PEOPLE v.
LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO
GR No. 210710, Jul 27, 2016
Ruling:
Law: RA10591: ​AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Doctrine: ​Illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder.
Facts:
Together with two others, appellant was charged with Murder with the use of
Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder that is contained in the
informations:
On 2 February 2007 at around 10:30 in the evening, Rey PerfectoDe Luna
(De Luna) and Sixto Elizan (Elizan) entered a videoke bar at Barangay
Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar. Noli Abayan (Abayan), appellant and Joselito
Bardelas (Bardelas) followed five minutes thereafter
While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun, four
successive gunshots were fired through the window. Because of this, Elizan
and De Luna were hit from behind. Later on, De Luna and Marialinisa
Pasana (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then wearing a black t-shirt and a
black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw
accused-appellant and Bardelas escape after the incident.
Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban City.
Unfortunately, Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival. De Luna, on the
other hand, survived.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Paraffin test is conclusive.
2. Whether or not Illegal Possession of Firearm is considered as an
aggravating circumstance in the crimes of Murder and Frustrated
Murder.
1. No. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses
bears more weight than the negative paraffin test result conducted
the day after the incident.
Paraffin tests, in general-, have been rendered inconclusive by this
Court. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test was
extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the presence or
absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; however, the test alone
cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was
the discharge of a firearm; The presence of nitrates should be taken
only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also
admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.
In this case, prosecution witness, Pasana and the victim himself, De
Luna, testified in the trial court that it was indeed the appellant who
was holding the gun during the incident. It should also be considered
that appellant was arrested the day after the incident. Thus, it is
possible for appellant to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or
gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed
afterwards.
2. Yes, In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and
R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate
prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in
order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as
an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from
the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but,
murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not
considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable
since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The
1
intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of
unlicensed firearm as a single offense.

In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was

not a licensed firearm holder, and that he was positively identified by
the witnesses as the one who fired shots against the victims, the use
of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder
and Frustrated Murder should be considered as an aggravating
circumstance thereof.

