A.C. No.
1512 January 29, 1993 That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on
August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C.
Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the
Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the
Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and
for the convenience of the parties and their
witnesses who were residing in the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with
transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits
submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single
and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City;
that when she was still a teenager and first year
in college she came to know respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go
to their house being a friend of her sister Norma;
that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in
Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently
transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St.,
Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30,
1976).
house and asked her to be one of the usherettes
in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents,
which respondent did, and her father consented;
that for three whole days she served as usherette
in the convention and respondent picked her up
from her residence every morning and took her
home from the convention site at the end of each
day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent
came to complainant's house and invited her for
a joy ride with the permission of her mother who
was a former classmate of respondent; that
respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the
course of which respondent proposed his love to
her; that respondent told her that if she would
accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first; that
from then on respondent used to visit her in their
house almost every night, and he kept on
courting her and pressed her to make her
decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7,
1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of
love and respondent continued his usual
visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp.
115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited her, with the consent of her
father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her
from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom
(pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of
that evening they left the party at the Lopez
Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent
invited her for a joy ride and took her to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent
parked the jeep by the beach where there were no
houses around; that in the course of their
conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and then
started caressing her downward and his hand
kept on moving to her panty and down to her
private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered:
"Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you"
and reminded her also that "anyway, December
is very near, the month we have been waiting
for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day,
just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and
again reiterated his promise and assurances, at
the same time pulling down her panty; that she
told him that she was afraid because they were
not yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with
him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the
intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to
worry because anyway he would marry her; and
at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to
invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he
would take her to the airport where they would
have sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual
intercourse from August to October 1973 at the
frequency of two or three times a week, and she
consented to all these things because she loved
him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-
127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973
complainant noticed that her menstruation which
usually occurred during the second week of each
month did not come; she waited until the end of
the month and still there was no menstruation;
she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result
was positive; she informed respondent and
respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted
but she objected and respondent did not insist;
respondent then told her not to worry because
they would get married within one month and he
would talk to her parents about their marriage
(pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and talked to her parents
about their marriage; it was agreed that the
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not
to create a scandal as complainant was already
pregnant; complainant and her mother left for
Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while
respondent would follow by plane; and they
agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the
house of complainant's sister Delia who is
married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135,
tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to
see complainant and her mother at Singalong,
Manila, respondent told them that he could not
marry complainant because he was already
married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother
got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my
daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however,
respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from his
wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and, subsequently
marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila
and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00
(p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog
City and actually sent the promised support; he
came back to Manila in January 1974 and went
to see complainant; when asked about the
annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp.
141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and
in March 1974 and told complainant the same
thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her
mother to come to Manila when she delivers the
child, but her mother answered her that she
cannot come as nobody would be left in their
house in Dipolog and instead suggested that
complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974
and, her sister Norma took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered
a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual
Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was
registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148,
tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came
to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent
by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as
she was ashamed she just stayed in their house;
she got sick and her father sent her to
Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she came
back after two weeks but still respondent did not
come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she
consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative
case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; the case was
referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed
and thus she filed the present administrative case
(pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his
sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth
certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was
born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in
Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20
years old; that because of incompatibility he had
been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in
1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby
embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to
know complainant's father since 1952 because he
was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's
mother because they were former classmates in
high school; that he became acquainted with
complainant when he used to visit her sister,
Norma, in their house; they gradually became
friends and often talked with each other, and
even talked about their personal problems; that
he mentioned to her his being estranged from his
wife; that with the consent of her parents he
invited her to be one of the usherettes in the
Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City
held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.);
that the arrangement was for him to fetch her
from her residence and take her home from the
convention site; that it was during this occasion
that they became close to each other and after the
convention, he proposed his love to her on July
7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she
accepted his proposal and since then he used to
invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited complainant to be his partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the
Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that
evening after the affair, complainant complained
to him of a headache, so he decided to take her
home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to
have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and
proceeded to the airport; that when they were at
the airport, only two of them, they started the
usual kisses and they were carried by their
passion; they forgot themselves and they made
love; that before midnight he took her home; that
thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse
many times whenever they went on joy riding in
the evening and ended up in the airport which
was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October
1973 that complainant told him of her
pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be
delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and
respondent would take care of expenses; that
during respondent's talk with the parents of
complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he
told him he was married but estranged from his
wife; that when complainant was already in
Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry
her, he answered he could not marry again,
otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but
he promised to file an annulment of his marriage
as he had been separated from his wife for 16
years; that complainant consented to have sexual
intercourse with him because of her love to him
and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or
cajolery; and that the present case was filed
against him by complainant because of his
failure to give the money to support complainant
while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the
child and, also to meet complainant's medical
expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for
medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is
single, a college student, and was about 20 years
and 7 months old during the time (July-October
1975) of her relationship with respondent,
having been born on December 23, 1952; while
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married,
General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time
of the said relationship, having been born on
August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the
marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto
Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship
with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the
Barrientos family for quite sometime, having
been a former student of complainant's father in
1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's
mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in
Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with
complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia
and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma
at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend
when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to
be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June
28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her home
from the convention site after each day's
activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and
after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the
evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with
her parents' permission was respondent's partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the
Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at
about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the
place but before going home, they went to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about
midnight they went home; that after the first
sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport
where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate
relations, complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent,
complainant and complainant's parents, it was
agreed that complainant would deliver her child
in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law
Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that
respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th
and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order
to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there
in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City;
that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl
at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City
and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about
the last week of June 1974 she went home to
Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila
and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed
some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
instituted the present disbarment proceedings
against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds
itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that
complainant was never informed by respondent
attorney of his real status as a married individual.
The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became
pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for having
been estranged from his wife for 16 years and
dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that
he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out
that respondent never bothered to annul said
marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all
along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a
ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest
him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in
Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying
in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He
never introduced his son and went around with
friends as though he was never married much less
had a child in the same locality. This circumstance
alone belies respondent's claim that complainant
and her family were aware of his previous marriage
at the very start of his courtship. The Court is
therefore inclined to believe that respondent
resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual
desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It
is not in accordance with the nature of the educated,
cultured and respectable, which complainant's
family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of
the local public high school, to allow a daughter to
have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the
perverted sense of respondent's moral values when
he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p.
209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even
suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense
is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his
membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107
SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman
while his first wife is still alive and their
marriage still valid and existing is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege
that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter
into multiple marriages and has inquired into the
possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15).
As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any
evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In
this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the
Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry
complainant he said he could not because he was
already married and would open him to a charge
of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he
were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives,
as he is now claiming, why did he not marry
complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a
moslem, but, having been married in a civil
ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into
another civil ceremony without committing
bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p.
242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if
respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being
a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant,
then it was grossly immoral for him to have
sexual intercourse with complainant because he
knew the existence of a legal impediment.
Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has
embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to
appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence,
his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) is in order. Good moral character is a
condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec.
2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed
with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing
qualification which all lawyers must possess
(People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos
Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise,
a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350
[1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395
[1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement
of good character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990,
181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice
George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's
character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the court retains the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was
resolved by this Court against a lawyer who
convinced a woman that her prior marriage to
another man was null and void ab initio and she was
still legally single and free to marry him (the
lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his
studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and
the child, and married another woman (Terre vs.
Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about
41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor,
knowing that he did not have the required legal
capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having
carnal relations with complainant by deception,
made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his
promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the
child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to
those who measure up to the exacting standards of
mental and moral fitness. Respondent having
exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained
to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary
action — disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts
from its members the highest standard of morality.
The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in
guarding the Bar against the admission of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19
SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA
1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead a
life in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA
21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA
757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859
[1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally
delinquent and as such, should not be allowed
continued membership in the ancient and learned
profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439
[1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral
conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and
is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies
of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract
was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from
and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me
and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro
City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract
prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then
proceeded to expound in considerable detail and
quite acerbic language on the "grounds which
could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;"
and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract . . . I
hope I do not have to resort to any legal action
before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to
annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-
President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing
it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya
also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith,
which was payable from salary deductions at the
rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered
into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed
the real facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he
narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of
the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief,
Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by
which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC
wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co.
" for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and .
. the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
— to which she appended a copy of the letter, and
of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges
with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her
honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of
free postage . . .;" and
 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea
that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on
the complaint, Conformably with established usage
that notices of resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in
which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this
power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced
the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a
"strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious
of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District
Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this
time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a
copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date
of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he
who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months,
a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD
26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the
affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself,
and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as
far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters
with the use of the money he had given for postage,
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by
the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers
the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that
what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would
show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co.
— is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house,
salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done
without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)
letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all
of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" —
in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the
title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in
question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . .
illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .
(his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling")
sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering, considering that in
six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times
respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved
in the administration of justice, from the presiding
judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with
good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely
— to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has
a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law
requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language,
or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than
for most other government workers. As a man of the
law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the rights
of others at all times, and that his every act and
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney,"
this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term,
or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized
use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains
no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty.
Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133,
requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo
L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled
"People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for
Falsification of Public Document pending before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was
pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a
letter to the Court Administrator, dated September
2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to
respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the
accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7,
1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred
the matter to respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998,
respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case
compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin
who did not have enough resources to hire the
services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other
hand, private complainant was a member of a
powerful family who was out to get even with his
cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his
office nor the interest of the public since he did not
take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave
applications approved by the presiding
judge.1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a
Resolution denying respondent's request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the
Office of the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court without
the required authorization from the Court.5 On
January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent
for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x court since the questioned appearances were made
(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto. – Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, Provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we
required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and
Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong
to a "powerless family" from the impoverished
town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From
childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms.
Ladaga had always supported and guided him while
he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser.
Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga
sought respondent's help and advice when she was
charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for
falsification by the private complainant, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the
said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her
cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with
Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit
with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is
the subject of the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only
lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to
accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she
not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his
seven (7) years of untainted government service,
initially with the Commission on Human Rights and
now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties
with honesty and integrity and that it was only in
this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping
hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never
took advantage of his position as branch clerk of
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and
not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal
case, he was on leave as shown by his approved
leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted
respondent's comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge
Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga
appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of
Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon
City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during
the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City,
he was on official leave of absence. Moreover,
his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan
was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bonocounsel
likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client
Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that
 the respondent did not receive a single centavo
from her. Helpless as she was and respondent
being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high
regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first
time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to
him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his
Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all
the years that he has been in government service,
he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the
respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the Court,
and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was
not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that any repetition of such act
would be dealt with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the
investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
servants from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which disallows certain attorneys from
engaging in the private practice of their profession.
The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No
judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to
clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private
practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the
public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained
the meaning of the term "private practice"
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the
isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No.
84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of
the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court
appearances did not amount to a private practice of
law, he failed to obtain a written permission
therefor from the head of the Department, which is
this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at
the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended
court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May
4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and
August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission.
It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court.
However, he failed to obtain a prior permission
from the head of the Department. The presiding
judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is
not the head of the Department contemplated by
law.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-
reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and
holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
 The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law,
or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists
in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor
at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
 attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling
and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following
any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is
of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot
to do during our review of the provisions on
the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed
to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is
that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result
in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just
one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in
the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in
the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the
work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve
legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given
to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
 MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner"
and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do
not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986],
p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates."
(Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law
as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863,
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of
a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to
litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in
the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in
this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or
role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal
work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the
most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by
the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that
work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service.
(Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business
daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be
called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied
by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for
such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of
information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have
some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate
finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate
lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado
de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer,
earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate
lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes,
is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction
may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a
feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into
the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide
one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of
the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly
needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching
method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances
which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy
sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization
process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel
for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels.
The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in
decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer
has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation
on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived
as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (
Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well
with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships
and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to
be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the
office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of
all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating
work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate
counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems —
physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to
make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department,
it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing
a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations.
All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers
requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional
or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences
 attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that
knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give
him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not
only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and
the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect
of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his
oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and
void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.)
and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked
as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for
the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-
list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating
panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a
country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the
meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role
in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting
and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during
the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (
Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps
even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one
or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also
state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion
to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15,
Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977,
p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the
only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
(Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as
in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission
on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX
of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for
seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion,
suffice it to say that his definition of the practice
of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of
law practice, as distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a
week and would outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says
that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily
mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by
means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since
the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising
others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has
been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be
brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission
in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has
been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a
nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the
answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the
nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth,
but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from
his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on
the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent
to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes
"A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,
5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-
Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS
on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL
Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the
Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by
it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the
merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-
vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance
to layman in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does
not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made
its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain
terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the
field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it
offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical
clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of
justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members
of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services
as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent
claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the
services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any
law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family
Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during
the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out
that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on
its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of
permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las
Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend
to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity
of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent
should be enjoined from causing the publication
of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in
general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized
legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct
of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the
case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar.
To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern
technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession
may be encouraged without tolerating, but
instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench
and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be
offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the
Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice
law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on
which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals
cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined
by rule or regulation, and without any adequate
and effective means of regulating his activities.
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove
to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the
public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is
to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
is offering and rendering legal services through
its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them
to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can
engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate
any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject
to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it
nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur.
270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It
follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position,
in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of
law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not
only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power
to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration
Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of
the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable
Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to
take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in
many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration
of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses
of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public
as such. While it may now be the opportune time
to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should
also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed
by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. —
does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in
that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it
is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that
the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only
illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to
employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada
and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact
it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic
about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful because
it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients
by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers
or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the
fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless
he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed
that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with
broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge
of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds
our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession.
A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification
in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to
omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert
cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In
my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this
is not the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their
own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing
into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used
by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing
law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client along the path charted by law. This,
of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law
only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of
his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part
of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may select an
agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But
if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade the opposite party to
the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'
here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a
person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in
the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the
work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and
non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic
appears to render wedding services (See Annex
"A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with
a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated
as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard
Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer,
such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a
legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to
legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to
his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But
that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation — in
their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no
legal impediment under the statute to the sale
of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification
of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having
any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75
or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p.
101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if
the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable
in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice
of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which
we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney
at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions
to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power
and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look
after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding
the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice
of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists
in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor
at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In
Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range
of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of
giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information
and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen
in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and
installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all
the respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the
law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and
for the which services it will consequently charge
and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such
a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by
an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.
N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-
legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot
afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.
"when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has been categorized,
then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of
by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you
had a rich relative who died and named you her
sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of
pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate
taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state
for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained
to deal with the problem. Now, if there were
other heirs contesting your rich relatives will,
then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court,
and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out
by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the
services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american
jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or
defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies
and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved
to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of what may be considered
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent
by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American
judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
. . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation
are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising
or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied
from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references;
and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation
of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar
of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case
at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as
an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of
fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code
of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable
in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general rule, such as that
being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers
after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain
that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part
of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to
the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative
in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state
of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in
this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted
by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis
for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off
from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement
in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION
OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration1 submitted its Report dated November
30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on
the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had
in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants,
as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment
of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays
the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962,
arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that
there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill
No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17,
1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval
of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos
is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with
argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on
the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission
and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate
the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given
by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to
5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the
setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as
an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of
Law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant
to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general,
are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its
members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its
members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal
research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things,
make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in
maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the
abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal
of incompetent and unworthy judges and
prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of
judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and
break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of
disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish
legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor
may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational
materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the
profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law
libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on
their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain
pervasive and meaningful country-
wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it
may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the
power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing
that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar,"
Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor
restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere
legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar
will promote public interest or, more specifically,
will "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the
unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following
pertinent discussion made by the Commission on
Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration
measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this
reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and
regulate the practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and
takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an
officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is privilege
clothed with public interest, it is far and just that
the exercise of that privilege be regulated to
assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be
discharged through collective action; but there
can be no collective action without an organized
body; no organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair
and just that all attorneys be required to
contribute to the support of such organized body;
and, given existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by integrating the
Bar through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar
imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities,
not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves
the function of elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the end of
improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional services,
may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The legal profession
has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate
the Bar includes the authority to integrate the
Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the
members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an
exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a
tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for
that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes
the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to
regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of the Bar
far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience
to a member that might result from his required
payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice
his views on any subject in any manner he
wishes, even though such views be opposed to
positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to
promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect
his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the
right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it
should become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental
exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended,
might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right
of private judgment has never yet been exalted
above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already
practising because although the requirement to
pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give
the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive benefits they have
not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective
manner than they have been able to do in the
past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a
valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers,
young and old, at the time Bar integration takes
effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it
is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the
Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time — requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England,
Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved
discipline among the members of the Bar; (2)
greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation of the
individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5)
elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance
of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment
of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive
profession; and (9) better and more effective
discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to
the public. No less than these salutary consequences
are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued
that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar;
and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all
over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent)
voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per
cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty
(80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all
over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and
other expressions of unqualified endorsement
and/or support for Bar integration, while not a
single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the
13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite
ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per
cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent)
vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-
committal.5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power
vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to
the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo,
and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have
aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a
candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of
the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69
per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per
cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of this court on
the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted
written comments adverse thereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill
No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of
the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June
21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads
in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of seventy per
cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one
bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining
a grade below fifty per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of
the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the
Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose
motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as
an additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration
of their grades without, however, invoking the law
in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they
had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades.
If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete
list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account
of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And
to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total reaching effects on the practice of the legal
1,168, classified as follows: profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its
1946 (August) 206 121 18 validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-
mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
1946 (November) 477 228 43
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
1947 749 340 0 constitutional.
1948 899 409 11
We have been enlightened in the study of this
1949 1,218 532 164
question by the brilliant assistance of the members
1950 1,316 893 26 of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in
1951 2,068 879 196 writing, on the various aspects in which the
question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of
1952 2,738 1,033 426
Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco,
1953 2,555 Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in
968 284 favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P.
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168 Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
said Republic Act, or mere motions for the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs.
reconsideration. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo
and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
from two to five different examinations, but failed and American jurisprudence on the matter. The
to obtain a passing average in any of them. question has been the object of intense deliberation
Consolidating, however, their highest grades in for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
different subjects in previous examinations, with voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach assigned to a new member in order to place it as
the passing average as provided for by Republic Act humanly as possible above all suspicion of
No. 972. prejudice or partiality.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited
by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because
they could be favorably affected by Republic Act
No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this
tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider
their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according
to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a
portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed
bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles
David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per
cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal
preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly
and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and
civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that
there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials
is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines
published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be published since
1946, which continued to be supplemented by the
addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been
easier had an identical case of similar background
been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily
consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-
Saxon legal history, from which has been directly
derived the judicial system established here with its
lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
and which we have preserved and attempted to
improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From the citations of
those defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite,
among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE
646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441),
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37),
aside from the opinion of the President which is
expressed in his vote of the original bill and which
the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force
or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law — that of
Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme
court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law
of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other
office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of
Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people,
shall be void. They shall not exercise any power
of appointment to public office. Any male citizen
of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral
character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts
of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
 Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers;
the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the
manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of
the provision" expecting the admission of
attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts
or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred
to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must
be by the court; that to admit means to grant
leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the
right of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without
affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision
does not however quote the text of the law, which
we cannot find in any public or accessible private
library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only
subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain
definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study
required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to
the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination
by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and
hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the
Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it
was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of
the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent
alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing
statutes, and it is to be read in connection with
these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the
law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent
evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of
the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of
attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and
that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment
and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law
is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the
highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably
judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study
of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts
was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been
able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial
function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it
stands alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications
for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is
the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and
legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as
to embarrass the other in the discharge of its
respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
 The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar
and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of
the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily
bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their bars,
at least in the English speaking countries. (p.
445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court
ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as
follows: For more than six centuries prior to
the adoption of our Constitution, the courts
of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law,
which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles."
If the courts and judicial power be regarded
as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be
difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an essential
element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to
the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a
separate independent, and coordinate branch
of the government. They took this institution
along with the power traditionally exercise
to determine who should constitute its
attorney at law. There is no express
provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that
the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
merely to its general and unquestioned
power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in
order that public interests may be protected,
such qualifications do not constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its selection.
Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary
by the course of the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars
persons deemed by them unfit to exercise
the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p.
450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to
exercise the power of appointment. It is
quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is
in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys
to the practice of law is a judicial function.
In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far
as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of
the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53,
19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas.
413.
 The power of admitting an attorney to
practice having been perpetually exercised
by the courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of
the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney
is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice
and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral character. This arises
from the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that
the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz,
C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60
A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a
privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That
has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and
made open and notorious by a decision of the
court entered upon its records. The establishment
by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of
its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in
its work, and to protect itself in this respect from
the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and
those not possessing good moral character. Chief
Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality
in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for what cause he
ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed
a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54
NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18
L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its
order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general practice
in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact
of the admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they, respectively,
belong for, three years preceding their
application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of
the possession of the requisite legal learning, and
the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From
its entry the parties become officers of the court,
and are responsible to it for professional
misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron,
admission or their exclusion is not the exercise
 of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of
judicial power, and has been so held in numerous
cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of
New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are
not only officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of
a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court,
and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of
their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost
without exception conceded everywhere to
be the exercise of a judicial function, and
this opinion need not be burdened with
citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one
of the inherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the
exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281
Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65,
A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to
establish rules that shall regulate and govern
in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and
obligations with reference to transactions
that are past or conditions that exist at the
time of the exercise of judicial power, and
the distinction is a vital one and not subject
to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province
shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control
the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them
to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall
be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the
bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of
law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be
so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the
 Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines,
Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule
on the matter, it would have nothing over which to
exercise the power granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated
by this Court, but the authority and responsibility
over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute
or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of
its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at
law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal,
modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But
this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial
power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are
not repugnant, but rather complementary to each
other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that
would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates
our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A
recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be
admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license
without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of
Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the bar, without taking
the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28,
1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act
Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An
Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as
follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the
laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and
are in good and regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any person
who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any
time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court
of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of
the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for
the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the
Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a
former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of
the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four
points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our
duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of
the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented
his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in
the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to
pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of
the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar without taking
the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory
proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It
is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting
the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute,
and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to
give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to
have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of
the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190,
the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon
this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and
restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the
word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those
who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the
admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe that the applicants
had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of
their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or
any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last
applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his
defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that
 this application for license to practice in the
courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took
the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked
ability in the performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service
by appointing him to the office of provincial
fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a
special examination which will be given him by
a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general
rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day
and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it
has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary
and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied
for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those
who had studied for three years if they commenced
their studies after the aforementioned date. The
Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission
to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from
law schools issued to the applicants. The act of
the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act
to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it
appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: "And
every application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a
law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding
any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double
proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two
years, and requiring an attendance by the student
of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied
with the usual proofs of good moral character.
The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office,
"and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose
course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this court.
If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar.
(p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an
enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in
the administration of justice, and could prescribe
the character of evidence which should be
received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general
law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege,
and a license for that purpose makes the holder
an officer of the court, and confers upon him the
right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and
to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest
on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing
an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for different
one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147
Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill.
98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S.
150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and
the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121
Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his
profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an
arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment
based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E.
113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to
learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class
of persons who began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into
two classes — First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who
studied law for the period of two years in a law
office, or part of the time in a law school and
part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both
classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed
with, and as between the two different conditions
and limits of time are fixed. No course of study
is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to
the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice
law resting upon the mere date of November 4,
1897, which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who began
on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso
need spend only two years in study, while those
who commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two years
before the time limit. The one who commenced
on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination before December
31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of
study, while as to the other the prescribed course
must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the
court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it
be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that
power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through
general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the
right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233,
32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right
of every citizen of the United States to follow
any lawful calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are
imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them
— that is, the right to continue their prosecution
— is often of great value to the possessors and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more
than their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to
establish the possession on the part of the
application of his proper qualifications before he
may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations
of those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121
N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W.
468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to
confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to
practice law and that one time he possessed the
requisite learning and other qualifications to
entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from
the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929,
c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all
who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and
received a honorable discharge therefrom and
who (were disabled therein or thereby within the
purview of the Act of Congress approved June
7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses
of the constitution of that state. In re Application
of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of
the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded
upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one
class of citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it does
not apply and must rest on some reason on which
it can be defended. In other words, there must be
such a difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the class
and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation to the subjects of
the discriminatory legislation as presents a just
and natural cause for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am.
Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the
bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain
72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955,
will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum
general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive
of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none,
and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941
or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal
has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the
unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953,
1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions
justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no
one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in
which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar
of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69
per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949,
74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the
Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by
the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo
what had been done — cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75
per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider
69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who
failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them
to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect
of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years
1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that
said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment
of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised
was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop
or suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules.
This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial
passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system
that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946
to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and
because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious
that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without
any force nor effect for the following reasons, to
wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It
decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their
respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only
this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended
to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration
of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge
and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of
that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it
concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after
hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our
Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate
among the members of the Court, and after hearing
the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the
eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided
for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act
No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices,
that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law,
that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions
of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more,
without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether
they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under
Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with
annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and
who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:
XXXXXX
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
A list of those who petitioned for the
consolidation of their grades in subjects passed
in previous examinations, showing the years in
which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had
filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 72
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953,
while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked
the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of
those candidates separating those who filed mere
motions for reconsideration (56) from those who
invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR
RECONSIDERATION
XXXX
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition,
they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court
reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average
in the bar examination of august and November of
1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74
per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per
cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those
who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused
the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the
Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters,
but those referring to sections 14 and 16
immediately concern us. The proposed amendment
is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed the
Av.
examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 20
per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10
per cent; International Law, 5 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social
Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any
subject in which they have obtained a rating
of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall
be taken into account in determining their
general average in any subsequent
examinations: Provided, however, That if
the candidate fails to get a general average
of 70 per cent in his third examination, he
shall lose the benefit of having already
passed some subjects and shall be required
to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful
applicants. — Any applicant who has
 obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without falling below 50 per
cent in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, or who has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission
to the bar, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5,
8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates
at bar examinations should be compelled to
repeat even those subjects which they have
previously passed. This is not the case in any
other government examination. The Rules of
Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any
subject which he has previously passed with a
rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by
Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the
same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and
one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule
127. One part of this amendment provides that if
a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in
any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said
subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment
plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient
for the candidate because he may in an
examination prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time
that he has passed the last required subjects,
which may be several years away from the time
that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he
shall have forgotten the principles and theories
contained in those subjects and remembers only
those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible
because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar
examinations every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on this
plan, must pass the examination in no more that
three installments; but there is no limitation as to
the time or number of years intervening between
each examination taken. This would defeat the
object and the requirements of the law and the
Court in admitting persons to the practice of law.
When a person is so admitted, it is to be
presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to
practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective
clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing
grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last
two subjects the present year. We believe that the
present system of requiring a candidate to obtain
a passing general average with no grade in any
subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and
prepared in all required legal subjects at the time
of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of
section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject
in any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject,
despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not
only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the
next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern
even in the future. As to the validity of making
such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal
doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that
after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average grade, but also rejecting
and denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present amendment
would have the effect of repudiating, reversing
and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those who
may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing average
fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of
the Court remarked during the discussion, when
a court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in
force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal
of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered
is the fact that members of the bar are officers of
the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a
Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a
person fit, competent and qualified to be its
officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any
year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required
for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court
equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction
of the passing general average runs counter to all
these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court
and practically and in effect says that a candidate
not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to
be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in
spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this
Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
is another important aspect of the question to be
carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951,
stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of
the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level.
This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed
in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after the 4th day
of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting
as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946,
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set
aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It
should be noted that after every bar examination
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average but
also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the
effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those who
may have failed to obtain the passing average
fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad
precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to
those who have failed in the examinations for
admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress
of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3
vote of each House as prescribed by section 20,
article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371
was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS
FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946
UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtained a general average of
70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations;
71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in
the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all
succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade
of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its
approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections
of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves
discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946
to 1951 when those who would otherwise have
passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme
Court has been altering the passing mark from 69
in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to
give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is
proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the
general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition
that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject
a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade,
is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last
world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea
of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of
the study of law which was objected to by
the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year
stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who
failed in the bar examination". He considered the
bill a class legislation. This contention, however,
is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the
Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the
passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for
who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination
on the strength of the established precedent of
our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which
they were unavoidably placed. We believe that
such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the rights
already accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the precedent
was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the
principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be
considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact.
The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the
following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who
naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification,
and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the
class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be
again split and then have the dissevered factions
of the original unit designated with different
rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time
with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike.
Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The
special public purpose will sustain the special
form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one
of legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in
the case of plain abuse will there be revision by
the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective
statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946
when the Supreme Court first deviated from the
rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this
bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed
by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which
endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with
the information that, with respect to Senate
Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are
taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in
May, 1951, contained in the first
indorsement of the undersigned dated June
5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the
bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953
(Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972
(many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON.
RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and
ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D.
Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and
re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and
67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the
Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This
was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law
Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as
well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons
to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the
release of the results. Note that this was without any
formal motion or request from the proper parties,
i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners
concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this
not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to
go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects —
Political Law and Public International Law, Civil
Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial
Law — of a successful bar candidate with office
code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by
the respective examiner concerned. Further check of
the records revealed that the bar candidate with
office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a
perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969,
1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with
a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the
1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar
Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said
Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and
his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual
sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining
to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized,
and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in
the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise
resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his
name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The
five examiners concerned were also required by the
Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March
12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and
35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement
in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified
answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163,
pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to
verify the same and complaince came on May 18,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that
it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of
a number of examination notebooks in Political
Law and Public International Law to meet the
deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.).
Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo
Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also
discovered that another paper in Political Law and
Public International Law also underwent re-
evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with
Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by
another successful candidate by the name
of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted
in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-
checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile
Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to
50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is
owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in
the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau
of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of
Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol.
V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in that
case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the
bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact
which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced
on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required
to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar
Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
submitted by them to the Court. The same became
the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer,
which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances
under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked
the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent
Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last
year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice and the
policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained
in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one
subject and a rather low one in another, he will
bring back the latter to the examiner concerned
for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of
this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the
belief that it was really the practice and policy of
the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was
brought back to me for such re-evaluation and
upon verifying my files I found that the notebook
is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-
evaluation of the answers were based on the
same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with
original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to
10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially
reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and
10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to
make the reconsideration of these answers
because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and
Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of
examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in
good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based
on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or
about October 16, 1971, relationship between
Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have
always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the
same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;
b) That considering this relationship
and considering his misrepresentation to me as
reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get
the consent and permission of the Chairman of
the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the
Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified
as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been
received by me in return for such recorrection,
and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original
correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit
of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to
my residence to obtain from me the last bag of
two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my
record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my
residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a
Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at
least two companions. The bar confidant had
with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he
requested me if it was possible for me to review
and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the
said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I
recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to
receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me
that I was authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and authority as long
as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee
in the case present bearing code number 661 had
not been identified or revealed; and that it might
have been possible that I had given a particularly
low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar
Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the
grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee
deserved an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to
correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question
had not been decoded and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total grade in the
notebook and the grade card attached thereto,
and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected
the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No.
10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy thereof, and the
Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-
59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by
reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn
statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's
notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973;
now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do
not know him personally, and that I have never
met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that
I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I
was authorized to make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his
identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in
the regular course of express prohibition in the
rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner,
and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained
as much as possible from frequent personal
contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as
an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me
at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding
in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked
like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as
it was about the same hour that he used to see
me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was
still in the same condition as when I submitted
the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see
if I committed an error in the correction, not to
make the examinee pass the subject. I considered
it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it
did not strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in
the position to know and that there was nothing
irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original
grade obtained by the examinee with notebook
code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final
grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass
the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of
the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was
that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said
subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know
the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a
party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance
in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with
him before or rather the review and even up to
the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63;
rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would
deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already
completed correction of the books in Criminal
Law and was helping in the correction of some
of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%then he would make the general passing
average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade
to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised
mark and revised also the mark and revised also
the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of
the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and
without expectation of nor did I derive any personal
benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law,
stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or
early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo,
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in
my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had
 previously graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and others (he used the
words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade that
I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of
being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall,
Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to
the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously
given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr.
Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address
such a request to me and that the said request
was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that
in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I
had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973,
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with
resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted
in good faith. It may well be that he could be
faulted for not having verified from the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners
the legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the
first time, he was not aware, not having been
apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume,
owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the
position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular
examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee
the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular
subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal,
to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile
Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one
Bar examinee passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee
that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper
of this particular Bar candidate;.
 That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to
me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613)
showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers of this particular Bar
candidate I decided to increase his final grade to
71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and
duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn
statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No.
1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith
and in direct compliance with the agreement
made during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate
fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned
should make a re-evaluation of the answers of
the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at
the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation
that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up
to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking
the entries in the grading sheets and the posting
on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook.
This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on
the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial
weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or
re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that
immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with
requests of the examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of them would file
motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-
evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious,
but just the same they have to be denied because
the result of the examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such
instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to
the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing,
it was not his intention to forsake or betray the
trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner,
because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge,
he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the Committee during
the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general
 average but with a grade below 50% in
Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned
who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a
notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification
of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the
examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing
in all good faith that they so merited on the basis
of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to
them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me
to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and
the early part of February, 1972, on my way back
to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though
of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always
made it a point that the moment I think of so
buying, I pick a number from any object and the
first number that comes into my sight becomes
the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment,
the first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the Supreme Court building from
San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the
south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo
High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion
of the post to which it is attached is identified
and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to
Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would
contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three
digits corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because the
sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to
link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers
on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when
I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the
number "27" (or "227") or end with said number.
(1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969
Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-
Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list
as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List
as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was
born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a)
On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.
While I was still confined at the hospital, our
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded November
27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I
was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at
the time was on the checking of the notebooks.
While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number "954". As the
number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents
of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent soundness
of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good
faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and
Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for
possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or
deception could have reference to either of the
two cases which I brought to the attention of the
committee during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50%
(47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 110,
identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade
of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as
Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a
borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at
the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It
turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade
of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as
Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political
and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. -----
-- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is,
only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter,
under the facts and circumstances I made known
to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the
notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation
even volunteered to review or re-check some 19,
or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and
that the increase in grade after re-evaluation,
unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of
only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only
serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12,
1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a
Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents
of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing
office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with
former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and
never met him before except once when, as
required by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the
Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases;
after the official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a
situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the
entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable
doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this
Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5,
1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations
which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in
his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent,
these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation
of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially
for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of
others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the
fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations
resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be
disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their
work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All
of these inferences are deductible from the
narration of facts in the resolution, and which
only goes to show said narration of facts an
unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of
March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations
of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is denied
and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were
in the performance of their duties and that they
should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104,
rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates
how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to
the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers
of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof
for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around
the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached
Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was
in the process of correcting examination booklets,
and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily
high grade in one subject and a rather low one on
another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and
change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on
the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word
and under the belief that was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court and in his further
belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to
75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged
to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95
and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee
is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of
the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision,
Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang
still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or
early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal,
with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected
and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining
and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook
were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find
the examinee deserving of being admitted to the
Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called
the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that
in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test
of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and
ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather
than a test of memory; in the correction of
papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-
evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's
grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made
by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet.
The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his
affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo,
Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver
to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's
house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be
corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that
particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects
except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-
evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations.
After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing
him that this is the practice of the Court to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject —
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated
the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from
68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then
made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made.
This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law
— that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his grade in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%,
then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want
to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade
from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the
general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his
Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1,
2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66
and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been
shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a
copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was
long before the re-evaluation requested by
respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61,
rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could
not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision
of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee
for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate
said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within
hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to
respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of
61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The
matter was not however thereafter officially brought
to the Committee for consideration or decision
(Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being
given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others,
he would not have consented to make the re-
evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to
change the grade of an examinee after he had
submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35,
rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of
200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review
and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook
because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the
examine who owns that particular notebook
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After
clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-
evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from
57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as
office code number. It belonged to examinee
Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30,
rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D.
Lanuevo, respondent.
A such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5)
MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's
average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more
or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It
is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the
examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought
to justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his
honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake
or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them
in the initial correction of the examination papers
and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any
but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo,
Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —
whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as Labor Laws and Social
well as corroborate each other. Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of
the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
and clarified by extensive cross-examination or 33 weighted points.
conducted during the investigation and hearing of
the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. evaluation made.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the or 30 weighted points.
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
and the Examiners implicit in his position as 4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence 22 weighted points.
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship
with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced 11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase Legal Ethics and Practical
of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar. evaluation made.
————————————
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
and well-calculated moves in successively
representing separately to each of the five Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of
minor subjects while his general average was only the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the
66.25% — which under no circumstances or other examinees. He did this in favor only of
standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for
notebook of Galang was referred back to the each of the latter who — Political Law and Public
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics for Ty dela Cruz.
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade
of 81%. The averages and individual grades of The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed,
Galang before and after the unauthorized re- has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
evaluation are as follows: reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail
to make the passing mark before or after their
BAI notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners.
After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him
1. Political Law Public by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
or 30 weighted points taken and thereafter compute the general average.
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
BAI showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of
which the Court will determine the passing average,
whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has
no business evaluating the answers of the
examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He
cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the
examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his
position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely
doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he
singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol.
VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact
further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of
Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average
of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave
injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the
1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more
than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure
of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of
re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is
inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in
Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping
that the over ninety examinees who were far better
situated than Galang would not give him away.
Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg
and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the
office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in
his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during
the investigation with this Court as to why he pried
into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for
support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973
or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY
DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE
LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50%
TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND
OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO
EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE
INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted
having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners
concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar
Examination Committee during its first meeting
(Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to
refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and
to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two
cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record
of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of
the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials
of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record
(Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol.
VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law,
maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him,
this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol.
V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that
the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty
dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the
cover of the notebook of said examinee and the
change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent
Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty
dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and
Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47
crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI,
pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo
testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner
concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo
declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but
who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17,
rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the
notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to
the Examiner concerned. The day following the
meeting in which the case of an examinee with
Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent
Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular
notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to
Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee
whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken
up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other
case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61,
rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers
of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the
meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner
in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No.
2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in
Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other
failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law
are as follows: The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in
Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
BA Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 violation was due to the misrepresentation of
weighted points respondent Lanuevo.
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = " It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
Taxation 69% 69% = " Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " the Bar Examination Committee because even at the
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " time of said referral, which was after the
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four
———————————————— (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in
Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under
the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo
was 71%.
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in
Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant,
grades. These are: thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the
Politic Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
al Law
70% As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Taxati Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
on from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they
72% should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
His grades and averages before and after the
disqualifying grade was removed are as follows: III

BA Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E.

Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = " A
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = " The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
weighted points the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of
Remedial Law 88% 88% = " his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law,
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = " Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
————————————————— Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in
admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94
Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts
through a Bar Examination Committee, composed
of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and
eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject
assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who
is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in
connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar
must be in accordance with the established rules of
the Court and must always be subject to the final
approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential
as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the
Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of
the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was
initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the
trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of
admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not
an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of
such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission
to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of
good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or
under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he
was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude
filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused.
It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the
first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any.
But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to
consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in
any criminal case, whether pending or terminated
by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or
conviction, has a bearing upon his character or
fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964,
when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants
already required the applicant to declare under oath
that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966,
when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving
moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form,
the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused
of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there
a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163,
p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his
criminal case of slight physical injuries which was
then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the
Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal
case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and
1971, he committed perjury when he declared under
oath that he had no pending criminal case in court.
By falsely representing to the Court that he had no
criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was
allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well — settled (see 165
ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the
conclusion that the respondent, in withholding
from the board of law examiners and from the
justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty
of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law
examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor of the
judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel.
Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W
— 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his
name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p.
710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is
conferred in the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the
court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state
from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court,
with such explanations as were available. Silence
respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the
very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim
himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his
name in that criminal case up to the present time,
indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is
therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the
noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part
of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was,
as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission
to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet
he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly
irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of
his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE
said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to
be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe
him with all the prestige of its confidence, and
then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case
is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE
had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among
others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico,
resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the
name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys
on the basis of the findings of the Court
Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A.
Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral
character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c)
fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People
vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In
re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro
and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez
(Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and
they were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel
G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel
Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted
having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation
of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned
the said notebooks; and that they did the same
without any consideration or expectation of any.
These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are
of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or
re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest
involved in the matter of admission of members to
the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive
before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the
Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme
Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo
to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to
fully satisfy themselves that the examinee
concerned was really so circumstances. This they
could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian,
and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that
the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-
evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent
Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you
said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I
cannot remember the exact average and if he would
get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish
to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told
me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and
that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular
examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said
'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to
help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said
'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate'
and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While
I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the
answers was correct although it was not complete I
raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68
and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp.
44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases
in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made
the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of
your own accord in the absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my
report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of
April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of
this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief
that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in
good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular
examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee
the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular
subject that said examinee failed, herein
 respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances
utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free
from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that
he deserved the increased grades given after the said
re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the
records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in
connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or
deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action.
WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the
admission of members to the Bar is one impressed
with the highest consideration of public interest —
absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and
vigilance in the performance of their duties relative
thereto.
V after the official release of the bar results, it remains
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up
this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance
or support thereto ... was motivated with
vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be
pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged
friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not
pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge
against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18,
1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did
not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during
the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still
alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar
Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be
misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the
part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the
motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he
deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to
see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with
the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results
(Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian
an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of
the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the
rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and
to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct
evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A transaction therein involved did not push through
There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary
as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his
wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more
or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed
of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same
date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said
house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the
total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage —
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument
— April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No.
90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date
of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down
payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or
less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of
the P17,000.00 was his savings while the
remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by
him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in
dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,
pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are
not fully reflected and accounted for in
respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo
listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount
of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his
bank deposit listed under Assets was in the
amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that
of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the amount of
P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol.
VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000
loan of respondent from his married sister in
Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place,
said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly,
the alleged note which he allegedly received
from his sister at the time he received the $200
was not even presented by respondent during the
investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a
loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as
one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during
the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised
to furnish the Investigator the address of his
sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled
as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a
family of her own, is among the top earners in
Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to
him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his
wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to
the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry
No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
 subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry
No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973
the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent
Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence,
only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as
the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot.
According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his
liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS
real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car
or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as
of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW
car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and
the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination
committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to
show that the money used by respondent
Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above
properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after
the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring
from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after
he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick
leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the
amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the
investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII,
pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another
public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes
the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it
is determined that his property or money "is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep.
Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that
There are likewise circumstances indicating
possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary
of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school
days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ
University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of
our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958,
Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position
of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and
Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts
with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was
approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the
date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it
was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even
when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-
law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19
years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed
as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy
(Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently,
during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI,
pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of
the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of
respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the
MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly
addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E.
Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-
12, Vol. IV, rec.).
he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of
the said office. He does not also know whether
beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their
ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang
admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court
of Manila, although he insists that he never
bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings
(Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS
building and is obliquely across the City Court
building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an
investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of
Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E.
Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of
the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp.
48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement
in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the
guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit
was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans
Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of
the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo
was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was
still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a
member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on
January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first
lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into
the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd
Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army
stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945
date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has
submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its
strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias
Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.
B.M. No. 1222 February 4, 2004
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar
examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in
the examination on the subject. After making his
own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar
examination on the subject be nullified and that an
investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23
September 2003, the Court adopted the
recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to
nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to
hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at
eight o’clock in the evening (being the earliest
available time and date) at the De La Salle
University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution
was issued without prejudice to any action that the
Court would further take on the matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court
received numerous petitions and motions from the
Philippine Association of Law Schools and various
other groups and persons, expressing agreement to
the nullification of the bar examinations in
Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations
against the holding of another examination on the
subject. Several reasons were advanced by
petitioners or movants, among these reasons being
the physical, emotional and financial difficulties
that would be encountered by the examinees, if
another examination on the subject were to be held Remedi 23.529
anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court 20% 4 4.71%
al Law %
included the spreading out of the weight of
Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar Legal
subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of Ethics
the examinations on the basis only of the and
5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
performance of the examinees in the seven bar Practical
subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, Exercise
the Court, finding merit in the submissions, s
resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in
Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate
the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar 100% 20%
examination subjects. In the same resolution, the
Court further resolved to create a Committee In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the
composed of three retired members of the Court that Court designated the following retired Associate
would conduct a thorough investigation of the Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the
incident subject of the 23 September 2003 Investigating Committee:
resolution.
Justice Carolina C. Griño-
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court Chairman:
Aquino
adopted the computation in the allocation of the
fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
wit:
The Investigating Committee was tasked to
Adjus determine and identify the source of leakage, the
Origina Adjuste
Relati ted parties responsible therefor or who might have
l d
ve Relati benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against
Subject Percent Percent
Weig ve all those found to have been responsible for, or who
age age
ht Weig would have benefited from, the incident in question
Weight Weight
ht and to recommend measures to the Court to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
Political
and On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee
17.647
Internati 15% 3 3.53% submitted its report and recommendation to the
%
onal Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -
Law
Labor "In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third
and Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the
11.765 examination in commercial law was held in De la
Social 10% 2 2.35%
% Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue
Legislati
on of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day,
the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage
Civil
15%
17.647
3 3.53% in the said examination.1
law %
"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary
Taxatio 11.765
10% 2 2.35% inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
n %
chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee,
Crimina 11.765 reported the matter to the Chief Justice and
10% 2 2.35% recommended that the examination in mercantile
l law %
law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of
the leakage be undertaken.
"Acting on the report and recommendation of
Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated
September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in
mercantile law and resolved to hold another
examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4,
2003 at eight o’clock in the evening (being the
earliest available time and date) at the same venue.
However, because numerous petitions, protests, and
motions for reconsideration were filed against the
retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the
Court cancelled the holding of such examination.
On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the
fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law
among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects
(Resolution dated October 7, 2003).
"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the
Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee
composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court
to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to
submit its findings and recommendations on or
before December 15, 2003.
"The Court designated the following retired
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose
the Committee:
Justice CAROLINA GRIÑO-
Chairman:
AQUINO
Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V.
MENDOZA
"The Investigating Committee was directed to
determine and identify the source of the leakage, the
parties responsible therefor and those who benefited
therefrom, and to recommend measures to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
"The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003
and continued up to November 7, 2003. The
following witnesses appeared and testified at the
investigation:
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman
of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk
in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in
mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty.
Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer
in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing
partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in
commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of
Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty.
De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of
Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious
brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief
of Systems Development for Judicial
Application, MlSO;
The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to
conduct the investigation and three times to
deliberate on its report.
"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG,
chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee,
testified that on Monday morning, September 22,
2003, the day after the Bar examination in
mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his
office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,2 Rose
Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks,
Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a
friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-
Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University
in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the
Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that
something was wrong with the examination in
mercantile law, because previous to the
examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of
the examination, she received a copy of the test
questions in that subject. She did not pay attention
to the test questions because no answers were
provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her
review of that subject, using other available bar
review materials, of which there were plenty
coming from various bar review centers.
"However, upon perusing the questions after the
examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them
were the same questions that were asked in the just-
concluded-examination.
"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend
to his office in the Supreme Court, but Carbajosa
declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested
that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them
at Robinson’s Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson’s Place at
the appointed time and showed the test questions to
Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the
leaked questions and compared them with the bar
questions in mercantile law. On the back of the
pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences
she noted between the leaked questions and the bar
examination questions.
"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked
questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with
the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He
found the leaked questions to be the exact same
questions which the examiner in mercantile law,
Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and
submitted to him as chairman of the Bar
Examinations Committee. However, not all of those
questions were asked in the bar examination.
According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final
bar questions were questions prepared by Atty.
Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself,
were included in the final bar examination. The
questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not among
the leaked test questions.
"Apart from the published news stories about the
leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and
Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail,
reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F.
Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh.
H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh.
B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions
and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source
of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed
them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003,
four days before the examination in mercantile law
on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR
was subpoenaed by the Committee. She identified
the copy of the leaked questions that came from
Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that,
according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test
questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying,
like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also
enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review
Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas
Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out
because the Lex Review Center gives them away
for free to its bar reviewees.
"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71
years of age, senior partner in the law firm of
BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009
West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on
the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the
examiner in commercial law. He accepted the
assignment and almost immediately began the
preparation of test questions on the subject. Using
his personal computer in the law office, he prepared
for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test
questions which covered the entire subject of
Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he
did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in
final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl
Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24,
2003). And, as he did not know how to print the
questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to
make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was
done inside his office with only him and his
secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy
(Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the
test questions, consisting of three sets, in an
envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice
Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the
questions to the latter’s office that afternoon.
However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office
shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed
envelope to his confidential assistant who had been
instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in
the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice
Vitug’s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted
the sealed envelope containing the test questions
(pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how
to operate a computer except to type on it. He does
not know how to open and close his own computer
which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he
did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his
secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his
computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the
password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who devised
it (Id., p. 71).
"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is
located inside his room which is locked when he is
not in the office. He comes to the office every other
day only.
"He thought that his computer was safely insulated
from third parties, and that he alone had access to it.
He was surprised to discover, when reports of the
bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact
interconnected with the computers of his nine (9)
assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of
fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and
Benjamin R. Katly - of the Court’s Management
Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the
request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the
Investigating Committee to inspect the computer
system in his office, reported that there were 16, not
9, computers connected to each other via Local
Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-alone
computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty.
Balgos’ law partner, former Justice Secretary
Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez
took it away when he became the Secretary of
Justice.
"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers,
connected to Attorney Balgos’ computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July
2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October
22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of
the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile
law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and
questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of
them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was
absent then. All of them professed to know nothing
about the bar leakage.
"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office
manager, Atienza is only a second year law student
at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and
operating computers. It was he and/or his brother
Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the
law office, including Attorney Balgos’ computer,
without the latter’s knowledge and permission.
"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he
participated in the bar operations or ‘bar ops’ of the
Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a
member, but he clarified that his participation
consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar
examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned
Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the
Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De
Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the
test questions from Attorney Balgos’ computer and
faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney
Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the
source of the leakage of his test questions in
mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh.
E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his
proposed test questions, with marginal markings
made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.),
indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or
different: (D), together with the percentage points
corresponding to each question. On the basis of this
comparative table and Atty. Balgos’ indications as
to which questions were the same or different from
those given in the final questionnaire, Justice
Mendoza computed the credit points contained in
the proposed leaked questions. The proposed
questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions.
Attached to this Report as Annex A is the
comparative table and the computation of credit
points marked as Exh. E-1.
"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary
of Attorney Balgos for the past six years, testified
that she did not type the test questions. She
admitted, however, that it was she who formatted
the questions and printed one copy as directed by
her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos’
testimony regarding her participation in the
operation of his personal computer. She disclosed
that what appears in Atty. Balgos’ computer can be
seen in the neighborhood network if the other
computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre
Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty.
Balgos’ computer when the latter is open and not in
use.
"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing
partner of the firm, testified that on October 16,
2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving
him ‘72 hours to explain in writing why you should
not be terminated for causing the Firm an
undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of
the leakage aforesaid.’
"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his
resignation ‘effective immediately.’ He explained
that:
‘Causing the firm, its partners and members to
suffer from undeserved condemnation and
humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out
of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident
subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest
assured, though, that I have never been part of any
deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and
integrity of the firm, its partners and members.’
(Exh. D)
"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined
Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB
degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an
awardee for academic excellence. He passed the
1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In
FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law
fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and
MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of
the fraternity, he was active during bar
examinations and participated in the fraternity’s
‘bar ops.’
"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he
was exploring Atty. Balgos’ computer, (which he
often did without the owner’s knowledge or
permission), to download materials which he
thought might be useful to save for future use, he
found and downloaded the test questions in
mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly
thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty.
Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in his
hard disk.
"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of
his fraternity ‘brods,’ a certain Ronan Garvida who,
De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar
examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from
FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but
did not pass.
"On September 17, 2003, four days before the
mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed
a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-
2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed
by Garvida that he was retaking the bar
examinations. He advised Garvida to share the
questions with other ‘Betan’ examinees. He
allegedly did not charge anything for the test
questions. Later, after the examination was over,
Garvida ‘texted’ (sent a text message on his cell
phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the
bar examination.
"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile
law bar questions to another fraternity brother
named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita
(Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28,
Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions
to still another ‘brod’ named Erwin Tan who had
helped him during the ‘bar ops’ in 1998 when he
(De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28).
He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and
Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he
informed by text message, that they were ‘guide
questions,’ not tips, in the mercantile law
examination.
"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on
Wednesday after the examination, (news of the
leakage was already in all the newspapers), De
Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed
the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did
not reveal where he got the test questions.
"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin
Tan acknowledging that he received the test
questions. However, Erwin informed him that the
questions were ‘kalat na kalat’ (all over the place)
even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp.
54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).
"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed
him that he gave copies of the test questions to
Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Arlan also ‘texted’ De Guzman that almost all the
questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Tan
commented that many of the leaked questions were
asked in the examination, ‘pero hindi exacto; mi
binago’ (they were not exactly the same; there were
some changes).
"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received
no response.
"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to
operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the
office manager, and through self-study, by asking
those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has
been using computers since 1997, and he bought his
own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses
at home.
"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal
secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her
affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her
participation in the reproduction and transmittal by
fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to
Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De
Guzman.
"RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the
Investigating Committee in compliance with the
subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated
from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32
years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was
afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of
the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of
the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling
disease although it may have periods of remission.
It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and
staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble
in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be
impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p.
737, Vol. 2, Reader’s Digest Medical Encyclopedia,
1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.).
All these symptoms were present when Garvida
testified before the Committee on November 6,
2003 to answer its questions regarding his
involvement in the leakage of the examiner’s test
questions in mercantile law.
"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at
FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended
by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one
and a half years. Although they had been out of
touch since he went home to the province on
account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman
was able [to] get this cell phone number from his
compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told
Garvida that he was faxing him ‘possible questions
in the bar examination in mercantile law.’ Because
the test questions had no answers, De Guzman
stressed that they were not ‘tips’ but only ‘possible
test questions.’
"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar
examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium
Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as
enrollment fee. However, on his way to the
Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar
examination, he suffered pains in his wrist -
symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician
advised him to go to the National Orthopedic
Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.
"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar
examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend
the review classes at the Consortium Review Center
because he did not want to waste completely the
P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review
course (‘Nahihinayang ako’). That was presumably
why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking
the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test
questions in mercantile law.
"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a
copy to his ‘brod’ Randy Iñigo who was reviewing
at the Consortium Review Center. Randy
photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity
brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of
the test questions, but Randy who has a high regard
for De Guzman, believed that the questions were
‘tips.’ Garvida did not fax the questions to any other
person than Randy Iñigo. He allegedly did not sell
the questions to Randy. ‘I could not do that to a
brod,’ he explained.
"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the
leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left
margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek
initials ‘BEA-MLQU,’ indicating that the source of
that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at
MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald
Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta
Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at
the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity
conducted ‘Bar Ops’ for the 2003 bar exams. Bar
Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every
year. They start as soon as new officers of the
fraternity are elected in June, and they continue
until the bar examinations are over. The bar
operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni
brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar
review materials for the use of their ‘barristers’ (bar
candidates) in the various review centers, providing
meals for their ‘brod’-barristers on examination
days; and to rent a ‘bar site’ or place near De la
Salle University where the examinees and the frat
members can convene and take their meals during
the break time. The Betans’ bar site for the 2003 bar
examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street,
Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start
of the examination, Collado’s fraternity distributed
bar review materials for the mercantile law
examination to the examinees who came to the bar
site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by
Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had
received them from Randy Iñigo.
"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to
be printed with the logo and initials of the fraternity
(BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU
examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time
constraints, frat members were unable to answer the
test questions despite the clamor for answers, so,
they were given out ‘as is’ - without answers.
"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose
Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City,
was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical
Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is
operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of
which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He
learned about the leakage of test questions in
mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-
week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano
University. The leaked questions were shown to
him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the
mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday
lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering
from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the
subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the
exam. He denied having bought or obtained and
distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile
Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.
"F I N D I N G S
"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions
in Mercantile Law were the questions which the
examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had
prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as
chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee.
The questions constituted 82% of the questions
asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the
morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some
cases with slight changes which were not
substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed
by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was
able to get hold of the leaked questions before the
mercantile law examination and answered them
correctly, would have been assured of passing the
examination with at least a grade of 82%!
"The circumstance that the leaked test questions
consisted entirely of test questions prepared by
Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage
originated from his office, not from the Office of
Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.
"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions
were prepared by him on his computer. Without any
doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was
Atty. Balgos’ computer. The culprit who stole or
downloaded them from Atty. Balgos’ computer
without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and
who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos’
legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating
Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the
test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita
Villasis, to his fraternity ‘brods,’ namely, Ronan
Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not
recall), and Erwin Tan.
"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to
Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Randy Iñigo passed a copy or copies of the same
questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave
a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda’s] Most
Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered
the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the
MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.
"Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading
Attorney Balgos’ test questions in mercantile law
from the latter’s computer, without his knowledge
and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It
was theft of intellectual property; the test questions
were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being
the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an
unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos’ right to
privacy of communication, and to security of his
papers and effects against unauthorized search and
seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of
Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article
III, 1987 Constitution).
"He transgressed the very first canon of the
lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes.’
"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test
questions to some members of the Beta Sigma
Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit
and to given them undue advantage over the other
examiners in the mercantile law examination, De
Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his
fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the
law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded
the noble profession of law instead of upholding its
dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public
respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of
the bar examinations as the final measure of a law
graduate’s academic preparedness to embark upon
the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not
believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for
the leakage of Atty. Balgos’ proposed test questions
in the mercantile law examination. The Committee
does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have
the assistance and cooperation of other persons,
such as:
"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos’ private secretary,
who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the
only person who knew the password, who could
open and close his computer; and who had the key
to his office where his computer was kept. Since a
computer may not be accessed or downloaded
unless it is opened, someone must have opened
Atty. Balgos’ computer in order for De Guzman to
retrieve the test questions stored therein.
"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity ‘brod’ of De
Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting
Atty. Balgos’ computer with the other computers
outside Atty. Balgos’ room or office, and who was
the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who
knew the password of Atty. Balgos’ computer.
"The following persons who received from De
Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test
questions, appear to have conspired with him to
steal and profit from the sale of the test questions.
They could not have been motivated solely by a
desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was
widespread (‘kalat na kalat’) according to Erwin
Tan. The possible co-conspirators were:
Ronan Garvida,
Arlan,
Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo,
Ronald Collado, and
Allan Guiapal
"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman
recklessly broke the law and risked his job and
future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior
material consideration for his breaking the law and
tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well
knows, covers the bar examinations.
"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the
theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos’
computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos
had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the
secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As
the computer is a powerful modern machine which
he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should
not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions
that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not
know the password of his computer. He relied on
his secretary to use the password to open and close
his computer. He kept his computer in a room to
which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the
use of the machine whose potential for mischief he
could not have been totally unaware of, he should
have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking
as typing the questions in the bar examination. After
all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of
which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should
therefore have prepared the test questions in his
trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home,
(instead of his law office), where they would have
been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and
assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos’ negligence in the
preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test
questions for the bar examination in mercantile law,
was not the proximate cause of the ‘bar leakage;’ it
was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken
those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of
his papers, nobody could have stolen them and
copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar
examinations would not have been sullied by the
scandal. He admitted that ‘Mali siguro ako, but that
was what happened’ (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v.
Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA
276, pronounced the following reminder for
lawyers: ‘Members of the bar must do nothing that
may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity
of the profession.’ In another case, it likewise
intoned: ‘We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer
to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. He can do this by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts, and to his clients.’ (Reyes v. Javier, A.C.
No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It
goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this
precept of the profession by committing a gross
misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the
public’s respect for the legal profession, should be
disciplined.
"After careful deliberation, the Investigating
Committee recommends that:
"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be
DISBARRED for he had shown that he is
morally unfit to continue as a member of the
legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of
integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he
should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and
pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for
involving it in another ‘bar scandal,’ causing the
cancellation of the mercantile law examination,
and wreaking havoc upon the image of this
institution.
"2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be
REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be
required to make a written APOLOGY to the
Court for the public scandal he brought upon it
as a result of his negligence and lack of due care
in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test
questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to
cancel the Mercantile Law examination on
account of the ‘leakage’ of Attorney Balgos’ test
questions, which comprised 82% of the bar
questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not
entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner
for that subject.
"3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De
Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza,
Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo,
James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan
Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation
and the Philippine National Police, with a view
to their criminal prosecution as probable co-
conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test
questions in mercantile law.
"With regard to recommending measures to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and
prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said
examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present
under study by the Court’s Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of
proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating
Committee believes it would be well-advised to
refrain from including in this report what may turn
out to be duplicative, if not contrary,
recommendations on the matter."3
The Court adopts the report, including with some
modifications the recommendation, of the
Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will
not countenance any act or conduct that can impair
not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but
the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M.
Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its
employees assigned to the Management Information
Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the
Investigating Committee to inspect the computer
system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the
Court’s Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR)
database4 was installed in the computer used by
Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported
that the system, which was developed by the MISO,
was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The
installation thereof to any external computer would
be unauthorized without the permission of the
Court. Atty. Velasco informed the two Court
employees that the CALR database was installed by
Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by
Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further
investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman
was able to obtain a copy of the Court’s CALR
database.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the
recommendations of the Investigating Committee,
hereby resolves to -
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN
from the practice of law effective upon his
receipt of this RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T.
BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving
any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile
Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation
(a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo
De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza,
Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James
Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with
a view to determining their participation and
respective accountabilities in the bar examination
leakage and to conduct an investigation on how
Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of
the Supreme Court’s CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the
records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court
Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4,
2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation
of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following
account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which
read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at
Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went
home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home
from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene
and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to
Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends.
Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident,
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her
share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a
folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of
his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments
away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in
what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only
for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness
with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make
your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you
from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of
your single life. But more importantly, I will
love you until the life in me is gone and until we
are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you.
I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my
heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU
DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I
WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR
ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY
TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing.
He also learned still later that when his friends saw
Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent
the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even
FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the
third week of September 2001, the couple
attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can"
promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City.
Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala."
A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting
their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the
complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning
or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was
his writing the love letter to complainant's bride
on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her "until we are together
again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring
supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the
bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial
and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in
public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of
paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the
COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to
support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable
social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs
afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal
10
profession. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal
and low profile special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a
REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live
Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of
Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER
WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having
"personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent
moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency
of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal
complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene
which was pending before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD,
complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to
Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-
examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that
respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled
and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for
lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the
original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before
this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in
setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case
for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the
present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated
October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainant's wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which support
the accusation of complainant against
respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17
October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit:
"Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal
and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
 These statements of respondent in his Answer
are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and
complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of
the child. Given the fact that the respondent
admitted his special relationship with Irene there
is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the
paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied
that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be
married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent
denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective
families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative
pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form
of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held
that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of
having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live
Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent –
a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And
the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the
desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that
they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied
being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St.
Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand,
declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is
"Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years
old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between
respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that
evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party
and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 –
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does
not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A
member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign
court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the
grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under
scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse
under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who
shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a
married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman
not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral
conduct' depends on the surrounding
35
circumstances." The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement
of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does
not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which
act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that
the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of
the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable
under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty.
Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question
of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is
enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, as well
as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a
 grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath
he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue
in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution andobey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of
Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. . family and shall be protected by the
State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive
Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the
pendency of the investigation of the case before the
IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on
March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted
by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene
"based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant
case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant,
withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16,
2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed
before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular
No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied
by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene
was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and
void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair
with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by
the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for
review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing
the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced
by complainant would, in the fair estimation of
the Department, sufficiently establish all the
elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent
Moje conceded to complainant that she was
going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this
she did when complainant confronted her about
Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to
her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje
and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he
knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In
fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about
Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11thStreet,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje
herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where
he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided
to hold office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the
said address appears to be a residential house, for
that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit
affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at
the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that
Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents
Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of
the child Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of
adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery
were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the
criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools,
Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January
28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala,
is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5816
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY.
KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez)
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27,
2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty.
Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and
Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-
1960’s when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths
of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It
was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court
Dr. Perez.2
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was
already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the
Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which
was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine
of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty.
Catindig however claimed that he only married
Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was
afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the
process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country
to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he
would eventually marry her once the divorce had
been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce
decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said
divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there
was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a
child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef
Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her
marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the
Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize
their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their
son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty.
Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to
get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she
received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing
her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a
love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter,
Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his "impediment is
removed." Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig
to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is
able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On
August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to
declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr.
Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City
where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court
directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November
25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he
married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding,
Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of
complying with her marital obligations, as she had
serious intimacy problems; and that while their
union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to
their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a
mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate
and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven
suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of
complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may
have and comfort it may provide them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a
divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984.
Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the
foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not
have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding
that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig
and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that
Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he
only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and
that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He
merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to
their relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr.
Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he
left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with
Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He
asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty.
Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an
affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was
employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she
could not reciprocate his feelings since he was
married and that he was too old for her. She said
that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still
pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned
from his law firm.22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on
July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29,
2003. During the conference, the parties manifested
that they were already submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to
submit their respective position papers within 10
days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and
Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October
17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr.
Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued
a Report and Recommendation,28 which
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr.
Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly
immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct
that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a
professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior.
Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity
for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused
damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to
him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed
to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a
second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully
well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage,
Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo
be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez
failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in
support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the
December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating
Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that,
under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by
such documents as may substantiate said facts. He
said that despite the absence of any corroborating
testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention
of committing any felony; that he never concealed
the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty.
Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its
Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents
committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective
allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s
good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing
if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life,
his all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice,
or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community’s sense of decency. The
Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by
the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s
own admission, indeed establish a pattern of
conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only
corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a
high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice
– a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in
1968, which was then followed by a Catholic
wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing
Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children
after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage
was then already falling apart due to Gomez’
serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had
a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce
decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year.
Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at
that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away – a marriage that has at
least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that
the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our
jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent
marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he
still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social
propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court
that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his
previous marriage remained valid, the logical
conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in
the USA for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s
claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that
he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least,
so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez,
and despite the various legal actions he resorted to
in order to give their union a semblance of validity,
Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the
nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently,
he was then already entranced with the much
younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed
by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to
separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in
itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral
conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing
his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross
immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases, the
Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an
illicit relationship with another woman who has
borne him a child.38
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests
a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution
of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in
the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the
power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member
of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.
Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations
against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he
indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably,
such admission provides ample basis for the Court
to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that
the respondents were indeed having an affair and
the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension
or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was
received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged
relations between the respondents; it does not prove
the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly,.
the supposed love letter, if at all, only
provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that
Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty.
Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen
E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4369 November 28, 1997
PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the
disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that respondent
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24,
1993 1 making it appear that some of the vendors in
said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and
signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all
three were already dead prior to the execution of the
said Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died
on August 22, 1992 2 while Leonardo P. Toledano
died on November 1, 1992.3 Edelina T. Bonilla
allegedly died on or about June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his
notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of
the signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its
execution. Satisfied with all of the above, it was
only then that he certified the document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had
a complete turn-around and moved for the dismissal
of his complaint. He alleged that the instant case is
only a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and is now
convinced that everything is in order.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted the above recommendation and resolved to
dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling
reason to continue with the disbarment proceedings.
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a
notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the
act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged
 that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party
acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any person authorized to take
acknowledgment of instruments or
documents. 4 Aside from being required to appear
before the Notary Public, it is similarly incumbent
upon the person acknowledging the instrument to
declare before the same Notary Public that the
execution of the instrument was done by him of his
own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale,
respondent certified: "BEFORE ME, this 24th day
of March, 1993 at Dumaguete City,
Philippines, personally appeared . . . Jesus Bonilla;
. . . Leonardo Toledano; . . . . " 5 Respondent claims
that as a Notary Public, he asked the signatories
whether the signatures appearing above their
respective names were theirs, and whether they
voluntarily executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. In
order to ascertain their identities, respondent asked
for their respective residence certificates.
Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death
was not evidenced by a death certificate, respondent
certified in the acknowledgment that Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano personally
appeared before him. Respondent's acts require the
presence of the vendors to be able to verify the
authenticity of their signatures, the identities of the
signatories and the voluntariness of the execution of
the Deed. It defies imagination and belief how these
could have happened. It would have been
impossible, both physically and legally, for Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano to have
personally subscribed and sworn before respondent
as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of
Sale as they had already passed on to the Great
Beyond prior to the execution of the said
documents.
Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By affixing
his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private
document into a public document. By certifying the
Deed, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world
(1) that all the parties therein personally appeared
before him; (2) that they are all personally known to
him; (3) that they were the same persons who
executed the instruments; (4) that he inquired into
the voluntariness of execution of the instrument;
and (5) they acknowledged personally before him
that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial
public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the
document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity. 6 A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries
public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.7
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public,
respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred
duties which are dictated by public policy and, as
such, impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat
is sacrosanct.8
It is for the above reason that this Court is most
concerned about the explanation given by
complainant for withdrawing his complaint against
respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss dated
September 9, 1996, complainant declares:
xxx xxx xxx
That he is now fully convinced that everything
was in order, and that nobody was ever
prejudiced by the acts of the respondent. Herein
complainant has realized that he himself, or any
other legal practitioner, would have done
similarly as the respondent, if confronted with
such an urgent voluntary transaction in an
emergency situation; . . . .
That respondent acted the way he did because he
was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is
no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so
as a member of the legal profession, he is required
to obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to
refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to
uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL
TIMES, to promote respect to his profession AT
ALL TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL
TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly
disregarded the requirements and solemnities of the
Notarial Law simply to accommodate his clients.
Not only did he commit an illegal act but also did so
without thinking of the possible damage or
prejudice that might result from non-observance of
the same.
As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional
responsibility by certifying under oath an
instrument fully knowing that some of the
signatories thereto were long dead. This Court
cannot countenance this practice, especially
coming, as it does, from respondent who formerly
served as president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Negros Oriental Chapter, President of
the Dumaguete Lions Club and City Councilor of
Dumaguete. If indeed respondent had taken steps to
verify the identities of the signatories, he would
have easily known that the signatures were fake as
they purported to be those of his former clients.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.9[M]embership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. There
being no lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law only during good
behavior and can be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
him. 10
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily required of
lawyers to obey the Constitution and laws of the
land. 11 They must refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. 12
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. 13
Respondent's act of certifying under oath a Deed of
Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, they being his former clients,
constitutes misconduct. But this being his first
administrative offense, such should no warrant the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty.
Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct. Consequently,
he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a
warning that another infraction would be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the
courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016
CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S.
REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F.
NIEVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated
March 3, 2010 filed by complainant Carrie-Anne
Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva (respondent),
praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually
harassing her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been working at
the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order
basis since October 2004. Sometime in January
2009, she was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the
Board Secretary under the supervision of
respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting
Board Secretary. During complainant's stint under
respondent, she would notice that during office
hours, respondent would often watch "pampagana"
videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned
out to be pornographic films. Complainant also
averred that whenever respondent got close to her,
he would hold her hand and would sometimes give
it a kiss. During these instances, complainant would
remove her hands and tell him to desist. According
to complainant, respondent even offered her a
cellular phone together with the necessary load to
serve as means for their private communication, but
she refused the said offer, insisting that she already
has her own cellular phone and does not need
another one.2
Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o'clock in
the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted
her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that
respondent might take advantage of her,
complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates
to accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon
respondent's arrival and seeing that complainant had
companions, he just told complainant and the other
two (2) office staff to lock the door when
they leave.3
Complainant further recounted that on the following
day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on her
cellular phone, asked if she received his text
message, and told her he would tell her something
upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the
morning of even date, respondent asked
complainant to encode a memorandum he was
about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his
hand on complainant's waist area near her breast
and started caressing the latter's torso. Complainant
immediately moved away from respondent and told
him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking
for an apology, respondent told complainant he was
willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket and even gave her a note stating "just bet
(between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy,"
referring to complainant's mother who was also
working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of the same day, while complainant and
respondent were left alone in the office, respondent
suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant's
arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then
attempted to kiss complainant. This prompted
complainant to thwart respondent's advances with
her left arm, raised her voice in order to invite help,
and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung
asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako." After
respondent let her go, complainant immediately left
the office to ask assistance from her former
supervisor who advised her to file an administrative
case4 against respondent before the CAAP
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).5
Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal
with respondent, she was traumatized and was even
diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major
depression.6 Eventually, complainant filed the
instant complaint.
In his defense,7 respondent denied all of
complainant's allegations. He maintained that as a
79-year old retiree who only took a position at the
CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely
for him to do the acts imputed against him,
especially in a very small office space allotted for
him and his staff. In this regard, he referred to his
Counter-Affidavit8 submitted before the CODI,
wherein he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he
indeed watches "interesting shows" in his office
laptop, he never invited anyone, including
complainant, to watch with him and that he would
even close his laptop whenever someone comes
near him;9 (b) he never held and kissed
complainant's hand because if he had done so, he
would have been easily noticed by complainant's
co-staffers;10 (c) he did offer her a cellular phone,
but this was supposed to be an office phone which
should not be used for personal purposes, and thus,
could not be given any sexual meaning;11 (d) he did
tell complainant to wait for him in the afternoon of
April 1, 2009, but only for the purpose of having an
available encoder should he need one for any urgent
matter that would arise;12 and (e) he would not do
the acts he allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as
there were other people in the office and that those
people can attest in his favor.13 Respondent then
pointed out that the administrative case filed against
him before the CODI was already dismissed for
lack of basis and that complainant was only being
used by other CAAP employees who were agitated
by the reforms he helped implement upon his
assumption as CAAP consultant and eventually as
Acting Corporate Board Secretary.14
The IBP's Report and Recommendation

15
In a Report and Recommendation dated August
14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the instant administrative complaint
against respondent.16 He found that complainant
failed to substantiate her allegations against
respondent, as opposed to respondent's defenses
which are ably supported by evidence. Citing
respondent's evidence, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that since the CAAP Office
of the Board Secretary was very small, it is
implausible that a startling occurrence such as an
attempted sexual molestation would not be noticed
by not only the other occupants of said office area,
but also by those occupying the office adjacent to it,
i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which is
separated only by glass panels. Further, the
Investigating Commissioner drew attention to the
investigation conducted by the CODI showing that
the collective sworn statements of the witnesses
point to the eventual conclusion that none of the
alleged acts of misconduct attributed to respondent
really occurred.17
In a Resolution18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously
reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation.
As such, respondent was found guilty of committing
sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
In view of respondent's Motion for
19
Reconsideration, the IBP Board referred the case
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) for study, evaluation, and submission of an
Executive Summary to the IBP Board.20
In the Director's Report21 dated July 8, 2014, the
IBP-CBD National Director recommended that the
current IBP Board adhere to the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
as it is supported by the evidence on record; on the
other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP
Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and
should therefore, be set aside. In this light, the
current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated
August 10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP
Board's Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the
administrative complaint against respondent.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court's Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the
court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."23
In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR
states:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
x x x x
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Good moral character is a trait that every practicing
lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as
"what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality."24 Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes,
namely: (a) to protect the public; (b) to protect the
public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective
clients; and (d) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.25
In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court emphasized that a
lawyer's continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition to remain a
member of the Bar, viz.:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the
Court that possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. This
proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts
from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the
bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping a mistress but must also behave
himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those
moral standards." Consequently, any errant
behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant suspension or
27
disbarment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets
of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity. They may be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as
it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.28
After due consideration, the Court reverses the
findings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds
respondent administratively liable for violations of
the CPR, as will be explained hereunder.
To recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to
complainant's purposedly bare and uncorroborated
allegations, respondent's evidence point to the
conclusion that none of the alleged sexual advances
made by respondent against complainant actually
occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from any
administrative liability. In support of such finding,
the IBP largely relied on the following: (a) the five
(5) photographs29 respondent submitted to the
CODI to show that respondent's office space was so
small that any commotion caused by a sexual
harassment attempt would have been easily noticed
by the other occupants thereof;30 and (b) the
investigation conducted by the CODI per the
Transcript31 submitted by respondent where the
witnesses said that they did not notice anything out
of the ordinary on April 2, 2009, the date when
respondent's alleged sexual advances against
complainant were committed.32However, the
foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not
actually refute complainant's allegation that at
around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2,
2009, respondent closed the door, grabbed
complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's
seal it with a kiss" and attempted to kiss
complainant despite the latter's resistance.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript shows
that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of
April 2, 2009, there was a time that complainant
and respondent were indeed left alone in the office:
Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe
sa amin nung 9:30 to 11:00 sinu-sino kayo doon?
Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma'am
Carrie Anne [complainant], si sir Nieva
[respondent] tsaka aka po.
Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang ang witness, ang taong
naroon 9:30 to 11?
Witness 1: Yes sir.
x x x x
Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?
Witness 1: Sa loob po kami naglulunch.
Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain minsan
may natitira pa bang iba?
Witness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira nung
umalis po aka. Um... pagbalik ko po wala na po
si Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am Amy nalang
po ang nandoon.
Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang at
tsaka si Atty. Nieva [respondent] ang naiwan doon Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas
sa room? Eh nasaan na yung ibang OJT pa? onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang alas
dose(12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]?
Witness 1: Tatlo lang po kasi kami
nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung dalawa. Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP Operations
Center].
Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong
may nangyari na naiwan silang Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun
dalawa[complainant and respondent] na time din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong bandang ganung
na silang dalawa lang ang naiwan sa kuwarto? oras past eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata
si Atty. Nieva [respondent] kayMs. Reyes (Caan)
Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po [complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan siya
nun. parang ganun ang dating eh "Iraised up my voice
also, so that the OPCEN personnel will hear of the
Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may nangyayaring alarm" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya?
ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa kuwarto?
Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun yung
Witness 1: Yun lang po kasi yung natatandaan ko time na ano yung RPCC 764 so nag-cocoordinate
po sir na time na naiwan sila eh. kami...

x x x x Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764?

Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala
pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva [respondent]? siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa so intransi po
kami... opo...
Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang
dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero tapos Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?
na po silang magtype nun tas nag decide na
maglunch na eh. Witness 4: Opo lahat kami.

Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan? Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw?

Witness 1: Dalawa pa lang sila sir pagbalik ko tatlo Witness 5: Opo.

na sila pero wala naman po si Ma'am Caan
[complainant]. Nung umalis po ako si sir Nieva Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa nun?
[respondent] tsaka si Ma'am Caan yung nandoon
then pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma'am Caan, si Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami
sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nandoon. ng coordination lahat kami nasa telepono.

Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung pader
iba? [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig?

Witness 1: Opo.33 Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara din
The same Transcript also reveals that the CODI sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya kaming may kausap
interviewed the occupants of the adjacent sa telepono eh.
office, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which,
according to the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon
was only separated from complainant and wala kayong ginagawa, narinig niyo ang usapan
respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the doon sa kabila.
Board Secretary, by glass panels. Pertinent parts of
the interview read: Witness 5: Yes sir.
Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas. Witness 4: Ah opo.

Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?
lang level.
Witness 4: Kung malakas.
Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio nila
eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may mga music sila. Eto Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
sir yung time na kinuha... Dami nila eh... Lumabas
nakita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan Witness 4: Opo.
nabasa sir.
Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man lang
Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng kahit isang word na malakas doon sa kanila during
alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas dose(12) ang the time na nangyari ito?
pinaka latest message mo dito 02/03/06 11:06. So
between 11:06 to 12 wala kayong... Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming
maalala...
Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga
kami kahit... kami lang nandoon sa telepono. Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo
pero mas busy kayo sa telephone operation.
Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo sa
telepono kayo? Witness 4: Busy kami.

Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book. Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano...

x x x x Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae

nga pero kala lang namin ah...
Mr. Abesamis: Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo
kanina naririnig niyo si sir [respondent] sa kabila Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi?
kung wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na kapag
malakas yung salita? Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi...

Witness 4: Opo. Mr. Abesarnis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang
sinasabi mo?
Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas
may possibility na maririnig niyo yung usapan kung Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami
walang radio? Siguro if intelligible or sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na
knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila? iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon hinahanap
pa namin yung requirement.
Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?
Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April
Mr. Abesarnis: Normal na usapan, conversation. 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na nag-aanuhan ng
ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva
Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila. [respondent], wala? May narinig kayong movie na
parang sounding na porno ganun?
Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?
Witness 4: Wala music lang talaga sir.
Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag
nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent] minsan Mr. Mendoza: So music.
naririnig namin.
Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila
Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto? yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto nila.
Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon?
Witness 4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano cartolina
na white.
Mr. Borja: Makakatestify lang kayo sa audio eh,
kasi wala kayong nakikita.34
The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show
that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of
April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent were left
alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as
complainant's officemates were all out on errands.
In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to
hastily conclude from the testimonies of
complainant's officemates who were interviewed by
the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary
happened. Surely, they were not in a position to
confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they
were not physically in the office so as to make a
credible testimony as to the events that transpired
therein during that time.
Neither can the testimonies of those in the CAAP
Operations Center be used to conclude that
respondent did not do anything to complainant,
considering that they themselves admitted that they
were all on the telephone, busy with their
coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that
while their office is indeed separated from the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary only by glass
panels, they could not see what was happening there
as they covered the glass panels with white
cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their
official duties as well as the fact that the glass
panels were covered, it is very unlikely for them to
have noticed any commotion happening in the
adjacent CAAP Office of the Board Secretary.
Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the
testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI
proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that
all those interviewed in the CODI proceedings were
job order and regular employees of the CAAP.
Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any
unfavorable statements against a high-ranking
official of the CAAP such as respondent who was
the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest they
earn the ire of such official and put their career in
jeopardy.
Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such
Transcript shows that respondent did not perform
the acts complained of. On the contrary, said
Transcript proves that there was indeed a period of
time where complainant and respondent were left
alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary
which gave respondent a window of opportunity to
carry out his acts constituting sexual harassment
against complainant.
More importantly, records reveal that complainant's
allegations are adequately supported by a Certificate
of Psychiatric Evaluation35 dated April 13, 2009
stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems -
diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder with
recurrent major depression started after suffering
the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of
respondent. Moreover, complainant's plight was
ably supported by other CAAP employees36 as well
as a retired Brigadier General of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines37 through various letters to
authorities seeking justice for complainant.
Perceptibly, complainant would not seek help from
such supporters, and risk their integrity in the
process, if none of her allegations were true.
Besides, there is no evidence to establish that
complainant was impelled by any improper motive
against respondent or that she had reasons to
fabricate her allegations against him. Therefore,
absent any competent proof to the contrary, the
Court finds that complainant's story of the April 2,
2009 incident was not moved by any ill-will and
was untainted by bias; and hence, worthy of belief
and credence.38 In this regard, it should be
mentioned that respondent's averment that
complainant was only being used by other CAAP
employees to get back at him for implementing
reforms within the CAAP was plainly
unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving
assertion that deserves no weight in law.39
In addition, the Court notes that respondent never
refuted complainant's allegation that he would
regularly watch "pampagana" movies in his office-
issued laptop. In fact, respondent readily admitted
that he indeed watches "interesting shows" while in
the office, albeit insisting that he only does so by
himself, and that he would immediately dose his
laptop whenever anyone would pass by or go near
his table. As confirmed in the Transcript40 of the
investigation conducted by the CODI, these
"pampagana" movies and "interesting shows"
turned out to be pornographic materials, which
respondent even asks his male staff to regularly play
for him as he is not well-versed in using
computers.41
Without a doubt, it has been established that
respondent habitually watches pornographic
materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the
office premises, during office hours, and with the
knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, the
Court cannot countenance such audacious display of
depravity on respondent's part not only because his
obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for - the CAAP where
he was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate
Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal
profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the
government service, respondent is expected to
perform and discharge his duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence,
and skill, and with utmost devotion and dedication
to duty.42 However, his aforesaid habit miserably
fails to showcase these standards, and instead,
displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of
respect to the government position he was entrusted
to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by
himself and that he would immediately close his
laptop whenever anyone would pass by or come
near his table is of no moment, because the
lewdness of his actions, within the setting of this
case, remains. The legal profession - much more an
engagement in the public service should always be
held in high esteem, and those who belong within
its ranks should be unwavering exemplars of
integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the
public faith, lawyers, such as respondent, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility
and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken the
oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be
more possessed of the consciousness and the will to
overcome the weakness of the flesh, as respondent
in this case.43
In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, the quantum of proof by which the
charges against respondent were assessed was
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence "means evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is
offered in opposition to it."44 Generally, under Rule
133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this
evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how
determined. - In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability
of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number. (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De
Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon45 cited by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the Court had
pronounced that the burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence in disbarment
proceedings is upon the complainant.46 These
rulings appear to conflict with other jurisprudence
on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial
evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in
administrative cases against lawyers.47 The latter
standard was applied in administrative cases such
as Foster v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in
fact, illumined that:
[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases
is different from the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto." In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would
suffice to hold one administratively
liable.49(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno,50 it was held:
Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1
[(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)] and 2
[(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules
of Court states that in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.51 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the
matter is Cabas v. Sususco,52 which was
promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said
case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a the CPR. In fine, respondent should be held
conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation
is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence.53 (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought
to control and therefore, quell any further confusion
on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in
administrative cases against lawyers.
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial
evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence
- is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of
and essential considerations attending this type of
cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor."54
With the proper application of the substantial
evidence threshold having been clarified, the Court
finds that the present charges against respondent
have been adequately proven by this standard.
Complainant has established her claims through
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is,
that respondent had harassed her and committed
despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of
administratively liable and therefore, penalized.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar
administrative cases where the lawyer exhibited
immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging
from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v.
Macabata,55 the lawyer was reprimanded for his
distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his
female client towards him and kissing her on the
lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña,56 the lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years for rubbing the female complainant's
right leg with his hand, trying to insert his finger
into her firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and pressing
his finger against her private part. While
in Guevarra v. Eala57 and Valdez v. Dabon,58 the
Court meted the extreme penalty of disbarment on
the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital
affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his immoral
behavior through his habitual watching of
pornographic materials while in the office and his
acts of sexual harassment against complainant.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the
Court deems it proper to impose upon respondent
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva
is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1,
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality
of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance and be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002.]
(Adm. Case No. 99-634)
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v. Atty.
ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a
lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even
if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-
client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is
a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or
suspension or any other disciplinary action against
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P.
Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June
14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
x x x Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he
"That in connection with my business, I was
introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime
in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio,
Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero
Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who
agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed
to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which
he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached
as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the
parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited
the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B,
upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta that the complaint had already been
filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its
progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such
notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but
there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that
I frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case,
considering that I am told to wait [every time] I
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last
May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had
not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he
even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at
Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he
left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the
ground floor of the building and told to wait while
he personally follows up the processes with the
came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by
Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the
Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta’s
complaint to personally verify the progress of my
case, and there told that there was no record at all of
a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27,
1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and
treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day; May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay
was being caused by the court personnel, and only
when shown the certification did he admit that he
has not at all filed the complaint because he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated
June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of
which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and
deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation,
dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
x x x. 1 was almost P4 million, complainant promised to
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999
Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2
respondent filed his Answer 3 vehemently denying
the allegations of complainant "for being totally
outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the
former’s law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter
against Regwill Industries, Inc. — a service for
which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre,
one of the business partners of complainant, replied
to this letter, the latter requested that another
demand letter — this time addressed to the former
— be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed
to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
complainant asked the process server of the
former’s law office to deliver the letter to the
addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had
required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to settle the case) and
prepared a compromise agreement. He was also
requested by complainant to do the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson
Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC
Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed
by complainant’s wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid
for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him
why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no
settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to
draft a complaint for breach of contract.
Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his
acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees
amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim
pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount
of P25,000 to respondent’s secretary and told her
that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case.
When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant,
informing the latter of the need to pay the
acceptance and filing fees before the complaint
could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told
respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of
the complaint because the former might be paid by
another company, the First Oriental Property
Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of
land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations
went on for two months, but the parties never
arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed
to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the
acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed
that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondent’s acceptance and legal fees. When
respondent refused, complainant demanded the
return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the
amount using his own personal checks because their
law office was undergoing extensive renovation at
the time, and their office personnel were not
reporting regularly. Respondent’s checks were
accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced,
mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone
had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it
was he.
The IBP’s Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8,
2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for
the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on
the part of respondent was created and that was to
file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The
failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to
his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession: The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part
of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress
upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Commission’s recommendation.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Misappropriation of Client’s Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of
respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give
him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence,
the former’s failure to file the complaint in court.
Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered
by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was
for attorney’s fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their
best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client’s cause. They who perform
that duty with diligence and candor not only protect
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain
the respect of the community for the legal
profession. 5 Members of the bar must do nothing
that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence
of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and
integrity of the profession. 6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no
lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was
established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
former’s business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles
of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is
established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the former’s fees. 8 Hence, despite
the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law
partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal
favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound
to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare —
and had actually prepared — at the soonest possible
time, in order to protect the client’s interest. Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that lawyers should not neglect legal
matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once
lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the client’s rights, and the exertion of
their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save
by the rules of law legally applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of
respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The
IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to
be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" — if
indeed it was one — respondent should have
immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant’s
attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the
payment.
The Practice of Law — a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget
that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business. 11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The
gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration. 13 Duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble
calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making
much money. 14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given
by complainant — as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent — the latter
also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their
possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them
are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien
upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers
that have lawfully come into their possession; that
they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may
apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do
not relieve them of their duty to promptly account
for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
client’s interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18
Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted
to him by his client and thus failed to file the
complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from
his breach of duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, we do not agree with
complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed
as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found
guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent’s
file.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE
THE LAWYERS OATH
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's
conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in
September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to
homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment
all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered
judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from
two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein
petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order
approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's
discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court
a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two
(2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation
had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan,
the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty.
Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty.
Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe
physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense
therefore was not only homicide but murder since
the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the
accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion.
They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his
co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had
hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he
still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is
now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion
of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the
law but, also of equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less
than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required
weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the
practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence
of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant
and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner]
was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether petitioner has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and
shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most
traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the
death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of
third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court-
manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in
this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not
in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we
resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys
and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has
exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is
NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will
continue with the assistance he has been giving to
his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a
better position to render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's
oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the
Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the
legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL
OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations
with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled
date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar
Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his
old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was
not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he
had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for
his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in
the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant
Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice
of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action
is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and
good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We
note that it was not a third party who called this
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him
this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the
time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna
happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen.
And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that
he possesses the character required to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand
the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate
petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law
since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking
was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer
claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have
known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in
spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without
authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is
in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be
reached after the filing of charges and the conduct
of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite
clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding
of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal
charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit
to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one
(1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit
to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the
one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to
pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice
of law. During the one year period, petitioner is
NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this
Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11316
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY.
PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-
Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant), before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard
A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming
complainant's identity and falsely representing that
the former has the required educational
qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to
Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is the older of the two, having been
born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed
their secondary education at the Makati High
School where complainant graduated in 19934 and
respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation,
complainant enrolled at the University of Makati
where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997.6 He started working
thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11
Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G.
Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
8
daughters. Through the years, complainant rose
from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a
Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school,
respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year
before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was
discharged from the PMA and focused on helping
their father in the family's car rental business. In
1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife,
Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then,
respondent never went back to school to earn a
college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro
Manila, respondent told complainant that the former
had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed
complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name
and college records from the University of Makati
to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law
in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as
he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to
him.15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm
respondent's use of his name and identity when he
saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the
Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the
latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless,
complainant did not confront respondent about it
since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a
family to support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his
promotion as Store Manager, complainant was
ordered to report to the head office of PSC in
Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was
informed that the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in
Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point, was using
the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and
Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he
was interviewed and asked to identify documents
including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the
University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's
driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati and his Birth
Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's
College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's photograph under
the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later
learned that the reason why he was invited by the
NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a
case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr.
Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name
to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other
people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and
that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to
respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013,
PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña &
Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in
the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On
the other hand, a fellow church-member had also
told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-
member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a
phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes
(Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her
into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel
of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was
not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use
of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and
security.26 He also became the subject of
conversations among his colleagues, which
eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged
use of the former's name and identity, and illegal
practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the
allegations against him and invoked res judicata as
a defense. He maintained that his identity can no
longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP
Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative
case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case
had already been declared closed and terminated by
this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover,
according to him, complainant is being used by
Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito
M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them
before the Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the
scheduled mandatory conference where both parties
failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to
reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date,
however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties
submitted any.37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner
Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of
illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name,
identity, and academic records.39 He observed that
respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove
his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant
presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he
and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his
parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage
Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain
"Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention
to the fact that the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one
in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the
Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law
and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent
falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws
degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick
A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be
dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46He
also recommended that respondent and the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being
admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for
making a mockery of the judicial institution, the
IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions
against respondent.47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP
erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and
(b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has
established by clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity,
and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's
University's College of Law, obtain a law degree,
and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that
he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents
are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges
from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick
A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows
the same person as the one in the photograph in the
IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted
numerous documents showing that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati
bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high
school yearbook with his photograph and the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI
clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably
confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain
admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that
respondent, whose real name is "Richard A.
Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar.
Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination
shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to
the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for
a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of
the following subject as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his
college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in
1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA
where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed
the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that
respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real
name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational records
renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character.58 In In the
Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee
Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and
for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine
Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court
explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he
is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is
not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common
honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter
lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar
when he assumed the name, identity, and school
records of his own brother and dragged the latter
into controversies which eventually caused him to
fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he
had been working for years. Good moral character
is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer,
the trust relation which exists between him and his
client, as well as between him and the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal
profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the
image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several
criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent
and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan
a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is
found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name,
identity, and academic records of complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly,
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil
and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves
that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll
of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in
the practice of law or making any representations as
a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as
a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in
such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered
to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of
respondent with his real name, " Richard A.
Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of
the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty.
Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to
comply with the requirements of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar
Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B.
Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this
Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in
his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,
and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
Complainant informed the Court that he inquired
from the MCLE Office about the status of
respondent's compliance and received the following
Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof.
Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's
Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number
14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did
not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter
[No.] 850 for the following compliance
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -
April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -
April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -
April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an
Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was
DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic)
its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court
referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean
D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer
of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court
the rollo of the case together with the MCLE
Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the
MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice
Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and
Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001
to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April
2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in
law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850.
The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on
14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE
Governing Board noted that respondent neither
applied for exemption nor complied with the Third
Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April
2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court
directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to
furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15
March 2013. The Court likewise required
respondent to file his comment within ten days from
notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February
2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a
copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He
stated that he was wondering why his application
for exemption could not be granted. He further
alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing
Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano
was based on the letter of complainant who
belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the
law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo
family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo
family controlled Camiguin and had total control of
the judges and prosecutors in the province. He
further alleged that the law firm had control of the
lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a
lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the
first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered,
immediately after she took over government in
February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme
Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory
crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my
silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of
CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the
results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING
CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally
resulted to the EDSAI revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now
SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in
the national canvassing before the National
Canvassing Board when she ran for President
against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other
counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court
SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the
2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS
like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX
OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now
SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court
contesting the constitutionality and validity of the
2010 national elections, still undecided up to this
day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a
case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality
and legality of the Corona impeachment which the
SC only decided after the Senate decided his case
and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to
the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot
and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting
the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF
IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the
Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of
Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the
Opposition in Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for
impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty
years now with appearances before the Supreme
Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera
and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and
numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a
number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five
books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2)
Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3)
Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles
and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration
of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked
for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the
alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law
while complying with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred
respondent's Compliance and Comment to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25
November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent
applied for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in
law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the
request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano
informed respondent of the denial of his application
in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported
that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in
order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to
expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to
establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The
OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the
requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires
practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their
pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The
OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no
record that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a
pleading that his "MCLE Application for
Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is
baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar
Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with
the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal
of the case and the striking out of the pleadings
from the records.7 The OBC also reported that
under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to
comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60
days from receipt of notification to explain his
deficiency or to show his compliance with the
requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a
member who fails to comply within the given
period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and
shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board.
The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-
Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August
2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August
2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended
that cases be filed against respondent in connection
with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE
compliance/exemption number for the immediately
preceding compliance period and that the pleadings
he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in
his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off
from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared
a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-
compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC
further recommended respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely. The
OBC also recommended that respondent be directed
to comply with the requirements set forth by the
MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is
administratively liable for his failure to comply with
the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to
undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice
of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15
April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14
April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was
from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's
letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for
the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010
to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that
respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that
respondent filed an application for exemption only
on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE
Governing Board, respondent's application for
exemption covered the First and Second
Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for
exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The
MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on
the ground that the application did not meet the
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3,
Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE
Office failed to convey the denial of the application
for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office
only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1
October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it
received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso
Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23
October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board
denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to
respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013,
signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for
the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed
after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his application for
exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter
dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking
the office to act on his application for exemption
but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the
MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the
MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance
periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013
letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption.
The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-
Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August
2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply.
However, in his Compliance and Comment before
this Court, respondent stated that because of his
involvement in public interest issues in the country,
the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter
No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that
he already registered with the MCLE Program of
the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on
those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
x x x x
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of
the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing
legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency
and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of
the notification to explain the deficiency or
otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A
CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A allow him to continue practicing law while
DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete
his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit
units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior period
requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess
may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of
the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court
shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February
2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only
cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance
Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not
been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of
respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed
that his application for exemption, filed after the
compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up
the status of his application but claimed that his
secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the
Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial
of his application for exemption when his motion
for reconsideration was already denied with finality
by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November
2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that
the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14
February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day
period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even
indicating when he intended to comply with his
deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case.
While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office
three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when
respondent indicated "MCLE application for
exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was
not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing
Board on his application for exemption. However,
after he had been informed of the denial of his
application for exemption, it still took respondent
one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After
the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition,
when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he
had not filed any motion for reconsideration before
the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a
delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE
Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE
Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of
Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent
member, there is nothing that prevents the Court
from using its administrative power and supervision
to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the
IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as
delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the
IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not
be permitted to practice law until such time as he
submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board
of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has
notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and
to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the
requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is
later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves

to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal

Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not
limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties
within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza

to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the
matter had already been denied with finality by the
MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a

delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of
law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required
non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished
the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for
their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary