Sie sind auf Seite 1von 14

Author: Earvin James M.

Atienza which prohibits the owner of the servient estate from

CORTES v. YU-TIBO doing something which he could lawfully do if the
Appellant: Maximo Cortes easement did not exist. (533)
Appellee: Jose Palaca Yu-Tibo
Ponente: Mapa, J. xxx

DOCTRINE: Easement of Light and View Art. 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative years. (537a)
character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by
prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements
the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate referred to in the preceding article, the time of possession
has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from the day
act which would be lawful were it not for the easement on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who
may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise
FACTS: it upon the servient estate; and in negative easements, from
the day on which the owner of the dominant estate
1. Maximo  Cortes’   wife  owns  a   house   in   Calle  Rosario,  Manila,  herein   forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary
described as House No. 65 (alleged dominant estate), where a public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing
window may be found to have been receiving light and air since 1843; an act which would be lawful without the
easement. (538a)
2. Said window is facing an adjacent house described as House No. 63
(alleged servient estate) and found to be the property of Jose Palaca
Yu-Tibo, who later on commenced to raise the roof thereof such that RULING + RATIO:
it covers ½ of the aforementioned window depriving the latter from the
enjoyment of the light and air it previously received; 1. No. The easement of light and air are negative easements.
It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient estate
3. Records of the case show that although Cortes made a demand for subject to such easement is under no obligation whatsoever to
Yu-Tibo to cease from the construction thereof, he nonetheless failed allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything
to prove any prior act of prohibition against the latter in the manner there himself, but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon
provided by law (i.e. prohibition acknowledged before a notary public). which may tend to cut off the light from the dominant estate, which
Instead, Cortes asserts that he acquired the alleged positive easement he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence
by prescription, while Yu-Tibo counters stating that Cortes had not of the easement
followed the requirement of the law for negative easements as in this
case. Hence, the instant appeal on the issuance of an injunction. Moreover the court reasoned out that when one places a window
on his own property such is only an act of strict ownership and it
ISSUES: does not by its own means establish an easement. Hence it is that
use  of  the  windows  opened  in  a  wall  on  one’s  own  property,  in  the  
1. WON the alleged easement is a positive easement. absence of some covenant, is regarded as an act of mere
2. WON Cortes acquired the same through prescription. tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property.
2. No. The counting of the period of prescription must be from the day
PROVISION: Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative. the owner of the alleged dominant estate executes a prohibition in a
public instrument.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner of x x x That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having
the servient estate the obligation of allowing something to be executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the
done or of doing it himself, and a negative easement, that owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the
defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the
property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the
complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned
as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a
time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall
of the said house No. 65, because the period which the law
demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have
commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily
commence not having been performed. x x x;

NOTE: The Court cited various decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court and
commentaries from the Partidas on the proper classification of the easement
of light and air as a result of windows being created for such purpose. Court
distinguished one made by a co-owner   in   a   party   wall   and   one   “apparently  
existing”  even  prior  to  the  sale  of  the  adjacent  lots  to  different  owners  from  the  
instant  case  such  that  the  former  situations  carried  with  them  the  “Doctrine  of  
Apparency”  while  the  latter  did  not.

DISPOSITION: Appeal DENIED. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Author: Angelo Logronio RULING + RATIO:
Petitioner: Emilio Purugganan Paredes made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in
Respondent: Felisa Paredes the Decree to the roofing of their house.
The distances prescribed in the Decree should not correspond
Ponencia: Martin, J.
to  the  width  and  length  of  the  roof  of  the  defendant’s  house,  but  
to the DISTANCES of the rain water falling inside the land of
DOCTRINE: With regard to an easement of receiving water falling from
roofs, the distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof, but to the distance of rain This is because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the
rain water falling inside the property of petitioner.
water falling inside the land of the servient estate
Defendant violated the conditions in the decree because their
FACTS: roof  protrudes  by  98  centimeters  over  petitioner’s  property  so  
1. Petitioner Emilio Purugganan owned a piece of residential lot (Lots 1 that the propulsion of the water would go as far as one meter
and 2) in Abra. This was bound on the North by defendant Felisa over the property of the latter.
Paredes’  land. 2. NO.
2. In  the  Decree  of  Registration,  petitioner’s  lot  was  subject  to  an   They failed to have the easement of light and view annotated on the
easement of drainage in favor of Paredes. It stated that a portion of certificate of title.
Lots 1 and 2 consisting of 8 ½ meters long and 1 meter wide is An easement is cut off or extinguished by the registration of the
subject to the easement of receiving water from a roof that Paredes servient estate under the Torrens System without the easement
would build. being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title.
3. Paredes then constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and
2 under such conditions: Disposition: Judgment affirmed.
a. The southern wall (demarcation line between the two lands)
had 3 windows. Additional facts:
b. The house is 2 ½ meters longer than the length of Ocular inspection found that:
roofing allowed in the Decree, and had an outer roofing eaves  of  Paredes’  house  juts  98cm  inside  petitioner’s  property  and  
(eaves)  of  1.20  meters  which  protruded  over  petitioner’s   measures 8meters and 20cm in length
land, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls about 3 during ordinary rain: water falling from the eaves fall within 1m from
meters  inside  petitioner’s  land.   boundary  line  of  petitioner’s  property
c. 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house during heavy rain: water falls beyond 1m from said boundary line
facing Lots 1 and 2 were also built. Paredes claims the previous house was turned into ruins because of the
4. Purugganan now seeks to have Paredes construct their house in bombing of Bangued
accordance with the easement. Paredes claims that the said house was reconstructed on the ruins of a
5. The trial court ruled in favor of Purugganan, and ordered Paredes to Spanish-built house
reconstruct the roof and eaves of their house, and also to reconstruct
the wall on the southern side if they desired their windows to
continue to exist.
6. Note that Paredes applied the distances prescribed in the Decree to
the ROOFING of their house.

1. WoN Paredes violated the conditions of the easement of
2. WoN Paredes acquired an easement of light and view
Author: Kina Lampa 4. WoN an easement of waters had been established in favor of
VALISNO v. ADRIANO (1988) Valisno
Petitioner: Nicolas Valisno
Respondent: Felipe Adriano
Ponencia: Grino-Aquino, J. 1. YES.
As  indicated  from  the  Bureau’s  previous  decision:  the  principal  issue  
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by
irrigation purposes, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
Article 648 of the NCC and suppletory laws (irrigation law and
specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
Spanish Law of Waters)
2. YES.
The  existence  of  the  irrigation  canal  on  defendant’s  land  for  the  
7. Nicolas Valisno bought land from a certain Honorata Adriano
passage of water prior to and at the time of the sale to Valisno,
Francisco  (defendant’s  sister).
was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
8. The aforementioned land was planted with watermelon, peanuts,
using it. (Article 624).
corn, tobacco and other vegetables adjoins that of Felipe Adriano
(defendant). Both lands were inherited by the siblings from their More than this, the deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
“conveyance  and  transfer  of  the  water  rights and
improvements”  appurtetant  to  Adriano’s  property.  This  means  
9. At the time of the sale to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal (about 70m long) that by deed of sale, Honorata Adriano sold and transferred to
traversing  Adriano’s  land. Valisno all rights, title and interest over the parcel of land, and
the water rights and such other improvements.
10. Some time after the sale, Adriano leveled a portion of the irrigation
canal  which  led  to  Valisno’s  being  deprived  of  irrigation  water. Valisno claims that the water right was the primary
11. Valisno then filed in the Bureau of Public Works and consideration for his purchase.
Communications (Bureau) a complaint for deprivation of water rights. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
A decision was rendered in his favor so Adriano asked for a irrigation purposes, pass with the conveyance of the land,
reinvestigation. although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
12. Pending the reinvestigation by the Bureau, Valisno rebuilt the canal purchaser’s  easement  of  necessity  in  a  water  ditch  running  
at his own expense to irrigate his watermelon fields. He then filed a across  the  grantor’s  land  cannot  be  defeated  even if the water is
complaint for damages in the RTC. supplied by a third person.
13. Thereafter, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as
reversed  the  Bureau’s  decision  and  dismissed  Valisno’s  complaint: an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency
a. The Secretary says that the siblings’  father’s  water  rights   as property right, which survives the determination of the
ceased to be enjoyed by him when his irrigation canal necessity.
collapsed back then, and so his non-use of the water right for
more than five years extinguished the grant.
b. As vendee, Valisno did not acquire any water rights with the Disposition: Appealed decision set aside, new one entered ordering to grant
land purchased Valisno continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch.
14. The trial court then held that Valisno had no right to pass through
defendant’s  land  to  draw  water.  
a. It also pointed out that under the Irrigation Law, this matter is
under  the  Secretary  of  Public  Works’  jurisdiction.
15. Hence, this recourse to the Court.

3. WoN the case at bar falls under the subject of servitude of waters
Author: Dory Orial Limitation – essentially a contractual obligation between seller (JM Tuason &
Trias vs Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (1965) Co) and the purchaser (now, Trias)

2. Existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories in the area is

Petitioner: Dra. Rafaela Trias (current owner of lot, TCT of which has prohibition)
Respondent: Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (broker for the seller of the lot -> JM Tuason &
The ordinance may be repealed at any time
Co. Inc)
Ponente: Bengzon, C.J. If repealed, the prohibition would not be enforceable against new
purchasers of the lot if such annotation was removed. Thus, new
DOCTRINE: owners might not be bound.
The sellers of subdivision lots may validly insert in their contracts of sale a prohibition
against the establishment of factories in the district where the lots are located. The DISPOSITION:
existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories in the area is immaterial. Appealed order is REVERSED.
Petition to cancel the annotation at the back of the Torrens cert. of title is DENIED
FACTS: Cost against petitioner
1. JM Tuason & Co. Inc. owned a lot in Quezon City that is part of a subdivision
which it then sold to a purchaser (Garcia Mateo and Deogracias Lopez) thru
Gregorio Araneta Inc.
a. A prohibition that no factories shall erect on the lot was printed at the back
of the TCT issued to the purchaser.
2. After a series of transfers (with such prohibition), Rafaela Trias acquired the lot.
3. Trias (now owner) sought for the cancellation of the annotation/prohibition
alleging that it infringes her right as owner to use her land.
a. She alleges that the prohibition results to surplusage due to the existence
of a zoning ordinance already prohibiting factories in the area.
4. The court granted her such relief in cancelling the aforementioned prohibition.
5. Thus, Gregorio Araneta Inc. moved for a motion for reconsideration saying that
the condition had been inserted in the title pursuant to a valid contract of sale
with  Trias’  predecessors-in-interest.
6. MR was denied, thus appeal to Supreme Court.

1. W/N the prohibition or limitation printed on the back of the TCT is valid
2. W/N there is surplusage due to the effect of the zoning ordinance

1. YES
2. Immaterial

1. Prohibition or Limitation is VALID (The sellers of subdivision lots may validly
insert in their contracts of sale a prohibition against the establishment of
factories in the district where the lots are located.)
It is in reality an easement which every owner of a real estate may validly
impose  under  Art.  688  of  the  Civil  Code:  “the owner of a piece of land may
establish thereon the easements which he may deem suitable, x x x
provided  he  does  not  contravene  the  law,  public  policy  or  public  order”.
o No law has been cited outlawing this condition or limitation
o It was imposed by the owner of the subdivision to establish a
residential section in that area to assure the purchasers that the
peace and quiet of the place will not be disturbed by the noise or
smoke of factories in the vicinity.
Author: Karen Oreo
La Vista Assoc. Inc. vs. CA (1997) 6. Ateneo transferred not only the property, but also the right to
negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not
Petition:Certiorari want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using
Petitioner: LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC 6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand
MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR. 7. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a
and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the residents of third party complaint against Ateneo.
Ponente: Pardo 8. La Vista contends that Loyola residents had adequate outlet
to a public highway using other roads and also that Ateneo has
DOCTRINE: not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
A voluntary easement of right-of-way, like any other contract, the same
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of ISSUE: WON there is an easement of right of way
the owner of the dominant estate.
FACTS: YES. An easement of right of way exists in favor of Loyola Grand Villas.

1. The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in The parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest
Mangyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University estates. This is quite evident when:
and Maryknoll College on the south.
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949
2. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons who sold stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the
a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. “boundary  line  between  the  property  herein  sold  and  the  
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property
the consent of the Tuasons, to Ateneo through a Deed of herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. adjoining  belonging  to  the  vendors;;”

3. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the
land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights
Vista. and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form
4. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the part of the 15-meter wide roadway;
voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the
parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and
Manyan  road  (La  Vista  to  use  Ateneo’s  7.5  meters  of  the   ATENEO for breach of contract and the enforcement of the
mangyan road and also the other way around.) reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that
MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its
5. Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in
the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in
1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that
“Mangyan  Road  is  a  road  fifteen  meters  wide,  one-half of which is
taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m.
portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-
way  was  created  on  our  7  1/2  m.  portion  of  the  road  in  your  favor;;”

(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual
right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the
Ateneo  de  Manila  University  and  La  Vista  Homeowners’  Association  
would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property
and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient
estates; and,

(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the

Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997,
acknowledged  that  “one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road)
belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam
(Maryknoll)  and  the  Ateneo  in  equal  portions;;”

These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties

concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other
contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.

The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes

to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the
least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied.

- Modify the decision of CA as to the amount to be paid to
Guevarra, reducing it to P112,672.11
Author: Camille Sapnu to real estate and ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this
OBRA v. BADUA (2007) agreement was executed by the parties.

Petition: Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner: Resurrecion Obra
Respondent: SPs. Badua, et al.

Ponencia: Velasco, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE: Since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement

creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed
to real estate and ordinarily must be in writing.


1. Badua, et al. (respondents) owners of residential houses on a lot co-

owned by them.

2. They allege that the only access to the national highway is a pathway
traversing the northern portion of the Obras' property and the
southern portion of the property of the Bucasases and the Baduas.
This has a width of 1m and length of 16 m.

3. They also claim that this had been established for more then 40

4. However, Obra constructed a fence on the northern portion of his

property; thereby blocking the pathway.

5. Despites demands, Obra refused to demolish the fence.


W/N there is a voluntary easement of right-of-way


NO. There are no records in the case which reveal any agreement executed
by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. There were no terms of
arrangements agreed, more particularly the payment of the indemnity.

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement

creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed
Author: Mike Castro Art.1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
Sps. Valdez v Tabisula (2008) involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
Petitioner: SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not  
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ included  in  this  sale” could only mean that the parties
Respondent: SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD would have to enter into a separate and distinct
TABISULA, agreement for the purpose.
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J Use    of  the  word  “shall,”  which  is  imperative  or  mandatory  in  
its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely
DOCTRINE: permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public
-Holder of the check can insert the date pursuant to Section 13 of the benefit or private right requires it to be given an
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). imperative meaning
-Pursuant to Section 12 of the same law, a negotiable instrument is not Lastly, a voluntary easement must be registered in the
rendered invalid by reason only that it is antedated or postdated. Registry
2. NO.
FACTS: To be a legal easement, ff must be complied:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
1. Petitioner VALDEZ purchased by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale a and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
200 sqm portion of a 380 sqm parcel of land in La Union from (2) proper indemnity must be paid;
respondent TABISULA. (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
2. In the Deed of Sale, there was a provision that “they  (petitioners)   dominant  estate’s  own  acts;;  
shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.” prejudicial to the servient estate;
3. Respondent TABISULA then built a concrete wall on the western Obviously. There are already 2 roads adjoining the estates.
side. Petitioners, believing that they had right to the creation of the Thus, there is no need for a legal easement.
right of way, reported to the Barangay and eventually filed a case to
4. Petitioners alleged that they purchased property because of the DISPOSITION: Petition MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of
respondents’  assurance  of  providing  them  a  road  right  of  way. respondents, Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed
Respondents deny, saying that there are two other public roads for and set aside. DENIED in all other aspects
the petitioner.
5. RTC and CA ruled for respondent,saying that the reference to an
easement in favor of petitioners in the Deed of Sale is not a definite
grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of way. Hence this

1. W/N provision in the Deed of Sale amounts to a grant of
voluntary easement
2. W/N petitioners are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of

1. NO.
Author: Earvin Atienza
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. PROVISION: Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be
LEGAPSI TOWERS 300, Inc. (2009) considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
Petitioner: Privatization and Management Office easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the
Respondent: Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided
Ponente: Peralta, J. in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should
be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also
DOCTRINE: Continuance of Apparent Sign apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties persons.
alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the
two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary RULING + RATIO:
agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before No.
the execution of the deed. Developer, being owner of the subject properties upon construction of
the generating set and sump pumps, could not have constituted the
FACTS: easement since the alleged dominant and servient estates have the
same owner;
16. Caruff  Dev’t  Corp. (“Mortgagor”) owned several parcels of land along
Roxas Blvd. where it constructed a 21-storey Condominium registered Even upon transfer of the alleged servient estate to the Assignee, no
as Legaspi Towers  300,  Inc.,  financed  by  a  loan  with  PNB  (“Assignor- title nor apparent sign could have been continuously maintained since
Mortgagee”)   with   REM over the same parcels of land. Adjacent the title of conveyance, i.e. the Compromise Agreement, clearly
thereto, Developer also constructed a generating set and 2 sump provided under paragraph 2.1 that  the  Assignee  “Assigns, transfers
pumps for the use of the said Condominium; and conveys in favor of defendant National government x x x free
from any and all liens and encumbrances, to be delivered,  x  x  x”.
17. However, Developer defaulted, leading Assignor-Mortgagee to Thus, an application of Article 624 negates such existence;
foreclose the subject properties. Said foreclosure subjected the
parcels of land to Proclamation No. 50 which sought to privatize
By virtue of the above discussion, Assignee is entitled to receive rent
government’s  non-performing assets. Thus, the same were assigned
from Developer.
to Asset Privatization Trust (“Assignee”);;
DISPOSITION: Petition for Review on Certiorari (by PMO) GRANTED.
18. Thereafter, Developer sued Assignor-Mortgagee for nullification of
foreclosure which yielded to an eventual Compromise Agreement
whereby Developer will cede the parcels of land covering the
generating set and 2 sump pumps to Assignee. Said Agreement was
later on confirmed and approved by the trial court;

19. A year after, Developer sought for the declaration of a voluntary

easement in its favor against the land ceded to the Assignee, alleging
that its construction of the same constituted an easement in favor of
the land covering the Condominium Tower. Assignee denied the same
in its Answer, claiming that by the assignment, it took the properties
free from all liens and encumbrances and that such construction was
an encroachment upon its property.


WON an easement existed.

Digest Author: Bulang, Mae knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road on their
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL V. EDMUNDO OBIAS properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used
the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated
Petitioner: BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the
COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
Respondent: EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country
VICTOR BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, was then under Martial Law. Respondents likewise denied that the
ROGELIO MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI, road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for
PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., its construction and maintenance and denied that they barricaded the
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE: To establish the existence of a voluntary easement,
the burden of proof is on the party alleging such existence and 1. Whether BAPCI acquired the road right of way in dispute through
must be proven by conclusive proof and not merely voluntary easement. NO
circumstantial evidence. 2. Whether the road right of way has been acquired by prescription.
(Circumstantial evidence is not enough to prove the existence of a NO.
voluntary easement.)
In  1972,  BISUDECO  in  Camarines  Sur  constructed  a  road  (“the   1. NO. BAPCI did not satisfy the burden of proving the existence of
disputed  road”)  – measuring approximately 7m wide and 2.9km long the alleged agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the
used for hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site construction of the road. Testimonies presented are mainly hearsay,
and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations. as not one among the witnesses had personal knowledge of the
BAPCI acquired the assets of BISUDECO in 1992 who later filed a agreement by reason of direct participation in the agreement or
Complaint against respondents alleging that respondents unjustifiably because the witness was present when the agreement was concluded
barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards by the parties.
and  stones  across  it,  preventing  petitioner’s  and  the  other  sugar  
planter’s  vehicles  from  passing  through  the  disputed  road. 2. NO. The road is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the
same may be apparent. Easements are either continuous or
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not
pursuant to an agreement with rice field owners of the road traversed according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
and that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the
landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of
properties. BAPCI contends that through prolonged and continuous years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply make
use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the the same apparent. Article 622 states that discontinuous easements,
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
by  it  when  it  bought  BISUDECO’s  assets.  
Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed August 24, 2005 Decision and October 27, 2005 Resolution of the
road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Digest Author: Billy Alcid o Petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
Unisource V. Chung easement and that the same should be cancelled since the
G.R. No. 173252 dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an
Petitioner: UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza
Respondents: JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J. only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements
like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may
Doctrine: A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of
from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
the dominant estate.
termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way,
Facts: like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
1. Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corp is the agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT of the estate.
Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October
from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico (vendor).
27, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
a. Easement was a right of way wherein a certain Hidalgo had
CA-G.R. CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED. The voluntary easement cannot
the right to open doors as passage way which would be cancelled due to the existence of an adequate access to a public
essentially  pass  through  Sandico’s  lot  until  the  bank  of  the   road.
estero that goes to the Pasig River.
b. Such  easement  was  annotated  in  the  TCT’s  covering  the  
said lot until it was transferred to petitioner.
2. Hidalgo eventually transferred his lot to the Chungs.
3. Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate
(Chung’s  property) has an adequate access to a public road which
is Matienza Street.
4. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the
Trial  Court’s  decision.  Hence  the  present  petition.

WON the easement can be cancelled.

Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of
right of way exists in favor of respondents which was reflected in his
allegations in his petition before the Trial Court.
Digest Author: Bugsy Mangaser
Petitioner: SPS. Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon YES. Parol evidence may be admitted.
Respondent: SPS. Santos and Erlinda Tan When there is failure of the written agreement to express the true
Ponencia: Abad, J. intent and agreement of the parties, parol evidence may be used to
modify, explain, or add to the terms of such.
DOCTRINE: SPS. TAN put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties.
Every owner of a land may establish the easement which he may deem YES. The easement has been extinguished.
suitable, and in the manner and form which he may deem best, provided he According to the testimony of EDUARDO, the true agreement of the
does not contravene laws, public policy or public order heirs was for the establishment of an easement of right of way for the
sole benefit of the interior lots (D and E)
FACTS: When the owner of Lots D and E became the owner of Lot B, the
20. Guillermo Ceniza dies intestate leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.
Mandaue City. Therefore, SPS. SALIMBANGON's contention that an easement
21. 20 years later, his children executed an extrajudicial declaration of established by agreement of parties may only be extinguished by
heirs and partition. mutual agreement cannot be given merit.
22. Lots A, B and C were adjacent to the street, while D and E were not. Also, SPS SALIMBANGON cannot insist that Lot A has an easement.
To give these two lots access to the street, the heirs established in The easement established on Lot A, D and E in the first extrajudicial
their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way which is a 3- partition was already cancelled upon the modification of the
meter wide alley between D and E, continued on between A and B. agreement by imposing an easement solely on Lot B.
This was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
23. Realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the DISPOSITION: Court DENIES the petition of SPS. Salimbangon.
property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the
easement along Lots A, D and E.
24. VICTORIA, owner of Lot E, swapped with Benedicta thus, became the CITYSTREET
owner of Lot A. CITYSTREET
25. VICTORIA and her husband (SPS. SALIMBANGON) constructed a
residential house on the lot and built 2 garages. One abutted the street A B C
and the other located in the interior of their lot, and uses the alley to A B C
get to the street. They also had the alley cemented and gated.
26. Lots B, C, D and E were all bought by SPS. TAN. They built D E
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also D E
closed the gate SPS. SALIMBANGON built.
27. SPS. SALIMBANGON filed a complaint against the SPS. TAN. While ORIGINAL
SPS. TAN filed an action for the extinguishment of the easement. RTC MODIFIED
ruled in favor of SPS. SALIMBANGON. But the CA reversed said
decision. Based on the parol evidence presented by EDUARDO, on of
the heirs, the true intent of the parties was to establish the easement
for the benefit of Lots D and E only.

WoN parol evidence may be admitted to bring forth the true intent of
the heirs with regard the establishment of the easement
WoN the easement has been extinguished

PROVISION: Sec. 9 of Rule 130, Art. 688

Digest Author: George Filasol a. That when Pilar Development Corp. (PDC) developed
CASTRO v. MONSOD (2011) Manuela Homes, Manuela Homes became lower than
Petitioner: Margarita F. Castro Moonwalk Village.
Respondent: SPS. Santos and Erlinda Tan b. That he (Monsod) personally complained to PDC and was
Ponencia: Nachura, J. assured that an embankment would be retained at the
boundary of Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village.
An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but ISSUES:
his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the
or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. subject adjacent properties

FACTS: PROVISION: Sec. 9 of Rule 130, Art. 688

28. Castro owns a parcel of land located on Manuela Homes, Las Pinas
29. Monsod owns property adjoining the lot of Castro, located on YES. The easement exists.
Moonwalk Village, Las Pinas City. It was proven that Castro has been making excavations and diggings
a. There is a concrete fence, more or less 2 meters high, dividing on the subject embankment.
Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village. o Unless restrained, the continued excavation of the
30. Monsod caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 65sq.m. embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of
of the property of Castro the house of Monsod to collapse.
a. There was really no claim over the property. However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral
b. Monsod merely asserted that there was an existing legal support is no longer necessary.
easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear o It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the
portion of the estate to prevent the property from registry of property.
collapsing since his property is located at an elevated A judicial recognition of the easement already binds the property and
plateau of 15ft,  more  or  less,  of  Castro’s  property. the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.
31. One day, there were deposits of soil and rocks about 2m away from o Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or
the front door of Castro. have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered
a. She was not able to park her vehicle at the dead-end portion in order for it to be recognized.
of Garnet Street.
32. When Castro noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her house DISPOSITION: Decision affirmed with modification that the annotation be
to be slippery, she hired construction workers to see where the leak ordered removed.
was coming from.
a. The workers had already started digging when the police
officers sent by Monsod came and stopped the workers from
finishing their job.
33. Monsod filed a complaint for malicious mischief and malicious
destruction befor the office of the barangay chairman.
a. In defiance, Castro filed a complaint for damages with
TRO/writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC.
34. Castro claims that when she bought the property in 1994, there was
no annotation or existence if any easement over the property.
a. That Monsod neither asked permission not talked to her with
regard to the use of the 65sq.m. of her property as easement.
35. Monsod claims that she and his family had been residing in Moonwalk
Village since June 1984.