Meade

USUS issues Tariff Schedule classification ruling letter stating that

Meade’s “day planners” now fell into a category that incurred a 4%
tariff, rather than their prior category that incurred no tariff. The Ruling
Letter:

- Can be issued by USCS HQ or any port of entry (here issued

by hq)
- Are made without N+C (HELD: lack of N+C alone does not
bar Chevron deference)
- Sometimes described their rationale, and sometimes did
not

Meade Sues in the Court of International Trade, which upholds USCS’

determination without mentioning deference.

On appeal, Federal Circuit reverses, saying that USCS’ ruling letter

should not get Chevron, and granting no deference at all.

HELD:

(1) a federal agency’s administrative implementation of a particular

federal statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that the rule is legislative because:

(a) Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to

make rules carrying the force of law, and

(b) the agency interpretation claiming deference was

promulgated in the exercise of that authority;

(2) delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, such

as by

(a) an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-

comment rulemaking, or

(b) some other indication of a comparable congressional intent;

(3) a Customs Service letter ruling (the rule at issue) concerning the
proper HTSUS classification of an imported item has no claim to
Chevron deference, because there is no indication that Congress
intended such a ruling to carry the force of law;
(4) however, the letter ruling should be reviewed under Skidmore
deference. (its “power to persuade” in light of the agency’s experience
and reasoning)

Remanded for analysis under Skidmore standard.

SCALIA DISSENT

(1) the Supreme Court’s new doctrine (using some totality-of-the-

circumstances test to decide if Chevron applies), was neither sound in
principle nor sustainable in practice;

- Ossification -> once an interpretation is upheld as “correct”

under Skidmore, the agency does not have room to adjust it
later

- Skidmore is too squishy

- IF “authoritative” position agency THEN Chevron is a simpler

formulation to apply AND better matches the idea that
statutory “flexibility” was intended to be filled by the executive.

(2) instead, the Supreme Court should have adhered to the original
Chevron formulation, under which any resolution of a federal statutory
ambiguity, by the agency administering the statute, that is
authoritative—that represents the official position of the agency—must
be accepted by the courts if the resolution is reasonable; and

- Here, this classification is clearly the authoritative position of

the agency, so just use Chevron.

Now, the Court limits Chevron to cases where Congress intended to

delegate primary interpretative responsibility to the agency, which is
determined by considering:

1) Whether congress delegated authority to make legislative rules

2) The extent of public participation in the rulemaking process
3) Degree of formality in the decision-making procedures
4) Extent to which the interpretation has a precedential effect
5) Whether the interpretation binds third parties or the agency
6) Whether the agency provided an explanation
7) The status of the individual who adopted the interpretation
 Brand X

The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling that classified cable internet access as NOT
a “telecommunications” service under the Communications Act is
petitioned for review.

The 9th Circuit held that the FCC’s construction was impermissible
because of the stare decisis effect of ATT v. Portland, which held that
cable modem service WAS a “telecommunications” service under the
Act.

REVERSED; HELD: the FCC’s ruling, stating that cable companies’

broadband Internet service was not ‘‘telecommunications service’’
under § 153(46) subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under
§ 153(44), was a permissible construction of the Communications Act,
as:

(1) The Chevron framework was applicable because:

- the ACT gave FCC authority to “prescribe and enforce

regulations as may be necessary”

- and the agency issued its Ruling under that authority

(2) The FCC’s construction was a permissible under Chevron, for

(a) the statutory term ‘‘telecommunications service’’ was

ambiguous; and

(b) the FCC’s construction was a reasonable policy choice.

(3) Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act made the FCC’s

construction unlawful, because the new construction did not constitute
an arbitrary and capricious deviation from agency policy.

-- also, we don’t want court decisions to cause policy ossification

-- in Portland, the court held that the “best” reading of the act included
cable in telecommunications, not that the ONLY permissible reading so
stated, so even if stare decisis did apply it wouldn’t preclude the new
interpretation.

GR: STARE DECISIS ONLY APPLIES TO BIND AGENCIES TO A PRIOR

INTERPRETATION IF THE REVIEWING COURT HELD THAT THE STATUTE
WAS UNAMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER READING
SCALIA DISSENT

- This decision allows the executive to overrule decisions of

Article III Courts; that’s a separation of powers problem
- What about cases where it’s not clear if the reviewing court
decided the issue of whether or not there was a single
“only” permissible interpretation
- What is the standard for “unambiguous” with respect to
court decisions binding agencies as compared to the
ambiguity check at Chevron 1?
- If a court affirms an agencies interpretation, does that
affirmation bind the agency to that interpretation for all
time?