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C. The Judicial Department
1. Judicial Power
2. The Supreme Court
a. Composition
b. Mode of Sitting
c. Appointments and qualifications
Republic v. Sereno, G.R No. 237428, May 11, 2018
(PDF!)
d. No non-judicial work for judges
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent
Raymundo Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the
Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the
Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila
Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity
of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act
No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to
Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway,
and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the
town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides:
"Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and
tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid
to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use,
shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it
was ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the
Attorney-General and the transportation companies affected by the
petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the
proceedings, and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of
public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral
hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted
that power is attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an
entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed that the franchise
granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to
effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties'
own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an
arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the
matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find
support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is
hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the Philippines,
and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a
contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be
referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and
cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims
& Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil.,
69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of
Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing
arbitration and award too far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such as
absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts
should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also
perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to
arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a
statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to
a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in
extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is
made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a
party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the
courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls
Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held
that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a
certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the
owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power
to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is
not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative
authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise
administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not
to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding
that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute
before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the
courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the
proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken
therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court,
where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members
acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
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considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in
in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court the matter.
could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present
petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull,
the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at
all.lawphil.net
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial
vs.
power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by RESOLUTION
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions. BARREDO, J.:

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26).
When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court
as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of
arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses
none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be
required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and
powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government,
and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the
court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other
duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in
the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the
judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party
without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a
dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties,
unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law
authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the
judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise
under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes firmly all the judicial
powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any
power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly
confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2
Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity
as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ...
gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed
(allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such
incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly
reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or
resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two
months to over three months, together with the title, number, number of
hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate
issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in violation of
Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form
No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2
thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his
official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has
collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from
January to February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the
cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as
Annex "C" and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph
thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of
service in flagrant violation of action 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended which provides as follows:

Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court
... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify
holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide
on their application for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by
the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established,
them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid,
and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or
shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a
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determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined
and decided on or before the date of making the certificate and ... no
salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to
December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein
the number of hours of session that the Court holds daily, the
accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55
and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has
manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or
discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable
Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon the
performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance
of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood
aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the
highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral character
appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of
justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging
pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court,
being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized
from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of
Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice,
respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal
Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the
court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial
government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and
to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the
court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these
items must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial
officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province
was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of
Calamba assured the respondent that the court could be accommodated
in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of
the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another
location. When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office
was about to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors
objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look
over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment
that the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the rentals.
Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank
branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the
building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable
space selected by respondent was the second floor of the Laguna
Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally
signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another
month passed before the municipal government could release the amount
necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented,
which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for
the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal.
Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the provincial government
appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and
materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also
placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of
the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the
equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23,
1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this
allotment is still under way (please see enclosed certification of the
Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could
actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during
the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had,
due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten
months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed
upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without
being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his
oath of office, grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58
of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Respondent was like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of
being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute
dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in
organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice
(please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S.
Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than
exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done,
have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position
then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be
Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of
the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving
P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the
judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of
absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law
where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
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"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated
February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a
Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not
actually started, to perform their judicial duties to comply with the
abovementioned statutory-provisions and circular (please see enclosed
certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked
Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the
folly of requiring a judge who has not entered into the Performance of his
judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge
who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal
cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination
for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on
or before the date of making the certificate.' And bow could such a judge
hold court in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55;
observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section
58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is
not yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of
the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in
their respective complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof,
that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that
this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the
complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge
of dishonesty in the actuations for the respondent complained of. As We
see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray
it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries
as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took
his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has
not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that
respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight
of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this
position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a
judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial
function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any
good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for
the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and,
instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not,
it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when,
as in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to
furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the
performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without
any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally
work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this
direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department
of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having
worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his
credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he
rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving
salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without
any fault on, his part. As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in
jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to
the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service
to the other departments of the government will be discussed a non. At
this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of
dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports
of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually
required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding
circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet
started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars
apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding
trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand,
respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a
valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made
himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he
could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was
not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith
seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to
have it read. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court,
respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these
preparations, but that is something within the initiative control of the
Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks
with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being
detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were
only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority
over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may
not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the
other great departments of the government must always be kept clear
and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on
which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by
good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional
precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to
him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval
and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the
case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best
that this practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let
a copy of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
e.Salary
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
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RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments
or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution
of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of
an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its
Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had
reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court
REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the
Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this
petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised
through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the
clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of
the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three
branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the
course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially
with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to
the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of
the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987
(infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure
to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from
payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the
continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of
the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all
other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it
had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David,
infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution
of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby
reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a
general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The
1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts)
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not
be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same
1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis
supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6,
Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim
that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of
"non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to
Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor
subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two
Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax
exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of
justices, does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation
and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not
on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge
receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the
 6
income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the
salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the
increase or decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect
way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of the
judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect
tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation
of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor,
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest
respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole
with the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative
invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens
outside, especially the humble government employees, might say that in
trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of
privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the
Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the
Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other
employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic
immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire executive department
and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14,
1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished"
be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income
tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three
branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this
Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a
vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an
amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment
saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to
income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will
just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the
statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN
support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to be that
the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they
already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of
Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right now, for
instance, there are many people who have accepted employment in the
government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to
income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by
accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the
amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a
suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas
announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original
proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4
would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision
in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the
salary of justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on
non-exemption from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner
Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the
General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after
"DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was
finally approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is
that there will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions.
Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of
officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be
exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted
by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor
subjected to income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11it may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.12 1avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:
 7
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis
supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must
be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or
if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.
It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling
that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded.
The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
f. Tenure
g. Removal
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ
DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B.
FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from
Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr.
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987
with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court,"
together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st
Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the
important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an
anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court"
addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment
brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and
asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment
is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29
February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135,
which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by
Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to
file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition
Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a
copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in
Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable
Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the
charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter
lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require
complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice
Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an
extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which
appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative
Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the
Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per
curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr
Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved.
This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A
public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of
the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who
may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally
before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of
which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in
Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1)
of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be
removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To
grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run
afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same
situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI
[8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.
and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public
accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally
required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter.
In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
 8
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions,
however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be
removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the
New Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall
be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and
punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a
reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite
apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect
of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to
hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally
manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and
thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer
expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the
impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment
proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a
conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal
action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987
Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it
Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are
entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior.
What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure
of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may
then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be
proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial
independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because
judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule,
Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any
number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority
by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer
should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a
Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance
is to file impeachment proceedings.
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution
upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., took no part.
Guetierrez, J., J., is on leave.
h. Fiscal autonomy
i. Jurisdiction
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs.
Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS,
MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO,
AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO, respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato
dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 — for certiorari,
injunction and damages — on the ground that the complaint therein
 9
states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a
quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of
dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in
the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six
at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As
the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned
at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as
chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita
Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the
above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro
Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and
third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the
"third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with
his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor
students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee
members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor
of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that
plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May
21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the
teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose the
"Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of
official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were
included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the
school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from
Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat
(second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close
rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that
Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much
benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was
coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas
who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in
the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the committee
referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was
composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that
the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all
teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial
matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have
exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing
of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia
Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting
grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention
to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that
several district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other
than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered
in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the
Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the
place such district examinations were not advisable; that there was a
unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers
to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro
Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first
place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with
the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and
discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the
disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally
appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and
to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each
other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will
be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court,
among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of
the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during
the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially
and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI
in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st
of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the
lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that
the graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May
21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to the school
authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward
to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation
exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965
was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the
petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the
case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss,
on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that
even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before
the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was
granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and
for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court
has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the
alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion'
are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be
substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades
one to six, the students closely contending for class honors were Socorro
Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once
second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times
second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place
(grade I).
Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade
VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given second place while
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is the ranking now
disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
 10
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of
1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth
grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on
honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual For
Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers
from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence
showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from
80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which
ratings were partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect
pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the
word "First Place" was erased and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school
authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such
tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of, together with
all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as required by
the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal
judgment or order of respondents that is submitted for revision or
correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to
the school authorities who only 'passed the buck to each other.' This
allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted
the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition
implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his
teachers. The administrative agencies of the Department of Education
could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and
give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them.
Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part
of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real
grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected
by means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the
petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved
for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence,
this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition
states no cause of action on the grounds — discussed by the court a
quo in the appealed order above-quoted — (1) that the petition does not
comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not
been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not
first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the
other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did not err in
dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the
questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the
"committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here
condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under
Section 1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really
the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of
the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by
Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer
be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be
employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.)
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the
exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of
the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of
certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances
must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of
persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal,
board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights
and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general
appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon
whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies
impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is
inconsistent with discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal must
decide according to law and the rights of the parties — or with dictation
 11
on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment
under the law, and not act under a mandate from another power. ... The
character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is
judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public
agent of the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns
be each.' (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181
S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed
with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al.
v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought
must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which
would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as
the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating
between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party
thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which
is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction so
far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in
the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear
and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of
doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to
or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a public
officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the
determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest
of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or
authority to carry out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the
power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them,
or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction;
the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power
which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual
citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power"
implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may
hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does
not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is
not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 C.J.
1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial
functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not
depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the
importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to
the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In
the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion
and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the
greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a
function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and
judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that
subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at
least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If
the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two
last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is
judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a
thing, than its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v.
Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis
supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and
there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it
is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential
that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the
sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but
it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301,
304), the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or
ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is
to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed
with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee
on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this
case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the
performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the
decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may
exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed
with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out
by appellees,3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law
that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits
of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function
involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still,
this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted
thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly
one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case
of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for determination
was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that
the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of
 12
that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests,
beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by
schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions
are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them
either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U.P.
annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor
in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of
judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect the
audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to
the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's
decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the
Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's
verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to
join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost:
the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs
was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did
not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or
judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United
States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the
determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long
period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought
to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have
often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to
establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted
views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent
judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and
that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered
some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there
was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the
deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no
right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the
board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are
instances of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or
malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her
action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below
apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this
nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed
from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements
of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that
appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment
or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is
supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as well.
In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5where it was
claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in
the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in complete
disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on
the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied the petition
for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said
petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly
violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even
sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of the writ of
certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations
abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court
in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the petition the decisions
allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular
portion or portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent
Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs.
Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by
Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following
language, this Court emphasized the importance of complying with the
said requirement of Rule 65:
While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the
respondent municipality with the respondent court for recovery of
property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached
to the petition.
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by
the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered
by the respondent court and of the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of
default is attached to its petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the
purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing pleadings
is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order
commanding the respondent court to approve either the original or the
amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is attached
to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.
 13
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of
the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary
School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises,
implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the
decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students
complained of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains, however, that
appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of teachers
much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even
before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May,
1965, he had personally appealed the said committee's decision with
various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed
the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition
various other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers
allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee;
altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which
appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no
doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of
Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary
to pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-4606. May 30, 1952.]
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, Petitioner, v. HON.
JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
EMMA IMPERIAL, represented by her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V.
IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN LUZON COLLEGE, Respondents.
Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for Petitioner.
Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamzon for respondents Judge
Leuterio and Emma Imperial.
Padilla & San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College.
SYLLABUS
1. ORATORICAL COMPETITION; PRIZES; RIGHTS TO PRIZES IN ORATORICAL
COMPETITION. — No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants in an oratorical competition, because theirs was merely the
privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the
competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
2. COURTS; STARE DECISIS; PARTICULAR ACTION NO PRECEDENT. — The
fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period
affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be
enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have often
arisen.
3. ORATORICAL COMPETITION; ERROR AND WRONG, DISTINGUISHED. —
Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the legal
principle that where there is a wrong there is a remedy, is the deprivation
or violation of a right.
4. ID.; LITERARY CONTESTS; COURT’S INTERFERENCE. — Generally, the
judiciary has no power to reverse - on the ground of error - the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical contest.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
Statement of the case. The issue in this litigation is whether the courts
have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical competition.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given
by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma
Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of first instance of that
province to reverse the award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen
into error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the
objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared
Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action
challenging the court’s power to modify the board’s verdict.
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held
in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce,
Emma Imperial and Luis General, Jr.
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B.
Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the
judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced their
decision awarding first prize to Nestor Nosce, second prize to Emma
Imperial, third prize to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis
General, Jr.
4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of
Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the judges had
committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her getting second place
only, instead of the first, which she therefore claimed.
5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint
in the court of first instance.
6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein
he gave the participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities,
giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second best etc., down to
number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the
lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.
7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10;
Benavides 17, General 17, the board of judges having voted as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Judge Nosce Imperial Benavides General
Felipe Sr. 3 1 2 4
 14
Obias 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez 1 4 5 3
Prado 3 2 1 3
Moll 2 1 5 4
___ ___ ___ ___
10 10 17 17
8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for first
place, the chairman, apparently with the consent of the board, broke the
tie by awarding first honors to Nosce and second honors to Imperial.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained
blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival orators and their
respective orations, the judge could jot down the grades he thought the
contestants deserved according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English",
"Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice." From
such data he made up his vote.
10. It was discovered later that the form filled by Delfin Rodriguez, one of
the judges, gave Imperial and General the following ratings under the
above headings: Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94 - Place 4th General
19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95 — Place 3rd.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore
should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez’ vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez,
her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she
copped first place in that speaking joust.
12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial’s
ratings; that she should have been given a total of 95, or place No. 3, the
same as General; that he was not disposed to break the tie between her
and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and
rank 3 also to General.
Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge to give the
same rank to two contestants, we will concede for the moment that Delfin
Rodriguez could have given 3 to Imperial and also 3 to General.
However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote (Exhibit 3)
one may infer that after the contest and before submitting his vote he
decided to give General an edge over Imperial. How? Under the caption
"English" General was given by him at first "14", later increased to "15."
Evidently because after he had added the ratings of Imperial and
(erroneously) reached the sum of 94, he added the ratings of General
(which were the same as Imperial with 14 under "English") and
(mistakenly) reached 94 also. So what did he do? He raised the 14 to 15
and thus gave General 95 to place him over Imperial’s 94. (Mistakingly
again, because with 15 General got 96 instead of 95).
But to us the important thing is Rodriguez’ vote during and immediately
after the affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3
and Imperial place No. 4. His calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not
material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank spaces in
his own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving 1 to Imperial, 2
to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice", "English",
"Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote; not
the calculations or processes leading to such vote.
Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct" the alleged
error.
The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the
winners announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that
the ratings he gave the second place winner should have been such as
would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their
verdict. May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award,
reversing the decision of the board of judges?
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by
schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical
competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken
part in them either as contestants in their school days 1 , or as members
of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not
reflect the audience’s preference and that errors have sometimes been
ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke
judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the
board’s decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the
Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of the referee’s
verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to
join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost:
the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their’s
was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did
not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or
judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United
States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the
determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long
period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought
to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have
often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to
establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted
views thereon. (See C. J. S. Vol. 1, p. 1012).
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent
judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and
that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered
some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error
on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same
thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize
unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or
judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are
instances of "damnum absque injuria." This is one of them. If fraud or
malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her
action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
 15
By the way, what is herein stated must not be understood as applying to
those activities which the Government has chosen to regulate with the
creation of the Games and Amusements Board in Executive Order No. 392,
Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so
declare, that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board
of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in
literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.
j. Deliberations
k. Voting
l. Requirements as to decisions
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983
RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and COPACABANA
APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.
G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983
J.R.M. & CO., INC. as owner and operator of Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of Labor,HON.
FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA, as Regional Director of the National Capital
Region, Ministry of Labor, nd RICARDO VALLADOLID, respondents.
Daniel Co for petitioner Ricardo Valadolid.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Vicente V. Ocampo & Antonio V. de Ocampo for J.R.M. & Co., Inc.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor
affirming the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without backwages
issued by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella in Case No.
R4-STF-2-1316-79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel," is being assailed by the parties in these petitions.
J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as JRM), as petitioner in G.R. No.
53349, is also the respondent in G.R. No. 52364 named therein as
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. JRM originally owned and operated not
only Copacabana but also Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal
stockholders of JRM were the brothers Joseph, Manuel, Vicente and
Roman, all surnamed Yu. Upon the death of Joseph on October 12, 1975,
although both Copacabana and Tropicana continued technically as owned
by JRM, the controlling (70%) interest in Copacabana was lodged in the
surviving heirs of Joseph, with brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15%
interest each. JRM was placed under the management of the heirs of
Joseph. The brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were allowed 100%
equity interest in Tropicana, which was operated separately from JRM.
Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became competing businesses.
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364 and respondent in G.R. No.
53349, after the death of Joseph, was employed by JRM in 1977 as a
telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the
position of clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM.
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-President,
attached to the position paper submitted by JRM before the Regional
Director, the transfer was motivated by the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
That as such switchboard operator numerous telephone conversations
and communications relating to business and confidential matters were
intercepted and relayed to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;
That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as the person responsible
for said interception and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM & Co.,
Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila Hotel to bring flowers on the
occasion of Wedding Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty. Matters
which Mrs. Lourdes Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to tell
anyone, reached Tropicana people;
xxx xxx xxx 1
The affidavit further disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
That while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of Accounts
Receivables, reach Tropicana Management although said copies were not
referred to them;
That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential matters taken in the office
of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;
That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was
the person responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the
entrapment was conceived by the management of Copacabana
Apartment- Hotel;
That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan, a cash voucher for
P500,000.00 supposedly in payment for representation expenses to
myself with the corresponding check were prepared and issued
respectively by Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager, who
thereafter called Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the said
cash voucher and check to my room which he did; few minutes later I
 16
came down to the office and asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the
corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking Corporation for said check;
That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher, corresponding check
and deposit slip were kept in the hotel vault with no other person other
than myself, Juan Bermudo and Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge
of preparation and existence thereof;
That unknown to Ricardo Villadolid, the aforementioned check, cash
voucher and deposit slip were cancelled;
That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua, came to Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel as minority stockholder of the latter, vehemently
demanding for an accounting of Copacabana books;
That he strongly charged that information reached him that I received a
disbursement of P500,000.00 from Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as
representation expenses in my capacity as Executive Vice-President
thereof;
That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled cash voucher, check and
deposit slip with mouth agape Manuel Yu Chua, could do nothing else but
admit that in fact, his informer within Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was
no other than Mr. Ricardo C. Villadolid;
That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under the circumstances, I
could no longer repose any trust whatsoever on Ricardo Valladolid and
requested him to take the latter to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just
swap him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua directed me to tell
Valladolid to see him;
That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back and told me that
Manuel Yu Chua has no place for him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in
this conversation, Ricardo Valladolid apologized for having betrayed the
trust that we had reposed on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu had
told him to stay impartial; that he then having done this for Manuel Yu
Chua, the latter could not even accept him in Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;
xxx xxx xxx 2
The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of Sofia Mo.
Gianan, External Auditor of J.R.M. & Co., Inc., and Juan V. Bermudo,
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager, which affidavits formed part of
JRM's position paper filed before the agency below. 3 The cancelled Cash
Voucher, the uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the
respective amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the same
position paper as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had been
effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5) day vacation leave
starting December 30, 1978 with the Manager of Copacabana, stating
therein that he would report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not
report for work on January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8,
1979 requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at the Dr.
Estrellado Clinic. 5 On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's wife allegedly called
up JRM informing the company through its accountant, Eddie Escueta,
that her husband was still sick and requested for 30 days sick leave, which
was allegedly granted. This was denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The Executive Vice-
President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to admit him and instead asked
him to resign. JRM maintains that Valladolid left the office that same day
and never returned, because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized
absences.
On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
with vacation and sick leave pay. 6
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed by Daniel T.
Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979
preparatory to the termination of his services 10 days from receipt of a
copy of the application for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given
were: (1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various instances,
confidential business matters to competitors of the company; and (2)
Gross Neglect of Duty for having been absent without leave or notice for
more than 25 days, to the detriment of the company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for clearance with the
Ministry of Labor. 8 The application for clearance and Valladolid's
complaint for Illegal Dismissal were consolidated and docketed as
R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties submitted their respective position papers
and documentary evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued
the following challenged Order:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for clearance with
preventive suspension is hereby denied. Respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate complainant to his former position without backwages and
without loss of seniority rights. Let the time this case was pending be
considered as complainant's suspension for his absences.
The claim for vacation sick leave pay is dismissed for failure to
substantiate the same.
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking
modification of the same, praying for the award of backwages from the
time he was illegally dismissed on February 16, 1979 to the date of his
actual reinstatement. JRM also appealed the said Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order,
dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or valid
reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for certiorari with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a modification of the Order
of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor so as to grant him
backwages. This Court resolved. on February 4, 1980, to give due course
to the petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
assailing that same Order. This Court gave due course to the petition and
consolidated the same with G.R. No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed
their respective memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised by Valladolid
claiming that the Orders in question are contrary to law and evidence, and
were issued arbitrarily and capriciously with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
 17
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the following grounds:
I Directors of JRM had a right to know the business standing of said
That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor committed grave abuse of
discretion when in his questioned order in effect sustained the finding of
respondent Regional Director that there is no evidence to support the
dismissal of private respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and Regional Director
Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse of discretion when they
arbitrarily failed to consider in their respective orders under review,
established jurisprudence.
III
That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion
when he held that preventive suspension is equivalent to dismissal.
IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed to state the facts and
conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V practically dismissed before he was formally notified of his suspension
That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority or transcending beyond
his jurisdiction, he absolutely disregarded procedural requirement in the
hearing of the present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its right to
due process.
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having committed
any breach of trust. 9 In corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr.
Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter
stated that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hard-working and
efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary collection
and clerical in nature which do not involve trust (or) confidential business
or trade secrets which he may 'divulge' to other companies." 10
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no evidence on
record that Valladolid furnished copies of receivables or divulged
confidential business matters to Mr. Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People'
including the P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme.'"
That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits attached to
petitioner's position paper adequately show that JRM did not act on mere
suspicion but on the contrary, acted prudently when it first transferred
Valladolid from switchboard operator where he could eavesdrop on
telephone conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But
even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as shown by the
entrapment scheme. Manuel Yu's certification as to Valladolid's
trustworthiness cannot be given much weight not only because it was
disproved by the entrapment contrived but more so because even Manuel
Yu himself refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had
suggested that Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM had lost
confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who owns 15% of the
equity holding of Copacabana, and being a member of the Board of
establishment, there is basis to believe that he would not have been able
to pinpoint the particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had
not been leaked out to him.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required, it
being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer
has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded of his position. 11 However, as this was
Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional Director, dismissal from
the service is too harsh a punishment, considering that he had not been
previously admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor.
Besides as clerk-collector, he need not be given access to facts relative to
the business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to Tropicana would be to
the former's prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional Director that
Valladolid was terminated without prior clearance. J.R.M. sent a
memorandum to Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of his
preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of
the application for clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was
filed on February 28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on
February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for Illegal
Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on
February 16, 1979 when he reported back to work, so that he was
leading to his dismissal, in violation of the requirement of Section 3, Rule
XIV, Book V, Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12 And as
provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without prior
clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be termination of
employment without a just cause."
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that
applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a
decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the
opposition 13 As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of
due process where the Regional Director merely required the submission
of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter. 14
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of
Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which requires a statement of the
facts and the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That prescription
applies to decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an
administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book
V, Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in
courts of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings
of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from those facts by the Regional
Director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised
therein.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from December
30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he notified the
company of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled
that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to
gross neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate
refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific
 18
circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for work. We
agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was committed by
respondent Regional Director in ordering his reinstatement without
backwages. 16
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are hereby denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 78648 January 24, 1989
RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA,
BASILAN, respondents.
Romulo D. Plagata for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute
Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition
for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the
public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding,
among others, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not
enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been
impleaded as an indispensable party in the case.
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the
law on which it is based;
2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise
agreement; and
3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA, for short) gravely
abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for separation pay by
your petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was appointed as
Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty,
misconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems
Board exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as
Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidence
by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No. 54,
Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
filed Case No. 43, a suit for mandamus and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court of First
Instance in Basilan Province, Branch 1, praying for reinstatement "with full
backwages and other rights inherent in the position." He also filed Case No.
45 with the same Court seeking that he and his wife be paid their back
salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision of
the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its
Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to
the provisions of the Local Government Code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on the
other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the
Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of
COA), entered into a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others,
that:
l. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and
other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as Municipal
Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from January 1, 1980
to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves,
mid-year and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay
under the Local Government Code, which are reflected in the computation
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof... (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered
as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary considerations mentioned
therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although,
concededly, no provision for the same had been included in the
Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, P. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the
amount of P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the
abolition of the position of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay
is provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim to
the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11 January, 1986, in a First
Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and
proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and
the ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX,
Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the
Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provincial
Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for separation pay.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission
on Audit (COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
 19
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not
only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but also disallowed the
other payments made to petitioner. It held:.
Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid back
salaries and other emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby
directs that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the
period when he was no longer in the government service should be
disallowed in audit without prejudice to his right of recourse against the
officials personally liable for his unlawful dismissal. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA,
which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May
1988 as heretofore adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was duly signed
by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their
lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for
reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this Court in
Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33, 113 SCRA 477, April
12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded in
this case, it being apparent that the officials concerned had been sued in
their official capacity.
It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued
petitioner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of
mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back
salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue
petitioner in his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and
other municipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the interests of
justice and equity, from including them herein as respondents. (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the
Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in
Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L- 17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965).
Thus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back
salaries, P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as
Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in the sum
of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement
benefits bad also been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we
uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:
Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the
instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement benefits
earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled from the
records is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the service on
January 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the service until his
position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was abolished. In other
words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the
service when the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his
separation from the service was not attributable to the abolition of the
position but was due to his dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 which provides —
'Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or
employee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance, the
official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant
position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be
available, the official or employee affected shall be granted a separation
pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over and
above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under
existing law.'
cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay.
Moreover, the fact remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already
been paid his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His
entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
is offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment
of double retirement benefits to an employee. (p. 4, COA Decision No. 388;
p. 15, Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay, Sr.,
G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September 24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the
Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted outright
but still had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly denied
by COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for
reinstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively dismissed
such that he could still be considered an incumbent whose position had
been abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not having
left his office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable
position and compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs.
Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980).
Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court
under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision"
within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course
and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due
course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed
Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and
thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC,
et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People,
G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of
right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed.,
Vol. IV- B, pp. 4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby
PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent
Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First
 20
Instance of Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is
hereby SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation
pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 110817-22 June 13, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated February 11, 1993, which the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon City rendered in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding
accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin guilty of four counts of
consummated rape and one count of attempted rape and sentencing him
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged of multiple (3 Counts) rape and one count of attempted
rape, and in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
sentences him to prison terms as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months in the
minimum penalty to four (4) years in the maximum period and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to deter sexual crimes of
the sort committed by accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of accused- appellant.
On February 22, 1992, accompanied by her mother, Regina Bugarin, and
her maternal aunt, Nena Padecio, she complained to the Central Police
District Command that she had been repeatedly raped by
accused-appellant. In her sworn statement she related how, on nine
different occasions between November 1989 and January 17, 1992, her
father entered the common sleeping area of their house in Payatas,
Quezon City and, after holding her knees and spreading her legs,
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and kissed her breasts. She
claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her father molested her by "kissing her
vagina" and that only by repeatedly kicking him did he desist from
molesting her any further.
Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I. Aranas, PNP
Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was "in non-virgin state
physically." 2 On February 25, 1992, she returned to the police station to
file formal charges against her father. The case was referred to the Office
of the Quezon City Prosecutor which found probable cause and
accordingly filed charges for consummated rape and attempted rape by
means of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991 and
January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin. No bail
was recommended "considering that the evidence of guilt of the
respondent is strong." The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-92-28785 and Q-92-28786 and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force and
intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990, June 1990 and
March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-appellant. Docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, the additional cases were
raffled to Branch 97 of the same court. These cases were eventually
consolidated and assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:
Crim Case No. 92-31157
That on or about the month of June 1990 In Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARY
JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent
and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31159
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her
consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31160
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her
consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
 21
Crim. Case No. 92-28785
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by
then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned
MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her,
all against her will, however, the said accused did not perform all the acts
of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of
some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is,
undersigned complainant push him away, to the damage and prejudice of
the undersigned in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Crim. Case No. 92-28786
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y
ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and against her will, to her
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under
the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in each case,
after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the prosecutor, Maryjane
Bugarin narrated how her father sexually assaulted her in their family's
common sleeping area while no one was at home and threatened her if
she told anyone about what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to be God
fearing and morally upright and that his wife, Regina Bugarin, must have
induced their daughter to file the complaints against him because his wife
blamed him for financially neglecting their family since 1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who testified that a
good mother would not expose her child to humiliation just to get back at
her husband. She further claimed that her daughter, who had been raised
properly and taught to be honest, could not have fabricated the charges
against the accused-appellant.
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court,
after giving a summary of the testimonies of the complainant and
accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how
she was raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite
yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's decision on the ground that:
(1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not credible; (2) the elements of
force and intimidation had not been proved; and (3) the decision of the
trial court does not state the facts and law upon which it was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the prosecution,
contends that complainant, who was only 15 years old when she reported
the crime, was not likely to concoct charges against her father and that
the moral ascendancy of the father over her took the place of force and
intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial
court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the Constitution
provides in part in Art. VIII, §14 that "No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented
by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule 120, §2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written
in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof,
if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a
finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least
three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of
the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not
explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony
credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out,
complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was
allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of
complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime.
Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to
wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14,
1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she
was molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason
six informations were filed against him, but the decision found the
accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court
erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without
explaining whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge
of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the
accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of
the four counts of . . . rape."
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989, but the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is far rape allegedly
committed in May 1990. It must be for this reason that the trial court
convicted accused-appellant of only four counts of rape, instead of five.
But the trial court should have explained so, if this was really the reason,
and expressly acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under this
information.
 22

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that A — (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced me and
they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which touched the different parts of my body and he informed me that when I
they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, grow up, I would not become innocent.
to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if
any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings Q — What do you mean by those words that he told you that when you
of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than grow up you would not be innocent?
that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is,
A — So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.
thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding by ipse dexit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse
by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative Q — What did he do?
of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public A — He touched my knees and spread them out and then holding my
confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in breast and he put his sex organ inside me.
this case disrespects the judicial function.
Q — When you say inside me, what do you mean?
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for compliance with
the constitutional requirement for decisions. But this case has been A — His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.
pending for sometime and further delay can be avoided if the Court simply
reviews the whole evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain
Q — What do you mean by what?
the transcript of stenographic notes, the complainant's sworn statement
dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the prosecutor, and the
statement of the arresting officer, on the basis of which the Court may A — My sex organ, sir.
properly decide the case. 3 For this reason the Court has decided to review
this case despite the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of Q — What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ to your
facts and a statement of the reasons underlying its decision. sex organ?

Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she A — I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to him, father,
is a minor, 4 testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is I don't like it, ayoko po.
necessary to prove the commission of the crime. 5 Care must be taken,
however, that her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified Q — Despite your pleas, what happened next?
based on her testimony alone. 6 In this case, Maryjane Bugarin testified on
November 25, 1992 7 as follows:
A — He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he suddenly
moved back.
Q — On November 1989, was your father residing with you or was he
living with you?
Q — After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?

A — Yes, sir.
A — He went out and I was left crying.

Q — Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual incident

Q — After this first incident, were there any other similar incident which
that happened, if any?
happened, if any?

A — Yes, sir, when he entered the room.

A — There are, sir, but I can't recall when.

Q — When you say "he," are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin?

Q — How many times more or less?

A — Yes, sir.
A — Around four (4) times.

Q — If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to identify

Q — After November 1989?
him?

A — Including November 1989.

A — Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-shirt who
answers by the name Marcelino Bugarin when asked by the Court).
Q — How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember where you
were?
Q — On November 1989, you were mentioning that "he", referring to the
accused, entered your room, what happened?
A — Yes, sir. I was in our house.
 23

Q — Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident that
happened on December 24, 1989?
A — Yes, sir. It is the same thing that he did to me.
Q — Please explain what the same thing he do to you?
A — He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and also my
breast.
A — That's it again, I was in the room and again he embraced me made
me lie down then kiss my sex organ and then, he placed again his sex
organ inside my sex organ.
Q — How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where you were?
A — I was also in the house.
Q — What happened?

Q — What happened next? A — I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me to accede
to his desire.
A — He was spreading my legs.
Q — What do you mean to accede to his desire?
Q — Then, after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?
A — He wanted to use me again.
A — He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.
Q — Then, he actually used you?
Q — After that, what happened next?
A — Yes, sir.
A — I cried again.
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?
Q — When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?
A — I was also in our house.
A — His face became scaring.
Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
Q — Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember where
you were sometime in June 1990? A — He licked my sex organ.

A — I was in our house. Q — After that, what did he do next?

Q — Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any unusual incident A — He was threatening me.
that happened?
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
A — The same thing happened, over and over.
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and over?
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched my breast
and kissed my nipples. A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.

Q — And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your nipples, what else Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that
did your father do on June 1990? date?

A — He kissed also my sex organ. A — None, sir. I was just crying.

Q — Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?
A — He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.
Q — In March 14, 1991, where were you?
A — I was also in our house.
Q — Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14, 1991?
The accused-appellant claims that Maryjane's testimony contains
inconsistencies which indicate that the charges against him were
fabricated. He points to the failure of complainant on cross-examination
to state in some instances the exact date and time she was allegedly raped,
and to the fact that it took complainant two years before reporting the
incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer
who examined the complainant. Accused-appellant also claims that no
evidence was adduced to prove that the rape was committed by force and
intimidation.
 24
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact date and
time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be expected
when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which
are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of
other people. 8 Indeed, this Court has ruled that complainant's failure to
recall some details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication,
precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who
is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime. 9 The precise time of the crime has no substantial
bearing on its commission, 10 especially since in this case the date and
time of the commission of the crime is not material to the
accused-appellant's defense. Indeed, accused-appellant's contention is
only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common bedroom
at nighttime because the place where they sleep is shut off from the rest
of their house by a curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. 11 Our cases
record instances of rape committed inside family dwellings when other
occupants are asleep. 12 In the case at bar, Maryjane testified that the
accused-appellant was able to rape her by sending out her siblings to play
with their neighbors' children, and while her mother was at work from 3
p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent inability to recall the
exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q — Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped sometime
November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989, March 14, 1991,
December 23, 1991, how come that you knew very well the date as
December 24, March 14, December 23; or rather, how come that your
complaint is only sometime in the early part of 1991?
A — I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my brother.
Q — How about March 14, how come you knew very well that you were
molested by your father?
A — Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were given
clearances.
Q — What day is your last school day?
A — I cannot remember, sir.
Q — Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not know
very well your last day of your school day?
A — Because March 14 is our clearance.
Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 13 In People
v. Coloma, 14 where the complainant was also only 13 years old when first
molested by her father, the Court adverted to the father's moral and
physical control over the young complainant in explaining the delay of
eight years before the complaint against her father was made. In this case,
Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and
shocked that her own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very
close to him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother
because the latter might be angered, so that she finally confided to her
aunt. Indeed, a survey conducted by the University of the Philippines
Center for Women's Studies showed that victims of rape committed by
their fathers took much longer in reporting the incidents to the authorities
than did other victims. Many factors account for this difference: the fact
that the father lives with the victim and constantly exerts moral authority
over her, the threat he might make against her, the victim's fear of her
mother and other relatives.
Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation had been
adduced during the trial. Maryjane testified that she tried to resist her
father's advances but, on several occasions, she was overpowered by him.
She was embraced and thus prevented from escaping. 15 At other times
she was intimidated by menacing looks cast on her 16and by threats of
harm. 17 Indeed, even if there was no violence or force employed against
her, the moral influence of accused-appellant over the complainant
sufficed to make the crime rape. 18
Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in prosecutions for
rape. 19 That the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer is,
therefore, not an obstacle to a finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all reasonable doubt
that Maryjane had been raped on four occasions by accused-appellant:
November 1989, June 1990, March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991.
Complainant has no motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she
testified that she was close to him. The absence of a motive lends greater
credence to her testimony. 20 Neither does her mother have any reason to
falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin. Regina Bugarin suspected her husband
of having an affair with her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she
continued to live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use
her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years later. A mother
would not expose her child to public trial, if the charges she makes are not
true. 21
We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant guilty of the
charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 for alleged rape committed in
May 1990. There is no evidence to prove that accused-appellant raped
complainant on that date. Her testimony is to the effect that she was
raped on another date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot
be convicted for this as no complaint was formally filed regarding it.
Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the charge in Criminal
Case No. Q-92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape
committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held. Maryjane testified:
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?
A — I was also in our house.
Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
A — He licked my sex organ.
Q — After that, what did he do next?
A — He was threatening me.
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
 25
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that
date?
A — None, sir. I was just crying.
The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described. It
cannot be inferred from this act (licking complainant's genital) alone that
his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her because it has not
been shown that he had at least placed himself on top of the
complainant. 22 The act imputed to him cannot be considered a
preparatory act to sexual intercourse. 23 Accused-appellant is instead
guilty of acts of lasciviousness. It can at least be inferred from his act of
kissing the genital of the complainant that he was moved by lewd
designs. 24
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is alleged only in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this circumstance was
nonetheless proved during the trial in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and,
therefore, should also be appreciated in that case to justify the imposition
of the penalty in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED finding
accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts of
consummated rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157,
Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159 and SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and
ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin in the amount
of P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed; and of acts
of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for which he is
SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to six 6 years ofprision correccional, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104874 December 14, 1993
DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in accordance
with law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to
Criminal Case No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED (Rollo, p. 33).
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to
29-87, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo Hernandez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No.
21-87, for Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and
to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of
P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of jewelries embezzled and
unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 22-87, for Estafa, he is
hereby ordered sentenced for an indeterminate prison term of Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal. as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 for the value of the
jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation
of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P250,000.00 for the value of the
jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for Viol.
of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P280,000.00 for the value of jewelries
embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 value of the jewelries
embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. case No. 29-87, for Viol. of BP 22,
he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional, and to
pay the costs (Rollo, pp. 49-50).
It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to
Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the business of buying
and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 18, 20).
In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of
jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their subsequent dealings,
petitioner either paid in cash or by way of postdated checks (TSN, March
17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks
with the aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced.
However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks concerned,
petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the dishonored checks. Some
 26
checks were likewise exchanged with cash even prior to their due date
(TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 33, 37).
Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon that he was
interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, p.
60). On that date, at around 10:00 A.M., petitioner, together with his
common-law wife, Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions,
went to the house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70).
Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth P150,000.00
for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246 payable to "cash" in the said
amount and post-dated it to October 26, 1986. The amount of the check
was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as
drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).
Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about 7:00 P.M.
and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and one bracelet with 16
diamond stones, for which he issued BPI Check No. 798247 payable to
"cash" in the amount of P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27, 1986.
Petitioner specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer
with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check was also
prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp.
73-79).
In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to the house of
de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond set. In payment thereof,
he issued BPI Check No. 798248 payable to "cash" in the amount of
P280,000.00 and post-dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17, 1987,
pp. 84-89).
On October 23, 1986, petitioner made a long-distance call to de Leon and
inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale. When she said that she did,
petitioner made an appointment with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's
house at around 2:30 P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where petitioner
selected a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond
(TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set, petitioner issued
to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable to "cash" in the amount of
P100,000.00 and dated that same day (October 23, 1992). Petitioner told
de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the
amount on that day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was
closed (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).
In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez went to de
Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece. In payment thereof,
petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check No. 245964 in the amount of
P150,000.00 post-dated to November 10, 1986 and issued by one Enrique
Araneta (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).
BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn against
insufficient funds, while BPI Check no. 798248 and ASB Check No. 245964
were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges (Rollo, pp.
16-17).
After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint
decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner was
affirmed as to Criminal Cases nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87, 25-87, 26-87, 27-87,
28-87 and 29-87, and reversed as to Criminal Case No. 21-87.
In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct
offenses subject of nine separate informations in a single judgment is
reversible error, This contention is untenable.
The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon by
petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tanjuatco, we held
that the trial court improperly rendered a single judgment for two
offenses in one of the two criminal cases, in the absence of a
consolidation of the two cases. In the case at bench, the trial court
rendered a judgment for each of the nine separate informations, albeit in
the same decision.
We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential
right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled, although accused of two
offenses, to a trial in each of the two cases upon the proofs adduced in
each individual case, and upon the allegations set forth in each
information. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one
case the facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118).
The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any
objection from petitioner. Even had he signified his opposition to the joint
trail, such opposition would have been unavailing. A consolidation of trails,
at the court's discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on
the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character"
(1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 14).
Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of
Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact as to the last two
assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial court erred:
VII
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PROOFS
NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH VERDICT.
VIII
IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE JUDGMENT, GUILTY
OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO
29-87, INCLUSIVE (Rollo, p. 56).
Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a
separate findings of fact for said assigned errors, because they were just
the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned errors.
Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate
that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based
(1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1), the decision of the Court of
Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor
general in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional
 27
mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for reconsideration must
state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2),
the denial of his motion of reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of
said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as
summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the quoted in full
the statement of facts of the Solicitor General (Rollo, p. 20). According to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent
judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by
the advance party (Rollo, p. 11).
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as
presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the
facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or
memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.
Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in
the writing of decisions.
We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor
General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of facts in the course of
its discussion of the assignment of errors.
As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of
the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a
modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit (Rollo, p. 35).
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals
did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a modification or
reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."
Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by
the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that
said decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12).
He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the trial
court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would
have sufficed to sustain her assertions (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that
self-serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible
and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were
presented.
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because
almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is
"hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving
statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are
those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do
not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861
[1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not
given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's
testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of
the opposing party for cross-examination.
It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was
presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to
some of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela
Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to
sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be
on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200
SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of evidence,
witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA
304 [1992] ).
Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the trial court
to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually presented in court to
prove the existence, ownership and worth of the pieces of jewelry other
than the checks (Rollo, p. 14).
The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon herself, who
testified that petitioner even selected the pieces of jewelry before buying
them.
As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy, 109 SCRA 400
[1981] that:
Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa, . . . In estafa,
the person prejudiced or then immediate victim of the fraud need not be
the owner of the goods. This, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "Any person who shall defraud another (it does say 'owner')
by any means mentioned herein below shall be punished . . . ." All that is
necessary is that the loss should have fallen on someone other than the
perpetrators of the crime. . . ." (at p. 408).
The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of the jewelry
as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the time of the transactions
and this is reflected by the face value of the checks.
Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
checks in evidence without the prosecution first proving that his signature
on the checks were authentic (Rollo, pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that
his signatures on the checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove
such fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.
In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by the San
Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as lost several blank
checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247, 798248, 798249, and
798250, and AB Check No. 245964. We agree with the trial court when it
gave little weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why
petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said checks were
really stolen.
Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered by the
checks were deposited by the offended party in her savings account with
 28
the Prudential Bank, it becomes the liability of the bank by its acceptance
to pay for the amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 157 SCRA 188
(1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt with the negligence of a
collecting bank which facilitated the payment by the drawee bank of the
value of a check with a forged endorsement and signature of the payee.
No such issue is involved in the case at bench.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000]
GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO)
assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the records
of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan* City
(hereafter MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for
unfair competition.
YAOs legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine
Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the
proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local
subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market
situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or
imported since 1983.PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a
market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin
Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold
GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial
Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to
purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the
GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit,
PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by
the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630
starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who
was TCCs President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member
of TCCs Board of Directors. The indictment[1] charged YAO and Roxas of
having mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which
have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them
appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to
believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution
presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of
facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo
Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization
seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter
from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCOs marketing
manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having a stenciled
silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo... back to back around the
starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an
M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined
random samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They
concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design
complement of a GE original. They also observed that some of the seized
starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these
were not shaped like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with
prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea
manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by PEMCO, they
would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCCs starters cost P1.60 each, the
witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging, design and
costs indisputably proved that TCCs GE starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that
as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of
the company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of
products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that
TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed
liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or
information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not
attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products
were counterfeit; (3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding,
stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCCs suppliers of the
starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only
discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume
items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[2] the MeTC acquitted
Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that
the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of
Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of
YAO on the following: (1) YAOs admission that he knew that the starters
were not part of GEs line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCCs
accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecutions evidence (Exhibit G-7), a
delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on
which a TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE
starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this
fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the
anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew
and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine
GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or
imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those
seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo
Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code ... i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway
Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him
identified in open court during the trial, he is acquitted of the same.
 29
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused,
George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of
arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and
Pantaleon for ... PEMCO ... Considering that no document was submitted
by the private complainant to show how the claim ofP300,000 for
consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court is not in
a position to make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the
offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by
way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil Code,
and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the
amount of another P20,000.00 as PEMCOs attorneys fees under Article
2208 (11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28,
1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the
absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City,
Philippines.[3]
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in
its order[4] of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The
appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned
to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch
121 issued an order[5] directing the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[6]
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution,
which was filed only on 20 August 1994,[7] Judge Adoracion Angeles
rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision[8] which affirmed in toto the
MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of
the MeTC and stated that [a]after going over the evidence on record, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration[9] and assailed the decision
as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. [10] In its order[11] of
28 September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as
devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a
notice of appeal.[12]
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its
Resolution[13] of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an
extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995
within which to file the Appellants Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the
Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[14] declaring that [t]he decision
rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has
long become final and executory and ordering the records of the case
remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was
granted an extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or until
March 12, 1995 within which to file appellants brief.
To date, no appellants brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor
Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:
xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTCs decision on August 16, 1994,
and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On October 3,
1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTCs order, dated September 28,
1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered
mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC
and the order denying YAOs motion for reconsideration were sent to and
received by YAOs counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August
16, 1994 to elevate his case to this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen
(14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for reconsideration. When he
received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he
had one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode
of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao, however, on October 4,
1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he
is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15)
day period had already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121,
transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a transmittal
letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal Section of
this Court on October 28, 1994. YAOs counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed
with this Court, a motion for extension of period to file brief for
accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in the
opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period
has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered
mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of appeal is
procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically
dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no judgmenton which an
entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant
procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance
of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10
February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellants
brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellants brief on
2 March 1995.[15]
 30
In its Resolution[16] of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied
the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of
merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having in effect
dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26,
1995... was proper.
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the
arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of
Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment
was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically
dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has
been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due
process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or
an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions
of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15)
days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals
was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it a final resolution
contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his
appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack
of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the
appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated
the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13 December
1994 a notice to file his Appellants Brief and granted him until 12 March
1995 within which to file the appellants brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering
that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this
case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of
appeal (instead of a petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a
technicality which should not bar the determination of the case based on
intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein
the Supreme Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to
disregard technicalities; decided [the case] on merits and not on
technicalities; found manifest in the petition strong considerations of
substantial justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of
technical rules, or heeded petitioners cry for justice because the basic
merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying
circumstances; discerned not to sacrifice justice to technicality; discovered
that the application of res judicata and estoppel by judgment amount to a
denial of justice and or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains that although
the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that the appeal was
being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It
asserts that the appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision
has long become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the RTC
decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of
the same with the Court of appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. Instead, he filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of
appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy had
lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural
remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that YAO
received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has
fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted
to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the
running of the period. He received a copy of the RTCs order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He had therefore, only one
day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court
of Appeals a petition for review.[18]However, on said date, YAO filed a
notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And
since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available
only if granted or provided by statute.[19] Since the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[20] Corollarily, its
requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the
period fixed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.[21] Non-compliance with such legal requirements is
fatal,[22]for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and
executory,[23] with the end result that no court can exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision.[24]
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAOs petition appears to
be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the
reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and
reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They
need not even be discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the
petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO
and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC
affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused,
George Yao; beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of
arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
 31
xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially
or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding
the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if there
(was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility provided that they eventually set out the facts and the
law on which they were based,[25] as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the
modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
imposed and the civil liability;[26] or discussed the facts comprising the
elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and
accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding
penalty;[27] or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutions memorandum
but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally
agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case.[28]
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, [29] a
specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance
with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129[30] on the grounds of
expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We
have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the
constitutional mandate.[31]
In Francisco v. Permskul,[32] however, we laid down the conditions
for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of
fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide
for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words,
the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study
was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course,
also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision
should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial
sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision
may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted
by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no
doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion
of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in
simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal
is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.
xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike
down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar
miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the
constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly
hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It
achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple
summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for
itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of
validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the
MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially
one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution;
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34] in that while we conceded that brevity
in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot
be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul,[35] where
we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot
excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and
concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more
significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice
Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals[36] come true, i.e., if an
appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully
deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was
not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in
this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if
not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process
and fair play.[37] It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution.[38] The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led
to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial
to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.[39] More than that, the requirement
 32
is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against
the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but
nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on
the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately
depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision.[40]
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts
and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the
constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only
to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to
the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order
which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference
to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than
a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal
authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question
was libelous;[42] consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly
sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of
parricide;[43] consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were
quotations from the labor arbiters decision including the dispositive
portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences
each) of its own discussion or reasonings[44]; was merely based on the
findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes;[45] or failed
to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.[46]
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in
question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not
on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively
discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal
and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial
system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed
from the constraints of technicalities.[47]
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed.[48] In other
words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity
and manifest injustice[49] or where the merit of a partys cause is apparent
and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements,[50]procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed.
A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor or property on mere technicalities.[51] We therefore withhold legal
approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply
with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day
in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to
uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be
lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is
GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered
in its appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded
to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and for the rendition
of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. September 5, 1997]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution, serious
misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision
in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled People of the Philippines v. Engineer
Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered,
convicting complainant of falsification of private document. The
promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion
of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of
the decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a
few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his
father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they
were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant filed a partial
motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to
submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of
the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the
case was not called as complainants counsel was told that the decision
had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an
Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the
case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion,
complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to
Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment
of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a
fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish
him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after
the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a
violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from
rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII, which
 33
provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within
three months from the date of their submission. He alleges further that he
was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the
Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it
and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for
reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of the court. On
January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the
motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge
responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of
the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of
Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was
promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was
already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing
it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its
promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion
had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo
(Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and
incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under
Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the
delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was
unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her
decision and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this
delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2)
stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for
her to make use of the Social Worker assigned to her to type her
decisions. During the period January to December 1993 she had to dispose
of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number
of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special proceedings
filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings
and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some
personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had
raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by
the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had
been under respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a
stroke. On September 17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, renal
failure, pneumonia, and cardiac arrest.Respondent was the one who
single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her
able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be
suffering from diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment
and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in
addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents
family suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against
them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P.
Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of violation of the
Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written
decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late,
nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds
the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in
view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency
to be well founded on the basis of respondents failure to furnish
complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time
after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administrator believes
that Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but
recommends that the other charges against her for violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three
months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the
dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on
April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and
discussion of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it
had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more
before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the
complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the
adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the
offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability
provided for by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed
by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
is based.
6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading
the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision
to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to
him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since
this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete
decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent
failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII,
15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had
been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text
of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it
took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was
able to do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out
her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the
Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not
finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could
have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the
promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.
 34
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a
sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the
facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final
judgment.[1] That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the
dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine,
respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within
her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral
sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the
decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her
contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.[2] Respondent only succeeds in
showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin
perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the
facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this
Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin
perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of
the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision
is finally rendered.[3] This Court has expressed approval of the practice of
some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions
until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to
prevent leakage,[4] but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not
its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete
decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a
secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to
be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondents failure to furnish him with a copy of
the decision until after one year and eight months is without basis. It
appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City
Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required to submit
simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any,
was not such vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay[5] as to justify
finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of
the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the
requirement for promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to
trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete
decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the
decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he
can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for
reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Sanz,[6] complainants period to appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy
of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no
prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a
conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the
conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges
culpability. Except for this incident, respondents record of public service as
legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State
Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of
Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years
now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the
first time she is required to answer an administrative complaint against
her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by
factors not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually
big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result of the death of her
niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor
health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,[7] a joint decision in two criminal cases
was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six months and
eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to
complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition of
the decision. Two complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional
provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower courts within
three months and for violation of complainants right to a speedy
trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the fact
that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing
complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the
mistake of his clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive
the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay in that
case was even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by
respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondents family, her own poor
state of health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume
of work done within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her
liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with
WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr. JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., (Chairman), on leave.
[G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001]
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35871
affirming the Decision[2] dated October 14, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168 in Civil Case No. 56368 which
dismissed the complaint of petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad for the enforcement of the money judgment of the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent Philippine National
Construction Corporation.
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a
corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private
respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation
duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for
collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v.
 35
Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.[3]
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance
bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the
completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai
and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya (Commercial
Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the
private respondent which is also designated therein as the
2ndDefendant. The judgment reads in full:
SUIT NO. C638 of 1983
Between
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
And
1. Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
2. Construction & Development
Corporation of the Philippines Defendant
JUDGMENT
The 2nd Defendant having entered appearance herein and the Court
having under Order 14, rule 3 ordered that judgment as hereinafter
provided be entered for the Plaintiffs against the 2nd Defendant.
IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the 2nd defendant do pay the Plaintiffs the
sum of $5,108,290.23 (Ringgit Five million one hundred and eight
thousand two hundred and ninety and Sen twenty-three) together with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum on: -
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983
to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March
1983 to the date of payment; and $350.00 (Ringgit Three
Hundred and Fifty) costs.
Dated the 13th day of September, 1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar,
High Court, Kuala Lumpur
This Judgment is filed by Messrs. Skrine & Co., 3rd Floor, Straits Trading
Building, No. 4, Leboh Pasar, Besar, Kuala Lumpur, Solicitors for the
Plaintiffs abovenamed. (VP/Ong/81194.7/83)[4]
On the same day, September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya
issued an Order directing the private respondent (also designated therein
as the 2nd Defendant) to pay petitioner interest on the sums covered by
the said Judgment, thus:
SUIT NO. C638 OF 1983
Between
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
And
1. Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
2. Construction & Development
Corporation of the Philippines Defendants
BEFORE THE SENIOR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
CIK SUSILA S. PARAM
THIS 13th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1985 IN CHAMBERS
ORDER
Upon the application of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, the
Plaintiffs in this action AND UPON READING the Summons in Chambers
dated the 16th day of August, 1984 and the Affidavit of Lee Foong Mee
affirmed on the 14th day of August 1984 both filed herein AND UPON
HEARING Mr. T. Thomas of Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay
Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant abovenamed on the 26th day of
December 1984 IT WAS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs be at liberty to sign
final judgment against the 2nd Defendant for the sum of
$5,108.290.23 AND IT WAS ORDEREDthat the 2nd Defendant do pay the
Plaintiffs the costs of suit at $350.00 AND IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that
the plaintiffs be at liberty to apply for payment of interest AND upon the
application of the Plaintiffs for payment of interest coming on for hearing
on the 1st day of August in the presence of Mr. Palpanaban Devarajoo of
Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the
2ndDefendant above-named AND UPON HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY
CONSENT IT WAS ORDERED that the 2nd Defendant do pay the Plaintiffs
interest at a rate to be assessed AND the same coming on for assessment
this day in the presence of Mr. Palpanaban Devarajoo of Counsel for the
Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant AND
UPON HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY CONSENT IT IS ORDERED that the
2nd Defendant do pay the Plaintiffs interest at the rate of 12% per annum
on:
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983
to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March
1983 to the date of Payment.
Dated the 13th day of September, 1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar,
High Court, Kuala Lumpur.[5]
 36
Following unsuccessful attempts[6] to secure payment from private
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5,
1988 the complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to
enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.[7]
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to
Dismiss filed on October 5, 1988, contending that the alleged judgment of
the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement
since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of
law or fact.[8] Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering
that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9]
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim[10] and therein raised the grounds it brought up
in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply[11] filed on June 8, 1989, the petitioner
contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the
person of private respondent by its voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay
Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all
objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the
court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its Decision dated October 14,
1991 dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and
affirmed the decision of the trial court in a Decision dated May 19, 1993.
Hence, the instant petition which is anchored on two (2) assigned
errors,[12] to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MALAYSIAN
COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PNCC,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT (a) THE FOREIGN COURT HAD SERVED
SUMMONS ON PNCC AT ITS MALAYSIA OFFICE, AND (b) PNCC ITSELF
APPEARED BY COUNSEL IN THE CASE BEFORE THAT COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT TO (SIC) THE MALAYSIAN COURT JUDGMENT.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country;[13] however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.[14]
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal
may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying
cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that
there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been
conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate
either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.[15]
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b),[16] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was
decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment,
against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is
proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden
of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence
of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it
offered. Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioners sole witness,
testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia;[17] that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal
Assistant up to 1981;[18] that private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued
by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala
Lumpur;[19] that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at
the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora
S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast
Asia operations;[20] that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and
Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC
Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional
appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the
service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same
when it realized that the writ was properly served;[21] that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks,
petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted
affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; [22] that the
matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series
of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; [23] and
that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be
enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner offered the
following documentary evidence:
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment
promulgated by the Malaysian High Court dated
September 13, 1985 directing private respondent to pay
petitioner the sum of $5,108,290.23 Malaysian Ringgit
plus interests from March 1983 until fully paid;[24]
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the Order dated
September 13, 1985 issued by the Malaysian High Court
in Civil Suit No. C638 of 1983;[25]
(c) Computation of principal and interest due as of January 31,
1990 on the amount adjudged payable to petitioner by
private respondent;[26]
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of petitioners counsel in
Malaysia indicating the costs for prosecuting and
implementing the Malaysian High Courts Judgment;[27]
 37
(e) Letters between petitioners Malaysian counsel, Skrine and
Co., and its local counsel, Sycip Salazar Law Offices,
relative to institution of the action in the Philippines;[28]
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law Offices dated
January 2, 1990 showing attorneys fees paid by and due
from petitioner;[29]
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and Affidavit of
Service of such writ in petitioners suit against private
respondent before the Malaysian High Court;[30]
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated March 28,
1983 filed by counsel for private respondent with the
Malaysian High Court;[31]
(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee,
counsel for private respondent, submitted during the
proceedings before the Malaysian High Court;[32]
(j) Record of the Courts Proceedings in Civil Case No. C638 of
1983;[33]
(k) Petitioners verified Application for Summary Judgment
dated August 14, 1984;[34] and
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from petitioners Malaysian
counsel to private respondents counsel in Malaysia.[35]
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence
and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes
its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that
fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it
relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment,
namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over
the person of private respondent due to alleged improper service of
summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its
counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the
foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear
mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites for
enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the
Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional
prescription that the every decision must state the facts and law on which
it is based.[36]
Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2)
witnesses, namely, Mr. Alfredo N. Calupitan, an accountant of private
respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive Secretary and a member of
the staff of the Corporate Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal
Division, of private respondent, both of whom failed to shed light and
amplify its defense or claim for non-enforcement of the foreign judgment
against it.
Mr. Calupitans testimony centered on the following: that from
January to December 1982 he was assigned in Malaysia as Project
Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A and B for road construction
under the joint venture of private respondent and Asiavest
Holdings;[37] that under the joint venture, Asiavest Holdings would handle
the financial aspect of the project, which is fifty-one percent (51%) while
private respondent would handle the technical aspect of the project, or
forty-nine percent (49%);[38] and, that Cora Deala was not authorized to
receive summons for and in behalf of the private respondent. [39]Ms.
Abelardos testimony, on the other hand, focused on the following: that
there was no board resolution authorizing Allen and Gledhill to admit all
the claims of petitioner in the suit brought before the High Court of
Malaya,[40] though on cross-examination she admitted that Allen and
Gledhill were the retained lawyers of private respondent in Malaysia.[41]
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent
in preventing enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment
primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the
Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by
petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from
that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied
on.[42] Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating
to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the
authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law
of the forum,[43] i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment
was rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process
on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the
Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may
not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon
private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of
summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity
of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High
Court of Malaya must stand.[44]
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen
and Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did the private
respondents witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen and Gledhill
were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia, [45] but of greater
significance is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence relevant
Malaysian jurisprudence[46] to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under
Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court to
submit a special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client
before said court, (b) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High
Court has full authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel
appearing before the Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain
pre-requisites as required under Philippine law to appear and compromise
judgments on behalf of their clients before said court.[47]
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts
conclusion that the conditional appearance of private respondents
counsel who was allegedly not authorized to appear and represent,
cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional appearance was not
premised on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the
conditional appearance was entered to question the regularity of the
service of the writ of summons. Such conditional appearance was in fact
subsequently withdrawn when counsel realized that the writ was properly
served.[48]
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and
law tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence
of the same was adduced or shown. The facts which the trial court found
intriguing amounted to mere conjectures and specious observations. The
trial courts finding on the absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn.
 38
Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that recovery was also sought
against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the same was found
insolvent.[49] Furthermore, even when the foreign judgment is based on
the drafts prepared by counsel for the successful party, such is not per
se indicative of collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within
the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based
on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is
rendered,[50] or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or
would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to
defend the action to which he has a meritorious defense. [51] Intrinsic fraud
is one which goes to the very existence of the cause of action is deemed
already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the
recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.[52] Evidence is
wanting on the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated
allegation cannot give rise to liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment
is not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and
law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As
aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters
of remedy and procedure.[53] Considering that under the procedural rules
of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even
without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the
judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign
court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate
the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, being the party challenging
the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead of doing
so, private respondent merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that
the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money
judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render meaningless the
presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party
seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35871 sustaining
the Decision dated October 14, 1991 in Civil Case No. 56368 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168 denying the enforcement of the
Judgment dated September 13, 1985 of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala
Lumpur is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in its stead is hereby
rendered ORDERING private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation to pay petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad the
amounts adjudged in the said foreign Judgment, subject of the said case.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official business.
m. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration
n. Periods for deciding cases
[A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 28, 2001]
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board
of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter, the IBP)
recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the resolution of
incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Antecedents
On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D.
Lim, transmitted to the Court a Resolution[1] addressing the problem of
delays in cases pending before the Sandiganbayan (hereafter, the
Resolution).[2] We quote the Resolution in full:[3]
WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution guarantees that, [a]ll
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies,
WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers mandates that [a] lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice;
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
undertake measures to assist in the speedy disposition of cases pending
before the various courts and tribunals;
WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has received numerous
complaints from its members about serious delays in the decision of cases
and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the
different divisions of the Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 requires all
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual
report indicating the title of the case, its date of filing, the date of pre-trial
in civil cases and arraignment in criminal cases, the date of initial trial, the
date of last hearing and the date that the case is submitted for decision,
and to post, in a conspicuous place within its premises, a monthly list of
cases submitted for decision;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 has not been
made applicable to the Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial court, the
requirements imposed upon trial courts by Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 10-94 should also be imposed upon the Sandiganbayan;
 39
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines hereby resolves as follows:
1. To recommend to the Supreme Court that Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-94 be made applicable to the
Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction; and
2. To recommend to the Supreme Court an inquiry into the causes of delay
in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases
before the Sandiganbayan for the purpose of enacting measures intended
at avoiding such delays.
Done in Los Baos, Laguna, this 29th day of July, 2000.
On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena to comment on the letter of the IBP and to
submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases pending decision, or with motion
for reconsideration pending resolution, indicating the dates they were
deemed submitted for decision or resolution.[4]
On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a report[5] (hereafter, the compliance)
admitting a number of cases submitted for decision and motion for
reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. We quote:
Cases Submitted W/ Motions For
For Decision Reconsideration
1st Division 341 None
2nd Division 5 None
3rd Division 12 None
4th Division 5 None
5th Division 52 1
Total 415[6]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415)
cases for decision remaining undecided long beyond the reglementary
period to decide, with one case submitted as early as May 24, 1990,[7] and
motion for reconsideration which has remained unresolved over thirty
days from submission.[8]
On October 20, 2000, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena submitted a schedule of cases submitted for decision, the
schedule indicating the number of detained prisoners, of which there are
(were) none.[9]
On October 26, 2000, the IBP submitted its reply to the compliance
stating: First, that it was not in a position to comment on the accuracy of
the compliance; nonetheless, it showed that there was much to be desired
with regard to the expeditious disposition of cases, particularly in the
Sandiganbayans First Division, where cases submitted for decision since
1990 remained unresolved. Second, the compliance did not include
pending motions, and it is a fact that motions not resolved over a long
period of time would suspend and delay the disposition of a case. Third,
since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is required to submit the same
reports required of Regional Trial Courts. Fourth, the Constitution[10]states
that, all lower collegiate courts must decide or resolve cases or matters
before it within twelve (12) months from date of submission; however,
the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required to resolve and decide cases
within a reduced period of three (3) months like regional trial courts, or at
the most, six (6) months from date of submission.[11]
On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) to conduct a
judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the cases subject of this
administrative matter, and to submit a report thereon not later than 31
December 2000.[12]
On December 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan[13] has a backlog of cases; that one
case[14] alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, involving 156
cases but the same has been set for promulgation of decision on
December 8, 2000, which would reduce the backlog by at least fifty
percent (50%).[15]
On January 26, 2001, the Court Administrator submitted a
memorandum to the Court[16] stating that the causes of delay in the
disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:[17]
(1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of several years;
(2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss,
Motion to Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc. that remain
unresolved for years;
(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court;
(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings
despite the lapse of considerable length of time; and
(5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if
the ponente is still in service.
We consider ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) as an administrative complaint against Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for serious delays in the decision of cases
and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the
different divisions of the Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence,
inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.
We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in
view of the admission of Justice Francis E. Garchitorena in his compliance
of October 20, 2000, that there are indeed hundreds of cases pending
decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their
submission. In one case, he not only admitted the delay in deciding the
case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for more than ten (10)
years that constrained this Court to grant mandamus to dismiss the case
against an accused to give substance and meaning to his constitutional
right to speedy trial.[18]
The Issues
 40
The issues presented are the following: (1) What is the
reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve
cases falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are there cases submitted for
decision remaining undecided by the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions
beyond the afore-stated reglementary period? (3) Is Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the Sandiganbayan?[19]
The Courts Ruling
We resolve the issues presented in seriatim.
1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views. The first
view is that from the time a case is submitted for decision or resolution,
the Sandiganbayan has twelve (12) months to decide or resolve it. [20] The
second view is that as a court with trial function, the Sandiganbayan has
three (3) months to decide the case from the date of submission for
decision.[21]
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.[22]
The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The
provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the
present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.[23]
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court
of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice,[24] with functions of a trial court.[25]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special
one.[26] The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its
own rules of procedure.[27] However, on March 30, 1995, Congress
repealed the Sandiganbayans power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure[28] and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated
by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with
the Sandiganbayan.[29]
Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction
over particular or specialized categories of actions. They are the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Sharia Courts.[30]
Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In his report, the Court Administrator would distinguish between
cases which the Sandiganbayan has cognizance of in its original
jurisdiction,[31] and cases which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.[32] The Court Administrator posits that since in the first
class of cases, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then for that
classification of cases, the three (3) month reglementary period
applies. For the second class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the
twelve-month reglementary period for collegiate courts.[33] We do not
agree.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606[34] is clear on this
issue.[35] It provides:
Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as practicable, the
trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be
continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within
three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.
On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own
rules,[36] thus:[37]
Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases The judgment or final order of a
division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months
from the date the case was submitted for decision(underscoring ours).
Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that
the three (3) month period, not the twelve (12) month period, to decide
cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan
presently sitting in five (5) divisions,[38] functions as a trial court. The term
trial is used in its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of evidence
by the parties in the cases before it.[39]The Sandiganbayan, in original
cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the discretion to weigh the
evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as credible and
reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated.[40]
Compliance with its Own Rules
In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) v.
Court of Appeals,[41] the Court faulted the DARAB for violating its own
rules of procedure. We reasoned that the DARAB does not have
unfettered discretion to suspend its own rules. We stated that the DARAB
should have set the example of observance of orderly procedure.
Otherwise, it would render its own Revised Rules of Procedure uncertain
and whose permanence would be dependent upon the instability of its
own whims and caprices.
Similarly, in Cabagnot v. Comelec,[42] this Court held that the
Commission on Elections ought to be the first one to observe its own
Rules. Its departure from its own rules constitutes arrogance of power
tantamount to abuse. Such inconsistency denigrates public trust in its
objectivity and dependability. The Court reminded the Comelec to be
more judicious in its actions and decisions and avoid
imprudent volte-face moves that undermine the public's faith and
confidence in it.
The ratio decidendi in the afore-cited cases applies mutatis
mutandis to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ought to be the first
to observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, or except a case from
its operation.
2. Undecided Cases Beyond the Reglementary Period.-- We find
that the Sandiganbayan has several cases undecided beyond the
reglementary period set by the statutes and its own rules, some as long as
more than ten (10) years ago.
 41

According to the compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan,
three hundred and forty one (341) cases were submitted for decision but
were undecided as of September 15, 2000. A number of the cases were
submitted for decision as far back as more than ten (10) years ago. As of
September 15, 2000, the following cases[43] had not been decided:[44]
order. The compliance report shows that to this day, several cases that
were reported pending by the Sandiganbayan on September 26, 2000, and
likewise reported undecided by the OCA on January 26, 2001, have not
been decided/resolved. We quote the compliance report:56

First Division
First Division

BOXES
BOXES
Summary/Tally
The Sandiganbayan is a special court created in an effort to
maintain honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy, weed out misfits and
undesirables in the government and eventually stamp out graft and Cases Assigned to Badoy, J. *** 11
corruption.45 We have held consistently that a delay of three (3) years in
deciding a single case is inexcusably long.46 We can not accept the excuses Cases Assigned to Estrada, J. 7
of Presiding Justice Sandiganbayan Francis E. Garchitorena that the court
was reorganized in 1997; that the new justices had to undergo an Cases Assigned to Chico-Nazario, J. 1
orientation and that the Sandiganbayan relocated to its present premises
which required the packing and crating of records; and that some boxes
No report/Unaccounted For 1
were still unopened.47

We likewise find unacceptable Presiding Justice Garchitorenas _________

excuse that one case alone48 comprises more that fifty percent (50%) of
the First Divisions backlog and that the same has been set for
Total 20
promulgation on December 8, 2000.49 As we said, a delay in a single
case cannot be tolerated, para muestra, basta un boton. (for an example,
one button suffices). It is admitted that there are several other cases 3. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme Court
submitted for decision as far back as ten (10) years ago that have Circular No. 10-94 applies to the Sandiganbayan.
remained undecided by the First Division, of which Justice Garchitorena is Administrative Circular 10-9457 directs all trial judges to make a
presiding justice and chairman. Indeed, there is even one case, which is a physical inventory of the cases in their dockets. The docket inventory
simple motion to withdraw the information filed by the prosecutor. This procedure is as follows:58
has remained unresolved for more than seven (7) years (since 1994). 50 The
compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan presiding justice incriminates
a. Every trial judge shall submit not later than the last week of February
him. The memorandum submitted by the Court Administrator likewise
and the last week of August of each year a tabulation of all pending cases
testifies to the unacceptable situation in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, there
which shall indicate on a horizontal column the following data:
is a disparity in the reports submitted by the Sandiganbayan presiding
justice and the OCA. According to the Court Administrator, the cases
submitted for decision that were still pending promulgation 51 before the 1. Title of the case
five divisions of the Sandiganbayan are:52
2. Date of Filing

First Division 3. Date arraignment in criminal cases of Pre-trial in civil cases and

4. Date of initial trial

BOXES

We find that Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena failed to
devise an efficient recording and filing system to enable him to monitor
the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition. This
is his duty on which he failed.53
Memorandum of the Court Administrator
On November 14, 2001, the Court required the Office of the Court
Administrator54 to update its report.55
5. Date of last hearing
6. Date submitted for Decision
b. The tabulation shall end with a certification by the trial judge that
he/she has personally undertaken an inventory of the pending cases in
his/her court; that he/she has examined each case record and initialled
the last page thereof. The judge shall indicate in his/her certification the
date when inventory was conducted.
c. The Tabulation and Certification shall be in the following form.

On November 16, 2001, OCA Consultant Pedro A. Ramirez (Justice,

Docket Inventory for the Period
Court of Appeals, Retired) submitted a compliance report with the Courts
 42

January __ to June ___, ___/July anti-graft court must be the first to avert opportunities for graft, uphold
To December ___, ___ the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and avert the
(Indicate Period) precipitate loss of their rights.

Court and Station ________

Presiding Judge ________ Practice of Unloading Cases

Title of Date Pretrial/ Initial Date of Last Date submitted

Case Filed Hearing Hearing for Decision According to the memorandum submitted by the OCA, there is a
Arraignme practice in the first and third divisions of the Sandiganbayan of unloading
nt cases to other divisions despite the fact that these cases have been
submitted for decision before them. We cite relevant portions of the
memorandum:67

CERTIFICATION: Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fourth Division

I hereby certify that on (Date/Dates___), I personally conducted a physical

inventory of pending cases in the docket of this court, that I personally
examined the records of each case and initialled the last page thereof, and
BOXES
I certify that the results of the inventory are correctly reflected in the
above tabulation. We suggest a review of the practice of unloading cases that greatly
contributes to the backlog of undecided cases. When a case has been
_________. heard and tried before a division of the Sandiganbayan, it is ideal that the
same division and no other must decide it as far as practicable.
_______________ We further note that several cases which were earlier reported as
______ undecided by the Sandiganbayan and the OCA have been decided since
the reports of September 26, 2000 and January 26, 2001.Nonetheless, the
Presiding delay in deciding these cases is patent and merits reprobation. According
Judge to the compliance report submitted by the OCA on November 16, 2001,
there are several cases decided way beyond the reglementary period
Given the rationale behind the Administrative Circular, we hold that prescribed by law, even assuming without granting, a reglementary period
it is applicable to the Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its of twelve months from the time a case is submitted for decision.68
original and appellate jurisdiction. In a case brought before this Court, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
admitted fault and that the fault is exclusively his own, in failing to decide
the case, though submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990.69 This
Mora Decidendi case was not even included among pending cases in the Sandiganbayan
report of September 26, 2000.

The following cases were decided, though beyond the prescribed

We reiterate the admonition we issued in our resolution of October
period:
10, 2000:59

This Court has consistently impressed upon judges (which includes justices)
to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice First Division
delayed is justice denied. Decision making is the primordial and most
important duty of the member of the bench.60 Hence, judges are enjoined
to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross BOXES
inefficiency61 that warrants disciplinary sanction, including
fine,62 suspension63 and even dismissal.64 The rule particularly applies to
justices of the Sandiganbayan. Delays in the disposition of cases erode the
faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lower its standards, Relief of Presiding Justice
and bring it into disrepute.65 Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated
especially in the anti-graft court, the showcase of the nations
determination to succeed in its war against graft (underscoring ours). At this juncture, the Court cites the case of Canson v.
Garchitorena.70 In that case, we admonished respondent Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena. General Jewel F. Canson, Police Chief
In Yuchengco v. Republic,66 we urged the Sandiganbayan to
Superintendent, National Capital Region Command Director, complained
promptly administer justice. We stated that the Sandiganbayan has the
of deliberate delayed action of the Presiding Justice on the transfer of
inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders to make
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
them conformable to law and justice. The Sandiganbayan as the nations
 43
City, depriving complainant of his right to a just and speedy trial. Due to a
finding of lack of bad faith on the part of respondent justice, we issued
only a warning. However, the dispositive portion of the decision cautioned
respondent justice that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.71
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena sits as the Chairman, First
Division, with a backlog of cases pending decision. At least seventy-three
cases have been unassigned for the writing of the extended opinion,
though submitted for decision. It may be the thinking of the Presiding
Justice, Sandiganbayan that an unassigned case is not counted in its
backlog of undecided cases. This is not correct. It is the duty of the
Presiding Justice and the Chairmen of divisions to assign the ponente as
soon as the case is declared submitted for decision, if not earlier. If he fails
to make the assignment, he shall be deemed to be the ponente.
The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. 72 In
Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court
provided that A case is considered submitted for decision upon the
admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the
trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall commence to
run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case
the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of
stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by
another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have
the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the transcripts
within which to decide the same.73 The designation of a ponente to a case
is not a difficult administrative task.
Administrative sanctions must be imposed. Mora reprobatur in
lege.74 Again, we reiterate the principle that decision-making is the most
important of all judicial functions and responsibilities. 75 In this area,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, as the ponente assigned to the
cases submitted for decision/resolution long ago, some as far back as
more than ten (10) years ago, has been remiss constituting gross neglect
of duty and inefficiency.76 As we said in Canson,77 unreasonable delay of a
judge in resolving a case amounts to a denial of justice, bringing the
Sandiganbayan into disrepute, eroding the public faith and confidence in
the judiciary.78
Consequently, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena should be
relieved of all trial and administrative work as Presiding Justice and as
Chairman, First Division so that he can devote himself full timeto
decision-making until his backlog is cleared. He shall finish this assignment
not later than six (6) months from the promulgation of this resolution.
We have, in cases where trial court judges failed to decide even a
single case within the ninety (90) day period, imposed a fine ranging from
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to the equivalent of their one months
salary.79 According to the report of the Sandiganbayan, as of September
26, 2000, there were three hundred forty one (341) cases submitted for
decision before its first division headed by the Presiding Justice. In the
memorandum of the OCA, there were one hundred ninety eight (198)
cases reported submitted for decision before the First Division. 80 Even in
the updated report, there are one hundred thirty eight (138) cases still
undecided in the First Division.
In fact, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that he
has a backlog.81 He claimed that one (1) case alone comprises fifty percent
(50%) of the backlog. We find this claim exaggerated. We cannot accept
that a backlog of three hundred forty one (341) cases in the First Division
could be eliminated by the resolution of a single consolidated case of one
hundred fifty six (156) counts. A consolidated case is considered only as
one case. The cases referred to were consolidated as Criminal Case Nos.
9812-9967, People v. Corazon Gammad-Leao, decided on December 8,
2000. What about the one hundred eighty five (185) cases that
unfortunately remained undecided to this date? Worse, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision in said cases, submitted as of January 11,
2001, has not been resolved to this date.82 The First Division has only
thirty (30) days from submission to resolve the same. It is now ten (10)
months from submission. The expediente and the motion were
transmitted to the ponente, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, on
that date, but to this day the case remains unresolved.83 Unfortunately,
even other divisions of the Sandiganbayan may be following his example. 84
In the first report of the Court Administrator, he indicated a total of
one hundred ninety five (195) criminal cases and three (3) civil cases, or a
total of one hundred ninety eight (198) cases submitted for decision as of
December 21, 2000.85 Almost a year later, as of November 16, 2001, there
are still one hundred thirty eight (138) cases undecided submitted long
ago. For almost one year, not one case was decided/resolved by the
Presiding Justice himself.86
Directive
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:
(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a fine of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for inefficiency and gross
neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice Francis
E. Garchitorena of his powers, functions and duties as the Presiding
Justice, Sandiganbayan, and from presiding over the trial of cases as
a justice and Chairman, First Division, so that he may DEVOTE
himself exclusively to DECISION WRITING, until the backlog of cases
assigned to him as well as cases not assigned to any ponente, of
which he shall be deemed the ponente in the First Division, are
finally decided. There shall be no unloading of cases to other
divisions, or to the First Division inter se.
In the interim, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as the
most senior associate justice, shall TAKE OVER and exercise the
powers, functions, and duties of the office of the Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan, until further orders from this Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and the
associate justices of the Sandiganbayan to decide/resolve the
undecided cases submitted for decision as of this date, within three
(3) months from their submission, and to resolve motions for new
trial or reconsiderations and petitions for review within thirty (30)
days from their submission. With respect to the backlog of cases, as
hereinabove enumerated, the Sandiganbayan shall decide/resolve
all pending cases including incidents therein within six (6) months
from notice of this resolution.
(4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular 10-94, effective immediately.
 44
(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later than
December 31, 2001 internal rules to govern the allotment of cases
among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them and other
matters leading to the internal operation of the court, and
thereafter to submit the said internal rules to the Supreme Court
for its approval.87
This directive is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
o. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
p. Administrative powers
1. Supervision of lower courts
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON
BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G.
DEMETRIA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor,
probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must
always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of
impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society
must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence
and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the
independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of
interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to
derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for
the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the
judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which
appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila
Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national
dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to
play in a Manila casino.2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued
a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the
derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice
Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor
(CSP) Jovencito R. Zuño, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice
Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of
the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their
respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and
designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino as Investigator and
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation
then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November
2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuño, SP
Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H.
Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab,
Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses:
respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino
Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu
Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas,
lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and
Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field
Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are
quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III
charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain
Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br.
18,5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent
and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated
drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a
Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not
strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused,
especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of
Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the
City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the
motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the
Manila City Jail.8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence
standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant
conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the
petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently,
both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial
court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just
and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the
joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the
offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself. 11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet.
Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the
Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the
case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and
allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not
exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose
Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu
Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.13
 45
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for
Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until
such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital." 14 On 7
July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court
to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to
Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge
Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of
the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES"
wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor,
the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro
ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and
there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the
notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to
file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of
millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of
the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for
Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling
this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein."17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was
supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk
Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday
Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the
time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at
around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the
hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of
Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said
that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a
return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of
Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria,
PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng
Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP
Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert
Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran
III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP
Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would
purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed
his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might
convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad
publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III
informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for
resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned
court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to
anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The
Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep
his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go
Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been
asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. 19 SP
Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an
end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the
matter to CSP Zuño. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then
stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed
closely behind.21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and informed the latter
of what had transpired. CSP Zuño replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also
told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño received a call from
Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to
withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could
already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran
na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa
na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as
saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said that he would see what he could do.
"Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme
Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader"25 had been
exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting
re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of
Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to
clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been
affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000,
several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug
lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July
2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu
Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having
interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the
DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting
Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental.
Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of
respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to
do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying
the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the
basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran
III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is
what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and requesting." 27 Respondent
claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal
bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the
discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form
of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the
discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated.
While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated
his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could
not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
 46
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by
CSP Zuño as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all
hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuño based his identification
from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was
he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and
from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor
about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to
withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he,
not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuño to inquire about the
latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP
Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken
up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for
him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do
something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the
first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself
corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of
someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his
meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if
not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of
suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. In her Report
dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of
violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended
that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this
Honorable Court."28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning.
Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a
hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following
offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and
PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice
punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal
case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño
and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human
experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was
Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice Demetria, and that
the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was
something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal
of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and indubitably
consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case —
CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga
kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to
Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III
said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to
withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuño was thus a
logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent
Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuño
would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuño's
former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo
nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang
Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could
not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had
moral ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of
the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice
claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any
other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to
withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the
state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr.
Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion,
and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok
wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act.
Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuño to ask for just that
— the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to
the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the
appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit
old friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely
accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier
Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary
purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec.
Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors
whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses
belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice
Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Dañosos, denied seeing him and claimed
that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was
really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria
did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
decided to "stay a while."35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the Investigating
Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to
exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were
not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did
not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact
corroborated by respondent himself.36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that
"[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his
office . . . (and) I stayed a while."37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there
"to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of
Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real
purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny
coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office,
and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but
pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought.
The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas,
 47

together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA
to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III. JUSTICE CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP Present:
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete,
Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and et al. v. Securities and PUNO, C.J.,
more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III Exchange Commission, et al.] QUISUMBING,
whom he had just met for the first time. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very
CORONA,
close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary
CARPIO MORALES,
that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk
AZCUNA,
Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is
TINGA,
enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has
CHICO-NAZARIO,
been helping the accused, and that he wields influence as a former DOJ
VELASCO, JR.,
Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court
NACHURA,
of Appeals.
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing BRION, JJ.
and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only
defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major Promulgated:
inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
September 9, 2008
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of --------------------x
responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and
must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, DECISION
not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his
behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.

PER CURIAM:
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live
up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not
only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable
damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic
national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the
entire Judiciary. between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the

law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts,
tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of
our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent,
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members
preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42 of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees

adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold
propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently
of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to
any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to
government owned or controlled corporation or institution.
determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary

SO ORDERED. involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct

has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur. performance of official functions.
Puno, J ., abroad on official leave.
 48

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated Meralco), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and

August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and

action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez,

justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance

entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the application for immediate issuance of a

al. TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that

should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of

To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC

Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA

Panel of Investigators) composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely, at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent

Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in

Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged a handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No.

improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas). [5] At 3:10

CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty.

alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS,

Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja. requesting the re-raffling of the case in the presence of the parties in the

A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating interest of transparency and fairness.[6] At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS

Panel, follows: filed an ex-parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition

On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case.[7]

then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for

leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1] Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of

the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the

Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure

designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth them that the motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals

Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice

regular senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was Roxas for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy of the

authorized to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final motion.[8] They initially talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of

resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not possible for them to

2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty. The said personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys.

office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice Reyes Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one

had participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity.[2] wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]

On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B.

Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his

Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the leave until June 6, 2008.[10] In the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had

Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence,
 49
informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was
inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the
Meralco.[11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle, Justice Roxas
informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition.[12]
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting
Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza. [13] At
11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the
new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by
Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were
indispensable on account of the national interest involved in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692.[14]
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from somebody who
did not identify herself but (who) said that she had important information
regarding the Meralco case. The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo
that a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers
had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas. The caller warned Atty. Elamparo
against Justice Roxas who had administrative cases and was very
notorious, but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more
details.[15]
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a
telephone call in his chambers from his older brother, Chairman Camilo
Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).[16] Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he
(Justice Sabio) had been named the third member of the division to which
the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as
he had not yet been officially informed about the matter. Chairman Sabio
likewise informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio
then tried to convince Justice Sabio of the rightness of the stand of the
GSIS and the SEC, and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which represents
the interest of the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that he
would vote according to [his] conscience and that the most that he could
do was to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled
for oral arguments, at which the respondents must be able to convince
him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.
In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators,
Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother
on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a
member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios
testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my
wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight
to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty.
Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of
GSIS. We had known each other and had become
friends since before Martial Law because as Chief
Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we
were opposing counsel in various cases in Bulacan.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute
between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the
Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my
brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to
which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee,
Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily
welcomed the request for help and thanked him.
There was no mystery about his having known of the
results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified
thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee,
Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved.
As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS
where he could legitimately find it. He was right in
seeking my assistance.
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and
MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy
between the long suffering public and the mighty
financially and politically controlling owners of
MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but
also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the
cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the
mercy of MERALCO.
x x x x x x x x x.
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due
to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we
would arrive in Manila.
As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch
with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in
fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO
had been raffled. I impressed upon him the character
and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help
GSIS if the legal situation permitted. He said he would
decide according to his conscience. I said: of course.
x x x x x x x x x.
 50

On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23

motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18] The Special and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were directed to file their

Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion respective memorandum of authorities in connection with the application

at 11:58 a.m.[19] for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their

comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of

Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction,

scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution

through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion forty five (45) days from promulgation of this Resolution. The SEC received

for inhibition as follows: a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]

3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent

GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been in contact For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial
with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was no need to put in
already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO
without affording respondents even a summary writing the action on the motion for inhibition.[24]
hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per
information, immediately transmitted to the
Honorable ponente upon his instructions. The At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received
worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it
learned that there are supposedly two administrative the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its
cases pending against the Honorable ponente, both Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS.[25] Justice Roxas did not act on
of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.
the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious.[26]

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not
On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr.
yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the case was
Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for
raffled to him.[20] Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo
almost a year already.[27] Mr. De Borja greeted him with: Mabuhay ka,
that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle
Justice. When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr.
proceeding, which was handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano
De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having
del Castillo with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto
signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I voted according to my
machine.[21]
conscience.

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated
signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by himself and
June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice
Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her
Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.
request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 in the presence of the

parties in the interest of transparency and fairness, as the case had been
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division
raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.[28]
composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the

Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing
On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.[29]
the respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to

dismiss) to the petition within ten days from notice, with the petitioners
On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor
given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their
General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion
reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for
 51

praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation

thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum together with their reply to the comment of the GSIS. [36] Meanwhile,

of authorities. Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on what transpired

between her and Justice Sabio when she returned the cartilla. Teary-eyed,

On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report.[37]

comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,[31] as well

as its memorandum of authorities. Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to avoid

an ugly confrontation with the Justices on the highly politicized case

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita involving giants of the Philippine society. He explained to the Presiding

Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and the actual practice

Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the in similar situations in the past. The Presiding Justice promised to talk with

issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on Justice Sabio and, for the sake of transparency and future reference,

June 23 and 24, 2008.[32] However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.[38]

Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio.

Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez

the Division Clerk of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice a letter[39] calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz),

Sabio demanded that it be returned back to him. Personally affronted by Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the dilemma as to who

the domineering and superior stance of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes read between him and Justice Sabio should receive CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication) until he was Justice Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as
satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case.[33] Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who
participated in the initial Resolution of the case?

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with
the undersigned as Chairman?
the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could

study the case before the hearing.[34]Justice Roxas asked him whether
For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this
Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the
provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review,
to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1)
giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary
Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting
the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually execution pending appeal have been taken, the case
shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him assigned for study and report and the Justices who
participated therein, regardless of their transfer to
whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained
other Divisions in the same station.
why the rollo should be with him.

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of
scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it necessary
five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their consolidated
that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of the
memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.[35]
controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to

seriously study the case before the hearing.[40]

 52

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter preside over the hearing of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz,

of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, who was junior to Justice Sabio was no better than his own opinion.[46]

noting some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday,

June 23, 2008.[41] It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice

Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz because he did not sign in an

letter[42] quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal

[i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who capacity and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio was as good as his, as in

participated in the case shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz opined fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he. [47] Justice Sabio told

that [n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary the Presiding Justice that he smelled something fishy about the move to

injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of transfer the case to the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did

the Ninth Division upon his return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated together on

letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day.[43] three occasions.

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so

opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the TRO is not weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of

a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice

that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to

or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory the promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already

order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio

the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato

participate in the hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority but by a member of the Division.[48]

was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position

of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent

IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against an unpalatable situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing,

the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The

2008 was a passport to participation in the decision-making process, in personal view of the Presiding Justice was at the time with Justice Cruz but

violation of the IRCA.[44] Justice Sabio had a different interpretation. Neither did the Presiding

Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be better if

referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that a temporary Justices Reyes and Sabio could settle it between themselves. The Presiding

restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action Justice was seeing the Justices practically everyday because he did not

such that he should be the one to chair the Division. [45] In his office after want these things to blow up. However, neither did it enter the mind of

that consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he

Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have

would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the Presiding Justice called changed his position that it should be the Sabio group.[49]

up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio insisted that he would
 53

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called

conduct a power-point presentation during the hearing.[50] Likewise the Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels were

SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he

Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings. [51] Justice could not preside as Justice Sabio had apparently hardened his position

Roxas did not act on the motions. and he wanted to avoid an ugly spectacle. His name plate was displayed in

the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing

On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the room.[57] Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the

Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on account of talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.[58]

the opinion of Justice Cruz.[52]

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with counsel for Meralco.[59] At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices

Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama) who advised him, in no Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did

uncertain terms, that his stand was correct and that he should remain in not ask a single question.[60] Not one of the Justices in attendance brought

the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the up the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas. [61] In

Special Ninth Division regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within

Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO, which the 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by

Special Ninth Division should resolve following the general rule that when the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction

a decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for would be deemed submitted for resolution.[62]

reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of that

division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate

the decision or resolution, except in case of death, retirement or conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the

resignation of such Member.[54] Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries

of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should resolve the matter of

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. injunctive relief or issue the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[63]

The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift the TRO,

Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV

to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the

ka baka magka-problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim

would follow his suggestion.[55] Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.[64] The Committee on Rules

was tasked to propose amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15,

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell 2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en banc. (The office order

him of his strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to

instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with include as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and

those Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.[65]) The Rules Committee used to be composed

other division(s). Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto

understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.[66]

remain with the Special Ninth Division.[56]

 54

At that point he mentioned the impasse

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and
issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement myself. He said: Alam naming may
problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa
of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know
Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and
about it, as this was an internal matter of
Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition the Court of Appeals which only
happened fairly recently and many
effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the associate justices of the CA were not even
Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. aware of this. Just the same, I explained
my stand and why I could not relinquish
Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang
Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (Justice Bruselas) as members.
opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge
ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon
namang nagsabi na it might become
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of messy.
absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang
responsible sa pag-recommend at
had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to
official leave when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place
offer me a win-win situation.
on July 4, 2008.[68] He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10
million. Ready. Just give way to Justice
Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila
On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not
sa kanya, sa akin hindi?
attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa
kanya.
Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. At that point, I was shocked that he had a
Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet very low regard for me. He was treating
me like there was a price on my person. I
submitted their memoranda.[69] could not describe my feelings. I was
stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko
rin magawang bastusin siya because I had
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, known him since 1993 and this was the
first time that he had ever treated me like
seeking to meet with him for an important matter. Because Justice Sabio this, or shown that he believed I could be
had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in
his classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila,
Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice, [70] would
mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may
be waiting for him.[71] According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I
meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows: told him I could not stay long. I told him
my wife and lawyer daughter were
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De waiting.
Borja was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge Even then, he was already insistent. His
of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first parting words before I left were: Just
words to me were: Alam mo Justice kung sino ang think about it, Justice.[72]
kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he
said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong
Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang katabi At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper
ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang
pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong bag, which he was handling as if something important was inside.
kaso na ito is a matter of life and death for the However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10 million. [73]
Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did
to them, which is being done now by the Arroyos. In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the

offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.[74]

 55

Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja

Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and project informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say

packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner to touch base anything.

and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have

evening classes at the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio.

would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that the government

the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme

MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for

the news because he is a confirmed free-enterpriser. Moreover, De Borja Justice Sabio to resist the governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly

thought that there was [n]othing like hearing things directly from the replied: Fifty Million.[76] He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up

horses mouth.[75] after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to the P50 million

solicitation. Justice Sabio asked him: O, ano, kumusta, ano ang

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred nangyayari.

he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After

parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio,

to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop some 15 years ago, as a balato because he came to value the friendship of

and, since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in

bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned more than P25 million

the grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The photographs of the bag and the although he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of

T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits A-De Borja and A-1-De Borja 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3

and attached to the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro.

the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit A-2-De Since the Roas had a lot of legal problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice

Borja, shows that the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He and consultation at the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro.

stressed the bag did not contain P10 million. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja

invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-togethers of the

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house

Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was of Mr. De Borjas mother.[77]

carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja

allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice

the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle about 2/3 (of Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to

the Kenneth Cole bag) in size. Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the

could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was

evidence. both shocked and amused. Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the offeror

was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also

owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas Vineyard just shocked that Mr. De Borja had the gall to ask her to convince Justice Sabio

like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the to accept the bribe.[78]
 56

urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer shows on its face that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received

of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita

ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding

Justice did nothing because he could not advise a fellow Justice on what to Justice his apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship,

do the Justice would know what he should do. Neither did he think of he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of

consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be

impasse.[79] required to comment on the Urgent Motion in a resolution to be issued by

the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render

phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who moot and academic the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the

told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him so that

ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had been

namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not reach the Presiding

kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million. Justice.[80]

Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice

Sabio said No. Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was

saying No, Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as its ponente to the Eighth

will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the

lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the

can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and Judicial Conduct reorganization did not spare any Justice.[81] Moreover, the IRCA does not

Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will

the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not appear in Section

retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary

added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the

ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard

Sabio said: I dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and

said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes. [84] And so, once

ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the pressing

parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa duty to promulgate the decision.[85]

iyo.

Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on all

Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but the ponencias of Justices Reyes and Roxas, just as they had acted on

denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio. his ponencias.[86]

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the

Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the
 57
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father,
sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez (Atty. Marquez) regarding
the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write
the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt
but all that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia
Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice.
Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten
letter for her to deliver to the Chief Justice. [87] The handwritten letter, in
essence, requested permission for Justice Sabio to unburden himself
before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.[88]
At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio.
The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as
follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me
behind my back? He said, Why, what did I do? I asked
him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy
of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal
capacity, when we could have discussed the matter
with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near
each other on different occasions only recently and
he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust
me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have
talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends.
Why did you have to do these things behind my back
and not discuss the matter with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent
motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take action
against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was
offered 10M for me to give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place,
how was the Meralco emissary able to know that
there was an impasse between you and me when that
was supposed to be an internal matter?
→ If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship
after I told you of the 10Million offer, what will I
think of you?
→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I
think you are part of this whole scheme or
shenanigan?
→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption?
After they failed to convince me of their offer,
now they will use you to oust me? Is it because
they are certain of your loyalty and they are
uncertain with mine?
→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to
assume? In my nine years in this court, I have
never seen such an animal as this. This is a
cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid
motion is also stupid. Why do you have to
dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a
motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
→ Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the
hearing on the 23rd and never raised any
question on the alleged irregularity of my having
presided over the hearing?
→ Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you
not aware that several days after the issuance of
the TRO, respondents filed a motion for
inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion
to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve
such motion?
→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo?
Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not
know of those pending motions. (Incidentally, these
motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala
talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma
charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito
nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and
this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the
matter. Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to
the door. He was silent after that and before he left,
he put his arm around me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako dito, wala
akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio
thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
the final decision on the MERALCO case bearing his signature, which he
gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for concurrence/dissent. According to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the rationale for
his conclusion. Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned with an
expensive looking travelling bag from where he pulled out the purported
final decision. Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to
the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had
signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice
Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.[89]
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8,
2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed
that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having
issued the TRO.[90] She also concurred with the portion of the decision
recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because
she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS.[91]
 58
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised
Justice Reyes to lay off the case and allow Justice Sabio to continue and to
resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship.
Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga
ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito.
After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page
decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his
word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day purportedly
for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio, who was then on
leave of absence until July 11, 200.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that the
parties had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed the convincing ponencia, including three copies of
the signature page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of
the signing of the decision due to the impending lapse of the TRO on July
29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]
However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it
to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she
asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as everything was unofficial
there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and
it did not have the special seal of Justice Roxas. It allegedly was thrown in
the garbage can.
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that
Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the Division, [95] alleging the
reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June
2008 in the instant case, the parties were first
directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of
Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice
Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices.
Thus, petitioners were of the impression that the
leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that
he would be presiding over the oral arguments as
Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable
Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to
transfer to another Room of the Court of Appeals for
the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners
saw that the name plates on the table for the justices
included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that
(sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal.
Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral
arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division
of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the
impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth
Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave
of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the
petitioners that Justice Reyes has already returned
from his temporary leave of absence and has
resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division
of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,
Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as
the chairman of the Division hearing the instant case
as he is already disqualified from acting as such upon
the return of Justice Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice
Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden
judicial responsibility of performing his
duties and functions as Chairman of the
Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3
(d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals, a case can remain
with the justices who participated therein
only when any of the following actions
have been taken: (a) giving due course;
(b) granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d)
granting of execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply
with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on
the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the
Justices who issued the temporary restraining order
in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this
circumstance is not among the grounds as
above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals
may remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical
that it is not the grant of a temporary restraining
order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with
the Division. Thus, the continued participation of
Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the
clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only
irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is
exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.
 59

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the

to Australia.[96] Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized

its transcription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There

called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes,

he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a

Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.[97] recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript from

memory.[103]

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division

Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to assume the The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that

chairmanship of the Ninth Division. there were previous deliberations were really meetings, which they had

twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas.[104]

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio

requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read the On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty.

memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her fathers letter to the Chief Justice

but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo.[105] A few days later,

to; neither was he available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice

scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking would no longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the

for Justice Roxas.[98] Chief Justice about the matter.[106]

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of

reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him

Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio berated

prepared never saw light.[99] him and accused him of orchestrating matters. Justice Sabio told him that

an emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case,

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much could have

the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter that been offered to the principals?[107]

he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case.

Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case.[100] After a On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the

cursory examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of Justice

been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was

more time to study the case.[101] the rightful claimant to the chairmanship of the Division that should

decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they were

A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is both correct.

attached to page 1926 of Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692

and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS,

08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the Justice Villarama had a brief chat with Justice Bruselas. The former told

transcript from memory to lend credence to the certification of Justice the latter that both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that
 60

one (1) [of] them can properly assume chairmanship either under the

exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most

the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the prudent, as the dispute revolves around the correct interpretation of the

general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI.[108] IRCA. He believed that since the question was purely internal, the CA

should not seek enlightenment from the litigants for it would only be

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the construed against its competence. He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas

Presiding Justice[109] an Interpleader Petition[110] praying that Presiding interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide

Justice Vasquez decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his best

Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the lights and act accordingly.

Preliminary Injunction or Decision.[111] Justice Roxas averred that [t]he

impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of

much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could properly submit the requested

date of the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. opinion. It was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying

Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift

Dimaranan-Vidal). He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the the TRO or to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice

interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution

Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of issuing the TRO.[117]

Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA should be strictly applied

because [w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet

interpretation. received any reaction from the Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as

well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.

Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice Reyes

for his signature or dissent to the finalized MERALCO Decision, which had The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding

been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008.[113] He also gave Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that

the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.[114] should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the

Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice to answer or resolve the matter anyway.

Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition,

which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to

must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas Interpleader-Petition. The Presiding

Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.[115] Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed the authority to

decide the subject conflict simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a Justice has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of the

letter on what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but

p.m.[116] Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested to endorse the Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice has

case and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file the authority to act on any matter not covered by the Rules although such

their simultaneous comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For action should be reported to the Court en banc.

Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division

in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.

 61
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the
(Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining order should
continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition because it was the
Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the
authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although
Justice Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for
inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have a bearing on the
application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section
7 (b) of Rule VI[118] points to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth
Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not
be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its members,
Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23,
2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with
dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding
Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be laid to rest
and that whoever would be dissatisfied with its outcome may elevate the
matter to the Supreme Court.
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding
Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco case the
previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas
and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division
chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision
had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.[119]
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered
him a bribe of P10 million in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from
the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes, and that the
decision in the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth
Division.[120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her as a matter of
judicial courtesy of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July
8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice
dated July 24, 2008,[121] bringing to his attention the apparent and obvious
irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and complaining
about Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy in discarding for reasons she
would not know, his purported final Decision that he had asked her to sign
and which she signed after a judicious study of the records
and rollo thereof. Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to
incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his
Decision.
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and consternation
when she learned on even date that a Decision in the case had been
promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice
Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned
who already signed the supposed final draft of the
Decision in the instant case which bears the signature
of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter
as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing
out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably
posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following
questions: under what basis was the case suddenly
transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that
neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman
Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not
consulted thereof? and, foremost, what happened to
the Decision which the undersigned signed after
devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and
laboriously examining the voluminous records
and rollo of the case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein
constitute a flagrant violation of the provision of
Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a
letter,[122] which was prompted by a disturbing telephone call he received
from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed
Justice Bruselas that, after the injunction hearing on June 23, 2008,
Meralco offered him P10 Million to either favor them or yield the chair to
Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the
Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was disgusted over
the turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special
9th Division that issued the TRO on the case. Justice Bruselas informed
Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that
he had participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with
the ponencia of Justice Roxas without such information ever being taken
up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter
as it is because he would bring it up in the open, to media, etc. Justice
 62

Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much collect the personal reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the

would have been offered to the others. matter.[125]

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a torrid

Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the discussion of all the issues, the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of
same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court,
Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed through the Office of the Court Administrator;

that he had heard about the bribe offer but that he did not reveal the (2) Leave the matter regarding the validity
of the decision rendered in the above-entitled case to
same to Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The effort of Justice
the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they
Bruselas to get in touch with Justice Roxas proved futile. may deem appropriate in the usual course of
procedure; and

Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived (3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation
of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of
at, and how the decision was promulgated, and that unless an immediate the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the
recurrence of a similar situation.[126]
and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken by the Court of

Appeals, both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices and
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in
of the Court of Appeals would undoubtedly be tarnished, Justice Sabio
a letter for the Presiding Justice[127] her strong reaction to the paper of
wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter[123] to the Presiding Justice, which
Justice Roxas falsely imputing to her grandstanding before the media or
precipitated the present investigation.
resorting to media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative

complaint before the Supreme Court, and taking exception to the equally
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an
outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging
account of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice,
to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to
without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to
leaked out.[124]
the attention of the Presiding Justice the impropriety done by Justice

Roxas in the MERALCO case that resulted in her having been eased out of
Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding
the case notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously examined
Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through a
the ponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her precious time to
telephone call, reiterated his full agreement with his desired investigation.
such study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal

reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.

The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an

emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit
Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the possible effect on the
admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in
decision rendered. The session was also called in order that the
his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed
predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 could be deliberated
having learned from the news that Justice Sabio was one of the justices in
upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the
the case arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in
reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and
favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio
Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja,
told him about the blandishments coming from the government side, that
respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to
he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to
the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to
favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., What would
 63

it take for you to resist the governments offer? and that the response of of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de

Justice Sabio, Jr. was Fifty Million. Borja.

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August

hold a press conference the next day on account of the publicized affidavit 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as

of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that this is a the parties direct testimonies upon which they were

matter of self-defense on his part, hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.

him from doing so.

On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators

Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response to submitted its Report of even date to the Court en banc.

the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, vehemently denying that Mr. De Borja asked

him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he never According to the Report, the investigation has revealed

asked for money from him.[128] irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals

Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to which are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and

read a signed statement entitled My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and public respect

Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case. for the Judiciary.[130]

Findings regarding
Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio the conduct of
decided to narrate almost word for word his conversations with Mr. De Associate Justice
Vicente Q. Roxas
Borja.
Justice Roxas
inexcusably failed to
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn
act on a number of
Clavano[129] executed in Davao City, she stated that - motions of the parties
prior to the
Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone promulgation of the
number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that Decision.
because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco,
he wanted to call him regarding his possible
inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were
designated as a substitute member of the division
vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in
of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire
the Report as follows:
that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are
more comfortable, to sit in the division.
(a) The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer
Action on any Incident of the Petition
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of
Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle filed by
Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.
GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case
was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
x x x x x x x x x.
b) GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice
Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of the motion raised a prejudicial question,
Justice Roxas should have resolved it
Investigators to investigate (1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the
before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco,
Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).

Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation
 64
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it
be allowed to use Power point at the
hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20,
2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both
motions were not acted upon by Justice
Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file
their Consolidated Memorandum of
Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs
Comment filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp.
981- 987).
(f) Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume
Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant
Case, which was filed on July 10,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).[131] (emphasis
supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or refusing to act
on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3,
third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such
motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division,
the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court.
The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x
xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be
acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished
the other members of the Division, the Presiding
Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk
of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance
of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since
under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is
mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that
Justice Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a
suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary) providing that:
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods.
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that [j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even
just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the
reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.[132] With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and
reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions
and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited
administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned
to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this
Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in
resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly
warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt
with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty
of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending
incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had
been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court
adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the
Transcript of Final Decision, which is supposed to be a
transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the
Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco
case was not a true transcript of the minutes of the
meeting, but purely a transcript from memory
because no notes were taken, no stenographer was
present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact
a drama which he composed from my recollection to
comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which
requires that minutes of the meeting, i.e.,
deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called transcript is
a fabrication designed to deceive that there had
been compliance when actually there was none --
with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation
and/or deliberation among the members of the
Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the transcript that it
was a recap from our previous deliberations was
 65
another falsehood because there had been no
previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final
Report of Justice Roxas was also false for Justice
Roxas admittedly did not submit a report as ponente,
as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for
deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14,
2008. The Final Report which he submitted was
admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice
Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The Final Report was
merely the title of the page that served as the cover
of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed
closing statement in the transcript that -- We have
covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice
Roxas extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes
testified at the investigation that he had not seen the
transcript until the copy in the rollo was shown to
him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his
cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26,
2008.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he
brought the Meralco decision to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft
for her to read, because she asked if she may read it,
not for her to sign it, is completely false. This
testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because
she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading
pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to
her office for her to sign as a member of the Special
Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night,
she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature
pages which were to be attached to three (3) other
copies of the decision.[133]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely
proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned
handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification
of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the
appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious
offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under
the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and
warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the
Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave
offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from
service upon the commission of the first offense. On
numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to
impose such extreme punishment on employees
found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. Dishonesty has no place in the
judiciary.[134]
Justice Roxas showed
a lack of courtesy and
respect for his
colleagues in the
Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly
disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when
he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and
burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had
signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already
been reorganized out of the Special Ninth Division as
of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out
of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not
promulgating the decision which she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas,
who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which
Division should decide the Meralco case, may have
been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth
Division. That is why he brought his decision to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However,
somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his
decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his
decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and
Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008
reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on
him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth
Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the
Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of
five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a
majority of the Division on his side, he would lose
his ponencia; someone else would become
the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be
the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and
Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his
decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr.
He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the
Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr.
-- with whom he and Meralco were comfortable.
 66

(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding

Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his Interpleader (d) Although the parties were given 15
Petition he sought on July 21, 2008, but he days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July
promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda
later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding and memoranda of authorities, and actually
Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, submitted:
2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page-
Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after memorandum
Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his On July 9, 2008 SECs 62
request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve page-memorandum
the same chairmanship issue raised in the On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page-
Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of
embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes authorities
and Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for his
position as head of the Court. Justice Roxas prepared the decision before
the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and
xxx xxx xxx submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her
signature on July 8, 2008. His rush to judgment was
indicative of undue interest and unseemly
There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn haste, according to J.Romero.

to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels He cheated the parties counsel of the time,
effort, and energy that they invested in the
and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges
preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as
and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and it turned out, neither he nor the other members of
the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing
professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for
in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
compliance a futile exercise.
expected to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for
xxx xxx xxx
all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial
(underscoring supplied)
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial

to the proper performance of such duties.

We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to

judgment (even before the filing of the parties memoranda) was indicative

of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that
taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in
Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the
resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas
Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves
failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead
the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands
to deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.
into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties

Justice Roxas memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate
questionable handling
transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision,
of the Meralco case
demonstrates his without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division
undue interest
therein. who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved

Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he

(Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate

In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in
action, just a few days before the promulgation.
fact began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties

memoranda. As discussed in the Report:

xxx xxx xxx

 67
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice,
judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that
judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This
standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made.[135] This Court will not hesitate to sanction
with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest
in their assigned cases.[136]
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons
of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded
by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding
the conduct of
Associate Justice Jose
L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed
improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of
the telephone call of
Chairman Sabio to his
brother Justice Sabio
showed that Justice
Sabio failed to uphold
the standard of
independence and
propriety expected of
him as a magistrate of
the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that
he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to
a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco.
Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice
Sabio the rightness of the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and that
Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance
with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the Court.
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible
to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper conversation
regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing
wrong with brother Camilos effort to influence his
younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because
both believe that our Filipino culture allows
brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose
of one is to influence the other, provided the latter
does not agree to do something illegal.[137]
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which
provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x x x free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from
inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of
government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO
in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios
unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case, seemed to indicate
that he may have been actually influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1)
Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special
Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned
to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and
signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform),
 68
requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for
Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9 th Division, which he
probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction
beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage
of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice
Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would
have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the
decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for
Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the
despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation as
acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of
absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his
own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards
equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper
interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did
nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with
Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them.
We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios
conversations with Mr.
De Borja were
improper and
indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the
Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas
profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary
of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja
had the Meralco case on his mind when he called
Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned
the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr.
for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio,
Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after
Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of
Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23,
2008, and the case was ripening for decision or
resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr.
and asked to meet him over dinner to chit chat about
the Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could
not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case,
Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the
lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his
evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the
Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate
and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the
second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice
Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that
covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order
to preserve and protect the integrity and
independence of the Court itself. He ignored the
injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary that: Judges shall exhibit and promote high
standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in
order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
It was during that meeting with De Borja in
the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De
Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of
Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice
Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the
Special Ninth Division because Meralco was not
comfortable with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected
the bribe offer because he could not in conscience
accept it.
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and
insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice
Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is,
however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his
outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De
Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De
Borja to stop pestering him with his calls. The Panel is
nonplussed because, normally, a person who has
been insulted would never want to see, much less
speak again, to the person who had disrespected him.
He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas
calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of
P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that
even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court,
GSIS would still lose, hence, saying lang yung P10
million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. He
testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call
was deadma or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed
that call of his to a lapse in judgment on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel
finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De
Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco,
than De Borjas denial that he made such an offer.
Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally
reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact
admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
 69
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did
not mention the bribe-offerors name in both his
verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media
as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice
Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not
believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million
as his price, he would not have reported the P10
million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He
would have waited for Meralcos reply to his
counter-offer.[138]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation
on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued
communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the
latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor
judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in
preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which
he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet
and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother
and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with
Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2)
months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding
the conduct of
Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding
Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice
Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division
of the Court of Appeals the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the
Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco
case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on
the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the
Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study
the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice
Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008.
Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling
nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their
intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when
the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July
24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision
on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As found
by the Panel, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback
when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his
opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus
oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two
justices to him.
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the
appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find
Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact
that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to
rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes
should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case
without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding
the conduct of Justice
Myrna
Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel
of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the
IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by
Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8,
2008, without reading the parties memoranda and
without the deliberation among members of the
Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO
would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3)
weeks away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed herself
to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that
signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with
certain dissembling practices of other justices of the
Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and
lack of independence on her part.[139]
 70
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment of the
facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or
for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be
independent from judicial colleagues in respect of
decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from
established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect
in the performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding
the conduct of
Presiding Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez
failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of
Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived
lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had
been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising
from the Meralco case.
He vacillated and temporized on resolving the
impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L.
Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that
should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to
take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to
J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of
the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged
him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he
hampered by the fact that he has relatives two
daughters employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a
consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority.
Was he not aware then, or did he discover too
late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is
in fact authorized to act on any matter involving the
Court and its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any
one acting in his place is authorized to act
on any matter not covered by these Rules.
Such action shall, however, be reported to
the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en
banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt on
Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an
attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for
the protection and preservation of the integrity of
the judicial processes of the Court, hence, an
administrative matter cognizable by the Court en
banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en
banc.- The Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) xxx
(b) Adopt uniform administrative
measures, procedures, and policies for the
protection and preservation of the
integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in
judgment.[140]
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the
view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals
could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the
part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode
in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has
indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the
second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez
is hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and
decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding
other personalities
involved in the
Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only
referred to this Court the propriety of the actions of the Justices
concerned in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the
facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential
liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.
 71

With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe

members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the penalty;

Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for

appropriate action. (3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY

REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to

With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with

Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a

attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should more severe penalty;

be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per

curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en (4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of

banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED,

themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will

who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted warrant a more severe penalty;

as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of

Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension (5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of

from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is

month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial

Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only duties.

as he should be credited for being a whistle blower and one (1) for his

dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate (6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the

Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby

for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous. referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows: (7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De

Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct,

dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of This Decision shall take effect immediately.

the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all

benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his SO ORDERED.

re-employment in any branch or service of the government including

2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in
government-owned and controlled corporations;
public interest

3. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple miscarriage of justice

misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning
 72
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING
ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the
transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame,
Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the
municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he
were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because
there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity;
some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in
Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death
while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a
gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could
even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was
trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur
signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New
Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court
to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but
the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd
to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be
imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W.
Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue
involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the
transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court.
According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the
custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of
the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the
record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it
should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be
tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should
be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the
occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Antonio, J, took no part.
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug;
DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN, respondents..
R E S O L U T I O N.
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants
accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in
Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province
(People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection with
an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue,
Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao
was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to
this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a
petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City.
They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe,
Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of
that province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former
Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be
afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners
further claimed that, as may be inferred from previous incidents
recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses and
lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and
antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the
Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George Bayucca was
killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of
Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of
venue but he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor
Lumauig that the case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in
view of its proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the
correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue
and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be
bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the
Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed personally
against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the
governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter
dated August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W.
 73
Diokno (who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of
that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as having been
filed only by Alipio Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974,
56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral
protests filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto
Lumauig and John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad
was a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his
present position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified.
A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for
whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to
secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is
necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near
as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue
or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the
Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that
the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are
serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez,
L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown
that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where
the trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent
Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's
petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have
reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of
justice and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be
tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in
the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred
from the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp
Crame should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal
Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the
venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is
granted. The said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court
of the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. .
SO ORDERED. .
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG)
CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR,
JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE,
ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change
of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure
ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this
petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a
certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz
and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no
time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full
measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle
that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public
officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised,
the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds,
necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution
dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court
required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private
respondents, 4the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The
present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos.
1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this
Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the
law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the
petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject
to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve
their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but
instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting
aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan,
presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the
criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue
or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on
the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province
issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies
of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in
his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On
September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of
the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made
in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of
Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica,
 74
Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23
and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental
filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo
Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo
Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139
and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the
municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued
an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release.
The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral
availed themselves of this right and have since been released from
detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases
informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court
of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused
are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats
made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly
for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation
of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor
General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of
bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside,
by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided
over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a
change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal
cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that
District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros
Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence
covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild
attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest
court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents
on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials
concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the
witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has
become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by
respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco
Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981,
dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such
comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed
submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of
respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that
the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a
capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of
petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to
the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring
the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The
Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the
landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes
as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case
before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for
which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is
imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus:
"The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in
this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their
lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they
may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their
lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but
his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent
Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation
of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no
objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases
where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the
witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be
resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not
be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could
have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is
justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with
the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail
was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without
hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine
enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano,
speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the
affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for
bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of
Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in
maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof.
But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.
We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the
prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions
asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be
characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a
jurisdictional character. 19
 75
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without
force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been
transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents,
with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
4. Appointment of officials and employees of entire
judiciary
5. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and
protection of constitutional rights
6. Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice
and Procedure
7. Admission to the Practice of Law
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under
the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this
Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of
the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as
respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal
informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case
No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those
cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the
1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177
were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and
Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing
and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177
insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and
resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3,
1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari
and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming
only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24
September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-
01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals.
Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of
authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to
 76
investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that
petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due
course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit
a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the
Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578,
the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the
Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of
Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the
following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents
for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original
period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as
party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs.
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of
the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order
of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578,
and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to
Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as
bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of
the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578.
In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a
news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30
November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court
order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an
prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that
while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given
due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because
the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating
graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations
because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a
friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases
even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been
restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft
cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino
government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the
Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate
the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress
of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend
and that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in
court during election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the
people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during
election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a
right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate,
who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16
February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid
Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court
rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The
dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
 77
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and
hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the
Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or
otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the
next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having
argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements
totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or
in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the
court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard
on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the
COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to
dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which
he claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court,
interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)."
He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said
notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous
statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long
reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof
On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the
Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez
under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the
petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public
statements to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but
also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual
members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into
disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the
administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why
he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in
the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the
"Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the
position he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit
or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to
stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or
friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and
on behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or
sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues
and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and
not to be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the
Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against
two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of
and circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public
respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted
to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies
of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and to
DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same
period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE
SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter
to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an
Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other
things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an
impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with
substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his
pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified
and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and
resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of
record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May
1988;
 78
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule
139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated
27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier,
respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with
Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and
defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending
before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was
respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation
called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent
on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline
officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice
of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance
of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due administration
of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in
cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for
contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and
non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is
a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's
disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar
is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as
such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at
one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez
first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little
later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this
matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent
Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the
function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re
Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had
occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our
authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the
members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not
a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but
also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the property and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
 79
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as
such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the
Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would
be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This
duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone
does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the
power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent
them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their
oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to
inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility
with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints
against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such
reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists
of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed
by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not
make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise
to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom
of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of
law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled
to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez
was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied
making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially
correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered
its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an
act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken
"that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends
(of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will
not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its
Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez,
and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to
accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and
Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however,
obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the
integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution
without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the
judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for
positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his
duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater
outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in
complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10
September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven
(7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also
ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to
cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner
Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that
on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari
for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this
Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the
Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the
Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render
decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of
"cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable
charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the
contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez
does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes
had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This
charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some
substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made
by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision
to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted
"pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect,
the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court
into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and
distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions
of the Republic.
 80
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect
discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the
poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming
the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be
regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It
may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed
judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total
picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of
an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily
and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once
again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an
institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had
respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and
the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have
discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample
opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support
thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons
for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered
by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and
upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this
connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always
and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to
explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In
his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and
to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light
of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as
shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due
process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative
charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced
as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the
contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps
passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by
the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that
he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this
Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due
process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be
the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the
original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier
made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court,
accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and
according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only
capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so
to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect
as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at
respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this
Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges
on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate
their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves
around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may
reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting
exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the
Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements
which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or
otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo,
who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the
Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment
rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of
court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the
Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case.
This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty.
del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition
for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names
of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had
voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me
with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against
the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the
 81
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification
committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court
and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people
the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know
them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis
supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt
with for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty.
del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human
efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a
life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up
deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the
practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft,
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the
government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800,
are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them
that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules
of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their
younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and
serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No.
46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific
issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court
of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their
respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent
del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for
his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder
for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis
supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of
the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company
were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in
MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to
the mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our
upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices,
that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in
effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence,
par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA
at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to
Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion
charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a
vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and
the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case,
the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before
the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the
son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.
The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board
of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be
the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates
"incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that
there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur
and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court,
which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
 82
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders
of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the
above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of
Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take
part—... . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent
for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits,
to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's
proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to
more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation
is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion
for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected
of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but
by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July
31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He
then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an
issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being
interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by
the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that
the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should
first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further
removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining
in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to
engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He
makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not
only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns
that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be
allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process has already
begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in
fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For,
inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a
favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every
time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc
on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel
is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not
too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy
to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended
to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar
to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The
stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion
announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption
of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to
the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than
fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide
the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the
appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to
 83
reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision
of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge
is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we
prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading
a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against
what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the
Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title.
He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice
committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen
released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September
1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as
follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not
expose the tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused
to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become
responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination,
and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit'
or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part
read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in
all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire
of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described
the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members
of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572;
emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The
Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding,
through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the
boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was
dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for
Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of
this Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes
a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by
this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is
likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected
by all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and
order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when
the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to
armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and
Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme
Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep
their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all
concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity
of the Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative
action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he
had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes)
and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court,
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory
and the above statements contumacious.
 84
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ...
are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent
killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the
Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a
pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been
repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs.
Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs.
Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What
makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a
member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with
that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights
of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re
Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which
carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto,
a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following
item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily,
who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the
source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its
object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to
liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the
deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598;
emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602;
emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before
the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in
translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the
resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do,
the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim,
and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters
will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at
726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared
in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt
to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of
the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded
in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts
of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery'
used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according
to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish
Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention
of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in
his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
 85
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper
and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice
can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and
hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in
judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to
the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial
outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the
nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days
ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court
and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of
justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it
has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor
promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests
that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn
for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust
our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the
Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined
lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in
the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99
Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported),
Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against
Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the
Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting
application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court
betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court.
Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by
the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then
fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the
centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent
that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal
against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism
in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;
both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges
their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
 86
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel
Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in
this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important
as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged
to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties
and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of
the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on
the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants
in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may
have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and
an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize
the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not
unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re
Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of
their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or
comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words
and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited
no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to
the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied
his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988
and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May
1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the
judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the
application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the
Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of
the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear
upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and
statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing
the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and
redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a
given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of
respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level
of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the
court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high
level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic
government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not
the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this
Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel
suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against
respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover,
where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the
Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked,
libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt
of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez
from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court
of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
 87

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to
the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with
which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74
per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on
the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing
general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found
no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it
must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize
more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1
of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1948 899 409 11
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN 1949 1,218 532 164
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled: 1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination,
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
 88

sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No.
972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is
therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which
are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act
No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the
practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set
the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate
legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal
profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious
social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of
legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests.
The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and
magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the
addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs.
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the
Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.
United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve,
Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century?
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on
Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37),
the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of
the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law
the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
respects.
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them
the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
uphold the disputed law.
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo
Angeles David stated:
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the
case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on
took up law soon after the liberation.
April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent
with the Constitution of the state of New York.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All
votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
 89
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept
is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing
them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and
with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting
the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution,
evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the
word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission
spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the
act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of
law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was
evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible
private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the
law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College
being an institution of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with
the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of
the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination
by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have
had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and
the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of
the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of
which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of
pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present
condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper
with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia
College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of
law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not
taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of
attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines
are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted
to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles;
in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on
the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A
comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which
the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted
to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision
we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in
the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at
law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission
has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to
 90
constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications
for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes
such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon
which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty
to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme
which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship.
The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision
over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries
prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity.
It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the
framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at
law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do
not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the
court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as
our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice
law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting.
Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually
exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court,
and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right
upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function,
no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of
the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes
an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
 91
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day,
54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient
legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three
years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of
the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys
and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes
therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during
good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for
admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that
court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate
almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter,
in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have
also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the
court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and
is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions
of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules
that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of
the other departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law,
p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is
very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders,
or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of
1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50
per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article
VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and
this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
 92
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute
or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should
be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that
the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial
power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal
profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to
each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to
the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña
took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average.
A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused
to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in
this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed
examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred
and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to
read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in
good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who,
prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held,
under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting
attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant
took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon
which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty
to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in
the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the
courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his
failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking
the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the
office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having
in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of
the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of
Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited
and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to
the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we
have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of
 93
those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any
other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal,
and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we
do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in
itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell
only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of
the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general
rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do,
to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and
that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass
an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they
commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a
class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by
virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of
the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made,
is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise
the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is
that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of
admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that
the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two
years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the
aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special
legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the
legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and
take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that
purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him
the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such
privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as
the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation
to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of
the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie
vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17
Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121
Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say
what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and
plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character,
or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class
of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and,
second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office,
or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be
admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two
 94
different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion
of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons
to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which
will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study
of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso
need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next
day must spend three years, although they would complete two years
before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of
a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31,
1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other
the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless.
Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons.
(pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where
the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of
law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right
of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the
right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as
are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them —
that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to
the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under
our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on
the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general
principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs.
Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right
to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the
requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That
fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the
Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all
who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during
the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on
the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained
in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based
on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and
other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason
on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of
the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in
the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent
in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a
minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably
followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and
none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before,
with the general average indicated, were not included because the
Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This
fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is
the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations
prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such
 95

form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges
of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which responsibility of the Supreme Court.
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by
the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court
These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their
could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons,
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve
being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules
the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates
as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words,
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
according to existing rules.
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them.
And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power 4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates,
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided. which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge
and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at
class legislation.
indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when
a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this
and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1
article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1,
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in
indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the force.
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it
is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire
law.
RESOLUTION
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are
not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third,
Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the
because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to
fatal defects.
take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to
this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court,
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act and under the authority of the same:
No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor
effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1
which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law,
that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in
force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates
who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and
(2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general
average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final,
they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice
may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of
legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even
if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
96
the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet
a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel
for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed
the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty
candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
L. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent
to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001
which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before
the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
 97
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC
as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on
his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a
law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of
the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly
D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized
by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate
of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated
that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is
a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations
but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages
in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the
law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any
court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
 98
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
8. Integration of the Bar
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to
reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the
relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity
of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself
of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was
disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly
pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23,
1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without
prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the
disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution
penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors,
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency
and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary
of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to
pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors
to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid
resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous
case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter
of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine
Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in
the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the
decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent
for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August
19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal
to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not
unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the
consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical
concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal
knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this
Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the
impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
 99

Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more

NAME POSITION
than justified.
Atty. Violeta Drilon President
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court
where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked —
the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence
apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates
times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates
ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made
certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luz
this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal
profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzo
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he
war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account.
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manil
It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish
for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luz
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting
to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia
vindictive principle. 11
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visay
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no
irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visa
likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mind
with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Min
sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there
was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
October 23, 1980.
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
Aquino, J., concurs in the result. officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device
safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
PER CURIAM:
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign
Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
 100
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989),
were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics"
allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates:
Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
"poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit
far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant
vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the
office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and
comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price
of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and,
on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy
in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center
where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution
dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the
IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House
of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court,
appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening
adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be
non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor
campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of
the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or
chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and
governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and
willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note
that in connection with the election of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief,
based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of
mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates
for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to
give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the
one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was
an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal
inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the
1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the
elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the
Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine
National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the
Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members
of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their
campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials
were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department
were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports
that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty.
Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who
claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and
analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived
to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly
non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
 101
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political,
and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited
and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof.
A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an
officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to
IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The
following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether
committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or
by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by
himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than
a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a
legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be
done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at
the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as
well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or
other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink,
entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar
consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the
above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of
the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be
a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office
if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any
erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n.,
July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter
presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p.
41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met
the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of
IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President.
He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March
1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the
House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado
Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C.
Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores,
Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C.
Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C.
Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose
P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
 102
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on
the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14
votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is
that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June
29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the
Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a
plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet
Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria.
The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi
(Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the
rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said
that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane
(t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain
booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to
Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client.
While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on
an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he
would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride
on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to
Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain
regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the
typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty.
Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho
fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran)
if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant
Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys
Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon
group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez
(Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V.
Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon),
Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao),
Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu
for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon
(Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo
(Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit
M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to
the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four
round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and
back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a
written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him
(Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as
sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he
Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be
committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n.,
July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh.
D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh.
D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to
be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills
of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
(g) Alfonso Reyno
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
(h) Cosme Rossel
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela,
Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza,
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo
Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy,
Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was
used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria
Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The
total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the
Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta,
booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva,
Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty.
Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP
c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements
with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms,
food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid
balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone
conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working
sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)
(b) Antonio Carpio
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)
(d) Jay Castro
(e) Danny Deen
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)
103
20,000
15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been
contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time,
they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted
her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in
whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a
senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza
so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group
(t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He
admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the
members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma
rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the
members of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the
convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he
paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention,
by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
P 25,000
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
20,000
pp. 22, 29, 39).
10,000
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
10,000
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
20,000
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1)
seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28,
10,000
1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of
P57,632.45.
 104
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager,
respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto
G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for
those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo,
Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo,
Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre
Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E.
Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group
admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did
so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked
about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained:
"More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance
there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy
Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the
progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of
the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total
of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating
from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of
Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao)
and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies
were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms
where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta,
Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts
are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused
to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest,"
as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed
their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b],
IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign
materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were
more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than
in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on
Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during
the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law
firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for
or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged
him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and
to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in
Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in
the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department
of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City,
she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos')
vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be
available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the
chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino,
who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he
was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
 105
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused
to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but
my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs.
Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna,
who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met
by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to
the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid
seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where
a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July
4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels:
Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at
the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He
mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied
by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor
in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to
Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his
two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their
own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three
weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of
which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The
Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon
City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the
provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and
Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does
not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months
before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed
by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly
non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates
that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of
tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions
aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the
procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination
forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for
delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates;
the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to
enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in
the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of
the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some
P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and
lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor
arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine
Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them)
in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing
them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for
law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules
that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the
witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
 106
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that
those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the
campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the
1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why
the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent
in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it
is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the
IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded
elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously
diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a
noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive
Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the
governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The
right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The
incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding
election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin
anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9)
Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the
different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1)
month before the national convention the delegates from each region
shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much
as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership
shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from
among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president.
In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national
officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as
 107
those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that
the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
9 Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged
q. Report on the Judiciary
3 Lower courts
a. Qualifications and appointment
b. Tenure
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court
of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C.
ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR.,
VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity
of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve
the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as
exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the
time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected
and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed
legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby
the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously
entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered
by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin
respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to
bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and
judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive
and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was
pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8,
1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing
in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners
and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on
the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed
submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and
rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being
supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our
opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved.
As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the
principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers
of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from
a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most
what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as
individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an
inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path
of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private
rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely,
without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private
rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural
sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners
have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing
to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the
liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the
doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think
we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark
back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest
 108
which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so
minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the
judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone
era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed
out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does
manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater
care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On
August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order
No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task
assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the
reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy
(70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options
for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower
courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City
and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan
Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The
Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the
following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the
opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic
and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system.
There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial
measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from
Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest
— can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be
manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those
whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that
task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans
submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the
Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since
1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved
court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a
major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the
first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even
greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for
recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those
economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not
proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so
much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to
be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The
national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search
for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only
thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To
be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly
stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor,
unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement
towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained
increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For
the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance,
extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of
social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning
of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The
efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor
elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the
social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could
be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some
measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be
challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not
go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and
application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders.
Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt
final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in
law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress
in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital
concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one
of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts
exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the
1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has
continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve
controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation
that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to
act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and
yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of
its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth
noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of
such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations .
enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the
Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and
ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions,
one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two
divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment
of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of
1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the
Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The
membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five
members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of
Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in
1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of
two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
 109
qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of
First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later
became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After
setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed
legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that
report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization,
to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend
to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a
consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it
was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of.
Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate
appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it
to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been
translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In
accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by
the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No.
225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa
recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship
speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17,
1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its
report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for
Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in
accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation
with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership.
Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was
referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members
of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals,
suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress
was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would,
firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases.
Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the
courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's
dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the
present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable
future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of
the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were
devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time
and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the
President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite
manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is
tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers
from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias,
Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents,
to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices.
This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule
also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid
at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that
the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval
in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a
similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other
branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of
merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any
clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that
he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial
Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of
original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such
statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he
received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial
District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission
on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with
respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the
Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This
Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on
the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice
Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the
standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an
inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee.
Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and
establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of
Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from
the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts
inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the
National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case
of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of
the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the
Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of
a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort.
(Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that
the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to
defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all
judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller
and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and
Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that
fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say,
and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of
the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and
plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak
an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it
will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I
 110
am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose
was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the
legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not
enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any
particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power
of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there
was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the
establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347
and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and
although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision
providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the
case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence,
this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the
legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited
opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No.
2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No.
4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including
the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First
Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As
Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of
abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145,
where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for
expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an
entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such
conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial
courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in
municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less
reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished.
For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts
was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that
pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to
the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to
make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It
bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous
opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa,
ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo,
entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a
cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El
derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o
reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such
well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there
obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the
former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el
Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre
con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything
but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the
Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that
should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to
municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and
understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal.
The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with
an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals,
the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City
Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no
choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the
security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The
amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established
tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted
in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist,
President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in
stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive
power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public
opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a
firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The
above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v.
Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that
once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same
jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not
through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under
Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of
the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that
all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again
vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically:
"The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the
position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there
was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising
the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a
modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981
amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v.
Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its
essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the
position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee
composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen
other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as
usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all

intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the
existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by
incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em
powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as
far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of
law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have
its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There
is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power,
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would
save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It
is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called
for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion
of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct
fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any
possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution.
That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of
this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province
basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated
111
under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the
most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon
to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the
Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from
the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this
Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither
agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well
in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment
of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to
recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic
in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of
Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of
Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to
the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force
and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh
unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers:
"The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent
necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the
academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus
right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this
attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case
of power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty.
v. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have
cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute
is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate
Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges,
municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic
postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the
legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and
to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in
all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v.
 112
Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links
that bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended
Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and
efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free
Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity
to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of
such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose.
It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as
early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could
be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this
point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept
need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of
what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally
bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision:
"The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days
from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts
constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the
immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section
is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts
affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon
such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished
and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no
ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished
"shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify
their being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any
interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to
assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the
event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal
of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not
from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive.
There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply
omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the
principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981,
petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the
first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was
denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three
members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify.
The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the
legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive
Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in
the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no
possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had
administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity
to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may
be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of
the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the
Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted
members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the
judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the
1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of
the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of
conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and
foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional
structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the
federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the
state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the
people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them
either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for
their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak
in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is
more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a
public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that
standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial
independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and
judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it
is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in
the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider.
independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind
and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those
appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of
office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to
be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the
wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will
be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are
confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised —
to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest

Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he
would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes
[him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing
the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo
Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with
"men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their
duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of
the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and
self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to
assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration
of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing
inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling
to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the
trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith
will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the
Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary
is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been
said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their
determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the
hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is
wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm
in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its
own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying
our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not
having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.
5. The Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner).
113
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his
v. initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether
the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the
practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress
with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision,
disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition
of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that
only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and
with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the
Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On
August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and
agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph
of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that
it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective
MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads:
"This disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their
respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine
Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of
the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the
Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12vested the power to
appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these
times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of
aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to
ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and
legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices
ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became
exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that
the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
 114
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the
Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, 15 the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to
the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the
JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially
altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. 18 It has been
the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider
its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that
allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to
absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the
Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would
provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of
the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by
the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion
arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater
bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which
the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema
lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework
upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on
the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language
used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly
says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even
by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain
oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the
July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the
intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions
were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One
example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8
thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be
confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all
these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and,
clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter
would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII,
by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on
plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear
that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise
of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the
executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be
discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which
particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses
consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the
exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia,
the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must
be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these
two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted
with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen
consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
 115
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other
branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two
Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening
and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular
members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the
Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the
Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was
in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major
branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from
the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any
further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated
doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council,
with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should
adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to
respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a
JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman
his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the
creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two
votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment
of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of
even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated
members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST
Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is
composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members
pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of
the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute
that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2)
representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has
contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the
Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx
The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the
three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable
tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was
designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio
members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in
the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article
VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress,
in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its
representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative
and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary.
The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as
such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence
as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed
upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of
Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice
cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of
what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the
 116
rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.
To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress
sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries
with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect,
has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC
should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first
time through the present action, deserves scant consideration.
Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act
is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to
a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this
case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which
was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct
what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the
Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express
provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To
do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to
the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission.
According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was
not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks
the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by
judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked
to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast
in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or
convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden
the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the
inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and
tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations
no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To
the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is
hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an
independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called
upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues
such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the
position of Chief Justice vis-à-vis the appointing power of the President,
the period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on
 117
midnight appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v.
JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as
to the JBC’s composition and membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually
undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm.
The heart of the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of
the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power.
More significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of
its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving
addition to the Highest Tribunal of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court,
no less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party
respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014.
Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules, 3 the
JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the
said vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo
Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner
Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the
Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination,
Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as well as in the
schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed
by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17,
2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals
Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman
(Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on
June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be
invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then
directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014,
during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying
that the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision
over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5)
working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would
be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of
the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of
supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the
charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public
record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and
supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted
in public, under the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews held
for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on
June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief
Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any
adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees
for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as
a resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal
memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as
posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as
shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an
international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima)
informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was
summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted
to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He
answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would
be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno
execute a sworn statement specifying her objectionsand that he be
afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested
that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio.
As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested
that he wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s explanation on the matter.
Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled intowaiving his
rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written statement 6 expressing his
views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting
considering that the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on his
pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s
request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its
deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in
the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4)
nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes,
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5)
votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in
the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not
be included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC
rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letterpetition in
view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the
President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules
that petitioner may still wish to pursue." 8 The said resolution was
accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the
position taken by the majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his
availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to
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compel the JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court
Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC
and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of
his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the
same was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC
meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for
deliberation by the Court en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist
had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He
attributedthis belated action on his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno,
whose action on such matters, especially those impressed withurgency,
was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to
judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from
the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due
process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation, of
its own rules. Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed
violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in
raising objections against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC
addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary
exclusion from the list of nominees.
Jardeleza’s Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the
petition, the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardeleza’s arguments,
as follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due
process in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist
last June 30, 2014. When accusations against his integrity were made
twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the
nature and cause thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be
heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC
violated his right to due process when he was simply ordered to make
himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the
objections to his integrity would be made known to him on the same day.
Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not
on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity
to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC fail to ventilate
questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested
of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written
opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its
discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a
hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who
shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer
countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be
true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the
interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet
again, the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice
Carpio testified against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations
against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and
Chief Justice Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when she
acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence
of fair play and the Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature
of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these
roles, nor does it dispense with the need to honor petitioner’s right to due
process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza
from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The
"unanimity requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009
does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to
an applicant’s integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the
membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be
completely capable oftaking hostage the entire voting process by the
mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s
interpretation of the rule would allow a situation where all thata member
has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object
to the qualification of a candidate, without need for factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the
part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule
10 of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial
position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members
of the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that
Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only
conclusion is that a majority of the members of the JBC found him to be
qualified for the position of Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist
impairs the President’s constitutional power to appoint.Jardeleza’s
exclusion from the shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the President’s
choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from
among four (4) nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for
the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court
from a list generated through a process tainted with patent constitutional
violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these
constitutional infirmities are remedied, the petitioner has the right to
prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice
Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s
petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant
favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available
against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a
pending case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the
government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in
the implementation of its policies.
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In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does
not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for
mandamus must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right
to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of
the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included
in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was
deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf
of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice
Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question
on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the
government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case
and his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De
Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection
against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain
himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to
shed light on the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a
statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her
witnesses file sworn statements so that he would know of the allegations
against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses;and that
the procedure be done on record and in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to
enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to
the voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to
cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a
fact-finding body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The
members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or
innocence of the accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule
10,JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may."
Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition
is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of
ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC
would not call a hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection
process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or her own appreciation of
the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a
general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she
obtains an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the
JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an
applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus,
when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the
affirmative vote of all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In
the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted.
Even then, he needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only
got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the
shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes,
was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As
to him, the "majority rule" was considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as
Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria
persona, all pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official
capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private
interest while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the
very parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed
himself in a situation where his personal interests collided against his
public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Code of Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public
officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as
Solicitor General, and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit
against his own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its
officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary relationship sharedby a lawyer
and his client.
In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC
called to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the
Court must be filled. As things now stand, the President has until August
20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained
by a TRO or an injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive
Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009, particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the
subject JBC rule impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially
operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where all that a member needs to
do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained
a majority vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who
invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal
and full participation of the other members in the nomination process. A
lone objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory,
the collegial nature of the JBC and the very purpose for which it was
created— to shield the appointment process from political maneuvering.
Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it
does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the
challenges to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC rules provide
mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed
against him, the subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In this
case, Jardeleza’s allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30,
2014 obviously show that he was neither informed ofthe accusations
against him nor given the chance to muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the
subject provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would
only be operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only
in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered
inconsequential. In the event that a JBC member raised the objection,
what should have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote,
where any JBC member retains their respective reservations to an
application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality
of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist
submitted to the President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the
allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on
August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the
closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply
of the JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led
to the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice
on the Integrity Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s Reply consisted only
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of his arguments against the JBC’s original Comment, as it was filed prior
to the filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit
comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was
by Atty. Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading
echoed the position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former
President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the
IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment
against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of
the essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of
the JBC and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment,
however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are
interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect
the conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the
questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of
Section 2, Rule 10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights
of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition
does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule.
Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only
from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible
unconstitutionality of the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu,
a practical approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of
the bleeding from which the gaping wound presented to the Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME
JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE
SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST
JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON
INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2,
RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS
AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN
CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN
APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES
SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The Court’s Ruling
I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume
jurisdiction over the case
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of
the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and
scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and
the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but
they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they
may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.
They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers
the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s
principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory
authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available.
"Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.17 There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is
discretionary and it may not becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
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Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it
does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of
Rule 65, a writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or
officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the
legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy.
Quasijudicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of
a judicial nature."18 It asserts that in the performance of its function of
recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise
judicial or quasijudicial functions. Hence, the resort tosuch remedy to
question its actions is improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of
votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule"
on integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by
the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court
is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of
review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper
remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore,
the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s
integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To
ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary,
the JBC has been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are
all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing
process itself is shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial
appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to
the ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in
the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they
are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not
possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness
of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote
stability and uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A set of
uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether
one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses
qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for
the sake oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria
in writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been
set inthe determination of competence,"20 "probity and
independence,"21"soundness of physical and mental condition,22 and
"integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of
qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be
shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government
officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the
courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In
fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive
feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a
qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is
the quality of person’s character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10
of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the
moral character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged.
- In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of
all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable
consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a
higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the
voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the
preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term
"integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful
existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe
conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted
uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation
where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the
"unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a
person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is
essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 to Jardeleza’s case.
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The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental
Comment-Reply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only
the question on his actuations in the handling of a case was called for
explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to
show his lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and
alleged acts of insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza’s
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal
memorandum related to Jardeleza’s manner of representing the
government in a legal dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule"
was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held
on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not
possess the integrity required tobe a member of the Court. 27 In the same
meeting, the Chief Justice shared withthe other JBC members the details
of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s position in a
case and how this could have been detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim
against Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in general terms. The
particulars thereof were only supplied to the Court in the JBC’s
Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s
demand to make the accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC
declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original
Comment due to its significant bearing on the country’s foreign relations
and national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving
into the details thereof in this disposition. The confidential nature of the
document cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost
prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the country’s
position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does
the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question
on Jardeleza’s integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the
handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main
point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or
implications of immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an
"act of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the
fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the
"disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international
lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that
preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against
his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces
its roots to the exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No
connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a
treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray
the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential
form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted
to him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the
interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer
is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of
legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a
clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of
a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to
others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their
reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could
be classified as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat
there was no clear indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza,
as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially
sought a different manner of presenting the country’s arguments, and
there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part. 30 Even Chief
Justice Sereno was not certain that Jardeleza’s acts were urged by
politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31Besides, the President, who
has the final say on the conduct of the country’s advocacy in the case, has
given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of
the country’s trust and interest. While this point does notentail that only
the President may challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis
commonsensical to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a
treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information that
indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the Executive Secretary
expressly prayed for Jardeleza’s inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding
international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the
Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardeleza’s
professional background, while commendable, have not produced a
patent demonstration of a connection betweenthe act complained of and
his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the
contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked
to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a
professional. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the
inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its
invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of
Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the
first time onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be
gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of
these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice
might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice
then deduced that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might
have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was
still the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that
inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the
qualification of the applicants," it might as well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid
issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion supra. Unlike
the first ground which centered onJardeleza’s stance on the tactical
approach in pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit
relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral
character. Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s
deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a
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disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is
that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed
to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every
member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships
which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to
charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a
relationship which was more than professional, more than
acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality
has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a
person must have the personal characteristic ofbeing good. It is not
enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by
the public in the place where she is known. 38 Hence, lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a
weakness in one’s values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor,
not only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of
the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in the Judiciary. This
is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute
exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity
of our vital securities market.40Manipulative devices and deceptive
practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the
heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with
unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information,
all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become
worthless. Given enough of stock marketscandals coupled with the related
loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of
capital. And investors would eventuallyfeel more secure with their money
invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider trading involves the
trading of securities based on knowledge of material information not
disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading
involves the propensity of a person toengage in fraudulent activities that
may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity"
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of
"questions on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into
operation as the subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been
informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not
furnished the basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal
memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding
his request for an opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his
refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his
right to answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was
railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of
JBC-009 is negated by the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2)
of which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of
candidates within which any complaint or opposition against a candidate
may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires
complaints and oppositions to be in writing and under oath, copies of
which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his
comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6
of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in
securing a candidate’s right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza
the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC,
as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of
the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding,
for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or
administrative offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis
the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of
the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not
exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most,
discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the
objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not
address the issues, but instead chose totread on his view that the Chief
Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC
proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments,
the Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby
demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where
the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s
constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President
cannot be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the
commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent
with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence
required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the
argument that an applicant’s access tothe rights afforded under the due
process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of
criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to
JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion
that due process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications
for the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work
experience and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is
qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step
to verify an applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining
whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors
which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from which the
President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion,
however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to
due process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely
civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.44 Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
 124
member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary
proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer
charged is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that
membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to
explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases
where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the
fulfillment of the duty of JBC torecommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its
adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the
truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby
guarding the body from making an unsound and capriciousassessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the
rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant.
Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the
dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must
surmount is that of soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings
also compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the
parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides
the following provisions pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible
step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty,
integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound
moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit
to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances
from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such
other agencies as the Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet
background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall
check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written
opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its
discretion, the Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a
hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who
shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer
countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be
true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet
investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or
during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009,
Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule,
JBC-010,46 squarely applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further
Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the
Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-010 recognizes the needfor transparency
and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010
was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who
of the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder
consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates
who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against
a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and
in ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall
strictly relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as
provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council, as well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the
complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or
opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet
in executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of
candidates and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The
Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the
background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the
Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to
interview for its further consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published
the dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the
websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of
the dateand place of the interview.
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the
interview, only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the
candidate. Among other things, the candidate can be made to explain the
complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again
meet in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of
candidates which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for
the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases
supplied]
 125
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can
be gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a
hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the
part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of
an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to
ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument
suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing
when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may
resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds,
"what is mandatory, however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a
testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the
applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-examine the
oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its
discretion to recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe JBC conduct a
full-blown trial when objections to an application are submitted. Still, it is
unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due process is a part
of JBC’s discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record.
While it may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances,
testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of
an applicant’s qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where
JBC is given a full rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever
a person’s integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack on the
person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain himself.
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The
subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference
to the grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and
corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se,
provide that: any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed
with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or
opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies;
the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the
complaint or opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or
opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the
complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under
the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers
"any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall";
and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process.
While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype
hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition,"
the right to answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the
minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardeleza’s Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule
on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the
events leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30,
2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza
the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the
fact that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that
he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting,
Chief Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy
for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council
would like to propound questions on the following issues raised against
him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not
compatible with public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in
SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order
from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side,
as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council
of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When
Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to
hear from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out
that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not
being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that
a candidate must be given the opportunity to respond to the charges
against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal
and translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting,
the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements
would be made part of the record. After Jardeleza was excused from the
conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the
Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process
required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the
determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity
resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept,
does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was
verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting,
these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that
lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid
down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and
disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition
against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten (10) days
from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this
notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti,
that the 10-day period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC
members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation
of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised
procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed
their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of
JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next
meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by
telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a
resource person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the
Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written
opposition, why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon
Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered
to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?"
It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal
memorandum used in the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually
addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume
is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of
its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of
the allegations against him based on the document and had he been
 126
ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be
informed and to explain himself would have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the
circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to
instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent
defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the
context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a
reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked
to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there,
subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the
allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up
only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the
object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the
idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These
circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to
explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the
person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently
muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile
exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real
rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right
to answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in
the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical
fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on
whether or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time
when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for
the government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading
fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have
warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded
due process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for
judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend
nomineesto the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings,
however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under
JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the
JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his
integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should
have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the
vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not
from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic
tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down
the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom
in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye
on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested
right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC
failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current
situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of
Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government
tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an
individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted
with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into
operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground
against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court
upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its
application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction with
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able
to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound
is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza
to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a
rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit
JBC’s
Internal Rules
In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules
of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired
and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the
"unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or
abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively
a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified.
Any assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it
effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the
other members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an
oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the probability of
annulling the majority vote ofthe Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial
impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it
has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC
meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as
to its precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague,
nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a
candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be
formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due
 127
process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity
and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the
peculiar nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be
adopted should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the
minimum requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an
endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court.1âwphi1 In
deference to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his
appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a
candidate's worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared
that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the
shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and
ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of
the President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this
Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and
Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court,
respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan,
Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del
Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment,
Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not
included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date,
the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking
reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a
letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was
duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his
name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing
policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge
only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the
petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the
qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the
JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement
violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights
for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that
the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should
be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications
for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he
has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the
JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 8separately submitted
their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they
essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the
assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process
clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy
of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has
no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection
clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who
have served at least five years and those who have served less than five
years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is
no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in
nature.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five
years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to
first determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was
 128
proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both
are governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P.
Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,10 this Court
explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader
in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in
any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the
petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether
the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue
of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides
that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws
and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed
and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed,
but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they
may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.
They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court,
through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire
about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in
assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper
because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of
candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion
in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.13The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to
the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as
an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion
and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us,
was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function
of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions
is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any
legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies.
Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of
the JBC, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that an individual possesses the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary does not create an
entitlement or expectation that his or her name be
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
By submitting an application or accepting a
recommendation, one submits to the authority of the
JBC to subject the former to the search, screening,
and selection process, and to use its discretion in
deciding whether or not one should be included in
the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal
right to be included in the list of candidates simply
because he or she possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications, then the application process
would then be reduced to a mere mechanical
function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and
selection process would not only be unnecessary, but
also improper. However, this is clearly not the
constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the list of
candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC
over the selection of nominees for a particular
judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not,
therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a
privilege the conferment of which is subject to the
JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a
promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from
a first-level court to a second level court. There is no
law, however, that grants him the right to a
promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the
original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not
properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of
sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for
 129
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a
will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected
by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties' rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged
breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that
the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although
he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court
reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to
be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person.
The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any
right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate
RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction
over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside
procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be
dismissed.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to
recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the
JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the
latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a
great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the
men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987
Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process
that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In
carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine
who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses
the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the
five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is
necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to
the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to
screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a
vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the
applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or
class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government
end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary."22 "The mere fact
that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement
and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the
fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC
has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others,
making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing
process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial
appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to
the ineligible or disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number
of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the
competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to
determine proven competence which may be measured by experience,
among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court
judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less
than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection
process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC.
No other constitutional body is bestowed with the
mandate and competency to set criteria for
 130
applicants that refer to the more general categories
of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion
to a second-level court, which is five years experience
as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to
the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a
premium on many years of judicial experience, the
JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of
the judiciary be of "proven competence." In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among
other qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who
have been judges of first-level courts for five (5) years
are better qualified for promotion to second-level
courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as
indicative of conversance with the law and court
procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient
span of time for one to acquire professional skills for
the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place
improved procedures and an efficient case
management system, adjust to the work
environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide
evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking
promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their
promotion, they must have had a "record of, and
reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral
and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must
be reflective of the soundness of their judgment,
courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether
judges are worthy of promotion to the next level
court, it would be premature or difficult to assess
their merit if they have had less than one year of
service on the bench.26 (Citations omitted and
emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only
factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be
appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither
automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The
applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated
based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the
questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do
exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those with
less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not
infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants.
Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying
judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not
be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive
branch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements
of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to
second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed
policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the
JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers
who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the
Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing
and listed the guidelines in determining competence, independence,
integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides
that applicants for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as
a general rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO
A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition
to the foregoing guidelines the Council should
consider the following in evaluating the merits of
applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals
and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years
 131
of experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court,
except when he has in his favor outstanding
credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive
scholastic or educational record and performance in
the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind;
at least very satisfactory performance rating for three
(3) years preceding the filing of his application for
nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate
judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been
duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general
circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal
rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be
published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for
determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and
should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did
not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines
for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute
should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the
five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional
provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not
prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive,
the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of
the JBC.30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion
of the prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or
promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition,
being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC
unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy
violates the constitutional provision under social justice and human rights
for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of
employment opportunities. The constitutional
provision does not call for appointment to the
Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons,
wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated
by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central
in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants who
meet the constitutional and legal qualifications must
vie and withstand the competition and rigorous
screening and selection process. They must submit
themselves to the selection criteria, processes and
discretion of respondent JBC, which has the
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting
candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President. So long as a fair
opportunity is available for all applicants who are
evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and
abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a
clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The
petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of
RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office
nor to be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the President
which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to
determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included
in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under
existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants,
including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in
it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for,
screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees
to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to
perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the
evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to
ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its
discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to
ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper
influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with
five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The
potential applicants, however, should have been informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare
for and comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling
reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise
of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent
in the latter.cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,
however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the
publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of
experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that
the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON.
DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V.
TIMBANG, JR., AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP), Petitioners, v. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON.
MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG,
HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON.
ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK,
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, AND HON. VICTORIA C.
FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Respondent.
DECISION
 132

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: their respective votes:

Before this Court is a Petition for Quo Warranto under Rule 66 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with Application for Issuance
of Injunctive Writs1 filed by petitioners Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo 1. AGUINALDO, PHILIP A. - 5 votes
(Aguinaldo) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Muntinlupa City, Branch 207;
Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Alhambra) of RTC, Manila, Branch 53; Judge
Danilo S. Cruz (D. Cruz) of RTC, Pasig City, Branch 152; Judge Benjamin T. 2. ALHAMBRA, REYNALDO A. - 5 votes
Pozon (Pozon) of RTC, Makati City, Branch 139; Judge Salvador V. Timbang,
Jr. (Timbang) of RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 253; and the Integrated Bar of
3. CRUZ, DANILO S. - 5 votes
the Philippines (IBP), against respondents former President Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino), Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa
(Ochoa), Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi 4. POZON, BENJAMIN T. - 5 votes
(Musngi), Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg
(Econg), Atty. Danilo S. Sandoval (Sandoval), Atty. Wilhelmina B.
Jorge-Wagan (Jorge-Wagan), Atty. Rosana Fe Romero-Maglaya (Romero 5. SANDOVAL, DANILO S. - 5 votes
Maglaya), Atty. Merianthe Pacita M. Zuraek (Zuraek), Atty. Elmo M.
Alameda (Alameda), and Atty. Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo (Fernandez-
-Bernardo). The Petition assails President Aquino's appointment of 6. TIMBANG, SALVADOR JR. - 5 votes9
respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.2chanrobleslaw
2) For the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
I
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,

On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges nominations for the vacancy for the SEVENTEENTH
to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such their respective votes:
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government owned or controlled corporations.3 A few months chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential
Decree No. 1606,4 which elevated the rank of the members of the
Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices 1. CORPUS-MAÑALAC, MARYANN E. - 6 votes
of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in
three divisions of three Justices each.5Republic Act No. 79756 was 2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, MARIA THERESA V. - 6 votes
approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the composition of
the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five
divisions of three members each. Republic Act No. 10660, 7 recently 3. QUIMBO, RODOLFO NOEL S. - 6 votes
enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the
Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant
positions. 4. DIZON, MA. ANTONIA EDITA CLARIDADES - 5 votes

On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the
5. SORIANO, ANDRES BARTOLOME - 5 votes10
Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website
an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for the six
newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. 8 After
screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President 3) For the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all dated October 26,
2015, which read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:

1) For the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the SIXTEENTH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the EIGHTEENTH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
their respective votes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 133

1. BAGUIO, CELSO O. - 5 votes 2. ATAL-PAÑO, PERPETUA - 5 votes

2. DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, MA. TERESA E. - 5 votes 3. BUNYI-MEDINA, THELMA - 5 votes

3. FERNANDEZ, BERNELITO R. - 5 votes 4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes

4. PANGANIBAN, ELVIRA DE CASTRO - 5 votes 5. FIEL-MACARAIG, GERALDINE C. - 5 votes

5. SAGUN, FERNANDO JR. T. - 5 votes 6. QUIMPO-SALE, ANGELENE MARY W. - 5 votes

6. TRESPESES, ZALDY V. - 5 votes11 7. JACINTO, BAYANI H. - 4 votes13

4) For the 19th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice: 6) For the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,

Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the NINETEENTH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
their respective votes:
Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTY-FIRST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
their respective votes:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. GUANZON, FRANCES V. - 6 votes 1. JORGE-WAGAN, WILHELMINA B. - 6 votes

2. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, MARISSA - 6 votes 2. ECONG, GERALDINE FAITH A. - 5 votes

3. CRUZ, REYNALDO P. - 5 votes 3. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, ROSANNA FE - 5 votes

4. PAUIG, VILMA T. - 5 votes 4. ZURAEK, MERIANTHE PACITA M. - 5 votes

5. RAMOS, RENAN E. - 5 votes 5. ALAMEDA, ELMO M. - 4 votes

6. ROXAS, RUBEN REYNALDO G. - 5 votes12 6. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, VICTORIA C. - 4 votes

7. MUSNGI, MICHAEL FREDERICK L. - 4 votes14

5) For the 20th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTIETH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
their respective votes.
1. MIRANDA, KARL B. - 6 votes
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for
the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent
Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4)
Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice
Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses).
The appointment papers were transmitted on January 25, 2016 to the six
new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their oaths of office on
the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent
Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of
office before Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz and Miranda,
took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza).15chanrobleslaw
 134

appointments within ninety days from the submission

Arguments of the Petitioners of the list.

Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, D. Cruz, Pozon, and Timbang
(Aguinaldo, et al.), were all nominees in the shortlist for the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. They assert that they possess the
legal standing or locus standi to file the instant Petition since they suffered
a direct injury from President Aquino's failure to appoint any of them as
the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Petitioner IBP avers that it comes before this Court through a taxpayer's
suit, by which taxpayers may assail an alleged illegal official action where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, deflected to an
improper use, or wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Petitioner IBP also maintains that it has locus
standi considering that the present Petition involves an issue of
transcendental importance to the people as a whole, an assertion of a
public right, and a subject matter of public interest. Lastly, petitioner IBP
contends that as the association of all lawyers in the country, with the
fundamental purpose of safeguarding the administration of justice, it has
a direct interest in the validity of the appointments of the members of the
Judiciary.
Petitioners base their instant Petition on the following
arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
PRESIDENT AQUINO VIOLATED SECTION 9, ARTICLE
VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN THAT:
It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with
at least three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary
to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall appoint from the
shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the
mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for
"every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the
President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the
nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven
nominees each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly,
for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices. Petitioners
contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for
the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the appointment
papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VACANCY IN THE PERSON BAR CODE SHORTLISTED
SANDIGANBAYAN APPOINTED NO. FOR

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(A) HE DID NOT APPOINT Michael

16th Associate 21st Associate
ANYONE FROM THE SHORTLIST SUBMITTED BY THE Frederick L. PNOY019445
Justice Justice
JBC FOR THE VACANCY FOR POSITION OF THE Musngi
16TH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN;
AND
17th Associate 19th Associate
Reynaldo P. Cruz PNOY019446
(B) HE APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY Justice Justice
MUSNGI AND JUDGE ECONG AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE VACANCY FOR THE
18th Associate Geraldine Faith 21st Associate
POSITION OF 21STASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE PNOY019447
Justice A. Econg Justice
SANDIGANBAYAN.

(C) THE APPOINTMENTS MADE WERE NOT IN 19th Associate Maria Theresa V. 17th Associate
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHORTLISTS SUBMITTED BY PNOY019448
Justice Mendoza-Arcega Justice
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EACH VACANCY,
THUS AFFECTING THE ORDER OF SENIORITY OF THE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 20th Associate 20th Associate
Karl B. Miranda PNOY019449
Justice Justice
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution
to reduce the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary, i.e., "to
rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from the political 21st Associate Zaldy V. 18th Associate
PNOY019450
pressure and partisan activities."17chanrobleslaw Justice Trespeses Justice

Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate of the Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino's
JBC, as well as the limitation on the President's appointing power to the appointments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Judiciary, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and 1. Michael Frederick L. Musngi, nominated
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
President from a list of at least three nominees Justice, was appointed as the
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every 16th Associate Justice;
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the

 135
2. Reynaldo P. Cruz, nominated for the
vacancy of the 19th Associate Justice, was
appointed as the 17th Associate Justice;
3. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, also nominated
for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
Justice, but was appointed as the
18th Associate Justice;
4. Maria Theresa V. Mendoza[-Arcega],
nominated for the vacancy of the
17thAssociate Justice, but was appointed as
the 19th Associate Justice;
5. Zaldy V. Trespeses, nominated for the
vacancy of the 18th Associate Justice, but
was appointed as the 21st Associate Justice.
1. Only the appointment of Karl B. Miranda as the 20th Associate
Justice is in accordance with his nomination.18
Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee
from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each
specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in deviation of
this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Hence, petitioners pray,
among other reliefs, that the appointments of respondents Musngi and
Econg, who belonged to the same shortlist for the position of
21st Associate Justice, be declared null and void for these were made in
violation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
Arguments of the Respondents
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Office of the
President (OP), filed a Comment,19 seeking the dismissal of the Petition on
procedural and substantive grounds.
On matters of procedure, the OSG argues, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, President Aquino should be dropped as
a respondent m the instant case on the ground of his immunity from suit.
Second, petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. cannot institute an action for quo
warranto because usurpation of public office, position, or franchise is a
public wrong, and not a private injury. Hence, only the State can file such
an action through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, under
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 6620of the Rules of Court. As an exception, an
individual may commence an action for quo warranto in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 6621 of the Rules of Court if he/she claims entitlement to a
public office or position. However, for said individual's action for quo
warranto to prosper, he/she must prove that he/she suffered a direct
injury as a result of the usurpation of public office or position; and that
he/she has a clear right, and not merely a preferential right, to the
contested office or position. Herein petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have
failed to show that they are entitled to the positions now being held by
respondents Musngi and Econg, as the inclusion of petitioners
Aguinaldo, et al. in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice had only given them the possibility, not the certainty, of
appointment to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as
nominees, only had an expectant right because their appointment to the
Sandiganbayan would still be dependent upon the President's
discretionary appointing power.
Third, petitioner IBP can only institute the certiorari and prohibition case,
but not the action for quo warranto against respondents Musngi and
Econg because it cannot comply with the direct injury requirement for the
latter. Petitioner IBP justifies its locus standi to file the petition
for certiorari and prohibition by invoking the exercise by this Court of its
expanded power of judicial review and seeking to oust respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices based on the
alleged unconstitutionality of their appointments, and not on a claim of
usurpation of a public office. Yet, based on Topacio v. Ong,22 a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is a collateral attack on a public officer's title,
which cannot be permitted. Title to a public office can only be contested
directly in a quo warrantoproceeding.
Moreover, it is the JBC, not petitioner IBP, which has legal standing to file
the present suit, as the dispute here is between the JBC and the OP. The
fundamental question in this case is "whether the JBC can corral the
discretion of the President to appoint, a core constitutional prerogative,
by designating qualified nominees within specific, artificial numerical
categories and forcing the President to appoint in accordance with those
artificial numerical categories." The Court, though, is barred from deciding
said question because the JBC is not a party herein.
Fourth, petitioners have erroneously included Jorge-Wagan, Romero
Maglaya, Zuraek, Alameda, and Fernandez-Bernardo (Jorge-Wagan, et al.)
as unwilling co-petitioners in the Petition at bar. Apart from the fact that
Jorge-Wagan, et al. do not claim entitlement to the positions occupied by
respondents Musngi and Econg, non-appointed nominees for the
positions of 16th and 21st Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan cannot
simultaneously claim right to assume two vacancies in said special court.
And fifth, petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly filing
the instant Petition for Quo warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition
before this Court. Even in cases where the Court is vested with original
concurrent jurisdiction, it remains a court of last resort, not a court of first
instance.
The OSG next addresses the substantive issues.
The OSG submits that the core argument of petitioners stems from their
erroneous premise that there are existing numerical positions in the
Sandiganbayan: the 1st being the Presiding Justice, and the succeeding
2nd to the 21st being the Associate Justices. It is the assertion of the OSG
that the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20
Associate Justices, without any numerical designations. Presidential
Decree No. 1606 and its amendments do not mention vacancies for the
positions of "2nd Associate Justice," "3rd Associate Justice," etc. There are
no such items in the Judiciary because such numerical designations are
only used to refer to the seniority or order of precedence of Associate
Justices in collegiate courts such as the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Court of Tax Appeals, and Sandiganbayan.
The OSG further contends that the power to determine the order of
precedence of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan is reposed in
the President, as part of his constitutional power to appoint. Citing Section
1, third paragraph of Presidential Decree No. 160623 and Rule II, Section 1
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,24 the OSG explains
that the order of precedence of the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan shall be according to the order of their appointments, that
is, according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when two or
more commissions bear the same date, according to the order in which
 136
their commissions had been issued by the President. It is the averment of
the OSG that the constitutional power of the JBC to recommend nominees
for appointment to the Judiciary does not include the power to determine
their seniority. President Aquino correctly disregarded the order of
precedence in the shortlists submitted by the JBC and exercised his
statutory power to determine the seniority of the appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The OSG interprets Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
differently from petitioners. According to the OSG, said provision neither
requires nor allows the JBC to cluster nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary; it only mandates that for every vacancy, the JBC shall present at
least three nominees, among whom the President shall appoint a member
of the Judiciary. As a result, if there are six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, the JBC shall present, for the President's consideration,
at least 18 nominees for said vacancies. In the case at bar, the JBC
submitted 37 nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan; and
from said pool of 37 nominees, the President appointed the six
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, in faithful compliance with the
Constitution.
It is also the position of the OSG that the President has the absolute
discretion to determine who is best suited for appointment among all the
qualified nominees. The very narrow reading of Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution proposed by petitioners unreasonably restricts the
President's choices to only a few nominees even when the JBC recognized
37 nominees qualified for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
This gives the JBC, apart from its power to recommend qualified nominees,
the power to dictate upon the President which among the qualified
nominees should be contending for a particular vacancy. By dividing
nominees into groups and artificially designating each group a numerical
value, the JBC creates a substantive qualification to various judicial posts,
which potentially impairs the President's prerogatives in appointing
members of the Judiciary.
The OSG additionally points out that the JBC made a categorical finding
that respondents Musngi and Econg were "suitably best" for appointment
as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The functions of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice are no different from those of the
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or 21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice. Since
respondents Musngi and Econg were indubitably qualified and obtained
sufficient votes, it was the ministerial duty of the JBC to include them as
nominees for any of the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan presented for
the President's final consideration.
Furthermore, the OSG alleges that it is highly unjust to remove
respondents Musngi and Econg from their current positions on the sole
ground that the nominees were divided into six groups. The JBC
announced "the opening/reopening, for application or recommendation"
of "[s]ix (6) newly-created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan." Respondents Musngi and Econg applied for the vacancy
of "Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." In its announcements for
interview, the JBC stated that it would be interviewing applicants for "six
(6) newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." It
was only on October 26, 2015, the date of submission of the shortlists,
when the nominees had been clustered into six groups. The OSG notes
that there are no JBC rules on the division of nominees in cases where
there are several vacancies in a collegiate court. In this case, the OSG
observes that there were no measurable standards or parameters for
dividing the 37 nominees into the six groups. The clustering of nominees
was not based on the number of votes the nominees had garnered. The
nominees were not evenly distributed among the six groups, i.e., there
were five nominees for 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; six nominees
for 16th, 18th, and 19th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices; and seven
nominees for the 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The OSG then refers to several examples demonstrating that the previous
practice of the JBC was to submit only one shortlist for several vacancies in
a collegiate court.
The other respondents had likewise filed their respective Comments or
Manifestations:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) In respondent Fernandez-Bernardo's
Comment,25cralawred she recognizes the legal, substantial, and
paramount significance of the ruling of the Court on the interpretation
and application of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, which
will serve as a judicial precedent for the guidance of the Executive and
Legislative Departments, the JBC, the Bench, and the Bar.
2) Respondent Musngi states in his Manifestation26 that he will no longer
file a separate Comment and that he adopts all the averments, issues,
arguments, discussions, and reliefs in the Comment of the OSG.
3) In her Comment,27 respondent Jorge-Wagan maintains that she is not
the proper party to assail the validity of the appointment of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice as she was nominated for the
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that she is also not the proper
party to seek the nullification of the appointments of respondents Musngi
and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Not being a proper
party-in-interest, respondent Jorge-Wagan argues that she cannot be
considered an "unwilling co-plaintiff."
4) Respondent Romero-Maglaya makes the following averments in her
Manifestation/Comment28: that she should not have been impleaded as a
respondent or an unwilling co-plaintiff in the instant Petition because her
rights as a nominee for judicial appointment were not violated; that she
had no claim of entitlement to the position of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; and that she had no participation in the alleged violation of the
Constitution or exercise of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
5) Respondent Econg manifests in her Comment29 that while she is
adopting in toto the arguments in the Comment of the OSG, she is also
making certain factual clarifications and additional procedural and
substantive averments.
Respondent Econg clarifies that her real name is Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
and not Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
Respondent Econg believes that the present Petition is really for quo
warranto because it seeks to declare null and void the respective
appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg. Respondent Econg,
however, asseverates that petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have no clear,
unquestionable franchise to the Office of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan simply because they had been included in the shortlist
submitted for the President's consideration. Nomination is not equivalent
to appointment and the removal of respondents Musngi and Econg will
not automatically grant petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. the right to the Office
of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al.,
except for petitioner Alhambra, are even uncertain about their right to the
position/s of 16th and/or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice/s as they
have also applied for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice in
lieu of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, who
 137

eventually retired on July 22, 2016. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that petitioners' alternative remedy of certiorari is proper, Sec. 1. Action by Government
respondent Econg contends that petitioners only had 60 days to file such a against individuals. - An action
petition from January 20, 2016, the date she and respondent Musngi were for the usurpation of a public
appointed. Petitioners belatedly filed their Petition before the Court on office, position or franchise may
May 17, 2016. be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of
Respondent Econg also raises the concern that if the Court affirms the the Republic of the Philippines
petitioners' position that there are no valid appointments for the 16th and against:
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the seniority or order of
precedence among the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices will be adversely chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) A
affected. Respondent Econg avers that there was only one list of nominees person who usurps, intrudes
for the six vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, into, or unlawfully holds or
considering that: (a) the announcement of the opening for exercises a public office, position
application/recommendation was for the six newly-created positions of or franchise;
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; (b) respondent Econg's application was
for the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; (b) A public officer who does or
and (c) the announcement of the public interview of candidates was for suffers an act which, by the
the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his
Thus, respondent Econg prays for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of office; or
the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for
lack of merit, and the declaration that the appointments of respondents (c) An association which acts as a
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices are valid. corporation within the
Philippines without being legally
6) In respondent Sandoval's Comment,30 he avows that he opts not to join incorporated or without lawful
the petitioners as he subscribes to the principle that the heart and core of authority so to act
the President's power to appoint is the freedom to choose. The power to
appoint rests on the President and the President alone. Respondent Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or
Sandoval has already accepted the fact that he was not appointed despite public prosecutor must
being nominated by the JBC for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate commence action. - The Solicitor
Justice and he is looking forward to another opportunity to apply for a General or a public prosecutor,
higher position in the Judiciary. when directed by the President
of the Philippines, or when upon
Respondents Zuraek and Almeda have not filed their comments despite complaint or otherwise he has
notice and are deemed to have waived their right to do so. good reason to believe that any
case specified in the preceding
On November 26, 2016, the JBC belatedly filed a Motion for Intervention section can be established by
in the Petition at bar, or more than six months from the filing of the herein proof, must commence such
Petition on May 17, 2016 and after Chief Justice Sereno, the Chairperson action.
of the JBC herself, administered the oath of office of respondent Econg,
whose appointment is now being questioned for having been done in Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or
disregard of the clustering of nominees by the JBC. public prosecutor may
commence action with
II permission of court. - The
The Ruling of the Court Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which
The Court takes cognizance of the present Petition despite several the action is to be commenced,
procedural infirmities given the transcendental importance of the bring such an action at the
constitutional issue raised herein. request and upon the relation of
another person; but in such case
The Petition at bar is for (a) Quo Warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised the officer bringing it may first
Rules of Court; and (b) Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the require an indemnity for the
same Rules. expenses and costs of the action
in an amount approved by and
Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court particularly identifies who can file a to be deposited in the court by
special civil action of Quo Warranto, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is
RULE 66
brought.
Quo Warranto
xxxx
 138
Sec. 5. When an individual may
commence such an action. - A
person claiming to be entitled to
a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another may bring
an action therefor in his own
name.
In Topacio v. Ong,31 the Court pronounced
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is
alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully
held or exercised the public office, and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which
goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,
reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v.
Villasin, that for a quo warrantopetition to be
successful, the private person suing must show a
clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a
mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can
lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the
action. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th Saridiganbayan
Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said position, and therefore
not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list
of nominees had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of
being appointed to the position, given the discretionary power of the
President in making judicial appointments. It is for this same reason that
respondents Jorge-Wagan, et al., nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as respondents or unwilling
plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding. Neither can the IBP initiate a quo
warranto proceeding to oust respondents Musngi and Econg from their
currents posts as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices for the IBP does not
qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court as an
individual claiming to be entitled to the positions in question.
Nevertheless, the Court takes in consideration the fact that the present
Petition is also for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which alleges that President Aquino violated Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his appointment of
respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Court the
expanded power of judicial review, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article VIII
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving
rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the
Government.
The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza Decision)32 that a
"petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."
In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the OSG
cites Topacio in which the Court declares that title to a public office may
not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it
cannot be assailed collaterally, such as by certiorari and
prohibition.33chanrobleslaw
However, Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio, the
writs of certiorari and prohibition were sought against Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong on the ground that he lacked the
qualification of Filipino citizenship for said position. In contrast, the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts under scrutiny, not any
disqualification on the part of respondents Musngi and Econg, but the act
of President Aquino in appointing respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which allegedly violated
the Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. This would not be the first time that the
Court, in the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review, takes
cognizance of a petition for certiorari that challenges a presidential
appointment for being unconstitutional or for having been done in grave
abuse of discretion. As the Court held in Funa v.
Villar34:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no
serious disagreement as to the propriety of the
availment of certiorari as a medium to inquire on
whether the assailed appointment of respondent
Villar as COA Chairman infringed the constitution or
was infected with grave abuse of discretion. For
under the expanded concept of judicial review under
the 1987 Constitution, the corrective hand
of certiorari may be invoked not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." "Grave abuse of
discretion" denotes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 139

such capricious and whimsical vindication of the public order and the securing of
exercise of judgment as is relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
or, in other words, where the Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both
power is exercised in an "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.
arbitrary or despotic manner by The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.
reason of passion or personal Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
hostility, and it must be so taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the
patent and gross as to amount plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff
to an evasion of positive duty or is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while
to a virtual refusal to perform in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
the duty enjoined or to act in public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
contemplation of law. Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of
mere public right, however ... the people are the real
We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the parties... It is at least the right, if not the duty, of
instant case in view of the allegation that then every citizen to interfere and see that a public
President Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her appointing offence be properly pursued and punished, and that
power in a manner constituting grave abuse of a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
discretion. (Citations omitted.) taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of
a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
Even so, the Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to
taking into account that when this Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he
his injury cannot be denied."
was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed immunity from suit.
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of
xxxx
government of this country, even though not expressly reserved in the
1987 Constitution.35 The President is granted the privilege of immunity
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
from suit "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v.
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention."36 It is sufficient
Dinglasan, where the "transcendental importance" of
that former Executive Secretary Ochoa is named as respondent herein as
the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such
he was then the head of the OP and was in-charge of releasing
liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental.
presidential appointments, including those to the
In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass
Judiciary.37chanrobleslaw
upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching
implications" of the petition notwithstanding its
Since the Petition at bar involves a question of constitutionality, the Court
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no
must determine the locus standi or legal standing of petitioners to file the
personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of
same. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
cases where this liberal policy has been observed,
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
rulings.
challenged; while "interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they
interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
have been allowed to sue under the principle of
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
"transcendental importance." Pertinent are the
party.38chanrobleslaw
following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,39 the Court acknowledged exceptional (1) Chavez v. Public Estates
circumstances which justified liberality and relaxation of the rules on legal Authority, where the Court ruled
standing:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
information and the equitable
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public
diffusion of natural resources
right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
are matters of transcendental
does so as a representative of the general public. He
importance which clothe the
may be a person who is affected no differently from
petitioner with locus standi;
any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger,"
or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In
(2) Bagong Alyansang
either case, he has to adequately show that he is
Makabayan v. Zamora, wherein
entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he
the Court held that "given the
has to make out a sufficient interest in the
 140

transcendental importance of
the issues involved, the Court The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for justifiable
may relax the standing reasons, did not follow, could have caused all nominees direct injury, thus,
requirements and allow the suit vesting them with personal and substantial interest, as the clustering
to prosper despite the lack of limited their opportunity to be considered for appointment to only one of
direct injury to the parties the six vacant positions for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice instead of all
seeking judicial review" of the the six vacant positions to which the JBC found them as qualified for
Visiting Forces Agreement; appointment. This is the far-reaching adverse consequence to petitioners
Aguinaldo, et al. that they have missed. More importantly, for a complete
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, resolution of this Petition, the Court must inevitably address the issue of
while the Court noted that the the validity of the clustering of nominees by the JBC for simultaneous
petitioners may not file suit in vacancies in collegiate courts, insofar as it seriously impacts on the
their capacity as taxpayers constitutional power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary,
absent a showing that "Balikatan which will be explained below.
02-01" involves the exercise of
Congress' taxing or spending One of the fundamental purposes of the IBP is to improve the
powers, it reiterated its ruling administration of justice.40 As the association of all lawyers in the country,
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan petitioner IBP has an interest in ensuring the validity of the appointments
v. Zamora, that in cases of to the Judiciary. It is recognized that the administration of justice is
transcendental importance, the primarily a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.41 Definitely,
cases must be settled promptly lawyers cannot effectively discharge their duties if they entertain doubts,
and definitely and standing or worse, had lost their faith in judges and/or justices. It is clearly
requirements may be relaxed. imperative for the IBP to prevent that situation from happening by
exercising vigilance and ensurmg that the judicial appointment process
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled remains transparent and credible.
from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following transcendental importance and of public interest, and for the above
requirements are met:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary mentioned reasons, the Court shall accord petitioners the legal standing
to sue.
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
The instant Petition fundamentally challenges President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as the 16th and
18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only one
of them should have been appointed as both of them were included in
one cluster of nominees for the 21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice. The
for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
(2) Petition presents for resolution of the Court the issue of whether
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
and gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees
for each specific vacant position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The
issue is of paramount importance for it affects the validity of
for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the appointments to collegiate courts and, ultimately, the administration of
(3)
validity of the election law in question; justice, for if there are questions as to the right of the appointee to his
position as judge/justice, then doubts shall likewise shadow all his acts as
such. This will indubitably undermine the faith of the public in the judicial
system. Since at hand is a constitutional issue of first impression, which
will likely arise again when there are simultaneous vacancies in collegiate
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues courts, it is imperative for the Court to already resolve the same for the
(4) guidance of the Bench and Bar, and the general public as well.
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
The OSG also prays for the dismissal of this Petition on the additional
ground that petitioners, by coming directly before this Court, violated the
hierarchy of courts. Relevant to this matter are the following
pronouncements of the Court in Querubin v. Commission on
Elections42:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
(5)
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original
jurisdiction over applications for the issuance of writs
of certiorari, however, the doctrine of hierarchy of
While neither petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. nor petitioner IBP have legal
courts dictates that recourse must first be made to
standing to file a petition for quo warranto, they have legal standing to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
institute a petition for certiorari.
 141

jurisdiction with a higher court. The rationale behind

(d) When the constitutional issues raised are best decided by this Court;
the principle is explained in Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion in the following
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court must enjoin the

observance of the policy on the (e) When the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored;
hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to
be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of
the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal (f) When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
with causes that are also well
within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave
time to the Court to deal with
the more fundamental and more When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
(g)
essential tasks that the ordinary course of law;
Constitution has assigned to it.
The Court may act on petitions
for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus only when
When public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
absolutely necessary or when (h)
dictates, or when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
serious and important reasons
exist to justify an exception to
the policy.

Petitioners do not have the absolute and

unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
an application for certiorari will be directed. Indeed,
referral to the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort will simply be empty rhetoric if party-litigants
are able to flout judicial hierarchy at will. The Court
reserves the direct invocation of its jurisdiction only
when there are special and important reasons clearly
and especially set out in the petition that would
justify the same.
In the leading case of The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Comelec, the Court enumerated the specific
instances when direct resort to this Court is allowed,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
(a)
addressed at the most immediate time;
(b) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(i) When the orders complained of are patent nullities; and
When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
(j)
(Citations omitted.)
Inasmuch as the Petition at bar involves a constitutional question of
transcendental importance and of first impression and demanded by the
broader interest of justice, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
resolves to exercise primary jurisdiction over the same.
Lastly, respondent Econg opposes the Petition at bar for being filed out of
time. According to respondent Econg, the 60-day period for petitioners to
file this Petition commenced on January 20, 2016, the date she and her
co-respondent Musngi were appointed by President Aquino. Based on
respondent Econg's argument, the 60-day period ended on March 20,
2016, Sunday, so petitioners only had until March 21, 2016, Monday, to
timely file the Petition. For their part, petitioners aver that after learning
of the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the media, they obtained copies of the shortlists
for the vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
on March 22, 2016. Counting the 60-day period from March 22, 2016,
petitioners allege that they had until May 21, 2016 to file their Petition.

(c) Cases of first impression; Rule 65, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states
that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice
of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day
period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
The question though is when said 60-day period began to run in this case.
 142
The Court refers to its ruling in Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the
President.43 In said case, the Court declared that appointment is a process.
For an appointment to be valid, complete, and effective, four elements
must always concur, to wit: "(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the
exercise of authority, (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal, (3) a vacant position at the time of
appointment, and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of
the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications." The Court expounded on the
importance of the last element as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath
amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath
of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office,
a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Javier v. Reyes is instructive in showing how
acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. On 7 November 1967, petitioner Isidro
M. Javier (Javier) was appointed by then Mayor
Victorino B. Aldaba as the Chief of Police of Malolos,
Bulacan. The Municipal Council confirmed and
approved Javier's appointment on the same date.
Javier took his oath of office on 8 November 1967,
and subsequently discharged the rights, prerogatives,
and duties of the office. On 3 January 1968, while the
approval of Javier's appointment was pending with
the CSC, respondent Purificacion C. Reyes (Reyes), as
the new mayor of Malolos, sent to the CSC a letter to
recall Javier's appointment. Reyes also designated
Police Lt. Romualdo F. Clemente as Officer-in-Charge
of the police department. The CSC approved Javier's
appointment as permanent on 2 May 1968, and even
directed Reyes to reinstate Javier. Reyes, on the
other hand, pointed to the appointment of Bayani
Bernardo as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on 4
September 1967. This Court ruled that Javier's
appointment prevailed over that of Bernardo. It
cannot be said that Bernardo accepted his
appointment because he never assumed office or
took his oath.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the
appointment process leads us to the very evil which
we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments).
Excluding the act of acceptance will only provide
more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision
in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the
appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the
Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to
antedate appointment papers and make it appear
that they were issued prior to the appointment ban,
but it is more difficult to simulate the entire
appointment process up until acceptance by the
appointee.44 (Citations omitted.)
The records show that on January 25, 2016, the appointment papers were
transmitted to and received by the six newly-appointed Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, including respondents Musngi and Econg, who, on the
same day, already took their oaths of office. Therefore, pursuant
to Velicaria-Garafil, the appointment process became complete and
effective on January 25, 2016. If the Court is to count the 60-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari from January 25,
2016, it expired on March 25, 2016. The present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was filed on May 17, 2016.
Just like any rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to the strict
observance of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, viz.: (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. There should be an effort, though, on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.45chanrobleslaw
The peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the issues
involved herein, justify the relaxation of the 60-day period for the filing of
this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Indeed, the official act assailed
by petitioners is the appointment by President Aquino of respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which was
completed on January 25, 2016 when said respondents took their oaths of
office. Yet, petitioners could not have sought remedy from the Court at
that point. As basis for petitioners' opposition to the said appointments,
they needed to see and secure copies of the shortlists for the 16th to the
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It was only after petitioners
obtained copies of all six shortlists on March 22, 2016 that petitioners
would have been able to confirm that no one from the shortlist for the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was appointed to any of the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that respondents
Musngi and Econg, both in the shortlist for the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, were appointed as the 16th and 18thSandiganbayan
Associate Justices, respectively. In addition, respondent Econg is not
unjustly prejudiced by the delay, but will even benefit from the Court
resolving once and for all the questions on her right to the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court reiterates that there can be no valid objection to its discretion
to waive one or some procedural requirements if only to remove any
impediment to address and resolve the constitutional question of
transcendental importance raised in this Petition, the same having far-
reaching implications insofar as the administration of justice is
concemed.46chanrobleslaw
President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."
The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if there is
 143
only one vacancy to consider at a time. The power of the President to
appoint members of the Judiciary is beyond question, subject to the
limitation that the President can only appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. However, the
controversy in this case arose because by virtue of Republic Act No. 10660,
creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three members
each, there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate Justice of said
collegiate court; and that the JBC submitted six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
On one hand, petitioners assert that President Aquino's power to appoint
is limited to each shortlist submitted by the JBC. President Aquino should
have appointed the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from the
nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the
17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from the nominees in the shortlist
for the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and so on and so forth. By
totally overlooking the nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice and appointing respondents Musngi and Econg, who were both
nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, as the 16th and
18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively, President Aquino
violated the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that President Aquino acted in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution and well-within his discretionary
power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the
clustering of nominees by the JBC into six separate shortlists and
collectively considered all 37 nominees named in said shortlists for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The primordial question then for resolution of the Court is whether
President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only
from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific
vacancy.
The Court answers in the negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal
function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary.47 It is a body,
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities.48 The extent of the role of the JBC
in recommending appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President to
appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
of judges of lower courts. At present it is the
President who appoints them. If there is a
Commission on Appointments, then it is the
President with the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to
establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of
seven members, called the Judicial and Bar Council.
And while the President will still appoint the
members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the
recommendees of this Council.
MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO: And the Council will, whenever there
is a vacancy, recommend three.
MR. CONCEPCION: At least three for every vacancy.
MR. RODRIGO: And the President cannot appoint
anybody outside of the three recommendees.
MR. CONCEPCION: Nomination by the Council would
be one of the qualifications for
appointment.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is apparent from the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that
nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the
Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot appoint an
individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed herein
that respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC
and, hence, qualified to be appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be
used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing
to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the
President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is
valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not
obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of
the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of
nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power
to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had
considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for
the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by
clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the
prospective appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is
composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into
seven divisions, with three members each. The numerical order of the
seniority or order of preference of the 20 Associate Justices is determined
pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or
appointment by the President.
This is clear under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,
which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications;
tenure; removal and compensation. - x x x
xxxx
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
commission and the other Justices shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective
commissions, or, when the commissions of two or
more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been
issued by the President.
Consistent with the foregoing, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan similarly provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 144

Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on there will be two more vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Precedence.- Justice.51 These vacancies will surely cause movement in the ranking
within the Sandiganbayan. At the time of his/her appointment, a
xxxx Sandiganbayan Associate Justice might be ranked 16th, but because of the
two vacancies occurring in the court, the same Sandiganbayan Associate
(b) Rule on Precedence - The Presiding Justice shall Justice may eventually be higher ranked.
enjoy precedence over the other members of the
Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters,
Justices shall have precedence according to the order one for every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond
of their appointments. its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the
President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of the
the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is
Justices of the Court of Appeals,50 which involved the Court of Appeals, limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the
another collegiate court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary,
vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in
therefore, the date the commission has been signed
contravention of the President's appointing power.
by the President (which is the date appearing on the
face of such document) is the date of the
To recall, the JBC invited applications and recommendations and
appointment. Such date will determine the seniority
conducted interviews for the "six newly created positions of Associate
of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection
Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Applicants, including respondents Musngi
with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by
and Econg, applied for the vacancy for "Associate Justice of the
RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the
Sandiganbayan." Throughout the application process before the JBC, the
commission of an appointee, the more senior
six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were not
he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is
specifically identified and differentiated from one another for the simple
only when the appointments of two or more
reason that there was really no legal justification to do so. The
appointees bear the same date that the order of
requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and
issuance of the appointments by the President
responsibilities are the same for all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
becomes material. This provision of statutory law
If an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also
(Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA
qualified for all the other vacancies. It was only at the end of the process
8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA
that the JBC precipitously clustered the 37 qualified nominees into six
which gives premium to the order of appointments as
separate shortlists for each of the six vacant positions.
transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a
particular law cannot override but must give way to
The Court notes that the clustering of nominees is a totally new practice of
the law they seek to implement. (Emphasis supplied.)
the JBC. Previously, the JBC submitted only one shortlist for two or more
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of vacancies in a collegiate court. Worth reproducing below are the examples
the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their cited by the OSG:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
actual appointment by the President.
77. For instance, in June 2011, there were 2 vacancies
for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Out of 30
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint
candidates, the JBC submitted to the President only 1
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to
short list of 6 nominees. Based on this short list,
determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed
President Aquino appointed Associate Justices
members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela Perlas-Bernabe.
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical
order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or
78. In January 2012, there were 3 vacancies for
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
Associate Justice of the CA. Out of sixty-three (63)
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating
candidates, the JBC prepared only 1 short list of 13
unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.
nominees for these 3 vacancies. Based on this short
list, President Aquino appointed Associate Justices
There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions of
Ma. Luisa C. QuijanoPadilla, Renate C. Francisco, and
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice should not each be assigned a specific
Jhosep Y. Lopez.
number by the JBC. The Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions were
created without any distinction as to rank in seniority or order of
79. In June 2012, there were 3 vacancies for
preference in the collegiate court. The President appoints his choice
Associate Justice of the CA. Out of 53 candidates, the
nominee to the post of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, but not to a
JBC submitted to the President only 1 short list of 14
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice position with an identified rank, which is
nominees who obtained the required number of
automatically determined by the order of issuance of appointment by the
votes. Based on this short list, President Aquino
President. The appointment does not specifically pertain to the 16th, 17th,
appointed Associate Justices Henri Jean Paul B. Inting,
18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because the
Oscar V. Badelies, and Marie Christine Azcarraga
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice's ranking is temporary and changes every
Jacob.52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
time a vacancy occurs in said collegiate court. In fact, by the end of 2016,
 145

Additionally, in 1995, when Republic Act No. 7975 increased the divisions November 23, 2009
in the Sandiganbayan from three to five, which similarly created six
simultaneous vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC, Her Excellency
with then Supreme Court Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa as Chairman, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
submitted a single list of nominees from which former President Fidel V. Malacañang Palace
Ramos subsequently chose his six appointees. Reproduced in full below Manila
was the nomination submitted by the JBC on said occasion:
Your Excellency:
July 17, 1997
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Section 9,
HIS EXCELLENCY Article VIII of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS Council has the honor to submit nominations for two
Malacañan, Manila (2) positions of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court (vice Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Hon.
Dear Mr. President: Minita V. Chico-Nazario), per the JBC Minutes of even
date, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to the
provisions of Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit 1. Abdulwahid, Hakim S. - 6 votes
the nominations (in alphabetical order) for six (6)
positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, 2. Mendoza, Jose C. - 6 votes
per the JBC Minutes of July 9 and 16,
1997:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Perez, Jose P. - 5 votes
1. Asuncion, Elvi John S.
2. Badoy Jr., Anacleto D.
3. Castañeda Jr., Catalina D. 4. Villaruz, Francisco, Jr. H. - 5 votes
4. De Castro, Teresita Leonardo
5. Fineza, Antonio J.
6. Flores, Alfredo C. 5. De Leon, Magdangal M. - 4 votes
7. Gustilo, Alfredo J.
8. Hernandez, Jose R.
6. Tijam, Noel G. - 4 votes
9. Ilarde, Ricardo M.
10. Laggui, Pedro N.
11. Lee Jr., German G. Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto
12. Legaspi, Godofredo L. attached.
13. Makasiar, Ramon P.
And, as mentioned by the OSG, the JBC, during the Chairmanship of
14. Mallillin, Hesiquio R.
15. Martinez, Wilfredo C. Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, submitted to President
Aquino on June 21, 2011 just one list of nominees for two vacant positions
16. Mirasol, Teodulo E.
of Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which President Aquino
17. Nario, Narciso S.
18. Navarro, Flordelis Ozaeta eventually appointed Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe. Such list is fully quoted hereunder:
19. Ortile, Senecio D.
20. Pineda, Ernesto L. June 21, 2011
21. Ponferrada, Bernardo T.
22. Quimsing, Godofredo P. His Excellency
23. Rivera, Candido V. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
24. Rosario Jr., Eriberto U. Malacañang Palace
25. Salonga, Josefina Guevara Manila
26. Sultan, Justo M.
27. Umali, Mariano M. Your Excellency:
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto
attached. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Once more, on November 23, 2009, the JBC, then headed by Supreme Council has the honor to submit nominations for the
Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Puno), submitted to former President two (2) positions of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single list of nominees for SUPREME COURT, per the JBC Minutes of even date,
two vacant positions of Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
President Macapagal-Arroyo ultimately appointed Associate Justices Jose
P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza. The letter of nomination of the JBC reads: 1. Reyes, Jose, Jr. C. - 7 votes
 146

appointments on the same occasion. This is in keeping with the

2. Robles, Rodolfo D. - 7 votes
constitutional provisions on the President's exclusive power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and the mandate of the JBC to recommend
3. De Leon, Magdangal M. - 6 votes qualified nominees for appointment to the Judiciary.

The Court denies the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in this Petition.
4. Reyes, Bienvenido L. - 6 votes
In its Motion for Intervention, the JBC echoes the arguments of the OSG in
the latter's Comment that the dispute is between the JBC and the OP and
5. Bernabe, Estela Perlas - 5 votes it cannot be decided by the Court since the JBC is not a party, much less, a
complaining party in this case. The JBC asserts that it has legal interest in
6. Dimaampao, Japar B. - 5 votes the matter of litigation because it will be adversely affected by the
judgment or decision in the present case, having submitted the
controverted shortlists of nominees to the OP. The JBC likewise claims
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto that its intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
attached. the rights of the original parties in the case. The JBC, thus, prays that it be
allowed to intervene in the instant case and to submit its
There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired
complaint-in-intervention within 30 days from receipt of notice allowing
the power of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his
its intervention.
statutory authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court. The
clustering by the JBC of the qualified nominees for the six vacancies for
Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have been done arbitrarily,
Court.53 The allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests
there being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the same. The
on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
number of nominees was not even equally distributed among the clusters.
circumstances. It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions
for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to secure the
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his
right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms
disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
of the applicable provision.54chanrobleslaw
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the
It bears to point out that petitioners did not name the JBC as a respondent
well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
in this case because petitioners precisely wanted the shortlists submitted
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
by the JBC upheld; they were on the same side. Petitioners already
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one
presented the arguments for the constitutionality of and strict adherence
JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
by the President to the separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for the six
Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. Significantly,
three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the
not one of the parties moved, and not even the Court motu
minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three
proprio ordered, to implead the JBC as an indispensable party herein.
nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC
for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the
The JBC avers in its Motion for Intervention that it has a legal interest in
minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC
the Petition at bar and its intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice
submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in the case.
nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9
The Court is unconvinced.
of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi
and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices,
The instant Petition was filed before this Court on May 17, 2016, yet, the
are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
JBC filed its Motion for Intervention only on November 26, 2016, more
than six months later, and even praying for an additional 30-day period
The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the situation
from notice to submit its complaint-in-intervention. Therefore, allowing
wherein there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, to
the intervention will undoubtedly delay the resolution of the case; and
which the President shall make appointments on the same occasion,
further delay in the resolution of this case will only perpetuate the doubts
regardless of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate
on the legitimacy of the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg
application process/es for the vacancies. The President is not bound by
as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to the detriment of said court, in
the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the
particular, and the entire justice system, in general. What is more, unless
separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. As the
promptly resolved by the Court, the instant case is capable of repetition
Court already ratiocinated herein, the requirements and qualifications, as
given the forthcoming vacancies in collegiate courts, particularly, the
well as the power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all the
Supreme Court.
vacant posts in a collegiate court; and if an individual is found to be
qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all the other
Even if the intervention of the JBC will evidently cause delay in the
vacancies. It is worthy of note that the JBC, in previous instances of closely
resolution of this case and prejudice to the original parties herein, are
successive vacancies in collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals and
there compelling substantive grounds to still allow the intervention of the
the Supreme Court, faithfully observed the practice of submitting only a
JBC? The JBC, through its own fault, did not provide the Court with a way
single list of nominees for all the available vacancies, with at least three
to make such a determination. The Revised Rules of Court explicitly
nominees for every vacancy, from which the President made his
 147
requires that the pleading-in-intervention already be attached to the
motion for intervention.55 The JBC could have already argued the merits of
its case in its complaint-in-intervention. However, the JBC not only failed
to attach its complaint-in-intervention to its Motion for Intervention, but
it also did not provide any explanation for such failure.
The Court can reasonably assume, as well, that the JBC is well-aware of
President Aquino's appointment of the six Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices, including respondents Musngi and Econg, on January 20, 2015.
The six newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices all took their
oaths of office on January 25, 2016 at the Supreme Court Dignitaries
Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses,
took their oaths of office before Chief Justice Sereno, who is also the
Chairperson of the JBC; while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz
and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate
Justice Jardeleza on the same occasion and at the same venue. Despite its
knowledge of the appointment and assumption of office of respondents
Musngi and Econg in January 2016, the JBC did not take any action to
challenge the same on the ground that President Aquino appointed
respondents Musngi and Econg in disregard of the clustering of nominees
by the JBC through the separate shortlists for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The silence of the JBC all this while, for a
period of eleven (11) months, can already be deemed as acquiescence to
President Aquino's appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion for Intervention of
the JBC.
There are several other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which
the Court takes cognizance of as a separate administrative matter.
The Court takes cognizance of several other matters covered by the new
rules and practices adopted by the JBC.
Item No. 1: The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the JBC
promulgated on September 20, 2016 JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules
of the Judicial and Bar Council" (Revised JBC Rules), to take effect on
October 24, 2016. Notably, the Revised JBC Rules explicitly states among
its Whereas clauses:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, the President of the Philippines may
appoint only one from the list of at least three
nominees for every vacancy officially transmitted by
the Council to the Office of the President[.]
This is an obvious attempt by the JBC to institutionalize through the
Revised JBC Rules its newly-introduced practice of clustering nominees for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts. The timing likewise is
disturbing as the instant case is pending resolution by this Court and with
existing and upcoming vacancies in several collegiate courts, i.e., the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, and even this Court. As the Court
has categorically declared herein, the clustering by the JBC of nominees
for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts constitute undue limitation
on and impairment of the power of the President to appoint members of
the Judiciary under the 1987 Constitution. It also deprives qualified
nominees equal opportunity to be considered for all vacancies, not just a
specific one. Incorporating such Whereas clause into the Revised JBC Rules
will not serve to legitimize an unconstitutional and unfair practice.
Accordingly, such Whereas clause shall not bind the President pursuant to
the pronouncements of the Court in the present Petition.
Item No. 2: The same Revised JBC Rules deleted a significant part of
JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, specifically, Rule 8, Section 1, which
provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Due weight and regard to the recommendees
of the Supreme Court. - In every case involving an
appointment to a seat in the Supreme Court, the
Council shall give due weight and regard to the
recommendees of the Supreme Court. For this
purpose, the Council shall submit to the Court a list of
candidates for any vacancy in the Court with an
executive summary of its evaluation and assessment
of each of them, together with all relevant records
concerning the candidates from whom the Court may
base the selection of its recommendees.
The deletion of this provision will likewise institutionalize the elimination
by Chief Justice Sereno of the voting by the Supreme Court Justices on
who among the applicants to the Supreme Court they believe are most
deserving.
Through Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the JBC had accorded through the
years due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court
for the vacancies in said Court. The JBC had consistently complied with
said rule and furnished the Court in prior years with the list of candidates
for vacancies in the Court, together with an executive summary of the
evaluation and assessment of each candidate by the JBC and all relevant
documents concerning the candidates, for the incumbent Justices'
consideration, but stopped doing so ever since Chief Justice Sereno
became the Chairperson of the JBC. Although the JBC was not bound by
the list of recommendees of the Court, the JBC at least took the list under
advisement. The deletion of the foregoing provision from the Revised JBC
Rules formally institutionalizes Chief Justice Sereno's unilateral decision to
abandon a well-established rule, procedure, and practice observed by the
Court, and completely precludes the incumbent Supreme Court Justices
from expressing their views on the qualifications of the applicants to the
vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The Court calls attention to the fact that the JBC, in JBC-009 and the
Revised JBC Rules, invites the public to give any comment or opposition
against the applicants to the Judiciary.
According to Rule 1, Section 9 of JBC-009:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 9. Publication of list of applicants. The list of
applicants or recommendees which the Council shall
consider in a given time shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
and once in a newspaper of local circulation in the
province or city where the vacancy is located. The
publication shall invite the public to inform the
Council within the period fixed therein of any
complaint or derogatory information against the
applicant. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision can be found in the Revised JBC Rules as Rule 1, Section
8:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 8. Publication of List of Applicants. The list of
applicants who meet the minimum qualifications and
the Council's evaluative criteria prescribed in Sections
2 and 3 of Rule 3 of these Rules, which the Council
shall consider in a given time, shall be published once
in two newspapers of general circulation in the
 148

Philippines.
Ameurfina M.
January 16, 1992 to March 30, 1992
Herrera
The publication shall inform the public that any
complaint or opposition against applicants may be
filed with the secretariat of the Council. A copy of Josue N. Bellosillo December 21, 1993 to November 13, 2003
the list shall likewise be posted in the JBC website.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Jose C. Vitug November 20, 2003 to July 14, 2004
Yet, Chief Justice Sereno, without consulting the Court en banc, has done
away with the settled practice of seeking the views of the incumbent
Justices on the applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court. Artemio V.
July 21, 2004 to December 19, 2005
Panganiban
To recall, Chief Justice Sereno had previously disregarded Rule 8, Section 1
of JBC-009, during the nomination process for the vacancy of Supreme
Court Associate Justice following the retirement of Associate Justice Leonardo A.
January 1, 2006 to November 5, 2009
Roberto A. Abad on May 22, 2014. As Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion Quisumbing
narrated in his Separate Concurring Opinion in the Jardeleza
Decision56:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Consuelo Y.
December 11, 2006 to October 4, 2009
[Of particular note in this regard is this Court's own Santiago
experience when it failed to vote for its
recornmendees for the position vacated by retired Renato C. Corona November 6, 2009 to May 16, 2010
Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, because of a letter
dated May 29, 2014 from the Chief Justice
representing to the Court that "several Justices" Antonio T. Carpio October 5, 2009 to May 16, 2010
requested that the Court do away with the voting for September 10, 2012 to January 28, 2014
Court recornmendees, as provided in Section 1, Rule
8 of JBC-009. When subsequently confronted on who
these Justices were, the Chief Justice failed to name Presbiterio J. June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
anyone. As a result, applicants who could have been Velasco, Jr. September 10, 2012 to [August 2016]
recommended by the Court (Jardeleza, among them),
missed their chance to be
Teresita J. June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
nominees.]57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Leonardo-De Castro [February 1, 2014] to [August 2016]58
The Supreme Court Justices were also not given the opportunity to know
the applicants to the succeeding vacant position in the Court (to which Without notice, warning, or explanation to the Supreme Court En Banc,
Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa was eventually appointed) Chief Justice Sereno recently unceremoniously relieved Supreme Court
as Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 was again not followed. Associate Justices Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. and Teresita J. Leonardo De
Castro as JBC consultants, and in their stead, the Chief Justice appointed
Item No. 3: The JBC currently has no incumbent Supreme Court Associate retired Chief Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Artemio V. Panganiban, and
Justice as consultant. By practice, since the creation of the JBC, the two (2) Reynato S. Puno as JBC consultants. The experience and wisdom of the
most senior Supreme Court Associate Justices had acted as consultants of three retired Chief Justices are undisputed. However, practicality and
the JBC. From 1987 until 2016, the following Associate Justices of this prudence also dictate that incumbent Associate Justices of the Court
Court, during their incumbency, served as JBC should be retained as JBC consultants since their interest in the Judiciary is
consultants:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary real, actual, and direct. Incumbent Associate Justices of the Court are
aware of the present state, needs, and concerns of the Judiciary, and
Supreme Court consultants from the Court, even if they have no right to vote, have served,
Associate Justices Period from the organization of the JBC, as the only link to the supervisory
as JBC Consultants authority of the Court over the JBC under the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, Hon. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez already sits as a regular
member of the JBC representing the Retired Supreme Court Justices,
Pedro L. Yap+ December 10, 1987 to April 13, 1988 pursuant to Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which
expressly describes the composition of the JBC, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Marcelo B. Fernan+ January 5, 1988 to June 29, 1988
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court
Andres R. Narvasa May 6, 1988 to December 5, 1991 composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Leo M. Medialdea+ July 21, 1988 to November 4, 1992 Congress as Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member
of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
 149
These changes in settled rules and practices recently adopted by the JBC
under Chief Justice Sereno are disconcerting. There appears to be a
systematic move by the JBC, under Chief Justice Sereno to arrogate to
itself more power and influence than it is actually granted by the
Constitution and this Court, and at the same time, to ease out the Court
from any legitimate participation in the nomination process for vacancies
in the Judiciary, specifically, in the Supreme Court. This behooves the
Court, through the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, to
take a closer look into the new rules and practices of the JBC and ensure
that these are in accord with the 1987 Constitution, the pertinent laws,
and the governmental policies of transparency and accountability in the
nomination process for vacancies in the Judiciary.
Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution gives the JBC the principal
function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary," but it also
explicitly states that the JBC shall be "under the supervision of the Court"
and that "[i]t may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it."
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(2) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as The Administrative Code of the Philippines, defines supervision
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. -
Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in
other laws defining the special relationships of
particular agencies, administrative relationships shall
be categorized and defmed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
(2) Administrative Supervision. - (a) Administrative
supervlSlon which shall govern the administrative
relationship between a department or its equivalent
and regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be
provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of
the department or its equivalent to generally oversee
the operations of such agencies and to insure that
they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with
day-to-day activities; or require the submission of
reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of
the department; to take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official
functions, including rectification of violations, abuses
and other forms of maladministration; and to review
and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to them;
(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1)
appointments and other personnel actions in
accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions under the Code, except when appeal is
made from an action of the appointing authority, in
which case the appeal shall be initially sent to the
department or its equivalent, subject to appeal in
accordance with law; (2) contracts entered into by
the agency in the pursuit of its objectives, the review
of which and other procedures related thereto shall
be governed by appropriate laws, rules and
regulations; and (3) the power to review, reverse,
revise, or modify the decisions of regulatory agencies
in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-judicial
functions; and cralawlawlibrary
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in
the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies, the word "supervision" shall
encompass administrative supervision as defined in
this paragraph.
The Court also provided the following definition of supervision in
the Jardeleza Decision59:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides
the definition and scope of supervision. It is the
power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures
that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of
a government entity are observed and complied with.
Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed,
but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor
do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, they may order
the work done or redone, but only to conform to
such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner
of execution of the act. They have no discretion on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed. (Citation omitted.)
"Supervision" is differentiated from "control,"
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is
the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it
does not include any restraining authority over such
body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the
doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is
discretionary on his part to order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that
the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed,
he may order the work done or re-done to conform
to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act.60 (Citations omitted.)
The Court had recognized that "[s]upervision is not a meaningless thing. It
is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
the power real and effective."61chanrobleslaw
In the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court shall
take up the aforementioned Item Nos. 2 and 3 as a separate
administrative matter and direct the JBC to file its comment on the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant
Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit.
The Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents
Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A.
 150

Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of

the Sandiganbayan, as VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for
Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition,
but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate
administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar
Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion
as Item No.2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the
Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of
JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar
Council, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of this Decision. The Court
finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment on
said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

6. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary