Carpio vs.

Executive Secretary

on 6:59 PM in Case Digests, Political Law

1

206 SCRA 290 (1992)

o power of administrative control

o power of executive control

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish
and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

o Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD:

Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the
power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.”
As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person,
he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant
view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
AQUINO JR V. ENRILE

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered
the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against
them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s
answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to
Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the
case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there
is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to
the President’s order.

Drilon, Trampe, Arizala, Solis, and Abesamis v. CA, Hon. Macli-

ing (RTC Judge), and Adaza (1997)Hermosisima, Jr., J.

General de Villa was then the Chief of Staff of the AFP. He wrote a letter to Sec of Justice Drilon
requesting aninvestigation of several people for their participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d
'etat.

The letter was based on the affidavit of some AFP officials (Brig. Gen. Galido, Capt. Mapalo, Co
l. Mamorno, Col.Figueroa, and Maj. Sebastian).

Gen. de Villa's letter was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Pros
ecutors created pursuantto DOJ Order No. 5.

Petitioner, Asst. Chief Prosecutor Trampe,

the Team Leader, found sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. He issued asubpoena to the peo
ple named in the letter and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investig
atorscomposed of the other petitioners (Prosecs Arizala, Abesamis, and Solis).

The panel released a resolution which stated that they found probable cause to hold those nam
ed people for trial rebellionwith murder and frustrated murder.
o
This resolution was the basis for the filing of an Information charged against private respondent
Adaza withrebellion with murder and frustrated.

Feeling aggrieved, Adaza files a complaint for damages saying that the prosecutors engaged
“
in a deliberate, willful andmalicious experimentation by filing
” those charges
against him. Adaza claims that those prosecutors knew that such crimedid not exist in the statut
e books.

The prosecutors filed a Motion to Dismiss

Adaza’s complaint
saying that the complaint
“
states no actionable wrongconstituting a valid cause of action
.”

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss. MR also dismissed.

Petitioner prosecutors then filed certiorari in the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in ruling t
hat there was sufficientcause of action.
o
CA dismissed.

Petitioner prosecutors filed in the SC for a review of the case. SC denied.

After more than a year, SC reinstated the petition and granted a TRO ordering the RTC Judge fr
om proceeding with thecase against the prosecutors

.Issue:
Did Adaza’s complaintagainst the prosecutors state a cause of action? Should it have been dis
missed from the start?

Held:
There was no statement of cause of action. Should’ve been dismissed right from the start.
The complaint filed by Adaza against the prosecutors does not allege facts sufficient to constitut
e a cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss must appear on the face of the com
plaint itself, meaning thatit must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from n
one other.

The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judg
e's attention.

Paragraph 14
of the complaint stating: “
The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-
existent crimehad severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name
…”
is a conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts

SEC OF JUSTICE V JUDGE LANTION

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

October 26, 2012 § 1 Comment

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of

the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the

United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle

the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel,

wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S

Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received

copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the

RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of

the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties

under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our

Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the

government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty

obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of

binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our

Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in

which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the

constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its

supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment

with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no

further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in

which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the

constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed

that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international

law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of

international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the

municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound

by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the

primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of

incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal

standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex

posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In

states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both

statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Garces v CA
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She
was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to
transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for
Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued
by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming
office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed
check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces
E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment
order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en
banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved
to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the
appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot
and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC
under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only
on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer
of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper
remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those
involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required
by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary,
it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of
the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those
that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
“elective regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an
appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over
“all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.”
*Petition denied

2. MATHAY V. CSC (1999)

The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive and not with thelocal
legislative unit or Sanggunian
The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is vested
in the local chief executive.[9]The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the
other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and
positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. This is
clear from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the powers of thesanggunian. The power
to appoint is not one of them. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[10] Had Congress
intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief
executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.
The Facts:

During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private
respondents[2] to positions in the Civil Service Unit ("CSU") of the local government of
Quezon City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51
which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972.
On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that
Presidential Decree No. 51 was never published in the Official Gazette. Therefore,
conformably with our ruling in Tanada vs. Tuvera[3] the presidential decree is deemed
never "in force or effect and therefore cannot at present, be a basis for establishment of
the CSUs . . . ."[4]

On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,
directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within
one year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the ground that the same never became law.
Among those affected by the revocation of appointments are private respondents in
these three petitions.

For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned
by the enactment of City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the
Department of Public Order and Safety ("DPOS").
Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents
contractual appointments for the period of June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The
appointments were renewed by Mayor Simon for the period of January 1, 1992 to June
30, 1992.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On
July 1, 1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private
respondents effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments,
however, were no longer renewed.

The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents'
appointments became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated
petitions grew.

Decision:

By ordering petitioner to "reinstate" private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance,

theCivil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot
be done. In a long line of cases,[11] we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission's power is
limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an
appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the
person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends.
The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

Therefore, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no legal standing to prosecute G.R. No. 126354.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions of Ismael A. Mathay in G.R. No.124374 and G.R. No. 126366
are GRANTED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 1996 and January 15, 1996
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The petition of the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 126354 is DISMISSED for lack of legal standing to
sue. The assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated July 5, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

BRILLANTES vs. YORAC

192 SCRA 358, 1990

Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of
the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes
challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the
independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific
provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their
independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should
therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions
of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the
absence of the regular Chairman.

Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”
They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and
its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only
to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary
chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot
be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The
situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely
have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event,
that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

DBP. V COA
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 [1988]

Facts:
Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI
of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City, after public bidding, contracted, admittedly on an "emergency labor
basis," the services of one Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the
renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo City.
When petitioner retired on 17 January 1984, among the items disallowed by the Resident Auditor was the
amount of P6,574.00 from the labor contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's daily rate from P40.00
per day to P18.00 daily.
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who affirmed the disallowance as being
"excessive and disadvantageous to the government," but increased Layson's daily rate to P25.00 thereby
reducing the total amount disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite petitioner's request for reconsideration,
respondent Commission remained unmoved, hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
WON the disallowance is invalid for being a usurpation of management function and an impairment of
contract

Held:
the Decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby SET ASIDE
COA is vested with power and authority, and is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to the Govt., or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
The COA found that the labor contract which they disallowed, was excessive and thus disadvantageous to
the Govt. however, the court found out that that the rate given is not necessarily disadvantageous. The
Bureau of Treasury hired Layson since he was the one submitted the lowest price in the auction for the
contract. Thus, it being found not disadvantageous, the decision of COA was set aside and ordered the
petitioner to refund the disallowed item.