Author: Earvin James M.
Atienza
CORTES v. YU-TIBO
Appellant: Maximo Cortes
Appellee: Jose Palaca Yu-Tibo
Ponente: Mapa, J.
DOCTRINE: Easement of Light and View
That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative
character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by
prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting
the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate
has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an
act which would be lawful were it not for the easement
FACTS:
1. Maximo  Cortes’   wife  owns  a   house   in   Calle  Rosario,  Manila,  herein   forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary
described as House No. 65 (alleged dominant estate), where a
window may be found to have been receiving light and air since 1843;
2. Said window is facing an adjacent house described as House No. 63
(alleged servient estate) and found to be the property of Jose Palaca
Yu-Tibo, who later on commenced to raise the roof thereof such that
it covers ½ of the aforementioned window depriving the latter from the
enjoyment of the light and air it previously received;
3. Records of the case show that although Cortes made a demand for
Yu-Tibo to cease from the construction thereof, he nonetheless failed
to prove any prior act of prohibition against the latter in the manner
provided by law (i.e. prohibition acknowledged before a notary public).
Instead, Cortes asserts that he acquired the alleged positive easement
by prescription, while Yu-Tibo counters stating that Cortes had not
followed the requirement of the law for negative easements as in this
case. Hence, the instant appeal on the issuance of an injunction.
ISSUES:
1. WON the alleged easement is a positive easement.
2. WON Cortes acquired the same through prescription.
PROVISION: Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner of
the servient estate the obligation of allowing something to be
done or of doing it himself, and a negative easement, that
which prohibits the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which he could lawfully do if the
easement did not exist. (533)
xxx
Art. 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
years. (537a)
Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements
referred to in the preceding article, the time of possession
shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from the day
on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who
may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise
it upon the servient estate; and in negative easements, from
the day on which the owner of the dominant estate
public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing
an act which would be lawful without the
easement. (538a)
RULING + RATIO:
1. No. The easement of light and air are negative easements.
It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient estate
subject to such easement is under no obligation whatsoever to
allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything
there himself, but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon
which may tend to cut off the light from the dominant estate, which
he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence
of the easement
Moreover the court reasoned out that when one places a window
on his own property such is only an act of strict ownership and it
does not by its own means establish an easement. Hence it is that
use  of  the  windows  opened  in  a  wall  on  one’s  own  property,  in  the  
absence of some covenant, is regarded as an act of mere
tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property.
2. No. The counting of the period of prescription must be from the day
the owner of the alleged dominant estate executes a prohibition in a
public instrument.
x x x That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having
executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the
owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the
 defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the
property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the
complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned
as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a
time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall
of the said house No. 65, because the period which the law
demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have
commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily
commence not having been performed. x x x;

NOTE: The Court cited various decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court and
commentaries from the Partidas on the proper classification of the easement
of light and air as a result of windows being created for such purpose. Court
distinguished one made by a co-owner   in   a   party   wall   and   one   “apparently  
existing”  even  prior  to  the  sale  of  the  adjacent  lots  to  different  owners  from  the  
instant  case  such  that  the  former  situations  carried  with  them  the  “Doctrine  of  
Apparency”  while  the  latter  did  not.