2
Roy Dizon v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111762. July 22, 1999
Law: PD 1866: ​CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR
DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES
FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES
Doctrine: ​Proof of actual explosion is not necessary to establish that the
device is an explosive under P.D. No. 1866.
Facts:
That on or about May 11, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession
and under his custody and control an explosive with the following description,
to wit:
One (1) Pill box bomb wrapped in an aluminum foil with electrical tape and
black powder
which he carried outside of his residence not for the purpose of surrendering
the same and without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 7:00 in the evening on May
11, 1990, patrolmen Ernesto Marquez and Alfredo Opriasa, of the Western
Police District followed a group of rallyist, numbering about 20 to 25, that
marched along Recto Avenue then turned left on Nicanor Reyes Street
(formerly Morayta Street) and proceeded to Espaa Street. The group was
protesting the coming exploratory talks between the governments of the
Philippines and the United States concerning the extension of the Military
Bases Agreement which was due to expire on September 16, 1991. Upon
reaching the intersection of España and A. Maceda Streets, the
demonstrators stopped to stage a noise barrage.
Marquez, who was driving the patrol car, stopped the vehicle about seven
meters from the group. Marquez and Opriasa remained in the car for about
ten minutes, observing the rallyists. When some of them started burning tires
in the middle of the street, Opriasa alighted and ran towards the students
who scampered when they saw him. Marquez followed Opriasa shortly after.
Opriasa got hold of accused-appellant who was left behind while trying to
light one of the tires on the street. Opriasa frisked accused-appellant and
confiscated from him a pillbox. Following standard procedure, they first took
accused-appellant to the Jose B. Reyes Memorial Hospital for examination
before proceeding to the WPD Station 4 on UN Avenue, where
accused-appellant was booked and detained for illegal possession of pillbox.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of black powder is sufficient to justify a
finding that an incendiary evidence , the possession of which is
punished by presidential decree 1866 and Whether or not the CA
erred in not taking into consideration that the alleged pillbox did not
explode
Held:
Accused-appellant does not say, however, how this is to be carried
out since, by deduction, the only logical choice is to make the object
explode. As the appellate court pointed out in its decision,
accused-appellant must have been less than serious when he
suggests that the device . . . should have been thrown to the ground.
Such would have been a sure way of losing the very evidence one is
testing. Indeed, ​the law merely states that the device be capable
of producing destructive effect. The positive results yielded by the
test conducted by Capacete and Dequito, whose findings likewise
enjoy the presumption of regularity, clearly establish this.​Moreover,
as discussed, proof of actual explosion is not necessary to
establish that the device is an explosive under P.D. No. 1866.
3
PEOPLE v DELA ROSA
G.R. No. 84857. January 16, 1998
Law: PD 1866: ​CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR
DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES
FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES
Doctrine:
A. While mere possession without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
B. Temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a
firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of
this kind of weapon.
C. ​Stealing a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner
defenseless, may suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft, but
would not justify a charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to
hold and eventually use the weapon would be lacking.
Facts:
Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo
Quimson were recruited by Kumander Tamang to join the rebel forces of the
New People’s Army. On the morning of 8th of December 1986, a meeting
was called by Kumander Tamang for the assassination plot of kagawad
Rigor. Kumander Tamang took the bag that is always being carried by Reyes
and took out the several sticks of dynamite. They were taught on how to
properly use them. After the meeting, they returned to their hut and rested. At
two o'clock in the afternoon, they heard a gunshot from the hut of Kumander
Tamang. They rushed outside and saw Reyes holding Kumander Tamang's
shotgun. He announced that Kumander Tamang was dead. He told them it
would be better to surrender themselves to the authorities. He ordered them
to gather the shotgun and the sticks of dynamite while he set on fire
Kumander Tamang's hut. At five o'clock in the afternoon, they descended the
mountains and headed towards Sitio Kadampat. At 7:00 a.m., the following
day, they reached the house of Kagawad Rigor. They saw the Kagawad
sitting by himself on a bench outside his house. Only Reyes approached the
Kagawad, so as not to frighten him. The three others waited by the roadside.
After five (5) minutes, Reyes signalled the three to approach the house.
Kagawad Rigor let them inside the house and offered them breakfast. Reyes
placed the shotgun and the bag on top of the dining table. Kagawad Rigor
then left the house and went to the police station. He returned with several
policemen. At first, the policemen pointed their guns at the accused but
Kagawad Rigor told them there was no need for they were surrendering
themselves to the authorities. Kagawad Rigor then showed the policemen
the shotgun and the bag containing the sticks of dynamite. The policemen
took all the surrenderees to the Municipal Hall, except Rodolfo Quimson, who
was left behind, to lead the police to Kumander Tamang's body. At the
Municipal Hall, Mayor Calixto Pancho greeted and congratulated them for
coming back to the fold of law. They had their picture taken with Mayor
Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police
headquarters. When an investigator started to question them, they asked for
a lawyer to assist them but the investigator said they would not need one for
they were surrenderees and would soon be freed. Hence, they gave their
subscribed statements to the police. After their statements were taken, the
police took them back to the police station in Labrador, where they were
detained. On January 5, 1987, they were transferred to the provincial jail in
Lingayen. They denied ever seeing the two (2) long firearms which were
recovered in Sitio Tebel Patar. They saw said firearms for the first time when
the prosecution presented them as exhibits during the trial.
Issue:
The trial court erred in finding Dela Rosa guilty in violation of PD 1866.
Held:
No. Broken down into its salient elements, illegal possession of firearms is
committed when the holder thereof:
(a) possesses a firearm; and (b) lacks the authority or license to possess it.
In People v. de Gracia,[19] we clarified the meaning of possession for the
purpose of convicting a person under PD 1866, thus:
4
"But, is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an
intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance for illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum,
punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal
intent are not valid defenses.
"When a crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the
crime is not necessary, it is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime
and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not
have consciously intended to commit a crime but he intended to commit an
act, and that act is by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first
(intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second
(intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and
intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent, is sufficient
to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown
that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other
criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is
not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm,
and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent."
In the early case of People v. Estoista, we held that a temporary, incidental,
casual, or harmless possession of firearms is not punishable. We stated
therein that:
"The terms "​control" and "dominion​" themselves are relative terms not
susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of
control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down
in the United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is that temporary,
incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of
weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a
weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment."
Also, in People v. Remereta, where the question posed was whether an
accused who stole a firearm could simultaneously be prosecuted for theft
and illegal possession of firearms, we held that transient possession is not
sufficient to convict one under the latter crime, thus:
"While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into
possession thereof, the crime of illegal possession of firearms is not
committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. x x x Thus, stealing
a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may
suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a
charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually
use the weapon would be lacking."
Hence, the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where
the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with
animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. It is not enough that the
firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same
temporarily and casually or for the purpose of surrendering the same.
Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into
the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based
on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances
explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.
5
PEOPLE v. ALAMADA MACABANDO
GR No. 188708, Jul 31, 2013
Law: PD 1613: AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
Doctrine:
A. In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime.
B. The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling.
C. P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Facts:
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December
21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe,
and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he
uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout
that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw
smoke coming from the appellant's house. He got a pail of water, and poured
its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just
10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get
a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant,
who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the
appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. The appellant also told the
people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his
nephews and nieces. Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings.
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot
investigation of the incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire
started in the appellant's house; and that it had been intentional.
Issue:
Whether the accused should be charged the Crime of Arson defined in Art.
320 of the RPC or Simple Arson defined in PD 1613
Held:
Appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. While Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, on the other hand,
currently governs simple arson.
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
a. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
b. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
c. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or
tunnel;
d. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo
grove or forest;
e. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
f. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a
lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.
6
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the
present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own
house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations
were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing,
and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that
damaged houses were residential​, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was
used as a residence. That the appellant's act affected many families will not
convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant's act does not
appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the
RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to
burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

