[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005] The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
s of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,[1] dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the
Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were
filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No.
284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that
they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way
of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation
of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters
Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
7070 are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number,
date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990
in the amount of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in
the amount of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26,
1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam.
He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga
became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55
loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8]
sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990
issued by Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check
No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three
checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11]
when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there
was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;[13]
and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in
the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused
Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they
stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for
each of them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount
of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to
one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for
each of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and
reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount of P30,302.10 which is the total
value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC
erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.[18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were made
applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs.
Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article
10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be
supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The
Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not
make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal
liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of
Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be
held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE
DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED
BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS
ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE
LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
are or in the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and
issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven
by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not
provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which
in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to
such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws
are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said
clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special
legal provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could
have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision
that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter
should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs.
Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases
involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code
to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with
reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S.
vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code,
with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the
crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No.
1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg.
22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in
U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the
lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was
merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of
Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070,
Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did
not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the
crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate,
is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.[39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs.
Mandao:[40]
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or
accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under
specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any
element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused
may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a
judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from
which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against
accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal
liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant
in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be
predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must survive
the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the
act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral
certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the
accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must
be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite
quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with
moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners
innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision,
dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443
affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting
the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,
and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration assailing the Decision
1
dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July
12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases
which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the
first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence
thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman
need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that
considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish
Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as
to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the
Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative,
should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2)
whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already
prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the
Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T.
ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R.
Nos. 143618-41, entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.)" promulgated on July
30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June
8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the
informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned
Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because the
officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the said
Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these
cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
archives.
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June
8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash,
terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on
June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the
Sandiganbayan, we held that:
 In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable
defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the
certification in the information was found inadequate, or in People v.
Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
proceedings.8
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to
Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because
the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and
applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was
based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i) 10 of this Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v.
Court of Appeals11 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. x
x x.12
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in
the instant cases was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the
charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases investigated by the
Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which have already
been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429.
As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for
efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in
sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed
cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were
filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos.
28031-28049 x x x.13
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-
referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared therein that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it
abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for
the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that
the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a
procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary
investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our
directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its
objective of affording petitioner his right to due process. 15
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first
resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and
resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the assailed
Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations
against the petitioner"16 and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered
through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already
prescribed."17 We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before
he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 19 which ground
includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally
extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the
merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal
cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
 In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for
failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985
during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the
period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall
prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of
People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A.
No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was
only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years,
as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not
being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be
given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986
or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March
15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses
allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982
until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326
which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and
penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision,
specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage
or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may
be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis
supplied)25
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to
run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the
complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the
petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto26 this Court already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans.27
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the
Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for
the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of
the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The
silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326
did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate
of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply
the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by
judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are
not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.28
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the
PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan
to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file
his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no
such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the
prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary
investigation of cases not falling within its competence.30 This Court, in its
resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner’s cases in the
Sandiganbayan to take"31declared invalid –
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24
offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of
assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.32
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the
informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting
petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is
no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. 34
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez
in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is
judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could
have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is
that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body
or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary
investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in
the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint
against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of
prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the
offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the
latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the
prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of
prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to
[special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary."
Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article
91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
 Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only
after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of
the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court
has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the
applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest
reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the
Majority Opinion and argues that –
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own
prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the State’s
jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a
fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this
jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of
the accused to the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and
prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this
Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or
prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction
to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion
unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.
With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such
as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases.
As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that –
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of
the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court
has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the
applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest
reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matteras evident
from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of
violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the
special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the
service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the
special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of
the Revised Penal Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and
"accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although it referred to
the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not
the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of
the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in
effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines
"special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not
included in the Penal Code".
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in ruling that –
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those
penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No.
3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines
prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can
be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326,
did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to
the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To
elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the
Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special
laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in
point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the legislature made
its intention clear and was thus categorical that –
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code –
All violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5)
years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the
so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation
of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the accused is
absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No.
3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code
suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of
"special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret
the term "special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the
Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to
penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the
Philippines. Thus –
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that
phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning
applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x
It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in
the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In
fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a
general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the
phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the
general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply
says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other
law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the provisions of
said code.43
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No.
3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the
contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly
states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground for
the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a
situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and
directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to
special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the
contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special
legal provisions must prevail over general ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running
of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go
beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond
our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained –
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply
the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by
judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are
not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.44
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of
limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1)
retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or extending the
prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed
vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the
prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot be
utilized to support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the prescriptive period
in a special law continues to run while the accused is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal
cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs
while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on
prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant
case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind
and the nature of prescription of penal offenses –
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in
applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that
has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of
statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two
contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is
no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the
right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the
ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is,
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute,
and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.'
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly
applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion
shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to
return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and
that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all
acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute,
is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed
and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently
of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril
to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural
lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts
of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing
from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes.
Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause of
interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be implied nor
derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly
and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter
must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on
prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of
the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily implied. The prescriptive
period may only be prevented from operating or may only be tolled for reasons
explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation
of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the
accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the
nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty
and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case
of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute
of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring
the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein
have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner
for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and

grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a
certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the
offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume
his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of
his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation
are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute
is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact
that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys
proofs of guilt.47

