Mamawal, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to Valdez the sugar cane planted by Sibal
and his tenants on seven parcels of land; that within one year from the date of the attachment
and sale, Sibal offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to Valdez the amount sufficient
to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which
he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that
Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether the sugarcane in question had the nature of movable property
Held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 416 of the Civil Code categorically states, “Real property which by any
special provision of law is considered as personal property.”
In the instant case, the Sugarcane, although considered as growing fruits, was originally
immovable, must be regarded as movable because Paragraph 2 of Article 415 has been
modified by special provisions of law, particularly, section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and also
for the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Here, the right to the growing fruits mobilizes by
anticipation.
Make sure when you report your cases, make sure you make it simple. Only the facts that are needed.
You have other subjects. You have an opportunity to make yabang there if you want. In my class, I
don’t need that.
So, let’s go to the third.
Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and
Example, electricity can be the subject of theft because electricity is considered personal property
under Article 416, paragraph 3. So, in relation to that, let’ go to the case of Laurel vs. Judge Abrogar.
In the old days, there was no such thing as internet, facetime. How do you call abroad? You use
your phone dial something and say “Hello, I’d like to make a long-distance call to the US. The
number is blah blah blah”. And then another person will call, “hello, long distance call from the
Philippines”. That’s how long distance call are made before.
So, the only telephone company at the time was PLDT. Mahal ang long distance. Per minute yan.
So, etong si Laurel, kumbaga kolorum. What did he do? He used the PLDT lines and he offered long

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distance calls to the public and those who found out, nakita yung rates niya, pumunta sa kanya
instead of going to PLDT. So, that is the explanation of International simple phishing. According to
Laurel, electricity is generated by the electrical … The international phone calls that he was selling
to 3rd parties are considered property of PLDT because they are made using the PLDT equipment
that they set up. International phone calls, ninakaw niya yun. What else did he steal? He sold
something else. That’s also considered personal property. He sold the business of PLDT because
every phone call he sells to another, nawalan ng income ang PLDT. So, that is also personal property
of PLDT that he stole. IN this case, he did not only steal the international phone calls, every phone
call that he made using PLDT’s equipment is …. Not only that. He also stole the business. So, he is
also liable for the loss of income of PLDT.
LAUREL vs JUDGE ABROGAR

GR 155076 | January 13, 2009
Case Digest
FACTS:
Laurel was one of the accused charged with theft for conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR) operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT's telephone
system, through which Laurel was able to resell or re-route international long distance calls
using PLDT's facilities. Therefore, stealing this business from PLDT.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence,
it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that
the "right to carry on a business" and not "business" is a personal property.
ISSUE: WON international long distance calls and business of providing telecommunications
or telephone services are personal properties.
HELD: YES!
1. In making international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses
or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. Intangible property such as
electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. A
telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. Electricity is personal property under Article
416(3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control
by science."
2. Although business or interest of business was not specifically enumerated as personal

property in the CC, it is still considered to be personal property since it is capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. (Art. 416, par. 1)
Let’s go to the case of Laud vs. People. Take note that human beings are not considered property
but once a person dies, human remains are considered movable property under Article 416,
paragraph 4, something that can be moved from place to place and therefore may be the subject of
seizure.

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LAUD vs PEOPLE
GR 199032 | November 19, 2014
Case Digest
FACTS:
A search warrant was issued to seize the remains of the six (6) alleged victims that were
executed and buried within the Laud compound. Retired SPO4 Laud raised that human
remains cannot be seized in a search warrant because they are not personal properties.
ISSUE:
WON human remains are personal personal that can be subjects of a search warrant
HELD:
Personal properties referred to in the context of things that can be seized in a search warrant
refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular
person. Article 416 of the Civil Code, which Laud himself cites, states that in general, all things
which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering
that human remains can generally be transported from place to place they are considered
personal properties and may then be valid subjects of a search warrant.
So, let’s continue. What are the tests to determine whether a property is movable or immovable?
We have the test by description under paragraph 4 and the test by exclusion. The test by exclusion
is the more superior test because that test under paragraph 1 tells us that property is either movable
or immovable. It draws a line unlike the test of description which is something that can be moved
from place to place. It is still subject to validation but in exclusion, it is very clear. If it’s not under
Article 415, then it is personal property.
Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and
What else is considered personal property or movable property? Obligations and actions which have
for their object movables or demandable sums. So, an example of a legal case is an action for
collection of a sum of money. That kind of action, that kind of right to file an action if you have a
cause of action for that, that is considered personal property. Now, going back to Article 415,
paragraph 10, if the action is accion publiciana which is an action to recover a parcel of land, to
recover possession of a parcel of land, that is immovable under Article 415, paragraph 10. What
does it say? Rights over immovable property. These rights are immovable. So if you have the right
to file an action in court and the subject is movable or personal, then that right is also personal. Very
easy. If the subject of your action is land, then your right is also immovable under Article 415,
paragraph 10. Are we clear on that?
Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal property:

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(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may
have real estate. (336a)
Next. No. 2. Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities although they may
have real estate. Now, let’s say Mr. X owns an internet café. He owns an internet café. Maraming
properties diyan. Let’s say, he owns the building and he own the land. That’s immovable. The
computers, are they movable or immovable? Paragraph 5, machinery and equipment used in the
industry. In the internet café, the computers are the machinery. What about yung kanyang mga
coffee maker, yung kanyang mga aircon? Movables na yan. He also has the business. The business
is considered movable or personal property. Pag business, personal property. What if hindi si Mr. X
ang may-ari kundi si XYZ corporation and then you and I are stockholders of XYZ corporation. Etong
si XYZ corporation aside from the internet café, he owns subdivisions, condominiums, all those are
immovable but your shares of stock, my shares of stock in that particular corporation according to
Article 417 are personal property even though that corporation is Ayala Land or Camella or whatever
real estate developer. When it comes to shares of stock of a corporation, they are movable or
personal.
Art. 418. Movable property is either consumable or non-consumable. To the first class belong
those movables which cannot be used in a manner appropriate to their nature without their
being consumed; to the second class belong all the others. (337)
So, movable property is either consumable or non-consumable. Very easy, you know that already.
You also have fungible or non-fungible. When it comes to consumability, it is as to the nature. When
it comes to fungibility, it is based on intention. It can be consumable but non-fungible. It is intention
which determines whether it is fungible or not.
We are done with the first classification of property, as to mobility and immobility.

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June 22, 2017 Part 1 - Pahayahay
Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
So property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. And Article 420 enumerates what
is property of public dominion. So, under Article 420, there are three kinds:
Number 1, those intended for public use. The second kind are those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service. And third, for the
development of the national wealth.
So if you look at number 1 there, there is an enumeration. Here in the enumeration, it says road,
you think the road in Ladislawa village are considered property of public dominion? So roads,
canals, bridges, ports, to be considered property of public dominion, must have been constructed
by the state or the government. So private roads inside a private subdivision, constructed by a private
company, are not included in this list.
So, the bridges constructed by the government are included but if there is an estate with a bridge,
that is not included. So not all bridges, not all roads, not all canals, are property of public dominion.
But all rivers are. So there is a river that runs through property that is privately owned, that river is
not included. What else? Banks, shores. What do you mean by shores? We will go through the
meaning of that in the cases. So take note of the enumeration there under Article 420.
Now, there is no enumeration under number 2. Those intended for public service. What are
examples of property for public service? They may be used only by duly authorized persons such as
the police cars, not anybody can use the police cars only the police. What about the army vessels,
the army helicopters, those are not for public use but for public service. The fire trucks owned by
the city. Of course there are private fire tracks which are not included. Even equipment used by the
DPWH, are for public service.
So when you talk of public use, anybody can use. Other examples are, mga plaza, government
parks, like that in City Hall, Rizal Park, or Magsaysay park. City streets, everyone can use. Property
for the development of national wealth. We have our natural resources, forest lands and mineral
lands.
What are the characteristics then of property of public dominion? First, they are outside the
commerce of man. They cannot be the subject of contracts. They cannot be sold, donated, etc. So
nobody can sell the city hall to a private entity. Second, it cannot be acquired by prescription. Third,
it cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law. So private property is normally registered
in the Registry of Deeds. You have a parcel of land and a title to that. You cannot go to the Register
of Deeds and register the Bangkerohan Bridge. No, that is not allowed because it is property of

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public dominion. Fourth, it cannot be attached or levied upon by execution. I have discussed that
yesterday. The relation of the case of Sibal v. Valdez.
In one case here that happened in Davao City, there was this contractor who sued the DPWH
because he was not paid for the services and the contractor won. The money judgment was, let's
say 10 Million, when the contractor went to the DPWH to collect, wala nibayad ang DPWH,
inattach ang mga (equipment) or levy. Was this correct? And the SC said NO, because they are
property of public dominion.
And fifth, it cannot be burdened by voluntary easements. We will take that when we reach
easements.
So, let us look at the different kinds of property of public dominion. The case of City of Manila v.
Garcia, 19 S 413, February 21, 1967. What characteristic of property of public dominion is being
discussed here? The characteristic that public property is outside the commerce of man. So, that
case illustrated the first characteristic.
What is the next case? Republic v. Vda. de Castillo, 163 S 286, June 30, 1968. So, it talks about
what particular type of property? Shores. Did the Supreme Court distinguish in this case the different
kinds of shores? Lakeshore and Foreshore. So, are all kinds of shores property of public dominion?
So here, the SC distinguished lakeshore from foreshore. What we are talking about here is lakeshore,
property adjacent to the lake. And according to the SC, lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake,
must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea.
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while
accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain.
So this case, as discussed, when it comes to lakeshore, that belongs to the owner of the land adjacent
to the lake but foreshore belongs to the state. So there is a distinction here when it comes to shores.
Not all shores are treated the same way. We will not discuss accretion. Just take note that Laguna
de Bay is the lake and all owners of property adjacent to the lake own the lakeshore. But Manila
Bay, is a part of the sea, so all shores along Manila Bay are foreshore. Foreshore is what you call
part of the land adjacent to the sea. What is considered the property of public dominion is the
foreshore. Anyway, just take note of that. We will explain that in detail when we discuss accretion.
So let us not confuse ourselves by trying to figure out if the property belongs to de Castillo or not.
We will go to that later.
Let us go to the next case. Republic v. Gonzales, 199 S 788, July 31, 1991. So property for public
use are not always already owned by the State. The State also acquires properties, and the way to
do it is by expropriation. So if the State needs certain land, it buys the property and it be appropriated
for public use then it may do so. But the requirement it must be for public use. Definitely, road
widening, that is definitely for public use. So it was argued, parking are for public use? But the SC
said, it is not who uses such parking area but whether or not it is accessible to everyone who wants
to avail of it. So, this case illustrates how the State acquires private property and it is transformed
into property of public dominion for public use. So here we saw a transformation from private to
public. Later, we will look at how public property may be transformed to private.

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Let us go to the next case. Republic v. CA, Morato, 281 S 639, November 14, 1997. Even though a
property has already acquired title, in this case an OCT, was already issued to Morato by the Register
of Deeds, but if it is proven that such property is in truth and in fact, actually property of public
dominion, then it can be reverted back to the State and title of the land because one of the
characteristics of property of public dominion is it cannot be registered.
Republic v. CA, Morato

281 S 639, November 14, 1997
Facts
Josefina Morato was granted (in 1974) a parcel of land through a homestead patent. When the
District Land Officer conducted an investigation, it was discovered that the subject land is a
portion of the Calauag Bay wherein the land is submerged deep under water during high tide
and low tide (specifically 5 to 6 feet deep under water during high tide and 2 feet deep during
low tide). Consequently, the Land Officer then petitioned for the reversion of the subject land to
the public domain on the ground that the land is a "foreshore" land.
Issue
WON the land in question is a 'foreshore' land, hence a property of the public domain.
Held
The SC here ruled in the affirmative stating that, "when the sea moved towards the estate and the
tide invaded it, the invaded property became a foreshore land and passed to the realm of the
public domain." And by virtue of paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the Civil Code, which specifically
provides for the inclusion of shores or foreshores as among the things that are property of public
dominion. Therefore, the subject land, being a foreshore land, is a property of public dominion
so much so that it is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
Therefore, the land should be reverted back to the state.
*Foreshore land - that part of the land which is between high and low water and left dry by the
flux and reflux of the tides.
Next case. Let us discuss Chavez case later. We go to the next case. Morandarte & Ferbrera v. CA,
436 S 213, August 12, 2004. Yes, very simple. A river is always a property of public dominion
whether it is full of water or dried up. So it cannot be registered, that is considered property of public
dominion.
Let us go to Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 S 110, November 11, 2004. So, government land. He claims
that he has a right of way over that property. We are not saying that Sarmiento has the right to live
there, we are just talking about the right of way that he claims he has but the SC emphasized that
one of the characteristics of property of public dominion that it cannot be burdened by voluntary
easement. A right of way is an easement.
In the case of Domalsin v. Valenciano, 480 S 114, January 25, 2006. What is the subject property
here? A portion of road. So this cannot be used, construct or build a house. It is outside the commerce
of man.

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Let us go to MIAA v. CA, GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006. So, the airports, the land, improvement,
and equipments within the MIAA complex, they are all property of public domain. Actually, the one
that wanted to tax the MIAA was the City of Parañaque. The MIAA sits on two cities, part of which
is the City of Pasay and part of it is in City of Parañaque. So the other case has the same facts and
ruling that the airport, lands, and buildings are outside the commerce of man. What the government
wanted to do was to sell the land and the building in an auction sale so that the proceeds will be
pambayad sa tax, realty taxes. But the SC said, because it is property of public dominion, the state
cannot tax itself. So we will not discuss the other MIAA case. It is the same.
Let us go now to PFDA v. CA, 534 S 490, October 2, 2007. So aside form airports, we have fishports.
The only requirement is that they should be constructed by the State and not by private individuals.
Now, in the case of PFDA v. CBAA, 638 S 644, December 15, 2010. The same facts but different
place. This time it is in Lucena City and the one who financed the project, this fishport, was
constructed on a reclaimed land, financed through a loan from the overseas. So it was funded by
some Japanese entity. The SC still considered the fishport in Lucena as property of public dominion
because even though it was financed by somebody else, it was constructed by the State so it still
falls under the term "ports".
I think we have already discussed the cases under Article 420. Let us proceed to the next topic. So
we already know the different kinds of property of public dominion. Does the state owned property
that are not of public dominion? And the answer if Yes.
Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.
So if not 420, it is patrimonial property. What is patrimonial property? It is a property owned by the
State in its private capacity and it is not devoted to public use, public service, and development of
the national wealth.
What are the characteristics of patrimonial property? Definitely, patrimonial property of the State
does not have the characteristics of property of public dominion. Meaning, such property is not
outside the commerce of man, it can be sold. And included in the patrimonial property is what you
call the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. So in this subject, you will learn a lot
about acquisitive prescription. It is possible to own property, to acquire ownership of land just by
possessing the land. What kind of land can be owned through prescription is patrimonial property
of the State.
So let us go to Article 422.
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
If you look at Article 422, it would seem like it is automatic that if property is no longer intended for
public use, patrimonial na siya. But is that really the case? Let us look at the case of Cebu Oxygen
v. Bercilles, 66 S 481, August 29, 1975. So what is the procedure to convert it? So it is not automatic.
There was this resolution made by the? Because of the resolution, it declared that road as abandoned
plus the mayor as authorized to dispose of it. So it is not automatic. In this case, this is not state

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owned, this is a property owned by the city, by the Local Government Unit. I just want to explain
how conversion is made.
Next, the case of International Hardwood v. UP, 200 S 554, August 13, 1991. So originally what
kind of property of public dominion we have here? So this is property for the development of the
national wealth. It is a public forest. And just like property of public use and public service, it is
outside the commerce of man. One of the ... of forest lands is the government issues timber license
agreements. International Hardwood had TLA(?) in that particular area. So may TLA na and then UP
took over by virtue of that law RA 3990. They are being charged now by UP. This is beyond the
commerce of man, how come you are already charging forest fees? So how was it converted? So by
enactment of a law. The legislative department of the government can convert and that is exactly
what happened here. Hence, UP can now enter into contracts to ... such property.
Next case, Laurel v. Garcia, 187 S 797, July 25, 1990. So the embassy was moved to a cheaper
area. So the government wanted to sell the property because it was no longer intended for public
service. What kind of property of public dominion was it before it became abandoned? Paragraph
2, property that is not for public use but for public service. Embassies, consulates, these are for public
service. So what is required to convert property of public dominion to patrimonial? So in this case,
the SC said there must be legislative and executive concurrence. What the proponents did here was
just propose that the property be sold because it is no longer being used for public service. But the
SC said that is not enough to have that executive act.
So if you look at these three cases, that we discussed on conversion, it would seem like what is
important in converting property of public dominion to patrimonial is the legislative act because
according to the SC here:
The subsequent approval by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating

committee to sell Roppongi was premature, or at the very least, conditioned on a valid change
in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the
force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. Assuming for the
sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there
is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents - there is no law authorizing its conveyance.
So it is always the law, the SC is looking for a law. What happened in Cebu Oxygen? It was initiated
by the legislative body sa city council. In International Hardwood? It was a law.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Remember, first we looked at roads for public use, then forests for national wealth, and the embassies
for public service. So remember that.

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June 22, 2017 Part 2 - Peroy
Chavez v. PEA
GR 133250, Jul 9, 2002
Facts:
1973: The Government entered into a contract with CDCP, a private corporation. Under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road & Reclamation Project (MCCRRP), CDCP is to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, located in the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
1977: CDCP turned over the project to Philippine Estates Authority (PEA)
January 1988: A Special Patent was issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino transferring to PEA the land
reclaimed under MCCRRP)
April 1988: Register of Deeds of Parañaque issued TCTs covering the Freedom Islands. The
Freedom Islands are 3 islands that have been reclaimed as part of the MCCRRP project.
April 1995: PEA and Amari, a private corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA).
Involving the following:
a. Development of the Freedom Islands – 157.8 hectares of land previously reclaimed
through the MCCRRP;
b. Additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding the freedom islands.
Eventually, the PEA-Amari JVA was amended as follows:

a. Development of the Freedom Islands;
b. Reclamation of an additional 250 has. of submerged areas surrounding the islands;
c. Plus reclamation of additional 350 has., at Amari’s option to regularize the reclaimed
land.
d. The title of the reclaimed land is to be distributed 70% to Amari and 30% to PEA.
e. Delivery of the Certificate of Title in Amari’s name.
The controversy arose Sen. Pres. Maceda called the JVA the “grandmother of all scams”, which
launched a senate investigation, and another investigation under Pres. Ramos.
Properties involved:
a. Freedom Islands
b. Approximately 600 has. of submerged areas
Issue:
What is the status of the reclaimed areas?
Ruling:
1. Freedom Islands – Alienable Lands of the Public Domain
Initially, the classification of reclaimed lands are inalienable land of public domain. Under the
Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, the State owns all the

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lands and waters of public domain. And all lands not acquired from the Government, by purchase
or grant, belongs to the public domain. Since the Freedom Islands are reclaimed lands, and have
not been acquired from the Government by sale or grant, they are considered to still be owned
by the government.
Being inalienable lands of public domain, the islands are outside the commerce of men, and
cannot be leased, donated or sold, or be the subject of a contract. It may be converted to
patrimonial property through 2 official acts of the executive department:
a. Classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition;
b. A Declaration that these lands are not needed for public service.
For the alienable lands of public domain to be sold, there must be a law that should be passed by
Congress.
The 1988 issuance of Special Patent and issuance of TCTs is equivalent to the classification of the
Freedom Islands into patrimonial property, i.e. Alienable Lands of Public Domain.
The transfer of Certificate of Titles in the name of Amari is tantamount to the transfer of ownership
of Public Land to a private corporation. Sec. 3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease only.
2. Submerged areas surrounding the Freedom Islands – Inalienable Natural Resources of Public
Domain
Submerged areas are part of the State’s waters. Under the Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in Sec.
2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, waters are property of public domain, and are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
In order for submerged areas to be alienated, the following must happen:

a. Reclamation of the land;
b. Classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition;
c. A Declaration that these lands are not needed for public service.
Quote from the full text:
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these

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submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside
the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Ma’am: Reclaimed property is property of public dominion. What if the reclamation is done by a
private corporation?
Reporter: Under the old Philippine laws, anyone who reclaims land from the sea is the owner.
According to CA 141, which superseded the old laws and is the controlling law on reclamation, any
land reclaimed from the sea is of public dominion. It doesn’t matter who reclaimed the land, whether
a private corporation, a private individual, or the government, the initial classification is of public
dominion.
M: We have reclaimed land is not included in Art. 420. How then is this reclaimed land which is
automatically property of public dominion, how is this converted into alienable and disposable
land? What is the process?
Answer:
a. The President must classify the land as agricultural because only agricultural lands may be
alienated by the government.
b. The President then classifies the land as open to alienation or disposition.
c. Declaration that these lands will no longer be used for public service. [Up to this point, the
land is now alienable]
d. Congress may then pass a law allowing the sale of the alienable land of public domain. [this
is only needed if the land is to be sold]
M: Is a law by Congress required to convert (to alienable land of public domain)?
R: No. The act of Congress is only required when the land is to be sold. When the land is only to be
classified as alienable and capable of disposition, only the action of the executive is necessary.

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M: There must be two declarations here and it is only the executive. For the classification process,
there must be this classification to be made:
a. The land is alienable or disposable; and
b. Declare them no longer needed for public use or public service.
It’s the DENR who can do all these things as part of the executive department. For reclaimed land,
CA 141 gives us the procedure. For the conveyance, we need a law. For the conversion from
property of public dominion to alienable and disposable land of the state, patrimonial, DENR. But
in order to convey, meaning to alienate it to others, there is this requirement of a law. A law is
needed to convey any real property belonging to the government, it’s not for the government to
convey.
M: Let me ask you, Ador, how do you differentiate foreshore from submerged when it comes to
reclassification?
R: They are essentially the same. Foreshore as well as submerged are properties of public domain.
M: So, let’s say we have strip of foreshore here. Let’s say we have 10 kilometers by 1 kilometer, 10
square kilometers. Can this foreshore strip be reclassified?
R: Yes. According to the case, foreshore as well as submerged areas should first be reclaimed. When
they are reclaimed they are classified as public dominion. After that it follows the process of how
reclaim lands are classified into alienable property.
M: But I read somewhere that foreshore can be reclassified as is. No need for reclamation because
there is that you can actually measure. But submerged, you cannot base the area of the submerged
on what is underwater. So submerged, before it can be considered, kasi ito it’s already property of
public dominion. This one (referring to the submerged part) this one is not land e, this is water. This
one (foreshore) can be can be reclassified and sold. But this one (submerged) has to be reclaimed
first before it can be considered property of public dominion and then it can be reclassified. So that
is the difference between foreshore and submerged.
You know this case is so long, so long that there is so many steps that are presented. There’s also
this portion here that “foreshore and submerged indisputably belong to the public domain and are
inalienable unless reclaimed and classified as alienable”. So just read this case if you want to get
the full story.
But in any case, to make a long story short, what are the steps.
1. First, reclamation. We are talking about reclaimed area.
2. And then it would be classified as alienable and disposable. This will be done by the
executive department.
3. And there must be a declaration that it is no longer intended for public use or for public
service.
4. And then there must be a law for the conveyance thereof.
The big issue here is the title of the property of the Freedom Islands and all the other areas are to be
transferred to Amari in the name of Amari. Is this allowed? The answer is No. At the most Amari can

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lease the reclaimed areas once they are reclassified because of the constitutional prohibition. Only
private persons can. Kasi agricultural ang classification nito e. Every natural person can only own 5
hectares. It’s really tedious if you have 300 hectares to buy. How many people would you need to
buy. Better to just lease.
157.4 hectares of reclaimed lands, the Freedom Islands have already been converted and are now
alienable lands of the public domain. So, PEA may lease the lands to public corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership. PEA may sell only to Filipino citizens, subject to the ownership
limitation.
Now what about the submerged areas that are to be reclaimed? They remain inalienable natural
resources of public domain. The government can only make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
So, actually, what really has to be reclaimed in order to acquire some kind identity as land are the
reclaimed areas [I think she meant submerged areas]. Because foreshore, in truth and in fact, can be
leased out as we will see in the case of […] under accretion. Anyway, that is the case of Chavez vs.
PEA.
Let’s go to the case of RP v. City of Parañaque.
So, you can see that we have 2 cases involving the PEA and reclaimed land. But the decisions are
not that clear. They do not really agree with each other on all fours. Because in the case of Chavez
v. PEA, which was decided en banc, and the ponente was J. Carpio, legislative participation is only
required for conveyance. But in the case of City of Parañaque, this is not en banc, 3rd division J.
Mendoza, the must be a law or Presidential Proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable, and open to disposition or concession. Now I’m not saying they are
conflicting, no they are not, they are just not on all fours. Because here in City of Parañaque, either
a proclamation or a law. Diba in City of Manila v. Garcia is legislative and executive concurrence.
Here it is either, now. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and open to disposition or concession.
Let’s go to Dream Village v. BCDA.
So, other words, for property of public dominion to be classified or converted to patrimonial property
it is not enough to declare it to be alienable or disposable. There must be an express declaration
also that it is no longer intended for public use or for public service because that is the requirement
of Art. 422. But since still used, still intended for public use or public service, no amount of
classification can convert it to patrimonial property of the state. The SC said here, because they
claimed to have ownership by prescription, the SC court said that it is provided in Sec. 14 par. 2 of
PD 1529 that: before acquisitive prescription can commence the property sought to be registered
must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the
state that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth or that
the property can be converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the
land remains to be property of public dominion. Here the declarations are important. Who does the
declaration, the court did not specify.
Let’s go to the next provision.

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Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property. (343)
It is divide into 2 only:

1. Property for public use, and
2. Patrimonial property
Take note that when it comes to property for the development of national wealth like timberland,
minerals, under the Regalian doctrine, that belongs to the state, not the cities, not the provinces
where such forestland, timberland is situated. They all belong to the state.
What is only under Art. 423 is public use and patrimonial.
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades,
and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (344a)
Enumerates what are these property for public use:

1. provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,
2. the squares,
3. fountains,
4. public waters,
5. promenades, and
6. public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
And all other properties possessed by them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Did I assign province of Zamboanga del Norte? No. Well, the reporter of SP of Bataan will discuss
that.
Let’s go to the case of LBP v. Cacayuran.
M: What do you mean by needs […] conversion?
Reporter: there must be a positive act on the part of the national government before they […]
M: So, the public plaza falls under number 2 squares. Actually […] municipality […] public plaza.
So, who can convert? The conversion needs a law. Therefore, the Sanggunian passed an ordinance
converting it. What was the ordinance all about?
R: For the construction of a commercial center in the public plaza.