DISPOSITION: Appeal DENIED. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Author: Angelo Logronio
PURUGGANAN v. PAREDES
Petitioner: Emilio Purugganan
Respondent: Felisa Paredes
Ponencia: Martin, J.
DOCTRINE: With regard to an easement of receiving water falling from
roofs, the distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof, but to the distance of rain
water falling inside the land of the servient estate
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Emilio Purugganan owned a piece of residential lot (Lots 1
and 2) in Abra. This was bound on the North by defendant Felisa
Paredes’  land.
2. In  the  Decree  of  Registration,  petitioner’s  lot  was  subject  to  an   They failed to have the easement of light and view annotated on the
easement of drainage in favor of Paredes. It stated that a portion of
Lots 1 and 2 consisting of 8 ½ meters long and 1 meter wide is
subject to the easement of receiving water from a roof that Paredes
would build.
3. Paredes then constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and
2 under such conditions:
a. The southern wall (demarcation line between the two lands)
had 3 windows.
b. The house is 2 ½ meters longer than the length of
roofing allowed in the Decree, and had an outer roofing
(eaves)  of  1.20  meters  which  protruded  over  petitioner’s   measures 8meters and 20cm in length
land, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls about 3
meters  inside  petitioner’s  land.   boundary  line  of  petitioner’s  property
c. 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house
facing Lots 1 and 2 were also built.
4. Purugganan now seeks to have Paredes construct their house in
accordance with the easement.
5. The trial court ruled in favor of Purugganan, and ordered Paredes to
reconstruct the roof and eaves of their house, and also to reconstruct
the wall on the southern side if they desired their windows to
continue to exist.
6. Note that Paredes applied the distances prescribed in the Decree to
the ROOFING of their house.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Paredes violated the conditions of the easement of
drainage
2. WoN Paredes acquired an easement of light and view
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES
Paredes made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in
the Decree to the roofing of their house.
The distances prescribed in the Decree should not correspond
to  the  width  and  length  of  the  roof  of  the  defendant’s  house,  but  
to the DISTANCES of the rain water falling inside the land of
petitioner.
This is because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the
rain water falling inside the property of petitioner.
Defendant violated the conditions in the decree because their
roof  protrudes  by  98  centimeters  over  petitioner’s  property  so  
that the propulsion of the water would go as far as one meter
over the property of the latter.
2. NO.
certificate of title.
An easement is cut off or extinguished by the registration of the
servient estate under the Torrens System without the easement
being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title.
Disposition: Judgment affirmed.
Additional facts:
Ocular inspection found that:
eaves  of  Paredes’  house  juts  98cm  inside  petitioner’s  property  and  
during ordinary rain: water falling from the eaves fall within 1m from
during heavy rain: water falls beyond 1m from said boundary line
Paredes claims the previous house was turned into ruins because of the
bombing of Bangued
Paredes claims that the said house was reconstructed on the ruins of a
Spanish-built house
Author: Kina Lampa
VALISNO v. ADRIANO (1988)
Petitioner: Nicolas Valisno
Respondent: Felipe Adriano
Ponencia: Grino-Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
FACTS:
7. Nicolas Valisno bought land from a certain Honorata Adriano
Francisco  (defendant’s  sister).
8. The aforementioned land was planted with watermelon, peanuts,
corn, tobacco and other vegetables adjoins that of Felipe Adriano
(defendant). Both lands were inherited by the siblings from their
father.
9. At the time of the sale to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal (about 70m long)
traversing  Adriano’s  land.
10. Some time after the sale, Adriano leveled a portion of the irrigation
canal  which  led  to  Valisno’s  being  deprived  of  irrigation  water.
11. Valisno then filed in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications (Bureau) a complaint for deprivation of water rights.
A decision was rendered in his favor so Adriano asked for a
reinvestigation.
12. Pending the reinvestigation by the Bureau, Valisno rebuilt the canal
at his own expense to irrigate his watermelon fields. He then filed a
complaint for damages in the RTC.
13. Thereafter, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
reversed  the  Bureau’s  decision  and  dismissed  Valisno’s  complaint:
a. The Secretary says that the siblings’  father’s  water  rights   as property right, which survives the determination of the
ceased to be enjoyed by him when his irrigation canal
collapsed back then, and so his non-use of the water right for
more than five years extinguished the grant.
b. As vendee, Valisno did not acquire any water rights with the
land purchased
14. The trial court then held that Valisno had no right to pass through
defendant’s  land  to  draw  water.  
a. It also pointed out that under the Irrigation Law, this matter is
under  the  Secretary  of  Public  Works’  jurisdiction.
15. Hence, this recourse to the Court.
4. WoN an easement of waters had been established in favor of
Valisno
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES.
As  indicated  from  the  Bureau’s  previous  decision:  the  principal  issue  
falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by
Article 648 of the NCC and suppletory laws (irrigation law and
Spanish Law of Waters)
2. YES.
The  existence  of  the  irrigation  canal  on  defendant’s  land  for  the  
passage of water prior to and at the time of the sale to Valisno,
was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it. (Article 624).
More than this, the deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
“conveyance  and  transfer  of  the  water  rights and
improvements”  appurtetant  to  Adriano’s  property.  This  means  
that by deed of sale, Honorata Adriano sold and transferred to
Valisno all rights, title and interest over the parcel of land, and
the water rights and such other improvements.
Valisno claims that the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, pass with the conveyance of the land,
although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser’s  easement  of  necessity  in  a  water  ditch  running  
across  the  grantor’s  land  cannot  be  defeated  even if the water is
supplied by a third person.
The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as
an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency
necessity.
Disposition: Appealed decision set aside, new one entered ordering to grant
Valisno continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch.

ISSUE:
3. WoN the case at bar falls under the subject of servitude of waters
Author: Dory Orial Limitation – essentially a contractual obligation between seller (JM Tuason &
Trias vs Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (1965) Co) and the purchaser (now, Trias)

2. Existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories in the area is

Petitioner: Dra. Rafaela Trias (current owner of lot, TCT of which has prohibition)
IMMATERIAL
Respondent: Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (broker for the seller of the lot -> JM Tuason &
The ordinance may be repealed at any time
Co. Inc)
Ponente: Bengzon, C.J. If repealed, the prohibition would not be enforceable against new
purchasers of the lot if such annotation was removed. Thus, new
DOCTRINE: owners might not be bound.
The sellers of subdivision lots may validly insert in their contracts of sale a prohibition
against the establishment of factories in the district where the lots are located. The DISPOSITION:
existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories in the area is immaterial. Appealed order is REVERSED.
Petition to cancel the annotation at the back of the Torrens cert. of title is DENIED
FACTS: Cost against petitioner
1. JM Tuason & Co. Inc. owned a lot in Quezon City that is part of a subdivision
which it then sold to a purchaser (Garcia Mateo and Deogracias Lopez) thru
Gregorio Araneta Inc.
a. A prohibition that no factories shall erect on the lot was printed at the back
of the TCT issued to the purchaser.
2. After a series of transfers (with such prohibition), Rafaela Trias acquired the lot.
3. Trias (now owner) sought for the cancellation of the annotation/prohibition
alleging that it infringes her right as owner to use her land.
a. She alleges that the prohibition results to surplusage due to the existence
of a zoning ordinance already prohibiting factories in the area.
4. The court granted her such relief in cancelling the aforementioned prohibition.
5. Thus, Gregorio Araneta Inc. moved for a motion for reconsideration saying that
the condition had been inserted in the title pursuant to a valid contract of sale
with  Trias’  predecessors-in-interest.
6. MR was denied, thus appeal to Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the prohibition or limitation printed on the back of the TCT is valid
2. W/N there is surplusage due to the effect of the zoning ordinance