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in

the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to
run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the
petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on
May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner
for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8,
2002.
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November
10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana
to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the
sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination,
were found positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after
his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He
voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the
merits ensued and was duly concluded.
I confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession.
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified
as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at
Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding
Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-
bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked
money from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded
to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and
barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential
informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached
appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the
affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and,
upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags
and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment.
Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to
fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz,
who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then
brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on
board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt.
Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal
that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was
the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the
buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members,
that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not
actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the
one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter
was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel.
Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the
Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on
the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for
P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to
put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the
correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly
involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at
5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were
practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor
also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The
next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered
that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience
abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant
came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain,
his physical condition remained normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts,
claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching
television with the members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance
that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment,
appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to
Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route.
While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight
from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented
to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves,
and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the
NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure
the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he
proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias,
Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana
Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined
for three days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was
hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain
and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been
suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn
Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but
her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic
ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court
rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise
ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the
lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1)
not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G"
(Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and
evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way
connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered
four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea
bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate
and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly
and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether for money or
any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both
parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to
prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell
two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself
creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony
of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the
utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion
and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt
do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team
before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed
to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail
over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been
framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it
all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited
chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly
done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the
then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp
Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
therein,23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the
contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and
had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of
the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost,
according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea
bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do
with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the
marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense
with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the
marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming
arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the
marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor
matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there
was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that
he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of
appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as
the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly
confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes
contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has
been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as
follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such
operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are
lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased
only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS,
as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request
for that powder because they, themselves, are using that in their own work,
sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money
bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be
fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act
punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The
dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary
technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a
barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of
pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in
flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the
obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report
prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for
selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation
of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these
remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for
the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein
he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They
were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant
manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to
counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in
evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal
participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely
the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of
the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any
peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana
to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the
doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case,
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any
place.40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a
total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such
sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances
of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused
supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional
particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental
torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp
Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support
his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed
were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence
to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The
evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is
that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated
that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had
no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to
see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.49
Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to
do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his
arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest
was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society
and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act
of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have
concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication
of the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties,
Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. —
The penalties for offenses under Sections
3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian
hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less
than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four
tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact,
stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial
inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194
of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article
10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The
execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses
since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could
neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary
question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be
imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case
of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal
Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not
the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the
penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced
penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and
executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice,
procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the
matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of
habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties
appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby
calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now
further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less,
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby
hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved
is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should
be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8
grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second
paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty
shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them
being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the
maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of
Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty
shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code
and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of
the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal
imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby,
the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context
of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons
for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph
be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately
among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if
the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at
bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again,
another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and,
as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of
and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question
is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to
be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing
the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should
not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder,
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the
Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty
in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to
special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked
where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the
special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system
of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved
speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in
the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the
United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the
American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct
that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code
and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and
wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or
laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall prima
facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer
against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses
similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and
fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same
manner as therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and
understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic
Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the
penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms),
the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal,
reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months,
when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law
are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the
Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic
Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of
the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the
other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated
in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in
the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and
special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other
statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the
Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and
1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals
the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies
under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold
otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which
could never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential
Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974),
it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that
—
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the
Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed
which is in terms of the classification and duration of
penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is
not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an
amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the
offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be
subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104
of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code
should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties
in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving
Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to
special laws, this Court held that where the special law
expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the
penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the
application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.
1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in
the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such
case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties
which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of
 experience in the administration of criminal laws."
(Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and
prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of
all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise,
the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act
No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in
the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to
lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and
applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within
rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61
of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more
ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence,
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to
be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article
71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree
lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each
likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is
for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order
not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut
res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the
law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the
concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence
for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of
the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate
sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature
of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there
could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In
the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided,
this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this
holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea
expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code
in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now
in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense." (Emphasis ours.) A divergent pedantic application would not
only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui
haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only
skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation
of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is
the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70
and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the
law states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that
under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have
been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the
interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in
an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws
with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion,
and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.72 The "minimum"
sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and
not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of
the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his
sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on
parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the
minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should
be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even
involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in
the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of
conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin
Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should
be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
 DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the
Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for
violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in
the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R.
Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and
petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period
during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District
Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-
Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of
the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos.
008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of
Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand
seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the
accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces
her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under
Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering
that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next
degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B.
Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right
of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the
Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders
from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by
the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
 I The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON
WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT
HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT
PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF
PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921
IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE
DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL
WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous,
based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial
evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of
private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in
the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala
prohibita.
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack
of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they
are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the
other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they
are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and
election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers
who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in
any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and
canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are
bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing
or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of
proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the
Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was
conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of
Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and
forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each
precinct was then recorded in the Statement of Votes with
appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures
appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in
his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the
Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of
Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each
candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each
precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of
Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera
with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the
corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads
the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts
listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records
the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray,
tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals
appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on
which the grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who
reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by
appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of
Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of
Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as
subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to
008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition
of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each
candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of
the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only
1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes
private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the
Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and
Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one
who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by
then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner
likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-
7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it
was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry
in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of
Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected
that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As
chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was
to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only
censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received
by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any
senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section
27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by
a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.20

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of

the appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings
of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter
coincide.21

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by

the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the
elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement
of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.22

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by

private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes
received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be
validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease
of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of
Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record
unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of
totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing
the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is
AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 111343. August 22, 1996]

ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and LOURDES DU,
respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of violating Presidential
Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an
information which reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of Violation of Anti-
Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential Decree 1612), committed as follows:
That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, with intent to gain for himself, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously purchased and received dismantled farrowing
crates made of GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00, knowing the same to be
the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of fencing, in violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Lourdes Du.
Contrary to law.
Davao City, Philippines, January 19, 1987.
(SGD.) ANTONINA B. ESCOVILLA
4th Asst. City Fiscal[1]
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao
City using the business name Dunlao Enterprise.
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito
Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its
proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioners premises together with
police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen
from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group saw the farrowing crates
and pipes inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I.
pipes inside a cabinet in petitioners shop and another pile outside the shop
but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were
owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police
station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY.
Trial ensued and on May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED and the evidence being sufficient, this Court
finds ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 and hereby sentences
him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years, Eight (8) Months, One (1) Day as
minimum to Seven (7) Years and Four (4) Months as maximum of
Prision Mayor with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On May
10, 1993, the appellate court promulgated its decision[3] affirming the
judgment of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner states that the appellate court erred:
(A) IN NOT FINDING THAT AT LEAST TWO (2) ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME CHARGED, NAMELY, THE ALLEGED PURCHASE BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE GI-PIPES AND HIS
ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BEING STOLEN ITEMS,
WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE;
(B) IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, A DULY
LICENSED SCRAP METAL BUSINESSMAN FOR MORE THAN
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN POSSESSING AS
TEMPORARY CUSTODIAN OF SAID GI-PIPES BY BRINGING
THEM INSIDE HIS BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT, WHOSE INSIDE
PREMISES WERE OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW, BEFORE DARK SET IN
ON THE DAY THEY WERE BROUGHT TO HIM BY WELL-
DRESSED JEEP-RIDING MEN WHO MERELY OFFERED SAID
ITEMS TO HIM FOR SALE BUT WHO FAILED TO RETURN TO HIS
ESTABLISHMENT UNTIL POLICE OPERATIVES WENT TO HIS
BUSINESS PREMISES A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER.[4]
In brief, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact
that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was motivated by
gain or that he purchased the said articles. Further, he questions the
alleged value of the stolen properties stating that they are worth a lot less
than what the trial court declared them to be.
Under Presidential Decree 1612,[5] fencing is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I.
pipes were found in the premises of petitioner. The positive identification
by Fortunato Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these
items were previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of fencing
under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery
or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao succeed in rebutting
this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioners contention, intent to gain need not be
proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts
mala in se, and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita.[6] This distinction
is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs,
but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated?[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law, we said:
On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this
element was not clearly established by the Peoples evidence and he,
therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in
presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores
the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is
demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil.
368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45;
1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the
external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and
respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were
vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to
blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial
stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission
of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were
loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1
Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on
Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a
special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14
Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone,
irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy
Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1
Aquino, supra, at p. 52).
Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles
by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing.[10]
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by
sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner
could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible
testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his
establishment and left them there.
A. There was a jeep loaded with G.I. pipes where he approached me with
the G.I. pipes but I refused to buy and instead requested me that they will
unload those G.I. pipes in front of my establishment.
Q. Now, did you have a talk with that person whom you said arrived
aboard the jeep which was carrying G.I. pipes?
A. We had a talk requesting me that they will just unload the G.I. pipe but
we have never talked that I am going to buy those G.I. pipes.
Q. Can you recall what did the man tell you as he asked you to allow him
to unload those G.I. pipes?
A. He told me that he would just leave them temporarily and he will come
back but it took a long time, he failed to come back.
Q. What time, more less, of the day was that when the unloading of the
G.I. pipes was made, was it in the morning or afternoon?
A. I can remember it was in the afternoon but I am not certain as to the
time.
Q. Can you estimate the time in the afternoon?
A. May be around 2 or 3 oclock but I am not certain, it was in the
afternoon.
Q. You said that man who unloaded the G.I. pipes did not return anymore
and so, what did you do with the G.I. pipes that were unloaded in front of
your establishment?
A. That was already late in the afternoon, around 5:30 up to 6:00 oclock,
we are about to close, so what I did I have it brought inside my compound
for safekeeping.[11]
In the Lim[12] case, we held that:
x x x the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
1612 x x x must be upheld in the light of petitioners shallow demurrer
premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this
score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence.
The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed[13] on
petitioners shelves inside his compound.If petitioner were merely keeping
the farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did
he display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that
he is doing so with the intention of selling them.
Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not even bother
to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who deposited the
articles with him. We quote with approval the trial courts observation
that:
The narration of how the items were simply dumped at the compound of