7
People v. Malngan
G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006
Law: PD 1613: AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
Doctrine:
A. There is no complex crime of Arson with (Multiple) Homicide.
B. If the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is
murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting
homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
Facts:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in
the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named
Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio
Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different
directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which
was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by
the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but
upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought
instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos
group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the
fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the
Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he
received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod,
that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the
housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman
(the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously on
Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other
tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later
identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified
the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended
her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay
Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house
was also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was
the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter
was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag. Thereafter,
accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the
presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she
set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary
for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her
employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be a complex crime in the crime of Arson.
Held:
There is no complex crime of Arson with (Multiple) Homicide.
The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a
complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two
(2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7659, and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
ART. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. Destructive Arson. x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion
of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
8
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up
penalty for the commission of arson​, whether considered destructive or the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'tre is that arson is homicide/murder and arson.
itself the end and death is simply the consequence.
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to be
a separate crime altogether, the joint discussion of the late Mr. Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, on the subject
of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is highly instructive:

Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person
who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house,
the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely
adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to
take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means
of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the
building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.

xxxx

If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not
be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate
offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.

Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to

determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of
the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is
simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;

(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,

9
Buebos v. People accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common
G.R. No. 163938, 28 March 2008 design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the
accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.
Law: PD 1613: AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated
Doctrine: ​Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the
group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together
Facts: while the roof of Adelinas house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe joint purpose and design, and community of interest.
was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her
sick child. She was lying down when she heard some noise around the
house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused,
Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.
congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her
nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her
immediate succor, the four fled.

