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Inhalt | Content

Internationale Zeitschrift für Kernenergie

2

Februar 2013

Offizielles Fachblatt der Kerntechnischen Gesellschaft

Inhalt | Content Internationale Zeitschrift für Kernenergie 2 Februar 2013 Offizielles Fachblatt der Kerntechnischen Gesellschaft Content

Content and concatenation for the volumes the Design Options and Provisions File “DOPF”

for MYRRHA. (Seite 81)
for MYRRHA.
(Seite 81)

Steady state results of initial heat flux [kW/m 2 ]

and heat flux after rod ejection

(Seite 86)

Inhalt | Content Internationale Zeitschrift für Kernenergie 2 Februar 2013 Offizielles Fachblatt der Kerntechnischen Gesellschaft Content

Cover: In 2012 Switzerland‘s BKW Mühleberg nuclear power plant (KKM, BWR, 390 MWe gross, 372 MWe net capacity) recorded its best result since going into commercial operation in 1973, generating a gross annual volume of 3,117 million kilowatt hours (kWh). (Photo: BKW)

 

Editorial

71

Japan: Warum die erneute Wende?

 

Japan: Why the Renewed Turnaround?

Content in brief

76

N.

Hakimi

78

Vorgenehmigung eines Hybrid-

C.

Dams

Mehrzweckforschungsreaktors für

A.

Wertelaers

High-Tech-Anwendungen: MYRRHA

V.

Nys

The Pre-Licensing of a Multi-Purpose

M.

Schrauben

Hybrid Research Reactor for High-Tech

R.

Dresselaers

Applications “MYRRHA”

A.

Gensler

82

Sicherheitsananalysen für

A.

Schmidt

Leichtwasserreaktorkerne mit

K.

Kühnel

3-D-Methoden von Areva

F.

Wehle

LWR Core Safety Analysis with Areva’s 3-Dimensional Methods

Chang Hyun Kim Young Soo Kim

88

Borsäurekonzentration im Kern in der

Hwang Young Jun Hee Cheon No

langen Abkühlungsphase von Druckwasserreaktoren

Boric Acid Concentration in the Core During the Long Term Cooling Phase of Pressurized Water Reactors

D.

Slabu

94

Qualifikationsprüfung für die

M.

Zemek

Brennelementherstellung

Chr. Hellwig

Review of Qualifications for Fuel Assembly Fabrication

Redaktion

99

atw Schnellstatistik Kernkraftwerke 2012

Nuclear Power Plants:

2012 atw Compact Statistics

74

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

International Journal for Nuclear Power

Inhalt | Content
Inhalt | Content

Chr. Moench

103

Refinanzierung der Endlagersuche und des Endlagers für wärmeentwickelnde radioaktive Abfälle – Teil I

Refinancing of the Search for a Repository and of the Repository for Heat

Generating Radioactive Waste (Part 1)

C. Eichenberger

108

Die Kernenergie im politischen Umfeld

Nuclear Power in the Political

Environment

M. Rey

112

Vertiefungskurs: Kernenergiesysteme der Zukunft – ein Weg zu mehr Akzeptanz?

Reinforcement Course: Future Nuclear Power Systems – a Way to Achieve More Acceptance?

115

Jahrestagung Kerntechnik 2012 Sektionsberichte – Teil 6

Section Reports: 2012 Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology – Part 6

Impressum

119

Nachrichten

119

Marktdaten

126

Veranstaltungshinweise

130

KTG-Mitteilungen

132

Beilagenhinweis:

Diesem Heft liegen – die Broschüre des Aachen Institute for Nuclear Training (AINT) – das Vorprogrammheft der Jahrestagung Kerntechnik 2013 sowie – das Anmeldeformular zur Jahrestagung Kerntechnik 2013 bei.

International Journal for Nuclear Power Inhalt | Content Chr. Moench 103 Refinanzierung der Endlagersuche und des

Schematic diagram of test apparatus for boric

acid precipitation (Seite 91)
acid precipitation
(Seite 91)

Example of a line qualification process:

fabrication, qualification, and QA documentation

for pellets [11] (Seite 96)
for pellets [11]
(Seite 96)

Ungarn: Laufzeitverlängerung für Paks-1. Ansicht

des Standortes.

(Seite 124)

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

75

Content in brief

Content in brief The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose Hybrid research reactor for High-tech applications “MYRRHA” (Page

The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose

Hybrid research reactor for High-tech

applications “MYRRHA”

(Page 78)

goals, meets, at the minimum, safety objec- tives set by the regulatory authority and ful- fils the security requirements and safe - guards obligation.

N. Hakimi, C. Dams, A. Wertelaers, V. Nys, M. Schrauben and R. Dresselaers

The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre in Mol has been working for several years on the design of a multi-purpose flexible irradia- tion facility in order to replace the ageing BR2, a multipurpose materials testing reac- tor (MTR), in operation since 1962. MYRRHA, a flexible fast spectrum re - search reactor is conceived as an accelera- tor driven system (ADS), able to operate in sub-critical and critical modes. It contains a proton accelerator of 600 MeV, a spallation target and a multiplying medium with MOX fuel, cooled by liquid lead-bismuth (Pb-Bi). Since February 2011, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre has engaged in a “pre-li- censing” process with the regulatory au - thority for an estimated period up to mid

Content in brief The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose Hybrid research reactor for High-tech applications “MYRRHA” (Page

LWR Core Safety Analysis with Areva’s 3-Dimensional Methods (Page 82)

A. Gensler, A. Schmidt, K. Kühnel and F. Wehle

The quality of the safety analysis strongly affects the confidence in the operational safety of a reactor. To ensure the highest quality, it is essential that the methodology consists of appropriate analysis tools and an extensive validation base. Sophisticated 3-dimensional core mod- els ensure that all physical effects relevant for safety are treated and the results are re- liable and conservative. The validation base includes measurement campaigns in test fa- cilities and comparisons of the predictions of steady state and transient measured data

  • 2014. gathered from plants during many years of operation. Thus, the core models achieve reliable and comprehensive results for a wide range of applications. As an example an overview of the appli- cation experience as well as the validation base of AREVA’s 3-dimensional codes is giv- en. The importance and necessity of the comprehensive 3-dimensional methodolo- gy is illustrated with examples of a BWR and PWR safety analysis. For BWR transient application the analysis of regional power oscillations is considered and regarding the PWR safety analysis an example referring to fast enthalpy rise and the maximum fuel temperature caused by a rod ejection acci- dent is shown.

The paper presents on the one hand the objectives of the pre-licensing phase as well as its implementation process and on the other hand, 2 implementing instruments which have been developed by the regula- tory authority providing guidance to the de- signer of MYRRHA in order to meet the pre- licensing phase objectives. The first instru- ment is a strategic note for the design and operation of MYRRHA where as the second instrument is a guidance document for the format and content of a design options and provisions file (DOPF). Both instruments have been developed taking into account that MYRRHA is an irradiation facility us- ing a Generation IV nuclear power system’s type technology (liquid metal cooled fast neutron reactor). The strategic note overview aims to cov-

er the safety approach as well as the securi- ty requirements and safeguards obligation applicable to MYRRHA. In particular, in the

strategic note, a specific attention has been

Content in brief The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose Hybrid research reactor for High-tech applications “MYRRHA” (Page

Boric Acid Concentration in the Core During the Long Term Cooling Phase of Pressurized Water Reactors (Page 88)

paid in order to ensure that a safety, securi- ty and safeguards integrated approach will drive the development of the MYRRHA de- sign.

The safety approach focuses on the safe- ty goals and the minimum safety objectives set by the regulatory authority for this inno- vative design. The DOPF overview presents its objectives and structure resuming the suggested logic and the links between the different design steps. With these 2 instruments in hand, the designer will, with the help of selected and justified safety design options, have the op- portunity to demonstrate at the end of the pre-licensing phase, that his design is ma- ture for a licensable facility, e.g. into a facil- ity design that aims at reaching the safety

Chang Hyun Kim, Young Soo Kim, Hwang Young Jun and Hee Cheon No

Boric acid precipitation in the core vessel of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) must be avoided in order to assure that the core is maintained at acceptably low temperatures following any rupture in the primary sys- tem. A new evaluation method for boric ac- id precipitation in post LOCA long-term cooling has been developed reflecting sys- tem effects such as the time-varied mixing volume due to the variation of the core mix- ture level and the void fraction. A series of tests has been performed to investigate the effect of sump debris including chemical products on the solubility of boric acid. It is

identified that there is a negligible effect of

sump debris on the solubility limit of boric acid. The calculated mixing volume is suffi- ciently smaller than that of the original evaluation method as identified by the US- NRC. However, it has been verified that the

operator’s action times for the hot-leg switch-over or the hot- and cold-leg injec- tions are still effective in Korean PWRs through the application of the newly devel- oped evaluation.

Content in brief The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose Hybrid research reactor for High-tech applications “MYRRHA” (Page

Review of Qualifications for Fuel

Assembly Fabrication

(Page 94)

D. Slabu, M. Zemek and Chr. Hellwig

The required quality of nuclear fuel in in- dustrial production can only be assured by applying processes in fabrication and in - spection, which are well mastered and have been proven by an appropriate qualifica - tion. The present contribution shows the understanding and experiences of Axpo

with respect to qualifications in the frame of nuclear fuel manufacturing and reflects

some related expectations of the operator.

Content in brief The Pre-licensing of a Multi-purpose Hybrid research reactor for High-tech applications “MYRRHA” (Page

Nuclear Power Plants: 2012 atw

Compact Statistics

The Editor

(Page 99)

At the end of 2012, nuclear power plants were available for energy supply in 31 coun- tries of the world. A total of 437 nuclear power plants were in operation with an ag- gregate gross power of approx. 391 GWe and an aggregate net power, respectively, of 371 GWe. This means that the number was unchanged compared to the previous year‘s number on 31 December 2011. The availa- ble gross power of nuclear power plants in-

creased by approx. 2 GWe from 2011 to the end of 2012. In total 2 nuclear generating units were commissioned in 2012 in China (+1) and in the Rupublic Korea (+1). Additionally two further units resumed operation in 2012 af- ter a longer power downtime in Canada

(+2).

atw Vol. 58 (2013) No. 2 »atomwirtschaft-atomtechnik« is published monthly by INFORUM GmbH, Robert-Koch-Platz 4, 10115 Berlin, Germany phone +49 30 498555-10 fax +49 30 498555-19 Publisher:

e-mail: atw@atomwirtschaft.de Editorial:

e-mail: editorial@atomwirtschaft.com www.atomwirtschaft.de

76

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

Content in brief

4 nuclear generating units were decom- missioned in 2014. In the United Kingdom 2 units ended commercial operation due to their lifetime. 2 units in Canada (-1) and Spain (-1) were shut down due to economi- cal reasons. 68 nuclear generating units with an ag- gregate gross power of approx. 70 GWe, were under construction in 14 countries

end of 2012. New or continued projects are

notified from (in brackets: number of new

projects) China (+4), the USA (+4) and the United Arab Emirates (+1). Some 110 new nuclear power plants are in the concrete project design, planning and licensing phases worldwide; on some of them, contracts have already been award- ed. Another units are in their preliminary project phases.

Content in brief 4 nuclear generating units were decom- missioned in 2014. In the United Kingdom

Refinancing of the Search for a Repository and of the Repository for Heat Generating Radioactive Waste

(Part 1)

Chr. Moench

(Page 103)

The final disposal of radioactive waste is a

state task that is assigned to the Federal Government pursuant to section 9a (3) sen- tence 1 of the Atomic Energy Act (AtG). Since the early 1970’s, the Federal Govern- ment has been actively searching for and

exploring final disposal sites for radioactive

waste. In a proceeding accompanied by the intensive participation of technical experts and the public, the Gorleben salt dome (Salzstock) has emerged as a presumably suitable disposal site from a mining stand -

point (eignungshöffig) according to the cur- rent status of the exploration. The cost of these exploratory measures – and the sub-

sequent construction – will be financed by

the waste producers, in particular the utili- ty companies, by means of advance pay- ments on their contributions. Part I of this article will evaluate the selection and ex - ploration of the Gorleben salt dome to date and examine the provisions on the pre-fi- nancing burden from the point of view of constitutional law. Constitutional objec- tions can also be raised against the regula-

tion in section 21b (4) AtG that was intro- duced in 1998, which excludes a refunding

of the pre-financing contributions even if

the repository is never erected or operated. Part II of this article, which will appear in the next issue, will take up the question of whether a search for an alternative reposi- tory site, as the Federal Ministry for the Envi- ronment (BMU) envisions in the working draft of an “Act on the search for and selec- tion of a site for a repository for heat gener- ating radioactive waste” (Gesetz zur Suche und Auswahl eines Standortes für ein End- lager für wärmeentwickelnde radioaktive

Abfälle), is likewise to be refinanced as a contribution by the parties obliged to make ad-vance payments.

Content in brief 4 nuclear generating units were decom- missioned in 2014. In the United Kingdom

Nuclear Power in the Political

Environment

C. Eichenberger

(Page 108)

Government, parliament, public authorities and, finally, the Swiss public are facing a tough challenge. Decisions must be taken about the energy future of the country which have the gravest consequences. This is the result of the hasty decisions by the Swiss government and parliament after the events of Fukushima, Japan in 2011. For the past 4 decades, the energy policy of Switzerland has revolved mainly around

2 topics: energy consumption and nuclear power. The debate about energy consumption

was triggered by the oil crisis of 1973. 1990 saw the adoption of the energy article

which, for the first time, gave the federation

central competences in the energy sector. The other major topic in Swiss energy policy is nuclear power. Reviewing the deci- sions in energy policy over the past few years is quite informative, showing clearly the confusion we are going through. However, there is reason to hope that facts will be able to counteract the energy policy rally currently presented to the pub- lic. Being an optimist, I hope that the de- bate about our future electricity situation will be carried on with more information and less bias than before.

Content in brief 4 nuclear generating units were decom- missioned in 2014. In the United Kingdom

Reinforcement Course: Future Nuclear

Power Systems – a Way to Achieve

More Acceptance?

M. Rey

(Page 112)

The 2012 Reinforcement Course organized by the Swiss Nuclear Forum was devoted to the question in what way nuclear reactors of the third generation and more recent con- cepts provide more safety, and whether this is a way to achieve more societal accept - ance. Besides presentations by speakers from industry and science, also theological, psy- chological, political and sociological views about nuclear power were expressed. Dr. Urs Weidmann, President of the Com- mittee on Education of the Swiss Nuclear Fo-

rum, Head of the Beznau Nuclear Power Plant, Axpo AG, opened the course to ap - proximately 120 participants by introducing

the first six presentations, which dealt with

societal aspects of nuclear power. The second group of three papers were introduced by Dr. Philipp Hänggi, Head of

the swissnuclear office. The subject was “Fu- ture Concepts – Design Regulations and Safety Considerations.” The agenda of the second day featured

“Third-generation Reactors in the Light of

Fukushima” and “Sideviews” of subjects and future technologies discussed by society in a similarly controversial way. Dr. Johannis Nöggerath, Head of Nuclear Safety, Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant, guided the partici- pants through the eight papers. The next reinforcement course will again be held in Olten on November 19 and 20, 2013, and will be devoted to lifetime man- agement of nuclear power plants.

Content in brief 4 nuclear generating units were decom- missioned in 2014. In the United Kingdom

Section Reports: 2012 Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology

– Part 6

(Page 115)

Summary report on 3 out of 12 sessions of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technol- ogy held in Stuttgart, 22 to 24 May 2012:

Operation of nuclear installations (Sec- tion 6), New build and innovations (Section 7), and Decommissioning of nuclear installa - tions (Section 8). The sessions of the section Energy economics (Section 10) will be covered in a further issue of atw. The reports on the sessions Reactor physics and methods of calcula- tion (Section 1), Thermodynamics and fluid dynamics (Section 2), Safety of nuclear installations – meth - ods, analysis, results (Section 3),

Front end of the fuel cycle, fuel elements and core components (Section 4), Radioactive waste management, stor- age (Section 5), Fusion technology (Section 9), Radiation protection (Section 11) and Education, expert knowledge, know- how-transfer (Section 12) have been covered in atw 8/9, 10, 11, 12

(2012), and 1 (2013).

atw Vol. 58 (2013) No. 2 »atomwirtschaft-atomtechnik« is published monthly by INFORUM GmbH, Robert-Koch-Platz 4, 10115 Berlin, Germany phone +49 30 498555-10 fax +49 30 498555-19 Publisher:

e-mail: atw@atomwirtschaft.de Editorial:

e-mail: editorial@atomwirtschaft.com www.atomwirtschaft.de

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

77

LWR Safety Analysis

Das Vertrauen in die Betriebssicherheit ei- nes Reaktors wird stark von der Qualität der Sicherheitsanalysen bestimmt. Höchste Qua- litätsansprüche erfordern, dass für die Analy- senmethoden geeignete Programme mit einer umfassenden Validierungsbasis zur Verfü - gung stehen. Fortschrittliche 3-dimensionale Kernmo - delle gewährleisten, dass alle für die Sicher- heit relevanten physikalischen Effekte berück- sichtigt werden und vertrauenswürdige und konservative Ergebnisse geliefert werden. Da deren Validierung sowohl Messungen in Ver- suchsanlagen als auch Vergleiche mit statio- nären und transienten Daten aus dem lang- jährigen Betrieb der Reaktoren beinhalten, sind die Kernmodelle für einen weiten Anwen-

dungsbereich qualifiziert.

Als Beispiele sind die Validierungsbasis und die Anwendungsbereiche der 3-dimensio- nalen Programme von Areva zusammenge - stellt. Die Bedeutung von umfassenden 3-di- mensionalen Methoden wird an Anwendungs- beispielen für Druckwasserreaktoren (DWR) und Siedewasserreaktoren (SWR) gezeigt. Das SWR Anwendungsbeispiel beschreibt das Verhalten von regionalen Leistungsoszillatio- nen. Für den DWR werden die schnellen En - thalpieerhöhungen und die maximalen Brennstofftemperaturen bei einem Steuerele- mentauswurfstörfall betrachtet.

Anschrift der Verfasser:

Dipl.-Phys. Albin Gensler,

Dr. rer. nat. Andreas Schmidt, Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Klaus Kühnel, Dr.-Ing. Franz Wehle AREVA NP GmbH PWR and BWR Thermo-hydraulics and Core Transients

Paul-Gossen-Straße 100, 91052 Erlangen/Germany

Reprint of a paper presented at the TOPSAFE 2012, 22 to 26 April 2012, Helsinki/Finland

LWR Core Safety Analysis with Areva’s 3-dimensional Methods

Albin Gensler, Andreas Schmidt, Klaus Kühnel and Franz Wehle, Erlangen/Germany

LWR Safety Analysis Das Vertrauen in die Betriebssicherheit ei- nes Reaktors wird stark von der Qualität
  • 1. Introduction

The methodologies of the safety analysis have developed with the advancement of computing power. In the past, the different analysis areas were considered uncoupled:

plant dynamics with point kinetics, 2D core kinetics, thermal-hydraulics with a single hot channel and fuel rod model with a single hot rod. Transient processes were approximated with steady state calcula- tions. The potential errors of these simple models restrict an economical fuel man - agement analysis. Upgraded computers and advanced numerical algorithms allow transients consideration, 3D full core cal- culations and coupling of the plant dy- namics with core kinetics, thermal-hy - draulics as well as a fuel rod model. Even full core, 3D, pin-by-pin representations are available. Simultaneously with these sophisticated codes, advanced safety anal- ysis methodologies are developed and penalties can be reduced to show higher safety margins. However, the usage of

such complex codes and methodologies requires users skilled and experienced in all subjects or – at least – the users must be

supported by experts on all relevant fields.

In close cooperation with these experts, the correct and conservative input can be composed and the results can be interpret- ed correctly.

LWR Safety Analysis Das Vertrauen in die Betriebssicherheit ei- nes Reaktors wird stark von der Qualität
  • 2. Codes

    • 2.1 Boiling Water Reactor Codes

The steady state 3D core design and opti- mization is performed with the NRC ap - proved code MICROBURN-B2. Core tran - sients, stability and reactivity initiated ac - cidents are analyzed with the 3D neutron- ic/thermal-hydraulic coupled code RAMO- NA [1]. To analyze operational transients

the good representation of the entire plant behavior is of importance. For this applica- tion the coupled code system S-RELAP5/

RAMONA is applied. In this coupled sys -

tem RAMONA represents the active core whereas the recirculation loop and all the other important reactor system compo - nents are modeled by S-RELAP5 [2].

  • 2.2 Pressurized Water Reactor Codes

The examples shown here are performed with the following codes:

Plant dynamics: S-RELAP5 Kinetics: PANBOX [3] Thermal-hydraulics with fuel rod mod- el: COBRA-FLX [4] These codes are coupled to model more complex transients:

Core kinetics and thermal-hydraulics:

PANBOX including COBRA-FLX, ARCA- DIA TM Core and plant: R/P/C (RELAP/PANBOX/ COBRA) [6].

LWR Safety Analysis Das Vertrauen in die Betriebssicherheit ei- nes Reaktors wird stark von der Qualität
  • 3. Validation Base

Since integral tests of the coupled code sys- tem cannot cover the total application range of the individual models, detailed validation of the individual models and empirical correlations are required. The in- tegral tests demonstrate the appropriate coupling functionality and overall validity, which shows the essential model setup properties (e.g. nodalization). Table 1 gives an exemplary overview of the broad vali-

dation base of the coupled PWR 3D-codes R/P/C and its integrated codes PANBOX and COBRA-FLX. In Table 2 the validation cases of the BWR codes S-RELAP5, RAMONA and F-COBRA-TF are shown.

LWR Safety Analysis Das Vertrauen in die Betriebssicherheit ei- nes Reaktors wird stark von der Qualität
  • 4. Application Experience for Licensing with Coupled 3D-Codes

Areva uses coupled 3D-methods for a wide range of licensing purposes as new builds, power upgrade, enrichment increase, in- troduction of MOX fuel and decennial

82

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

LWR Safety Analysis

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 1. Validation base of PWR codes. Tab. 2. Validation base of BWR

Tab. 1.

Validation base of PWR codes.

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 1. Validation base of PWR codes. Tab. 2. Validation base of BWR

Tab. 2. Validation base of BWR codes.

lyzed widely. Industrial research in this ar-

ea is active since the invention of the first

BWR. Stability measurements have been performed in various plants during com -

missioning phase but especially the magni- tude and divergent nature of the oscilla - tions during the LaSalle Unit 2 nuclear power plant event on March 9, 1988, re- newed concern about the state of knowl - edge on BWR instabilities and possible consequences to fuel rod integrity. The

flow stability is of particular importance in

parallel channel systems as BWRs and steam generators. Sustained flow oscilla- tions may cause forced mechanical vibra - tion of the components or system control problems. Flow oscillations affect the local heat transfer characteristics and may in - duce boiling transition. Density-wave os- cillations are probably the most common type of instabilities encountered in 2-phase systems and are due to multiple feedbacks between the flow rate, the vapor genera - tion rate, and the pressure drop in a boil- ing channel.

For example, in Figure 1 a density-wave oscillation can occur as a consequence of perturbation in heat input. The resulting perturbations in the 2-phase region will ap- pear as quality δx and void fraction pertur- bations δα. Since the total pressure drop ∆p across the boiling channel is imposed by the external characteristic, the 2-phase pres- sure-drop perturbation δ ∆p II will create feedback pressure perturbations of the op - posite sign in the single phase region -δ∆p I , which can either enforce or attenuate the void fraction perturbation. The good stabil- ity behavior of Atrium TM fuel designs main- ly results from the optimized 2-phase/sin- gle-phase pressure drop ratio realized through advanced spacer designs, part

saf ety revisions. They are applied for dif - ferent PWR types ( Framatome, Siemens, Westinghouse , and Areva ) with various types of fuel assemblies (14x14, 15x15, 16x16, 17x17, and 18x18) and a large range of rated power from 360 to 1,600 MW. Coupled 3D-methods are the most suit- able tools for transients with asymmetric power distributions or strong axial and ra- dial power redistribution. Table 3 shows the wide experience of licensing analyses performed with 3D-methods. Overall, the coupled 3D-methods are accepted for li - censing in several countries: Belgium, Bra- zil, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 1. Validation base of PWR codes. Tab. 2. Validation base of BWR

5. Examples of Coupled 3D Effects

  • 5.1 BWR Regional Power Oscillations

BWR power oscillations associated with density-wave oscillations have been ana -

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 1. Validation base of PWR codes. Tab. 2. Validation base of BWR

Fig. 1.

Feedback mechanisms of BWR stability.

atw 58. Jg. (2013) Heft 2 | Februar

83

LWR Safety Analysis

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 3. Transients with licensing analyses performed with coupled 3D codes. length fuel

Tab. 3. Transients with licensing analyses performed with coupled 3D codes.

length fuel rods and the positive neutron- ics impact of the internal water channel. The most likely modes of BWR instabili- ties are the core-wide or global mode with in-phase oscillation and the regional mode, where the power in one half of the core os- cillates out-of-phase with the power in the other half. In the latter mode, local flux signal oscillations tend to cancel out in the summation, so the local amplitudes may be significantly higher than the average flux signal measured by the power range monitors. If not detected the amplitude of the oscillations may increase and impose oscillatory dryout and rewetting phenome- na. The dryout leads to a strong reduction of the heat transfer at the fuel rod clad- ding, which in turn leads to a strong in - crease of the fuel rod cladding tempera - ture. In combination with the rewetting of the fuel rod surface the heat transfer at the cladding surface underlies rapid changes, which have to be accounted for. At the test facility KATHY in Karlstein (Germany) continuously full scale tests are performed to demonstrate product per- formance and to prove that analytical mod- els used in reload licensing are applicable to more complex fuel geometries and asso- ciated operating strategies. Full scale elec- trically heated mockup of the BWR bundle design Atrium TM 10XM is used to perform an expanded scope testing campaign for its stability performance. The scope of the sta- bility testing prior to the recent Atrium TM

10XM campaign was focused on the linear stability performance where the power is fixed during any given test to simulate den- sity wave modulated noise and small am- plitude oscillations. The operational pa - rameters and boundary conditions, power and inlet subcooling and also pressure, were varied to collect different data for benchmarking stability codes. In some Atrium TM 10 tests, the flow oscillations were allowed to increase until cyclical dry- out and rewetting was measured. These data were very useful to support the bench- marking of the time domain methodology using the RAMONA code where nonlinear effects are represented. In the last meas- urement campaign the scope has been ex- tended including high oscillation ampli - tudes with inlet flow reversal, increased subcooling range for low feedwater tem - perature regime possible under hypotheti- cal anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) scenarios and the simulation of power feedback using a feedback module, i.e. a computer program used to control power with an input from the inlet flow signal [12]. The program is a model of a single hydraulic channel representing the Atrium TM 10XM design. The kinetics (not dynamics) of 2-phase flow is simulated us- ing inlet flow rate and subcooling as input

time-dependent boundary conditions and

the void fraction profile is calculated. This

requires mass and energy equations but no momentum equation as the inlet condi -

tio ns are driven by a forcing function di - rectly obtained from the loop instruments. The model calculates void perturbation and generates local reactivity which is integrat- ed with proper weighting appropriate for the selected axial power shape and uses it to drive point kinetics and modal kinetics. The simulation of the regional oscillation mode has been also accomplished by nu - merically including an out-of-phase mirror image of the physical test bundle. For both, the global and regional oscillation mode the simulated power response is used to

calculate heat flux response with damping

and time lag due to simulated pin conduc - tion. The heat flux signal will be used to de- mand voltage from the power source, which is the needed power feedback.

Unstable power oscillations in the cou- pled system with feedback occur at lower

average power than needed for pure hy - draulic instabilities, thus allowing more re- alistic conditions for exploring the dryout and rewetting phenomena. The simultane-

ous modulation of power and flow in the

test is important for studying the physical mechanisms of dryout. The stability tests with power feedback could be also ana - lyzed to extract information about the non- linear stability. Figure 2 shows an example of the extensive dryout and rewetting measurements where the limiting rod tem- perature oscillates in response to the large oscillation magnitude, which was main - tained for a long time. Figure 3 shows the measured temperature response in differ- ent thermocouples in the same rod as the cyclical dryout-rewetting regime breaks

down and failure to rewet was identified

under severe test conditions. With RAMONA an anticipated transient without scram is simulated. After the fail- ure of feedwater heater and a pump run - down the reactor reaches an unstable con- dition, where the neutronic power starts to

oscillate with increasing amplitude ( Fig - ure 4). For the simulated case of a scram failure we observe in the first phase a global

oscillation characterized by diverging total neutronic power and after some time the development into a regional mode where the total neutronic power oscillation nearly vanishes. Figure 5 shows in more detail the behavior of an established regional mode limit cycle where 2 hot channels from oppo- site core halves nearly compensate because of their 180 degree phase shift. This high amplitude regional mode limit cycle is also characterized by reversal flow at the hot channel inlet (Figure 5 right).

  • 5.2 Rod Ejection Analysis at PWR

5.2.1 Description of the Studied Case

The following example refers to a generic rod ejection accident (REA) analysis of a

84

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LWR Safety Analysis

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 2. Temperature trace of the limiting thermocouple during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting

Fig. 2.

Temperature trace of the limiting thermocouple during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting period under slowly growing oscillation.

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 2. Temperature trace of the limiting thermocouple during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting

Fig. 3.

Temperature traces of several thermocouples during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting period under slowly growing oscillation.

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 2. Temperature trace of the limiting thermocouple during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting

Fig. 4.

Neutronic power for hot and average channel during transient.

Siemens built plant with 3,950 MW ther- mal power and 193 fuel assemblies of the type 18x18-24. A rod ejection accident is simulated by means of PANBOX at end of cycle with an initial power of 30 % P/PN. At this power level, 16 of the 61 control rods are fully inserted according to the control bank insertion limit. An ejection time of 0.1 seconds is assumed. The kinetic and thermal-hydraulic relevant parame - ters are set conservative to obtain a high rod worth of 1.58 $, which yields a fast power excursion plotted in Figure 6. The power excursion is mitigated by the fuel

temperature coefficient and the power transient is terminated by a scram starting at ~0.6 seconds after accident onset.

During the REA transient severe power redistribution is expected since the power excursion is maximum pronounced in the area of the ejected rod. To study local ef- fects, the hot channel analysis is performed by COBRA-FLX with a pin-by-pin and subchannel-by-subchannel full core repre- sentation.

  • 5.2.2 Maximum Fuel Centerline Temperature

One of the safety criteria of a reactivity-in- itiated accident (RIA) event is the maxi- mum fuel temperature which – depending on regulation or the local authorities – must not exceed the melting temperature or must not exceed the melting tempera - ture in 10 % of the fuel volume.

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 2. Temperature trace of the limiting thermocouple during an extended cyclical dryout/rewetting

Fig. 5.

Neutronic power (left) and inlet flow rate (right) of average and hot channels in left and right core half in limit cycle.

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85

LWR Safety Analysis

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 6. Fission power during REA. state calculation: Ini- tial condition on the

Fig. 6.

Fission power during REA.

state calculation: Ini- tial condition on the left and the steady state situation after rod ejection on the right. The positions of inserted control rods are indicated by the black framing. In

steady state calcula - tions the heat flux cor- responds to the fission

power. The 2 core schemes in Figure 7 il- lustrate, how the max- imum power is severe- ly redistributed from

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 6. Fission power during REA. state calculation: Ini- tial condition on the

Fig. 7. Steady state results of initial heat flux [kW/m 2 ] and heat flux after rod ejection.

perature, is located within the blue circle. The blue curve in Figure 8 demonstrates the fuel temperature over time for this hot rod obtained by 3D calculations. Additionally, 2 other fuel rods are observed in detail:

Fuel rod with core wide maximum pow- er at initial conditions located near the core center (within green circle in Fig- ure 7)

Fuel rod with maximum power at initial conditions in the same fuel assembly as the ‘blue’ one (within red circle in Fig- ure 7). As demonstrated in Figure 8, the core wide maximum does not occur at the hot rod af- ter rod ejection (blue curve), but at the fuel rod with the maximum heat flux at the ini- tial state (green curve). This ‘green’ rod is located far from the ejected control rod, it does not have noticeable power in the steady state run after rod ejection and its temperature increases only by ~170 K. Nevertheless, it results in the maximum fu- el temperature due to the high initial tem- perature. Even within the fuel assembly the hot rod after rod ejection does not result in the maximum fuel temperature. The rod with the highest initial temperature (red curve) obtains the highest transient tem- perature despite a lower temperature rise. This example demonstrates the limits of uncoupled analyses since – with the re - striction to the hot rod – the maximum fu- el temperature within the core is not de - tected.

5.2.3 Enthalpy Rise

In an uncoupled methodology the loca- tion of the limiting hot rod is determined by steady state calculations after rod ejec- tion with frozen feedbacks. The rod with the maximum power is normally chosen for a subsequent hot rod analysis. In the following, it is shown that this approach may yield non-conservative results. Figure 7 shows the pin-by-pin heat flux of an 8 th core at the axial position with the maximum values resulting from steady

the core center before rod ejection (left side) to the area of the ejected control rod after rod ejection (right side). The hot rod after rod ejec- tion, which is normally ana- lyzed in un - coupled meth- ods for maxi - mum fuel tem-

One important safety parameter for RIA is the enthalpy rise during the accident. The safety limit is normally a curve dependent on

LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 6. Fission power during REA. state calculation: Ini- tial condition on the
LWR Safety Analysis Fig. 6. Fission power during REA. state calculation: Ini- tial condition on the

Fig. 8.

Transient fuel temperatures of the studied rods.

Fig. 9.

DNBR at 0.7 s, red colors indicate film boiling.

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LWR Safety Analysis

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 4. Steady state heat flux [kW/m ]. maximum enthalpy rise in the

Tab. 4.

Steady state heat flux [kW/m 2 ].

maximum enthalpy rise in the analysis must not exceed the limit curve.

Figure 9 shows the minimum departure from nucleate boiling (DNBR) distribution at the time point of 0.7 s. The red color in- dicates the channels w ith film boiling.

Three rods (red, blue, green) of a fuel as- sembly are chosen for a detailed study. Ta-

ble 4 compiles the heat flux of the

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 4. Steady state heat flux [kW/m ]. maximum enthalpy rise in the

Fig. 10. Fuel enthalpy for selected rods.

burnup, oxide/wall thickness or hydrogen content and it requires that the resulting

  • 3 rods resulting from steady state

calculations at initial conditions and after rod ejection. The ‘blue’ fuel rod obtains the maximum power at initial condition, while

the ‘red’ fuel rod results in the

maximum steady state heat flux

after rod ejection. None of these

  • 2 rods obtain the maximum tran-

sient fuel enthalpy rise within the fuel assembly. As shown in Figure 10 the maximum fuel enthalpy rise is located at the ‘green’ rod

which is adjacent to a channel in

film boiling. Just after the power

pulse the energy in the rods with- out DNB (blue, red) is discharged well due to the good heat transfer of nucleate boiling. In the ‘green’ rod with

film boiling, however, the bad heat transfer

of the film boiling phase minimizes the en- ergy discharge of the fuel. Consequently, the fuel enthalpy increases further, until at about 1 s, the reactor trip terminates the

fission power input, rewetting takes places

and the enthalpy decreases. Such effects can only be observed by means of coupled 3D-code systems, which take into account the feedbacks of ther-

mal-hydraulics to the fuel rod model. If a study relies only on the hot rods by means of uncoupled methodologies, it may result in non-conservative values.

LWR Safety Analysis Tab. 4. Steady state heat flux [kW/m ]. maximum enthalpy rise in the

6. Summary

Coupled 3D methodologies are well vali- dated for transient safety analyses. They deliver higher safety standards and more margins for operational needs by concur- rently overcoming the potential non-con- servatism of uncoupled methodologies. Since the continuous development of ad - vanced methodologies for safety analysis is a high priority objective of the R&D proc- ess, Areva will concentrate on the most ad- vanced coupled 3D-codes ARCADIA TM for PWR and RAMONA for BWR.

____________________________

Elektrische Energie stellt für die Funktionsfähigkeit jeder entwickelten Gesellschaft die Schlüsselenergie dar. Sie wird heute in

Elektrische Energie stellt für die Funktionsfähigkeit jeder entwickelten Gesellschaft die Schlüsselenergie dar. Sie wird heute in der Schweiz zu 60 % durch Wasserkraft und zu 40 % durch Kernenergie erzeugt.

Im Rahmen unserer Nachfolgeplanung suchen wir in der Abteilung Kernbrennstoff einen Maschinenbauingenieur oder Materialwissenschaftler als

Fachspezialist/in Brennelement-herstellung (m/w)

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Ihr Profil:

– Hochschulabschluss an einer schweizerischen oder gleichwertigen ausländischen Hochschule oder Fachhochschule im Bereich Materialwissenschaft oder Maschineningenieurwesen.

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Ein gutes Arbeitsklima und moderne Arbeitsmittel in einem fachlich kompetenten und gut eingespielten Team erleichtern Ihnen Ihre neue Aufgabe. Wenn Sie sich für diese Stelle interessieren, freuen wir uns auf Ihre vollständigen Bewerbungsunterlagen in Briefform. Über die Einzelheiten Ihrer künftigen Tätigkeit orientiert Sie Herr Mark Whitwill, Leiter Ressort Out of Core, gerne.

KERNKRAFTWERK GÖSGEN-DÄNIKEN AG, Personalabteilung, 4658 Däniken, Telefon 062 288 20 00

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LWR Safety Analysis

Technology, Nuremberg, Germany, May se Flow, Volume 2: Two-Phase Flow. EPRI-

Technology, Nuremberg, Germany, May

se Flow, Volume 2: Two-Phase Flow. EPRI-

7. References

10-12, 2005

NP-3459 Volume 1 (1984) and Volume 2

[5] D. Porsch et al.: ARCADIA TM AREVA NP’s

(1988)

[1] L. Moberg and J.P. Rea: BWR Space Time Ki- netics Applications with RAMONA. Procee- dings of ANS 1990 Annual Meeting, Nashvil-

[2]

Next Generation Nuclear Design System. An- nual Meeting on Nuclear Technology, Dres- den, Germany, May 12-14, 2009

[9] K. Kuehnel, K. Richter: Recalculation of a PWR Load Ramp with the Coupled 3D Code Sys- tem R/P/C. TopFuel2006, Salamanca, Spain

le, Tennessee, June 10-14

[6] Jackson et al.: Dimensionally Adaptive Neut- ron Kinetics for Multidimensional Reactor Sa-

[10] A. Knoll, K. Kochskaemper, K. Kuehnel, K. Rich- ter, U. Stoll: Simulation of a Strongly Asym-

2003

 

H. Chow, T.H. Chen and D.C. Kolesar: Assess- ment of S-RELAP5 for Realistic Analysis of PWR Large Break LOCA. 4 th International To- pical Meeting on Nuclear Thermal Hydraulics

The coupled neutronics and thermal hydrau-

fety Transients-I: New Features of RELAP5/ PANBOX. Nucl. Sci. Eng., 131, 143 (1999), and II: Dimensionally Adaptive Switching Al-

metric “Loss of Load” Event Using the Coup- led 3D Code R/P/C. ICONE11, Tokyo, Japan,

[3]

Operation and Safety, Taipei, Taiwan, April 6-8, 1994 R. Boer, R. Boehm, H. Finnemann, R. Mueller:

lics code system PANBOX for PWR safety ana- lysis. Kerntechnik, Vol. 57, No. 1 (1992)

gorithms. Nuc. Sci. Eng., 131, 164 (1999) [7] R.T. Lahey, B.S. Shiralkar, D.W. Radcliffe: Mass Flux and Enthalpy distribution for Single- and Two-Phase Flow Conditions. Transactions of the ASME, Journal of Heat Transfer Vol. 93, p. 197 (1971)

[11] K. Kuehnel et al.: Analysis of a Load Rejection Event at the Nuclear Power Plant Goesgen with Coupled Neutronic/Thermal-Hydraulic Code Systems. PHYSOR 2000, Pittsburg, USA, May 8-9 [12] D. Pruitt, Y. Farawila, F. Wehle, R. Velten:

[4]

U. Wende, R. Mueller, J. Heinecke: Pin-by- Pin Full-core Subchannel Analyses with COBRA 3-CP. Annual Meeting on Nuclear

[8] A. Tapucu, S. Gencay, N. Troche: Experimental Study of the Diversion Cross-Flow Caused by Subchannel Blockages Volume 1: Single-Pha-

Full Scale Stability Measurements for the ATRIUM-10XM Fuel Bundle. LWR Fuel Per- formance Meeting 2010, Orlando, USA

_____________________________________

_____________________________________

LWR Safety Analysis Technology, Nuremberg, Germany, May se Flow, Volume 2: Two-Phase Flow. EPRI- 7. References

LWR Operation

Eine Ausfällung von Borsäure im Kernbe- hälter von Druckwasserreaktoren (DWR) muss vermieden werden, damit der Kern auf jeden Fall nach einem Bruch im Primärkreis- lauf auf ausreichend niedrigen Temperatu - ren bleibt. Ein neues Verfahren ist zur Beur- teilung der Borsäureausfällung in der Lang- zeitkühlung nach einem Kühlmittelverlust- störfall entwickelt worden. Es berücksichtigt Systemeffekte, wie zum Beispiel das zeitlich veränderliche Mischungsvolumen auf Grund der Schwankungen im Stand der Mischung im Kern und des Leervolumenanteils. In ei - ner Reihe von Versuchen wurden die Auswir- kungen von Sumpfrückständen, darunter auch chemischen Produkten, auf die Löslich- keitsgrenze von Borsäure untersucht. Das be- rechnete Mischungsvolumen ist ausreichend niedriger als das nach der ursprünglichen Auswertungsmethode von der USNRC be - stimmte. Allerdings hat sich bestätigt, dass die Eingreifzeit des Betreibers zur Umschal- tung des heißen Strangs oder für Einspeisun- gen in den heißen und den kalten Strang in koreanischen DWR durch die Anwendung der neu entwickelten Bewertung nach wie vor gelten.

Anschriften der Verfasser:

Chang Hyun Kim, Hwang Young Jun Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd.

25-1, Jang-dong Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea, 305-343

Young Soo Kim, Hee Cheon No

Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

Guseong-dong Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea, 305-701

Boric Acid Concentration in the Core during the Long Term Cooling Phase of Pressurized Water Reactors

Chang Hyun Kim, Young Soo Kim, Hwang Young Jun, and Hee Cheon No, Daejeon/Korea

LWR Safety Analysis Technology, Nuremberg, Germany, May se Flow, Volume 2: Two-Phase Flow. EPRI- 7. References

I. Introduction

Post-LOCA (LOCA: loss of coolant acci - dent) long-term cooling has the objective of maintaining the core at safe tempera - ture levels following any rupture in the pri- mary system. To assure that the core is maintained at acceptably low tempera - tures, precipitation of boric acid during the event must be avoided. The method of pre- venting boric acid precipitation has been to initiate simultaneous hot- and cold-side injections (CE-type plants) or switchover from cold-side injection to hot-side injec - tion (Westinghouse -type plants) to termi- nate the build-up and to flush the boric ac- id from the core. The timing of this opera- tor’s actions is based on an evaluation of

the build-up of boric acid in the vessel core and upper plenum regions.

Recently, the U.S. NRC (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission) identified several non-conservative assumptions in the previously approved boric acid precipi- tation evaluation methodology and decid-

ed not to allow the use of the existing eval- uation methodology until the U.S. NRC staff’s safety concerns are sufficiently re - solved [1]. The U.S. NRC staff has also re- quested licensees to confirm that sufficient

safety margins exist for the operator’s ac - tion time to prevent boric acid precipita- tion. They also noted that the following four items should be addressed on a plant- specific basis in any future submittals re - garding post-LOCA long-term cooling [2]:

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