the accused; the fragile and vague statement that the unidentified party
unloading the items would bring more items at some indefinite date; x x x
that accused caused the pipes to be brought inside the compound of his
own volition without any such arrangement with the strangers; that the
latter did not return thereafter; that some of the items delivered by the
strangers were distributed in and around the compound and in cabinets
inside the building already cut in short pieces; that accused cannot
produce any proof of ownership by the persons who simply unloaded the
items then left without coming back these are matters which common
sense and sound business practices would normally clarify in the face of
the express provisions of the Anti-fencing Law.x x x And when the
accused took it upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound
items unloaded by total strangers without any agreement as to how the
items would be sold or disposed of nor how soon agreement would be
compensated, a rather dubious aura of illegitimacy envelopes and taints
the entire transaction. Lastly, petitioner questions the value of the stolen
articles as found by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. He contends that the pipes were worth only P200.00, not the
P20,000.00 alleged in the Information.
Prosecution witness Carlito Catog testified on the value of the stolen
pipes stating that, as he worked as purchaser for Lourdes Farms, he was
knowledgeable about their true worth. He also explained the basis of the
estimate of the said articles:[14]
Q. Now, those G.I. pipes which you said you saw in the premises of Mr.
Dumlao and which you earlier mentioned as having been identified by
you as coming from Lourdes Farms, can you tell the Honorable Court,
more or less, how much did you buy those pipes?
A. I arrive at the amount of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) as my
estimate.
Q. Fifty Nine?
A. Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00).
Q. And can you tell the Honorable Court what is your basis of making
this estimate?
A. The G.I. pipes were made into piggery crates, we use the 3 / 4 inch by
20 feet G.I. pipes in fabricating. We use 6 lengths of those pipes at the
cost of P80.00 per crate. So, we arrive at the amount of P480.00 of the
materials, the G.I. pipes used in fabricating crates, plus the cost of
fabrication which we paid to the one making at P700.00 per crate, so we
arrive at P1,180.00 per crate and the number of crates per estimate, which
we recovered from the premises of Mr. Dumlao is about more or less 50
crates. So, we arrive at Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00).
The trial court, however, based its decision on the amount of P20,000.00
as alleged in the information, instead of the appraisal of P59,000.00 made
by Mr. Catog. The Court believes that P20,000.00 is a more realistic
estimate of the value of the stolen pipes. Petitioners claim that the pipes
were worth only P200.00 is not credible considering that it took a truck to
haul off the entire load from petitioners premises, as testified to by
Fortunato Mariquit.[15]
Q. How did you bring the G.I. pipes from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the
police station?
A. We loaded them in a dump truck owned by Federico Jaca.
Q. Now, what was the quantity of the pipes that you were able to bring
from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station?
A. Almost a truckload.
Q. What did you say, it was a dump truck?
A. Almost a load of a dump truck.
Q. After reaching the police station, what happened?
A. We unloaded it in the police station and we went home.
In line with our ruling in the Lim case,[16] petitioner should pay Lourdes
Farms, Inc. represented by its owner Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of
P20,000.00 minus the value of the pipes and farrowing crates recovered
and in the custody of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes Farms, Inc.,
represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value
of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORIEL
LACERNA y CORDERO & MARLON LACERNA y ARANADOR,
accused.
MARLON LACERNA y ARANADOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The unrelenting and pervading war against illegal drugs has absorbed the
attention of all branches of government, both national and local, as well as
media, parents, educators, churches and the public at large. This case is
one more intrepid battle in such all-out war. Herein appellant seeks
acquittal on the ground that his acts did not constitute the crime of giving
away prohibited drugs penalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act). Nonetheless, he cannot escape
the law because the very same deeds, which appellant admits to have
performed, show his culpability for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
-- penalized in Section 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended -- which is necessarily
included in the crime charged in the Information.
Statement of the Case
This ruling is explained by the Court as it resolves this appeal from the
Decision,[1] dated February 24, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 16,[2] convicting Appellant Marlon Lacerna y Aranador
of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended x x x.
Asst. City Prosecutor of Manila Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. charged appellant
and Noriel Lacerna in an Information,[3] dated September 16, 1992,
which reads as follows:[4]
The undersigned accuses NORIEL LACERNA Y CORDERO and
MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR of a violation of Section 4 Art.
II, in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1675, xxx
That on or about September 12, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver or give away
to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and jointly sell, deliver or give away to another the following,
to wit:
Eighteen (18) blocks of marijuana
flowering tops - weight 18.235 kilograms
which is a prohibited drug.
When the case was called for arraignment on October 7, 1992, appellant
and his co-accused appeared without counsel but they alleged that they
had engaged the services of a certain Atty. Kangleon. Thus, the trial court
provisionally appointed Atty. Rodolfo P. Libatique of the Public
Attorneys Office as counsel de oficio, in case Atty. Kangleon did not
appear for the arraignment on October 28, 1992.[5] Because the alleged
counsel de parte failed to show up during the arraignment on that date,
Atty. Libatique assisted the accused who pleaded not guilty.[6]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo promulgated the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:[7]
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
I. The guilt of the accused Marlon Lacerna having been established
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 4 of RA
6425, as amended, he is found guilty of the same, sentencing him to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. With costs.
II. The guilt for the crime charged of accused Noriel Lacerna not having
been established beyond reasonable doubt he is hereby ACQUITTED.
The warden of the Manila City Jail is ordered to release his person, unless
held on other charges.
The evidence seized in this case is to remain in the custody of the NBI
Director as Drugs Custodian of the Dangerous Drugs Board. (RA 425,
Sec. 36; Supreme Court Circular No. 9 dated July 18, 1973) to be
properly disposed of after the final disposition of this case.
Hence, only Marlon Lacerna (his co-accused having been acquitted)
interposed this appeal direct to the Supreme Court in view of the life
penalty imposed.[8]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Carlito P.
Valenzuela, Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual, and PO3 Rafael
Melencio. Their testimonies are summarized by the Solicitor General in
the Appellees Brief as follows:[9]
On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a
member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District
(WPD), was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area
somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street.
The assignment to monitor strategic places in the city and barangays of
Manila was a direct order from General Nazareno. Thus, he and his
companion PO3 Angelito Camero went about cruising the area in their
Mobile Patrol car, with PO3 Valenzuela at the helm. At about 2:00 p.m.,
appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3
Valenzuelas place of assignment, which was then heavy with traffic,
looking suspicious (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4; Nov.
20, 1992, pp. 2-7).
Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated
at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the
occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing
to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his
companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to park by the side of
the road (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4).
PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the
vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers went about
searching the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a
dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents of
the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered
that the bag contained his vomit (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992,
pp. 4-5).
Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the
contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and
peeped inside. He found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the
distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened
one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and
co-accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused
readily affirmed. According to both Lacernas, the bag was a padala of
their uncle. Specifically, they claimed that the bag was sent by their uncle,
who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo (t.s.n., PO3
Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 5-7; Nov. 20, 1992, pp. 8-10).
Appellant and co-accused, and the plastic bag containing blocks of
marijuana were brought by PO3 Valenzuela and PO3 Camero to the WPD
Headquarters on UN Avenue, Manila.[10] At about 9:00 p.m. of the same
day, both appellant and co-accused were turned over to PO3 Rafael
Melencio for investigation while the blocks were turned over to Lt. de
Soto (tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 3-5. 20).
Lt. de Soto counted the blocks of marijuana, numbering eighteen (18) in
all. Each block was wrapped in newspaper. After seeing what the contents
of the blocks were, the specimens (Exhs. B to B-19) were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further examination.[11] On
the other hand, PO3 Melencio investigated appellant and co-accused,
informing them of their constitutional rights during a custodial
investigation. Thereafter, he prepared the Affidavit of Apprehension and
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhs. A, G, List of Exhibits, pp. 1,
15; tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 15-24).
NBI Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual examined the eighteen (18)
confiscated blocks which tested positive of containing marijuana (Exhs.
C, F to F-9. List of Exhibits, pp. 2-14; tsn., A. Pascual, Dec. 2, 1992, pp.
2-5).
Version of the Defense
Appellant sets up the defense of denial, alleging that the blue plastic bag
was owned by his uncle who requested him to bring it to Iloilo. He also
denied knowing that it contained marijuana. In his Brief prepared by the
Public Attorneys Office, he narrated his version of the factual
circumstances of this case, as follows:[12]
On September 12, 1992, at about 2:00 P.M., accused Marlon and Noriel
Lacerna were riding in a taxicab on their way to (the) North Harbor to
board a boat bound for Iloilo City. While plying along Pier 15 their
taxicab was flagged down by a patrol mobile car. Accused Marlon
Lacerna (appellant herein) was sitting in front while accused Noriel
Lacerna was at the back of the taxicab. The accused carried two bags.
One bag contained their personal belongings and the other bag contained
things which their uncle Edwin Lacerna asked them to bring along. When
their taxicab was stopped, the two policemen in the Mobile car requested
them that they and their baggage be searched. Confident that they have
not done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched. During the
(search), the two accused were not allowed to alight from the taxicab. The
knapsack bag which contained their clothes was first examined in front of
them. The second bag was taken out from the taxi and was checked at the
back of the taxicab. The accused were not able to see the checking when
the policemen brought the plastic bag at the back of the taxi. After
checking, the policemen told them its positive. The accused were (asked)
to alight and go to the patrol car. They were brought to the WPD
Headquarters at United Nations. While there, they were brought inside a
room. They asked what wrong they have done but the policemen told
them to wait for Major Rival. At about 8:00 oclock P.M., Major Rival
talked to them and asked them where the baggage came from and they
answered that it was given to them by their uncle. Then Major Rival
asked them to hold the marijuana and pictures were taken. Later, they
were brought inside the cell where they were maltreated by the Kabo. The
Kabo forced them to admit ownership of the marijuana. Noriel was boxed
on the chest, blindfolded and a plastic (bag) was placed on his neck and
was strangled. The mauling took place for about 30 minutes inside the
toilet. They refused to sign the Booking and Arrest Report but they
impressed their fingerprint on a white bond paper. They were brought by
Melencio to the Inquest Prosecutor at the City Hall. On the way to the
Inquest Prosecutor, Melencio told them to admit the charge against them
before the Inquest Fiscal, because if they will deny, something (would
happen) to them in the afternoon and Melencio even uttered to them vulva
of your mother. Because they were apprehensive and afraid, they admitted
the charge before the Inquest Fiscal.
(Appellant) Marlon Lacerna first met his uncle Edwin Lacerna at Munoz
Market. The second time was on September 11, 1992, when his uncle
went to his brothers house in Caloocan City and requested him to bring
his (uncle) personal belongings upon learning that he (Marlon) is leaving
for Iloilo city the next day, September 12, 1992. He told his uncle to bring
his personal belongings either in the evening of that day or the following
day at the (Grand) Central (Station), Monumento because he was going to
buy a ticket for Noriel as he intend (sic) to bring the latter with him in
going home to the province. His uncle already gave a ticket for him.
When he and Noriel (arrived) at the Grand Central at about 10:00 oclock
A.M. on September 12, 1992, their uncle was already there. The latter
placed the plastic bag besides their baggages. They no longer inspected
the contents of the bag as the same was twisted and knotted on top. After
getting a ticket from the office of Don Sulpicio Lines, Marlon told Noriel
to hail a taxi and then they proceeded to the pier.
(Appellants) purpose in going home to Iloilo was to get all the
requirements needed in his application to enter the Marines.
Accused Noriel just arrived in Manila three days before September 12,
1992 to look for a job and was staying with (appellant) at Caloocan City.
In the evening of September 11, 1992, (appellant) requested him to come
xxx with him to Iloilo and assured him that he (would) be the one to pay
for (Noriels) fare. (TSN., January 6, 1993, pp. 3-23; January 8, 1993, pp.
2-12; January 11, 1993, pp. 2-18; January 20, 1992, pp. 2-6; January 22,
1993, pp. 2-14)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of
delivering prohibited drugs because the Information did not allege that he
knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of
transporting or dispatching in transit such prohibited drugs because these
acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused further that
appellant could not be convicted of selling marijuana because the
elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the
Information charged appellant with giving away to another prohibited
drugs, a charge which was different from delivery defined under Section 2
(f) [13] of R.A. 6245, as amended. Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing,[14] the
trial court ruled that giving away to another is akin to transporting
prohibited drugs, a malum prohibitum established by the mere
commission of said act. Thus, the court a quo convicted appellant of as contradistinguished from the term deliver; where knowledge is
giving away marijuana to another on the following premise:[15] required.