At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help.
Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Years Eve.
Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping
over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to
identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also
saw Rolando Buela running away.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a conspiracy in the commission of the crime of Arson

Held:
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out
the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective
is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the

10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR G. SORIANO
G.R. No. 142565. July 29, 2003
Law: PD 1613: AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
Doctrine​: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple
Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender.
Facts:
The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn
of 18 September 1998 accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano was having an
argument with his live-in partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning their
son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed Otoy. Honey worked as Guest Relations Officer
(GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house. The disagreement stemmed from the
fact that Honeys brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the
consent of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to
return with him to Manila. But Honey refused. As their discussion wore on
accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her, which
he vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time Honey
did not relent to the baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her
stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.
Incensed by her negative response, Nestor nastily retorted: [S]he is now
arrogant and proud of her brother who now supported (sic) her and her
children. He added that since he returned from Manila, the house had
become unlucky, referring to that belonging to her aunt Fe Cimagila then
occupied by Honey located at Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City.
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. You are
hurting me, she snapped back, just like what you did to me in Manila.
Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It is better that I burn this house,
and then took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set
fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys room.
With her naked body precariously draped in a towel, Honey instinctively took
off her covering and doused off the flame with it. Then she rushed to her
cabinet in the room to get a T-shirt and put it on. But Nestor did his worst; he
went to Honeys room and set on fire her clothes in the cabinet.
Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As the conflagration was
now engulfing the second story of the house, Honey frantically shouted to her
uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who was residing next door, Boy is setting the
house on fire, referring to Nestor.
On the ground floor Nestor grappled with Honey and choked her as he
dragged her towards the kitchen. She told him that it would be better for him
to kill her than to set the house on fire as it would endanger the neighboring
houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Nestor finally laid down his
knife and hurriedly went back to the second floor only to see the entire area
in flames. They had no choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the
neighboring houses. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally
burned together with five (5) neighboring houses owned individually by
Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braa, Simplicio Cabrera and
Perla Clerigo.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused committed destructive arson
Held:
No. Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two
kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD
1613). This classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices,
trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of
crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the
commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and
protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only
destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to
authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this
11
crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the
malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its
commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact
on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320,
death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal
Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways,
bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the
purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social,
economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be
meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need
to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in
the commission of Simple Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed
in its maximum period: (a) If committed with intent to gain; (b) If committed
for the benefit of another; (c) If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned; and, (d) If committed
by a syndicate, or group of three (3) or more persons. If by reason, or on the
occasion of Simple Arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has
deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce
further evidence of his wrongful intent. If there is an eyewitness to the crime
of Arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the
only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. In the crime of Arson,
the prosecution may describe the theatre of the crime and the conditions and
circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type is part of the res gestae.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. ​The acts
committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed
under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In
other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted
into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears
to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness
as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the
offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that
accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned cannot be appreciated in the present case
where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen
temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his
wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate
father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the
Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple
Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally
burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
12
PEOPLE v PEDRO CEDENIO
G.R. No. 93485 June 27, 1994
Law: PD 1613: AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
Doctrine: Since appellants failed to move to quash the information on the
ground of multiplicity of charges or object thereto at any other time, the
defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may validly render judgment
against them for as many crimes as were alleged.
Facts​:
Bonifacio Palomas recounts that on 26 November 1986, at about ten-thirty in
the evening, he was roused from his sleep by bangs and slams and what
sounded like women’s desperate cries for help coming from the direction of a
neighbor’s house some thirty (30) meters away. It was Hilario Dorio’s house
on fire. Peeping through his window, Palomas saw around seven (7)
persons, among them appellants Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe
Antipolo, emerge from the house of Dorio that was afire. The blaze was so
bright he was able to recognize them. They were wielding unsheathed bolos.
Afraid, Palomas remained home. The following morning, he narrated to
Romeo, son of Hilario Dorio, what he witnessed the night before. Then he
went with the younger Dorio to the rubble and saw the charred bodies of his
father, Hilario Dorio, his mother Flora, his sister Maria, his niece Dioscora,
and his maternal grandmother Nicanora Tabanao, said to be a family of
sorcerers in the village.
Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that fateful evening
when he heard dogs barking. Thinking that a carabao may have gone astray,
he went out of his house and headed for the cornfield. On his way, he
noticed some thirty (30) meters away that the house of Hilario Dorio was on
fire. From where he stood, he also saw people running out of the burning
house. As the fierce fire illumed the surroundings, he recognized three (3) of
them as his neighbors Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo.
When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with blood so he
retreated home. The next morning, he went to the burned house, joined the
people already milling around, and saw the seared bodies of the five (5)
members of the Dorio household.3
Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan, Pangantucan,
Bukidnon, also narrated that on 27 November 1986, at around seven o’clock
in the morning, he was informed by Cristituto Gajo that the Dorio residence
was gutted by fire the night before and that five (5) members of the Dorio
family then occupying the house were burned to death. He thus proceeded to
the scene and found the house razed to the ground. The five (5) bodies
retrieved from the site were those of Hilario Dorio with wounds on the head
and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed;
Maria Dorio with wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao with
a wound in the stomach; and, infant Dioscora Dorio with no wounds at all but
charred to the bone.4
Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Pedro Cedenio to the heinous crime.
Antifuesto said that on 26 November 1986, at around seven o’clock in the
evening, he was awakened by Cedenio who borrowed his bolo. At around
three o’clock the following morning, Pito Panla-an woke him up to return the
bolo earlier borrowed by Cedenio. It was placed in its scabbard and left
leaning against the wall below the window. When Panla-an left, Antifuesto
got his bolo and found bloodstains on its handle. Upon unsheathing it, he
discovered fresh blood on its blade. Thirty (30) minutes later, Cedenio arrived
and appeased him, ". . . do not worry, if this incident reaches the court I will
answer (for) everything."5
Although it appears that around nine (9) persons were involved in the
commission of the felony,6 only three (3) were convicted by the trial court.
Thus on 16 March 1990, it found Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo and Jurito
Amarga guilty of "Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 (amending the law on Arson)" 8
and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On 4 April 1990, they filed their
notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether the accused persons should be charged complex crime of arson
with homicide.
Held:
No. The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the
crime of "Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly charges appellants with six (6)
13
distinct criminal acts. It accuses them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
attack(ing), assault(ing) and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G.
Tabanao, Maria T. Dorio, Dioscora T. Dorio and Flora T. Dorio, inflicting on
their persons multiple mortal wounds . . . (and) set(ting) on fire and burn(ing)
the house of the victims . . ." Since appellants failed to move to quash the
information on the ground of multiplicity of charges or object thereto at any
other time, the defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may validly
render judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged. In order
to sustain a conviction for as many offenses as are alleged, it is elementary
that all the allegations must be proven with moral certainty. Hence,
considering that the Information alleges that appellants burned the house of
the victims and killed them with treachery and (evident) premeditation, both
the arson and the multiple murder must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
Considering that the prosecution was able to show with moral certainty that
the killing of the four (4) victims was attended with evident premeditation and
the burning was done to disguise the murder, appellants are guilty of arson
and four (4) counts of murder, each count aggravated by dwelling which,
while not alleged in the Information, was sufficiently proven during the trial

We accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We see

no reason to depart from the conclusion of the trial court that it was "morally
convinced that the three accused are all guilty . . . . The court a quo had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses thus its findings are given great weight
and respect.

Palomas, Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is

not a shiver of evidence to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. In fact,
the records show that witness Antifuesto even lent his bolo to appellant
Cedenio so that the former could not have had a grudge against the latter,
otherwise, he would not have lent his bolo. Absent the most compelling
reason or motive, it is inconceivable why the prosecution witnesses would
openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which would send three innocent
men to jail. Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on
the part of prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies
are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence.

While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the victims
and the burning of the house, we have repeatedly ruled that guilt may be
established through circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus in (People v. Adriano)
and (People v. Galendez) we ruled that there can be a conviction based on

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