such other circumstance showing that the latter is not the real mother, sufficiently negate
G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000. *
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs.PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL,
respondent.
Actions; Filiation; Parties; Real Parties in Interest; A legitimate child has the requisite
standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth certificate of one claiming to be a child of the
former’s mother.—
_______________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
488
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
88
Babiera vs. Catotal
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral
attack. This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest
is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.” The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner
stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Same; Same; Family Code; Article 171 of the Family Code applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child, i.e., to declare that such child is
an illegitimate child, but not to an action to establish that such child is not the wife’s child at
all.—Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of
this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy
of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at
all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
Same; Same; Birth Certificates; Prescription; An action to cancel a person’s Birth
Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe, and the prescriptive period set
forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply.—This argument is bereft of merit.
The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not
impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family
Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that an official document such as a Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts that there were already
irregularities regarding the
489
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 48
9 The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
Babiera vs. Catotal
Birth Certificate itself, such as it was not signed by the local civil registrar, and that
the alleged mother’s signature therein was different from her other signatures, as well as
such presumption.—While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at
bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself.
It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed
that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial. Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner
show that Hermogena is not the former’s real mother. For one, there is no evidence of
Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other than the
Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was
already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it
was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. for petitioner.
Dulcesimo Tampus for respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is
fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already
fifty-four years old at the time of the child’s birth and which was signed neither
by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights
are adversely affected, the legitimate child of
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said
certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court’s consideration is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18,
1
1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming
2 3
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the
CA ruled as follows:
“IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA
BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.” 4
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court,
judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
 1. 1)Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void
‘ab initio’;
2. 2)Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the
registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry
No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City
Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
Rollo, pp. 9-16.
1
Rollo, pp. 22-29.
2
Fifteenth Division.
3
CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 29. The Decision was written by J. Demetrio G. Demetria, with the
4
concurrence of JJ. Ramon A. Bercelona (Division chairman) and Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. (member).
491
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 491
Babiera vs. Catotal
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
“Presentation B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the
entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of
Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
“From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted ‘that she is the only surviving child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996
and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by ‘hilot’
in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by ‘hilot’; that
the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is
made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the
carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera’s birth certificate is void ab
initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible
for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera,
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena’s last child birth was in the year 1941, the year
petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after
publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring x x x the certificate of
birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering
the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan
City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
“Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof ‘in a
newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City and TEOFISTA.
“TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that ‘the petition states no cause
of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.’
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
“Subsequently, ‘Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an
answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on
substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent.’
“In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred ‘that she was always known as Teofista
Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that]
plaintiff Presentation B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-
blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate
of Baptism, x x x Student’s Report Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and
493
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 493
Babiera vs. Catotal
finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.” 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It
further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth
took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its
concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner’s Birth Certificate was
not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was
purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
which stated that only the father could impugn the child’s legitimacy, and that
the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions
contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child 3. (3)If the child was born after the death of the husband.
of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the
child’s Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did It appears that respondent invoked Rule 108 in the present action. Although the said Rule allows
9

only the correction of typo

not belong to either the father or the mother.
495
Hence, this appeal. 6

VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 495

Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors: Babiera vs. Catotal
_______________ est of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for
partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the 10

CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp, 22-24.

5
properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 24, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case.
6

Petitioner’s Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. Respondent’s Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Dulcesimo Tampos, had been received earlier.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
1. “1)Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal
capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-
56031subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2. 2)The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is
A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in
the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled thus: 11

improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription);
[and]
3. 3)The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to
hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner’s birth is superior to
the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.” 7
“Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx xxx xxx
“A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or

biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband
_______________
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious. graphical or clerical errors and not material or substantial ones (see Leonor v. CA, 256 SCRA 69, April 2, 1996), the
propriety of the present remedy was not raised as an issue. Hence, the Court finds no reason to pass upon it. It should be
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action observed, however, that the trial court ordered the publication of the Petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article general publication and caused the service of copies thereof to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Iligan City local civil
registrar and the Office of the Iligan City Prosecutor.
171 of the Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by
8
10 Civil Case No. 2389.

the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a 11 229 SCRA 468, January 24, 1994.

child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate
the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real
party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The inter- 9
_______________
Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 11.
7
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
8
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
1. (1)If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2. (2)If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
496
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of See Santos v. Aranzanso, 116 SCRA 1, August 21, 1982.
13

the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear The civil registrar was G.L. Caluen.
14

submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz.:
‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being
neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’” (Emphasis supplied.)
12
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family
Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
_______________
Ibid., pp. 472-474, per Puno, J.
12
497
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 497
Babiera vs. Catotal
“Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took
place or was recorded.
“If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they
should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted
from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, whichever is earlier.”
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply.
Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it
was allegedly void ab initio. 13
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that
Hermogena is not the former’s real mother. For one, there is no evidence of
Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other
than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the
pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed
birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to
have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her
own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of
Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and
that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s. The deposition reads in
part:
“q Who are your children?
a Presentacion and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with
your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you
in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.

q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena’s daughter with your husband?
testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the a No, sir.” 15

presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate. _______________

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s Birth Certificate
enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at CA Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 28-29. The same was taken from Special Proceedings No. 1794,
15

entitled “In the matter of the

bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently 499
negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the
Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More 14
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 499
important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was Babiera vs. Catotal
_______________
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner
has presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is
really Hermogena’s child. Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed
mother would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter’s child
at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial
and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent’s parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., Abroad on official business.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Documentary evidence rejected as insufficient to prove filiation;
Photographs of a person at baptism and in the house do not prove that he is the
father. (Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130 [1994])
An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his parents or to their
estate. (llano vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 242[1994])
An action for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights
which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. (Aruego, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711 [1996])
A blood test could eliminate all possibility that the accused is the father of the
child, if none of the putative father’s phenotype(s) are present in the child’s blood
type—while the
_______________

Perpetuation of the Testimony of Hermogena C. Babiera, Presentacion B. Catotal, Petitioner.”

500

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Re: Pilferage of Supplies in the Stockroom of the Property Division, OCA
Committed by Teodoro L. Saquin, Clerk II
converse does not hold true (i.e., that the presence of identical phenotypes in both
individuals establishes paternity), the absence of the former’s phenotype in the
child’s would make his paternity biologically untenable. (People vs. Cartuano,
Jr., 255 SCRA 403 [1996])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 363
Angeles vs. Maglaya
G.R. No. 153798. September 2, 2005. * Estelito P. Mendoza petitioner.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, petitioner, vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES
MAGLAYA, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Paternity and Filiation; A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage; Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.—We are unable to lend
concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the legitimate status of respondent, or, to
be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and,
therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family
Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception of birth occurred during the
subsistence of that marriage.—A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely
on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed.
However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by
legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption
of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
Same; Same; Same; Birth Certificates; Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate to
be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be
signed by the father
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
364
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
64
Angeles vs. Maglaya
and mother jointly or by the mother alone if the father refuses.—The contention
commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is
asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De
Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit
considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.
Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Villaraza & Angangco Law Offices for respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66037, reversing an earlier Order
1
of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the
herein respondent Aleli “Corazon” Angeles-Maglaya.
The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloo-
_______________
1Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo pp. 192-215.
365
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 365
Angeles vs. Maglaya
can City, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
2
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles
(Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-
2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged, among other
things, the following:
1. 1.That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan,
died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind
four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties;
2. 2.That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate;
3. 3.That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and
Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles,
decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the
decedent; and
4. 4.That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent,
be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. In support of her opposition and
3
plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge
Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two
(2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan
City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single Angeles vs. Maglaya
at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”; pictures taken during
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her
further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract records.
between After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits,
_______________
petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss” under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
2Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 218-221. Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of
3Annex “C” Petition, Rollo, pp. 232 et seq. administration on the ground that the petition failed “to state or prove a cause of
366 action”, it being her stated position that “[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence,
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles.” 10

Angeles vs. Maglaya

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by
her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. petitioner’s reply, to which respondent countered with a rejoinder.
And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco, Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999, the trial court, on its finding
11

petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the
surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the
administration of his estate.
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification
of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of
the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-
that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco,
dismissed the petition, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
[respondent] to state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil of Procedure.” (Word in bracket added)
Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial
court in its Order of December 17, 1999. Therefrom, respondent went on appeal
12

Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent to the Court of Appeals where her recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having 66037.
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption _______________
entered by the RTC at Caloocan. 4

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo,

commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. She 10 Rollo, pp. 421 et seq.
testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of 11 Rollo, pp. 458 et seq.
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. She also 5

12 Rollo, p. 482.
testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a 368
legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Angeles, Francisco Yaya, Jose O. Carreon and Paulita Angeles de la
6 7 8

Cruz. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained
9 Angeles vs. Maglaya
an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision
Manila, to Francisco Angeles dated May 29, 2002, reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal
13

_______________ and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco,

to wit:
Rollo, pp. 243 et seq.
4
“WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby
T.S.N., August 14, 1998, p. 34.
ordered to appoint petitionerappellant Aleli “Corazon” Angeles as administratrix of the
5

Son of Demetrio Angeles, Francisco’s brother.