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M: Construction of a commercial center. Was there an ordinance that reclassified it?
R: There was no specific ordinance that classified the said property. There was only an ordinance
for the construction.
M: For property of the LGUs to be the subject of contracts like the building of a commercial area or
mortgage it to the bank, there must be conversion or reclassification to patrimonial. Because as long
as the property remains to be property of public dominion, it is beyond the commerce of man. Here
there was no proper conversion, it is just a shortcut that is taken by the municipality.
Let’s go to SP of Bataan v. Garcia.
M: What did the SC say in the case of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga
which was discussed in the case of SB of Bataan? How many kinds of property do we have?
R: In Art. 423 there are only 2 kinds of property. In the case of Province of Zamboanga, it was
emphasized that the municipal corporation law had the effect of including public service as a
classification.
M: Yes, take note that under the Civil Code, we only have 2 kinds: property for public use and
patrimonial property. But we have the last paragraph there, “without prejudice to the provision of
special law”. The law on municipal corporations classifies property for public service as included
in property of the local government unit. The land which is in the name of the province of Bataan,
actually it is registered under the province of Bataan. Sabi ng province of Bataan, patrimonial ito.
Because […] wanted to transfer the title of the property to the Polytechnic College. The SC said, “If
the property is owned by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity, it is
public and Congress has absolute control.” So, if its purpose is public and government like a
Polytechnic school, is a state university, congress still has control over it. “In its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control”. The state runs the school,
congress can dictate to Bataam province that the title of the property be transferred to the Polytechnic
state university.
We have finished this topic and the last provision is that. We have property of public dominion and
we have private property. And that is what we will discuss in our succeeding topic, private property.

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June 27 - Alcomendras
Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights.
Ownership is not limited to things. Rights are also considered property as we read in 415 (10) 417
(1). These are rights that are owned.
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover
it.
These are the fundamental and basic rights of an owner.
Right to enjoy includes

1. Right to possess (jus possidendi)- right to hold the thing which is subject to the control of
the owner
2. Right to use (jus utendi) - right to exclude another from the enjoyment of the thing
3. Right to the fruits (jus fruendi)
Right to dispose
1. Right to consume (jus abutendi)– ex. food
2. Right to destroy – throw away or discard one’s property
3. Right to encumber – mortgage property
4. Right to alienate – sale/donation/assignment
Right of action (jus vindicandi)

1. Right to file an action to recover
Limitations of these Rights:

1. Imposed by Law
Example: easement of right of way. A owns a parcel of land adjacent to the street. B owns a
lot behind it and has no access to the highway. B is entitled to a legal easement of right
(Article 649) of way and A has no choice but to give access to B. Instead of A enjoying his
right entirely, he has to allow B a limited right to enjoy his property because the law imposed
that to A.
2. Imposed by the State – in the exercise of its inherent powers of taxation, eminent domain
and police power.
Example: Eminent Domain. A owns a parcel of land that is adjacent to the road. The
government does road widening and expropriates a portion of A’s property. He has to give
up a portion of his property. Right to enjoy is limited.

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3. Imposed by the Owner
Example: A leases out his house to B. A’s right to possess is given to B thus he cannot use it
as he gave that right to B. An owner can limit his own right to enjoy.
4. Imposed by the Grantor.
Example: A donates his parcel of land to his children XYZ but they cannot sell the property
for twenty years. Ownership is transferred to XYZ but right to dispose is limited.
Res perit domino - Owner bears the loss.
Different Actions to Recover
Action to Recover Personal Property:
1. Replevin – action to recover possession of personal property
Example: X buys a car from Toyota and goes to his bank to get a loan. He signs a mortgage
contract which states that the bank shall own the car while X will pay installment. Only upon
the completion of the installment shall X own the car. If X fails to pay installment, the bank
can recover the car through Replevin.
Action to recover real property:

1. Forcible Entry

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June 28, 2017 - Manligoy
CITY OF PASIG vs REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES

GR 185023 | August 24, 2011
Case Digest
What kind of property of the State are we talking about here? Patrimonial property. So, patrimonial
property does not have the characteristics like it cannot be registered, it cannot be … of a property
of public dominion but they are not taxable because owned by the State. The businesses that rent
these kind of property are subject to tax. It’s just the Real Estate Tax that is not payable because they
are owned by the State. You will learn when you reach 3rd Year that Real Estate Taxes are charged
to the owner of the property. So, whether the property is of public dominion or patrimonial property,
they are not subject to Real Estate taxes.
So now, we go to another topic, Article 429.
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property. (n)
So, yesterday we looked at the different kinds of actions that the owner may file to recover his
property and we started discussing the doctrine of self-help. That is the provision. Let us outline the
provision.
Who has the right under this provision? It is the owner or lawful possessor of a thing. And what is
his right? It is to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. When does the right
exist? When there is actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
What do you do? You may use reasonable force necessary to repel the actual, prevent the threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
So, let’s go to an example. X borrowed a car from Z and he parked it there along San Pedro St. While
you were shopping in San Pedro St., you saw the car being stolen by Y. So, he runs to the car and
throws his shoe at Y. So, natamaan si Y sa ulo. So that is an example of Article 429, the Doctrine of
Self Help; using reasonable force. What did he do? He used reasonable force to? Is it actual? Yes, Y
was already about to enter the car. To repel actual to prevent threatened. Actual. You can even
chase Y and recover the car from Y by force. However, what if Y manages to steal the car? Wala na
and then 3 days later, X sees Y. “This is the guys who stole the car.” Can he like beat Y up for taking
the car? The answer is no more. You cannot use 429 anymore. Is this provision applicable to X? Yes.
He may not be the owner of the car but he is a lawful possessor. He borrowed the car from Z. Z can
also, if it is Z who sees Y, he can use the necessary force.
The doctrine of self help is the right to use reasonable force to counter force with force (11:17) It is
similar to self-defense under Article 11 of your Revised Penal Code, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. But in self-defense, one is protecting his person. Under 429, one is protecting his
property. Did I assign the case of People vs Polinar?

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In the old case of People of Polinar, the SC said that attack against one property must be coupled
with an attack against the person for it to be justified. So, if it is only one’s property, then it is not an
attack. Using reasonable force under Article 429 is not justifiable because there needs to be an attack
on one’s person. That is what the SC said in People vs Polinar.
Now, this case has been reversed. Another doctrine was established in the case of People vs
Narvaez.
PEOPLE vs NARVAEZ
GR L-33466 | April 20, 1983
Case Digest
All of the requisites were discussed and yes, the Supreme Court said in this case that it is no longer
necessary for an attack against one’s person to exist before the owner or lawful possessor can use
reasonable force to protect his property from unlawful, threatened or actual invasion or usurpation
thereof. However, in this case, the force that was used was not reasonable. He could have just
stopped them from fencing his property instead of killing them. He killed the people in trying to
protect his property and therefore his acts will not be justified by this doctrine of self-help.
Let’s go to the case of Camarines Norte vs Quezon.
CAMARINES NORTE vs QUEZON

GR 80796 | October 11, 2001
Case Digest
There was a boundary dispute and the SC said Camarines Norte, the owner of that property in this
case. And then?? The issue in this case is when the Quezon officials removed the …, what was their
allegation? If you want to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of property, you … that you are the owner or the lawful possessor. In this case, there was
already a decision rendered by the SC that it’s the Camarines Norte province that owns the disputed
property and thefore Quezon province has no right to invoke Article 429 to justify its act of
destroying the monuments placed by the Camarines Norte province. Simple.
MWSS vs ACT THEATER

GR 147076 | June 17, 2004
Case Digest
Facts: Four (4) employees of Act Theater were apprehended for tampering the water meter of
MWSS. On account of said incident, MWSS cut-off the water service connection of Act
Theater. According to Act Theater, MWSS acted whimsically, arbitrarily and capriciously for
cutting the water service connection without due notice. In its defense, MWSS raised that it is
merely exercising its proprietary right by virtue of Article 429.
Issue: WON Article 429 is applicable
Held: No. Article 429 is not applicable.

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Article 429 provides that the purpose of the reasonable force to be employed by the owner or
the lawful possessor of the thing is to repel or prevent actual or threatened unlawful invasion
or usurpation of his property. In this case, the act of tampering the meter was already
consummated. There was already no use for the force employed by MWSS. Hence, Article
429 is no longer applicable.
Article 429 in truth and in fact is not applicable. It cannot be used by MWSS as a justification for
cutting off the water of Act Theater for the reason Act Theater employees tampered on the water
meter and stole water. Tapos na. The act was done The employees were already caught. So, is there
any threatened or actual physical invasion or usurpation of the water of MWSS? No, wala na. So,
you have to know when Article 429 is applicable.
Next, UCPB vs Basco.
UCPB vs BASCO
GR 142688 | August 31, 2004
Case Digest
The Memo that issued by UCPB was all-encompassing. It prevented Basco from entering that bank.
So, what is the 1st issue? WON that memorandum was validly in compliance with Article 429 when
it prevented Basco from entering the bank. The doctrine of self-help is actually applicable when
there is unlawful invasion or usurpation of property. When Basco enters the premises of the bank,
what did he do? He would go into the general premises of the bank. What is he? Aside from being
an ex-employee, he is also a depositor. The act of withdrawing and depositing is not unlawful
invasion or usurpation of one’s property. So the memo that prevented Basco from entering the
general area of the entire bank was not in compliance with Article 429. But, is this memo, in certain
aspects, valid? The fact that Basco could enter a restricted area that is for employees only and talk
to his former co-employees about his case to be filed, was already tantamount to unlawful invasion
of property and therefore that memo preventing him from entering the restricted areas is valid under
Article 429. What should the Bank do? The memo should be amended to prevent BAsco from
entering only the restricted areas. The general areas for every bank depositor is allowed to enter
would not be off-limits to Basco in being a depositor of the bank.
Next, Villafuerte vs Court of Appeals.
VILLAFUERTE vs CA
GR 134239 | May 26, 2005
Case Digest
What is the proper action to be filed? Unlawful detainer. Originally, Villafuerte spouses invalidly
and unlawfully operated the gasoline station. It was a lease contract but the lease contract expired.
So now, they are unlawfully withholding the land from the owners. It is not proper to invoke Article
429 and physically cordon off a fence in the property because there was no threatened or actual
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of the property. IN fact, the Villafuertes were already inside.

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So, the fence was used to prevent anybody from entering or somebody inside from going out. But,
this one has been inside for the longest time. So, you have to analyze the situation properly and
know what are the remedies. So in this case, the remedy is to file an action for unlawful detainer.
PBCOM vs TRAZO
GR 165500 | August 30, 2006
Case Digest
This case is a wasted of Article 429. I don’t understand how this provision was actually used by the
SC. When PBCOM did that, Article 429 right belongs to Elenita.
We are done with Article 429.

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June 29 Part 1 - Pahayahay
So yesterday, we discussed the cases under Article 429. So what will we do is we will compare
Article 429 and the actions that are available to an owner so that he can recover his property. So
here we have the comparison.
Distinctions among Article 429 (Doctrine of Self-Help), Forcible Entry, and Unlawful Detainer
(1) As to who has the right. The Doctrine of Self-Help is the owner or the lawful possessor of the
thing. But if you look at forcible entry, the one who has the right need not be the owner. It is any
person who is deprived of possession through FISTS, so the prior physical possessor of the property.
And for unlawful detainer, the lessor, vendee, vendor, or person against whom any possession of
land or building is unlawfully withheld.
(2) As to what is the right given. Now what is the right given to that person who owns the right, for
Article 429, it is to use force reasonably necessary to repel or prevent actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. But for forcible entry, what does the person own?
The right to file a case, an action against the person who unlawfully deprive him of possession. So,
what kind of property is described to file an action for forcible entry? Movable or immovable?
Immovable, under Article 415 paragraph 10. If your right to file an action has the subject which is
immovable property. So all of these rights are actually immovable under Paragraph 10. So unlawful
detainer, the right to file a case against the person unlawfully withholding the property. Subject
again is that a mere property.
(3) As to when does the right exist. Under Article 429 when there is threatened or unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. For forcible entry, the right exist after he is unlawfully
deprived of possession through FISTS. For unlawful detainer, the right exist after possession by
another becomes unlawful. Remember in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is
originally lawful and becomes unlawful after the termination of his right to possess by virtue of a
contract or agreement, express or implies.
(4) As to when does the right end. For the Doctrine of Self-Help, the right ends when the invasion
or usurpation of the property has been completed, finished na. For forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, the right only is available for one year.
(5) As to what is the remedy when the right ends. For the Doctrine of Self-Help, like in the case of
Villafuerte, it does not apply to him. You apply, file an applicable action for recovery, what action
will apply? You do not say automatically forcible entry. For forcible entry and unlawful detainer, at
the end of the one (1) year period, the right is accion publiciana.
So those are the distinctions among those three. Let us go to Article 430.
Article 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches,
live or dead hedges or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Under Article 430, this is included in the right to enjoy. So we are talking about owner of the land
here. Therefore, he can enclose his property so that nobody can enjoy it except him. But there is a
limitation to this right under Article 430. It says, without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
So the example that I gave you last time, so if this (draw something on the board) is the road, and

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this is property of A, and the property of B, and B has a legal easement of right of way through the
property of A, A can enclose his property but he cannot enclose this. So without detriment to
servitudes, an easement is a servitude. So it is a limitation to the right to enjoy. So the example is a
water outlet that cannot be blocked. A water outlet passess through the property of the owner.
Next, Article 431 is a limitation, you know this already, we discussed this.
Article 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the
rights of a third person.
This is one of the fundamental basis of police power. Article 431 (read the entire provision), like
Mr. X has a gun, he has all the rights of an owner, he can enjoy his gun, he can use his gun but he
cannot use it to shoot people. Or Mr. X has a car, he can use his car, but he cannot run over people.
So this is common sense.
So another limitation is this provision that is also very important in the civil code. The State of
Necessity.
Article 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the
same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened damage,
compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The
owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
So this is a limitation to one's right. So, the requisites for State of Necessity are: (1) The interference
is necessary, and (2) the threatened damage is much greater. So, you have to be able to distinguish
State of Necessity from the Doctrine of Self-Help. So to give an example, this is the example in the
book of Paras, to prevent fire from spreading and thus burning valuable houses, firemen may
dynamite the shanties between the fire and the houses so as to stop the spread and the fire. So, if we
have a fire here, next to the shanties is an exclusive subdivision, and the fire is so big, that will
definitely move to the exclusive subdivision, and the fire is still there, then this little portion could
be destroyed to prevent fueling the fire. So the shanty owners cannot do anything. They cannot
prevent the farmer from destroying their houses. But the owners of the houses in the exclusive
subdivision shall compensate the shanty owners in proportion to their loss.
Now, let us go back to that example under Article 429. There was this car. So let us say we are
already in a situation where Y was already able to start the car, and diba you always see in the
movies, when a person is running after a car, what does the person do? He steals another's car, or
motor or bike. Can this be done? Is this an example of State of Necessity that you steal somebody
else's car and use his car to chase that car? The answer is NO. Why? Because in this example, there
is no State of Necessity. There is no imminent danger. If you look at the requisites under Article 432,
there are two requisites and when we talk about requisites, everything must be present. So the
interference is necessary to avoid imminent danger. There is no danger to him. So danger means
danger to the person not to a car, not to a thing.
So, going back to that example the shanty owners, can the shanty owners invoke Article 429 and
say that, hey you are about to destroy our houses, isn't that unlawful physical invasion of our
property? The answer is NO, precisely because there is a State of Necessity and the first phrase there
is the owner of a thing has no right to prohibit another, interference of another. So definitely Article

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432 is superior to Article 429. If two provisions, these two provisions are in conflict with each other,
Article 432 will always prevail. The imminent danger prevails over the invasion of one's property.
So let us compare Article 429 with Article 432.
Distinctions between Article 429 and Articel 432.

(1) As to who has the right. we already know Article 429. In State of Necessity, it is the person who
is in imminent danger.
(2) As to what is the right. In Article 429, the right is to use reasonable force. In Article 432 is to
interfere with something belonging to another.
(3) As to whether or not the liability exists. Under Article 429, if you use force, no if the force that
you use is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel bla bla bla. There is no liability. But for the State
of Necessity, the owner may demand from the person who benefited. Walang kamuwang muwang,
the owner of the house of the exclusive subdivision have to pay because they were benefited by the
sacrifice of the shanty owners.
So let us go to some comments made by Tolentino, who is a luminary in a Civil Law. He has written
a lot of books so he has given his opinion in a lot of issues and he talked about the effect of mistake
in relation to Article 432. According to Tolentino, the right to act in a State of Necessity depends on
the objective existence of the danger with the requisites provided by law. So, if through error one
believed himself to be in a State of Necessity, or used excessive means, his act would be illicit, and
the owner of the property can property use against him the defensive force of the rights in Article
429 (or the principle of Self-Help).
What is the situation here? There is really no state of necessity. By mistake, let us go back to the
example of the Shanties, so the fireman, nataranta sila, oh my goodness, shanties are burning, and
then you have here an exclusive subdivision, let us dynamite all the houses, yun pala, after the
shanties, there is a huge river that is 100 meters wide. Hindi nakita ng firemen. There was really no
State of Necessity. So they used means in excess of the requirement of the situation. If that is the
case and a shanty owners know that there is a river, but they can stop the fireman and invoke Article
429. So Article 429, this time will prevail if there is really no State of Necessity. There was a mistake
as to thinking that there was a state of necessity. Therefore, the person who interferes to the property
of another, it says his acts would be illicit, illegal, unjustified, and so if the shanty owners do not
invoke Article 429, hinayaan lang nila na sirain ang kanilang shanties, those firemen could be held
liable because those acts are illicit according to Tolentino.
So, let us go to the next, the effect of negligence. According to Tolentino, the law does not require
the person acting in the state of necessity to be free from negligence in the creation of such situation.
So here, the situation is that person was really in a state of necessity but he is in that state because
of his stupidity or his negligence. And look at the example Tolentino gave, if this is not the most
stupid person in the world, I do not know who is. If a person picks out an unknown object in a drug
store and eats it, thinking it to be candy, and it turned out to be poision, he can lawfully drink any
antidote he may find in the store even if without the consent of the owner. Parang if he does not
know that what he ate was poison, how can he know what the antidote is? Is it not easy for him to
ask if may antidote kayo. Diba? That is the example that he is given. So I think this happens in the

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movies. The guy who is so stupid to eat that poison but so smart that he knows what the antidote to
that poison. So that is the effect of negligence.
We do not have cases under Article 432. Let us go to Article 433.
Article 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
This is a presumption of ownership. Now this presumption is disputable. So this one, this thing that
I am bringing with me every day, am I in actual possession of it? Yes. Do I claim the owner? I do.
What if in truth and in fact I am not really the owner of this thing, what if the owner is you, can you
take it from me just like that? No. So there are requirements to raise the disputable presumption of
ownership, actual ownership, actual possession and claim of ownership. So the real owner cannot
just get this from me, the real owner must go to court and find the necessary action to recover and
in this case, that is replevin - recovery of possession of personal property.
To continue, we have Article 434.
Article 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
So, in the complaint, it is not enough for the owners to say, oh Atty. Suarez is using her tumbler,
period. The thing must be identified. Aside from that, plaintiff cannot just say it is mine, he must rely
on the strength of his title. He must prove that he is the true owner. He must show the receipt, or
anything that may prove his title. It is not enough to say Atty. Suarez took it from my cabinet. It is
not enough.
Okay, so we have cases.
In the case of Custodio v. CA, 253 S 483, February 9, 1996. This is an application of Article 430.
That is the illustration. This path is actually owned by the landowners Sps Santos but by mere
tolerance, people were allowed to pass through. Sps. Santos, at first build something here, but
because were like passing, eventually that was closed. Can they close the pathway? Yes. It is your
property. In that case, Santos owned that portion of the land and so, Article 430 applies regarding
the existence of an easement, we will take that up when we reach easements, but there was none at
that particular time. Therefore, the applicable provision is Article 430.
Custodio v. CA, Pacifico Mabasa

253 S 483, February 9, 1996
Facts
Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2-door apartment thereon which is situated around
the properties of spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. From Mabasa's property, there are two
passageways leading to the main street, one way is that which passes through the properties of
the Custodios and the Santoses.
However, sometime in 1981, sps Santos built an adobe fence around their property which
incidentally deprived Mabasa of passageway to and fro the main street.

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Issue
WON Sps Santos in constructing a fence within their property was a valid exercise of their right
as owners.
Held
YES. Their act in constructing a fence was a valid exercise of their right as owners pursuant to
Article 430 of the Civil Code, which provides that, "Every owner may enclose or fence his land
or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
In the case at bar, at the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes such that there was no easement agreement existing in favor of Mabasa, neither by
operation of law nor by contract. Therefore, Pacifico Mabasa here having no existing right over
the said passageway, the spouses had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of the said right.
So let us go to the case of Aneco v. Landex, GR No. 165952, July 28, 2008. Okay, so to add to that,
FHDI, the original of that land, initially wanted to develop it into a subdivision. So on paper, a
subdivision plan was already made and in a subdivision plan, there is what you call road lots. And
still those road lots are actually leading to the main road. Now, under the law, a road lot cannot be
blocked even though it is privately owned, but if it is classified as a road lot, the title would always
state that it cannot be blocked, it has to be kept open because precisely it is for passage. In reality,
FHDI decided to forget about that subdivision, siguro it was not worth it. So instead of developing
the subdivision, it just sold the lots. So why is Aneco insisting... (disrupted by Barrios' standing,
decided to take a 5-min break).

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June 29 Part 2 - Peroy
Let’s go to Art. 434 cases. VSD Realty v. Uniwide.
You start with Uniwide entered into a contract. We are not remedial law. This is not Civil Procedure.
Go straight to the fact that is related to our topic.
This is what happened. Here we have Baello the registered owner of this particular lot that is
registered in her name with the TCT 35788 in her name. So, she entered into a lease contract with
Uniwide. Uniwide constructed a building on that lot. You know Uniwide Sales that warehouse,
department store, grocery and all those things. P200M worth on the lot that is registered in Baello’s
name. Itong si Baello she goes in and out of the Philippines. When she was abroad here comes VSD
approaching Uniwide saying: you pay rentals, we are the owner, we own that lot, you constructed
a building on our lot. At the end of the day, the Court said that Uniwide constructed a building on
a lot that is not Baello’s but it is Uniwide’s [I think she means VSD’s]. Hindi nag match yung
technical description of that lot with the title of Baello. So, in this case VSD filed an action to recover,
reconveyance of the property. The issue: would that action prosper, to recover the property.
Reporter: Yes, VSD may recover the property. Under Art. 434, the law provides that in order for an
action to recover ownership of a real property, there must be compliance of 2 requisites:
1. The land being claimed must be identified; and
2. The person claiming the land must prove his title
In this case, the person claiming the land has proved his title. VSD was able to comply with the
requisites by presenting the technical description contained in its title, the derivative title of
Bonifacio to whom VSD bought the subject property, and then by the technical description included
in the registry of deeds, and also from the survey made by the DENR.
M: So how did they prove that they are the owner?

1. First in the identity. The property must be identified.
2. Second, he must rely on the strength of his own title.
R: The technical descriptions contained in the title of VSD is the same from where the subject lot is
located. It was able to establish the title of VSD is the one that covers the subject lot.
M: Yes, in other words, all of the evidence, the documents, the technical description from whom
the lot was purchased up to the time of VSD’s title, the technical description matched the title of
VSD. VSD was able to show the strength of its title there was a match between the technical
description of that particular lot. It did not only allege, kasi the weakness of the title of Baello is the
technical description of the lot did not match that of her title. It’s not enough. You are only showing
the weakness of the title of Baello. VSD was able to show the match between the technical
description of the lot and its own TCT, which is a different TCT. Siguro yung kay Baello is somewhere
else, pinarenta ng iba. So what happened to the building, we are going to discuss that in another
case under another topic. That is how you recover.
1. Identify the property, and
2. show the strength of your title.

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Heirs of Kulaw v. Spouses de Jesus. Is not in the list? Oh my, I was not able to give you the new
updates. Okay then the reading of that case is up to you.
Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public
use and always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case,
restore the owner in his possession.
Eminent domain, we will not dwell on Art. 435 because this is discussed thoroughly in your Consti.
Par. 1. Read.
Par. 2. So, the owner has the right to recover if the proper procedure is not complied with by the
expropriating authority. Those are the requisites under Consti.
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can
show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
That is based on police power.
Let’s go to ownership of land. What does the owner of a parcel of land own?
Art. 437 says:
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and
he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
He owns its surface, but not only that, he also owns everything under it. Anything solid, the surface
plus the solid stuff under, he owns that. Of course, above it, how can he own something that he
cannot feel, hangin lang yan. Though his right is he can construct thereon, whatever he constructs
is his. Or make any plantations or excavations in which he may deem proper. He can build upwards,
he can excavate downwards. He can build a hotel underground if he can afford to. So that is the
right of the owner of a parcel of land, what he owns and what his rights are.
However, the last part of Art. 437 says he cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation. There is a subdivision there in Lanang, Vincent Heights where the houses are short
because it is along the flight path. The flight path of a plane when it lands is really next to the airport.
So, the house can only be up to a certain height.
What are the limitations to such ownership of a parcel of land? He must respect the servitudes
imposed on his land. Under Art. 430 and as a general rule, when there are servitudes, he must
respect. He is subject to special laws and ordinances whatever they are. And he cannot complain,
that’s already in the provision.

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And the last one, pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine. Mines is covered under the land should belong
to the public domain. When it comes to mines, mines only. Everything else is his. So, mines are
property of public dominion and for the development of the national wealth.
In relation to that let’s go to the case of NPC v. Ibrahim.
Do not act like you’re the Supreme Court. You start with the facts. You’re already in the ruling e.
Ibrahim is the owner of a parcel of land, ganun ba.
There is another issue. According to NPC 150 meters is already way down below, so far from the
surface, you cannot own that anymore. The issue in this case is how high and how low can the
owner go? According to NPC sobrang baba na yang 150, hindi na yan kasali sa property ni Ibrahim.
In other words, a landowner can build as high as he can, provided that these limitations are not
present. That’s why there are skyscrapers, there is no limit. Except when it is so high that you can
no longer breathe, then of course hindi na. You can go as high and as low as you can. According to
the SC as long as it is possible to obtain some benefit or enjoyment. The right to enjoy. What did
Ibrahim want to do? They wanted to build a deep well. Maybe 200, maybe 300, nasa kanila na yun.
But they were prevented from going as low as they can because of the tunnels. Those tunnels really
encroached on the property of Ibrahim by being there. According to the SC: Ibrahim still had legal
interest in the subterrain portion insofar as he could have excavated the same for the construction
of the deep well. For the tunnels interfered with his enjoyment of his property and deprived him of
its full use and enjoyment. What do you mean by the right to use under enjoyment? He can exclude
others from using his property and why is NPC using his property.
Let’s proceed to this topic of hidden treasure. Let’s go first to Art. 439.
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money,
jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear.
Art. 439 gives us the definition of hidden treasure. “By treasure is understood, for legal purposes,
any hidden and unknown deposit”. Hidden and unknown, if it’s just there hindi yan hidden,
kumbaga sa Consti, in plain view [If in plain view, not hidden treasure. But if it’s there but it is
unknown, it is treasure].
“Hidden and unknown” and it must consist of “money, jewelry, or other precious objects”. Now we
are in movables. Movables na tayo. Money, jewelry, and other precious objects. Hidden treasure
cannot refer to immovable property, only movables.
“And their lawful ownership does not appear.” Let’s say that there is a chest of money hidden in the
ground, meron nakalagay dun “property of”, hindi na yan hidden treasure. For treasure to be
considered hidden treasure, Art. 439 requisites must concur.
What are not included? According to Paras:

1. Property embedded in the soil or part of the soil. – it must not be embedded in the soil.
2. Immovables – like a tomb
3. Precious objects deliberately hidden by the owner

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4. Treasure whose owner is dead but identified as a thing owned by the dead owner – this
belongs to his heirs
Now, what are the rules? According to Art. 437, if you are the owner of land, you own everything
under it including hidden treasure. You don’t own the mines, iba ang mines, these are natural
resources. Minerals, iba yan. Gold, iba yung gold na naka porma na naging coins na, yan hidden
treasure yan. Pero gold that’s in a mine, that belongs to the state.
So, let’s say a chest of gold is found underground. Dig, dig, dig, meron palang chest of gold dyan,
hidden treasure under Art. 439. That belongs to the owner of the land under Art. 437.
He gets 100% ownership of the treasure if he is the finder. Art. 438 says:
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on which
it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of
its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a
trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State may acquire them at their just
price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
When it is the finder is not 100% the owner of the property. If the finder is different from the owner.
The rule is ½ will go to the finder, ½ will go to the owner.
So, if discovery is made on the property of another, ½. If hidden treasure is found in a forest,
timberland, which is property of public dominion, pero treasure sya hindi sya mineral kundi a chest
of gold coins. Then the finder will get ½. Who will get the ½? E di the State, the landowner.
To get the ½, the finder must not be a trespasser. He must be authorized to be there.
Who is not considered to be a trespasser? An employee, or maybe a guest. If it is somebody who is

not allowed inside the property, then he is considered a trespasser even if he finds a treasure, he will
not get the ½.
And another element that is required to get ½ of the treasure is the discovery is made by chance.
Now, what do you mean by chance? Does that mean “oh, there’s treasure!”? Diba yung mga
camping tapos walang toilet, dig, dig, dig for a whole and then nakakita ng treasure chest. It is by
chance talaga yan. Pero what if may treasure map and sinunod talaga nila yung treasure map and
then nakita nila yung treasure. Jurisprudence says by chance parin yan. Most of the time, by chance.
What is not by chance? Even if you contract somebody to look for treasure in your own land, that is
even by chance even if he finds it. So, just take note of that “by chance”.
Next portion of Art. 438. What if the thing found is of interest to science or the arts? What if mga
painting ni Juan Luna nakita dun in one of the bunkers. You know in our country there are a lot of
Japanese bunkers. What if that bunker is full of paintings and nobody knows who owns those

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paintings. Then the State shall “acquire them at their just price” and then proceeds will be divided
between the landowner and the finder.
We are done with ownership in general.

