SEC OF DENR VS.

YAP

These are two consolidated cases.

G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC
Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for
forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay
filed with the Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the
Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay.
They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing
their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al
do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is
an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of
the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act
of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case
at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable
and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act
No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Private
claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to
argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove
the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that
the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having
been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of
pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued
possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants
do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The
SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented
and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.

G.R. No. L-35744 September 28, 1984

WENCESLAO JUNIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FELICIANO DE LOS SANTOS and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents-appellees.

Julian U. De Vera for petitioner-appellant.

The Solicitor General and Juan C. Austria for respondents-appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The question involved being purely one of law, the then Court of Appeals
certified to us petitioner's appeal from the Decision of the former Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan in Case No. 16362, G.L.R.O. Record No. 52512,
dismissing his Petition for the cancellation of the Adverse Claim annotated on
his transfer certificate of title. The case is being decided under the provisions
of the former Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

Petitioner-appellant, Wenceslao Junio, is the registered owner of a parcel of

land situated at Bayambang, Pangasinan, with an area of 7.65 hectares, more
or less, covered by TCT No. 1004 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.

By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by petitioner over the

said parcel of land in favor of respondent Feliciano de los Santos and his
co-vendees, Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose Junio, an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim was executed by respondent, Feliciano de los Santos, claiming a
one-third undivided portion of petitioner's property, which claim was annotated
on petitioner's title.
Petitioner denies having sold any portion of his property to private respondent.
hence, his Petition for the cancellation of said adverse claim. Petitioner
disputes the appropriateness of the annotation alleging that under Section 110
of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), such inscription may be resorted to
only when there is no other means of registering an interest or right; that
Section 57 of the same statute provides for the registration of a documented
sale involving a titled property; and that the Register of Deeds acted
negligently in registering the document without the formal legal requisities.

Opposing, respondent de los Santos countered that he had tried to avail

himself of Section 57 by requesting petitioner to surrender his owner's
duplicate certificate of title but since the latter refused to do so he was
compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act.

The case was submitted for decision, without the presentation of evidence,
and based on the pleadings, the lower Court denied the petition for
cancellation for lack of merit and because "petitioner has his own remedy but
not in this summary proceedings." The provision on adverse claim reads in
part:

Sec. 110. Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration,
may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a
statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to,
and shall state the adverse claimant's residence and designate a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may
require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid the registration shall be cancelled.
If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double
or treble costs in its discretion.

... (Emphasis ours)

The "other provision for registering" referred to above is, indeed, provided for
in Section 57, thus:

Sec. 57. An owner desiring to convey in fee his registered land or any portion
thereof shall execute a deed of conveyance, which the grantor or grantee may
present to the register of deeds in the province where the land lies.
The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be produced and presented at the
same time. The register of deeds shall thereupon, in accordance with the rules
and instructions of the court, make out in the registration book a new certificate
of title to the grantee, and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate
certificate. The register of deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate
certificates the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book
where the new certificate is registered, and a reference by number to the last
prior certificate. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be surrendered and the
word 'canceled' stamped upon it. The original certificate shall also be stamped
'canceled'. The deed of conveyance shall be filed and indorsed with the
number and place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
(Emphasis supplied).

However, considering that petitioner had refused to surrender the title, private
respondent could not avail of Section 57. Hence, the latter correctly resorted to
the annotation of an adverse claim. Where the vendor fails to deliver to the
vendee the duplicate certificate of title, the vendee should file men." with the
Register of Deeds an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496, as
amended. 1

Petitioner, however, calls attention to the case of Register of Deeds of Quezon

City vs. Nicandro, 2 which held that when a claim is based on a perfected
contract of sale executed in their favor by the lawful owner of the land, the
remedy provided in Section 110 would be ineffective considering that the Land
Registration Act specifically provides the procedure for registration in Section
57 thereof. The factual milieu in that case, however, is completely different, for,
therein there was no question about the existence of a perfected contract of
sale, unlike in the case at bar, where the sale between the parties is contested.
Moreover, as already adverted to, private respondent could not register the
document of sale under Section 57 because of petitioner's refusal to surrender
the duplicate certificate of title.

But petitioner additionally submits that because of such refusal, it is Section

111 of the same Act No. 496, which provides the proper remedy, and we
quote:

Sec. 111. In every case where the clerk or any register of deeds is requested
to enter a new certificate in pursuance of an instrument purporting to be
executed by the registered owner, or by reason of any instrument or
proceedings which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent,
if the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate is not presented for cancellation
when such request is made, the clerk or register of deeds shall not enter a new
certificate, but the person claiming to be entitled thereto may apply by petition
to the court. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any
person withholding the duplicate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of
a new certificate upon such surrender.

If in any case the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable
to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's
duplicate certificate cannot be delivered up, the court may by decree annul the
same and order a new certificate of title to be entered. Such new certificate
and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate.
If in any case an outstanding mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate is
not produced and surrendered when the mortgage is discharged or
extinguished or the lease is terminated, like proceedings may be had to obtain
registration as in the case of the nonproduction of an owner's duplicate.

We find that contention again bereft of merit as said Section 111 can be
availed of only if controversial issues are not involved. 3 In this case, the
genuineness and due execution of the sale between the parties is in
controversy.

Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for cancellation of the adverse
claim were unmeritorious, it behooved the lower Court to have conducted a
speedy hearing upon the question of validity of the adverse claim pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act, reading:

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served
upon him. This statement Shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim,
and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter
such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged
to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after
notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or
vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion. (Emphasis ours)

In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of the
registration of the adverse claim should already have decided the controversy
between the parties on the merits thereof. Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil
actions, since the Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of
general jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity
of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner is
entitled or not to the relief that he seeks. 4 That doctrine is based on
expediency. In fact, petitioner has also prayed in his Brief that the case be
returned to the lower Court for further proceedings. Note should also be taken
of the fact that an adverse claim may be cancelled only after it is adjudged
invalid or unmeritorious by the Court acting either as a land registration Court
or a Court of general jurisdiction. 5 The two other co-vendees, however, should
be impleaded as parties so that the entire controversy as to ownership may be
threshed out in a single action to prevent multiplicity of suits.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial

Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
hearing and for passing upon the controversy on the merits between petitioner,
as the registered owner, and private respondent, who had filed the adverse
claim, impleading for that purpose the alleged co-vendees, Guillermo de la
Cruz and Jose Junio.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA

ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL
ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO,
SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO
ARCEO, respondents.

Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.

Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error

committed by the Court of Appeals.1

It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the
owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595,
3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941.
Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose
married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita,
Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and
Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose
died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.

It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed
a deed of donation inter vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses
bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942, Jose had been paying
taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon,
and claimed them as owner thereof 5

It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another

deed of donation inter vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties
further in favor of Jose. 6
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of
donation mortis causa, marked as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving
away the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose.
It seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after
Escolastica had died.

On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the
cadastral court 7 an application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582,
2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio,
Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro
and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131
on claims that each of them were entitled to one-third thereof. 8

The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. 9

Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.

On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court.

The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been
awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or
otherwise, by acquisitive prescription. 10 They also assert that exhibits "J" and
"T" had validly transferred the subject lands to them.

In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the
cadastral court had the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of
property; that the issue of prescription was never ventilated below; and that
exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".

The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather,
over the dates thereof. Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and that exhibit "l", the
instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al.
maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27,
1941, twenty-four days after the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming
exhibit "1" came earlier, it was notarized, and took effect, only on November 3,
1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the donors.

Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no
real question of fact to be resolved in this case. The important question, so we
find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character: Who has the right over lots
Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?

As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.

The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have
held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court."
The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts
the authority to act not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also
'over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.'" 12 At any
rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land
registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the
parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues
for determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present
their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of
record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision
upon such controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it has been held that the
rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which
may be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the
cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for
instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to
defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which
case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless
the court first decided it.

The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims,

Virginia, et al. cite four events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties
and until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2) Upon his death, they, Virginia,
et al., divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since,
Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a
finger to oust him, Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right.
Virginia, et al. now say that barring the above exhibits, they have anyway
acquired the parcels by prescription.

We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners
suppose that the parcels ' had come under the category of a co-ownership,
following the death of their grandparents, but in that case, it has been held that
in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he
has made known to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive
ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof;
and (4) his possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15

The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose)
have acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested
possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession
because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can
not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid
taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes
does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact finally that Virginia,
et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive
because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to
Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands
had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of prescription.

We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been
conferred to Jose by a valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".

Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by
exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears to have been executed in compliance with legal
requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is true that the cadastral
court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making
Abdon sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature
thereon upon "the belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from
one Marciano Santos" 19) but as found by the Court of Appeals, It is a theory
that "must be received with a 'grain of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is
dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J"
was genuine. We are bound by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and
as we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure questions of law.

As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just
as controlling on this Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after
the death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and does not contain the
acceptance ... by Jose Arceo." 21

We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to
comply with charges imposed in the donation, 24 or by reason of
ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof that Abdon when he executed exhibit
"1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.

We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had
"neutralized the force and effect" 26 of exhibit "J".

It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of
Jose (whose rights were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.

We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits,
because first, it is an issue of fact and second, because whatever their true
dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia, et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
ORDERED to distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos,
dated October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and
conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.