6

Employed as auto mechanic by Liberty Taxi Corporation where Francisco was President and
7
intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.
General Manager. SO ORDERED.”
A former town mate and employee of Francisco.
8 The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main
Niece of Francisco.
9
premises:
367
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 367
 1. 1.Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised
on the alleged failure of the underlying petition for letter of
administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33; 14
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more con-
_______________

2. 2.Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived 15 See Note # 11, supra.
her right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondent’s testimonial 16 276 SCRA 582 (1997).
Page 15 of the CA Decision, Rollo, p. 206.
and documentary evidence; and
17

370
3. 3.Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the deceased Francisco.
Angeles vs. Maglaya
Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission vincing than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in re-
The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
_______________
‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. x x x
13See Note #1, supra. xxx xxx xxx
14Sec. 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, ‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption,
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early
present evidence. action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . .
369 may still be easily available.’
xxx xxx xxx
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 369 ‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .’ (Words in bracket
Angeles vs. Maglaya added; Emphasis ours)

versing the trial court’s order of dismissal; (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as
15
a demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of
Francisco; and (4) in decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of
Francisco’s intestate estate.
We resolve to grant the petition.
The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether
or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently
misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in
wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked
collaterally.
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
18

Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in the affirmative presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima
and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint facie established by legal presumption shall, unless
_______________
respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997).
18

legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the 371
decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 371
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code Angeles vs. Maglaya
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of
19

marriage of the parents are legitimate.” the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
20

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
from Tison vs. Court of Appeals, stated that since petitioner “opted not to present
16 conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the
any contrary evidence,” the presumption on respondent’s legitimacy stands presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
“unrebutted.” 17 In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did
Following is an excerpt from Tison: not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the
presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it
wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent’s
gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no
proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To
stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract—doubtless the best evidence
of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized —was offered
21
in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to
the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two.
None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let
alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that
respondent was Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because
his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both Francisco’s siblings,
told them so. And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in
22
Francisco’s house
_______________
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190, 268 (2003), citing Defensor-Santiago, RULES OF
19
COURT ANNOTATED, 1999 ed., p. 857.
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
20
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
21
TSN, Sept. 18, 1998, p. 8; TSN Jan. 19, 1999, p. 4.
22
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Angeles vs. Maglaya
in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war. In
all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco
Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage
was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and
like significant details.
While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage
between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that
respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents
really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly, therefore, the
Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of
legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between
Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is
no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for
petitioner to rebut.
Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco
Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question
what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical
as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she
made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion—as well as the
appellate court’s conclusion—that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As
may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988,
implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner
Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already “spouses.” Now,
then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva
Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of
Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s death, would
_______________
TSN Oct. 29, 1998 pp. 43 & 47.
23
373
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 373
Angeles vs. Maglaya
necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be,
24
as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a “surviving
spouse” of the decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:
4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old,
and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his
second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . ” (Emphasis and word in
bracket added)
We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that
the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein
defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents.
Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. 1.The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. 2.An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
23
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. 1.The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. 2.Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her
Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila (Exh. “E”). In it, her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word
_______________
Art. 35 (4) and 41, Family Code.
24
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Angeles vs. Maglaya
“married” is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and
Genoveva.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that “[I]t was error for the
Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that[respondent’s] Birth
Certificate indubitablyestablishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco
and Genoveva who are legally married.”
 The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it
is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was
signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to
having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public
record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a
child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
25
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the
father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Dr. Arturo 26
Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of
birth, wrote:
x x x if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is
necessary. 27
_______________
25 Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence . . . of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985).
26
27 Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p.
540, citing Bercilles vs. Government Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 (1984) and Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985).
375
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 375
Angeles vs. Maglaya
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of
respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes—and
“indubitably” at that—not only respondent’s filiation to Francisco but even her
being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the
limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as
defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by
inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In the apt
words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a
physician who merely certified having attended “the birth of a child who was born
alive at 3:50 P.M.,” created “a marriage that of ‘Francisco and Genoveva,’ and
filiation (that said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco.’ ” 28
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself. It cannot, as the decision under review seems to
29
suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother,
with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest
legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the
putative father’s name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long
time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facieevidentiary value of filiation:
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming
unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or
affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate
that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate
will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize
the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evi-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 134-135.
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321 (1999).
29
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Angeles vs. Maglaya
dence—when and if the “father” dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design x x x 30
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records
which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The
same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are
by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence
of filiation or recognition. And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of
31
the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.
The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the
school and service records and the testimony of respondent’s witnesses lend
support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession of the status of a
child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have been
the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle
is not an, or at issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily
predicated her petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate
child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions
which we have earlier refuted herein.
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition
were it not for another compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and
which we presently take judicially notice of.
As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the
trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the
decision of the RTC Caloo-
_______________
Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 (1954).
30
Bercilles vs. Government Service Insurance System, supra; (1984); Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,
31
supra; Colorado vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 47 (1985).
377
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 377
Angeles vs. Maglaya
can granting the petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S.
Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two others. In that petition,
docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned “Aleli
‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora
A. Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles,” respondent alleged that as
legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption
proceedings.
Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to “NOTE WITHOUT ACTION”
Maglaya’s second motion for reconsideration.
In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as
affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious
objection to applying in this case the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, one of 35

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicataprinciple. Following
annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a _______________
Decision dated December 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP
32

No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary to her Rollo, p. 1232.
33

Ibid., p. 1233.
34

claim, a “legitimate daughter” of Francisco, nor “a child of a lawful wedlock The rule on conclusiveness of judgment precludes the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
35

between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado.” Wrote the appellate
court in that case:
“Petitioner [Aleli “Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument
that she is a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado . . . .
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is
nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the
late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. x x x In other words, Francisco M.
Angeles was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad,
contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were
married in 1938.
While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of
marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was
presented by petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles
_______________
another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action (Calalang vs. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994).
379
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 379
Angeles vs. Maglaya
the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from
claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the
latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner
and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of
the latter. 36

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP

32 Per Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Elizer R. Delos
No. 47832,as sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms
Santos; Rollo, pp. 1215 et seq.
378 the ratio of the trial court’s order of dismissal in Special Proceedings (SP) No. C-
2140, i.e., that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to
Angeles vs. Maglaya Dismiss interposed by herein petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in
37

and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of
such marriage . . . .
Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs
are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.
To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and even her
marriage contract. . . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally
the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and academic. It need not
detain us any minute further.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin
of the decedent. When the law speaks of “next of kin,” the reference is to those
38

inconsequential are petitioner’s school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property; one 39

Francisco and Genoveva . . . . whose relationship is such that

xxx xxx xxx _______________
Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural
child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the Carlet vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 97 (1997).
36

adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required.” (Emphasis in the See Note #10, supra.
37

original; words in bracket added) Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 78, Rules of Court, the administration of the estate of a person who dies
38

intestate shall be granted to the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.
dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli “Corazon” Maglaya’s Ventura vs. Ventura, 160 SCRA 810 (1988).
39

380
petition for Review on Certiorari, and Resolution dated October 20,
33

2004, denying with “FINALITY” her motion for reconsideration. Another

34 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Angeles vs. Maglaya
he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In
40

resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of

administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special
Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside, order of the trial court reinstated.
Note.—Paternity or filiation or the lack of it is a relationship that must be
judicially established. (Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 360 [2003])

——o0o——

_______________

Tavera vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., 98 Phil. 481(1980).

40

381
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Labagala vs. Santiago
G.R. No. 132305. December 4, 2001. *
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T.
SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Actions; Filiation; Legitimacy; Prescription; Article 263 of the Civil Code refers to an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s
child by his wife—it does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple; An action for recovery of title and possession is outside the scope of
Article 263 on prescriptive periods.—Article 263 of the Civil Code should be read in
conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil
Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a
doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263 refers to an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by
his wife. However, the present case is
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
361
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 3
61
Labagala vs. Santiago
not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the
scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; A baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to a person’s kinsfolk.—Petitioner opted not to
present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in
evidence her baptismal certificate. However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of
Appeals: . . . a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein
stated with respect to [a person’s] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism
administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized
subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized.
Same; Same; Same; Income Tax Returns; If a baptismal certificate, a private
document, is not conclusive proof of filiation, more so are the entries in an income tax
return.—A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has
been paid and the amount thereof.
Same; Same; Birth Certificates; The failure of a party claiming filiation to show her
birth certificate raises the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim; Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.—We note
that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth certificate but
petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner
obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such
were the case. We find petitioner’s silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate
telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to
be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth
certificate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all
her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
362
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
62
Labagala vs. Santiago
Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Admission by the vendee that he did not pay any
centavo for the property, makes the sale void.—Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case.
Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since
2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the
contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the
essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which
makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1471. If the price is
simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or
some other act or contract.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
Venancio B. Padilla for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4,
1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set
1
aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
2
Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner
of 1/3 pro indivisoshare in a parcel of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in
Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently
registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now
respondents herein) sued
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 51-56.
2Id., at 23-33.
363
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 363
Labagala vs. Santiago
Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in
3 that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that
that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of
portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never
Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the acknowledged respondents’ claim over the property such that respondents had to
certificate of title to said property. 4 sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases
petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover against her and other occupants of the property. The first was decided in her and
from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into the other defendants’ favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents
petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death. persisted and resorted to the present action.
Respondents alleged that Jose’s share in the property belongs to them by Petitioner recognized respondents’ ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed
operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name
intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the
made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed 5 property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty taxes
through petitioner’s machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334 ) in 6 tax amnesty.
petitioner’s name alone. 7 On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed showed thus:
that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having _______________
been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumbmark on documents
he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not 9Id., at 3-4, 18.
365
have sold the property belonging to his “poor and unschooled sisters who . . .
sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare.” Respondents also
8
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 365
_______________
Labagala vs. Santiago
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs [herein respondents]
Civil Case No. 56226, lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 6 (Records,
as being entitled to the ownership and possession each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share
3

p. 9). In the TSN, the case No. is listed as 56626. See Exhibit “G” to “G-11”, records, pp. 165-176.
4Records, p. 17. of the property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of
5The purported deed of sale is dated “___ day of February, 1979” but was notarized on March 19, Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the
1979. See records, pp. 147-148; TSN, June 29, 1989, p. 19. name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal
6Records, p. 161. Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs
7Id., at 3, 18. per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third
8Id., at 4. (1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said
364
case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney’s fees and
costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered
Labagala vs. Santiago cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as
pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the SO ORDERED. 10

alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed
petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid
years after the execution of the sale. 9 donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. of the property as Jose’s daughter. The trial court ruled that the following
Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two
any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose’s
Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that daughter, and (2) Jose’s income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter.
she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued It further said that respondents knew of petitioner’s existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against
petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the court in
refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida
C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the trial court.
_______________
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
10
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Labagala vs. Santiago
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered declaring the
appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT
No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title and
issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents’ testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth
certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement
made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. 1.Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove
that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. 2.Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the
petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced
sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole
heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents
had, before the filing of the instant case, previously “considered” her as the11
daughter of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate
daughter. She asserts that her identification as Jose’s daughter in his ITR
outweighs the “strange” answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No.
56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals in which we held that
12
“(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper par-
_______________
Id., at 17.
11
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, 205 SCRA 321 (1992).
12
367
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 367
Labagala vs. Santiago
ties and within the period limited by law.” Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the
13
Civil Code in support of this contention. 14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of
Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. They argue 15
that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the present
case since this is not an action impugning a child’s legitimacy but one for recovery
of title, ownership, and possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not
respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action for recovery of title
and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion
of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner’s reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code
to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same
place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in
the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the
term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his
heirs) denies
_______________
Rollo, p. 18. Sayson v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 328.
13
The present controversy arose prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
14
Esperanza and Cornelia were sisters. See rollo, p. 16.
15
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Labagala vs. Santiago
the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be
the child at all of a particular couple. 16
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert
and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present
case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child
of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and
17
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner’s reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu
present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged
by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it
Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate does not
_______________
status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have
been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at 19 Records, p. 179.
the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was 20 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
TSN, August 11, 1988, p. 10.
not the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to
21

22 Exhibit “10”.

question the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a 370
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
direct proceeding. 18

In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner’s legitimate status but Labagala vs. Santiago
are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother’s child. The birth prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning
the relationship of the person baptized.
certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
23

We agree with the Court of Appeals that: A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
_______________ filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows
24

that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. 25

16 See Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, 229 SCRA 468, 473 (1994). This case We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth
deals with Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code. Article 263 of the Civil Code is now Article certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so.
170 of the Family Code.
Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be
17 Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69679, 166 SCRA 451, 457 (1988).
18 Sayson v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 12, at 326-328. found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner’s silence
369 concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 369 existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate
Labagala vs. Santiago would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) plainly states that . . . Ida was the child of the
19

spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the
entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida
Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She
adverse to her claim. Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner had been using
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish
pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same
birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
26

did not present any though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that
according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects
such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida .
..
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a
baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee’s parents were Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal
certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This document can only
prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the
baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament—nothing
more. (Citations omitted.)
20
coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing
Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida
Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is
the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting
statements that affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her
claims of filiation.
_______________
Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 106314-15, 316 SCRA 338, 344 (1999),
23

citing Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-49542, 100 SCRA 73, 84 (1980).
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner’s counsel admitted that Id., at 343.
24

petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, Exhibit “11”.
25

though she had been using this name all her life. 21 TSN, June 29, 1989, p. 3.
26

Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship 371
with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. However, as 22 VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 371
we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals: Labagala vs. Santiago
. . . a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on
the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
respect to [a person’s] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the
being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Costs against petitioner.
Court of Appeals that: _______________
. . . This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable
mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable 29 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1327.
from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in 30 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1318.
question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of
31 TSN, June 29, 1989, pp. 17, 25.
32 Rollo, pp. 54-55. Articles 725 and 741 of the Civil Code state:
the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties accepts it.
covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven’s name did Art. 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done
through their parents or legal representatives.
Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his 373
signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the]
child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to her when VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 373
she would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his
Adiong vs. Court of Appeals
thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to
Esperanza Cabrigas); Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was then just 15 years old); and the SO ORDERED.
subject properties were free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the Buena, J., On official leave.
title of said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession was the baptismal Notes.—When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds
sponsor of Ida? 27
his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer acknowledgment. (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 1 [1997])
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
sisters. Petitioner could not have
28
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims
_______________
thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
27

CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1459.

28
recovery of ownership and possession. (Agapay vs. Palang, 276 SCRA 340 [1997])
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ——o0o——
Labagala vs. Santiago
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the
29

contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one

30

of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner

admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void.
31

Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been
in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as
explained by the Court of Appeals:
. . . Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the
acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the
acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her]
mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code.
No one of those mentioned in the law—in fact no one at all—accepted the “donation” for Ida. 32

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994. *
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA
BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
do contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological
child of a certain couple.—A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child
of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166,
it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case
of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence.
Same; Same; Same; Appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles
to the case at bench.—Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
469
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 4 (Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before
69
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
Isabel.
Same; Same; Same; The totality of contrary evidence presented by the private
respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner’s Certificate of Live
Birth.—We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary evidence presented by the
petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. “3”) purportedly
showing that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This
Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased
Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, “the books making up
the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” As related above, the totality
of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of
the content of petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting evidence, the most
telling was the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. “E”) executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document, they stated that “(they) are the
sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or
ascendants”. In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of
Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner’s father. The repudiation
was made twenty eight years after he signed petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
________________
Composed of Associate Justice Pedro Ramirez (Chairman); Associate Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
1
(Ponente) and Associate Justice Ricardo Galvez.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued. On September 24,
1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx
“4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or
descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to
do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without
descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for
by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir; x x x”
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner’s heirship to
the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate
child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted
documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2)
Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs.
10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said
spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the
other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence,
that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late
Isabel, then
471
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 471
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a
noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria
Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically2
declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It
dismissed the private respondents petition for letters of administration and
declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170
of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29,
1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the appellate court states:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one entered
declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of
the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently,
DENIED; said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the
lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special Proceeding No. SP-797(90) in
accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.”
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. “1.The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions, more
particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code in this
________________
She died during the pendency of the present action, and was substituted by her daughters, Mayra
2
B. Lirio and Nieva L. Isla and son, Jose B. Lirio, Jr.
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
1. case and in adopting or upholding private respondent’s theory that the
instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child;
2. “2.Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn
directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa’s birth, still the
respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private
respondents whose credibility and demeanor have not convinced the
trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the documentary and
testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. “3.The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court,
more particularly, on prescription or laches.”
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of
the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
“Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
“Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his
wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall
be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
“Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1. “1)That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of:
1. a)the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
2. b)the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
3. c)serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
1. “2)That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband except in the
473
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 473
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
1. “3)That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
 “Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one
year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or,
in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth
took place or was recorded.
“If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they
should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted
from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, whichever is earlier.
“Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the following case:
1. “1)If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;
2. “2)If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom; or
3. “3)If the child was born after the death of the husband.”
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For
the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision
is apropos, viz:
“Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code]
is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction
of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.”
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not
the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties
as follows:
“x x x And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee’s evidence is utterly
insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while
the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took
Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife’s legally adopting
her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her
the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really their only
daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
“The strong and convincing evidence referred to by us are the following:
“First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel’s own only brother and sibling, Dr.
Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years and was
already about 36
475
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 475
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
years old and still she had not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to
refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-
gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of
years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the
youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente
and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and
his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she
refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but
Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and
that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria that he would
register the baby as his and his wife’s child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old
and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in
Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the time
she testified in this case. Victoria Benitez Lirio’s testimony is highly trustworthy and
credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be
interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her
oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and
Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel
almost everyday especially as she had a drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but that
they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. “3”) or at any time at all, and that this
is also true with the rest of their townmates. Resurreccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian’s
personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel’s) residence, likewise
declared that she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never
delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day when she
went to Isabel’s house to set the latter’s hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where
the baby came from, and “she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told
me not to tell about it (p. 10, tsn Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman’s becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her
delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact
that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own,
especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee’s birth certificate Exh. “3” with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing
as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente’s wife Isabel, who was
already 36 years old at the time of the child’s supposed birth, was truly the mother of that
child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a
hospital under the experienced, skillful, and caring hands of Isabel’s obstetrician-
gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel
would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that
as appearing in appellee’s birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez
home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent
times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply
register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Vicente O.
Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the expense
of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his
wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so either
because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights
of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late
Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel’s only brother and
sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel’s death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial
settlement Exh. “E” that they executed of her estate, “that we are the sole heirs of the
deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants”? Dr.
Chipongian, placed on the witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-
law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he signed the same only
because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez
make such statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is really not his
and his wife’s daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased’s wife legal heir? As
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VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 477
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document without
understanding completely the meaning of the words “descendant and ascendant” (p. 21, tsn
Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who
has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was
just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and
brother-in-law, as against those of the latter’s collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter
and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter,
before her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
“even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter will inherit what
is legally my own property, in case I die without a will,”
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband—
“that any inheritance due him from my property—when he die—to make our own daughter his sole heir.
This do [sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to decide for himself
regarding those.”
(Exhs. “F-1”, “F-1-A” and “F-1-B”)
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to
write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their
legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate
her husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her properties when she
dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he would inherit from
her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be
their legal heir unless her (Isabel’s) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez’ elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even
testified that her brother Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa’s birthday in her
birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente’s) mother. It
is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and
Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was
only registered by Vicente as his and his wife’s child and that they gave her the birth date of
Vicente’s mother.”
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary evidence
presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live
Birth (Exh. “3”) purportedly showing that her parents were the late Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954
appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410
of the New Civil Code, however, “the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” As related above, the totality
of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted
the truth of the content of petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting
evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. “E”) executed on July 20, 1982 by
Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized
document, they stated that “(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel
Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants”. In executing
this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner’s father. The repudiation was
made twenty eight years after he signed petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padillaand Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—Under Article 887 of the Civil Code, all cases of illegitimate children,
their filiation must be proved by voluntary or compulsory recognition
(Mangulabnan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 760).

——o0o——

479
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108366. February 16, 1994. *
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Evidence; Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court only under exceptional circumstances, such as when the findings of the
appellate court clash with those of the trial court.—The rule is well-settled that findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional
circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with
those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves use therefore to exercise our
extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that
private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on
record.
Same; Family Relations; Paternity and Filiation; Documentary evidence rejected as
insufficient to prove filiation; Photographs of a person at baptism and in the house do not
prove that he is the father.—We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the
petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation.
Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the
private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs
that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private
respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. Secondly, the
pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
________________
SECOND DIVISION.
*
131
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 1 complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
31
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptismal Certificate has scant evidentiary value.—
Thirdly, the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent
participated in its preparation. In Macandang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we
also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect
to the child’s paternity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of live birth where the alleged father not shown
to have had a hand in its preparation not competent evidence of paternity.—Fourth, the
certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show
that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces
v. Local Civil Registrar,102 Phil. 1050 (1958). We reiterated this rule in Berciles v.
Systems, 128 SCRA 53 (1984), when we held that “a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.”
Same; Same; Same; Court not prepared to concede that the priest who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies can remember the parents of the children he has baptized in
the absence of proof that he is a close friend of the alleged parents.—Petitioners capitalize on
the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to
be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
respondent. Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification
of the private respondent during petitioner Claro’s baptism. In the absence of this proof, we
are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal
ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case
No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon
City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P.
Solano, who found that “(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the
1
(petitioners) as his illegitimate children,” and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners’ filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they filed the case at bench,
another action for recognition and support against the private respondent before
another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and
JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ. Violeta and the private respondent, CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta’s father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they
started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
________________
1 Presiding judge of Branch 86, RTC Quezon City.
2 In this regard, Judge Solano held:
xxx
“(Petitioners’) certificates of birth imputing filiation to defendant as the putative father are incompetent evidence.
 “The baptismal certificates, upon the other hand, is not an indubitable writing that is impressed with authority to
establish filiation with those alleged as the parents of the child baptized.
“The oral testimony of Violeta Esguerra, uncorroborated as it were, by competent evidence, is inadequate to sustain a
conclusion that defendant indeed is the father of plaintiffs.”
133
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 133
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro
Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on February 11, 1985.
Violeta further claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the
birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October,
1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which
they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary
evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their
father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home
of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, Dr. Milagros 3
Villanueva, Ruby Chua Cu, and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. The first three
4 5 6
witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different
times, introduced the private respondent to them as her “husband”. Fr.
7
Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented
himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter’s baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta’s allegations that he sired the
two petitioners. He averred he only served as
_________________
She is a neighbor of Violeta Esguerra.
3 Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
She is the obstetrician who delivered the petitioners. Dr. Villanueva is the mother-in-law of Violeta
4
Esguerra’s brother.
She is a friend and former officemate of Violeta Esguerra.
5
He is the priest who officiated over the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Fr.
6 weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving
Fernandez actually testified in Civil Case No. Q-45567. The whole records of the earlier case were
presented as evidence in this case.
In the case of Rosario Cantoria, she first met private respondent Carlito (who was introduced by
7
Violeta as her “husband”) when she (Rosario) was taking care of Violeta after the birth of petitioner John
Paul Fernandez. Dr. Villanueva was first introduced to Carlito (as Violeta’s “husband”) on March 1, 1984,
after she (Dr. Villanueva) delivered petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Ruby Chua Cu met Violeta’s
“husband” (Carlito) at the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent
Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The
private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the
Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta’s allegation that she and respondent
Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he
never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said
restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the
birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support
in Civil Case No. Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners, viz.:
“In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs minors
(petitioners herein) are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. The defendant
(herein private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez,
now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 4 1/2, as his sons. As the defendant has
admitted that he has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in
the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the
children’s mother and natural guardian, within the first five (5) days of the month, with
arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
“SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners’ complaint dismissed by the
respondent Court of Appeals in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It
8
found that the “proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the
(private respondent’s) paternity and filiation of (petitioners).” It further held that
the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners’
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied on December 22, 1892.
________________
8Through its Fifth Division, composed of Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon (chairman), Jorge S.
Imperial (ponente) and Cancio C. Garcia. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29182.
135
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 135
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not
giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving
probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken
during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4)
not giving probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so
much credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito
Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the
case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be
reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation
is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in
the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power,
and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on
record.
 We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners
which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly,
we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of
the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. “B-8”, Exh. “B-12”,
Exh. “H” and Exh. “I”). These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private
respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His
testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private
respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to
prove paternity (Exhibits “B”, “B-1”, “B-2”, “B-7”, “B-14” and “B-15”). As we held
in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
“x x x The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to
show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving
him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. The same must be said of
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
x x x (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove
violation of complainant’s person and honor.” (Italics supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificate (Exh. “D”) of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held
in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
“As to the baptismal certificate, Exh. “7-A”, the rule is that although the baptismal record of
a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the
record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
voluntary recognition of parentage. x x x The reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the
legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to
which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or
in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of
the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior
and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They
are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child’s paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. “A”, Exh. “B”) of the petitioners
identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on
the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our
pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050(1958), viz:
“x x x Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly
prohibited, not only the naming of the
137
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 137
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not
filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which
he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.” (Italics supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit,when we held that “a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
paternity.”
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly
calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He
declared on the witness stand:
“Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the
father and the mother of the child, that both father and mother were
present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognize the father and the mother who were present
at that time?
A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you
remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, ‘do you renounce Satan and his works?’
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again.
I want to be sure if he is the person who appeared before you on that
occasion?
A I am sure.”
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in
private respondent, viz: dismissing petitioners’ action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary
138 considering our findings that petitioners’ evidence failed to substantiate their
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED cause of action.
139
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 18, 1994 139
“Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture
People vs. Bostre
by Violeta Esguerra? IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
A I cannot recall. respondent court CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Q At least the month and the year? SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
A It must be in 1986. Petition dismissed; Reviewed decision affirmed.
Q What month in 1986? Notes.—The Department of Social Services and Development cannot enforce
A It is difficult. . . the criminal sanctions of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Dempsey vs. Regional Trial
Court, 164 SCRA 384 [1988]).
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here? A paramour is one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the place without
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a the legal rights of the husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover (People vs.
baptismal certificate and then the second time was I asked you for what Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]).
is this? And you said it is for the court.
——o0o——
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you
were already informed that you will testify here before this Honorable © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were shown this picture?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man
wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who . . .
A Yes.”
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his
identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro’s baptism. In the
absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who
officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility
of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by
itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
 VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 483
People vs. Tumimpad
G.R. No. 109144. August 19, 1994. * Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORENO L.
TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
Rape; Evidence; Blood Test; Paternity; Blood test is adduced to show that the alleged
father or any one of many others of the same blood type may be the father of the child, but the
culpability of the alleged rapist is mainly established by the testimonial evidence of the
victim herself and her witnesses.—Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously
argues that his conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the
same blood type “O.” Accused-appellants’ culpability was established mainly by testimonial
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as
evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood
type may have been the father of the child.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.—As held by this
Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals:Paternity—Science has
demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and
the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility
that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the
value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the
conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the
prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of
the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding
is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The
findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as
they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Br. 14.
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tumimpad
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable
Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year
old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother,
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April
1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant’s daughter, a
woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving
rational and legal consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and
daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a
five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was
limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental.
Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable
Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son
Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers’ quarters
inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The
upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while
the
_______________
1Records, p. 2.
485
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 485
People vs. Tumimpad
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four security
men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs.
Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication
was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable
and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out
from the kitchen and told her mother, “Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos.” 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter’s condition, brought her to
Regina Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but still
remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings
from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol,
the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical
Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was
pregnant. 3 Grouping Test” and “Pheno Blood Typing” be conducted on the offended party, her
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was pregnant and so
she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr.
Kho, an OB-GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic
ultra-sound examination. The results were positive. The fetus’ gestational age
was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. Another ultra-sound examination at the United
4
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed
that she was indeed pregnant. 5 10T.S.N., August 5, 1991, p. 9.
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob
Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
6
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of
different persons were laid on the table and
_______________
T.S.N., August 1, 1991, p. 9.
2
3Exhibit “A,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
4Exhibit “B,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
5Exhibit “C,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 5.
Supra.
6
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tumimpad
Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the
pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. Later, Sandra was brought out of
7
the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants.
Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two-daughters-in-law,
Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who
sexually molested her. 9 proceedings.
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested
her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who
raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were
touched, then she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A push and pull
movement followed. Celsa testified that she was present when the victim
10
demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way
her nipples were touched saying “dito hawak,” and holding her breasts to
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering
at the same time “hubad panty.”
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as
the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something
bad to her. She once again demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held
11
her two thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying, “panty” and
then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also
touched her private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both “Major Blood
child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati
Medical
_______________
7T.S.N., August 7, 1991, p. 11.
8Id., p. 12.
9T.S.N., August 1, 1991, pp. 15-16.
11Id., p. 25.
Id., p. 26.
12
487
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 487
People vs. Tumimpad
Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type “O” blood, Sandra Salcedo type “B,”
accused Ruel Prieto type “A” and accused-appellant type “O.”
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was
impossible for them to have committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the
crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt,
stating that he “has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as
his type of blood is “A,” while that of child Jacob Salcedo is type “O.”
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00;
and to suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the
charge.
SO ORDERED.
13
Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:
1. 1.The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of
committing the offense charged without detection.
2. 2.The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on
major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal
test known as chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed
the crime of rape because most of the time he
_______________
 Rollo, p. 23.
13 TSN, August 1, 1991, pp. 6, 10.
14

488 Id., p. 6.
15

489
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 235, AUGUST 489
People vs. Tumimpad
19, 1994
and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection
tours while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further People vs. Tumimpad
contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to
molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult
to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra’s brother, Cristopher stay?
Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her. A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the
We are not convinced.
living room.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection
tours but sometimes they were left behind and would play pingpong or card Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra was always A Moreno and Prieto.
with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in the house with the
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with
accused. 14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified: your daughter?

Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno

reported for work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used to go
with my husband to the office.
Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were (sic)
at the headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch with
my daughter Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they were listening
music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room. 15
Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation
conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused
from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her. Second, at
the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once
again unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who
raped her. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim’s own testimony:
PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what Moreno
and Ruel did to you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood up held both her thigh (sic) with her two hand
(sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word ‘panty’ and she placed her
hand on her breast and did something as if sucking and held her private

part (sic) and did a push and pull movement and she cried.
x x x
Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and
“Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at
when this was being done did you feel pain?
the headquarters you were able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry
A Yes pain.
jobs in the second storey of your house. Do you know where is your
Q What part of your body is painful?
daughter Sandra at that time?
RECORD:
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
_______________ The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ? Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you
A Yes. point to them?
Q Where did you see these blood? A Yes.
_______________
Q Will you please point to them?
Id., pp. 10-11.
16 PROS. RAMOS:
490
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
RECORD:
People vs. Tumimpad
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the
RECORD:
courtroom.
The witness touching her private parts.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno
man’s organ?
Tumimpad?
A Yes sir.
A Moreno.
Q Where did you see this male organ? 491

A Witness touching her private part. VOL. 235, 491

Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty? AUGUST 19,
A Moreno and Ruel. 1994
Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants? People vs. Tumimpad
A Yes. RECORD:
Q Did you see his sex organ? The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing
A The witness touching her private parts. and when asked what is his name, he readily answered that
Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his pants? he is Moreno Tumimpad.
A Yes. PROS. RAMOS:
Q Did you see his sex organ? Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A Yes, witness again touching her private part. A Joel.
Q Both of them? PROS. RAMOS:
A Yes. If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well
Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty? the word Ruel but the way she called this name is Joel
A Moreno. which refers to the same person who is one of the accused
Q In your house? in this case. 17

A Yes. Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim’s sister-in-law, testified that Sandra
demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?
Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
how she was abused?
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?
A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.
A In the room.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra
Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra
Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and
then the panty was taken off and making a push and pull movement
(witness demonstration by holding her thigh?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was
abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you any
more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What
happened next?
thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you ob served whose names
was usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in-law about what Sandra Salcedo told
you and Celsa?
A That very evening sir. 18

A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the
questioning, did you hear the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?
Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction
was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type
“O.”
Accused-appellants’ culpability was established mainly by testimonial
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced
as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the
same blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court
in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals: 19

_______________
A Yes.
_______________
Id., pp. 9-11.
18

152 SCRA 359 (1987).

19

T.S.N., August 5, 1991, pp. 68-72.

17
493
492
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 493
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tumimpad
People vs. Tumimpad
Paternity—Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo? the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is.
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these two had
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations
done to her? of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-
paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done to her?
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
A By way of talking and action. the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as
have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
A He (sic) answered it by action and talking. paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to Celsa
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant’s guilt of the crime of rape having been proven
through words and action? beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
RECORD: SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to her
 Cruz, (Chairman) J., On official leave.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Sole testimony of rape victim is sufficient to sustain conviction of
accused if it rings true or is otherwise credible. (People vs. Martinez, 219 SCRA
502 [1993])
There can only be one conviction for rape if the information charges only one
offense even if the evidence shows three separate acts of forcible intercourse.
(People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9 [1993])

———o0o———

494
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104376. February 23, 1994. *
ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Family Relations; Paternity and Filiation; Illegitimate Children; Support.—Under the
then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived
and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disquali-
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
*
243
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 2
43
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
fied by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269,
new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born
of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account
of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the
time Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the
Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article
269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to
them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not
be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them
to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his
parents or to their estate.—Before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a
recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal
principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his
parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his acknowledgement by the parent. In other words, the rights of an
illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because
under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. The relevant law on
the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code. While the aforementioned provision speaks of the
obligation of the father to recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the
present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This
provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children x x x is
permitted under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Last paragraph of Art. 283 of the Civil Code
permits hearsay and reputation evidence with respect to illegitimate children.—The last
paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other
cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the
father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
244
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of
Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill
the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they
multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned
illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court’s decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. llano while she was working as
secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty.
Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less than
a year’s time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of
goods. Later, he courted her for more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in
April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general
manager. He came home to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the
Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing
and paid rentals, light and water bills. Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia
1
was
________________
1Exhs. “A,” “A-1,” “A-2,” “A-3” and “A-4”.
245
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 245
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to
give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by
petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she
delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate
was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54,
2 to give the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early
Makati, private respondent Merciditas S. llano was born on December 30, 1963
also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merciditas de los
Santos llano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipt issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that
3 up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon
she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the
name Mrs. Leoncia llano. 4 explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. They stayed at
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merciditas was sometimes in the
form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of
Leoncia) or thru Merciditas herself; and sometimes in the form of a check like
5 6
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing thereon
7 Petitioner’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with
having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. Both petitioner and
8 opposite column 16 of the death
his daughter admitted that the check and signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
he showed concern as the father of Merciditas. When Merciditas was in Grade I at
the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and
fifth grading periods as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by
10
Leoncia and Merciditas because he signed them at
________________
2Exhs. “B” and “B-1”.
3Exh. “C”.
4Exhs. “D” and “D-1”.
Exhs. “E-2,” “E-3,” and “E-6”.
5
6TSN, May 17, 1974, pp. 40-41.
7Exh. “G”.
8TSN, July 18, 1973, p. 49.
9TSN, October 17, 1977, p. 53; TSN, October 9, 1978, p. 19.
Exhs. “H,” “H-1” and “H-2”.
10
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merciditas started to have
11
discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He 12
treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and
anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and
even cuddle her to sleep. 13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong.” 14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o’clock in the
afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.
Inasmuch as it was already past seven o’clock in the evening, the nurse promised
to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction
the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merciditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and
sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-
his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of
15
112 Arellano St., then at Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred
to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he
stopped coming home.
Leoncia and Merciditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures
________________
TSN, July 18, 1973, p. 57; TSN, October 1, 1973, p. 28.
11
TSN, October 18, 1974, pp. 28-29.
12
TSN, October 18, 1974.
13
Exh. “1.”
14
Exhs. “E,” “E-1” “E-2,” “E-3” and “E-4”.
15
247
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 247
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
certificate of a female child surnamed llano, although in column 13 thereof
opposite father’s name the typewritten name, Artemio G. llano, appears. He also
denied the following: all the notes alleged to have been received from him by
Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merciditas’ Report
Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication.
He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including the
signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on
January 7, 1964. He does not understand why this case was filed against him.
16 17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for
Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities
therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped
visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with
another which he eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered
by Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda llano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has
she been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite, On December 30, 1963,
her father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was
advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7,
1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30,
1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila
Sanitarium because he was at their home at that time, and that her father lived
with a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living
with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday
and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes
with him.
Victoria J. llano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated the previous
testimonies about petitioner’s sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization
on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963
to 1968, lived three (3)
________________
TSN, October 9, 1978, p. 13.
16
TSN, December 11, 1978, p. 25.
17
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never
slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the
Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a
year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the
trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merciditas, on the
basis of the following:
1. 1)petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of
Merciditas’ conception;
2. 2)testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia
was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3. 3)the birth certificate of Merciditas was not signed by petitioner;
4. 4)petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of
Merciditas; and
5. 5)there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by
petitioner to Merciditas.
Thus, it rendered judgment on April 4, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share
the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm
conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive
portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby
rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the rights
appurtenant to such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of the complaint on
August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month
from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
_______________
18 Records, p. 693.
249
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 249
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
(P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 18, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time
she reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.” 19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26,
1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by
respondent court:
1. 1)in awarding “back support” even in the absence of recognition or of a
judgment declaring petitioner father of Merciditas with finality;
2. 2)in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for
recognition; and
3. 3)in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established
decisions of this Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the
trial court, therefore, there was absolutely no obligation on his part to give
support to Merciditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of
the trial court that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law
in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an
action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may
constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act,
such as signing under the caption “parent” in the report card, is not sufficient.
Merciditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor
introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as his child,
introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was part of
his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegiti-
________________
 Rollo, p. 55.
19
Rollo, p. 58.
20
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
mate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those
born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119,
old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous,
adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception,
were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
21
Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of
22
the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in
accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
23
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code.
The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They
were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. However,
before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of
paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal
25
principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights
from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation
or blood relationship but from his acknowledgement by the parent. In other
words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real
child of his parents but because
________________
Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 50974-75, May 31, 1989, 173 SCRA 656.
21
TSN, March 5, 1979, p. 6.
22
ART. 269. x x x. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
23
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983
24
Edition, p. 615 citing Commission, p. 89.
Paterno, et al. v. Paterno, et al., G.R. No. L-23060, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 585.
25
251
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 251
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. The
relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:
1. (1)In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
2. (2)When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
3. (3)When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;
4. (4)When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.”
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to
recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case,
petitioner is obliged to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This provision
should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
“ART. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children x x x is
permitted under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.”
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is
likewise our finding, that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation
with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed
aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the
inherently weak denials of petitioner:
“Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff’s mother and defendant carried an
intimate relations. It nonetheless was not
_______________
24
26 Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, citing Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v.
Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et
al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985].
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her
mother and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment where
Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care of all the bills
and that he shared the same bed with plaintiff’s mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was rented
by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and godson of the
defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and only
frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at the back of
the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio was the General Manager
(TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of Artemio
whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for the first time, Leoncia met
26
Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of
Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio
gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-
12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services needed in the
apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of
payment for liquidations of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exh. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and
14, 1/25/74).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three or four times a week and
sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a
month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73). Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred
Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known
as husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was
fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant’s Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places heretofore
mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver
notes (Exh. “F”, “F-1” and “F-3”) and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among
the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from defendant were the following:
253
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 253
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
‘Exh. “F-1”
‘Dear Ne,
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay
masakit pa.
‘Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si Miling na
lamang and utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.
Sgn.’
‘Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati.
Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
‘Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.
‘Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-2”
‘Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-3”
‘Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan (11:30 am)
Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, Sigurado yon.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-4”
‘Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang dugo, kaya
minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.’
‘Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong makarating dian sa
Jueves.
Sgn.’
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
“The address ‘Ne’ in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose nickname is ‘Nene’
but which Artemio shortens to ‘Ne’. Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The ‘Gracing”
mentioned in Exh. ‘F-1’ refer to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with
Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the birth of Merciditas.’ (pp.
17-19, Appellant’s Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives
lie to defendant’s diversionary pretense that it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the
mother lived with during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia being in the
apartment and sharing together the same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
xxx xxx x x x.
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia
and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to
the hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his
expenditures (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or
Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were true that there
was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff’s mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio foisted on
the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since
there was really no such relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway
54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed there belying his pretence (sic) of an
intimate relationship with piaintiff’s mother.”
27
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court
then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that plaintiff
was in continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his
paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to
plaintiff’s mother. The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the
putative father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had
already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is
plaintiff’s father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A
mere change of mind would be incompatible with the
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 43-49.
255
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 255
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even
when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not
revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).
To be sure, to establish ‘the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child,’ it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
‘Continuous’ does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue forever
but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C.
Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia vs. Coquia,
CA 50, O.G. 3701). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602).
(Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their
residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of ‘Ilano’ since birth without any objection on the part
of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known
and called Artemio as her ‘Daddy’ (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time
Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants
to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father
should do for his child—bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her
which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are
positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as
such. Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need
for a ‘frog test’ to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru
Elynia (Exhs. “E-2” and “E-3”, and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40,
5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check
No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature appearing therein which
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49,
7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of
Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio
has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1
at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh.
“H”) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of
Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio where both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at their residence in the
presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73).
x x x.
xxx xxx x x x.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”.
(Exh. “1”). (pp. 19-20, Appellant’s Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in
the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married
does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to
be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiff’s mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to
be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter’s
signatures and handwriting.” 28
Granting ex gratia argumenti that private respondent’s evidence is not sufficient
proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court
applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
“x x x plaintiff’s testimonial and documentary evidence x x x (is) too replete with details that
are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an
inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess.
_______________
Rollo, pp. 50-53.
28
257
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 257
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship
between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as husband and wife in several places,
the birth of the first still-born child, the circumstances of plaintiff’s birth, the act of appellee
in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and
documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may
not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff’s evidence as lacking in credibility but
did not deem them as convincing proof that defendant is the father since the Certificate of
live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not sufficient to
establish recognition, considering the denial of the defendant of his signature appearing
thereon.
While defendant’s signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the
evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas
(sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25,
5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id., p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata
of the born child. The inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who
heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The
inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the interview the nurse
told them that the information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by
Artemio (id., p. 30) but because there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m. the nurse would
just return in the morning for Artemio’s signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the
nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the
following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33).
Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed
out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
‘The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila(102 Phil. 1050 [1958] and Berciles v. Government
Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity
does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave
all the data about his daughter’s birth. x x x.’
x x x the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
258
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten
‘x x x although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by
years after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any
another method. consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in this
‘What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that an illegitimate child petition. 33

is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
laws,” according to the Civil Code, x x x. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under AFFIRMED.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.’ ” 29
SO ORDERED.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or Petition denied; Assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the ________________
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the first three Rollo, pp. 54-55.
32

paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph 30
Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532.
33

260
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation. 31
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the Gaco vs. National Labor Relations Commission
spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, Notes.—The mother is in the best position to know whether petitioner was
respondent court took into account the following: really her son (Chua Keng Giap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 158 SCRA
“The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a 18 [1988]).
right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted
date of judicial
________________ children (Dempsey vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. LXXV, Olongapo City, 164 SCRA
384[1988]).
Rollo, pp. 49-50; 53-54.
29

Navarro v. Bacalla, G.R. No. 20607, October 14, 1965, 15 SCRA 114.
30

Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983 Edition, pp.
31 ——o0o——
607-608.
259
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 259
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on
December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age
spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant
was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained the age of majority on December 30,
1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of
twelve (12) years four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a
month for the first three (3) years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well as
her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next
three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a
month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she attained
the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under
Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the
given facts and circumstances that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.” 32

We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was
arrived at arbitrarily.
 VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 745
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86639. June 2, 1994. *

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN M. ALBERTO and YOLANDA R. ALBERTO, respondents.
Family Relations; Filiation; Recognition; Illegitimate Children; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Declaration against interest may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.—The
testimony of Jose Tablizo established his recognition of Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed
straight “A’s.” He said “Boy! Great!” and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the grades of his daughter. This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay. This Court holds that the
same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: “Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest.—The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made his declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to present relatives who could have negated petitioner’s testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased
gives rise to the presumption that their testimonies would be detrimental to the respondents had they been presented as witnesses.—As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner’s status as a
natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well—Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others.
Private respondent only had to present any one of those relatives to negate petitioner’s testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased. Her failure to
do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa Alberto were fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under
the circumstances, it is safe for us to assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for
_______________

*THIRD DIVISION.
746

7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

46
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
private respondent, their testimonies would be detrimental to the latter’s cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Natural Children; Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child
of parents who, at the time of her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.—While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too
clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he begat his first-born. Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural
child occupies the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and could, therefore, have
contracted a valid marriage. Often the fruit of first love, she is ensconced firmly in her parent’s hearts. No subsequent liaisons, though blessed with legitimate offspring, can completely obliterate
those early memories. A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear marks of heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring are not to be denied.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; An illegitimate child whose father or mother dies during her minority has four (4) years from the attainment of her majority within which to file an
action for recognition.—Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18, 1967—the day petitioner turned fourteen. As such, petitioner had four years from the
time she reached twenty-one on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had until September 18, 1978 within which
to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with the prayer that she be declared to have acquired the status of a
natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore, seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-year
period.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioner.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents.
747

VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 747

Alberto vs. Court of Appeals

ROMERO, J.:
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal
bard Shakespeare perspicaciously said: “Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the action.” Herein deceased father cannot possibly be
charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his action to his word and his word to his action.
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the status of a natural child of the deceased
Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to participate in the latter’s, estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she
used “Alberto” as her surname in all her school records and correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun, died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate on January 10, 1968. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’ Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970 and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the
proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have
acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter
and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of oppositor and against the estate of the deceased Juan M. Alberto—

1. (a)Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having acquired the status of a natural child of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
2. (b)Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased and their children, namely, Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan, Jr., Juan III, Maria Yolanda and Juan IV, all surnamed Alberto,
to recognize and acknowledge oppositor as an acknowledged natural child of the late Gov. Alberto;
3. (c)Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
4. (d)Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceased’s estate and turn over to oppositor her participation therein equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate child;
and
5. (e)Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

Costs against the administratrix.

SO ORDERED.” 1

The probate court’s findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:

1. “1)In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that the oppositor has been in continuous possession of the status of a child of Juan Alberto by his direct acts
as well as the acts of his family, as follows:

1. (a)The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her schooling;
2. (b)The deceased made known to his friends and relatives that she was his daughter; and
3. (c)He made known to the personnel of the International School where oppositor was enrolled that she was his daughter.

1. 2)The following incidents would show the direct acts of the family of the deceased

1. (a)When the deceased’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto Solidum asked that the oppositor be sent to her house in her Sunday best to meet her father for the first
time;
 2. (b)When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of the deceased in the hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard to give way to her as she was a member of
the family;

_______________

1Record on Appeal, pp. 107-108.

749
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 749
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals

1. (c)When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake, introduced the oppositor to her youngest sister as an elder sister.

1. 3)Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the oppositor is the child of the deceased.

1. Oppositor’s mother, Aurora Reniva, testified:

1. (a)Of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving birth to the oppositor;
2. (b)that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between the oppositor and the deceased at the MOPC; (This particular testimony was corroborated by Cristeta
Andaya, former maid of Mrs. Solidum, and by the oppositor) and
3. (c)that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time to time.

1. 2)Oppositor also testified that:

1. (a)She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC where he gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone numbers where he could be contacted and
where they talked about her name, age and other matters.
2. (b)She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on which occasions her father also gave her money.
3. (c)The deceased visited her two times at the International School whose rules on visitors were strict and when her father visited her, the secretary of the principal
told her that her father was waiting for her. This showed that the deceased had identified himself to the personnel of the school that he was the father of the
oppositor.
4. (d)He promised to see her in her school during her birthday on September 18, 1968 but was not able to do so because of his untimely death.
5. (e)The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to Catanduanes but failed likewise because of his death.
6. (f)When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of her father’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her
because she was a child of Juan Alberto.
7. (g)After the wake for her deceased father, the deceased’s step-mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to Joy Alberto her half-sister.
8. (h)Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon her representations, to use the ballroom of the Regent of Manila for practice purposes. Congressman
Alberto was the

750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals

1. owner of the Regent of Manila.

2. (i)Her uncles and aunts, i.e., brothers and sisters of her father, regarded her as their niece and introduced her to others as the eldest daughter of Juan Alberto.
 3. (j)The children of the brothers and sisters of Juan Alberto recognized her as their cousin.

1. 3)Jose Tablizo testified that:

1. (a)There was a strong physical resemblance between the deceased and the oppositor.
2. (b)The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.
3. (c)It was known among the friends of the deceased, particularly the Breeze Gang, composed of the witness, Jose Tablizo, the deceased and 4 others.
4. (d)Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report card of the Oppositor and beasted of her high grades.
5. (e)The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac, Catanduanes for the oppositor whom they considered as the deceased’s daughter. (This was corroborated by
Silverio Taberara.)

1. 4)Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of Immigration Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for the deceased, made an appointment with him (Atty. Vivo) for a
conference, at which they discussed the latter’s letter to the deceased regarding the oppositor. In said conference, Com. Reyes said that the deceased was not
denying that he was the father of the oppositor. And because of his marital status and the fact that he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal with
the promise to support the oppositor quietly through a cousin, Fr. Arcilla.” 2

The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court on the strength of the following observations:
“Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they satisfy the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased.
‘In one case, the following facts were proved; that two nurses took care of the children at the expense of the defendant; that said defendant kissed the children, called them sons, and ordered that they be taken care of very
well; that he gave the money for the necessities of the mother and the six children, the
_______________

2 Record on Appeal, pp. 100-106.

751
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 751
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
oldest of whom called the father; that he visited the mother, complained of his big family, and was publicly regarded as the father of the children. It was held that these were not sufficient to be a basis for a declaration of
paternity. They may show that the defendant was convinced of his paternity in relation to the children; but they do not show any intent on his part to place such children in the possession of status of natural children. The
continued possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and presumption. So, also, the mere fact that defendant’s mother used to visit the child, cannot be considered as conduct of his family sufficient to confer
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child.’ (1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1983 ed., pp. 604-605, citing, Sentencia, 12 October 1907; Gustilo vs. Gustilo, et al., 14 SCRA 149; Sentencia, 9 May
1921; Potot vs. Ycong, No. 6651, 22 March 1941, 40 O.G. No. 4, 26 July 1941, p. 748)
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositors Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose Tablizo
after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of association between the deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship between father and child. It gives the impression
that the deceased studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter, and I feel even prouder after I heard from people like you. You were the ones that knew him most, shared his dreams as a young man, and witnessed his struggle from
Palmera’s slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard about them through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I were to help write it, I would be able to contribute
but a few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel and I envy you.’ (p. 35, Folder of Exhibits)3

Hence this petition.

May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by
petitioner to estab-
_______________

3Rollo, pp. 65-67.

752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
lish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?
 We rule in the affirmative.
In the probate court, the following have been established:

1. 1)that prior to Juan M. Alberto’s marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private respondent, Juan M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were
sweethearts;
2. 2)that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave birth to herein petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3. 3)that petitioner used ‘Alberto’ as her surname in all her school records and Juan M. Alberto was known to be her father;
4. 4)that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to Aurora Reniva;
5. 5)that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner and
Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;
6. 6)that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school, International School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;
7. 7)that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M. Alberto’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make
way for her as she was a daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
8. 8)that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister;
9. 9)that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
10. 10)that the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her as their cousin;
11. 11)that petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his daughter;
12. 12)that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and remarked that those were the grades of his daughter.

753
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 753
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private respondents, denied that Juan M. Alberto ever recognized Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. She
presented in evidence Aurora Reniva’s letters to Juan M. Alberto dated December 23, 1955, September 27, 1954 and March 15, 1960; Aurora Reniva’s letter to Fr. Arcilla
dated December 23, 1955; letter of Zenaida Reniva to Juan M. Alberto dated September 16, 1953, to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto as
his own. 4

However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was that Aurora Reniva was having a
difficult time raising a child by her own self and therefore, she was seeking the assistance of Juan M. Alberto. Private respondent quoted as Exhibit “3-B” the portion of
Aurora Reniva’s letter dated March 15, 1960 which says:
“x x x I am just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting, you still do not give a damn to her.” 5

The full text of the paragraph, however, reads as follows:

“On the 23rd of this month, Maria Theresa P. Alberto will graduate from the Prep School of Holy Ghost College. I am just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting, you still do not
give a damn to her. I thought, as I was told before by Fr. Arcilla, that I just pray and wait because he said pretty soon you will be sending her money for support. So far, only the 300 pesos was
received by us last October, 1959. For it, I am very grateful because it helped me a lot in our wants.”6

The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely indifferent towards Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her support whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15, 1960. At the time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had
_______________

4Record on Appeal, pp. 93-94.

5Exhibits, p. 92.
6Exhibits, p. 92.
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
not yet met. About two years later, when petitioner was nine years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the first meeting between petitioner and the deceased. This initial
meeting was followed by many more. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Juan M. Alberto never took any step to stop petitioner from using his surname. The testimony of Jose
Tablizo established his recognition of Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed
straight “A’s.” He said “Boy! Great!” and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the grades of his daughter. This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay. This
7

Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
“Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest.—The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest that a reasonable man in his position would not have made his declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”
As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner’s status as a natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well—Fr.
Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others. Private respondent only had to present any one of those relatives to negate petitioner’s
testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased. Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa Alberto were
fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under the circumstances, it is safe for us to
assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for private respondent, their testimonies would be detrimental to the latter’s cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
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7TSN, June 19, 1980, pp. 21-23.

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Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
deceased in accordance with Article 283 of the Civil Code which provides, inter alia:
“Art 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.”
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the probate court, stated as follows:
“We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositor’s Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose Tablizo
after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of association between the deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship between father and child. It gives the impression
that the deceased studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter, and I feel even prouder after I heard from people like you. You were the ones that knew him most, shared his dreams as a young man,
and witnessed his struggle from, palmera’s slums to Forbes Park. You saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard about them through Mama. His life was a novel,
and if I were to help write it, I would be able to contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel, and I envy
you.” 8

What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she now seeks to establish indubitable parental links with a father who sired her some forty-one years ago. Why
he desisted from marrying the mother of this girl at a time when no impediment blocked the way is a matter one can merely conjecture at.
While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he
begat his first-born.
_______________

8Rollo, p. 67.
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756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of
her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage. Often the fruit of first love, she is
ensconced firmly in her parent’s hearts. No subsequent liaisons, though blessed with legitimate offspring, can completely obliterate those early memories.
A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear marks of heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring are not to be denied. Thus, whether openly
or furtively, a father in the situation of Juan M. Alberto could not have resisted manifesting signs of concern and care insofar as his firstborn is concerned. If, at an early
age, the child shows much talent and great promise as petitioner in this case apparently did, it is understandable, and even to be expected, that the father would proudly
step forward to claim paternity—either through his direct acts or those of his family, or both, as in instant case.
 In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically be concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to conceal his paternity. No less
than his younger sister, his stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were categorically informed of the relationship and they accepted the same as
fact.
Understandably, considering the strait-laced mores of the times and the social and political stature of Juan M. Alberto and his family, those who were privy to the
relationship observed discreetness. But he himself openly visited his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the MOPC on which occasions he gave her money and
introduced her proudly to his gangmates.
Where the daughter admits to envy in a letter to her father’s friend because the latter played a greater role in her father’s life, this is but the natural expression of a
wistful longing of a child to reach out to her biological father. Far be it for us to interpret such sentiment as a betrayal of “a lack of association between the deceased and
oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship between father and child.” In this instance, the lack of association cannot be helped for the relationship was far
from normal.
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Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
Much less do we take it as giving the impression that the deceased “studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of recognizing
oppositor as his child.” On the contrary, during his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto, herein
oppositor, as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly,
by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and
gangmates manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be recognized as a natural child to enable her to participate in the estate of the deceased, Article 285 of the Civil
Code prescribing the period when such action should be brought governs. It provides:
“Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
x x x x x x x x x”

The oppositor’s case falls clearly under the above exception.

Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18, 1967—the day petitioner turned fourteen. As such, petitioner had four years from the time
she reached twenty-one on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had until September 18,
1978 within which to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with the prayer that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore,
seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-year period.
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758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jurilla vs. Commission on Elections
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the probate court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, decision reversed.
Note.—Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of
matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of the family—the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is
taken in the question of the existence of marital relations (In Re: Florencio Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 [1974]).

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