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July 1 Part 1 - Alcomendras
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
Accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is the right implicitly included in ownership. It
is generally automatic. No prior act of the owner of the principal is not required for him to be the
owner of the accessory or the fruits.
Art. 441. To the owner belongs:

(1) The natural fruits;
(2) The industrial fruits;
(3) The civil fruits.
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other
products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the
amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income.
Accession Discreta – right of accession to what is produced by one’s property
Natural Fruits – Human labor does not intervene. Ex. Weeds; Cow’s Milk; Sheep’s Wool
Industrial Fruits – Ex. Herbs; Sugarcane; Palay; Apples
Civil Fruits – Ex. Rent
Note: If you are a stockholder of a corporation, the cash dividends are considered as income. Cash
dividends are considered as fruits because it was produced from the stocks. It is a civil fruit.
The offspring of animals belong to the owner of the female.
• BACHRACH MOTOR VS TALISAY

When we talk about fruits, it must be produced by the property of the owner. The bonus that was
given to Ledesma because he allowed Talisay to use his property as a security for mortgage was
not produced by his property but was given in consideration of his kind heart.
Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and preservation.
There are two characters in this provision - the owner of the land and the third person.
Example: The Planter/Sower planted something on the land of X in bad faith. By principle of
accession, X owns the gathered fruits. However, accession is not a way of acquiring something for
free. X has to reimburse Planter/Sower for the necessary expenses for the production, gathering, and
preservation

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This does not apply if Planter/Sower is in good faith. This provision is if the Planter/Sower is in bad
faith.
Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the mother, although unborn.
Annual Crops (those that are grown annually like rice and corn) are manifest or born from the
moment their seedlings appear from the ground although the grains are yet to appear.
Perennial Crops are considered born when the fruits appear.
Right of Accession with Respect

to Immovable Property
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles.
Accession Continua or Industrial Accession
Characters: Land Owner and Builder/Planter/Sower
Builder is the one who builds.

Planter plants perennial crops (durian trees, lanzones).
Sower sows annual crops.
Sowing - gives rise to a single crop or harvest. Regular planting must be made.
Planting - each seed gives rise to a permanent plant which gives rise to the fruits themselves.
• DACLISON VS BAYTION
445 talks about something that is built on the land and not outside of it. The word thereon means
on top. In this case the filled up portion is not considered a property of Baytion under 445.
• PROVINCIAL ASSESOR VS FILIPINAS PALM OIL

Filipinas is an organization engaged in the business of palm oil. They had a plantation with a milling
area in the middle. Filipinas created roads inside the plantation. Originally, this was leased by NDC
to Filipinas. But because of CARP, the plantation was expropriated and is now owned by the
COOPERATIVE. The Land Owner now is the COOPERATIVE. The roads are owned by the COOP
not Filipinas by principle of Accession.
Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed made by the owner and at his expense,
unless the contrary is proved.
There are two presumptions:

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1. That the house, the trees, the palay are made by the owner
2. That they are made at his expense.
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad
faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have
the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or
without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted
in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be
indemnified for damages.
Characters: Land Owner (Active Party because he used the materials of another to plant on his
land) and Material Owner.
Example: Land Owner A orders five stacks of premium palay to be planted on his land from a
supplier. Land Owner B orders five stacks of ordinary palay from the same supplier. Supplied
delivered mistakenly to land owner B the premium palay. B plants it on his land. If B has no idea
that the palay sent to him was owned by A, he is deemed to be in good faith. But if he had knowledge
that it was owned by A, he is in bad faith.
If in good faith, he becomes the owner but he must pay for the value. Material owner can remove
them if it can be removed without injury to the work made or to the plants
If in bad faith, he becomes the owner of materials but he must pay the value and damages. Material
owner can remove them whether or not destruction shall be caused plus damages.

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July 1 Part 2 - Manligoy
The land belongs to the Garcia spouses but they are also the incorporators of the FGCI. In order to
escape the payment of taxes, the building was registered kasi when you declare the building,
obviously, malalagay sa pangalan mo yung land. So, the land is in the name of Garcia and the
building is in the name of FPCI.
What happened here kasi is FPCI was not able to pay the contractor. So, the contractor sued FGCI
for some of money collection case for 7 million. The next step for the sheriff to do is to levy upon
the property of FGCI. So, what could he levy? The building that was under the name of FGCI in the
tax declaration. Sabi ni Garcia, “dili oy. You cannot levy that. That building does not belong to
FGCI. It belongs to us. It’s on our land.” Under the principle of accession, whatever is built on the
land belongs to the landowner but there is always this provision which says unless otherwise. Subject
to the provisions of the following articles. It’s not an exclusive rule that whatever is built belongs to
the landowner if there is proof to the contrary. This is just a principle. If there’s a proof to the contrary.
The land is owned by Garcia. The buiLding is owned by FGCI. Under the law, even on the
incorporations of FGCI, they are separate and distinct from each other. So, that allegation that the
owner of the land is Garcia and therefore the owner of the building is Garcia, the SC said, NO. The
Sheriff can still levy on the building because it is under the name of FGCI. It proves that the building
is not owned by the landowner.
Let’s go now to Article 448.
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
Who are the characters there in Article 448? We have the landowner and we have the builder,
planter or sower. Who is the active party here? Remember under Article 447, who is the active party
there? The landowner. In Article 448, why is it that it is the builder, planter or sower who is the
active party? It is because he is the one who built, planted or sown on the land of another. Without
him doing that, walang 448. Diba? A landowner is just a landowner. What did he do? Nothing. The
active party is the one who did something. In 447, who did something? The landowner. He used the
materials of another to build, plant or sow on his land.
The characters in Article 448 are the landowner and the builder, planter or sower (BPS). So,
something is built, planted or sown in the land of another by the BPS. The landowner is in good
faith and the BPS is in good faith. Article 448, this article, everyone is in good faith.
There’s this case, a perfect application of Article 448, Pleasantville Subdivision vs CA.
PLEASANTVILLE SUBDIVISION vs CA

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GR 79688 | February 1, 1996
Case Digest
We have a newly developed subdivision and there you have a first buyer and the second buyer. It
turned out that he built on the wrong lot. What about the owner of lot 9? Was he in good faith? Yes.
He did not know that somebody is building on his lot. He discovered later that there was already a
house. So, both of them are in good faith. Now, what to do? Under the principle of accession, the
landowner owns the building on his lot but Article 448 give him two (2) options. According to 448,
because this is accession, it is the landowner who can either appropriate for himself the works,
sowing or planting. So in the case of Pleasantville, we have here a building, a builder, after he pays
the builder for the proper indemnity. IN accession, there’s always payment of indemnity. But then,
he also has another option. Kung hindi niya feel yung bahay na ginawa dun sa kanyang lupa,
mapilitan siya magindemnify para sa house na he doesn’t want to live in? He has another option
and that is to oblige the builder, planter, sower to pay the price of the land unless the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the building and the sower to pay the proper rent.
Why do you think there is a difference in the treatment when it comes to the sower? Bakit renta
lang? We discussed earlier, what is sown and what crops? It is too much to make the sower pay the
price of the land. You’ve go to harvest the palay after few months. So, magbabayad lang siya ng
renta. But when you talk about the trees, building, they are permanent, they are permanent and
therefore there is this option given to the landowner. If he is not interested in the building or the
planting, he can just sell his land to the builder, planter.
So, let’s look at the cases. The old cases are very important.
TAYAG vs YUSECO
GR 14043 | April 16, 1959
Case Digest
The principle here is once a party, the land owner, has made his choice, he has duly informed the
court of his choice and the court already informed the other party that this is the choice, he can no
longer convert or change it. He has to stick to his choice. So, before he communicates to the court,
he can change his mind anytime but once it is communicated, that is his choice and if he does not
pay, the land improvements, according to the Section 546, the builder has the right of retention. He
can keep the property and stay there until he is paid. So, that is the principle in the case of Tayag vs
Yuseco.
In Tayag vs Yuseco, the land belonged to Tayag. Yuseco was given the right to build on a portion of
the land. So, Yuseco recognized that he is not the owner of the land, that the land belonged to
Tayag. This is a very old case. The SC does not rule in this manner anymore because a builder in
good faith under 448 is one who builds on the land thinking that he is the owner. Just like
Pleasantville, he built on the land for he thinks he owns the lot. But why did the SC apply 448? What
the SC emphasized in the case of Tayag vs Yuseco is the choice, once made cannot be changed.
Let’s go to Ignao vs Ignao.

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IGNAO vs IAC
GR No. 72876 | January 18, 1991
Case Digest
There’s a portion of the house which encroached upon the lot of Florencio. Now, I just want to
explain why there is co-ownership. Under 486 of the Civil Code, any co-owner can use the thing
co-owned. So when the three co-owners of this entire lot together, all of them can use the entire lot.
They did not know that they were only co-owners up to this portion because as co-owners, their
rights are for the entire property. So when they build, they were the owners of the land. So kung
baga, that’s why they were considered in good faith. But unfortunately for them, there was an
encroachment. So, the SC said although co-ownership is governed by different provisions, but since
there was already a partition and there’s a situation where there is something built on the land of
another, what should be applied? The SC said let’s apply 448 and give Florencio a set of options.
What did RTC do? Instead of giving him an option, the RTC why don’t you just sell your portion ….
It’s more practical. That is true but the SC said, practicality aside, 448 gives the right of choice to
the landowner. It is not for the court to … upon the owner of the land of what he has to do, what
option he has to take. It is the owner you should make the choice and by doing so, the RTC
encroached upon the right of this owner. So, the right of choice belongs to the owner.
Let’s go with Ignacio vs Hilario.
IGNACIO vs HILARO
GR L-175 | April 30, 1946
Case Digest
Take note that the land owner has only two options under 448. What happened was there was a
dispute as to who owns the land. According to Ignacio, he owns the land, according to Hilario, he
owns the land. Now, there’s a house there. They went to court to determine who is the owner of the
land. According to the court it is Hilario. So, Iganacio was a builder in good faith because he thought
that he owns the land and therefore Article 448 applies. What are the rights and obligations of the
parties? Landowner is Hilario. You have two options. Take note; whatever option the landowner
chooses there is a corresponding obligation. If the landowner chooses to appropriate, the first
choice, he will then have the obligation to pay for the value of whatever is built on the land or sown.
The corresponding obligation goes to the land owner. He has now the obligation to pay. If the land
owner chooses the 2nd option and that is to oblige, then the obligation now belongs to the builder,
planter to pay the landowner the value of the land. So, those are the two options. Ano’ng ginawa ni
Ignacio? “ay kailangan tanggalin yang bahay na yan”. Demolition ang gusto niya. Removal. Is that
allowed? The SC said NO. IT is not a part of 448. Is there a possibility of removal? The SC used the
term here, remotion. He is entitled only to such remotion, if the landowner chooses to appropriate,
sya yung merong remotion. Wala siyang right na patalsikin. Actually 546, if he chooses to
appropriate and hindi pa siya nakapagbayad, nakalagay ditto, to appropriate after he pays. So
meaning, he can only appropriate after he has already paid. So, under 546 gives the BPS the right
of retention until he is paid. Sa 2nd option naman, the obligation belongs to the builder or planter.
That is where the right of remotion may exist. It is limited to the 2nd option. According to the SC, if
the landowner chooses the 2nd option and the builder/planter cannot pay the price of the land

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provided it is not considerably higher, then that is when the landowner can demand the removal of
what is built or planted on his land.
There are two principles here. First, there are only two options. He has to choose between the two.
Second, the right of removal is limited ot the 2nd option and only when the builder/planter cannot
pay the price of the land.
Let’s now go to Pecson vs CA.
PECSON vs CA
GR 115814 | May 26, 1995
Case Digest
Article 448 applies when the builder builds on the land of another. It does not apply when the
builder builds on his own land. If Article 448 is applicable by analogy, what option did the Spouses
Lugid choose? To appropriate the works and he offered to pay 53K pesos which is the construction
cost of the building. Since Pecson has been collecting rents for the building, spouses Lugid alleged
that it offsets the indemnity. Did the SC agree na ganun na lang? No. According to the SC, the proper
indemnity is the market value of the property now. That’s why in all the cases where Article 448 is
applied, the cases are remanded to the RTC to determine the market value of the property now and
the property now is worth millions. Kasi ilang years yan eh. A lot of years passed, 30 years. So, what
about offsetting the rentals against the market value, is that allowed? Did the SC allow the offsetting?
Wala ng ibabayad si Lugid? The SC said there is no need for Pecson to reimburse Lugid for the
rentals that he collected because Articles 546 said that until the builder is indemnified by the
landowner, he has the right of retention and the SC said including and necessary the income
therefrom. Retain possession and retain the fruits. So, walang utang si Pecson kay Lugid. LUgid has
to pay the market value of the property without deductions of the rentals earned by Pecson.

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Property July 4 - Pahayahay
So let us continue with out reports. We are still in Article 448. Let us go to Geminiano v. CA, not in
your list? Technogas v. CA, GR No. 1088994, February 10, 1997. So, here we have a situation
where the technogas is not the builder of the structure that encorached the upon the property of Uy.
But Article 448 is still applicable in a sense that Uy, the remedies of Uy as to the encroachment is
based on Article 448 and he is allowed to choose between the two. But what about the encroaching
structure that has been there ever since technogas bought the property because the building was
already there, then a remedy that has been offered by the Supreme Court in this case is for the
payment of rentals by technogas for using the land of Uy and it is only until such time that Uy made
his choice that the situation will change. If Uy chooses to appropriate the encroaching portion of
the fence or the building, then technogas will no longer required to pay rent but it has right of
retention until Uy indemnifies technogas for the portion of the building that encroaches. But if Uy
chooses to compel technogas to pay the price of the land where the encroachment is sitting on, then
technogas will have to continue to pay rent until such time it can pay for the value of the land. So
this is an additional remedy given by the Supreme Court in case the situation turns out to be like this
where the other side, the other party, who is merely a successor-in-interest.
Let us go to Parilla v. Pilar, GR No. 167680, November 30, 2006. Here we have a situation where
we have a landowner, a lessee, and a builder. So Pilar, Parilla, and Shell. Parilla is the dealer. Shell
is the oil company. Pilar is the landowner. Now there is a lease contract between Shell and Pilar.
The lease contract is with Shell and the landowner and Parilla was merely the operator of the gas
station so it is a tripartite thing but the lease is between Shell and the landowner. Now, when the
lease expired in the year 2000, the parties, Shell and Pilar did not renew the lease. So Shell brought
with it all its equipments, all its tanks, remember in the case of Caltex, that can be removed. Now
etong si Parilla stayed behind. He did not leave the premises. What did he do? He built improvement
consisting of billiard hall, restaurant, and sari sari store. Pilar, the owner, kept on giving him demands
to vacate, verbal and written, but he refused to vacate. So, Pilar the landowner filed an action to
object Parilla from the property. Remember the case of Villafuerte? Ganun din eh there was a
gasoline station. In this case, Pilar, he did not fence in the property. He did not avail of Article 429.
He filed an ejectment case. True enough, the court ruled in favor of Pilar, the landowner and ordered
Parilla to vacate. Now here comes Parilla saying that he was a builder in good faith and as a builder
in good faith under Article 448, Pilar has to choose and since Pilar chose to eject him, then Pilar the
landowner has to appropriate the improvements constructed by Parilla on the lot. He wants to be
indemnified for the improvements that he constructed.
Now, is he entitled to be indemnified for the improvements? The answer is NO. Why? Because
Article 448 as already mentioned only applies to a builder in good faith. What is a builder in good
faith? A builder in good faith is one who builds on land thinking that he owns the land. So definitely
Article 448 does not apply in this situation because Parilla recognize the fact that he is not the owner
of the land. He recognized the fact that the land is owned by Pilar. So he cannot be considered a
builder in good faith and therefore entitled to reimbursement or indemnification. So, what is the
solution? In fact, there is a provision that applies in this situation. You have to listen very carefully
because you are not going to take this up in law school. This subject is not included in the curriculum
but it is included in the bar. So the provision that is applicable here is Article 1678 on Lease. So
according to Article 1678:

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Article 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value
of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than
is necessary.
Now, can Parilla invoke this? The answer is, why did I insist on knowing the characters? Because
of this? First of all, Parilla is not a lessee. Who is the lessee? Shell. So, Parilla cannot invoke this one.
Number 2, granting arguendo that Parilla can be considered the lessee, the dealer or the operator
as a somebody who is connected to the lessee, the improvements that he made are not suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended and what is the intention of the lease? Gasoline station. Ano
ba yung ginawa niya? Restaurant, billiard hall, sari-sari store. Therefore, he still cannot avail of this
provision Article 1678. However, this is the applicable provision in lease contracts, it just so
happened that the person here, Parilla, is not the lessee. So, again, to repeat what the SC said, Article
448 covers only cases in which the builder, planter, or sower believed himself to be the owner of
the land or at least has a claim of title thereto but not when the interest is merely that of a holder
such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith
as he has no pretention to be the owner. Why is this? Article 448 does not apply where one's only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract otherwise it will always be in the power of the
tenant to improve his landlord out of this property. So take note of this case.
Let us go to Republic v. Judge Ballocanag, GR No. 163794, November 28, 2008. So, if the
landowner is the State, Article 448 still applies. If there are improvements constructed on land and
in this case property of public dominion. However, there is only one choice, the first one. The
second is definitely not an option because they will just be going around the circles. He already
bought the property in the first place, etong si Reyes. So there is a limited application of Article 448
in this case. If the landowner is the State, it must indemnify the builder, planter, in this case Reyes.
Now, can the State refuse the demand of Reyes to cut off the tree? Definitely yes, because the State
has the choice, and the choice is to appropriate and pay for their value.
Let us go to Sulo sa Nayon v. Nayong Pilipino, GR No. 170923, January 20, 2009. Now, you can
see, in this case, there are only two parties. The lessor, which is Nayong Pilipino and Philippine
Village Hotel. So the SC just remanded the case to determine whether or not Philippine Village Hotel
complied the requirements of Article 1678 to be entitled to 1/2 of the value of the improvements
made on the property. But definitely it cannot ask for reimbursement under Article 448 in relation
to Article 546 and 548 because such provisions only apply to builders in good faith.
Let us go to Cabang v. Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009. So, here we have the landowner
choosing to appropriate and the offer to pay 21,000. So this 21,000 was already a valid determined
by a court appointed commissioner. Now, here we have argument made by Basay, it is so hard to
explain, it is already have something to do with execution. Since the choice of the landowner Basay
is to appropriate, then Cabang, I will not explain, it is so hard to explain execution to you at this
point. Anyway, let us stop this point where what was chosen was to appropriate a family home,
whether it is possible or not, you will take it up in your Civil Procedure.

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Let us go to Nervaez v. Alciso, GR No. 165907, July 27, 2009. So, in this case, Article 448 will not
apply because what is constructed on the land, he was the owner. He bought it. It just so happened
that there was the right to repurchase. So when Alciso repurchased, he repurchased from the owner
and therefore Article 448 is not applicable. But is Narvaez entitled to reimbursement? Yes, under
Article 1606 in relation to Article 1616, which applies to sale with right to repurchase.

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Property – July 5, 2017 - Peroy
Briones v. Macabagdal we will not discuss this anymore because the facts are similar to
Pleasantville. What you need to take note in the case of Briones is the SC laid down the procedure
upon determination that 448 is applicable what is the procedure that must be taken. It’s quite a long
procedure, determination [?], the choice of the landowner, but before the landowner could make a
choice there is still the determination of the market value, the fair price of the lot, the amount of
expenses paid, and all those other things. We will not go over them one by one, it is very easy to
understand.
Let’s go to the case of Benedicto v. Villaflores.

This is a case of double sale. If you reach this provision, Art. 1544 if the same property is sold twice,
who is the owner of that property? According to Art. 1544, the one who registers first. Because
automatically when property is sold from one person to another, the buyer would register the sale
so that the title can be transferred to his name. But in the old days, like this case it happened 1980
people didn’t really bother to register, there were no sanctions like now. Nowadays there’s so many
sanctions if you don’t pay your capital gains tax on transfer, may mga multa. In those days, Antonio
bought a property he didn’t bother. For him siguro the moment he paid for the property pwede na
yun. He would enter, build a house and all those things. For him in his part that what he did was
enough. When he paid for the lot, occupied the lot, and he built his house, he was the owner of the
lot. When Maria sold the lot again to another person, Filomena, much later 1994, 14 years later.
And Filomena registered right away. Under the law Art. 1544, Filomena is the real owner of the
property. But at that time when Antonio constructed a house in the lot, he was the owner because
the property wasn’t sold to anyone else at that time. But then 448 was applied to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties.
Angeles v. Pascual this is similar to Technogas. We will not discuss this case.
Remember the case of VSD Realty v. Uniwide? We discussed it under Art. 434. In this case,
remember that Baello entered into a lease contract with Uniwide Sales and it turned out that
Uniwide constructed a building on the land that it leased from Baello. But it turned out that the
owner of the land is VSD Realty and Baello’s land is somewhere else because the technical
description of that particular lot where the Uniwide building was sitting on matched the technical
description of the VSD title. Considering that Uniwide constructed a building on the lot, VSD wanted
its property back, can Uniwide ask for reimbursement for the improvements? If you look at the
principle of accession, VSD is the owner of the land and the owner of the building. But under 448,
VSD has to reimburse the builder. Well, the SC said No, as enunciated by the SC in Parilla v. Pilar
[other citations], here we have a situation where there is a lease contract. Uniwide cannot avail of
448 because whether the property belonged to Baello or VSD, it didn’t matter. Uniwide constructed
on a land that did not belong to it. So, Uniwide constructed as a lessee therefore Uniwide cannot
recover reimbursement from VSD under 448. Can it recover pursuant to another provision of law?
Maybe, but we are talking about 448. What about Art. 1678 on lease? Hindi rin because VSD is not
the lessor of Uniwide. Ang lessor niya dito ay si Baello, so alangan namang singilin ng Uniwide si
Baello. What will Baello get out of it? Wala because she is not the owner of the land. So, we don’t
know what article applies. If you want to know, you read the case. But in relation to our topic, 448
does not apply.

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Let’s go to Communities Cagayan v. Nanol. Here we are looking at a case where the builder, Nanol,
is not your builder in good faith, one who builds on land that he actually thought belonged to him.
In this case, what was entered into was a contract to sell. In your Sales you will learn that when
there is a contract to sell, the buyer does not become the owner of the property yet although the
property is delivered to him. Despite knowledge that he did not own the lot yet, Nanol demolished
the house thereon and built his own house. The SC said, this is an exception to the rule that a builder
in good faith should be one who thinks he’s building on his own land. The SC expanded the meaning
of builder in good faith and actually invoked many cases like in Del Campo v. Abesia, “applied to
one whose house – despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner – overlapped with
the land of another” “applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the
consent of the owner”. In many cases that there is consent on the part of the owner, the SC will
consider the builder a builder in good faith and the reason for this is Art. 453. Please read Art. 453.
What the SC is saying here is not that the builder was in good faith but that the landowner was also
in bad faith. Knowing that the builder is building on the land that does not belong to him and yet
the landowner did not oppose. It is really an application of Art. 453.
Let’s go to Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation. What was the applicable ruling here? Art. 448.
Who was the builder in good faith here? Our Lady’s Foundation not Roxas.
How can it be considered in good faith? Did Our Lady know that it was encroaching on the property
of another? Because that is the essence of good faith you are building something thinking that you
are building on your own land. What did the case say? There are 2 encroachers here: Roxas and
Our Lady’s Foundation. The SC considered one in good faith and one in bad faith. Who was
considered in good faith? Our Lady’s Foundation. What about Roxas? He was considered in bad
faith and ordered to return the property that he encroached to Latosa. Why was Roxas considered
in bad faith? The said property that he encroached upon was Latosa’s property. In this case there are
2 encroachers, one was considered in good faith. What is considered a builder in good faith under
Art. 426 when facts exist that show that possessor is not aware of the flaw in his title or mode of
acquisition that invalidates it. The presumption is that Our Lady’s Foundation was in good faith
because it didn’t know that it was encroaching 92 square meters upon the land of Roxas. When
Roxas found out that there was an encroachment on his land nag encroach na din sya sa kabila, and
definitely that is in bad faith because he knew that he was building on land that did not belong to
him and he pretended that it was his. And therefore, the treatments are different. With respect to
Our Lady it was required to reimburse Roxas of the value of the 92 square meters pegged at P1,800
per square meter which is the value of the land. While Roxas was ordered to demolish whatever
construction was thereon at his own expense. You can that under Art. 449 it says “He who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right
to indemnity”. So only a BPS in good faith can be indemnified for the improvements but if the BPS
is in bad faith he does not have the right of reimbursement he would know the landowner will
appropriate.
Compare Art. 449 with Art. 443. Art. 443 refers to gathered, na harvest na, and the planter or sower
in bad faith is entitled to expenses for planting, gathering and preservation (PGP). However, Art. 449
talks about accession meaning there is a building there, there are plants there, there are crops there
not yet harvested. But […] the building, planting, sowing belong to the landowner, the BPS in bad
faith completely forfeits whatever he built, planted, or sowed on the land of another. He is not
entitled to indemnity except Art. 452. Art. 452 says: “the builder, planter or sower in bad faith is
entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land”.

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Art. 450 continues that the builder in bad faith, when the owner decides to remove, the owner can
remove. It is an option of the landowner to remove automatically. Unlike Art. 448 is a limited right
of removal. But if the BPS in bad faith and the landowner has the absolute right to refund plus
damages, and a third option is available to compel the BP to pay the price of the land, the sower to
pay the proper rent plus damages despite the fact that the value of the land is etc, etc.

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• DEPED VS CASIBANG
The court expanded the definition of builder in good faith to include cases where the improvement
was constructed on the land of the owner with his consent. In this case the builder is considered is
in good faith
• CHRISTIAN VS MANGALLAY
By paying 300,000 as financial assistance, it was deemed to be indemnity for appropriating the
improvements made on the land.
• NHA VS BAELLO
NHA is not a possessor in good faith because they knew that Baello owned the property. During
martial law, the government took the property of private citizens. When it ended, the owners took
back their property. Those who constructed buidlings like the dubious beneificaries of NHA are not
entitled to reimbursement if Baello wishes to appropriate it.
• PADILLA VS MALICSI
Here, Malicsi claimed that he was in good faith. The fact is that they never bothered to check who
the owner is. There was already a title in the name of Padilla which is a notice to the whole world
that he owns the property. Malicsi is in bad faith thus Padilla can avail of the option in Article 449
plus damages.
Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who has not acted in bad faith,
the owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one
who made use of them has no property with which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the right granted by article 450. If the
owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter
may demand from the landowner the value of the materials and labor.
We have the land owner, the builder planter sower (active party because he builds plants or sows
using the materials of the material owner on the land of the land owner) and the material owner.
The material owner has the right to be reimbursed. The builder planter sower is liable for reimbursing
the material owner.
Land owner may be subsidiarily liable for the value of the materials if:
1. Bps is insolvent
2. Mo is in good faith
3. LO chooses to appropriate.
This is accession. If LO chooses to appropriate then the building will belong to him. Thus he has to
pay the MO. If he chooses the 2nd option, there’s no accession so he doesn’t have to pay.

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Art. 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude
negligence, which gives right to damages under article 2176.
One can be considered in good faith even if he was negligent.

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July 6, 2017 part 2 - Manligoy
We are now going to discuss accession natural or natural accession. The provision that we should
always remember with respect to this particular type of accession is Article 457.
Article 457. To the owners of the land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The term accretion is related to natural accession. We have the principal forms of natural accession:
1. Alluvium – the gradual deposit of sediment by the natural action or current of freshwater
2. Avulsion – change in the course of rivers and the formation of islands.
This body of freshwater includes rivers, creeks, streams and lakes. Ang river, nasa 457. The original
identity of the deposit will be lost. So it’s a very simple situation or illustration. We have here A, the
owner of the land adjacent to the river. A is called a riparian owner. The river, in its natural current,
started to move. After 10 years, the river is here and this becomes dry land. So this is what you call
alluvium. And according to 457, the alluvium or the alluvial deposits belong to the owners of the
land adjoining the banks of river. So if we have here A and then B and C, they are all benefited.
Now, if we had D, E and F, obviously when the river will move to the right on the lots of D, E and
F, there will be a downside to this because if the riparian owner can be benefited by the natural
current of the river, a riparian owner can also be prejudiced. That’s what happened to D, E and F in
the example.
So, when this happens, the river usually moves to the right, you cannot see any line. Sometimes, it
is not even noticeable. It should not be noticeable. You do not know that your property has already
been decreased by 1 meter. Di na by just looking at it. It has to be by means of a survey. So, the
identity or the original identity of the deposits will be lost.
So, how do you distinguish accretion because it says, to the owners of the land adjoining the river
banks belong the accretion, how do you distinguish it from alluvium? Well according to Paras,
accretion is a broader term and is the process of accretion whereby the soil is deposited. Alluvium
applies to the soil deposited on the river banks. This is according to Paras, the alluvium or the alluvial
deposits. Pareho lang yan. So, it is the soil deposited. So, accession is the general term, natural
accession. But when you talk about natural accession, the process is accretion and the soil deposited
is what you call alluvium or the alluvial deposits.
So, what are the requisites for the riparian owner to actually own the alluvial deposits or the
alluvium? It’s right there in front of you:
1. The alluvial deposits should be gradual, natural and imperceptible. Hindi pwedeng biglaan.
2. It should not involve any act of man. It should be natural, that’s why it is called accession
natural or natural accession.
3. The cause is the current of a river, lake, creek or stream.
4. The river must continue to exist. If there is no more river because it dried up because of a
drought and we have a dried up river bed, which you can see. It is a dried up river bed. That
is property of public domain. But if the river moves and it leaves up dried land behind, it
moved somewhere else, then that is accretion.

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5. The increase must be comparably little. You cannot add the whole item of Mindanao in your
beach front property. That is unnatural phenomenon.
Remember that you have distinguish river from the sea. (Illustration) If there’s accretion at sea, after
some time it was discovered that at high tide ad this is already dried. If this is dried land, does this
belong to the litteral owner? No. This is foreshore. This is accretion from the sea and therefore it
does not belong to the litteral owner. Only riparian owners are benefited by accretion.
So take note that Article 48 of the Spanish Law of the Waters includes creeks, streams and lakes. A
creek is a small river. So it’s a stream. They are bodies of water that traversed the land and end up
in the sea. Mga creeks siguro if we have a river that closed out the sea, the river, siguro meron tayong
mga creek ditto. I really don’t know the difference between a creek and a stream. Does somebody
know the difference? Well, let’s just consider them to be the same. They are all small rivers that flow
eventually because even those that are crossing rivers eventually flow out in to the river and they
flow out to the sea. A lake on the other hand is an enclosed body of water. It may have an outlet to
the sea but it is not really or it does not open up to the sea. All those are included in Article 457.
Now, 458 is the exact opposite of 457.
Article 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left
dry by the natural decrease of the waters, or lose that inundated by them in extraordinary
floods.
So, when it comes to ponds and lagoons, there is no change. There is no such thing as accretion in
ponds and lagoons and flooding will not affect the ownership of the landowner adjacent to the pond
or the lagoon. So how do you differentiate a pond and a lagoon from a stream, creek or river? I don’t
know. Maybe the spelling. Because it’s so hard. Here in the Philippines, we don’t really have popular
things like those place in the United States and etc. Here we have Laguna de Bay and Lake Taal.
What about lagoon, do we have lagoon here? Anyway, just remember that when it’s a pond or
lagoon, then 458 applies and there is no change or whatever.
Let’s look at the cases under 457. Let’s start with the very very old case, Zapata vs Director of Lands.
ZAPATA vs DIRECTOR of LANDS

GR L-17645 | October 30, 1962
Case Digest
Facts:
Zapata’s land which is adjacent to a river received alluvial deposits gradually through the
currents of the river. She then moved to register such accretion. Director of Lands contended
that the accretion shall form part of lands of public dominion as it was not done naturally due
to the fish traps built on the river which was by human intervention.
Issue: WoN the accretion belongs to Zapata
Held:

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There is no evidence to show that the setting up or erection of the fish trap was expressly
intended or designed to cause or bring about the accretion, the appellee may still invoke the
benefit of the provisions of Article 457 of the Civil Code to supper her claim of title thereto.
Moreover, the fishermen who since 1894 used to set up fish traps in the creek later on secured
permit from the Government that auctioned off the right or license to set up fish traps in the
creek and the setting up of such fish traps stopped or was discontinued even before 1926 all
go to show that the alluvial accretion was no entirely due to the setting up of such fish traps.
The fish traps did not only trap the fish but also trapped the soil. Once the soil went inside the fish
traps, it … and so the reasoning of the Director of Lands was this is not caused by the current of the
river but by the participation of the fish traps and therefore there was human intervention. But …
explained that the fish traps were removed, it was not Zapata who installed the fish traps but the
fishermen, it was not the sole cause of the accretion that happened. Therefore, Zapata was allowed
to register. What is the importance of registration? Land, there are a lot of … of the land especially
yung land formed by accretion because if the riparian owner discovers that indeed there are deposits
adjacent to his land, he should have that registered to protect his ownership over the land.
Let’s compare that case with Vda. De Nazareno vs CA.
VDA. DE NAZARENO vs CA
GR 98045 | June 26, 1996
Case Digest
Facts:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was
formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried up Balacanas Creek and along the banks
of Cagayan river. Salasalan and Rabaya leased a lot on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno. The said lot is adjacent to the Cagayan river where the sawdusts are being
dumped. Later on they have stopped paying rentals thus a case for ejectment was filed against
them and they were ultimately ejected therefrom.
Nazareno caused the approval of the survey plan with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. However, Salasalan and Rabaya protested said plan
claiming that they should be the ones to whom the accretion should be awarded.
Issue:
WON the accretion which was formed by sawdust being dumped can be claimed by the
riparian owner pursuant to Art 457 of the Civil Code
Held: NO
Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code,
requires the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

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(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea
coast).
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of
the current of waters.
For Nazareno and even Salasalas and Rabaya to insist on the application of these rules on
alluvion to their case, the above- mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit
that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on
portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. Both parties’ submission not having met the first and
second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
Therefore, the accretion was man -made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in
Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect
of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct
and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part
of the public domain.
So here, the SC said that alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, where the land is not
formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river adjoining said land, that is also
the consequence or the effect of the direct intervention of man, it is deemed man-made accretion.
So, the land forming the accretion must be the exclusive work of nature and there should be no
human participation. This case of Nazareno is departing from the ruling of Zapata. 1962 ang Zapata
and Nazareno is 1966. So therefore, the SC became strict about human participation but here in this
case, the SC used the phrase, “where the land is not formed solely by the natural effect”, it must be
exclusively formed by nature.
So, we will continue next week.

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July 11, 2017 - Pahayahay
Continuation on cases under Article 457.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
We look at the case of Heirs of Navarro v. IAC, GR No. 68166 (1997). Okay, very simple. So,
Pascual here is both a riparian owner and literal owner. And so, it really depends where the alluvium
is deposited. And since the alluvium was deposited in the northern part of the land, then it is
presumed this was caused by the current of the sea or maybe because of the plants or the trees that
were planted along the foreshore. If there were alluvium deposits in the eastern or western portion
of his property, then he could have [...] because of the current of the river. So just remember the
requisites of alluvium.
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

GR No. 68166 | 1997)
Facts
Pascual was an owner of a tract of land. This land is bounded on the North by the Manila Bay,
on the East by the Talisay river and on the West by the Bulacan river. Pascual planted palapat
and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of his property and years later, the land begun to
rise.
Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to the accretion which formed at the
northern portion of his property. Pascual contends that the accretion was formed by the actions
of the Bulacan and Talisay River and as the riparian owner, he clams ownership thereof.
Navarro opposed Pascual’s application contending that the land sought to be registered is part
of the public domain, it being part of Manila Bay.
Issue
Whether or not Pascual can acquire the subject land by Accretion under Art. 457?
Held
No. The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay
and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought
soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by
Pascual in 1948.
Here, Pascual anchored his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code. He argued that
the disputed land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan River
which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries respectively of Pascual’s own tract
of land.
According to the SC, Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under article 457, requires the
following essential requisites: 1.) That the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2.) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; 3.) that the land

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where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
In this case, the 3rd requisite is lacking, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion
of claimant’s land which is adjacent to the river bank. Here, the disputed land, is an accretion
not on a river bank but by a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which
adjoined Pascual’s own tract on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Art. 457 of
the NCC but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Therefore, Pascual cannot acquire and register the subject property in his namebecause the
increased land adjoining to his registered land was adjoined and formed by the action of the
Manila Bay (Sea) and not by the 2 rivers in this case, thus, Art. 457 not applicable.
Let us go to New Regent v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168880, April 16, 2009. Yes, so this case is very
simple because the principle here is by just being a riparian owner, one does not have the right to
the alluvial deposits added to his land. There are requisites to be complied with. The first requisite
is not complied with. There is no accretion and therefore, the riparian owner cannot claim
ownership thereof.
New Regent v. Tanjuatco

GR No. 168880 | April 16, 2009
Facts
New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of
Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds
of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna.
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to
apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion.
Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands.
On January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares
of stock in the corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000.
On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of
rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco. In his Answer with Counterclaim, Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that
the complaint stated no cause of action against him.
According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between
Cuevas and NRSI. RTC dismissed the complaint of New Regent on demurrer to evidence and
held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.
Issue
WON NRSI was able to substantiate its claim of entitlement to ownership of the lands in
Tanjuatco's name.

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Held
NO. NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It
submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name
of Tanjuatco. But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One
who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the
conditions provided by law.
New Regent has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has
satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of
land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1) of the Civil Code
rightly pertains to the public dominion.
The Certification issued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands were verified
to be within the Alienable and Disposable, certified and declared as such on September 28,
1981.
Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to
respondent. Next, New Regent sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name
of Tanjuatco. NRSI presented before the trial court a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which
the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said agreement
indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its
behalf. Neither did New Regent adduce evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and
Chairman. Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are confined only
to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws. In truth, New Regent
could have easily presented its by-laws or a corporate resolution to show Cuevas’ authority to
buy the lands on its behalf. But it did not. Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration
of nullity of contract, reconveyance and damages against respondents.
Now, let us go to a different issue. Let us look at the case of Grande v. CA, GR No. L-17652, June
30, 1962. Okay, so we won't go to the issue on good faith / bad faith. But just take note that even
though the riparian owner is [...] the owner of the alluvial deposits, there is a thing called "extinctive
prescription". He can lose ownership thereof if a third person possesses the said alluvial deposit for
a definite number of years. So a riparian owner must protect his ownership by registering the land
in his name. Otherwise, he can use ownership thereof because acquisitive prescription can only
apply to unregistered land. That is the purpose of the Torrens Title under the Land Registration Law.
When the land is registered, then you are protected. Nobody can acquire ownership thereof. But in
this case, Grande had no idea that his land became bigger. It is quite impossible to know. When he
found out, it was too late because Claro already acquire ownership thereof.

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So the SC here said:
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. x x x The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property x x x The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed
by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
Grande v. CA
GR No. L-17652, June 30, 1962
Facts
Grande owned a parcel of land. In the early 1930s, a gradual accretion took place and in in
1958 the alluvial deposits had formed over 19,000 square meters. Grande then discovered that
Bernardo Calulung has been occupying the alluvial deposits since 1934. Bernardo now claims
that he has acquired the alluvial property through prescription. However, Grande contends that
he is the rightful owner of the property as he is the registered owner of the land to which it
adjoins.
Issue
WON accretion may be subject to prescription
Held
Yes. Although Grande is the rightful owner of the alluvial property as he is the registered owner
of the land to which it adjoins, this does not automatically make the alluvial property registered
by extension. Thus, it is not subject to the protection of the Torrens System. It is not
imprescriptible. Grande failed to register the alluvial property. Since, Bernardo has been in
possession of the property since 1934, he has acquired the same through prescription.
Let us look at Agne v. Director of Lands, GR No. L-40399, February 6, 1990. Okay, so compare
those this case with the case of Grande. In Grande, [...] occupied, physically possess the alluvial
deposits for the requisite number of years. In this case, the one in possession was Marcelino, the
riparian owner. It just so happened that some other person was able to register the same in her name
via a free patent. So, just because the registered owner is somebody else does that mean that
Marcelino is not the owner of the alluvial deposits? The answer is NO under the principle of
accession. The riparian owner, as long as the requisites are present, is the owner of the alluvial
deposits. It does not matter if somebody else registered. In Grande, there was a possessor. Here, the
possessor is the riparian owner. So you have to see the difference between the two cases.
Agne v. Director of Lands

GR No. L-40399, February 6, 1990
Facts
In 1920, a big flood occurred which changed the course of the Agno-Chico River, latter
abandoned its original river bed. The original river bed is adjoining the land of the riparian
owner, Agne. Agne was in actual possession of the property ever since, however, they never
registered it under their names. Agpoon on the other hand has the title over the property by virtue

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of a free patent awarded by the Director of Land on 1937. Agpoon contended that Agne could
no longer question their ownership over the property since an action to annul a free patent many
years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.
Issue
Whether who between the two parties has a better right over the property? Agne, Riparian Owner
Held
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was issued
pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if the
property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action to annul the same
does not prescribe.
It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian
owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The
acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners
to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the
mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition. 26Such
abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as
a trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a
mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory
follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation
of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment
the mode of acquisition becomes evident.
The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law
of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of
flocks and herds to their natural increase. Petitioners herein became owners of aliquot portions
of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno River changed its course, without
the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part, it being an admitted fact that
the land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the Agno River and that
petitioners are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed.
The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes
of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Although we take cognizance
of the rule that an accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and therefore not
entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. The said rule is not applicable to this case since the title claimed by private
respondents is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the
Government, which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land.
Then let us go to Office of City Mayor v. Ebio, GR No. 178411, June 23, 2010. Okay, so GHI is the
riparian owner. And because of the natural current of the cut-cut creek, alluvial deposits were
formed which was occupied by Ebio since 1930. And this possession by Ebio was more than 30
years and therefore GHI lost ownership of this lot formed by alluvium and therefore, when he wanted
to put around here the cut-cut creek, did not [...] because he is already the owner thereof not because
of accretion but because acquisitive prescription.

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Office of City Mayor v. Ebio

GR No. 178411 | June 23, 2010
Facts
There are two lots in this case. 1. Road Lot 8 (RL 8), 2. The accreted portion adjoining RL 8.
Guaranteed Homes, Inc is the owner of RL 8 which it donated to the City of Paranaque.
On the otherhand, Ebios claim that he is the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek. He obtained such land from Vitalez, the father of his wife.
However, the City Government of Parañaquedecides for the construction of an access road along
Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When
the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents
immediately registered their opposition thereto.
Issue
WON Ebio can be evicted from the lot.
Held
NO. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that
have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs
ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads: ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands
contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
Applying Article 457 of the Civil Code, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the
owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the
accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case.
The law provides for the only restriction - the owner of the adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had
occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured

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a permit from the local government of Paranaque for the construction of their family dwelling
on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him
to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.
Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot
No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
government of Paranaque.
For more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of
Paranaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot.
The case of Siain Enterprises v. FF Cruz, GR No. 146616, August 31, 2006. So this area, is foreshore
or it will be reclaimed. Whether foreshore or reclaimed, it is property of public dominion. We
already know that. Now, Cruz applied for a foreshore lease of this entire area. Now, lease is allowed
for foreshore. Although it is beyond the commerce of men that it is allowed. So Cruz applied first.
And then here comes Siain applying for a foreshore lease for this area in front of it. Sabi ni Cruz, we
have the right because there is no such thing as accretion here. We have the right because we
applied first, Siain applied after us. So we have the right to lease this entire area. What did the
Supreme Court say? Siain has the right to lease the area in front of its property. This is the preferential
right given to the littoral (riparian) owner. Hindi pwede na pati yung foreshore in front of somebody
else's land, ilelease din niya.
Why is the littoral owner given a preferential right? The SC said,
The reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to
the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive
force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of
the sea should gain by its recession.
So diba, the riparian owner does not only get benefitted by the current of the water. Sometimes, the
riparian owner is prejudiced. It also happens to littoral owners. So in the case of littoral lands, he
who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
So, a littoral owner may not acquire ownership of the land adjacent to a foreshore or reclaimed but
it may lease and therefore, it can still possess.
Siain Enterprises v. F.F Cruz and Co.

GR No. 146616 | August 31, 2006
Facts
Siain bought a land (lot 3309) from DBP. On the said land, there is a foreshore area. Before Siain
Ent owned the land, its previous owner, WESVICO, sought for the registration of the said

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foreshore area but it was not pursued because the point person of the transaction cannot be
contacted.
Cruz had a property adjacent to Lot 3309. It made constructions thereon for the Iloilo City Port.
Later, Cruz applied for a foreshore lease on the said foreshore area.
Siain also applied for a foreshore lease on the foreshore area, which resulted into an overlap of
their (Siain and Cruz) respective leases by 130 linear meters.
Siain alleged that it should be given preference of the said land as the riparian owner and such
preference was provided by law. When the parties submitted the issue for resolution, there is an
issue as to the real classification of the land
Issue
(1) What is the classification of the land; (2) WON SIain lost the right to apply for the lease of the
said property.
Held
1. The land is a natural foreshore, land of public dominion. Being a natural foreshore, even
though reclaimed, does not remove it from its classification of being a natural foreshore and it is
therefore subject to the preferential right of lease by the riparian owner. This preferential right is
provided by Par 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 as well as The Spanish Law on Waters.
It stated there that the right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner for the diminution which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters
CAB: The “reclaimed land” existed long before Siain owned the property and Cruz made his
improvements. It was a natural accretion due to the action of the sea.
2. Siain can still lease the property. The Court held that when WESVICO sought for the
registration, which is a wrong action as the land is inalienable, it does not remove the right of
Siain to apply for the lease. Worthy to note in the case at bar is that WESVICO did not continue
the action for lack of interest. As such, even though WESVICO employed the wrong action, it
does not also prevent it from applying for a foreshore lease.
Take note of an additional case of Heirs of Narvasa v. Imbornal, GR No. 182908, August 6, 2014.
Tomorrow we will discuss this and we will proceed to the next topic.

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July 12, 2017 - Peroy
Heirs of Narvasa v. Imbornal, G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014. The issue here is who owns the
accretions. Take note the first accretion was formed in 1949. In 1952, this was registered under the
Imbornals, Vicitoriano, who was only an occupant of the southern portion of the lot owned by
Ciriaco. If they are considered in bad faith, from 1949 to 1979 they already acquired ownership
over the lot. The other accretion, was formed in 1971, dito. This one [refer to case] became the
owner in 1979. This one formed in 1971. When the Heirs of Narvasa filed a case in 1984, the
Imbornals already acquired ownership of this through prescription, 30 years because they started
occupying it 1949. When this was formed in 1971, who was the riparian owner, it was the heirs of
Imbornal already so they are entitled to the second accretion. This one, ownership of this was
acquired through prescription. Remember registering the property in your name does not make you
the owner. They believe that, just the same, they were also able to prove that they occupied this
land for more than 30 years. In 1984 owner na sila dito so sila na yung riparian owner who is entitled
to the second accretion.
Let’s continue with the provisions.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within
two years.
This is the second kind of natural accession, avulsion. Avulsion is a process by which the current of
a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers
it to another estate.
Let’s see, we have here the land of A. Then we have a river, and this is the land of B. Let’s say the
river suddenly goes this way. This land of A is now connected to the land of B. This is the known
portion of land transferred to the estate of another. Na- segregate yung land, segregated from A’s
estate, still belongs to A even though it is now connected to the land of B. What is the condition for
this continued ownership of this portion? He (A) must return it, ibalik yan ni A dito. He must return
the land to its original position.
Here, in both cases, alluvium and avulsion, there is something caused by the current of the river. In
avulsion, it is sudden, it is not gradual.
The distinctions between alluvium and avulsion are:

Alluvium Avulsion
the deposit of the soil is gradual; sudden or abrupt process may be seen
The soil cannot be identified The portion segregated is identifiable or
verifiable – because B’s property is this entire
area, you can see that there is a boundary,
maybe not physically but there is a boundary
because the land of A is over here.
It belongs to the owner of the property to Belongs to the owner of the property from
which it is attached which it was detached – this was detached

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from the property of A but he still owns this
provided in 2 years he returns it to its original
location […] back to its original place.
Art. 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current of the waters belong to the owner of the
land upon which they may be cast, if the owners do not claim them within six months. If such
owners claim them, they shall pay the expenses incurred in gathering them or putting them in a
safe place.
I don’t think that provision needs to be explained, that is very easy.
By the way, avulsion according to Reyes-Puno[?] is a case of delayed accession which happens if
the original owner does not remove the transferred portion in 2 years. So if A does not remove the
transferred portion, then B becomes the owner of the segregated area.
Let’s look at Art. 461, change in the course of a river:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire
the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied
by the new bed.
Here, avulsion, a portion lang, the current of the river segregates a known portion of land. However,
change in the course of the river is different. We have an abandoned riverbed.
The general rule is: the abandoned river bed ipso facto belongs to the owners of lands occupied by
the new course in proportion to the area lost.
In change in the course of river. This is the land of A, this is the land of B, and this is the land of C.
What happens is, the river because of flood or typhoon, suddenly transfers to this area and this is
dried out. According to the provision the abandoned river bed, this one, ipso facto belongs to the
owner whose lands are occupied by the new course. This river is sitting on the land of B. B becomes
the owner of this area (dried up river bed). This is an automatic ownership of the dried-up river bed.
The owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the old bed by paying
the value thereof.
Who is the owner of the land, A. But let’s say that the river is in C’s land. It would not be practical
if this area is owned by C, diba meron syang strip of land dito just because the river is sitting on his
land. So, A the adjoining owner of the dried up river bed has the right, he can, it is not up to C, if A
wants to he can acquire this portion from C by paying the value thereof. That is the rule under Art.
461.
What are the requisites for Art. 461 to apply?

1. The change must be sudden, not gradual, in order that the river bed will be identified.
2. The changing of the course must be more or less permanent and not temporary over flooding
of another’s land

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3. It [changing of the course] must be natural – there must be no human participation.
4. There must be definite abandonment by the government. No effort has been made to bring
back the river to its old bed. – we will discuss that later.
5. The river must continue to exist – it must not disappear. If the river dries up, there is no more
river, then the dried-up river bed is the property of public domain.
Nowadays, property cannot be transferred from one person to another without paying taxes. But this
one, the change in the course of river, it is a forced ownership because the owner of the land
occupied by the river is forced to own the dried up river bed. I don’t know the tax situation of that,
baka naman sabihin ng gobyerno kailangan i-tax yan because that is a change in ownership. This is
one instance where property of public dominion can be acquired by a private person, the dried-up
river bed. There is no need for conversion, reclassification, automatic.
PD 1067, Article 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private lands,
the owners of the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to its former
bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its
former course. The owners of the land thus affected are not entitled to compensation for any
damage sustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the
abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each.
Art. 461 should be related to PD 1067, Art. 58. If the situation is the river changed is course and is
now sitting on the land of C. Can the government move it back to its original place? Definitely. That
is what it means by the 4th requisite [for Art. 461 to apply].
If let’s say on June 15, the river that was there on the land of A is now found in the land of C. If the
government on June 16 puts it back to its original position then there would be no acquisition of the
dried-up river bed. But if the government abandons, bahala na yung river if it’s in the new position,
then that is the time that there will be accession. This is ownership by accession by C.
Under PD1067, Art. 58, the owner of the affected lots, C, the river is sitting on C’s land, cannot
compel the government to restore the river to its former bed. Kung ayaw ng gobyerno, C cannot
compel. But if the government decides to put it back, C cannot restrain the government from taking
steps to revert the river to its former course. And he is not compensation for any damage sustained.
What is the compensation that he will get? The old river bed, yung pinanggalingan ng river, that is
his compensation for any damage cause to his property because it’s now occupied by the new river.
However, they should be the owner of the abandoned river bed in proportion to the area lost. If the
river is occupying 10 hectares of the property of C, then he gets 10 hectares as well.
The owners of the affected may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed at their own
expense. Who are the owners of the affected land? Ito si C. He cannot:
1. compel the government,
2. he cannot restrain the government,
but [in order to return the stream to its original bed]:

1. he must get a permit from the DPWH and the DOTC; and
2. he must commence the work within 2 years.

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In other words, this is similar to avulsion, 2 years din ang avulsion. It’s just that in avulsion there is
only a small portion, a very small portion. Because in the change of the course of the river, the river
may be occupying somebody else’s property. But if you look at the period, transfer […] 2 years.
In relation to Art. 461, we will look at the case of Bagaipo v. CA, GR 116290, Dec 8, 2000. (For this
subject, don’t be lazy ha. You have to draw.) This is actually in Maa. The Bagaipos were our
neighbors. Take note, when we reach possession, we will talk about acquisitive prescription. There’s
no acquisitive prescription over registered land. If the land is registered, no matter how long
somebody else possess it he can never acquire ownership thereof. But look at this case, [lot] 415-C
was registered in the name of Bagaipo. But because the river gradually moved. The current of the
river caused it to move upwards and westward, despite registered ownership Bagaipo lost. One can
lose ownership by accretion even though one’s land is registered because of Art. 457. And so
Lozano, because the boundary between Bagaipo and Lozano is the river, Lozano is now the owner
of what used to be lot 415-C.
Why is it that the court said that it is not a change in the course of a river but accretion? Because it
happened in a long period of time. One day the lot of Bagaipo was this big, maybe after a few years
they realized, ay parang lumiit. So, gradual yan. Ang change in the course of a river, you will see, it
is not overnight. One day the river is here, the next day the river is over there – it is obvious. But for
accretion, you will not notice it at all. You go through your daily life, you will not notice that there
is some kind of movement on the course of the river. Especially since the level of the 2 properties
are not the same. The other one is lower. Obviously, because of the current soil would accumulate
here in the lower portion and eventually form into alluvial deposits. Tatanggalin yun nila. […]. Here
we are very lucky to have a case that deals with Art. 457 and Art. 461, one case.
We have another case, Agustin v. IAC, GR. 66075-76, Jul 5, 1990. As you can see, in this case we
have both. Alluvium which happened in the span of 49 years where those 3 where able to expand
the area of their land because of the gradual current of the river. And then suddenly it went back to
its original bed. So it doesn’t really matter what article is that, 459, 461, 463, the result is the same
because they already owned the alluvial deposits up to here. When it went back, they will retain
the ownership of the separated portion. And if you apply Art. 461, if the river is sitting on their land,
then they own the dried-up riverbed.

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Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new bed through a
private estate, this bed shall become of public dominion.
This automatic conversion this time is in the reverse. A river that opens in private property, the
property automatically becomes property of public domain. If the river moves again, there is a
reversion back to private property.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of
land is separated from the estate by the current.
Ex. The river is between the land of A and B. Suddenly the river branches out to the land of C. It still
retains its old bed and branches out to the land of A. A remains ownership of the portion which is
isolated from the rest.
Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on
lakes, and on navigable or floatable rivers belong to the State.
Art. 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-
navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of
them, or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it
shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed be more distant from one
margin than from the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.
The only question here is what is navigable and what is not. According to the law on the waters
article 135, it is the government who shall determine what rivers are navigable. Rivers are navigable
in law if navigable in fact. The rule is when the island is formed on a non navigable river because it
will belong to the non-riparian owners.
SECTION 3. - Right of Accession

with Respect to Movable Property
REMEMBER: In accession, the owner of the principal is the owner of the accessory. It talks about
two different owners. If the two movables belong to the same owner, there is no controversy.
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith, united
in such a way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory,
indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
Adjunction is the process by which two movables belonging to different owners are united in such
a way that they form a single object. Both must be in good faith for this to apply.
Ex. Painting – Canvass and Paint

Weaving – one thread belongs to A, the other thread belongs to B

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Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things incorporated, is deemed to be that to which
the other has been united as an ornament, or for its use or perfection.
Art. 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given in the preceding article which of the two things
incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the greater value shall be so considered, and as
between two things of equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal,
stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing.
Ex. Painted chair – Chair belongs to A, paint belongs to B. The chair is the principal because the
paint is used for its perfection
Test of greater value/volume/merits

Ex: a white gold ring and a diamond stone. The diamond stone has greater value.
Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be separated without injury, their respective owners may
demand their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is much
more precious than the principal thing, the owner of the former may demand its separation, even
though the thing to which it has been incorporated may suffer some injury.
This gives us the situation where the things united can be separated without injury.
Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he
shall lose the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the
principal thing for the damages he may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory
thing shall have a right to choose between the former paying him its value or that the thing belonging
to him be separated, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal thing; and
in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the incorporation with the knowledge and without the objection
of the other, their respective rights shall be determined as though both acted in good faith.
This is about bad faith in adjunction.
Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material employed without his consent has a right to an
indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and
in all other respects, to that employed, or else in the price thereof, according to expert appraisal.

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This is the rule if the material is used without the consent of the owner. He has the right to be
indemnified.
Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of
the things mixed or confused.
Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same or different kinds
are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be determined by the provisions of the
preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging
to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to
the owner of the other thing with which his own was mixed.
Mixture arises by chance, by the will of only one owner, by the will of both owners or by an agent.
Mixture is the process by which there is a combination of materials where the respective identities
of the component elements are lost.
Kinds of Mixture:
1. Comixtion – mixture of solids
Ex. Coffee and coffemate
2. Confusion – mixture of liquids
Ex. Coke and sprite
Is there accession in mixture?
General Rule: no accession if both are in good faith because there is co-ownership.
Exception: If the one who caused the mixture is in bad faith, there is accession because he will lose
ownership of the movable and the one in good faith will become the owner of the united object.
SANTOS VS BERNABE
Facts: Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Bernabe. At the same
time, Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of Tiongson and Santos
were mixed together and cannot be separated. Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson
files a case against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabe’s
warehouse. So Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it.
Bernabe’s properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice and 31 ½ kilos of palay.
These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos tried to
intervene in the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had already proceeded with the
attachment, so Santos files a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay;
he says that by asking for the attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the cavans of
rice all belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

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Issue: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own.
HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately. The cavans
belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule
prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: “If, by will of one of their owners, two things of identical
or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things
cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to
the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.” The number of
kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924 cavans
of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3Php per cavan
Comments: Since they are co owners they own their respective proportions. They have to divide the
cavans proportionately.
Art. 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole or in part in order to
make a thing of a different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed as his own,
indemnifying the owner of the material for its value.
If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of more value, its owner may, at his
option, appropriate the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work,
or demand indemnity for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the material shall have the right to
appropriate the work to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter
that he indemnify him for the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered. However,
the owner of the material cannot appropriate the work in case the value of the latter, for artistic or
scientific reasons, is considerably more than that of the material.
Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental value shall be duly appreciated.
Is there accession here?

Principal – labor
Active Party – worker. It is his bad faith or good faith that matters.
Specification is the giving of a new form to another’s material through the application of labor. The
material goes through a change of identity.
Parties: Worker/Transformer (one who transforms the material) and the Material Owner
Example: A ordered sugar and butter. B, thinking that he ordered them, used them to bake the cake.
The one who baked the cake is the owner of the cake. He has to indemnify A for the value of the
ingredients.
He cannot appropriate if the materials are more value than the new thing. The material owner can
appropriate after indemnifying the transformer for his services or demand indemnity for the value of
the materials.

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If material owner knew that the worker was using his materials, he is in bad faith.
Distinction of A, S, M

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QUIETING OF TITLE
Quieting of title is an action that involves real property, land. It could either be alienated action
which is to remove a cloud hovering over one’s title or it could be preventive; to prevent a cloud
from coming. What is this cloud? Why? Because title is very complicated in itself. The term
“quieting” is not used in its ordinary sense.
So by combining both provisions, we have the requisites. First is Article 477.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
The one who files an action to quiet title is the plaintiff and for the action to quiet title to prosper,
these requisites must be present. The plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. So you have real property which is the subject
matter. If you’re a plaintiff, you must show that you either have a legal title over such property or
equitable title. What is a legal title? TCT, the name. The equitable title, what’s that? You will learn
that later in the cases.
However, why is the plaintiff filing an action? Nasa kanya naman pala yung legal title or yung
equitable title over the property which is the subject matter. Why on earth is he filing? Because there
exists a cloud over the title which could be a price. What is a PRICE? It is an acronym for proceeding,
record, instrument, claim or encumbrance. The cloud could either be of those five. That cloud is
apparently valid on its face. Kung tingnan mo yung record ngayun o yung instrument ng cloud,
parang okay man sya because it was issued by a Government entity. Walang problema, but in truth
and in fact, it is not. Why? It is because it is either invalid, ineffective, voidable, unenforceable,
extinguished, exterminated or barred by extinctive prescription and the 5th, why is he filing? Eh ano
ngayon kung may cloud? It is valid on its face, but it is not in truth and in fact. So why is he filing?
Because it is prejudicial; maybe prejudicial to his title. What is his title? Legal or equitable title.
To understand this better, let’s look at the cases, let’s start with the case of Mamadsual vs Moson. In
this case, the cloud was an instrument in the form of an OCT registered in the name of Macarapan
which is or maybe prejudicial to the title. What is the test to determine the existence of the cloud or
if the cloud is really a cloud? Let’s say X is sued for ejectment of the PRICE. In this case, Mamadsual
was sued by Macarapan for ejectment on the strength of Macaparan’s OCT. Does X have to produce
other evidence to defeat the action? If none, then the cloud is strong. It’s not only an ordinary cloud
but a … cloud that is prejudicial to X.
Mamadsual vs Moson
GR 92557 | September 27, 1990
FACTS
Here, there is a certain land in which the spouses Mamadsual claims to be in possession in
actual, continuous and adverse possession since time immemorial. Here comes spouses
Macarapan who constructed dikes on the said property claiming to have a legal title on the
subject property as evidenceD by their original certificate of title.

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Now, spouses Mamadsual here filled an action for quieting of title against the claim of spouses
Macarapan who in turn moved for the dismissal of the action on the following grounds:
1. Spouses Mamadsual here do not have legal title over the said property
2. The action for quieting of title has already prescribed
ISSUE
WON the action for quieting of title should prosper.
HELD
Yes, the action should prosper because all the requisites provided for under Article 477 have
been complied with.
As the to the first requisite that the plaintiff had a legal title or equitable title or interest in the
real property, here in the case of Bar, spouses Mamadsuan here do not have a legal title but it
does not necessarily mean that spouses Mamadsual here can no longer avail the remedy
because in this case, the spouses Mamadsuan here claim to be in actual continuous and adverse
possession of the said property which in turn gets them an equitable title over the property.
Now, as to the second requisite as to the existence of the Cloud, in this case there’s a cloud by
means of an instrument and that is specifically the original certificate of title evidencing the
ownership of the land as registered under the name of spouses Macarapan.
As to the 3rd requisite, the original certificate of title being registered by the Register of Deeds is
apparently valid on its ways which may as the 5th requisite is maybe prejudicial to the equitable
title of Spouses Mamadsual,
As to the 4th requisite as to the determination of validity, affectivity, and enforceability of the
cloud, the court here reminded the case back to the Sharia District Court for further proceedings.
Let’s go to the next case, Fernandez vs CA. The principle here is if the plaintiff in an action to quiet
title is in possession of the property it is imprescriptible. The action to quiet title will not prescribe.
Why? Because the plaintiff has legal title or equitable title. Malay ba niya kung a cloud is coming or
not. What if he has no idea about the cloud? And that it will come 30 or 40 years later? So, according
to the SC, the discussion here is the owner may wait until his possession is distrubted by his …
because his action to quiet title does not prescribe but this privilege only applies if the plaintiff is in
possession of the subject property.
FERNANDEZ vs CA
GR 83141 | September 21, 1990
Facts:
On November 28, 1966, petitioners-spouses Florentino and Vivencia Fernandez and private

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respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez and the latter's husband Justiniano Fernandez purchased
in common a parcel of land with an area of 310 square meters Identified as Lot 13, Block 19,
Pagasa Subdivision, Quezon City. A Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "B") was executed by the
spouses de Torres in favor of the two Fernandez couples.
On February 24, 1967, the vendors Torres executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses
Zenaida and Justiniano Fernandez only. When petitioners learned that the Absolute Deed of Sale
did not include their names as vendees they confronted Zenaida and Justiniano Fernandez. Thus,
on April 24, 1967, Zenaida and Justiniano Fernandez executed an affidavit in which they
acknowledged the sale to petitioners Florentino and Vivencia Fernandez of a portion of the subject
parcel of land consisting of 110 square meters and the receipt of the consideration therefor in the
amount of P5,500.00.
On January 26, 1970, Zenaida and Justiniano caused the issuance of a certificate of title (TCT No.
149347) only in their names.
In a letter dated October 22, 1977, private respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the
premises of the lot awarded to her.
On June 9, 1981, petitioners' spouses Florentino and Vivencia filed an action to quiet title and
damages against Zenaida Fernandez only, who was then already estranged from her husband
Justiniano.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Spouses Fernandez can file an action to quiet title under Article 476?
2. Whether or not their action to quiet title has prescribed?
Ruling: 
1. Yes, Spouses Fernandez can file an action to quiet title. This is because all of the requisites
for an action to quiet title (as found under Article 476) is present in the case at bar:
a. A cloud in the title exists by means of an instrument. This is manifested by the
certificate of title that Spouses Zenaida obtained;
b. The certificate of title obtained by Zenaida appears to be valid. There is
presumption of immutability in a torrens title;
c. However, the TCT is ineffective because the Spouses Florentino and Vivencia have
equitable title over a portion of the property. Zenaida does not own the entire
property; and
d. Such certificate of title is prejudicial to the Spouses Florentino and Vivencia
because it is enough for them to be ejected from the property.
2. The action has not prescribed. Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, which is, in effect an action to quiet title against the plaintiff therein who
is in possession of the land in question. Since Spouses Florentino and Vivencia are in
possession of the property, their action to quiet title is imprescriptible. As explained in
Bucton v. Gabar, ... “that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding,
or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to

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ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any
superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.”
Let’s look at Bucton vs Gabar. In this case, there was an allegation that the action has prescribed
because for specific performance, the prescriptive period is 10 years from the issuance of the
document. The Supreme Court said here that even if the action is designated as specific performance,
you read the allegations fo the complaint of Bucton, it is in truth and in fact an action to quiet title
and you already know that if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is
imprescriptible. So, this is really an action to quiet title.
BUCTON vs GABAR
GR L-36359 | January 31, 1974
Facts:
In 1946 Josefina Llamoso Gabar bought a lot from the spouses Villarin on installment basis.
Josefina Gabar entered into a verbal contract with her sister-in-law Nicanora Bucton wherein
Bucton would pay 1⁄2 of the price of P 3,000 and would then own 1⁄2 of the land. Bucton then
gave the initial amount of P 1, 000. Then in 1948, Bucton gave P 400. In 1951, Bucton gave
Gabar P 1, 000 in the concept of a loan. Gabar signed receipts for all the amounts she was given.
After Gabar received the initial amount of P 1, 000 in 1946, Bucton took possession of the land
indicted to her by Gabar and she built a modest nipa hut therein. 2 years later, Bucton built
another house for rent behind the nipa hut. Bucton then demolished the nipa hut and built a house
with 2 floors. Bucton lived on the 2nd floor while there were 3 apartments for rent in the lower
portion. Bucton eventually converted the whole building into a dormitory.
In 1947, the spouses Villarin (the original owners) executed a Deed of Absolute sale of the land
in favor of Gabar and a TCT was issued in the name of Gabar. Bucton sought to obtain a separate
title for her portion of the land. Gabar repeatedly declined to accommodate Bucton’s request
saying that the entire land was still mortgaged to Philippine National Bank.
Bucton continued enjoying their portion of the land, Bucton then instituted an action for specific
performance praying that Gabar be ordered to execute a deed of sale in her favor for her half of
the property. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that Bucton’s
right of action was based on a receipt issued in 1946. Based on the Civil Code, an action arising
out of a written contract prescribes after the lapse of 10 years. When Bucton filed this case, 22
years had already elapsed therefore her right of action to enforce the alleged written contract had
already prescribed.
ISSUE 1:
WON Bucton’s action will prosper. Yes.
RULING 1: *based on recitation and requisites for quieting of title

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1. The plaintiff has legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action, Bucton has an equitable title by virtue of the consummated sale between
her and Gabar.
2. There exists a cloud or doubt on the title of real property which could be a PRICE,  The cloud
is the TCT in the name of Gabar.  
3. The PRICE is apparently valid on its face,  The TCT is valid.  
4. But in truth and in fact, the PRICE is invalid,  ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or
extinguished or barred by extinctive prescription.  The TCT is ineffective insofar as it
encompasses the whole lot, including the portion belonging to Bucton.  
5. The PRICE may be prejudicial to his title.  The TCT in the name of Gabar is prejudicial to
Bucton because she may be ejected from her portion of the property based on the title.  
ISSUE 2: WON Bucton’s right of action has already prescribed. No.
RULING 2:
The real and ultimate basis of Bucton’s action is her ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with
her possession thereof, which entitles her to a conveyance of the property.
In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained that, under
the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the delivery of possession of
the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that, actually,
the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the appellee's
ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. We
held therein that "... it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this
jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 20 L.R.A. 930;
Inland Empire Land Co.vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one
who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors
remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule
being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the
adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title in attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One
who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke remedy within
the statutory period. (44 Am. Jur., p. 47)
The doctrine was reiterated recently in Gallar v. Husain, et al., where We ruled that by the delivery
of the possession of the land, the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee,
that the action is actually not for specific performance, since all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove
the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale
made by his predecessor, and that as plaintiff- appellee is in possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible. Considering that the foregoing circumstances obtain in the present case, We hold

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that Bucton’s action has not prescribed.
Let’s go to the case of Sapto vs Fabiana. This case is a civil case. In civil cases, the one who filed is
a plaintiff. In this case, it was SApto who filed against FAbiana to eject them. They wanted to recover
the possession of the property. In civil cases, defendant or Fabiana here can file a counter claim and
in the counterclaim he is considered the plaintiff. This was what has been filed. Fabiana filed a
counter claim for specific performance asking the court to order Sapto to execute the necessary
documents to allow the transfer of the title to their names, fAbiana. But it was alleged that the action
has prescribed but the SC said that in truth and in fact the action filed by FAbiana is for quieting of
title considering that all of the requisites are present and since FAbiana is in possession of the land,
the action does not prescribe. It is easy. You just need to ensure that you have all the documents
and the requisites.
SAPTO vs FABIANA
GR No. L-11285 | May 16, 1958
FACTS:
Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale in favor of Antonio Fabiana. This land was
inherited from their father and is covered by transfer of certificate of title. Now the deed of sale
was not registered however, the possession of the land was already conveyed to Antonio Fabiana.
Antonio Fabiana has been in possession of said land since 1931 and now in 1954 or 23 years
later, the Heirs of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land from Antonio Fabiana claiming
that the Deed of Sale was not registered.
The court of first instance ruled in favor of Antonio Fabiana wherein it upheld the sale between
the predecessors of the heirs of Sapto and Antonio Fabiana even though it was not registered. The
heirs of Sakto were then ordered by the court of first instance to execute a deed of conveyance in
favor of Fabiana and annotate a title in his name. The heirs of Sapto questioned said order alleging
that they can no longer be demanded to execute a deed of Conveyance because according to
them the action has already prescribed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the order of the court is for the conveyance of the land or an action for quieting a
title
HELD
The action is one for quieting of title. The cloud in this case is the refusal or the claim of title
which is still in the name of Antonio.
The cloud is the title of the property. The cloud is apparently valid because it is a valid transfer
certificate of the title because it was issued by the register of deeds however it is in truth and in
fact unenforceable because although the legal title is in the name of Sapto there is already an
equitable title on the part of Antonio Fabiana because ownership was already delivered to him in
1931 through the sale.

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The title maybe prejudicial to the title of Antonio Fabiana because he may ejected from the land
he has been in possession for more than 20 years.
Another case is Metrobank vs Alejo. The judgment in favor of … who is the real owner of the
property that was mortgaged with Metrobank. According to the CA, it should be considered a cloud
over the title of Metrobank assuming … of equitable title over the property. Is it a cloud over the
title? Well, no according to the SC because for it to be considered a cloud, it must be only apparently
valid on its face but in truth and in fact it is not. You have a judgment which is a valid judgment,
tapos not valid na naman. It’s one of the kinds of cloud enumeration, the cloud there is the
proceeding, there’s a court case, a proceeding. When it comes to judgment, you cannot say it is a
valid judgment and it’s not a valid judgment pala. There’s another way of attacking a judgment, not
like this. So therefore this is not one to quiet title because of the non-existence of a cloud.
METROBANK vs ALEJO
GR 141970 | September 10, 2001
FACTS:
Sps. Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from Metrobank and Trust Company in the
amounts of Php. 5,000 and Php. 2,000. As a security of the loans obtained, the Sps. Acampado’s
executed a real estate over a parcel of land registered in their names covered by a TCT registered
in the ROD of Valenzuela City.
However, certain Sy Tan Se filed a complaint for Annulment of the TCT under the names of Sps
Acampado’s that the said parcel of land is owned by Sy Tan Se and not by Sps. Acampados. On
the other hand while the judgment of annulment of the TCT under the names of Sps. Acampado’s
declared as null and void, Metrobank started in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding of the
real estate mortgaged by Sps Acampado’s when they failed to pay their loan obligation.
Hence, Metrobank being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued under their name and
when they are about to get the TCT in the ROD of Valenzuela City, they are informed that there
is judgment declaring the TCT under the names of Sps Acampado’s as null and void. This
prompted Metrobank to file a case for quieting of title.
ISSUE: W/N the action for quieting of title is applicable in the instant case.
HELD:
No, the action for quieting of title is not applicable in the instant case because not all the requisites
of Quieting of Title are present.
1. Although Metrobank has an equitable title by virtue of the real estate mortgage foreclosure,
but the judgment rendered declaring the TCT as null and void cannot be considered a
cloud on title because there is no semblance of a title.
2. The judgment mentioned is not among those provided as a ground to be considered a
cloud pursuant to Article 476.
Therefore, the action of quieting of title is not proper. (It should have been relief of judgment/
annulment of judgment).

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Let’s go to Article 478.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the
contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been
barred by extinctive prescription.
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the
latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as
they are not in conflict with this Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be
governed by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated.
Just read the discussion of Paras.
This is actually procedural in a sense. These are actually self-explanatory.

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Co-ownership is not new to you because this is a term or a concept that you have already gone
through in your previous classes or in your previous lessons. I can remember in Article 147 and 148
of the Family Code, those who are not capacitated to enter into a marriage or those whose marriage
are void by virtue of certain defect in their marriage, their property shall be under Article 147. And
under Article 147, everything that is not provided for by the article, the Family Code says that it shall
be governed by the rules on Co-ownership. Under Article 148, it talks about those who are not
capacitated to marry each other, so you remember that in your persons and family relations. What
does it provide? Those who enter into such an arrangement, the property regime shall be governed
by their joint contributions and we say that this is a concept called a limited co-ownership.
So the concept of co-ownership is actually not new to you. However, we have to look at co-
ownership more specifically. In your previous lessons in Property, I just like to point out that you
have already learned the co-ownership. Maybe you do not know about it yet na co-ownership na
pala yun. So for example, under Article 438, diba you remember the rules on hidden treasure. So,
if a hidden treasure is found on the property of another, by one who is not a trespasser, that person
who found the hidden treasure is entitled to 1/2 share of that treasure. We also know about this in
the lessons of Article 472 and 473, commixtion and confusion of things. So under 472 is clear:
Article 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed,
or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing
in mind the value of the things mixed or confused.
So that espouses what happens if there is co-ownership. So under 473, on the other hand:
Article 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same or
different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be determined by the
provisions of the preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing
belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the
damages caused to the owner of the other thing with which his own was mixed.
What is the provisions of the preceding article? Those rules governing co-ownership. However, co-
ownership there is co-ownership of a movable thing. So these concepts, the concept of co-ownership
in particular is not new to you. So do not be afraid of co-ownership. So in co-ownership, we have
to discuss first the legal definition of when can we say that there is co-ownership.
Title III. CO-OWNERSHIP
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons.

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In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the

provisions of this Title.
Now, Article 484 talks about the requisites of co-ownership. When can we say that there is co-
ownership. So, from the provision itself, let us go through the terms one by one. First, there must be
a unity of the object. That is what we call material indivision. So a thing exists and that thing which
we call a property or a right, is materially indivisible. So you cannot divide it into certain portions.
So that is the first requisite - the unity of the object which shows material indivision.
Second, it must belong to different persons. So that means there must be a plurality of parties. So the
parties with respect to undivided thing must be more than by 2 or more persons. Is this concept
familiar to you? Yes, you have that under conjunction but at the same time what brings to mind is
your lessons in obligations and contracts if you remember. Anyway, under Article 1209, all creditors
must make the demand in order that all debtors may deliver that [...] So even if they are joint debtors
with respect to the thing, there is a plurarlity of the subject and there is unity of the object. So that
is how you familiarize the concept of co-ownership.
But what makes co-ownership so special is the requisite provided for by jurisprudence, that there is
a recognition of ideal rights. Why is this so important? There must be a recognition of the ideal rights,
proportional share or what we say spiritual rights.
So what makes co-ownership different from everything that we have learned before is the fact that
there is a recognition of ideal shares or an abstract quota, proportional shares or what we also call
spiritual shares. What does this provide? So these shares, rights, with respect to an undivided thing
is what will determine the rights and obligations of the parties belonging to the co-ownership. So
remember those three requisites.
Since nasa co-ownership na tayo, I presume that you have already gone through ownership. Diba?
In ownership under Article 427, ownership pertains to a property or a thing or a right. So you may
own things, you may own rights. But what is important about ownership are the provisions under
428 and 429. What do those provisions provide?
Article 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights.
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it.
Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
Diba those are incidents of ownership. Remember that ownership entails a bundle of rights. So you
have the right to use, you have the right to abuse, you have the right to fruits, you have the right to

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institute actions for the recovery of the thing. If you remember those concepts in ownership, those
concepts still apply to co-ownership. But what is the difference? The difference is, in ownership,
generally, the issue there is whether or not that person has a right with respect to that thing so much
so can he enjoy, can he possess, can he abuse, recover that thing? So that is the question in
ownership. But in co-ownership, there is a plurality of subjects, we call those subjects co-owners.
Therefore, each and every subject belonging to the co-ownership may also exercise the rights
pertaining to ownership because all of them are equal owners of that.
But why is it so important to talk about co-ownership? What makes co-ownership special is the fact
that we have recognize two(?) concepts of ownership. So, we said that there is a third requisite as to
the existence of the co-ownership and what is that? The recognition of ideal shares. So we have
ideal shares but also at the same time, we said that one of the elements of co-ownership is that there
must be a unity of the object. What is that object? The object is the thing or the right co-owned by
the subjects to the co-ownership or what we call as the property.
The concept of ownership entails two things, the ownership of the ideal shares because the third
requisite says that there must be a recognition of the ideal shares. And next, the ownership of the
actual material thing, which cannot be divided. Now, as to the ideal shares, you have to take note
that the ownership thereof is absolute with respect to the individual co-owners. As to the material
thing, as to the thing right or property subject of the co-ownership, since it is materially indivisible,
or there is material indivision, we say that there is a joint ownership among all co-owners over that
material thing. So under ideal shares, we say that there is an absolute ownership with respect to that
share to an individual co-owner. But with respect to the thing, right, or property, the material thing
subject of the co-ownership, we say that there is a joint ownership among all co-owners. Why joint?
Remember in your obligations and contracts, solidarity is never presumed, the law presumed that
two or more persons concur into one obligation, the obligation is joint. So that is why there is joint
co-ownership.
Why do we say that the ideal shares are the absolute ownership of the individual co-owners? What
is our legal basis? We have Article 493. We jump. We have to correlate that with Article [...].
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 493 is our basis why we can say that with respect to the ideal shares, the absolute ownership
of each individual share will pertain to each co-owner. Why? Because each co-owner shall have
full ownership of that part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to that part. What is that part, that is
the idea share. So what is the consequence if you have absolute ownership? You can exercise all
the rights of an owner thereof but only with respect to the ideal share. That is why Article 493 says
that since a co-owner has full ownership over the ideal share, what he may do? First, he may alienate,
asign, mortgage it, or even substitute another person for its enjoyment because if he can't enjoy it
himself, he can substitute another person for its enjoyment.
But what is the limitation under 493? Except in cases where personal rights are involved. So if the
personal qualifications and circumstances of a co-owner is the very reason why the co-ownership

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was brought about, and for example that co-owner whose personal circumstances and conditions
were considered, he will assign his ideal share to another person. Is that allowed? No, because his
part of the co-ownership is by virtue of his personal qualifications and circumstances, that is a
personal right. Relate it to Article 1178 under Obligations and Contracts - subject to law, the debtor
with respect to his obligation, upon his death, can transmit to the heirs all the rights and obligations
pertaining to an obligation.
Article 1178. Subject to the laws, all rights acquired in virtue of an obligation are
transmissible, if there has been no stipulation to the contrary.
So under the Doctrine of Transmissibility of Rights, we have an exception. Not all rights are
transmissible. Those rights which are personal or are strictly personal in nature cannot be transmitted
to the heir. You remember that? That is why for example if a husband dies, can the child have all
the rights of a husband with regard to the wife? No, because the rights of the husband is personal.
So that is what we call of the concept of a personal right. That same concept is applicable to co-
ownership. If the personal circumstances of the parties are the very reason why the co-ownership
was made, then that co-owner cannot transmit his right to some other person. He cannot be
substituted.
You have to take note that the effect of this alienation, for example, mortgage, with respect to other
co-owners shall only be limited to the ideal share. Why? Because we said that the absolute
ownership of the ideal share if with respect to the individual co-owner. Therefore, individual co-
owners may [...] all the rights of an owner with respect to that ideal share. So he does not care about
the other co-owners. But if he does alienate an ideal share in the co-ownership, his alienation, his
mortgage, his substitution, will only affect him insofar as his ideal share is concerned. Why? Because
he is the absolute owner only of the ideal share and not of the material portion.
So the next concept of ownership under co-ownership is the ownership with respect to the object
of the co-ownership. With respect to the thing, right, or property subject of the co-ownership. Why
can we say that all of the co-owners have a joint ownership over that material indivisible thing. We
have Article 486.
Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Now, 486 is clear. Common use of the thing. Use is a right of ownership but since they are co-
owners, all of them can exercise the right to use. That is why there is a common use for all co-
owners with respect to the material thing. What is the limitation with regard to the use?
First, it must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was intended. So for example, the
parties, ABC bought a parcel of land because they just want to have land in order for future
investments. But for example one of the parties constructed a house and allowed his family to live
there. Is that the purpose of the object of the co-ownership? No. It was only supposed to be for
appraisal, for investment. Meaning, the right of one co-owner stops when the right of another co-
owner is alienated. So that is the basic limitation of co-ownership. That is what makes co-ownership
a special type of ownership.

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Second, it must be used in such a way not to first injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Again, this is because there is a join
ownership over the thing owned in common by all co-owners. So you always have to look back to
the purpose of the co-ownership.
So how may a co-ownership is established? It is established by stipulation of the parties, it may be

established by law. So generally we say that a co-ownership can be established by law, when? When
the law so provides. So what are the instances where the law provides that there must be a co-
ownership? We already talk about persons and family relations, hidden treasure, commixtion,
conjunction. So those are clear provisions of law which the law says that there is a co-ownership.
What are other examples? Under the law on succession, when a person dies, his estate with regard
to rights, properties, and obligations belonging to him will be transmitted to the heirs. That is in
accordance with Article 1178. Succession is not a part of ownership. It is a mode of acquiring
ownership. These laws tell us that by law there is a co-ownership. When is there a co-ownership?
When there is unity of the object, plurality of the subject, and recognition of ideal shares.
What are the governing rules as provided for under Article 484? So first, you have to look into
whether there is a contract. What is a contract? We already know that, Article 1305.
Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
So that is a contract. A meeting of the minds. Of course the purpose of the co-ownership shall be in
accordance with that contract with regard to that stipulation. Second, it shall be governed by special
provisions of law whenever special provisions of law are applicable. So what brings to mind is
Article 90 of the Family Code. Remember if you are married under the Family Code, the default
property regime and the absence of a marriage settlement is Absolute Community Property. And in
ACP, the provisions in the Family Code will govern. However, for those incidents in ACP which is
not found in the FC, what does Article 90 provide? The rules of co-ownership shall be applied
suppletorily. That is why sabi nila ACP is a special kind of co-ownership.
The question is, what if there is no contract or the contract is implied, or the contract is not that
express, or what if there is no special provision of law which governs co-ownership? Article 484
provides that the provisions under the New Civil Code will govern. So that is why it is important for
us to learn co-ownership.
Okay, so let us illustrate. For example, with respect to a lot. There is a particular lot a group of frineds
want to have. A B and C want to buy a particular lot. In buying the lot, they buy it from D, an agent
or a license broker. When they buy it from D, is the land already partitioned? Does A B and C know
which part of the land is theirs? A material part of the land? No. But we can say that there is unity of
the object and at the same time there is a plurality of the subjects. We will learn later on under
Article 485, if A B C contribute proportionally in order to buy the land from D, then we can say that
there is a co-ownership. Let us go to Article 485. Let us go to Article 485 so you can understand it
better.

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Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proved.
It says that all charges, all the benefits arising from the co-ownership will be in accordance with the
proportionate contribution of co-owners. In the absence to a stipulation or if we do not know what
is the proportionate contribution of the co-owners then we say that, the law presumes that their
shares are equal. So for example, A B and C want to buy the land valuing at 5M from D. A B and C
agreed that okay, let us just own the interest of the land with regard to our proportional contributions.
Let us say, B is the richest so he will give around 2.5 M. How much is the proportional obligation
of each of the subject in regard to the buying of the land? (Sir computed on the board). So what is
the ideal share? The ideal share is this. Their proportional share, their abstract quota, their ideal
share, their spiritual share with respect to the materially indivisible thing. So this is the share of each
of the buyer.
Article 485 says that with respect to the benefits and charges on the thing co-owned, it shall be
proportional to their contribution or to their interests. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be void.
So for example, on the land, let us say of course there are natural fruits or growing crops, let us from
it there is a harvest amounting to 1M. What is that? Under accession, that the right of the fruits will
pertain to the owners. This case to the co-owners. So let us compute how much is the benefit
proportional to each and every co-owner. (Computation on the board). So what if the parties after
their proportional contribution, they just say na bugo man ta ug math, so eveyrthing that we own
from the land shall be equally distributed between us. Is that valid? The provision says No. Any
stipulation to the contrary, meaning any stipulation which will provide that they will not follow their
ideal share, that they will not follow their proportional contribution shall be void.
What if on the property, let us say there are charges. Let us say there is a real estate tax of 300k. So
this is as to the charges. How much shall each co-owner incur with respect to the charges? So we
can say that A shall be charged 75k, B 150k, and C 75k. They shall share with respect to the common
charge of the property, which is the real estate tax. So it shall be proportional according to their
contribution. Why is it considered void? Because in co-ownership it is not like a partnership, that is
in the book of Paras. So you go over that. Why? Because one of the incidents in partnership is that
it should always be by virtue of a contract as opposed to a co-ownership, a co-ownership shall
always be in accordance with the law or in accordance with a contract.
Under co-ownership, we say that a co-owner may substitute we say that a co-owner may substitute
another person in his place but only with regard to his ideal share because of the principle that full
ownership of the ideal share shall be with regard to each and every co-owner but as to the material
thing, you only have joint ownership. So that is why you can substitute another person. But under
partnership, that is not possible because you have the principle of electus personi(?), which under
that principle, it says that in partnership, the relationship between the partners is one that is fiduciary
or one of utmost confidence.
We already talked about Article 486. Now let us go to Article 487.

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Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Now, you already learned under Article 438, the right of an owner to institute an action against any
person in order to recover. What are the actions? We have accion publiciana, etc. So those are
actions instituted in order to recover property. Those same actions as we said can even be exercised
by the co-owners. But what does Article 487 provide? Each co-owner may institute an action for
ejectment. The word ejectment can also pertain to forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion
publiciana and not merely just an action for ejectment case. It is a general term used for all of those
actions instituted in order to recover the property.
But what is special under Article 487? As we said as to the material thing, there is a joint ownership
with respect to each and every co-owner. But why is it that each co-owner may file an action in
court for ejectment? Why not all? Why does the law not provide all the co-owners must institute the
action? Why any? You have this principle in co-ownership that you have to remember that
everything [...] to the benefit of the co-ownership, each co-owner may do but anything that is
prejudicial to the co-ownership, all co-owners cannot. So anything beneficial, anyone can do. We
said, since there is a benefit, all of them should enjoy the benefit with respect to their proportional
contribution. But why is it that with respect to those prejudicial to co-ownership, why must not
anyone, why must all do or consent to those acts? Simply because it is prejudicial to everyone, to
their joint ownership. That is the logic behind Article 487.
But we have to distinguish actions under Article 487. We have actions that can be instituted against
third persons by any co-owner. And we can also say that their actions instituted against co-owner,
or it is an action between or among co-owners. If the action is instituted against a third person, we
have to make a distinction. Jurisprudence provides that there are two kinds of cases. If the complaint
for ejectment is instituted by only one co-owner but that co-owner does not recognize the co-
ownership, what does it mean? That co-owner instituted the action to recover the property thinking
that he has exclusive ownership over the co-owned properties. Is that allowed? We say that NO.
That complaint must be dismissed. Why?
Under Civil Procedure, there are certain persons which we call indispensable parties. If they are not
included in the case, the case shall be dismissed. Since all co-owners we said are joint owners to
the material thing, then therefore all co-owners must institute the action. Why? Because it talks about
exclusive ownership. So if each and everyone of them says that they are all owners, then they protect
that object to the co-ownership as opposed to, if the complaint is instituted by anyone of the co-
owner and that co-owner institutes the complaint in benefit or in recognition of the co-ownership.
Meaning, a co-owner is fighting the rights not only of his right as a co-owner but all the rights of
other co-owners. If he institute that action, then that is the proper action under Article 487.
Did Maam assign the case of Baloloy v. Hular, GR No. 157767, September 9, 2004. This action
was instituted for the benefit of the complainant alone. But it turns out that the complainant was a
co-owner over a co-owned property. He instituted the action to recover the property under his own
name fighting his rights as if he were the exclsuive owner. In that case, the court dismissed the
complaint because the action was not proper.
Baloloy v. Hular
GR No. 157767 | September 9, 2004

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Facts
Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in
Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the
property was agricultural, while the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino
Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over
the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, ( 15,906 sqm) and the residential portion of the property
(287 sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hular’s permission to
construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed.
Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of the residential portion of Lot 3347
Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and registered the same. Iluminado constructed his house on a portion
of Lot No. 3353. He and his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347,
which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children continued
residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminado’s children, later
constructed his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died, he was survived
by his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others,
who continued to reside in their house.
Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and discovered that the residential
area deeded by Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287
square meters only.
Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property against the
children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo
and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He prayed among others that he be declared the absolute
owner of the property in question
Issue
Whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court.
Held
NO. Respondent adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they were survived by
their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate
of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action
will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject
property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other

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co- owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.
Now, is it possible that co-owners file a case for recover against other co-owners? Yes. That is
explained in the case of De Guia v. CA, GR No. 120864, October 8, 2003. By the way, for all the
cases, let us postpone that until Saturday. Usually this case involves quieting of title and you already
know what a quieting of title is diba. Why is this allowed? This is allowed because it just forces the
other co-owners to recognize the co-ownership. Because this presumes that one of the other co-
owners would want to exercise the exclusive right with regard to the materially indivisible thing. Is
that allowed? No. That is why one of the co-owners may file an action against the other co-owners
in order that the co-owner who is exercising exclusive right over the joint property will be forced to
recognize the co-ownership.
So under Article 487 you have to make a distinction. If the action is instituted, you have to look first
against whom? Against a third person or against a co-owner? If it is against a co-owner, generally
that is allowed depending if the requisites of the action is present like the requisites of forcible entry,
etc. But for example, if it is against a third person, you have to make a distinction. Is the complaint
instituted in order to recognize the co-ownership or not? If it is not then the complaint is not possible,
that complaint should be dismissed. Will learn that more under civil procedure. As of now, it is
important for you to know that we have to make a distinction.

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July 19, 2017 - Peroy
[…] baka may ma-shock sa inyo na, my god, mag compute man jud ta ani. Yes and no. Yes, it is
necessary for me to show you para maintindihan niyo what it means to recognize ideal shares. But
at the same time, no, baka hindi yan lalabas sa exam ni maam or baka ang lalabas sa exam ni maam
will already have the ideal shares. You have to know how to apply the concepts with regard to
benefit and charges.
Last meeting, we talked about Art. 487, any one of the co-owners may bring and action in ejectment.
However, even if Art. 487 talks about actions for eject, we have to focus on those actions we already
know, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, etc. At the same time, it doesn’t mean that those are the
only actions that can be instituted by the co-owners.
What are other actions that can be instituted by co-owners that is not necessarily an action for
ejectment or an action for recovery of possession? We already discussed the case of De Guia v. CA,
I think that case talked about an action for quieting of title. Although the case does not talk about
actual ejectment but quieting of title is an action that can be instituted under Art. 487.
Under the Law on Sales, Art. 1620 and 1621, you will learn that co-owners may file an action for
redemption of co-owned property in case one of the co-owners sells the property. Any one of the
co-owners may redeem the property to the benefit of the co-ownership. I’ll leave that up to you for
sales. It’s enough for you to know that actions for ejectment are not the only actions that can be
instituted by the co-owners, there are a lot.
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must,
if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or
embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492.
Art. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the
resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent the
controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to
those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested
party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an
administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is
owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common.

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Since we talked about co-ownership, and again we said that co-ownership is special because there
are 2 concepts of ownership over co-ownership. We have absolute ownership over the ideal share
or the spiritual share. Which you know is the interest of each co-owner in a thing which is materially
undivided or the object of the co-ownership.
Art. 488, talks to you about the incidents of a life in a co-ownership. Since we already know that
the 2nd kind of ownership under co-ownership is a joint ownership over the material object which
is the subject matter of co-ownership, then corollary to that we know that co-owners have to respect
the rights of other co-owners.
Art. 488 shows us an interaction between co-owners. What can co-owners do with respect to other
co-owners.
Each co-owner has the right to compel the other co-owners the right to contribute to the
expenses of preservation and to contribute to taxes.
These are broadly what we call necessary expenses or necessary repairs – those incurred necessary
for the preservation of the thing, which is the subject matter of the co-ownership, or for tax, because
taxes will preserve the co-ownership such as in the case of land. Those are what we call necessary
expenses. For necessary expenses, we know that these are expenses which are necessary for the
preservation of the thing or the object subject of the co-ownership.
But what are the rights of parties when we say that they will incur in these expenses which are
necessary expenses. We have Art. 489.
Art. 489, Sentence 1: Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners…
That means that if any one of the co-owners decide to incur an expense and that expense is necessary
for the preservation of the thing then at the will of any one of the co-owners they may incur in such
necessary expenses. Meaning since any one of the co-owners may decide to incur expenses for the
preservation of the thing and for taxes, what is his right with regard to other co-owners? That is
where At. 488 comes in – he may compel the other co-owners to contribute because they are joint
owners of the material thing.
That is why we say that those expenses necessary for the preservation of the thing are necessary
expenses because Art. 489 tells us that there is a necessity for such repairs therefore they are called
necessary expenses. Those expenses which are necessary to the preservation of the thing.
When any one of the co-owners will decide to incur necessary expenses, his right against the other
co-owners is the right to compel them to contribute. To contribute to the expenses for the
preservation of the thing and the right to contribute for taxes, because taxes are necessary expenses.
We now have the remedy of one co-owner who wants to decide to incur necessary expenses.
Art. 488, Sentence 2: Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing
so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes.
But what is the remedy of other co-owners who don’t want to contribute? That is still under Art. 488.
Any one of those co-owners who are compelled to contribute, and if they don’t want to contribute,
what is their remedy? They may renounce so much of their undivided share as may be equivalent
of the expenses and the taxes.

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The remedy of the co-owner who is compelled to contribute but does not want to contribute is to
renounce. How he will renounce, we will talk about that in a while because it involves computation.
It’s enough for you to know that the remedy is to renounce so much of his undivided share. “So
much” meaning a portion, not the entire undivided share [So much = in that degree, to that extent].
Art. 489, Sentence 1: …but he must, if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for
such repairs.
I want to focus first on the fact of notification kasi nakakalito on first blush. Your first impression
under Art. 489, the co-owner who decides to incur expenses necessary for preservation must give a
notification first to his co-owners before he could incur those necessary expenses. But only if the
notification is practical. Why only if practical? Number 1, Art. 489 already tells us that there is a
necessity for the repairs. Sometimes because of the repairs or the necessary expenses they have to
be incurred right away. Because of the urgency of incurring those expenses sometimes notification
cannot be given. So the rule is, it must be given if it’s practicable.
But if it is not practicable do we say that the expenses incurred are void? No. We go back to Art.
488, any one of the co-owners can decide if they want to incur expenses necessary for the
preservation of the thing, because it is necessary for the preservation of the thing.
What is the effect if it was practicable but no notification was given? Jurisprudence would tell you
that the one who incurred the expenses has the burden of proof to show that:
1. It was a necessary expense and
2. He will compel the others to contribute.
That’s the story behind necessary expenses, Art. 488 and 489.
Example: Let’s go to computation.
There is a parcel of land. A,B and C are co-owners. They have equal interests (1/3 each) with respect
to the material portion of the land and they incurred necessary expenses. We said that A, B, C cannot
claim a material portion of the land because they are only the absolute owner of their ideal shares,
but they are joint owners of the material object. It doesn’t mean that they are the absolute owner of
their interest, you cannot determine their interest. Their interest, even if it is ideal or spiritual, is still
definite, you know how much. It’s just not material, you cannot hold it.
What if they incurred in necessary expense for taxes on the property. You will learn that if you do
not pay your taxes to the government with respect to real property taxes the government can levy or
take away your property. Taxes, therefore, are necessary expenses in order to preserve it, otherwise
the government can take it away at least with respect to the unpaid taxes.
They incur P300k of taxes. What does it mean to renounce so much of his interest? If B paid the
300k, B has the right to compel the other co-owners to contribute, but C doesn’t want to. The remedy
of C is to renounce so much of his undivided interest, not the entire undivided interest. Only so
much [to the extent of].
A B C Total

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Interest at the beginning 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 100%
Value of the spiritual interest
at the beginning 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 3,000,000 A
Ideal share of taxes (100,000) (100,000) (100,000) (300,000)
Payment of taxes by B 300,000 300,000 B
Refund of A to B
100,000 (100,000) - C
Renunciation of C to B 100,000 (100,000) - D
Actual Share of Taxes (100,000) (200,000) - E
Value of spiritual interest
after paying taxes and A+B+
renunciation 1,000,000 1,100,000 900,000 3,000,000 C+ D + E
Interest after paying taxes and 1M/3M= 1.1M/3M= .9M/3M=
renunciation 33.33% 36.67% 30.00% 100%
Renounce so much of his undivided share with regard to the share in the taxes and expenses.
Meaning with respect to his interest.
An important thing you have to take note, the remedy of the co-owner who does not want to
contribute is “to renounce so much of his undivided share”. We can compute that and we already
know what is the sharing afterwards. Is that familiar? Obligations and Contracts, it is in the form of
a dation in payment. When there is a valid subsisting obligation and instead of a sum of money, you
pay something else, such as an object or property. Therefore, we say that there is dation in payment.
Dation in payment, what is necessary, you know the requisites. Take note the consent of the
creditors. In this case, the consent of the other co-owner, the co-owner who expended or spent for
the preservation of the thing, is necessary. Meaning the consent of B is necessary. Malay nyo ayaw
ni B na kunin yung interest ni C. Gusto nya lang magkapera, yung P100k nalang. Is that valid? The
rules of dation in payment will apply. But insofar as property is concerned, you know that the remedy
of the co-owner who does not want to contribute is to renounce so much of his undivided share.
Para medyo holistic and learning nyo.
Technically, Art. 488 does not say anything about consent. There is a school of thought which says
(I don’t know if it’s in the book of Paras) that the consent of the other co-owner, the one which spent
for the necessary expenses is not necessary na daw. However, if you read the book of Tolentino in
Property, Tolentino will tell you na it’s a form of a dation in payment. Therefore, since it’s a dation
the consent of that co-owner (B) who spent for the expenses, that co-owner (B) is the creditor of the
other co-owner (C), is required. Because there is a change, a novation, instead of paying P100k, he
(C) will have to pay in the form of renouncing his interest.
Art. 489, Sentence 2: Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority
as determined in Article 492.
Let’s go to expenses to improve or embellish the thing. This is with regard to useful and luxurious
expenses.
Useful expenses are those necessary for use or improved use of the thing.
Luxurious expenses are those for embellishment, ornamental, pampaganda lang, etc.

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For you to know Art. 489, par. 2, we have to discuss Art. 492. Art. 492 talks about expenses or those
incurred in administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common. What is the rule?
The rule is it must be approved by the majority of the co-owners. But is it headcount? No.
Example: A and B gang up on C. A and B win against C. Is that the case? No.
Art. 492, Par. 2: There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who
represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership.
Example: If the share is A=1/5, B=1/5, C=3/5. Who has the controlling interest? C because he has
majority interest in the thing co-owned. Even if A and B gang up on C because they don’t want to
incur expenses for […] or better enjoyment, it is the will of C that should be followed. It is the
decision of the controlling interest. That is the majority.
Art. 492, Par. 3: Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously
prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an
interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of
an administrator.
What happens in cases when there is no majority? Or what if the resolution of the majority is
seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property. Then the court will decide and order for one
that petitioned in the court, such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an
administrator. This is a familiar concept to you under Art. 1197 of Obligations and Contracts, if from
the nature and circumstances of the obligation a period was intended but a day certain cannot be
identified, the court will fix the period. In this case, it is just like that, it is clear that whether an
expense is incurred or not, we really don’t know because there is no majority, or the financial
majority is prejudicial to the interest of the other co-owners. What will be do, we will allow the
court to come in and decide. The court will order such measures as it may deem proper including
the appointment of an administrator. An administrator is a 3rd person who will administer, literally,
the property. Because since hindi magkasundo ang co-owners among themselves and they allow a
3rd person, an officer of the court to administer it for them insofar as the expenses for the
administration and better enjoyment of the thing concerned. That is the rule.
Is this the same as Art. 488? No. Under Art. 488, we talked about necessary expenses, those are
expenses necessary for the preservation of the thing and include payment of taxes. What does Art.
492 talk about? Art. 492 or Acts of Administration and Better Enjoyment of the Thing, talks about
the 2nd paragraph of Art. 489, those expenses need to improve or embellish the thing.
Why does act of administration talk about expenses to improve or embellish the thing? Because
those expenses should be decided upon by the majority as indicated under Art. 492. Therefore, our
conclusion is expenses for the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common
which is subject to the decision of the majority are those expenses necessary to improve and
embellish the thing. They are not necessary expenses. Why? Because necessary expenses may be
incurred by any one of the co-owners with the right to compel others to contribute. The decision in
necessary expenses is anyone of the co-owners may decide to incur necessary expense, it’s just that
he has a remedy against the other. But in these types of expenses, expenses in relation to the
administration and better enjoyment of the thing it’s always decided upon by the majority. And what
is the majority? The controlling interest. Therefore, these expenses pertain to the improvement and

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embellishment of the thing. These are separate expenses. These are not expenses necessary to the
preservation of the thing.
Take note of that difference [Who makes the decisions]:

1. Necessary expenses – any one of the co-owners
2. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing (which are acts of administration and better
enjoyment) – they are governed by the decision of the financial majority.
Art. 492, par. 4: Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the
remainder is owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in
common.
Par. 4 is self-explanatory. What if a part of the co-ownership is exclusively owned, therefore these
rules with regard to the rules on the decision of the majority of the co-ownership will only apply to
that portion which is co-owned.
Example, if you have a tract of land and a portion of this is exclusively owned by A. However, the
other portions are co-owned by A, B, and C. Then the decision of the financial majority, that will
only apply to the co-owned portion. Because we already know that this portion is exclusively owned
by A.
Art. 492, Par. 3: …should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested
in the property owned in common
What are some acts of the majority that is considered prejudicial to the co-ownership? Jurisprudence
gives you a lot of examples.
Example: Under Art. 491, which we will talk about later on. If it involves alterations or permanent
substantial changes to the object of the co-ownership, then that is not allowed. Because that is an
alteration, not an expense for the improvement or embellishment.
Next, when it is considered alteration under Art. 491. When the majority authorizes the lease, loan,
or other contracts without security, exposing the thing to serious danger and prejudice. What does
that mean? Obligations and Contracts, you remember Art. 1177. When a debtor has a claim against
a creditor and the debtor cannot pay. What can the creditor do? One, he can demand. Two, pursue
leviable property. Three, impugn contracts. Lastly, accion subrogatoria and accion pauliana, impugn
contracts. To be subrogated the rights of the debtor or impugn contracts.
For example, what if there is a tract of land owned by A, B, and C. A=3/5, B and C = 1/5 each. Since
A has controlling majority, A’s decision will be followed. Example A says that it will be useful if our
land will be mortgaged to a bank so that we can acquire a loan from a bank. For you to acquire loan
from a bank, of course there has to be a mortgage. So, A decides to mortgage. Does that seriously
prejudice the co-ownership? Yes. Let’s take away the fact that there is a mortgage. Let’s just say that
A decides to loan from the bank. Under Art. 1177, kahit hindi na mortgage ang land that is the
subject matter of the co-ownership, the bank has a right against all the debtors to pursue their
leviable property. That decision, even if loan lang, even if walang mortgage, that decision is seriously
prejudicial to the co-ownership. Therefore, that decision, even if by controlling majority may be
questioned. So, file a petition to the court. Yun ang reason kung bakit ko ni-review ang Art. 1177.
Generally, when there is a loan you have to give a mortgage. But what if there is a loan and there is
no mortgage. We have to rely on Art. 1177 for you to know that it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

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Let’s go to alterations.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the
thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common
interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Art. 491 talks about another form of expense. Those expenses that are necessary to be incurred in
order to alter the thing or alteration. What are incidents to alteration. For example, if the parties
oppose to a certain expense beacuase the expense will change the purpose of the co-ownership, or
it may result into the changing of the permanent substance of the thing, that is an alteration.
Example: ABC are co-owner of a car and A decides that he wants to incur expenses in order to make
a car a shanty, kasi gusto nyang gawing bodega sa likod ng bahay niya. The car cannot be anymore
be used as a car, it will be used as a shanty. That is an alteration, a permanent substantial change to
a thing as to render it different from the purpose intended by the co-owners.
What if for example ABC buy land. And their purpose was for investment. They just want the land
to appraise. Later on in the future they will sell it. What if A starts constructing on the land because
he allowed a developer to develop the land into a condominium unit. Will that be prejudicial to
their interest? Yes, that is a substantial change. That alters the land, na sana gawing pang investment
lang, ginawang pang condo tuloy. Those are alterations. Substantial changes to the object of the co-
owner.
Why do I want to emphasize this? Now you have a view of the 3 types of expenses that you will
incur during a co-ownership.
1. Necessary expenses [Art. 488] – for the preservation of the thing or involving taxes, any one
of the co-owners may do it.
2. Expenses to improve and embellish the thing [Art. 492]
3. Expenses necessary for the alteration [Art. 491]
Take note that in expenses involved in the alteration of the thing, no one of the co-owners without
the consent of the others can make that alteration. All co-owners must consent. Since the object of
the co-ownership is necessary for us to know if there is a co-ownership or not. A substantial change
to that would alter the joint ownership of the parties to the material things. That is why all the co-
owners must decide, not majority, not any one of them, but all. It affects the joint ownership of all
co-owners of that material thing. That’s why alteration requires the consent of all.
Summary:
Expense Who makes decisions Remedies
1. Necessary Expenses for the Any one of the co-owners 1. Right to compel the other
preservation of the thing or co-owners; or
involving taxes 2. Renounce
2. Expenses to improve and Controlling interest/ Financial Upon petition, court decides
embellish the thing (Act of majority measures deemed proper,

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administration or better including appointment of
enjoyment of the thing) administrator
3. Expenses necessary for the Consent of all the co-owners 1. Courts may afford adequate
alteration of the thing relief (Art. 491)
2. Undone at obligor’s
expense (Art. 1168)
What if some withhold their consent but in withholding their consent is prejudicial to the purpose
of the alteration, then we rely on the courts.
Take note that even if the alteration was with all good intentions, example, in the case of the land,
pag pinagawan ng condominium unit. Sasabihin ng isang owner, diba yun ang purpose natin para
lumaki ang value ng land. E di gawan ng condo unit. Is that allowed? No. Under Art. 491, “even
though benefits for all would result from the decision in the alteration, without consent of all the co-
owners, that alteration is not allowed.
Example: ObliCon. What is now the remedy of the other parties if one party makes an alteration to
the property and the other co-owners do not want it, or other co-owners did not consent. You can
see that in Art. 1168. In obligations not to do, when the obligor does what is prohibited, it shall be
undone at his expense. Therefore, if an alteration is made without the consent of the other co-
owners, we know that such alteration is not allowed, it is void. Art. 1168, the remedy of the other
co-owners, what has been done must be undone.
Extinguishment of a Co-ownership
We already know when a co-ownership is made, we already know what happens in the life of a co-
ownership, and the interaction of the co-owners with one another. Now, let’s talk about
extinguishment of co-ownership.
Since this is Civil Law, you also apply suppletorily all modes of extinguishment under ObliCon.
Under the requisites of co-ownership, there is plurality of the subjects. If there is a merger or
confusion of the subjects, therefore mawala yung element of plurality of the subject. Therefore, the
co-ownership ceases to exist.
In co-ownership, there is a unity of the object, there is a material thing. If the material thing is lost
through fortuitous event, Art. 1173 no person shall be responsible for those events that are
foreseeable or though foreseeable is inevitable. Since it is a fortuitous event, no party will be liable.
It extinguishes the co-ownership because the object of co-ownership is already lost.
Next, we will discuss now. Partition. Partition means to part with. Since the start of the co-ownership,
there is a materially indivisible thing but we know that no one of the co-owners may claim any
portion thereto, their remedy if they want to claim a material portion of the thing is Partition. Partition
ends the co-ownership because there is no more unity of the object.
Rule of Partition:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.

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Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Par. 1, Sentence 1: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership

Take that to heart. Since no co-owner wants to stay in the co-ownership, his remedy is partition.
You are not obliged.
Par. 1, Sentence 2: Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
An action for partition is imprescriptible. Because a co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owner in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Par. 2: Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
If you partition the thing, can you also say that there is an agreement not to partition it? Diba co-
ownership arises from law or contract. If the contract of co-ownership says that “you cannot partition
this co-owned property” is that allowed? Yes, in a limited sense. It shall not exceed 10 years. After
that, the co-owners have to decide again if they want to keep the co-ownership or not. If yes, they
can renew again for 10 years.
If the co-owners from the start decided not to divide the co-ownership for a period of 50 years, is
that allowed? No, the maximum period is to not exceed 10 years. Even with that agreement, after
the 10th year, any one of the co-owners may ask for the partition. Because the stipulation for 50 years
is void for being against the law.
Par. 3: A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
In case a thing is donated and the donor says that “you cannot partition this property ever”. No, that
is not valid. That stipulation is void because each donor may allow prohibition of partition up to 20
years. In wills and successions, you will learn that a testator can only provide a maximum of 20
years that a thing shall be undivided.
Par. 4: Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

General Rule: you may partition at any time.
Exceptions:
a. Agreement – 10 years
b. Donation or will of testator – 20 years
c. Prohibited by law
d. Physical partition renders the property unserviceable for the intended use (Art. 495)
Instances that partition is prohibited by law:

a. Art. 90 ACP under the FC is a special type of co-ownership. That’s why under Art. 134 in
the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of property

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between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order of
separation. In ACP, judicial separation of property is the only way allowed to change the
property regime of the property regime (Doctrine of Immutability of Property Regime). That
is provided for in the law.
b. Art. 159 FC, rules of the family home. The FH shall continue despite the death of one of the
spouses as long as there are heirs thereto. The heirs cannot partition the FH. The FH shall
continue despite the death one or both of the spouses or the unmarried head of the family
for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary and the heirs cannot
the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefore.
One of the exceptions that a co-owner cannot demand partition is under Art. 495 when physical
partition would render the property unserviceable. [Refer to Art. 495]
Par. 5: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Why? First you have to take note, based on ObliCon, what are the requisites for acquisitive
prescription? Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership because through passage of
time you can acquire through your possession you can acquire the thing. First, you have to have
open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious (OCEAN) possession of the thing over a period
of time. If in good faith – 10 years, bad faith – 30 years. That is acquisitive prescription.
What is another element that is so important? Even if you possess the thing and even if you possess
the thing for a lapse of time, if you do not possess the thing in the concept of an owner, you cannot
avail of acquisitive prescription of the thing.
Therefore, the last paragraph of Art. 494 tells us that co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the
share of others in the co-ownership because they will not possess it in the concept of an owner.
Remember, as to the material thing, they are joint owners. By virtue that they are co-owners, they
recognize the right of their co-owners. Since they recognize those rights, they do not possess the
thing in the concept to an owner. Therefore, there cannot be acquisitive prescription.
But Art. 1111 of ObliCon, the prescription obtained by any one co-owner or co-proprietor shall
benefit the others.
Example: ABC occupy a certain land beside a riverbed. If by gradual, imperceptible accretion of soil
there is a soil deposit made on their property. That is alluvium. If A decides to occupy the alluvium
beside the co-owned property, A will not be the exclusive owner of that accretion based on Art.
1111. The accretion will redound to the benefit of the co-ownership.
Take note that co-owners cannot acquire the co-owner property by acquisitive prescription. And in
relation to Art. 1111, any prescription benefiting any one of the co-owners shall redound to the
benefit of the other co-owners.
Is there an exception to the rule? There is. We will talk about that on Saturday.
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand
a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable

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for the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with
Article 498.
General rule: if the physical partition of the thing would render the thing unserviceable, you cannot
allow partition.
1. Based on Physical Nature:

Example: Co-owned car. If you partition the car by chopping it up. A will get the engine, B the body,
C the wheels. It will render the object unserviceable. If that happens, partition is not allowed.
It is similar to the concept of indivisible thing under Art. 1209 ObliCon, as long as it is indivisible
by its nature, you cannot divide it. In application to co-ownership you cannot partition it. It has to
be the essence of the property that will determine if it will be rendered serviceable or not.
Example: Land. If they are artistic they divided it in an unconventional shape. That is allowed. It
does not render the object unserviceable. They are just creative in their partition. They can still use
the land.
If by the nature of the thing it will not allow the division or partition, you cannot demand for partition.
2. Based on Legal Nature:

Last is when the legal nature of the property does not allow partition.
Example: Contract of mortgage. Co-owners, A, B & C, decide to mortgage a co-owned property to

the bank. Is that right divisible by A, B, C? Example kani na hearing A ikaw attend, kani na hearing
B ikaw attend, because we are co-owners. That is not allowed. The legal nature of the common
property does not allow the partition. The legal nature of a mortgage, a mortgage right, the legal
concept of a mortgage right, does not allow the partition of a mortgage contract. That is why you
cannot demand for the partition in that instance.
We already know the rules now when it comes to partition. We say that you can partition the thing.
But how do we make partition?
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Partition may be made:

1. Extra-judicially or voluntarily – through the agreement of the parties.
2. Judicial partition – decreed by the court
Judicial partition is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
If there is an agreement, you rely on the contract or agreement of the partition of the thing. If there
is no agreement, you may institute an action in court for the judicial partition of the co-owned thing.
Tip from Sir: Himay-himayin ang provisions.

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July 22 Part 1 – Alcomendras
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of
ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses
and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at
the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front
door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the
owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners
pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second
story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner
of the first story; and so on successively.
This is the concept of perpendicular ownership. There are portions of the property where the co-
owners jointly own the thing such as the stairs. They co-own the common portions but remain in
absolute ownership over their own individual portions. They have to respect the material portions
belonging to the other co owners.
CONDOMINIUM ACT
It is a condominium corporation. The entirety of the condominium is run by the condominium

corporation. It has a separate and distinct personality from each condominium owner. In a condo,
there is a semblance of co-ownership. Under a condo set-up there is a recognition of separate
interest in a unit of a building which is absolute ownership. There is an undivided interest in the
common areas. Each condominium owner has a condominium share which is a certificate of shock.
When you invest in a condo unit, you are given a certificate of shock showing your interest to the
condo corporation You are technically a share holder. At the same time the certificate of stock shows
your absolute interest to your condo unit. At the same time there are areas held in common like the
pool.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

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No co owner may be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. The remedy is to partition.
In any co-ownership, there is a tacit resolutory condition. Any co-owner may demand partition. It is
a resolutory condition because it extinguishes rights that have already been acquired by the co-
owner. The moment the co-owner wants to partition, their right of the material object extinguishes.
The reason for this is to avail of the benefits of acquisitive prescription. You must have OCEAN
possession over the thing in the concept of the owner. Since co-owners have a joint ownership of
the material thing, acquisitive prescription that is acquired by one of the co-owners shall be for the
benefit of the whole co-ownership.
General Rule: Prescription does not lie with other co-owners
Exception: When a co-owner repudiates their share to the co-ownership (acknowledges that he
performs acts not for the benefit of the co-ownership but for his sole accord and that he is the sole
owner) the benefits of acquisitive prescription will lie. Since this is in bad faith, it must be for 30
years. He must make the act of repudiation known to the other co-owners. There must be clear and
convicing evidence of repudiation and knowledge on the part of the co-owners.
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a
physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for
the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article
498.
General Rule: Co-owners cannot partition if it would render the material object unserviceable. No
one can use it as a result
Exception: Article 498
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Read this in relation to Article 494. This is how a partition may be carried out.
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned
in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a
formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to
maintain its validity.
This article speaks of the limitations to partition.
Creditors and assignees of the co-owners have rights:

1. They may object to its being effected without their concurrence.
2. Take part in the division of the material object

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But just because their concurrence is required does not mean that they can impugn the partition
because they are strangers to the co-ownership. They can object only to the extent of their right. It
is only to protect their interest.
If the partition is already executed, they cannot intrude anymore unless there has been fraud or if it
was made notwithstanding the creditors formal opposition. Therefore, the contract to partition may
be rescinded because it is in fraud of creditors (in relation to 1321).
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
This is the remedy in relation to 495. All of them must agree to sell the thing because it is a joint
ownership over the material object. The proceeds will be divided among themselves. They
relinquish their right over the material thing and in effect extinguishes the co-ownership. The portion
of the proceeds of the sale shall be in accordance with the co-owners’ interest.
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall
retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division
was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in
force, notwithstanding the partition.
This is another limitation to the right to partition. When there is a real right over the thing, third
persons who have a right to the thing co-owned must be protected. If there is a personal right to a
co-owner, it survives despite the partition of the co-owned property.
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and
reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by
reason of his negligence or fraud.
Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion
assigned to each of the other co-owners.
This provides for the effects once there is a partition.
Mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursement for expenses. These expenses must be
necessary expenses.
Example: A, B, and C are co-owners. The benefits are worth P3 Million. All the benefits must be
given in proportion to their share. B spent P300,000 (P100,000 for each co-owner) for necessary
expenses. They shared the benefits and expenses equally. Thus, every co-owner will only get
P900,000 each.
Each co-owner has an implied warranty against the owner as they are joint owners over the thing.
After partition, their proportional interests must still be perfected. If there are damages or losses given
to another co-owner, he can institute his right to warranty.

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Example: A, B, C and D are co-owners. D was abroad when the partition took place. Upon partition
of the property, the property assigned to co-owner D has a big lagoon in the middle of the land. D
can exercise his warranty against hidden defects against the other co-owners.
SPOUSES SI VS CA
FACTS:
Escolastica Armada owned a property. During her lifetime with her husband, the transferred the title
of the subject land under the names of their children namely: Crisostomo Armada, Jose Armada, and
Severo Armada.
With respect to the part of Crisostomo, a deed of sale over the said land is executed in favor to Anita
Bonode. Upon learning of the said sale, Jose Armada filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed
of sale with reconveyance alleging that Crisostomo did not sell the property himself because he
already migrated in the US and the co-owners were not given notice of the said sale. Ptr alleged that
the property had already been partitioned so there is no more right of redemption. The brothers only
failed to submit the necessary subdivision plan.
ISSUE: WON a co-ownership still existed between the parties
RULING: There is none
1. After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership TERMINATED
and the right of preemption or redemption for each was no longer available. Art 484 of the civil
code states that there is co- ownership whenevr the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable,
even if not yet technically described.
CAB: as agreed by the trial court and ca, the subject property had already been partitioned. Every
portion conveyed and transferred to the three brothers were definitely described and segregated and
with the corresponding technical description. The portion alienated to the sps Si are determined and
identifiable.
COMMENTS: the element of the unity of the object is absent. Therefore, there is no co-ownership.
Rights to redemption cannot be enjoyed because only co-owners at the time of the co-ownership
may exercise the right to legal redemption. In a sale, it is presumed that the co-owner cannot sell
the material object but only his ideal share.
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
Facts: Jose and Juana Ocampo had 10 children, namely: Fidela, Felix, Andres, Nemesio, Jose,
Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis.
The subject of this case is a parcel of land registered under the name of FidelaOcampo as TCT-4389.
In Sep 30, 1987, Fidela donated inter vivos said lot to her daughter Belen Ocampo-Barito to whom
TCT 1364 was issued.

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Apolonia and the other siblings of Fidela, filed this complaint to annul the donation made to Belen
on the ground that the subject lot was co- owned by them as heirs of their parents who originally
owned the same. Apolonia claims that Fidela executed a document, Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership, wherein she acknowledged that she was merely a co-owner of the subject land with her
siblings.
Issue: WON the subject property co-owned by the Ocampo siblings
Held: No. The chief evidence of co-ownership of the lot is simply the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership executed by Fidela. This piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array
of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by Belen.
Apolonia failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned property that
eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents — Jose and Juana
Ocampo — whose deaths passed it on to the children. Apolonia, however, presented absolutely no
proof of ownership of their parents. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, she
merely relied on the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and
presented preponderant proof of her claim.
COMMENTS: Take note that the SC said the co-owners have a right to sell a portion of their interest.
Each and every co-owner has full ownership of his ideal share. The co-owner may lease his
undivided interest to a third party. But that co-owner does not have the right to sell a concrete part
of the thing held in common.
PASCUAL VS BALLESTEROS
Facts: The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land. The subject property is owned
bythe following persons, (1) the spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, (2) Angela
Melchor(Angela), and (3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor (Spouses Melchor). Upon the
death of the Spouses Melchor, their share in the subject property was inhereited by their daughter
Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros (respondents) acquired the share of Angela. On August
11, 2000, Margarita, sold their share in the subject property to Spouses Pascual andFrancisco.
Consequently, the respondents, claiming that they did not receive any written noticeof the said sale
in favor of Spouses Pascual and Francisco, filed with the RTC of Laoag City a Complaint for legal
redemption against the petitioners. The respondents claimed that they are entitled to redeem the
portion of the subject property sold to Spouses Pascual and Francisco being co-owners of the same.
For their part, the petitioners claimed that there was no co- ownership over the subject property
considering that the shares of the registered owners thereof had been particularized, specified and
subdivided. On January 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for legal
redemption filed by the respondents. On the first issue, the RTC held that the respondents and the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property considering that the
petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective shares of each of the registered

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owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided. On the second issue, the RTC
ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day
period pursuant to Article 1623 Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the sale
of a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the
respondents had actual notice of the said sale.
Issues: WON (1) their predecessors-in-interest and the respondents are not co-owners of the subject
property since their respective shares therein had already been particularized, specified and
subdivided; and (2) even if such co-ownership exists, the respondents could no longer exercise their
right of redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the
said sale.
Ruling: Yes. In any case, it ought to be stressed that both the RTC and the CA found that the subject
property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioners. Thus, in the absence of any exceptional circumstances to warrant the contrary, this Court
must abide by the prevailing rule that findings of fact of the trial court, more so when armed by the
CA, are binding and conclusive upon it.
COMMENTS: RIGHT TO REDEMPTION cannot be exercised if you do not follow the 30 day
period notice.

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In this case, as to the 1st issue, what happened was, co-ownership was clear. De Guia and Abejo are
co-owners of a fishpond. So, now let’s go to the issue on WON any one of them can file an action
with respect to the recovery of title to the co-owned property.
DE GUIA vs CA
GR 120864 | October 8, 2003
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in Barrio
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego
married to Juan Abejo. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and
Lorenza Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:
PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - ½ share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO,
Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, ½ share, ---
The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is seeking
to recover possession of the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square
meters.
DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire FISHPOND by
virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan (“Lease Contract”)
executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from
30 July 1974 up to 30 November 1979 for a consideration of P100,000. The Lease Contract was
executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo.
Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza Araniego Abejo’s ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND by
intestate succession.
Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO,
on 22 November 1983. However, DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to
derive income from the property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several demands
to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last demand letter
was dated 27 November 1983.
ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA on 12 May
1986. DE GUIA’s claim of ownership over the other ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND has
not been finally adjudicated for or against him. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision,
debunking DE GUIA’s claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the proper remedy
under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIA’s failure to respect
ABEJO’s right over his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of
possession. The trial court’s decision effectively enforces ABEJO’s right over the property which
DE GUIA violated by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the Court

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of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting
when necessary.
Hence this appeal
Issue:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision ordering De Guia to vacate the fishpond,
on the ground that the proper action should have been partition rather than recovery of possession
Ruling:
YES. Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.” A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land
is an “owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.”[15] On the other hand, there is no co-
ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.[16]
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.” This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions
are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the
jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the
jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.
In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-
owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part
of the property.
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned,
all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned
in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an
ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the
property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any
material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the
delivery of one-half (½) of the building in favor of private respondent.

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Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is
the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner
has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions.[23] Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has
repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
What’s important here is that the De Guia case shows you the illustration that I gave you. Now,
when it comes to Article 487, you have to distinguish between filing actions against 3rd persons and
filing actions against co-owners. Those actions may involve actions for …. So, is it allowed to
institute an action against a co-owner? Yes. The Supreme Court in this case said, when you institute
that action against a co-owner, the effect is only to compel the co-owner to recognize the co-
ownership and not literally an action to recover a portion of the property. Why? Because during the
subsistence of the co-ownership, during the time before there is a partition, there remains to be
materially undivided thing by virtue of which they enjoy joint ownership.
Let’s compare that with the case of Plasabas vs CA. This case illustrates what happens when one of
the co-owners will file a case against 3rd persons. In this case, it is allowed because this case
illustrates to you … what Article 487 means. Any one of the co-owners against the 3rd party may file
an action for the recovery of the co-owned property. Diba I gave you the citation for the Baluloy
(????) So that is a case which gives you …. You read that. It talks about what happens when a co-
owner will file against a 3rd person claiming exclusive ownership over the property. You read that
because all those three cases will illsutrate to uou the actions instituted by the co-owners whether
against the 3rd party or against co-owners. So, remember the case of Plasabas, De Guia and Baluloy.
PLASABAS vs CA
March 31, 2009
Facts
Plasabas filed a complaint for recovery of title to property against Lumen and Aunzo. Plasabas
admitted that the property in question was inherited by her and her siblings from their common
ancestors. Lumen and Aunzo moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging the failure of
Plasabas to implead in the complaint, indispensable parties, more specifically the other co-
owners, Jose, Victor, and Victoria.
RTC dismissed the case because the case was not for ejectment but for recovery of title. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON Article 487 is applicable.
Held
YES. Article 487 covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession including an accion
publiciana and reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file a suit without necessary joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiff because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

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So, let’s discuss the case of Adille vs CA. So in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that there was a
redemption. So, the important principles that you have to remember here, again when you go for
the redemption of the property during the time of the subsistence of the co-ownership, you sell that
portion, we said that there is a presumption, a legal presumption that you only sell a part of your
co-ownership. So only your aliquot share. However, what happened here was that it was sold, the
entirety of the property was sold to ... and therefore only one of the co-owners redeemed that
property. Does that co-owner make him an absolute owner of the property? The answer is NO
because again you go back to the principle that anything that is beneficial to the co-ownership, it
shall redound to the benefit of the co-owners.
So in this case, redemption resounds to the benefit of the co-ownership because it will reinstate the
co-ownership back to the co-owners. So even if only one of the co-owners will redeem the property,
the important principle there is that since redemption is an important preservation or a necessary
expense for the co-ownership, then that is and should be for the benefit of the co-owners. Next,
since the redemption is a necessary expense for the co-ownership, then we follow the rule under
Article 488 that any one of the co-owner may compel the others to reimburse their proportionate
share in the expense or the necessary expense.
ADILLE vs CA
GR No. L-44546 | January 29, 1988
FACTS:
Property Involved: 11, 325 sq. m. land in Legaspi City
During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul was married twice. Rustico Adille, petitioner, is her son during
her first marriage. The Asejos were her children in her second marriage. In 1939, she conveyed
the pacto de retro sale with a 3-year redemption period. In 1942, she died without redeeming the
property. After her death but within the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the
whole property. By 1955, Adille was able to execute a deed of extra-judicial partition of the
property representing himself as the only child and heir of Felisa Alzul. Eventually, the title was
transferred to his name. Efforts by the Asejo siblings to compromise with Adille failed. Adille’s
half-brothers and sisters filed a case for the partition of the property.
Adille contends that he redeemed the property by himself because hi co- heirs failed to join him
in the redemption within the required period. He alleges that he is now the sole owner of the
property.
Trial Court ruled in favor of Adille. CA ruled in favor of Asejo.
ISSUE:
WON Adille became the sole owner upon repurchase of the whole lot?
HELD:
No, Adille did not acquire ownership over the whole property.

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The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respe ct to his share alone. Adille’s
repurchase of the whole property and subsequent registration did not vest him with the sole
ownership. The co-ownership was still in effect and was never terminated.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect
reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense.
Applying Art. 488, Adille has the right to collect reimbursement from his co -heirs, the Asejos, but
the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.
Additional discussion from Atty. Alabastro: Redemption of the property is a necessary expense
because it restores the property to the possession and control of the co-owners.
Alright? So there are three expenses which you should always remember with respect to the rules of
co-ownership.
1. If it’s a necessary expense or for the preservation of the property like the payment of taxes
2. If it’s for improvement or embellishment of the thing or those expenses which we say are
acts of administration or better enjoyment of the thing.
3. Those expenses in relation to alteration.
So take note that preservation and necessary expenses will be on account of any one of the co-
owner given the urgency of the preservation and that co-owner who made advances to that
necessary expenses can compel the others to pay and the remedy of the others who would not want
to contribute can only renounce so much of his undivided interest not the entire undivided interest.
Let’s discuss the case of Aguilar vs CA. This is a clear application of the rule sof co-ownership with
regard to Articles 494 and 492. So you look at the case of Aguilar.
AGUILAR vs CA
GR No. 76351 | October 29, 1993
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot
object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that
Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left
in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu. After their father’s
death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the
property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then
filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding

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the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his
wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the
motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus
they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the
property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in
addition, respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents
appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring
respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?
RULING:
YES, with a few modifications. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot
in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the
other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed.
SC held that ½ of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent
(1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the
trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property.
BASIS:
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and
the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Let’s go to RA 4762 or the Condominium Act. So diba we said we have to compare that with
perpendicular ownership under Article 490. So let’s have the case of Sunset View Condominium vs
Campos.
The Sunset View case clarifies certain special provisions that are only applicable to Condominium
Act. So you read that case because condominiums nga ang uso diba. Even if a condominium
corporation, even in a condominium set-up, there is a certain level of co-ownership. It is not the

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rules of co-ownership which will govern but it is RA 4762. So for the nuances of those provisions,
we have to go back to Sunset View and RA 4762.
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM vs CAMPOS

GR No. L-53261 | April 27, 1981
FACTS
This case involves 2 consolidated cases where Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship,
owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee
of a unit, "Solana", in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated bought the "Solana" unit on
installment from the Tower Builders, Inc.Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the
collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty, however, this case
was dismissed on the ground that Aguilar-Bernares Realty is, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4726, a "holder of a separate interest" and consequently, a shareholder of the condominium
corporation; and that "the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission
which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the
corporation."
Sunset View filed a complaint for the collection of premiums and the interest thereon against Lim
Siu Lengto whom was assigneda unit called "Alegria" of the Sunset View Condominium Project by
Alfonso Uywho had entered into a "Contract to Buy and Sell". with Tower Builders, Inc. over the
said unit on installment basis. But this also has been dismissed.
In both cases, it is admitted that the private respondents (Aguilar-Bearnares Realty and Lim Siu
Leng) have not yet fully paid the purchase price of their units.
Issues:
1. Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the condominium project managed by the

petitioner, who has not yet fully paid the purchase price thereof, automatically a
stockholder of the Sunset View Condominium Corporation?
2. Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange Commission that has jurisdiction over
cases for collection of assessments assessed by the Condominium Corporation on
condominium units the full purchase price of which has not been paid?
Held:
1st issue: No, Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the shareholding in the
Condominium Corporation will be conveyed only in a proper case.
Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or other space therein,

shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the common
areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholding in the condominium
corporation ...

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It is clear then that not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder of the condominium
corporation. The Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the
shareholding will be transferred to the purchaser of a unit. Thus, Section 4 of said Act provides:
The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided into
condominium only if there shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
province or city in which the property lies and duly annotated in the corresponding
certificate of title of the land ... an enabling or master deed which shall
contain, among others, the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) Astatement of the exact nature of the interest acquired or to be acquired by the purchaser in
the separate units and in the common areas of the condominium project ..
In this case, the Master Deeds provides that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation is
inseparable from the unit to which it is only an appurtenant and that only the owner of a unit is a
shareholder in the Condominium Corporation. The Master Deeds also provides that the purchaser
of a unit shall acquire title or ownership of such Unit, subject to the terms and conditions of the
instrument conveying the unit.
The instrument conveying the unit "Solana" and "Alegria"is the "Contract to Buy and Sell", n both
deeds of conveyance, it is provided that share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred
accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which
time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only
the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners
is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser
of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and
consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
It follows that a purchaser of a unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid the
full purchase price, is not a shareholder By necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a
condominium, which entitles the holder to become automatically a share holder in the
condominium corporation, as provided in Section 2 of the Condominium Act, can be no other
than ownership of a unit. This is so because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the owner
of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner, he also ceases automatically to be a shareholder.
Now, let’s go to the partition cases, Fabian vs Fabian. In this case, what’s important for you to take
note of diba under Article 494 last paragraph, for as long as a co-owner recognizes the co-
ownership, expressly or impliedly, acquisitive prescription cannot take place. However, in the same
breadth, we can say that there is a repudiation of the co-ownership, then that remediation of the co-
ownership will first happen before we can say that benefits of acquisitive prescription can come in.
In this case, repudiation can also therefore be in the form express or implied. So in this case, they
committed actions that impliedly showed their intention that they do not anymore recognize the co-
ownership. In that way, we said also that there is notification of the other co-owners that they did
not anymore recognize the co-ownership. So therefore acquisitive prescription has set in.

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FABIAN vs FABIAN
22 SCRA 520
Facts
Pablo Fabian was an owner a parcel of land. When he died he was succeeded by his for daughters,
namely: Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and Silbina. Now, Silbina and Teodora (Niece of Pablo)
Fabian, executed in their favor an affidavit whereby, sale certificate 547 or the subject property
in this case was assigned to them. Thereafter, in 1928, Silbina and Teodora took physical
possession of the subject property, cultivated it and appropriated the produce therefrom.
Sometime in 1960, the other heirs of Pablo filed an action for Reconveyance against Silbina and
Teodora over the Subject property.
The RTC ruled that Silbina and Teodora Fabian had acquired the property by acquisitive
prescription.
Issue
Whether or not Silbina and Teodora can acquire the subject property through acquisitive
prescription?
Held
Yes. Although under art. 494 (last paragaraph) provides, “No prescription shall run in favor of co-
owner or co -heir against his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership.” In this case, Silbina and Teodora did not recognize the co -ownership, instead they
possessed the subject property in an adverse manner in a concept of an owner. They took
possession of the land from 1928 up to 1960 publicly and continuously under claim of ownership;
they cultivated it, harvested and appropriated the fruits for themselves and this clearly delineate,
the adverse character of the possession exercise by Silbina and Teodora over the land. Thus
pursuant to sec. 41 of Act 190 (the governing law at that time) which provides for 10 years’ actual
adverse possession for an individual can acquire land through acquisitive prescription. Applying
the law in the case at bar, the 32 years of adverse possession of Silbina and Teodora entitled them
to acquire the subject land by acquisitive prescription.
Now let’s go to the case of Delima vs CA. So take note of the case of Delima. It talks about how the
mere issuance of title over the co-owned property intimates the intention to repudiate the co-
ownership. Those actions will show you that there is anymore no recognition of the co-ownership
then we said that all benefits of acquisitive prescription will apply.
DELIMA vs CA
GR No. 46296 | September 24, 1991
Doctrine: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. The exception however is that the
from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the

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properties and denies the others any share therein, the question is no longer one of partition but
of ownership.
Facts:
Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale
on installments from the government. After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers and a
sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima, and
Vicente Delima. A new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an
affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property
excluding the other heirs. He declared the lot to be of his own and paid for its taxes. On February
29, 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu an action for reconveyance and partition of property and for the annulment of the
certificate of title issued plus damages against their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also later
included as party defendant for his refusal to help in the action.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and void and
declaring Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be owners
of the property, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth of the whole. The respondents,
Heirs of Galileo Delima, appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision in their
favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that the other brothers and sisters have already waived their
rights to the property being that it was Galileo alone that paid for the balance of the purchase
price and the realty taxes for the property.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided
by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shared in the disputed property?
Held:
Yes, Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: “No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized
the co-ownership.” By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was holding
the property in representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an administrator who
took care of the property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the property to his co-
owners.
However, this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute
and exclusive ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptability of the
action for partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over
the property. In order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of

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repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and (3) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive.
Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the
cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, he thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners
over their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run. Since an action for
reconveyance
Lastly, we have this case of Herrera vs Fangonil. In this case, it talks about why there was no
repudiation of the co-ownership. Take note that the only act of Carmen is supposedly an act of
repudiation was when she refused to annul the extra-judicial settlement in 1994. However, the
Supreme Court still said that the benefits of adverse possession cannot be taken in her favor because
of the fact that the manner of possession by which he tried that co-owned property was not in the
concept of an owner. The manner of possession was not in an open and continuous possession.
HERRERA vs FANGONIL
GR No. 169356 | August 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondents are children of the late Fabian and Maria LlorenFangonil. The spouses
died intestate, leaving an estate consisting of seven parcels of land. Prior to their death,
transactions involving parcels number six and seven took place. A portion of the sixth land and
parcel seven were sold with a right to repurchase to Oribello and Estacion, respectively. It was
petitioner who repurchased and redeemed these properties in 1956 and 1959. In 1995, six of the
seven children, excluding petitioner, filed a petition for judicial partition of the seven parcels of
land. Petitioner opposed claiming exclusive ownership over parcels six and seven, and that the
right to claim by the respondents had long prescribed as a result of their inaction.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct.
Held:
Petitioner's possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof.
Prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-
owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-
owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

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As a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition
among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property.
For the rest of the cases, you review that because those are important principles.

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The case of Balus v. Balus, GR No. 168970, January 15, 2010. Now, we have compared the case
of Balus with the case of Fangonil. You remember the case of Fangonil? We talked about the
redemption of one of the co-owners and that Carmen, in this case should have been reimbursed by
other co-owners with respect to the redemption of what was co-owned. In this case, we also have
the case of Balus which talks about as well on whether or not there was co-ownership. So in the
case of Fangonil, there was proper redemption on the part of Carmen such that form of redemption
is part of unnecessary expense. And therefore such unnecessary expense maybe compelled to the
other co-owners for the reimbursement. So in this case, since Carmen was the one who made the
redemption and necessarily, since the redemption is a necessary expense, Carmen, as the
redemptioner, he therefore force the other co-owners to reimburse her of the cost of the redemption.
As opposed to the case of Balus where there was no proper redemption whatsoever. So that is the
first salient point that I want to point out. In the case of Herrera v. Fangonil, there was a proper
redemption. However, in the case of Balus, there was no proper redemption.
What is the effect therefore if there is a proper redemption vs no proper redemption. Take note that
when property is redeemed, for example by virtue of a contract of sale or by any other disposition
of the property, because of the law on legal redemption, the sale or the disposition of that property
is not yet absolute. It is always subject to the period provided by law for the redemption of that
property. So meaning, being a redemptioner, the seller or the one who disposes a thing can take the
property back, after a certain period of time. Those periods of time you will discuss in your law on
sales. In case of foreclosure sales, the redemption period is one year from the time of the disposition
or contracting or execution of the sale.
So, what is therefore the effect with regard to redemption? If property was properly redeemed on the
part of one of the co-owners, we said that that redemption will [...] to the benefit of the co-ownership
such that no one of the co-owners, just because they were the ones who redeemed the property can
claim they will have exclusive ownership over the co-owned property. That is the ruling in Fangonil,
just because there was unnecessary expense in the form of reimbursement as to the redemption
price, or the price or expense necessary to redeem the property that does not make Carmen the
absolute exclusive owner of the redeemed property because again if there is redemption, it shall
redound to the benefit of the co-ownership, provided that there is a co-ownership existing.
However, if you compare that to the case of Balus v. Balus, there was not anymore co-ownership,
why? Because there was a failure on the part of the co-owners to redeem the property. So what is
the effect? Take note that if there is a failure to redeem a property within a period provided by law,
it necessarily gives a right on the part of the buyer to consolidate the title. Why the buyer consolidate
the title? Because it can put an end to the uncertainty in the sale. Of course ikaw ang buyer, bumili
ka ng property tapos may right of redemption ang seller, paano mo malalaman if yung property na
yun sayo na ba talaga? You will know after the period of redemption. That is why there is no proper
redemption made within the period of redemption provided by law shall give rise on the part of the
buyer to consolidate the title. Therefore, the absolute title will now rests on the buyer.
Now what is the effect? As compared to the case of Fangonil, which there was a proper redemption,
Balus v. Balus did not have a proper redemption of the co-owned property. So the effect therefore,
in the case of Balus, the buyer can consolidate the title and therefore, anyone of the co-owners
cannot anymore redeem the property because why? The title has already been vested with the buyer

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because there was no proper redemption made within the period provided for by law. As compared
to the case of Fangonil, there was proper redemption. And therefore, such redemption is a necessary
expense which shall [...] to the benefit of anyone of the co-owners, in this case Carmen. So you read
and compare the two cases.
Balus v. Balus,
GR No. 168970 | January 15, 2010
Facts
Rufo Balus owned a parcel of land which he used as security for a loan from the Rural Bank of
Maigo. He failed to pay, so the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold
to the Bank.
The property was not redeemed, so more than two years after the auction, or on January 25,
1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On October 10, 1989, the children of Balus (Celestino, Saturnino, and Leonarda) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. They admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged
the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest
possible time.
Three years after, Saturnino and Leonarda bought the subject property from the Bank. A transfer
certificate title was issued in their name. Meanwhile, Celestino continued possession of the
subject lot. Saturnino and Leonarda filed a complaint contending that they had already informed
Celestino that they were the new owners, but the latter still refused to surrender possession.
Celestino argued that the Extrajudicial settlement provided a provision retaining co-ownership
by repurchasing the property. Thus, co-ownership was retained when his siblings purchased the
property--making him entitled to 1/3 of the property.
Issue
Whether co-ownership continued to exist even after the transfer of title to the bank
Held
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. Also, what can
only be inherited are those transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of a person’s
death.
In this case, a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Thus, it
acquired exclusive ownership of the lot during the lifetime of Rufo. Thus, in this case, the heirs
never inherited the subject lot from their father. There is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Herrera v. Fangonil
GR No. 169356 | August 28, 2007

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Facts
Petitioner and respondents are children of the late Fabian and Maria Lloren Fangonil. The
spouses died intestate, leaving an estate consisting of seven parcels of land. Prior to their death,
transactions involving parcels number six and seven took place. A portion of the sixth land and
parcel seven were sold with a right to repurchase to Oribello and Estacion, respectively. It was
petitioner who repurchased and redeemed these properties in 1956 and 1959. In 1995, six of
the seven children, excluding petitioner, filed a petition for judicial partition of the seven parcels
of land. Petitioner opposed claiming exclusive ownership over parcels six and seven, and that
the right to claim by the respondents had long prescribed as a result of their inaction.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is correct.
Held
Petitioner's possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof.
Prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-
owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
As a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition
among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property.
Now, the more important thing that you have to remember is the 30-day period will start to run from
the time of the written notice. So the written notice under Article 1623 will be be a condition
precedent to the running of the 30-day period within which the right of redemption may be properly
exercised. So why 30 days? Because 1620 and 1623 talks about the redemption of shares disposed
by the co-owners in the co-ownership. As opposed to the case of Fangonil and Balus v. Balus, when
the redemption does not arise, because of 1620 and 1623, but it arises because of forced sale or
foreclosure sale. Therefore, the provisions therefrom that will govern are not 1620 and 1623 but
Article 39 if it is a judicial foreclosure, yun, mga provisions under forced sales. The general banking
law of 2002 if forced sale is because of a bank.
Having said that, will it come out in your exam in property? Most likely not. At least ngayon may
heads up na kayo for your sales. So when it comes to redemption under 1620 and 1623, for now it
is enough for you to know that co-owners [...] and what is the effect of their redemption with regard
to the case of Fangonil and the case of Balus v. Balus.
So most likely we have already gone through the cases with regard to the definition of co-ownership.
Let us talk about Wee v. De Castro, GR No. 176405, August 20, 2008. Here, take note that the

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ruling is similar to that case of Plasabas v. CA. So, under this two cases, it falls under the general
import of Article 487 which talks about anyone of the co-owners instituting an action for ejectment.
Wee v. De Castro
GR No. 176405 | August 20, 2008
Facts
Respondents alleged that they are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey
building erected on a parcel of land. Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner
on a month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month.Both parties agreed that effective 1 October
2001, the rental payment shall be increased from P9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however,
failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his rental obligation for the
month of 1 October 2001 became due.
On 10 June 2002, respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease
agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the subject property to
respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter, respondent
George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de Castro, Felomina de
Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated that it was being filed by all of
the respondents, the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by
respondent George de Castro alone. He would subsequently attach to his position paper filed
before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) executed by his
sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban authorizing him to institute the ejectment
case against petitioner.
One of the main arguments of petitioner is that respondent George de Castro cannot maintain
an action for ejectment against petitioner, without joining all his co-owners.
Issue
Whether or not George de Castro, as a co-owner of the property, can solely file an action for
ejectment against petitioner?
Held
Yes, George de Castro can file an action for ejectment. Article 487 applies in the case at bar.
As explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is
for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,this Court declared that a co-owner
is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even
in his absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant

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to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an
action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the
co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property,
is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are
not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban each executed a Special
Power of Attorney, giving respondent George de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No.
1990. Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that the lack thereof does
not in any way affect the validity of the action for ejectment instituted by respondent George de
Castro.
Let us go to the case of Jimenez v. Fernandez, GR No. L-46364, April 6, 1990. Now take note that
this case illustrates a very important point that under Article 485, for you to share in the benefits as
well as for you to be in charge of the charges in the co-ownership, you must be determined as a co-
owner. That is why Article 485 states that the share of a co-owner, so meaning you must be
determined to be a co-owner first. In this case, since it was under the old civil code, an illegitimate
child could not be considered part of the co-heirs. Therefore, with regard to that property transmitted
by the death of the precedent, that illegitimate child who was not even acknowledged a natural
child, cannot be considered a co-owner.
So what is the moral of the lesson? You go back to how ownership is instituted. We said a co-
ownership is instituted either by contract or by specific provisions of law. So what are those
provisions of law, we already talked about that. So all these laws with regard to Article 1178 on the
Obligations and Contracts in relation to Succession, it will create also a co-ownership. Anyway,
these provisions of law under the contract or provisions of law will create co-ownership. So for you
to know when to properly charge or when to properly reap the benefits, you must first know whether
you are properly considered a co-owner to a co-ownership. Because again, just because there is a
unity of the object or material indivision, and just because there is a plurality of the subjects
involving that single object to a co-ownership, we cannot properly say that it is a co-ownership
without the recognition of ideal shares. Therefore, that recognition of ideal shares will only be proper
if it is a co-ownership.
Now the case Punsalan v. Boon Liat, GR No. 18009, January 10, 1923. We just talked about that.
You won't understand it as of now because you have to go through the modes of acquisition of
ownership. So, read again the case. Basta it talked about how there is a co-ownership by virtue of
occupation. Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership under the law on property.
Punsalan v. Boon Liat

GR No. 18009 | January 10, 1923
Facts
From Cawit-cawit, a Moro named Tamsi saw a whale from a distance. Together with 21 other
Moros, he boarded small boats and they proceeded to pull it toward the shore where they
quartered it. They found ambergris in its abdomen. They placed the ambergris in three sacks,
two of which were full and the other half full.

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Tamsi and other Moros then brought the half sack of ambergris to Zamboanga to sell and so that
they could get the market price of the ambergris. The 2 full sacks were taken to the house of
Maharaja Butu, where they left it to the care of Ahamad. All of these twenty-two persons made
an agreement that they were to be the sole owners of this ambergris and that none of them could
sell it without the consent of the rest.
In Zamboanga, Tamsi and the others met a Chinaman named Cheong Tong who agreed to buy
the half sack for P 2, 700. They then offered to sell to Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat the other two
full sacks of ambergris for P 12, 000. A document to this effect was executed by Lim Chiat and
Cheong Tong, on the one hand, and Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod, and Imam Asakil, on the other.
While Tamsi and the other Moros were in Zamboanga, Mr. Henry Teck, who knew of the
ambergris, went to Cawit-cawit. He then seized the ambergris and boarded it on the boat named
Mindoro. He then offered to purchase the ambergris, butAhamad refused to sell it for the reason
that he was not the sole owner thereof, but owned it in common with other persons who were
in Zamboanga.
Mr. Tek was able to convince Ahamad to sell the ambergris for P7,500 and received P2,500 as
part payment on account of this price, a bill of sale having been signed by Ahamad, Maharaja
Butu and three Moros more. The balance of this price was paid later. When Tamsi and the
Chinamen Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat arrived in Cawit-cawit, they discovered that the
ambergris that they purchased from Tamsi was no longer there.
Issue
WON the fact that one of the defendants is a co-owner of the subject property is a bar to the
action brought by the co-owners.
Held
No. It appears from the foregoing that the ambergris in question was the undivided common
property of the Tamsi, the 21 other Moros and Ahamad. This common ownership was acquired
by occupancy (arts. 609 and 610 of the Civil Code), so that neither Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod, or
Imam Asakil had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong, nor had the
Moro Ahamad any right to sell this same amber, as he did, to C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go Tong,
and Henry E. Teck. There was an agreement between the co-owners not to sell this amber
without the consent of all. Both sales having been made without the consent of all the owners,
the same have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them (art. 399,
Civil Code).
Although the original complaint filed in this case was entitled as one for replevin, in reality, from
its allegations, the action herein brought is the ordinary one for the recovery of the title to, and
possession of, this amber. It is no bar to the bringing of this action that the Ahamad is one of the
co-owners. The action for recovery which each co-owner has, derived from the right of
ownership inherent in the coownership, may be exercised not only against strangers but against
the co-owners themselves, when the latter perform, with respect to the thing held in common,
acts for their exclusive benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in
violation of, the right of the community. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 22,
1892.) In this case the selling of the amber by the Ahamad as his exclusive property and his
attitude in representing himself to be the sole owner thereof places him in the same position as
the stranger who violates any right of the community. He is not sued in this case as a co-owner,

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for the cause of action is predicated upon the fact that he has acted not as a co-owner, but as an
exclusive owner of the ambergris sold by him.
Let us go to the case of Sps. Cruz v. Leis, GR No. 125233, March 9, 2000. Now in this case, illustrates
you my point before that if anyone of the co-owners will try to allege that they can sell any material
portion of the co-owned property, Article 493 of the Civil Code will tell you that it cannot be
possible. Why? Under Article 493, we said that co-owners have absolute ownership only with regard
to their ideal share. And therefore if they can sell anything, even if they purport to sell a material
portion of the co-owned property, it is understood by virtue of Article 493 that the only sold their
ideal share because again, they are absolute owners of their ideal share and joint ownership over
the material thing.
Now, under Article 493, recognition of full ownership as to the ideal share, the case of Sps. Cruz v.
Leis does not only illustrate to you the point of Article 493, because of the principle under the law
on Sales - nemo dat quod non habet (you cannot give what is not yours). Therefore, in this case,
since a co-owner cannot give properly any material portion of the co-ownership, let alone the entire
property co-owned. It is presumed under law by virtue of Article 493 that you only dispose only so
much or to the extent of your ideal share. So that sale has the effect of introducing the buyer as a
co-owner in the property.
And therefore, all the rules on legal redemption shall apply. But of course take note that the rule on
legal redemption also has exceptions. One of those exceptions is when for example even if we say
that Article 493 tells us that a co-owner is the absolute owner of the ideal share to the co-ownership,
therefore it is understood that share is the share that he or she is disposed of in favor of the buyer.
The exception to that rule is when the buyer is a buyer in good faith. Or when he is called a
purchaser for value. This rule is properly applicable in cases where for example it involves title to
the land. If what was disposed is a titled land, a registered land under PD 1539, and under that title
it is under the name of any one of the co-owners not annotated after the name of the entire co-
ownership. There is a principle under your Land Titles and Deeds, which is the mirror principle,
saying that any buyers who would engage into a sale involving registered property, they are not
obliged to go beyond the title which is a title considered to be conclusive proof of ownership. So
they are considered a buyer in good faith, a purchaser for value if they were not apprised anything
that was fishy involved in the sale or any claim that questions the title of the seller. So Land Titles is
an exception to the rules on Sales with regard to co-owned properties.
Let us go to Del Campo v. CA, GR No. 108228, February 1, 2001. Now, basically it is the same
thing with regard to sales involving co-owned property. So there is a presumption by virtue of Article
493, that that sale of the material portion or any portion or even the thing itself co-owned, there is
a presumption that without the consent of the others or if not all of the co-owners sell that thing,
therefore, what is sold is only to the extent of the ideal share of the co-owners because again of the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
Del Campo v. CA
GR No. 108228 | February 1, 2001
Facts
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were
the original co-owners of Lot 162. On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot

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162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. Then, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo sold a portion of the
lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Jose then caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title. The
reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However,
title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller
lots, each covered by a respective title in his name.
Issue: WON sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common
be valid
Held: Yes. The transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in
its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former
in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly
stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salomes 4/16
undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even
without the consent of the other co-owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest
in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment.
The principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned
property prior to partition among all the co-owners does not signify that the vendee does not
acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to
him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract
of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights
as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under
their transaction.
Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor.
It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose
Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share
previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that no one can give what he does
not have,[14] Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to
Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership.
Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951.
So we said that in cases of disposition of property, we cannot say properly that any material portion
can be disposed of if it does not have the concurrence or the consent of all the co-owners. So if
anyone of the co-owners try to dispose a material portion of the property, it is understood by virtue
of Article 493 that the disposition is only to the extend of their ideal share.
But the question now we pose to ourselves is this, we did not involve only sales, we involved other
forms of disposition, so for that we have the case Metrobank v. Pascual, GR No. 163744, February
29, 2008.

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Now, in this case it is clear, this illustrates Article 493 in such a way that since anyone of the co-
owners are absolute owners of their ideal share, they can do anything with their share, they can
dispose it in any manner without the consent of the other co-owners because again they are absolute
co-owners of their ideal share but joint owners of the material thing. More importantly, this case
illustrates to you that these dispositions where the presumption under Article 493 applies does not
only involve sale but also involve those encumbrances constituted upon by anyone of the co-
owners. So in this case, Florencia was the one who constituted the mortgage over the co-owned
property. And in that case, what is the presumption? So the mortgage covers only to the extent of
her share in the co-ownership. So it illustrates to you that Article 493 does not cover only dispositions
with regard to sale but also encumbrances, mortgages, other servitudes that may burden the share
of the co-owner in the co-ownership.
Metrobank v. Pascual
GR No. 163744 | February 29, 2008
Facts
Nicholson and Florencia were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought
a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. TCT
No. 156283was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson
Pascual.
Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC rendered a
decision,declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia,
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal
partnership.
Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan
from Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several
real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT
No. 156283.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell
due, Metrobank, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on RTC in Makati City, a Complaint
to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the
property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
Issue
Whether Nicholson could validly claim ownership over his 1/2 undivided share in the property.
Held
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso
facto end the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage,
without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown
that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets. While the declared nullity of marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the

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character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or
a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but
before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations
of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it,
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the
disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as
mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and
void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

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July 26 – Peroy
[Tips from Sir A.]
Cases under Art. 498. What are those things that are, more or less, by virtue of their nature,
essentially indivisible such that they may be subject of co-ownership.
Aguilar v. CA, GR 76351, Oct 29, 1993. This case tells us under Art. 498, if the co-owners cannot
decide as to the manner of partition or cannot decide how the thing to be partitioned is to be
distributed among them, Art. 498 gives you the remedy. It may be sold and then they will share in the
proceeds in accordance with their interest. Take note it’s all based in accordance with their interest.
More importantly, this case illustrates that it’s not only up to the decision of the parties. If there
is a conflict and they ask the court to settle the conflict, the court may likewise order under Art.
498 that the thing be sold to a 3 person and after which the proceeds will be distributed between
rd
the co-owners or the previous co-owners.
This case tells us that:

a. It’s not only up to the co-owners to sell the thing and divide the proceeds among themselves;
but
b. It can be also by virtue of an order of the court
in order to settle the manner by which partition can be made.
Take note the action was an action for specific performance, not even an action for partition. But
eventually the court gave it the remedy under Art. 498. The court can decide in favor of the parties
what is most beneficial to them.
[Sir starts discussion on Possession. 2 exam coverage.]

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TSN based on the Lectures

Property – considered as an object is which, or may be appropriated.

Property is the branch of civil law which:

Property vs. Thing

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 1

Classification of things or property according to the nature of their ownership

Objects tangible or intangible, owned privately either in a collective or individual capacity.

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 2

We will take this up when we reach accession.

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 3

3 Main Characteristics of Property

1. Utility for the satisfaction of moral or economic wants

1. Immovable – is synonymous with real property.

2. Movable – is used interchangeably with personal.

Classification of Immovable Property

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 4

3. Immovable by Destination or Purpose

4. Immovable by Analogy or Law

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 5

Q: Are all buildings immovable under par. 1?

For a building to be considered immovable, it must be a permanent structure substantially

c. Construction of all kinds adhered to the soil

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 6

What classification of immovable property do we have under paragraph 2? We have immovable by

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 7

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 8

What are the distinctions between par. 3 and par. 4?

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 9

Please don’t say “stay-Choo” ha, say “stah-Choo”.

Under par. 5, when is machinery considered immovable?

4. The machinery must be essential and principal elements of the industry.

Example: In a lumberyard. Computers for accounting of the lumberyard is not essential

Those are the requisites for immovability under par. 5.

Exception to the exception:

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 10

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 11

SERGE PRODUCTS VS PCI

Serge Products is a chocolate making company. it bought chocolate making machines

Issue: What kind of property are the chocolate making machines?

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 12

Issue: WON the tanks are immoveable

Note: The SC did not rule on the immoveability of the machines

BENGUET CORPORATION VS CBAA

Issue: WON tailing dams are immoveable and thus taxable.

MERALCO VS CITY ASSESSOR

MERALCO is a private corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws to

Issue: WON the properties are immoveable

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 13

Note: This case reversed the 1964 Meralco Case.

CAPITOL WIRELESS VS PROVINCIAL TREASURER

Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing

Issue: WON submarine cable systems are immovable

Held: Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission

Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters" is classified

PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR VS FILIPINAS PALM OIL

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 14

Issue: WON road equipment is immovable

Physical facilities for production is comprehensive enough to include the road

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

Art. 415. The following are immovable property: