EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39086 October 26, 1934

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ONG CHIAT LAY, ET AL., defendants.
ONG CHIAT LAY, appellant.

Juan S. Alano, T. de los Santos, Eduardo D. Enriquez and Gibbs ad McDough for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

Quick facts:

Ong chiat lay was charged with the crime of arson together with other 2 accused Ong ban
hua ang kua sing. The co-defendants were acquitted. Hence he appealed on the court. The
prosecution contends that appellant induces his co-defendants to nburn the building but it
was not proven in the case that the appellant had taken direct part in the commission of the
crime. In fact the prosecutionstressed that he was absence in the scene.

Court ruled that the appleant should also be acquitted as that of the acquittal of his co-
defendants. The gravamen in this instanst case is the conspiracy between the parties, hence
the acquittal of the other defendants negate the conviction of such and the the accused must
also be acquitted.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by the
provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in which
was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his
codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua
Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to suffer sixteen
years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively, and to pay
one-third of the costs.

In support of this appeal, appellant has signed the following errors:

First. The lower court erred in holding that evidence presented against the accused Ong
Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson had
been committed.

Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused
Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.

In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be shown either (1)
that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced
another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act
without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.) They take
direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed
to carry out their plan and personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to
the same end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann.,
144.)

In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of the
building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the scene of the fire as one
of the suspicious circumstances indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory that he
induced his said codefendants to set fire to the building. Hence the three were charged jointly on an
information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation of conspiracy, however, has been
negatived by the acquittal of appellant's codefendants. The same may be said with regard to the
theory that appellant had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed; for it seems
clear that one can not be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without its first
being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another.

In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: "Pero las prueblas de la acusacion, a
juicio del Juzgado, no establecen que los acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing hayan cooperado
directa o indirectamente a su coacusado Ong Chiat Lay en la comision del delito. Las pruebas
indiciarias presentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden producir
mas que mera sospecha de que dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de lo que habia realizado
Ong Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no puede servirse de base para una sentencia condenatoria, y
por ende se debe absolver a los mismos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la querella."

While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs. Tom (13 N. C. [2 Dev. L., 569), is
pertinent to the question now under consideration. In that case, the court held that although more
than two persons are charged with conspiracy, the acquittal of all but one of those charged amounts
to the acquittal of that one, since there can be no conspiracy unless at least two unite. Ruffin, J.,
therein said: "Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation of two, at least, to constitute
it, in which there is a mutual dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the other, principle
would seem to demand that all the accused should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In
other cases of dependent crimes, that upon which the rest depends must be first established. Such
is the law between principal and accessory. The reason is that there may be as full defense as
possible upon the very point of the principal's guilt, by that principal himself who is best able to make
it. To make that rule effectual, it became necessary to establish another that, but by the accessory's
own consent, no proof of the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was first established
against the principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature of dependent criminality. Now
conspirators may be said to be co-principals. The guilt of both must concur to constitute that of
either; and it must consists of a joint act, and it makes one crime in both. As the trial of one need not
precede ha of the other, the trial of both ought to be concurrent. I think it more than probable that
anciently such was the course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise. There are many precedents of the
separate trial of person indicted for offences that could not be committed by less than two. (. . .
Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1 Strange, 193; Rex vs. Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange, 1227.) It is too late now
to question it. But it can never follow from those cases that where one of the persons, the
establishment of whose guilt is essential to the conviction of the other, has been legally acquitted,
the other does no hereby become discharged. It cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any
purpose who has, in due course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy between this case and
that of the accessory is strict. The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute discharge
of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a deed when the deed itself was never
perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint act or intent of two, and it is found that one of them
did not join in the act or intent, it is conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if the latter
did not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a verdict affirming the guilt of fewer persons than
could commit the crime, and affirming the innocence of all others charged, has been held to be an
acquittal of all." (4 B. R. C., 930.)

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct offense, it is clear from
the nature of the evidence presented that appellant alone could not have committed the unlawful act.
As already stated, the theory of the prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his
codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge was conspiracy, and the
acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with appellant's guilt.

This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case. Appellant was convicted wholly on
circumstancial evidence. As stated in the decision of the trial court: "Las pruebas de la acusacion
son todas indiciarias, que son las que siempre se presentan para probar esta clase de delito, porque
su autor o autores ordinariamente no lo practican en presencia de un trercero." Continuing, the court
further said: "El traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay a varios sitios antes de occurrir
este incendio, su indiferencia a todo lo que ocurria en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia del lugar
donde estaba instalado su bazar mientras ardia el edificio ocupado por este, y el hecho de no
haberse negado que fuera el el autor del incendio ante el teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciaras
muy fuertes contra este acusado. El hecho de que se olia a gasolina dentro de la casa ocupada por
el establecimiento "China Bazaar" en la ocasion en que el repetido Ong Chiat Lay transladaba sus
muebles y su residencia a otro sitio, y el haber sido encontradas varias latas de petroleo o gasolina
vacias en el mismo terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente despues de occurrir
el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas indiciarias muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong
Chiat Lay. Todas estas pruebas apreciadas en su conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la
culpabilidad del acusado Ong Chiat Lay."

It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can not be had unless
the corpus delicti is first established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R. A., 902.) To establish the corpus
delicti in arson the proof of two elements is required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other
thing, and (2) the criminal agency in causing it. (Spears vs. State, 16 L.R.A. [N. S.}, 285.) The corpus
delicti may be proved by circumstancial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan, supra.) However: "Before a
conviction can be had upon circumstancial evidence, the circumstances proven should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. It is indispensable that the evidence be derived from
interrelated facts and duly proven in a manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author of the crime. In other words, there must
be from all the circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and natural course
of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." (Moran, The Law of
Evidence, 453; numerous cases cited in support of the text.)

While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions against the
appellant, they fall far short of establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the well-
settled rules of evidence. This court held in United States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant
a conviction upon circumstancial evidence, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. The chain of circumstances which would have pointed to the appellant as the guilty
person was broken by the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As already explained, the
acquittal of his said codefendants is not only consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is
innocent, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty. lawphi1.net

It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.

Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:\

Quick Facts:

The principal accused herein was a headman of parang. He is alleged to have committed the
murder by inducement. He ordered a certain induk to bring one sariol to his house which
induk obeyed. Afterwards indanan ordered akiran and uhuri to tie sariol. Sariol was tied until
midnight when the accused order the two to take sariol to the chinses cemetery and kill him
because the governor ordered him to do so. He in fact gave bolo to akahuri to ensure the
killing. Sariol was brought to the cemetery and was killed there.

WON the aacused is a principal?

The court ruled that the accusedis a principoal by inducement. His words are so powerful to
the petpetrators, hhim being the headman to their town and with the knowledge of them that
the governor ordered the killing. Though he did not directly take part for the commission of
such

An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and sentencing him to be
hanged.

The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. He is alleged
to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th
day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol.
The following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the
accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the
presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in
the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the
accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese
cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect
from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol
was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the
accused ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was
taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200
yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while
Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied
behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the
accused that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared
to be very much pleased.

The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized headman of Parang,
and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very
powerful influence over them, hence this power over them was such that any order issued by him
had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the accused)
knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He is headman of
Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There
is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is
the headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry with the
people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not know; might kill them."
Another witness, answering the question as to why he did not run away instead of going to the
Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well,
take the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to
this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me and tells me it is by
order of the governor and that he has a warrant there, well, a man like me does what he tells me."
Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not believe that he would make me do anything
unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you have killed this
man if any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not."
Another witness declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did
not do it, he would get angry with us." This witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make
you think that he was acting under the orders of the Government in causing this man to be killed?"
testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you thought that it was a legal
execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."

We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed
the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such
orders.

Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly
force or induce others to commit it."

Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:

They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for
example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit
the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said
that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an
instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty
persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.

One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by

any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which
was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose.
We have already seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who
physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted
with due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the
one who orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and
therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt him from criminal responsibility as
 the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the
criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime.

The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which commits the
crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime
by direct inducement, because without such offer or promise the criminal act would never
have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits the crime
by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility;
on the contrary, we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that
such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.

We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there are similar
means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who
offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2. But it must be borne in mind that these actsof inducement do not consist in
simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the
time the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act,
an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the
Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or
as violence itself.

The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles involved and their
application to particular cases:

It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in which a person
was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything
more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide
by inducement, the court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such
phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed."

In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that "a person who
advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that the only thing
for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that
imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."

In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply said to his son
who was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the
injuries committed after such advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being
held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may
be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be founded
in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone
produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez,
inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient
detail to show with clearness the effects which the words produced, or the relative situation of the
deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the time
the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts
upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."

In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of having proposed to other
persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter of the robbery, at the same time
telling them the place where they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the
robbery because the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause
of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been committed without it; nor was the
indication of the place where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."

The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing concrete cases in which
the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute inducement. They not
only lay down the legal principles which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those principles to actual cases.

The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of the accused
constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application of the principles to concrete cases.

In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It appeared that Lulu,
who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth to a child on the
morning of the 28th of March, the offspring of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously
agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to William as soon as it was born, with
instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken up; but Joe
changed his mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it
whatever you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the
facts the accused was held guilty by inducement.

In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a woman who, living with
a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually manifested her
disgust and repugnance for such conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred
and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods, obtaining for that purpose
poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her family and all of the tenants in
the house should go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and obliged to
remain at home, in order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that
he might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime the same
as her lover who actually committed the deed."

In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes advantage of his position as
an inspector for the maintenance of public peace and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration
of a robbery, with the threat that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an
escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from the vicinity of the place to
be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as
principal, although he did not take personal part therein."

In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio who, accompanied by
a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain music that was being played in the public
street, and after the order had been obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed
his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the man,
which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the balcony of his house
cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those with whom they were
fighting before they were killed themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a
little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones gravesby inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under
such orders."

In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the inducement and the
commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent and effect as if
he had physically committed the crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime."

In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition that the secretary of
the ayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior
to the election of senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It
appearing and it being a fact proved that the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio
Dura, induced the members of the council to commit the act stated, his participation as principal in
the commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of paragraph 2, article 13,
of the Penal Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently dominant to turn the
mind of those induced."

In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman who was at enmity
with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a relative had given to
him, who made frequent threats to kill the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
of money together with the land involved in the donation if he would kill the uncle, and who told her
son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it himself as he would
thus inherit 15,000 pesetas with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he
must leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder
committed by the son under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in mind that the
suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real
inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by means of the relations which she bore to
him as well as the reward which she held up before him."

In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a crime, him who,
"by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the inexperience of a boy of tender age,"
induces him to commit a crime, was warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that
the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the
jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing cause of the
criminal act that without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."

In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in paragraph 2,
article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime
is determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be
the source of such influence."

In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the "principal by inducement
in five different larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer, knowing that the oil which was
brought to her for sale was stolen by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them
thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on
five different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the physical authors of the
crime were boys under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the inducer
without discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew
that the oil which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less than 15
years of age, and therefore easily led, that she furnished the vessels in which to carry the stolen
property — all indicate conclusively that the five crimes were committed by the influence exercised
by the woman, which inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was
that which determined its commission."

In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a master to his
servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between them, contains the elements of
inducement which makes the master who orders such servant to cut wood belonging to a third
person, in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by such servant,"
the court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the servant, made within
the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and
apparently legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of
inducement according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing
that the master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise
over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away wood from land which he knew did not
belong to him, without disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to
the influence which the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."

The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles
to particular cases.

In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the
defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys
with which to open it. He took no immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion
said:

These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-
Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the
robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable or
unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution
of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal.
The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could
be accomplished, instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him
money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of
determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts
constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said robbery, and place
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13
of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the accused
induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that by such act
they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao
which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man
and take his carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town." They
having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and
explained why they had not been able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my
chickens if you are not going to do what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in
Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then spent three days
clearing some land for another person from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and
comply with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You
go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same place you were concealed before." The
murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that he was
liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January, 1887, 12th of
January, 1889.)

In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the accused had
a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio
Gavato and his associates, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to
confer upon you a commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of
Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey
this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then
he gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any
responsibility I will be responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons,
return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement
to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:

Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and more or less
dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when
this crime was committed, a man of great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of
people working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political
leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-in-
law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were
members of the police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the
Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own
house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question of murdering the priest was
discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who were present. He
selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio,
immediately after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported
the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and powerful
that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly induced to murder
the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no question.

In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the "one
who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he does nothing
himself in the actual commission of the crime."

In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a married woman
suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her
husband in order that thereafter they might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these
suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference of
the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together
as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:

We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully established por
pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would live in
illicit relations with the murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by
precept) which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement
(excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the woman
constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her co-defendant was
 entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of
the relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the man to
take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to these illicit relations she
had required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that he
commit the crime had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.

In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the accused
proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with
a talibon he accompanied them during the assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood
watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his companions would not be caught, and that,
finally, he accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed. These facts were held by
the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct
participation.

In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not
seem to have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he
induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he
induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According
to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law
and whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who
physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring,
the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the
Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It
cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation was false and purposely and
intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.

Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the accused
within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still
remain all of the elements necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the
authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the
determination of whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it
may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such
a nature and made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such
inducement was offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by
inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be
intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.

The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the
part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A
chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for
some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed
the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it
produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the
extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid
down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the
determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the persons who actually
committed the crime that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that
they were under obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement
was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to do
his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be said,
and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the
effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the
crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had in his
possession an order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material
influence in effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production
of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other
upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.

There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were present, also, the
aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.

We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded, and we
accordingly affirm the same, with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants-
appellants.

Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding them guilty of
frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior
strength, and sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision
correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the
sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the corresponding
costs.

The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the lower court erred
in convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.

The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants in the commission
of the crime.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano
were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant
Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the
gross receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.

Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation.
According to the offended party he refused to grant this request because there was already an
unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission
requested and he began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario,
accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home from
the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been destroyed
for the purpose of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido
and his party went to the house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a
sharp conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the prosecution contend
that while the offended party was talking with Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but
was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not
wound him except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido
by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to him "pegale y matale", and
Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his bolo.

Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the
offended party and his son were the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who
after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp
plants, struck him in the breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor attempted to
intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with
brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded
by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to
strike Angel Pulido.

The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo, named
Saito, who was their relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The
witnesses for the defense were the four appellants.

The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo
Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine,
who was responsible for the destruction of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy
among the defendants, but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the
facts of the incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally
responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence does not convince us
that Ladion and Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe that they
ran away and were not present when Angel Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened
by the fact that they were not included in the original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the
offended party on December 29th. They were not included as defendants until the amended
complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were present and held the offended party by
the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence does not show that they held him for the purpose of
enabling Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for
the purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from continuing their attack on Omine.
There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor
to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale".
According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck
each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and
then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between
his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him
without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case,
even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the
opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not
appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the
first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido
when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in
question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended
party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently
according to the testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that
Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of
a father giving orders to his son are obviously different from the case at bar.

In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a
person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application to particular cases were cited
with approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one who,
during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
appearing the he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not
guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering that,
although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent
that they may be considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and
must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been
performed." Another decision cited was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father
who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!",
was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given.

Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions
of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such
words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. (2
Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)

We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the
injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.

The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of the offended party,
found that it was the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and
accordingly found said defendant guilty of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does
not justify this finding. It is true that the wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging
from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length, extending from the breast to
the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a
downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and without
being aimed at any particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the
offended party only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to take the offended
party's life. If he had so intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so far as the
record shows. It might be contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second
time, because he thought that he had already killed him. This was apparently the theory of the
prosecution, because the offended party and his witnesses testified that the offended party dropped
down unconscious when he was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that
contention. In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would not ordinarily render the
injured man immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the prosecution,
that Angel Pulido did not fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was
flowing from his breast and stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to support him and
take him home.

It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result unless the intent
to kill is manifest.

When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act which was not
realized, the facts from which it is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude
all contrary supposition. When this intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts
performed by the defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than that
which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that
which is actually involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be deduced
from the external acts performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a
definite result, the courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other
result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)

There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in
a struggle for the possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of
Autor, Exhibit E, executed on December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo
and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very aggressive.

We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended
party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days,
and not of frustrated homicide.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion,
and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As
to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted
of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the
corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to
be served by him is fixed at one year of prision correccional.

Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is
constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the prosecution and
not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority, undoubtedly already
strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.

As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon
Montealegre was committed as follows:

At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating at the
Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby
table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the
restaurant and soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente
Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of
them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she knew
them but the waitress said she did not. 1 Then the mayhem began.

While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad with his left
hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right
side of his waist and started stabbed Camantigue in the back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to
draw the gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to
prevent the latter from defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as
Capalad continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fens to the floor
and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the door. Camantigue fired
and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue
abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the
alley with a bullet wound in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the
following day. 6

The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been informed of the
incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately organized a team that went to look
for him that very night. 8 They did not find him in his house then but he was apprehended in the
morning of March 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but
later admitted he was the fugitive being sought. 9

Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that death was
caused by shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds affecting the
heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and
about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was analyzed as human.11 The stabbing incident
was narrated in detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13

On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from drawing his
pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of court personnel the
relative positions of the three during the incident. 14

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically, thus:

 Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue
upon drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue?

A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because
he was being held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the
back. 15

He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the accused-appellant —

Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the

back, accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at
that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue

at that time?

A. Yes sir.

Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc.

Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw

gun, Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. With what hand?

A. Both hands, sir.

Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.

Q. With both hands?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of

Camantigue?
 A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both

hands the hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?

A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 17

San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.

Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?

A. He was on the right side.

Q. What was he doing at that time?

A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but
Montealegre held his hand.

Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They

slammed down on the floor and when they were already on the floor,
I ran away because I was already figures lightened. 18

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted:

A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre

suddenly held the hand of Camantigue.

Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue,

what happened to Camantigue?

A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding
his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 19

And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre

was holding the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from
drawing his gun?

A. Yes, sir. 20

The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own guilt. He
claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of denials, evasions,
contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate
himself from the charge established against him by the prosecution.
 Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what
happened if any?

A. Camantigue pulled his gun.

Q. What happened after that?

A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened. 21

xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really
happened.

Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?

A. I did not see. 22

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and
killed Vicente Capalad?

A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue
killed Capalad. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding

both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc.
Camantigue?

A. I did not see anything. 24

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while
Capalad was on the left side?

A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.

Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of
Camantigue?

A. I am not sure if that is the right side.

Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were
placed?

A. I cannot remember. 25
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening on that
evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident, he could not
have not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling event that even more onlookers
could not forget. The evidence has established that the accused-appellant was directly and
personally involved and was in fact one of the two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed.
Yet Montealegre would now insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that
night.

If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been less likelihood
of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention would have been fully concentrated on his lone
captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol
and defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant had, by his own account, already
escaped before the stabbing.

It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-appellant did was
attempt to hide, only to be found the following morning on board a bus bound for outside Cavite City.
When apprehended, he first gave a false name before he finally admitted his Identity, thus beginning
the mesh of contradictions, admissions and denials, in which he would enshare himself.

The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the stabbing, the
victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a person in authority. Several
witnesses testified as to his attire when he was killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in
civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself,
replying to questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a
policeman. 27

The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually
stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to
prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused-
appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a
principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal
resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a prior
agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of
such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms to our consistent holding on this
matter:

Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts
of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was committed,
participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circiumstances. 29

xxx xxx xxx

 We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino Bautista.
The whole incident happened because the accused came upon Bautista and Mallabo
fishing within or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was under the
care of Vicente Cercano.

But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be established, it is

not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the
assault; it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the accused by their acts
manifested a common intent or desire to attack Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act
of one accused became the act of all. 30

xxx xxx xxx

If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven. A conspiracy only be
entered into after the commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of
the crime. 31

As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:

There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when
the latter was stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards
the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as
instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant held both arms of the
victim from behind, the latter could have partied the thrust or even run away from his
assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although
there was no anterior conspiracy , the two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose
and intent immediateIy before the actual stabbing. 32

xxx xxx xxx

It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running
decedent in such a manner that the latter could not even move or tum around. This
enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was barely five
meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake him and stab him at the back with
hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another act-holding the
decedent—without which the crime would not have been accomplished. This makes
him a principal by indispensable cooperation. 33

The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the
complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person in authority.
Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to
P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at
the trial.

Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while enforcing the law
against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no less than seven vicious stabs by
a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of the incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner
also eventually succumbed, and that made the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug
addiction. There was another Iife also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself,
although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In the
somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has done, he may yet find his
ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any

pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and
VICENTE ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused whose death sentence is under
automatic review.

Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.

Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for accused Misa.

Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Octavio R Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita
C. Dumlao for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra
appealed from the decision dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court of
First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City Branch II, convicting them of murder,
sentencing each of them to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No. 2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced to death and ordered to
pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8, Record). His death sentence is
under automatic review.

According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Pagano Nierra,
39, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of
soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold
pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the
owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder
brother. To mollify Pagano, by diminishing the competition between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa
II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking terms.

In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of
liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of
Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a
convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp.
10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin,
Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)

Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia Garrido-
Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand pesos.
Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos
near the municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from
General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same place on August 12, 1969.

That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the assassination on July 8,
1969, Pagano said that it was up to Misa since he was the one who would kill Juliana.

In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a
package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas,
and apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on
the night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.

On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek or canal about twenty-
seven steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house of Maning
Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of the crime. Pagano was near the house of Juanito
Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The houses of the two
Desinorios were separated from the house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.

Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the crime in close
proximity to the back of Juliana's house where. as he had previously observed some nights before,
she used to answer the call of nature. The house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the
beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.

Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was
accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held
her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle
of the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed the
actual killing.

The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot wound in the tongue. The
bullet passed through the buccal cavity down to the spinal column where the slug was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went down from the
house and saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her mouth and nose. Her panty was
pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and her genital organ was exposed. At the
hospital, the doctor pronounced her dead.

After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by
the alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of
the Esso Gas Station crossed the creek or canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the
gun into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital.
Then, he changed his mind and returned to the beach near the victim's house.

The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley between the house of
the victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the Northern Lines and
the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided. Their residence was about two
hundred meters away from the scene of the crime.

A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa Bus Terminal at around
eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified that she saw
Pagano Nierra wearing an underwear and striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio
Tinago. About five minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and running towards Saguing
Street. He was wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the police about what she had
seen.

Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and alighted near the municipal
building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to
General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's house where he
mingled with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil there, staying there for four nights.

He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the , buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He
received a commission of one peso per passenger. Policemen arrested him and Rojas as for
questioning but they were later released. He left the city and brought his family to Barrio Luan,
Maitum South Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary soldiers.

On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police
department. He signed a confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other
accused therein. The statement was sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the
killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the scene of the crime was
prepared.

On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted
again the killing and confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife
Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another confession on August 12, 1969 which was
sworn to before the city judge.

Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra
spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with murder aggravated by reward, treachery, evident
premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he
had been sentenced to reclusion perpetuafor the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co accused, his confessions and testimony
were offered by the prosecution and were the main bases of the judgment of conviction and the
imposition of the death penalty.

As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will be separately reviewed.

Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident plea because the trial
court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the offense and the consequences of
his plea of guilty.

That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in
criminal procedure. Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime
as the triggerman He testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was sentenced to death,
he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his co-
accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified
his plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as to his understanding
of the consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction
be set aside and that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial To hold a new trial.
wherein Misa himself would again be the star prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and
preposterous ceremony.

The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity in the killing of Juliana Nierra.
Their version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight o'clock in the evening, Paciano
Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia Nierras was in her room, writing something.
Eduardo Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion Sabihon a housemaid,
was somewhere in the house premises.

Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the room, he met
Nolasco Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked who shot her.
Docallos answered that he did not know.

Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in going to the hospital.
Paciano instructed his son Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not go out because two
years before he had undergone a surgical operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the
children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor that Juliana was already dead.

At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She
talked with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-law and husband of the victim,
did not answer when she tried to talk with him.

Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their Muslim friend Pandita E.
Saguil and Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy
bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon
with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not able to buy bamboos. They ate
lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.

The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in the afternoon. They went
to the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day,
Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the
second, third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the succeeding nights because she
was advised that it was bad for her to do so. Their child attended the novena Paciano could not
attend the novena because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred pesos to Juliana's family
as contribution to the funeral expenses.

The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost consciousness and
collapsed Paciano revived him by pressing his abdomen. After the coffin was placed in the tomb,
Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos
(Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he was a recidivist and his
testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That contention is devoid of merit.

Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his confessions and testimony
was that he was hired by the Nierra spouses, through Doblen to kill Juliana for the price of
three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the conviction of the Nierra spouses as the
inducers of the assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor
details.

And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual commitment to pay Misa
the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him to unmask them and to
reveal the truth even if such a revelation speeled his own destruction.

The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied by the facts
shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so
because of the monetary consideration promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to
Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia
had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was allegedly Paciano's
mistress. That projected killing did not materialize.

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view
of the rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence against appellants Nierra,
the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other than such testimony and that there is
no such independent evidence. This argument is wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule 130

Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given on the stand
at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs.
Serrano, 105 Phil. 531, 541).

Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive for the killing was to
stifle business competition. This argument is refuted by the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son
Rodelio which show that Paciano Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager
or "brains" of Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution businesses.

In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was under construction.
Aniceto had to sell that launch because of Paciano's threat that somebody would be hurt if its
operation was continued. Pagano told Rodelio that the latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked
was bad and dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano even challenged his
brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on the basis of the hearsay
testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is misleading. The judgment of
conviction was anchored principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool used by the
Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death. Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.

The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas and Doblen were
implicated in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing,
that gave the police a breakthrough in the solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with the
crime was established, the police arrested him and obtained his confessions which implicated
appellants Nierra as the investigators.

The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court erred in admitting as
evidence the affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was obtained through an alleged
promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was
taken on August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the pre investigation. The record of his
testimony before the fiscal was signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that pre investigation.
(Exh. K et seq.) No promise of immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.

In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in character. As already
stated, the crucial and decisive evidence consists of Misa's testimony and confessions.

Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted acted the preliminary investigation as
counsel of appellant Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and
then at the trial, he acted as counsel de oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for
Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).

The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra
who, as already noted, were convicted on the basis of Misa's confessions and testimony. The
appellants have not successfully overthrown or rebutted Misa's evidence.

It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano Nierra and at the same time
he posed as a friend on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the assassination of
Aniceto's wife.

We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view
the remains of Juliana.

After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a confrontation between the said
spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other
brother, Gerundio. The following dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:

Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of your wife?

Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you that you
were standing by the post and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also
standing in a another post when he (Misa) killed my wife. From now
on I have no brother by the name of Pacing.

Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.

Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were confined in the city jail
(translation):

My companion Pacing (Paciano):

I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best that you will be
free. Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that you give me the sum of P600 even
if you give the cash advance of P 500 before Sunday. OK and you give the same
thru the hole.

Your companion,

(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa

Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit 1)

The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co- conspirators. The Nierras were co-
principals by inducement. By acting as lookouts during the perpetration of the killing, they became
co-principals by cooperation as well.

Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the killing, he was stranded
at Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City at ten o'clock in the morning
of the following day. He denied that he accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4,
1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing the murder weapon.

Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at Lion's Beach, General
Santos City. However, that could not have precluded him from having acted as lookout on that same
beach.

These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions and testimony have no
probative value because there was no other evidence proving the alleged conspiracy. As already
stated, that rule does not apply to testimony given on the witness stand where the defendants have
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).

It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not present when Misa
and the Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and that when Doblen
delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not know that it contained the murder weapon.
As to Rojas, it is contended that he was not present at the said conference between Misa and
the Nierra spouses.

These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas indubitably show that
they had community of design with the Nierra spouses and Misa in the assassination of
Juliana Nierra.

Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained under an alleged promise of immunity.

It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything connecting him to the murder. In
that affidavit, he denied that he had any participation in the commission of the crime and that he
conspired with Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to the Nierras, relationship is an additional
aggravating circumstance.

Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which Misa liquidated
Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. Hence,
ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).

In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of guilty. That did not
preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in
accordance- with law. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on
Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and delivering the murder
weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as
lookout and received fifty pesos for his work.

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the
conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-
conspirators they should be punished as co-principals. However, since their participation
was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court
should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38
and other cases).

In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a
malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or
murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs.
Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano
Nierra.

(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil
liability imposed upon her by the trial court is affirmed.

(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as accomplices. They are each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor medium as minimum to
seventeen years of reclusion temporalmedium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals
an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each
subsidiarily liable to the extent of six thousand pesos for the principals' civil liability. Costs against
the accused.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO
ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated
homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only
five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other five named only as "John Does" in the information
having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino
were acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on
the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The decision of the
trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed the death penalty.

Both the de •ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a
retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed decision, and as quoted in
appellants' brief, the relevant and material facts accurately reflect the evidence presented, except
only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full
conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).

As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:

Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily armed
with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a motor banca and
proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas and taking advantage of the
darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked from the banca and proceeded to
the beach in the direction of the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were
heard throwing the people around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in
different directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the shots grew in
intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their banca, still
fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded
the waiting motor banca and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got
killed and some injured. Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like
Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl.
Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a market
collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat. Armando Ocampo,
Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.

The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North hay
Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an unusual banking
hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten
employees, more or less, including a security guard. It has two cages or
compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin Domingo and the
other one under the care of Alejandro San Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14,
1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo
when two men entered the bank asking that their money be changed. Domingo
refused, saying that they had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men armed
with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They
ordered the employees to lie down, face downward and then demanded the key to
the vault. When Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the armed men
aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it until its doors were opened. They
entered the vault and found that they could not get anything as the compartments
inside the said vault were locked. Not being able to get anything from the vault, the
armed men went to the two teller cages and took whatever they could lay their hands
on. Not long afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.

Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat. Nicolas
Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos, Rosal
Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish landing. Suddenly,
Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst which he believed came from a
Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing a Thompson upwards while he was in
front of the banca Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the
same direction. Antonio and his companions then went to the middle of the road and
again they heard shots, and this time they were successive, coming from their left.
Antonio could not see who was firing the shots. Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this
companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella sitting
down folding his stomach. They were both felled by the shots coming from the left
side of the bank. Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos
by the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on,
Antonio said, he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that
from the outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh.
After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions placed in a vehicle,
together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said he
saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground already dead. (pp.
83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing that followed in its
wake were actually committed, the three appellants had no participation. It is not surprising that the
Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this
recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this appellant ahead of the other two,
appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.

In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following observation:

As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in his
house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This circumstance, standing
alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not show
that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took
a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without which it would not have been committed. It could
be that Simeon was present at the meeting held in his house and entered no
opposition to the nefarious scheme but, aside from this, he did not cooperate in the
commission of the robbery perpetrated by the others. At most, his act amounted to
joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or
approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
(15 CJS 1062).

We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that Simeon
was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite his non-participation
in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that Simeon received a part
of the looted money as to make him an accessory. Romaquin's testimony that the
day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5,
t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is
significant that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp.
10-11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).

A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to be
with convincing rationality it is only that portion in which is cited Simeon's statement made before the
Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his
share" that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives the
impression that Simeon had given material or moral support or encouragement to the malefactors
(referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot.
However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that impression, and reveals
the true import of that statement as intended only to show that Simeon had nothing to do with
commission of the crime and therefore did not receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote
pertinent portions Of his statement. on custodial investigation:

3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang

Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.

4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?

S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang

petsa pero nito pong buwan na ito.
5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng
isang bangko dito sa Navotas?

S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang

mga taong nangholdap dito sa Navotas.

6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?

S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa

pa at ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng
bangka, si Joe Rondina Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may tinawag
pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero
makikilala ko Pag aking nakitang muli.

7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong

ito?

S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes
ng gabi (June 13, 1966).

8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?

S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa

Navotas,

9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?

S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after

being shown five (5) other pictures).

10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?

S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa

Navotas, Rizal.

11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat

ako ay nakikinig lamang.

12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan,

ano pa ang iba mong mga narinig?

S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni

Jose Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG
MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."

13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?

 S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing
paglaban.

14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?

S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.

15. T — Pagkatapos?

S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang

lahat.

16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?

S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay

nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila.
At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony
(Antonio Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong
aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi
na ako sa amin.

17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito.

Ikaw ba ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa
salaysay mong ito?

S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.

18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?

S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap

silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.

19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?

S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.

20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?

S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.

21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?

S — Wala na po.

The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the meeting place of
the malefactors for their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank
branch thereat. He did not join them because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him
only a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was most
unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because it was near the landing place of
the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere
presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he could not join
them because of his foot injury, and will just wait for them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness
in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in the
attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active
part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.

Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the
commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in any way be of
help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the
latter to be one of them.

Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main contention
is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was principally made to rest, are
inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. In support of this contention,
appellants have only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon.

Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone he could not
name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left side with the butt of a gun
causing him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery liquid
was poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to sign
a piece of paper which he could not read because of his blurred eyesight.

Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to admit culpable
participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the claim of violence and
involuntariness of their statements is true as to render said statements inadmissible in evidence.

Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements (Exhibits E, F,
F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by how the details as given by
both appellants in their respective statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played by
each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca up to their get-
away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his statement that although he
wanted to escape from the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission, he
could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his escape, as was the
order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The latter denied this allegation when he testified that
he returned the gun given him because he did not know how to use or manipulate it, although in his
extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.

The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is generally taken
as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving his statement on custodial
interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).

The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to which
appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the appellants presented medical certificate to
attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs.
Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his
extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused,
made no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he
admitted that no violence was applied to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12,
1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have been dealt
with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of
Cresencio addressed to Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions.
This means that the names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to
both appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in this case has remained only as "John
Does" indicate the non-employment of any coercive means with which to force them into revealing
the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture and violence.

It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-
judicial statements when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show
the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one
named among the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the investigators,
specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967)
the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.

It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to escape could have
instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of will in giving their own
statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after their interrogation. In his supplemental
statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the
person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to check the dates of the
main statements of both appellants which were given not later than just past the middle of June,
1966, and that of the supplementary statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not
have probably come forth with this argument.

Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694,
harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial statements, for their having been unaided by
counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during the interrogation. 'There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial interrogation one of constitutional grant as is
provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to an accused, not to a
mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People vs.
Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their custodial interrogation in 1966,
however, the requisite of assistance of counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as
it has been granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.

The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be appreciated to impair
the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an admission or
confession that determines its admissibility, for no principle of law or constitutional precept should
stand on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded
being that ample safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element of
voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the admissibility of
an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes unquestionable. 1

The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the testimony they gave in
court, would convince Us that their liability is less than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual
participation, as as was the holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-
judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by
Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for robbery. Cresencio gave an affirmative
answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied
Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin,
p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his banca, to board a
launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as to
the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for while according to the former, it was for the
commission of robbery, according to the latter, it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a
trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed
to give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.

Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a co-conspirator.
Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that
would commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough
men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning
and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which is not shown with
respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours
before the actual robbery.

Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at large, to be
asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by Romaquin who alone was given
money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider appellant
as their confederate in the same character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given
to Romaquin could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he
extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on the other
hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not
what should represent his share if he were a full-fledged ally or confederate.

The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious misdeeds,
Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as shown by the measure
they had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-
conspirator, who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio
testified that while he was given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned
the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the
beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca. In his statement,
however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the
same, and he received it.

The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime
charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal
design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite
knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the
malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to
prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even
without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially with the
boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.

The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26, Record of
Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the names of their
companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00,
as if to show that he had helped in some material way to deserve a share in the loot.

As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which the latter
would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently to show that he never joined in
the criminal purpose, and that all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary,
the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an extra
precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially
if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him
with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as
should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the
money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience
arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their
criminal purpose.

An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal
Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and
assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and
moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction which
makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case
of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.

It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble,
the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What
appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices.
Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in
the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from
liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2

The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity
and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish
their complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and
killed and injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and
actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public,
upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown to be as abominable as those who
had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in
meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.

Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant
Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient
evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as accomplices for
the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8
years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of
the same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by nighttime and the use of a
motorized banca. There being no mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of
each of the deceased in the sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he
should be continued in confinement for some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against
Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING,"
and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged
with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple
murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero
guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio,
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the
minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to mitigate
the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3)
LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to
6 Months ofarresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan
Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and
1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years
and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional
 penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury
suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all
surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in
the sum of P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of
P12,000.00; and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-
fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1

The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and
once thereat, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme
cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and
strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately
thereafter, the same accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds
which caused his death.2

Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial
court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:

It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de
Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old
child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the
breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo
Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital but he died on the way. . . .

The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio
and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And
immediately thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked
Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.

The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on
November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
(sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came
from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo.
Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or
reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun
with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession
of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico
Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so
she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
 Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning
palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused,
Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of
Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house
to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw
the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going
towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to
interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle
of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three
accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be
patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you."
Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father
Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo
Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.

The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of

Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house
of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at
their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their
house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio
going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there,
she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your
children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the
road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he fell.
When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all
left.3

On the other hand, appellants present the following version:

On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the
crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was
with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio
Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p.
7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way
home. (p. 8, Ibid).

Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed,
however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial
Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed
Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he
was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).

At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also
unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita
de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter
ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio
Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).

Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico
tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run
(sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
 Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal,
together with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in
the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing
June 8, 1971-Salazar).

He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might
meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the
door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer
anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).

He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins,
Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial
Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house
calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial
Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the
back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19,
tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).

Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the
buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from
the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone
approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not
recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however,
that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard.
He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered
him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading
the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a
second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing
Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero
unsheathed Ms bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero
boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4

The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A
doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then taken.5

Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below established that
––

. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead.
There is fracture of the underlying skull.

(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.

(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
 (4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right
eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.

(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the
lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.

(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.

(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level
of the middle finger.

(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm,
left.

(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.

xxx xxx xxx

One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3
cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the
sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal
bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.

(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.

(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.

(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the
right frontal portion of the head.

(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.

(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony
portion, left.

(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.

(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.

(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right.
There was fracture of some of the underlying bones.6

Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru,
about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another
about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2
inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8,
1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7

During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May
17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8

and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day.9

In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-
appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death
certificate attached thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of
appellant Conrado Doctolero.

The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the
commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the
commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place
where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any
evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-
conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must
be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion.11

This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the
prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more
credence.12

There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only
imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants occurred years ago
and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the following
testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:

Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic)
your relationship with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?

A Yes, sir.

Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail
to see you in your house?

A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13

As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial
Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the
persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a
grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the crossing
yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14

When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit.15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.16

In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that
allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies,
however, are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the People,
the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness
pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each
observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute
evidence of good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same
manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.17

In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer
to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.18 And where the
prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and
the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions become
insignificant.19

Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the
investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is
accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that
they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other
than that of accomplishing his mission.20

Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of San
Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros
were involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with
bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21

In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to
be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the trial court.

The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in
the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the
ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:

Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling
challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn.
Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up
the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally
killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the
child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number,
and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and
D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado
(assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of
their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when
 their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these
circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew
what was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did
nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to
death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio,
merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased
women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two
appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the
encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes
against two defenseless women and a child.22

We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the
others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material
and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.23

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse,
thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one
can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided
he was aware that it was an illicit act.24

This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices
therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the
resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.

Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of
their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on
the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is
that of being mere accomplices,26

no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.

The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan
Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants
therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days
of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an
accomplice.

The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only his
criminal liability but not his civil liability.27

Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same
should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the
judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to
him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the
death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty
(20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo.
Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the
sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and
TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with
indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of
P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and
Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate
nor any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged
with parricide.

Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant
Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra,
some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a
couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions,
appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go
down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was
going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly
charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of
more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before
he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several
times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter,
accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the
latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between
10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then
in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to
400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say
"Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her
daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-
year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her
mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other
appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she
heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern what they were saying.
She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through
the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to
see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting
did not last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room,
while the other appellants went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child
caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his
daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by
saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the
kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then
climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time,
but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you",
so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.

The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came
out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed
her that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons
arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was
performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36
hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila
arrived one day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she
resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she
was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing
to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5,
1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.

On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with
Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2)
brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and
regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the
time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place,
separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the
house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband
never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his
own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo
never did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws
also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of
her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not
give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she
ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only during those times when she had to go
to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was
sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the
morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and
always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons
carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan
only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and
horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the
matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so
that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors,
the latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never
existed between them.

Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for
supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in
the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the
children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then
proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen
when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their
"batalan". They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet
at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room
on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her
husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did
not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was
in her arms when the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them
were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even
advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6)
months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and he
found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He
also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern wallings of
the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of her
husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother
and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in
Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case
with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an
investigation, but she did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who
shot her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law,
Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila,
and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children
under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes
to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the
said child to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies
during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.

Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at
the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he
was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the
latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning
thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with the said killing.
On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the
date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the
place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two
appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on
that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a
long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who
was then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them,
but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300
meters away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.

After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have
no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting
inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in
their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense by the
witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby.
They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often
before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had
climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called
for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before the four appellants went up the "batalan",
they already fired shots from downstairs.

We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the
deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several
times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their
town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter
refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting
to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."

We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between
her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in
the morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the threat made by
Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-
appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house,
near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask
"Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did
say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it
were true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the
same to her father, specially when she again saw the said appellants on the very night in question
shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.

Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully
reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are
guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In
other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely,
evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.

Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions
and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged
by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness
varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1)
whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was
before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23,
1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or
still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen
appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances
related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:

Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon
Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her testimony; First,
she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she informed him of the
presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by the prosecuting fiscal
the witness does not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of
March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused conversed that
Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place
although there was a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only
proves that the accused were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of
whether the place where they were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of
the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras
did not fire their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since
they were privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability?
Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an
observation on her part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also
declared that only three bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their
mark on the body of her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the
accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was still
able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was
instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion could
yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without in the least
affecting the findings of said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the
deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in the whole
breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)

Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not
basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she
testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others" because "he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him,
because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses
an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent
explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men,
aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her
account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His
Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant,
firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony
and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share
appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a
mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or
wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was
too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are
convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the
whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout
her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-
interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject the
possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration.
Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are
well taken:

Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of
Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the deceased could have
been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the appellants overlook the
testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was fired, the gunman was
about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which
disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under
an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants
also insist that the Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl.
Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks
on the southern walling of the house of the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30
carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however,
made the following apt observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl.
Bonifacio Hall:

This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the
crime after the deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the widow as
well as the surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot. He found empty
shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the 'batalan' of the house of
the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and that he saw bullet holes on
the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of the
house of the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the
position of the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might
have been standing. The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top
portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high,
and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of
the 'batalan,' he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it
is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the
'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no
consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying
for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging
to the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).

As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to
state that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to
 the bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises in this respect
surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the
accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-12,
People's Brief.)

At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when
it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed
aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of
the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it.
Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His
Honor in reference thereto thus:

This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly
in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who
pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This is so because, first,
according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and Berras — they were sleeping at
8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters away
from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without
admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at
sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the
accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed the crime and went home
to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According
to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house
of the victim. Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the
testimony of Mrs. Bayongan, the owner of the house where they slept that night to
corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants'
Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi,
stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of
Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose
of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in Sallapadan in the early morning of
June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to
accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after
conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the
cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he
never saw the mayor until after they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.

This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned
anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the offense
to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to
Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan on the 26th.

The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been
accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a matter of
fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also
policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied the mayor to
Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the
 mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio
Talingdan?

Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the

Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the
witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued,
Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St. Joseph
Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of
fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to
23, 1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio
Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued.

(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of
accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General
has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as
she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she
actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual
cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all,
what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs.
Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt,
for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand
at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not
object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it
either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be
plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own
unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete
elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very
surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If
you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her
faults was just to slap her.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-
accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information
given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before
the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-
appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting
in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery.
It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault
their victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery
to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants
acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he
met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just
before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his
paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with
their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery,
and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the
offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the
law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby
found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

LITO VINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court
dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an
accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate
proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos
Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At
around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto
ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife,
his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was
crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights
and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius
saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving
the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to
watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took
his ante-mortemstatement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie
Salazar was Identified as his assailant.

The autopsy report of his body shows the following-

Gunshot wound

POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal

1 & 2 cm. diameter left

Slug found sub cutaneously,

2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Tension Hemathorax 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto
N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the
municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO)
inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who
then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan.

Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an
answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an
accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere
accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower
court. 3

Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:

1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE

CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL
IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS
PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED

SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A
WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;

3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE

PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO
was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later
charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No.
2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that
Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.

The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the
petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which
the respondents were again required to comment. The required comment having been submitted,
the motion is now due for resolution.

The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a
principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in
the affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of
the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of
the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder
had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant.
That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only
logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with
Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two
witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established
by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which
is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a
mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not
be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be
charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the
said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The
variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the
lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and
there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this
lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.

The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative.
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each
other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal.

The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the
conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or
insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime
was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the
acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown
that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was
no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as
an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same
offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal.
However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted
Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly
established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto
Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of
Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar
as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his
father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored
the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the
bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells
recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar.
Thus, the trial court made the following observation:

There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the
law enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence and the
seeming lack of concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of such
evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the
prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not
positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified
person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the
commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the
principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the
accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.

We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried
and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense
and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should
be held criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as
two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case
of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was
positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the
case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the
assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for
the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.