HELD:
1. YES
2. Immaterial

RATIO:
1. Prohibition or Limitation is VALID (The sellers of subdivision lots may validly
insert in their contracts of sale a prohibition against the establishment of
factories in the district where the lots are located.)
It is in reality an easement which every owner of a real estate may validly
impose  under  Art.  688  of  the  Civil  Code:  “the owner of a piece of land may
establish thereon the easements which he may deem suitable, x x x
provided  he  does  not  contravene  the  law,  public  policy  or  public  order”.
o No law has been cited outlawing this condition or limitation
o It was imposed by the owner of the subdivision to establish a
residential section in that area to assure the purchasers that the
peace and quiet of the place will not be disturbed by the noise or
smoke of factories in the vicinity.
Author: Karen Oreo
La Vista Assoc. Inc. vs. CA (1997)
Petition:Certiorari
Petitioner: LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE
MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN
ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO, JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C.
MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR.
and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the residents of
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II
Ponente: Pardo
DOCTRINE:
A voluntary easement of right-of-way, like any other contract, the same
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of
the owner of the dominant estate.
FACTS:
1. The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in
Mangyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University
and Maryknoll College on the south.
2. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons who sold
a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation.
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the
Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with
the consent of the Tuasons, to Ateneo through a Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage.
3. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the
land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La
Vista.
4. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the
voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the
parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the
Manyan  road  (La  Vista  to  use  Ateneo’s  7.5  meters  of  the   ATENEO for breach of contract and the enforcement of the
mangyan road and also the other way around.)
5. Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc.,
the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest
bidder.
6. Ateneo transferred not only the property, but also the right to
negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not
want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using
6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the
road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand
Villas.
7. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a
third party complaint against Ateneo.
8. La Vista contends that Loyola residents had adequate outlet
to a public highway using other roads and also that Ateneo has
not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUE: WON there is an easement of right of way
RULING + RATIO:
YES. An easement of right of way exists in favor of Loyola Grand Villas.
The parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest
intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient
estates. This is quite evident when:
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949
stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the
“boundary  line  between  the  property  herein  sold  and  the  
adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining  belonging  to  the  vendors;;”
(b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the
assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights
and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form
part of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and
reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that
MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its
original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in
the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
 (d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in
1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that
“Mangyan  Road  is  a  road  fifteen  meters  wide,  one-half of which is
taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m.
portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-
way  was  created  on  our  7  1/2  m.  portion  of  the  road  in  your  favor;;”

(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual
right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the
Ateneo  de  Manila  University  and  La  Vista  Homeowners’  Association  
would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property
and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient
estates; and,

(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the

Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997,
acknowledged  that  “one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road)
belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam
(Maryknoll)  and  the  Ateneo  in  equal  portions;;”

These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties

concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other
contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.

The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes

to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the
least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied.

- Modify the decision of CA as to the amount to be paid to
Guevarra, reducing it to P112,672.11
Author: Camille Sapnu to real estate and ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this
OBRA v. BADUA (2007) agreement was executed by the parties.

Petition: Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner: Resurrecion Obra
Respondent: SPs. Badua, et al.

Ponencia: Velasco, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE: Since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement

creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed
to real estate and ordinarily must be in writing.

FACTS:

1. Badua, et al. (respondents) owners of residential houses on a lot co-

owned by them.

2. They allege that the only access to the national highway is a pathway
traversing the northern portion of the Obras' property and the
southern portion of the property of the Bucasases and the Baduas.
This has a width of 1m and length of 16 m.

3. They also claim that this had been established for more then 40
years.

4. However, Obra constructed a fence on the northern portion of his

property; thereby blocking the pathway.

5. Despites demands, Obra refused to demolish the fence.

ISSUE:

W/N there is a voluntary easement of right-of-way

RULING + RATIO:

NO. There are no records in the case which reveal any agreement executed
by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. There were no terms of
arrangements agreed, more particularly the payment of the indemnity.

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement

creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed
Author: Mike Castro
Sps. Valdez v Tabisula (2008)
Petitioner: SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ,
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ
Respondent: SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD
TABISULA,
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J
DOCTRINE:
-Holder of the check can insert the date pursuant to Section 13 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).
-Pursuant to Section 12 of the same law, a negotiable instrument is not
rendered invalid by reason only that it is antedated or postdated.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner VALDEZ purchased by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale a
200 sqm portion of a 380 sqm parcel of land in La Union from
respondent TABISULA.
2. In the Deed of Sale, there was a provision that “they  (petitioners)   dominant  estate’s  own  acts;;
shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.”
3. Respondent TABISULA then built a concrete wall on the western
side. Petitioners, believing that they had right to the creation of the
right of way, reported to the Barangay and eventually filed a case to
Court
4. Petitioners alleged that they purchased property because of the
respondents’  assurance  of  providing  them  a  road  right  of  way.
Respondents deny, saying that there are two other public roads for
the petitioner.
5. RTC and CA ruled for respondent,saying that the reference to an
easement in favor of petitioners in the Deed of Sale is not a definite
grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of way. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N provision in the Deed of Sale amounts to a grant of
voluntary easement
2. W/N petitioners are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of
way
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO.
Art.1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing
The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not  
included  in  this  sale” could only mean that the parties
would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose.
Use    of  the  word  “shall,”  which  is  imperative  or  mandatory  in  
its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely
permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public
benefit or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning
Lastly, a voluntary easement must be registered in the
Registry
2. NO.
To be a legal easement, ff must be complied:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity must be paid;
(3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
 
(4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate;
Obviously. There are already 2 roads adjoining the estates.
Thus, there is no need for a legal easement.
DISPOSITION: Petition MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of
respondents, Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed
and set aside. DENIED in all other aspects
Author: Earvin Atienza
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v.
LEGAPSI TOWERS 300, Inc. (2009)
Petitioner: Privatization and Management Office
Respondent: Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
Ponente: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE: Continuance of Apparent Sign
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties
alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the
two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary
agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before
the execution of the deed.
FACTS:
16. Caruff  Dev’t  Corp. (“Mortgagor”) owned several parcels of land along
Roxas Blvd. where it constructed a 21-storey Condominium registered
as Legaspi Towers  300,  Inc.,  financed  by  a  loan  with  PNB  (“Assignor-
Mortgagee”)   with   REM over the same parcels of land. Adjacent
thereto, Developer also constructed a generating set and 2 sump
pumps for the use of the said Condominium;
17. However, Developer defaulted, leading Assignor-Mortgagee to
foreclose the subject properties. Said foreclosure subjected the
parcels of land to Proclamation No. 50 which sought to privatize
government’s  non-performing assets. Thus, the same were assigned
to Asset Privatization Trust (“Assignee”);;
18. Thereafter, Developer sued Assignor-Mortgagee for nullification of
foreclosure which yielded to an eventual Compromise Agreement
whereby Developer will cede the parcels of land covering the
generating set and 2 sump pumps to Assignee. Said Agreement was
later on confirmed and approved by the trial court;
PROVISION: Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided
in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should
be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons.
RULING + RATIO:
No.
Developer, being owner of the subject properties upon construction of
the generating set and sump pumps, could not have constituted the
easement since the alleged dominant and servient estates have the
same owner;
Even upon transfer of the alleged servient estate to the Assignee, no
title nor apparent sign could have been continuously maintained since
the title of conveyance, i.e. the Compromise Agreement, clearly
provided under paragraph 2.1 that  the  Assignee  “Assigns, transfers
and conveys in favor of defendant National government x x x free
from any and all liens and encumbrances, to be delivered,  x  x  x”.
Thus, an application of Article 624 negates such existence;
By virtue of the above discussion, Assignee is entitled to receive rent
from Developer.
DISPOSITION: Petition for Review on Certiorari (by PMO) GRANTED.

19. A year after, Developer sought for the declaration of a voluntary

easement in its favor against the land ceded to the Assignee, alleging
that its construction of the same constituted an easement in favor of
the land covering the Condominium Tower. Assignee denied the same
in its Answer, claiming that by the assignment, it took the properties
free from all liens and encumbrances and that such construction was
an encroachment upon its property.

ISSUES:

WON an easement existed.

Digest Author: Bulang, Mae
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL V. EDMUNDO OBIAS
Petitioner: BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS
COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI)
Respondent: EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS,
VICTOR BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES,
ROGELIO MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI,
PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR.,
MARIA VILLAMER and ROBERTO PADUA
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE: To establish the existence of a voluntary easement,
the burden of proof is on the party alleging such existence and
must be proven by conclusive proof and not merely
circumstantial evidence.
(Circumstantial evidence is not enough to prove the existence of a
voluntary easement.)
FACTS:
In  1972,  BISUDECO  in  Camarines  Sur  constructed  a  road  (“the   1. NO. BAPCI did not satisfy the burden of proving the existence of
disputed  road”)  – measuring approximately 7m wide and 2.9km long
used for hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site
and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.
BAPCI acquired the assets of BISUDECO in 1992 who later filed a
Complaint against respondents alleging that respondents unjustifiably
barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards
and  stones  across  it,  preventing  petitioner’s  and  the  other  sugar  
planter’s  vehicles  from  passing  through  the  disputed  road.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road
pursuant to an agreement with rice field owners of the road traversed
and that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the
landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their
properties. BAPCI contends that through prolonged and continuous
use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired
by  it  when  it  bought  BISUDECO’s  assets.  
Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with
BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed
road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their
knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road on their
properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used
the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated
protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the
construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country
was then under Martial Law. Respondents likewise denied that the
road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for
its construction and maintenance and denied that they barricaded the
road.
ISSUES:
1. Whether BAPCI acquired the road right of way in dispute through
voluntary easement. NO
2. Whether the road right of way has been acquired by prescription.
NO.
RULING + RATIO:
the alleged agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the
construction of the road. Testimonies presented are mainly hearsay,
as not one among the witnesses had personal knowledge of the
agreement by reason of direct participation in the agreement or
because the witness was present when the agreement was concluded
by the parties.
2. NO. The road is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the
same may be apparent. Easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the
road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of
years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply make
the same apparent. Article 622 states that discontinuous easements,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
August 24, 2005 Decision and October 27, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Digest Author: Billy Alcid o Petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
Unisource V. Chung easement and that the same should be cancelled since the
G.R. No. 173252 dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an
Petitioner: UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza
CORPORATION Street.
Respondents: JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J. only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements
like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may
Doctrine: A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of
from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
the dominant estate.
termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way,
Facts: like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
1. Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corp is the agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT of the estate.
Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October
from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico (vendor).
27, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
a. Easement was a right of way wherein a certain Hidalgo had
CA-G.R. CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED. The voluntary easement cannot
the right to open doors as passage way which would be cancelled due to the existence of an adequate access to a public
essentially  pass  through  Sandico’s  lot  until  the  bank  of  the   road.
estero that goes to the Pasig River.
b. Such  easement  was  annotated  in  the  TCT’s  covering  the  
said lot until it was transferred to petitioner.
2. Hidalgo eventually transferred his lot to the Chungs.
3. Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate
(Chung’s  property) has an adequate access to a public road which
is Matienza Street.
4. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the
Trial  Court’s  decision.  Hence  the  present  petition.

Issue/s:
WON the easement can be cancelled.

Provision/s:
Ruling/Ratio:
No.
Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary
easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of
right of way exists in favor of respondents which was reflected in his
allegations in his petition before the Trial Court.
Digest Author: Bugsy Mangaser
SALIMBANGON v. TAN (2010)
Petitioner: SPS. Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon
Respondent: SPS. Santos and Erlinda Tan
Ponencia: Abad, J.
DOCTRINE:
Every owner of a land may establish the easement which he may deem
suitable, and in the manner and form which he may deem best, provided he
does not contravene laws, public policy or public order
FACTS:
20. Guillermo Ceniza dies intestate leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion,
Mandaue City.
21. 20 years later, his children executed an extrajudicial declaration of
heirs and partition.
22. Lots A, B and C were adjacent to the street, while D and E were not.
To give these two lots access to the street, the heirs established in
their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way which is a 3-
meter wide alley between D and E, continued on between A and B.
This was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
23. Realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the
property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the
easement along Lots A, D and E.
24. VICTORIA, owner of Lot E, swapped with Benedicta thus, became the
owner of Lot A.
25. VICTORIA and her husband (SPS. SALIMBANGON) constructed a
residential house on the lot and built 2 garages. One abutted the street
and the other located in the interior of their lot, and uses the alley to
get to the street. They also had the alley cemented and gated.
26. Lots B, C, D and E were all bought by SPS. TAN. They built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also
closed the gate SPS. SALIMBANGON built.
27. SPS. SALIMBANGON filed a complaint against the SPS. TAN. While
SPS. TAN filed an action for the extinguishment of the easement. RTC
ruled in favor of SPS. SALIMBANGON. But the CA reversed said
decision. Based on the parol evidence presented by EDUARDO, on of
the heirs, the true intent of the parties was to establish the easement
for the benefit of Lots D and E only.
ISSUES:
WoN parol evidence may be admitted to bring forth the true intent of
the heirs with regard the establishment of the easement
WoN the easement has been extinguished
PROVISION: Sec. 9 of Rule 130, Art. 688
RULING + RATIO:
YES. Parol evidence may be admitted.
When there is failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, parol evidence may be used to
modify, explain, or add to the terms of such.
SPS. TAN put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties.
YES. The easement has been extinguished.
According to the testimony of EDUARDO, the true agreement of the
heirs was for the establishment of an easement of right of way for the
sole benefit of the interior lots (D and E)
When the owner of Lots D and E became the owner of Lot B, the
easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.
Therefore, SPS. SALIMBANGON's contention that an easement
established by agreement of parties may only be extinguished by
mutual agreement cannot be given merit.
Also, SPS SALIMBANGON cannot insist that Lot A has an easement.
The easement established on Lot A, D and E in the first extrajudicial
partition was already cancelled upon the modification of the
agreement by imposing an easement solely on Lot B.
DISPOSITION: Court DENIES the petition of SPS. Salimbangon.
CITYSTREET
CITYSTREET
A B C
A B C
D E
D E
ORIGINAL
MODIFIED
Digest Author: George Filasol a. That when Pilar Development Corp. (PDC) developed
CASTRO v. MONSOD (2011) Manuela Homes, Manuela Homes became lower than
Petitioner: Margarita F. Castro Moonwalk Village.
Respondent: SPS. Santos and Erlinda Tan b. That he (Monsod) personally complained to PDC and was
Ponencia: Nachura, J. assured that an embankment would be retained at the
boundary of Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village.
DOCTRINE:
An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but ISSUES:
his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the
or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. subject adjacent properties

FACTS: PROVISION: Sec. 9 of Rule 130, Art. 688

28. Castro owns a parcel of land located on Manuela Homes, Las Pinas
City. RULING + RATIO:
29. Monsod owns property adjoining the lot of Castro, located on YES. The easement exists.
Moonwalk Village, Las Pinas City. It was proven that Castro has been making excavations and diggings
a. There is a concrete fence, more or less 2 meters high, dividing on the subject embankment.
Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village. o Unless restrained, the continued excavation of the
30. Monsod caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 65sq.m. embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of
of the property of Castro the house of Monsod to collapse.
a. There was really no claim over the property. However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral
b. Monsod merely asserted that there was an existing legal support is no longer necessary.
easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear o It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the
portion of the estate to prevent the property from registry of property.
collapsing since his property is located at an elevated A judicial recognition of the easement already binds the property and
plateau of 15ft,  more  or  less,  of  Castro’s  property. the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.
31. One day, there were deposits of soil and rocks about 2m away from o Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or
the front door of Castro. have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered
a. She was not able to park her vehicle at the dead-end portion in order for it to be recognized.
of Garnet Street.
32. When Castro noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her house DISPOSITION: Decision affirmed with modification that the annotation be
to be slippery, she hired construction workers to see where the leak ordered removed.
was coming from.
a. The workers had already started digging when the police
officers sent by Monsod came and stopped the workers from
finishing their job.
33. Monsod filed a complaint for malicious mischief and malicious
destruction befor the office of the barangay chairman.
a. In defiance, Castro filed a complaint for damages with
TRO/writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC.
34. Castro claims that when she bought the property in 1994, there was
no annotation or existence if any easement over the property.
a. That Monsod neither asked permission not talked to her with
regard to the use of the 65sq.m. of her property as easement.
35. Monsod claims that she and his family had been residing in Moonwalk
Village since June 1984.