It is not denied by (appellant) that he did give to his co-accused cousin II

Noriel Lacerna the bundled 18 blocks of marijuana who thereupon seated
himself at the rear of the taxi with the marijuana. His claim that he did not The lower court erred in not giving credence to the assertion of accused-
know the contents of the blue plastic bag can hardly be believed because appellant that he had no knowledge that what were inside the plastic bag
it is within judicial notice that the marijuana contents readily emits a given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves.
pungent odor so characteristic of marijuana as what happened when the
18 blocks were displayed in open Court. But as stated, guilty knowledge III
is not required by the phrase GIVE AWAY TO ANOTHER (Sec. 4). It
was clearly established that he gave the stuff to another, that is, to his co- The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite failure of the
accused Noriel Lacerna. The law does not distinguish as to whether the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
word another refers to a third person other than a co-accused or to a co-
accused. The information, as in the case at bar, need not allege guilty The Courts Ruling
knowledge on the part of Marlon Lacerna in giving away to another the
marijuana. (Appellant) should, therefor be found culpable for violating
After meticulously reviewing the records of the case and taking into
Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, as charged for giving away to another
account the alleged errors cited above and the argument adduced in
the marijuana.
support thereof, the Court believes that the issues can be restated as
follows: (1) Was appellants right against warrantless arrest and seizure
Accused Noriel Lacerna, on the other hand, was acquitted for violated? (2) Was the trial court correct in convicting appellant for giving
insufficiency of evidence. The court a quo reasoned that it cannot be said away to another 18 blocks of marijuana? and (3) May the appellant be
that he did give away to another the marijuana for it was (appellant) who
held guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs? The Court answers
gave the marijuana to (Noriel). Besides, unlike appellant who was the first two questions in the negative and the third in the affirmative.
urbanized in mannerism and speech, Noriel Lacerna manifested
probinsyano traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited
First Issue: Appellants Right Against
drugs.
Warrantless Search and Seizure
The Issues
The defense argues that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in
Appellant objects to the trial courts Decision and assigns the following
evidence as they were obtained through illegal search and seizure.
errors:[16]
Appellant alleges that at the time of the search and seizure, he and his co-
accused were not committing any crime as they were merely riding a
I taxicab on the way to Pier 15, North Harbor in Manila. Hence, the
precipitate arrest and seizure violated their constitutional right and the
The lower court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of marijuana seized constituted fruits of the poisonous tree.
giving away to another() is not defined under R.A. 6425 specifically
requiring knowledge what intent one (sic) is passing is a dangerous drug, The Solicitor General disagrees, contending that the search and seizure
were consistent with recent jurisprudential trend liberalizing warrantless
search and seizure where the culprits are riding moving vehicles, because
a warrant cannot be secured in time to apprehend the mobile target.
Both contentions are inaccurate. In the recent case of People vs.
Cuison,[17] this Court reiterated the principles governing arrest, search
and seizure. To summarize, let us begin with Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
The Constitution further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation
of the provision mentioned is inadmissible in evidence:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, not being absolute, this right is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions. The Rules of Court, Section 12 of Rule 126, provides that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
have also been judicially formulated as follows: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.[18] Search and seizure relevant
to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases however, the
search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.[19] Military or
police checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual.[20]
In the case at bar, the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped
at the police checkpoint by PO3 Valenzuela. It should be stressed as a
caveat that the search which is normally permissible in this instance is
limited to routine checks -- visual inspection or flashing a light inside the
car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body searches.
A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of
probable cause.[21]
In applicable earlier Decisions, this Court held that there was probable
cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of
marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;[22] (b)
where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to
have been acting suspiciously;[23] (c) where the accused fled when
accosted by policemen;[24] (d) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana;[25] and (e) where the moving vehicle was stopped
and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the
drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged
-- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.[26]
In the case at hand, however, probable cause is not evident. First, the
radio communication from General Nazareno, which the arresting officers
received and which they were implementing at that time, concerned
possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area.[27] Second, Noriel
Lacernas suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in his seat
when PO3 Valenzuelas car passed alongside the taxicab might have
annoyed the latter, or any other law enforcer, and might have caused him
to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare acts do not constitute
probable cause to justify the search and seizure of appellants person and
baggage. Furthermore, the Claudio ruling cannot be applied to this case
because the marijuana was securely packed inside an airtight plastic bag
and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana odor, was offered by the
prosecution.
Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly
searched, not because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he
freely consented to the search. True, appellant and his companion were
stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere suspicion -- not probable cause --
that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela
expressly sought appellants permission for the search. Only after
appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual
search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver
being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless
search.[28]
We are aware that this Court in Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a
search based on an implied acquiescence, because such acquiescence was
not consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was
merely passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and
coercive circumstances.[29] In the case before us, however, appellant
himself who was urbanized in mannerism and speech expressly said that
he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and
had done nothing wrong.[30] In his brief, appellant explicitly, even if
awkwardly, reiterated this: Confident that they [the accused] have not
done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched. This declaration of
appellant is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence
to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally
through a valid search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence;
there was no poisonous tree to speak of.
Second Issue: Did Appellant
Give Away the Prohibited Drug?
The trial court justified the conviction of appellant for giving away to
another the prohibited drugs, because he literally handed to Noriel the
plastic bag containing marijuana, manually transferring the plastic bag
from the front seat to the backseat of the taxicab. We hold, however, that
this is not the act penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended, the violation of which is charged in
the Information, penalizes any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.
The phrase give away is commonly defined as to make a present of; to
donate, or to make a sacrifice.[31] As used in a statute making it an
offense to sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of liquor without a
license, this phrase was construed as extending only to a disposition in
ejusdem generis with a sale or a gift.[32] It is synonymous with to
furnish, a broad term embracing the acts of selling and giving away with
the intent of transferring ownership. Selling by itself is one distinct mode
of committing the offense, and furnishing is intended only to include
other modes of affording something to others besides selling it.[33]
As distinguished from delivery, which is an incident of sale, giving away
is a disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale
which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or
merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership
is transferred.
According to appellant, he gave the plastic bag and the knapsack to Noriel
because the latter got into the taxicab first and because there was more
room in the backseat than in the front. By handing the plastic bag to
Noriel, appellant cannot be punished for giving away marijuana as a gift
or premium to another. In Cuison,[34] this Court acquitted an accused of
carrying and transporting prohibited drugs because the act per se of
handing over a baggage at the airport cannot in any way be considered
criminal.
Further, adopting the trial courts interpretation would lead to absurd
conclusions. Following the trial courts line of reasoning, Noriel should
have been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to
PO3 Valenzuela for the latters inspection. And yet, the trial court
inexplicably acquitted him. Valenzuela would similarly be criminally
culpable as he testified that he turned over the plastic bag to his superior,
Lt. de Soto. It is a well-settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to give effect to the legislative intention and to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.[35]
Third Issue:
May Appellant Be Convicted
of Illegal Possession?
Appellants exoneration from giving away a prohibited drug to another
under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act does not, however, spell
freedom from all criminal liability. A conviction for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, punishable under Section 8 of the same Act, is clearly
evident.
In People vs. Tabar,[36] the Court convicted appellant of illegal
possession under Section 8 of said Act, although he was charged with
selling marijuana under Section 4, Article II thereof.[37]
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the
sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession
of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in
the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the seller.[38]
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the
sale be identified and presented in court.[39] That the corpus delicti of
illegal sale could not be established without a showing that the accused
possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that
possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in
cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.
In People vs. Manzano,[40] the Court identified the elements of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the
Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited
drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a
condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is
necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will
thus determine appellants culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases
adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as
follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited
drug.[41]
The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was
in possession of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs, without the
requisite authority. The NBI forensic chemists identification of the
marijuana or Indian hemp was conclusive.
Appellant protests the trial courts finding that he knew that the plastic bag
contained marijuana. The lower court ruled that appellant could not have
possibly missed the pervasive pungent smell emitted by marijuana which
was duly noted when the marijuana was exhibited in open court. This
reasoning, however, is not supported by the evidence; the plastic bag, at
the time of the search and seizure, was twisted and tied at the top, and
thus airtight. PO3 Valenzuela did not even notice this pervasive
characteristic smell until he poked a hole in the plastic bag and
unwrapped the newspaper covering one of the marijuana bricks.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution
of acts mala prohibita. On grounds of public policy and compelled by
necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, as
the greater master of things, to forbid certain acts in a limited class of
cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent
of the doer.[42] Such legislative enactments are based on the experience
that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of
the dealers knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely
accomplish their purposes; besides, the prohibited act is so injurious to the
public welfare that, regardless of the persons intent, it is the crime
itself.[43]
This, however, does not lessen the prosecutions burden because it is still
required to show that the prohibited act was intentional.[44] Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he
did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.[45]
Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law must be shown. In Bayona, the Court
declared:[46]
xxx The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the
intent with which he violated it is immaterial. x x x x The act prohibited
by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters
or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element
of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver,
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he
intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in
those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * * (U.S.
vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128).
a denial which by itself is insufficient to overcome this presumption.[48]
Besides, this defense, unless substantiated by clear evidence, is invariably
viewed with disfavor by courts, for it can just as easily be concocted.
Verily, it is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions
involving dangerous drugs.[49]
Further, the trial court did not give credence to appellants denial. It is
axiomatic that appellate courts accord the highest respect to the
assessment of witnesses credibility by the trial court, because the latter
was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand.[50] The defense failed to present sufficient reasons
showing that the trial court had overlooked or misconstrued any evidence
of substance that would justify the reversal of its rejection of appellants
defense of denial.
Appellant is, therefore, liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[51]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
is CONVICTED of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8
of R.A. 6425; SENTENCED, in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as
maximum; and ORDERED to pay a fine of twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000.00). Costs de oficio.

In illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous

Drugs Act, the prosecution is not excused from proving that possession of
the prohibited act was done freely and consciously, which is an essential
element of the crime.

In the case at bar, appellant was found to have in his possession a plastic
bag containing 18 kg of marijuana formed into 18 bricks which were
separately wrapped. His possession thereof gives rise to a disputable
presumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[47] that
he is the owner of such bag and its contents. His bare, unpersuasive,
feeble and uncorroborated disavowal -- that the plastic bag was allegedly
given to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents -- amounts to
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated February
10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211,
which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386
finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
9262,[5] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004."
The Facts
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation
Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial
support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of
economic abuse against one [AAA,[6]] and her minor son, [BBB] (12
years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement[8] on the civil
aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement
on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on
June 24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise
agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar
sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the
support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their
compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal
aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.[9]
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship
with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child.
Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the
latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs
showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar
turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB
was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted.
This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and
BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case
against Melgar.[10]
To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to
provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle
with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled
in. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the
amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar
for P8,000.00 as support.[11]
For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce
evidence due to his repeated failure to appear during trial.[12]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[13] dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and,
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.[14]
The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA
and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the
property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from
2001 to 2010.[15]
Melgar moved for reconsideration,[16] which was, however, denied in an
Order[17] dated May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed[18]
to the CA.
 The CA Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's
conviction. It held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.[20] As
such, when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of
support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case
was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment
based on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his
son; and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which
was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his
son from 2001 to 2010.[21] Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has
clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation
to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]."[22]
Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,[23] which was, however,
denied in a Resolution[24] dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband,
or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.[25] The said law
defines economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.
xxxx
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a
woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging
in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right
to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned
in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling
the conjugal money or properties.
xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include
the deprivation of support of a common child of the man-accused and the
woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.[26] This
specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
(e)
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
hann, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall
include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the
purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
 financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
(3)
legal right;
xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered an act of violence against women and children.[27]
Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a child is a
continuing offense.[28]
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established
that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's
birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar
had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year
old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent
when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer
for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no
reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact,
the trial court was in the best position to assess and detennine the
credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due
deference should be accorded to the same.[29]
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues,
inter alia, that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as
the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[,
BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.[30]
Melgar's contention is untenable.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,[31] punishes
the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of
violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or
the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present
the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party."[32] Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the
accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic
abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim
and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed
deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show
that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional
anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5
(i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the
variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime
charged[33] - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself
and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is
already specifically penalized therein.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262
provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia,
prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special
penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People,[34]
the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed
penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,[35] otherwise
known as the Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is
ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum
prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the
landmark mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239
SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is
defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects
under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily
apply to the speciallaw.[36]
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence
will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the
RPC.[37]

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on
Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a
mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report
compliance to the court.[38]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision

dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner
Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso
M.F.L. Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum;
(b) to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a
mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report
compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA
CLARA LOBREGAT, JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE CONCEPCION,
ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA,
HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IÑAKI R.
MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM, SIGFREDO
VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover ill-
gotten wealth acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue of
prescription.
The Facts and the Case
On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar
B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM)1 with an authorized capital stock of ₱100
million divided into one million shares with a par value of ₱100 per share.
The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth ₱20 million and paid
₱5 million.
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1)
increasing its authorized capital stock to three million shares without par
value; (2) converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one million
shares without par value and deemed fully paid for and non-assessable by
applying the ₱5 million already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the
subscription receivables of ₱15 million.2
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan
Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C.
Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo
C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua
approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than ₱500
million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut
farmers.3
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10
million shares without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock
stated that the incorporators held one million shares without par value and
that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth ₱495 million.4
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iñaki
R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and
Jaime Gandiaga, approved another amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization.
This increased its authorized capital stock to one billion shares divided into
500 million Class "A" voting common shares, 400 million Class "B" voting
common shares, and 100 million Class "C" non-voting common shares, all
with a par value of ₱1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million
shares without par value (consisting of one million shares for the
incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB) were then converted to 500
million Class "A" voting common shares at the ratio of 100 Class "A" voting
common shares for every one without par value share.5
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
30196 against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of
directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
The OSG alleged that UCPB’s investment in UNICOM was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a
capitalization of only ₱5 million and it had no track record of operation. In
the process of conversion to voting common shares, the government’s ₱495
million investment was reduced by ₱95 million which was credited to
UNICOM’s incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,7 which
disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the
case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum,8 stating that although it found
sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, the action has already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOM’s
capitalization a third time on September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators
unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million
shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of
Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public
respondents’ acts as board of directors, the period of prescription began to
run at that time and ended on February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already
prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with the PCGG for preliminary
investigation on March 1, 1990.
In a Memorandum9 dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman
approved the OSP’s recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It
additionally ruled that UCPB’s subscription to the shares of stock of
UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the
prescription of the action began to run since respondents’ act of investing into
UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the
investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the
incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably,
when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not
yet been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019
provided for prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out
of time.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the
Ombudsman’s action but the latter denied the same;10 hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent
Maria Clara L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.11
The Issue Presented
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents’ alleged violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that what Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) filed in this case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. But the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.12 Still, the Court will treat this petition as one filed
under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion and reversible jurisdictional error to the
Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The Court has previously treated
differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65
for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.13
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against
respondents was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its
prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees is not barred
by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto14 that Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in
OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or
incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.15
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed
under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.16 Since
the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A.
3019, as originally enacted.17
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326,18 which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the
prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second, from its
discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.19 Petitioner points out that, assuming the
offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to run only from
the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus,
the charge could be filed as late as 1996. In the prosecution of cases of behest
loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery of such
loans.1âwphi1 The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party,
could not have known that those loans existed when they were made. Both
parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the
government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior
to that date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of
the loans.20
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is
questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be
concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPB’s investment in
UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco,
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to
have been withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to know
like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that
respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB connived with
UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board
rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible
government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to
accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in
the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to
submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB’s
investment in UNICOM during martial law at the President’s or anyone
else’s instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the
SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial
law since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the
SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the
UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element—
that the action could not have been instituted during the 10-year period
because of martial law—does not apply to this case. The last day for filing
the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after
martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions
for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period
of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the
beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the
plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the
defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who
would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have
been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of
witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of
fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to
show probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of
UNICOM’s capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without
par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was ₱5 million. When these
shares were converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value
of such shares remained at ₱5 million. But, the action having prescribed,
there is no point in discussing the existence of probable cause against the
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 14,
1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of
prescription the subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
against respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M.
Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona,
Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and
Jaime Gandiaga.
PANGILINAN
N recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
Promulgated:
June 13, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------
-x
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant
Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that
respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two
Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were
dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting,
contract and specific performance against private complainant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition
to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency
of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant
with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed
the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the
filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in
connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the
amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The
estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other
checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997
were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on
3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC,
Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the
motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The
criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February
2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on
07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the
latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP
Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with
the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16
September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition
to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of
BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent]
sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the
[respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of
dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted
by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section
1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of
1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the
proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic)
against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore,
clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes the Supreme Court held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section
2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance,
this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs
the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special
laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes
likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.
According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by
Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November
1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it
is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with
the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription
of the offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit
by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied
on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes,
Jr. that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of
prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, the CA allegedly failed to consider
the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that
the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon
City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four
years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the
petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true
copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such
procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation
of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is
governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction
should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances
or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to
the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March
2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by
the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original
copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken
by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA
reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had
already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment
of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for
its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of
Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. when it held that the filing of
the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases
involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving special laws, this Court held
that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., the Court even
ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the
Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period
because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is
in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg.
22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of
1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of
the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent
on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil
case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The
matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the
Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of
BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000. As laid down in Olarte, it is unjust to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
the respondent.